Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework

Conceptual Framework: Civil-Military Relations, Demilitarisation, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Security

This chapter outlines the conceptual framework that underpins this study. The central argument is that the demobilisation of soldiers and their reintegration into society is a crucial but not sufficient component of demilitarisation. Countries emerging from internal armed conflict face a number of challenges which include dismantling the ideology of militarism and creating democratic civil-military relations. To achieve this, it is important to scrutinise the concept of national security and the roles of the military and other security forces. To reduce the chance of renewed conflict, post-conflict societies have to ensure the full economic, social and political reintegration of demobilised soldiers. Linked to this is the challenge of reducing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. All these challenges are inextricably linked to the demobilisation of soldiers.

Dismantling the ideology of militarism involves promoting non-violent means of conflict resolution, which is important for soldiers emerging from the context in which they were taught the skills of violence. Developing democratic civil-military relations involves subjecting the security forces to democratic institutions and processes. Redefining security, which involves redefining the roles and functions of the defence force, may potentially channel resources to developmental projects and thus increase the demobilised soldiers’ sense of security. Reducing the flow of small arms and light weapons helps to reduce the potential for armed conflict. While the
availability of such weapons is not a cause of these conflicts, “the widespread abundance of such munitions has made it much easier for potential belligerents to initiate and sustain armed combat” (Boutwell and Klare, 1999a: 217; Klare, 1999b: 14).

The conceptual framework is developed through six sections. Section 2.2 discusses the role of the military in a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Przeworski (1991) observes that transition negotiated with the previous authoritarian regime is likely to leave institutional traces, mainly the autonomy of the armed forces. This is relevant for the present study, since South Africa’s transition was negotiated by both the previous authoritarian regime and pro-democratic forces. Section 2.3 flows from the first and discusses civil-military relations, specifically civil-military relations in a democracy. Success in the creation of such relations depends in part on how the government deals with the legacy of militarism. Thus, Section 2.4 discusses militarism and demilitarisation as well as obstacles to the demilitarisation of African politics. Since militarism and demilitarisation are closely linked to security, Section 2.5 discusses the concept of security. The concept is expanded to include HIV/AIDS and the environment, two non-military security threats. While the concept of security is expanded to include non-military security threats such as the environment, it is acknowledged that personal and physical security remain important elements of security, especially in the context of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Hence, Section 2.6 discusses disarmament and the control of small arms and light weapons. It will be argued that the disarmament of soldiers during demobilisation is not enough if other weapons that may be circulating among civilians are ignored. Building on this material, Section 2.7 defines and discusses the three key concepts – demobilisation, reintegration and ex-combatants.
2.1 Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy

Przeworksi (1991) argues that all transitions to democracy are negotiated either with representatives of the old regime (extrication) or among the pro-democratic forces seeking to form a new system (constitution). Extrication occurs when the regime is weakened and seeks to extricate itself from power, but is not in a good position to dictate the terms (Gill, 2000). However, “the relative importance of extrication and constitution depends on the place within the authoritarian regime of those political forces that control the apparatus of repression, most often the armed forces” (Przeworksi, 1991: 67). Thus, wherever the military remains cohesive in defence of the old regime, elements of extrication dominate the process of transition (for example, Chile and Poland). In contrast, wherever military cohesion disintegrates because of a failed foreign adventure (for example, Greece, Portugal and Argentina), and in regimes where the military is effectively subjected to civilian control, elements of constitution are more common (Przeworksi, 1991).

However, even when the military is not a dominant element in the regime, its stance may be decisive. This is because negotiations with the previous authoritarian regime leave institutional traces. “These traces can be effaced, but transitions are more problematic and longer in countries where they result from negotiated agreements with the old regime” (Przeworksi, 1991: 94). For example, in Chile Augusto Pinochet extorted a number of concessions for his consent to free elections. Huntington (1991) observes that one of the conditions posited almost invariably by military leaders for their withdrawal from power is that the institutional roles and autonomy of the military establishment be respected. This is because as an institution “the armed forces also have concerns in the transformation of civil-military relations. Important institutional interests may be at stake, including funding, mission and composition of the officer corps” (Griffiths, 1996: 473). All these indicate that the relationship between the armed forces and society, as suggested by the term civil-military relations, is both complex and more salient during democratic transition and consolidation (Griffiths, 1996).

Huntington (1991) provides guidelines on how to reduce the power of the military during the process of democratisation. The first step is to purge or retire all potentially
disloyal officers, including both leading supporters of the authoritarian regime and military reformers who may have helped to bring about the democratic regime. Second, he recommends ruthless punishment for leaders of attempted coups against the new government. Also important is to consolidate the chain of command over the armed forces. “Remove ambiguities or anomalies, making clear that the civilian head of the government is the commander of the military” (Huntington, 1991: 252). Some of the guidelines are contradictory, as he suggests major reductions in the size of the military, using the money saved from the reductions to increase salaries, pensions and benefits, and improving living conditions, while at the same time buying new and fancy equipment for the military. This is contradictory because buying new military equipment may undermine the savings gained from the reduction of the armed forces and thus leave no money to increase salaries and benefits. Huntington (1991) further suggests the reorientation of the military forces to military missions, which includes resolving conflicts with and between other countries. Linked to this is the drastic reduction of the number of troops stationed in or around the capital by moving them to the frontiers or other relatively distant and unpopulated places. Lastly, he suggests developing and maintaining a political organisation that is capable of mobilising supporters in the streets of the capital if a military coup is attempted.

However, the military and security bureaucracies should not be stereotyped as obstacles to transformation which have to be “controlled” by civilian structures (Luckham, 2003). In some cases, elected civilian governments may co-opt the armed forces and police as instruments of political control (Luckham, 2003). There are various reasons why civilian governments may enlist the military as their accomplices in undermining or destroying democracy. These include the failures of democratic governments to promote economic development, the failure to maintain law and order, the need for protection from demands for greater representation, and the need to ward off pressure from those who seek a social as well as a political revolution (Huntington, 1996; Przeworski, 1991). In other cases, the need to preserve its own interests may motivate the military to support the democratic process (Danopoulos, 1992; Hamburg, 1988; Huntington, 1996; Luckham, 2003). Thus, it is incorrect to associate civilian control necessarily with a democratic government and military control with an absolute or totalitarian government (Huntington, 1957). The
discussion of civil-military relations, militarisation and demilitarisation that follows provides evidence for this argument.

2.2 Civil-Military Relations in a Democracy

2.2.1 The Concept of Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations refer to the distribution of power and influence between armed forces and the civilian authority. Huntington (1957) observes that civil-military relations in any society are a system composed of interdependent elements. These are the formal, structural position of military groups in the government, the informal role and influence of military groups in politics and society at large, and the nature of the ideologies of military and non-military groups. Ideally, in a democracy, the military exists to protect the nation and the freedoms of its people. It does not represent or support any political viewpoint or ethnic or social group. Its loyalty should be to the larger ideals of the nation, to the rule of law, and to the principle of democracy. In democratic societies, the main governing principle of civil-military relations is civil supremacy over armed forces. Griffiths (1996) argues that democratic civil-military relations require, at a minimum, restrictions on the military’s political role and the delineation of clear boundaries between civilian and military power. In practice, this includes the institution of firm civilian control over the military (Griffiths, 1996). Civilian control of the military helps to ensure that decisions concerning defence policy do not compromise fundamental democratic values such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of religion (Trask, 1997).

However, as Cawthra and Luckham (2003) argue, civilian control is not a simple concept. Civilian control over the military requires that democratic institutions be in place as well as a basic acceptance of democratic politics by the political leadership, civil servants and security personnel. They further argue that civilian control of military and security structures is not necessarily equivalent to democratic control. There is a “widespread continuation of authoritarian politics by ‘democratic’ means” (Luckham, 2003: 15). Hence, Luckham (2003) argues, the term “civilian control” as used in the civil-military relations literature hides the nature of the regimes under discussion because civilian governments are not necessarily democratic. The military
may undermine civilian control and acquire great political power through the legitimate processes and institutions of democratic government (Huntington, 1957). “The military may often play a stronger role when it is not directly responsible for policy formation and implementation than when it is formally in control” (Hamburg, 1988: 2).

Luckham (1998b) discounts “civilian” control for “democratic” control. His argument is that the quest for stable civil-military relations should be concerned with securing the loyalty of the armed forces to institutions (democratic control) rather than to a particular set of civilian rulers (civilian control), which may enable such rulers to repress dissent and defy public accountability. The term “democratic control” recognises the fact that even “democratic” governments may abuse their national security powers and misuse their military and security forces (Luckham, 2003). As Hutchful (1997) observes, some of the most durable civilian regimes, such as Kenya and Cameroon, have been (and continue to be) particularly notorious for repressive and illegal use of military and special security units. This supports the argument that the creation of democratic institutions do not guarantee democratic governance (Cawthra and Luckham, 2003), and that democratic constitutions do not guarantee democracy (Bastian and Luckham, 2003).

Democratic institutions are only effective if accompanied by democratic politics (Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor, 2003). Democratic institutions refer to a socially constructed set of arrangements routinely exercised and accepted “for organising political competition, legitimating rulers and ensuring accountable governance, typically through free elections to determine the composition of legislature and of the government” (Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor, 2003: 18). Democratic politics includes the capacity of citizens to hold powerful private interests and agents of the state to account “[However] perfect the construction of democratic institutions, conflict cannot be managed, except in the context of a dominant inclusive political culture” (Kaldor and Luckham, 2000: 2). Democratic politics are an alternative to various forms of exclusive politics that have contributed to “new types of conflict” (Kaldor and Luckham, 2000). However, democratisation is a very long-term process; it does not end with formal transition to an elected government, and may be derailed or reversed, especially in conditions of national and international insecurity (Cawthra
and Luckham, 2003). Thus, the creation of democratic civil-military relations during transition is a complicated process.

2.2.2 Principles and Mechanisms of Civil-Military Relations in a Democracy

Nathan (1994) identifies five principles of civil-military relations in a democracy. First, there must be a fundamental division between the military and civilian spheres at all levels of interaction. “The essence of the division is that armed forces should refrain from involvement in politics other than through constitutionally approved channels” (Nathan, 1994: 61). The second principle is that the powers and responsibilities of the armed forces are determined by law. This starts from the premise that the military is a public institution that is dedicated to provide national security. In a democratic country, the principle guide in all endeavours is the constitution. “It may therefore be argued that it is this basic norm which is coveted and, indeed, a point of reference for all – including the military” (Ngoma, 2004a: 10). Thirdly, all state institutions should be accountable to the elected civil authority. As Rupiya (2004: 17) observes, “The much hoped for ideal of civil–military relations in a democracy is one in which power is distributed among different sectors to ensure adequate checks and balances”. This is a challenge for most countries on the African continent, which face problems such as relatively weak political institutions, a poor governance culture and poor economic performance (Ngoma, 2004b). The fourth principle entails a sufficient degree of transparency and the adequate provision of information on security matters. In this sense, “civil-military relations deal not only with who makes decisions about the use of force but what is decided” (Fishel, 2000: 51). However, this principle may easily be undermined by arguments for confidentiality in the interest of national security. Finally, the government must fulfill certain responsibilities towards the armed forces, for example ensuring that the defence force is not misused for partisan or repressive ends.

Nathan (1994) identifies three mechanisms to implement these principles of civil-military relations in a democracy. First there is objective control, which includes an acceptance by the armed forces of the primacy of civilian rule. This means that military officers respect the Constitution and other forms of legislation, accept the authority of whoever is in power, and refrain from taking sides. Second, the public
through the use of open debate, media scrutiny and research are able to exert some a measure of indirect control. Finally, through executive, parliamentary and legal control, all activities including the defence budget and defence procurement decision-making are left to Parliament. In some countries, like Pakistan, the parliament is unable to play a major role in defence procurement policy-making. “The fundamental explanation for this lies in the military’s control of policy-making. In Pakistan it is actually the military establishment, particularly the senior echelons of the armed forces, that set the defence policy and arms–procurement agendas” (Siddiga-Agha, 1998: 81). This is an indicator of state militarisation in Pakistan in spite of the existence of institutions such as parliament. This further confirms the argument that the creation of democratic institutions does not always guarantee democratic governance (Cawthra and Luckham, 2003). Demilitarisation is one of the critical processes necessary to reduce the influence of the armed forces and counter the ideology of militarism. However, militarism and militarisation are contested concepts and there is hardly any consensus on their meanings (Shaw, 1991).

2.3 Militarism and Demilitarisation

2.3.1 The Contested Meanings of the Concepts

The concept of the military refers to a social institution, a set of social relationships organised around war (its prevention or conduct) and taking the shape of an armed force (Cock, 1989). Due to its functions, the modern officer corps is a professional body consisting of men who are skilled in the management of violence (Huntington, 1957). The military is a unique form of bureaucracy, which fuses traditional, bureaucratic and charismatic authority (Luckham, 1998a). Three levels characterise this fusion. First, armies can be seen as quasi-feudal structures governed by ceremony. Second, they deploy some form of power-knowledge in the form of technology and the professional “management of violence”. At a third level, military establishments are built upon charisma of command, evident in the military leaders’ direct personal domination of subordinates (Luckham, 1998a).

While there is no consensus on the meaning of militarism, there are some general similarities in various definitions. Some scholars associate militarism with war
preparation. For example, Mann (1987: 25) defines militarism as an attitude and a set of institutions which regard war and the preparation for war as normal and desirable”. Similarly, Luckham (1998a: 14) associates militarism with war preparation and states, “Militarism normally refers to the pervasiveness in society of symbols, values and discourses validating military power and preparation for war”. However, neither Mann nor Luckham define war preparation, which Shaw (1991) defines as all social activities leading or designed to lead to war. His definition includes all forms of organisations capable of producing war, irrespective of whether there is any intention or desire to use them. Other scholars define militarism as an ideology. For example, Cock (1989), argues that the key component of this ideology is acceptance of organised state violence as a legitimate solution to conflict. Other components of militarism include the glorification of war, whereby actors and encounters are portrayed in heroic terms. Militarism also includes an acceptance of hierarchy, discipline, obedience and the centralisation of authority (Cock, 1989). However, as Shaw (1991) argues, militarism is not a purely ideological force. “The ideological impact of war-preparation is only one part of its influence on society. We may distinguish therefore between militarism, in general, and militarist ideologies, which are belief systems which give a high value to military activities” (Shaw, 1991: 12 original emphasis).

Like militarism, militarisation is also a contested concept (Shaw, 1991). As Hutchful (1997) argues, militarisation is a complex and highly dynamic phenomenon, a moving target which presents an analytical challenge. However, as is the case with militarism, there is some general agreement regarding the definition. This relates to scholars who view militarisation as a social process (Cock, 1989; Luckham, 1998a; Shaw, 1991). Shaw (1991: 71) defines militarisation as “a societal process, affecting civil society as well as the state”, while Luckham (1998a) argues that militarisation refers to a multi-dimensional process through which a number of elements become dynamically linked, both to each other and more widely to capital accumulation and projects for national and international hegemony. These elements include military coups and regimes, authoritarian governments, the dominance of patriarchy, powerful military and repressive state apparatuses, war and armed conflict, rising military spending and arms imports, and external military intervention (Luckham, 1998a). Cock (1989) defines militarisation as a social process that involves a mobilisation of resources for
war at political, economic and ideological levels. Militarisation at a political level involves the increasing participation of the military in traditionally civilian positions of state power (Cock, 1989; Simbulan, 1988). At an economic level, militarisation involves the mobilisation of resources for war preparation. An indicator of this is, among other things, increased expenditure for defence and the expansion of the military establishment (Simbulan, 1988). At an ideological level, militarisation involves the acceptance and glorification of war and the use of violence to settle conflicts. Thus, militarisation and demilitarisation can be measured by the size, and the increase or decrease over time, of a country’s armed forces, defence budget and weapons holdings (Nathan, 1998).

Militarisation involves both the spread of militarism as an ideology and an expansion of the power and influence of the military as a social institution. It is sometimes very difficult to demonstrate the militarised nature of a particular society because the role of the military as a discrete institution becomes increasingly obscure during the process of militarisation (Cock, 1989). “The more a society becomes militarised, the more difficult it becomes to distinguish clearly their purpose and procedures. The military becomes less discrete and a more pervasive element in society” (Cock, 1989: 4). However, militarism and militarisation do not depend simply or directly on the role of the military in society (Shaw, 1991). “Of course, where the military is large and powerful, drawn (particularly by conscription) from many layers of society, militarisation is likely to become extensive. But to the extent that war-preparation becomes central to society, it may become effective through other institutions” (Shaw, 1991: 14).

Demilitarisation is a multi-dimensional process that involves the reversal of militarisation. It involves the shift of power and resources away from the armed forces and the arms industry. This process has political, economic, ideological and social dimensions. The political dimension relates to the position of the military within the state, specifically to increased democratic control of the armed forces and reduction in force levels. The ideological dimension involve shifting away from the ideology of militarism, which views violence as a legitimate means of solving problems and obtaining and defending power. The ideological dimension of demilitarisation is indicated by the increased use of non-violent methods of conflict resolution, a shift in
the prestige accorded to soldiers and a stigmatising of weaponry (Cock, 2000). An important element of demilitarisation as this level is “dislodging the variant of nationalism which measures the prestige of a state by the size and sophistication of its armed forces and weapon holdings, rather than by its ability to feed and house its people” (Cock, 2000: 3). The demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of soldiers are the most significant aspect of demilitarisation as a social process. The economic dimensions include reductions in defence expenditure and weapon holdings, and the transfer of resources such as land from defence to civilian purposes.

The economic dimension of demilitarisation resonates with the concept of conversion. Conversion refers to the civilian (re)use of resources that were previously used for military activities (Kingma, 2000). “If managed well, it channels resources to productive activities, leading to increased employment, social justice and decreasing social tension” (Kingma, 2000: 24). The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) (1996) identifies six indicators of demilitarisation – reduction of military expenditure; reorientation of military research and development (R&D) capabilities; conversion of the defence industry; base closure and redevelopment; the demobilisation and reintegration of soldiers into society; and the dismantling of surplus weapons. All of these processes deal with the reform of the security institutions of the state to achieve a desired pattern of civil-military relations (Isima, 2004). They all represent what Clark (2000) terms surface demilitarisation. Unlike surface demilitarisation, “deep demilitarisation” seeks to address the roots of militarisation and to undo the legacy of war and militarisation as part of an effort to reconstruct society on a different basis. As Clark (2000) argues, there cannot be deep demilitarisation unless civilians take issue with militarisation, question militarised perceptions and build up a counter-force to militarised institutions. Important in deep demilitarisation is the “demilitarisation of the mind” and, as Clark (2000) argues, this means going beyond changing institutions to changing the values, attitudes and mindsets of ordinary people, particularly their attitudes towards violence and its causes. Understood in this sense, demilitarisation should involve “dismantling the ideology of militarism” (Cock, 1997a).

The demobilisation and reintegration of soldiers into society is an important aspect of demilitarisation for two reasons. First, it is an important part in the transformation of
civil-military relations. “Demobilisation is a key aspect of reducing the militarisation of societies that have experienced extensive and traumatic wars. It is the first step that soldiers take on the path toward civilian society” (Ball, 1998: 23). However, Hutchful (1997) maintains that the argument for the deliberate minimisation of the size of the armed forces in order to curb its political power and influence misses the paradoxical and contradictory nature of the relationship between military power and democracy. He argues that few democracies have existed on the basis of military weakness, and that democracy cannot be expected to flourish where the state lacks the repressive and defensive capability required to effectively control its national population and at the same time defend its territory. Nevertheless, Hutchful (1997) does recognise that there are cases in which strong national security capability directly threatens democracy and human rights.

Secondly, personnel-related costs tend to absorb most of the military and other security budgets. Demobilisation can reduce defence expenditure and free resources for development, thereby contributing to the process of demilitarisation (Motumi and McKenzie, 1998). However, as argued in Chapter 1, demobilisation does not always imply demilitarisation. It might be part of the military’s modernisation effort, a move from manpower to weapons maintenance (Shaw, 1991). Even when demobilisation does reduce military expenditure, demilitarisation is not always guaranteed, especially if the ideology of militarism remains intact. Hence, it is argued that the demobilisation of soldiers is a necessary but not sufficient indicator of demilitarisation. A discussion of the militarisation of African politics will clarify this argument.

2.3.2 The Militarisation and Demilitarisation of African Politics

Africa, like other parts of the world, has experienced militarisation in the previous decades. However, the nature, depth and relative distribution of militarisation on the continent defy generalisations. Coups have been less prevalent in Southern Africa but common in West, Central and East Africa (Hutchful, 1997). While it is difficult to generalise, five causes of militarisation in Africa can be identified. They are the decolonisation process, the Cold War, intra- and inter-state war, arms merchants and mercenaries, and underdevelopment (Brenes, 1998). While Hutchful (1997) argues that war has been the most important cause underlying militarisation in Africa,
decolonisation has been identified by a number of scholars as a source of the militarisation of African politics. For example, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002) argues that the major problem of the post-colonial state is that it failed to deliver the fruits of independence to the majority of its citizens. Further, this has led the post-colonial state to being intransigent and using the repressive machinery inherited from the colonial state against its own people. Others argue that at the time of decolonisation, African countries inherited Western-type armies in the absence of Western-type political structures of checks and balances. “Western-style military structures presuppose the submission of the military to a vibrant, stable democratic political system” (Ochoche, 1998: 117). The absence of such checks and balances, in particular consolidating democratic control over defence, provides an opportunity for militaries to use their institutional strength and their ability to wield force to take over government at times of crisis (Cawthra, 1997b).

While some armed conflicts are still in progress in some parts of the continent, there has been a process of demilitarisation in other parts. There are at least seven reasons to explain the process of demilitarisation (Harris, 2004a). First, the nature of warfare has changed and almost all armed conflicts now occur within countries rather than between them, typically between government forces and groups wishing to secede or take over government. Second, related to the changed nature of wars, the traditional definition of security focusing on protection against external military threats to nation states has become increasingly less relevant. As will be discussed below, human security has become more central to the discussion of security. Third, military expenditure retards economic growth and development. Fourth, the military negatively affects human rights because of its negative effects on development. Fifth, the military is ineffective in resolving conflicts. While it is often effective, in the short term, in winning wars, victory does little to deal with the underlying reasons for the conflict, thus resulting in the likelihood of renewed warfare. Sixth, there are ethical, moral and spiritual reasons not to deal with disputes by force. Lastly, there are cost-effective alternatives to the military, which are beyond the scope of this study. (They are discussed by various scholars in the volume edited by Harris, 2004.)

Demilitarisation differs from one country to another. In some countries, it involves the demobilisation and/or integration and political emasculation of competing official and
non-official armed bodies and gangs, while in others demilitarisation refers primarily to the national armed and security services (Hutchful, 1997). While there are differences, there are two common obstacles to the demilitarisation of African politics (Luckham, 1998b). The first is the attempt by African states to achieve a multiplicity of conflicting goals while at the same time striving to resolve conflicts between these goals. The challenges for African governments include creating a genuine base of popular support, effective governance and economic development within constraints imposed by external donors. Also important is the need to find some way of resolving the inevitable conflicts between these goals. Luckham (1998b) observes that failure to do so may lead to discontent among members of the population, which will tempt political leaders to use the military and security forces to repress the discontented population. The second obstacle to demilitarisation is the inherent ability of the military, both as government and as an institution, to stall transition or to shape it for its own advantage (Luckham, 1998b). It is worth noting that even carefully negotiated transfer of power between military elites and civilian elites cannot safeguard the state against military re-intervention (Luckham, 1998b).

While there have been attempts at the demilitarisation of the state in various countries, militarism has mutated and reproduced itself in the emergence and growth of several actors outside the state, whose agendas have seriously undermined the state’s monopoly of violence in Africa (Isima, 2004; Luckham, 1998a). These include the spread of non-state military formations, often armed and organised with covert foreign support (Luckham, 1998a). The new forms of militarism include: the diverse and often subterranean forms of military political influence under democratic regimes; the role of other security apparatuses, including the police and intelligence services; the privatisation of violence and emergence of non-state armed conflict and its impact on security, including human security; and the complex and troubled relationship of all these with democratic governance (Luckham, 2003). Meanwhile, Hutchful (1997) observes that the movement away from the militarisation of politics in some African countries has coincided or overlapped with new manifestations of militarisation in others (or sometimes in the same countries), and been punctuated in situations such as Somalia, Liberia and Rwanda by yet more horrific instances of carnage and ethnocide far exceeding anything witnessed in the previous decade.
There are four necessary conditions for demilitarisation (Harris, 2004b). First is a change of mindset – what in the context of this study is called demilitarisation at an ideological level. Second, a demilitarisation plan is required; however, Harris (2004b) does not provide details of such a plan. Third, there is a need to establish an organisation to implement demilitarisation – for example, a National Ministry of Peace-building. Lastly, adequate financing arrangements are necessary for successful demilitarisation. “Demobilisation and reintegration need to be well planned and well funded to avoid the real possibility that ex-fighters will recommence fighting or resort to crime and banditry” (Harris, 2004b: 208). While all these are necessary conditions, they might not be adequate if there is no mass-based demilitarisation movement to challenge military power and to serve as checks and balances against the use of the military by political leaders. As stated above, there cannot be deep demilitarisation unless civilians take issue with militarisation. It is also important to redefine the concept of “security” so that it ceases to be the exclusive preserve of the military (Hutchful, 1997). This means drawing a distinction between military and non-military aspects of security, or between security (which is the responsibility of the citizenry as a whole) and defence (the legitimate area of the armed forces) (Hutchful, 1997).

2.4 Redefining Security

2.4.1 The Differences between the Old and New Concepts of Security

During the Cold War, security was generally understood as the pursuit of freedom from threat (Buzan, 1991). The threat to state security was generally perceived to be external, and security was to be achieved through an increase in military capabilities. This conception of security was informed by the assumption that “states are the main actors in the international anarchy; power determines their ability to establish their interests; order is maintained largely through the balance of power” (Cawthra, 1997a: 8). Thus, states had to rely on increasing defence expenditure and modernisation of defence capabilities to achieve security (Smith, 1988). National security was measured by the number of military tanks, ships, planes, missiles on each side, and by comparing the range of firepower and position of a nation’s weapons with the comparable equipment of its enemy (Renner, 1991). The old approach has a number of weaknesses, two of which are discussed here.
The first weakness is that the state was the referent of security (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). In the new approach, referents of security include individuals, regions and world society (Du Pisani, 2004). There are two levels of security referents. On a sub-state level ethnic groups, tribes, marginalised communities and other collectives and individuals are perceived as having security concerns. “While these might impact on the state, they are not identical with state security. Moreover, the state itself can be seen as a threat to sub-state actors including individuals” (Cawthra, 1997a: 10). On a supra-state level security has also been disaggregated with the rising importance of environmental and other global threats. However, while the new approach to security includes referents of security other than the state, regime security remains a concern of inter-governmental organisations such as the African Union (AU). Originally, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU provided for a right of the AU to intervene in members states in cases of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. These three conditions for intervention show a concern for human security. However, on February 3, 2003, Article 4(h) was amended to include a threat to legitimate order for the purposes of restoring peace as another ground for intervention. “The amendment to Article 4(h) brings back the idea of protection of the regime and not individuals. In a sense it constitutes a step backward in the quest to enhance the protection of individuals’ rights against infringement by the state” (Baimu and Sturman, 2003: 44).

The old approach to security was reinforced by the Cold War between the West and the Communist bloc. The end of the Cold War led governments to interrogate their assumptions about security and to scrutinise the roles, functions and postures of defence forces. According to Shaw (1991) the end of the Cold War ushered in a post-military society which he defines as a situation in which the world is moving from the mid-century condition in which the military and militarism dominated all social relations and cultural forms. He argues that while post-militarism transforms the military and militarism, it does not remove them from a central position in the social structure. “Rather, military and militarism are constantly transformed, and the question of their future roles becomes an ever more open issue on the agenda of twenty-first century society” (Shaw, 1991: 184). This process is uneven and varies tremendously across the globe. Most notable is the fact that “in Africa, limited policy capacity has resulted in desultory policy change, or simple diminution (sic) of the
defence function” (Cawthra, 2000a). This is despite the fact that the old approach to security does not apply neatly to developing countries, especially on the African continent. The main military threat to the security of citizens in many African countries today comes not from neighbouring states, but from the phenomenal growth of armed violence precipitated by the activities of emerging non-state militant actors that challenge the position of the state as the sole security actor even in peacetime (Isima, 2004). More importantly, the primary security concerns of developing countries are the economic, political and social weaknesses that make them vulnerable to other threats on non-military levels (Cawthra, 1997a).

The second weakness of the old approach to security is that it emphasised one dimension, which is military security. The new approach to security views it as multi-dimensional, and includes other dimensions which were previously overshadowed by the military-political security. An expanded concept of security includes five dimensions identified by, among others, Buzan (1991). The first is military security, which concerns itself with the interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of the state, and states’ perceptions of each other’s intentions. The second is political security, which concerns organisational stability, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. It includes food security, which has three aspects – food availability (sometimes mainly based on agricultural production), food access (which might be based on having money to buy food), and the stability and quality of food supplies (UNDP, 2001). The fourth dimension of the new approach to security is societal security, which concerns itself with sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture, and religious and national identity and custom. Lastly, environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as an essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend (Buzan, 1991).

There is a growing recognition that ecological security is as important as other components of security (Klare, 1998; Renner, 1991). Thus, it is argued that national security has to encompass ecological security, the preservation of the environment, because environmental degradation may imperil a nation’s natural support system on
which all human activity depends (Renner, 1991). Ecology studies the flows of energy and food through complex systems made up of living things, air, water and soil.

Human activity is now a major part of these flows; and the disruptive impacts of humanity are not simply a matter of climate change but rather a matter of numerous and simultaneous changes to many natural systems. We are literally remaking the biosphere – indirectly by changing the air that we breathe, and directly by disrupting forests and grassland, through mining, agriculture, deforestation, and urbanization (Dalby, 2002: 101).

Human activities often lead to environmental degradation, which results in environmental scarcity. Environmental degradation refers to an overuse and eventual depletion of a resource and the emission of pollutants that degrade various kinds of resources (Renner, 1991). While non-military activities such as industrial production for civilian products cause environmental degradation, military activities contribute more than any other single activity. Deudney (1990) identifies three ways in which military activities affect the environment. First, the pursuit of national security through military means consumes fiscal, organisational and leadership resources that could be spent on environmental restoration. As Cock (1998b) points out, military activities consume resources urgently needed for economic development and environmental protection. Second, war is directly destructive of the environment. “However, environmental damage is not limited to episodes of war and armed conflict, but is implicit in militarisation, the process whereby resources are mobilised for war” (Cock, 1998b:5). Military activities that impact on the environment include research, development, weapons production, testing manoeuvres, the presence of military bases and the disposal of toxic wastes (Cock, 1998b). Third, the preparation for war causes pollution and consumes significant quantities of resources. An example is that large quantities of radioactive waste have been produced as a by-product of the nuclear arms race (Deudney, 1990).

Trans-national threats have also become recognised as important security issues for developed as well as developing countries, although the latter are more vulnerable (Cawthra, 1997a). One such threat is trans-boundary environmental degradation which includes reduced water flow or water diversion, industrial and agrichemical
pollution, salinisation of streams through heavy irrigation, siltation of rivers and floods aggravated by deforestation, and soil erosion. Trans-boundary air pollution is another example of trans-boundary environmental degradation; as Renner (1991) argues, the environment does not respect human-drawn borders. “The security of one person, one community, one nation rests on the decisions of many others—sometimes fortuitously, sometimes precariously” (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 2). Hence, in March 2005, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly, Secretary-General, Kofi Annan called for the strengthening of regional and global efforts to invest in improved environmental management and structural changes to ensure environmental sustainability (United Nations, 2005). Currently, there is a growing recognition of the link between environmental security and armed conflict (Gasana, 2002; Kaplan, 1994; Percival and Homer-Dixon, 1995).

A discussion of the link between environmental security and armed conflict is relevant for demobilisation because failure to address the economic needs of ex-combatants may potentially serve as a motivation to start or participate in environment-induced armed conflicts, as was the case in Zimbabwe. In the mid-1980s, given the failure of the resettlement exercise, landless communities began to occupy and use parts of farms acquired by politicians and the black elite. These “illegal occupants” were forcibly removed by police and army units (Chitiyo, 2000). However, this set a precedent, and in the late 1990s Zimbabwe experienced new incidents of illegal land occupations. There are two differences between the 1980s and 1990s land occupations. First, in the 1990s, illegal occupation was targeted at white-owned farms. Second, and more important for the present discussion, these occupations “were led by war veterans” (Electronic Mail and Guardian, 04.08.1998). This is a clear example of the link between demobilisation and environment-induced armed conflict.
2.4.2 The Environment as a Security Issue

Two concepts are used in an analysis of the link between environmental security and armed conflict, namely, resource wealth and resource scarcity. The two are related to a third concept, resource wars. Resource wars are struggles to control or plunder resources, capturing sites rich in minerals, timber and other valuable commodities, or controlling points through which they pass on the way to markets (Renner, 2002). Resource wars take the form of either inter-state or intra-state conflict and, as Klare (1994) observes, they are sparked by conflicts between states or groups over the control or possession of vital water, energy or mineral supplies. Armed conflict induced by resource wealth occurs when there is conflict over the control of an abundant natural resource, such as diamonds. Resource wealth through either legal or illegal resource exploitation helps trigger or exacerbate violent conflict or finance its continuation.

In some places, the pillaging of oil, minerals, metals, gemstones, or timber allows wars to continue that were triggered by other factors – initially driven by grievances or ideological struggles and bankrolled by superpowers or other external supporters. Elsewhere, nature’s bounty attracts groups that may claim they are driven by an unresolved grievance, such as political oppression or the denial of minority rights, but are in effect predators enriching themselves through illegal resource extraction. They initiate violence not necessarily to overthrow a government, but to gain and maintain control over lucrative resources, typically one of the few sources of wealth and power in poorer societies (Renner, 2002: 7).

Klare (2004) observes that the United States (US) is already engaged in “oil wars” and argues that the war on Iraq, which started as a war on terrorism, has developed into a two-front war – the battle for control over Iraq’s cities and the constant struggle to protect petroleum infrastructure against sabotage and attack. While the first front has been widely reported in the media, the second has received far less attention (Klare, 2004). However, Iraq is hardly the only country were American troops are engaged in oil wars. Others include Cambodia, Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Georgia, in which US personnel are protecting pipelines and refineries, or supervising the local forces assigned to this mission. US soldiers are on oil-protection patrol in the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the South China Sea, and along other sea routes that
deliver oil to the United States and its allies. Due to all these, Klare (2004) observes that the American military is increasingly being converted into a global oil-protection service.

Apart from the struggles to control abundant natural resources, resource scarcity – the overuse and depletion of natural resources – also has the potential to spark conflict. Kaplan (1994) predicts that the global population could grow faster than the ability of the environment to support it, which would lead to resource scarcity. The rapid population growth in poor countries with slow or stagnant economic growth leads to the hyper-utilisation of natural resources, which in turn leads to environmental degradation and eventually to resource scarcity (Klare, 1998). There are three types of resource scarcity or, as Percival and Homer-Dixon (1998) refer to it, environmental scarcity. The first is supply-induced scarcity, which is caused by the degradation and depletion of an environmental resource. This includes the erosion of cropland or low agricultural production as a result of severe drought. The second type of environmental scarcity is demand-induced scarcity, which results from population growth within a region or increased per capita consumption of resources. The forms of environmental scarcity are products of environmental degradation, while the third type, which is structural scarcity, is socially constructed. It arises from an unequal social distribution of a resource that concentrates it in the hands of relatively few people while the remaining population suffers from serious shortages.

According to Percival and Homer-Dixon (1998), the three types of scarcity and their interactions produce several common social effects, including lower agricultural production, economic decline, migrations from zones of environmental scarcity, and weakened institutions. They argue that lower agricultural production and economic decline can cause objective socio-economic deprivation that might raise the level of grievance in the affected population. Thus, wars against a ruling government might actually represent frustration about deteriorating living conditions caused by environmental decline (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998). However, grievances in themselves do not lead to violent conflict. Percival and Homer-Dixon (1998) argue that people must perceive a relative decrease in their standard of living compared with other groups or compared with other aspirations, and they must see little chance of their aspirations being addressed under the status quo. Gasana (2002) observes that
the genocide in Rwanda started as an intra-ethnic conflict between the wealthy northern Hutus and the poorer southern Hutu peasants. Gasana further observes that even when the Tutsi-led rebels\(^2\) waged a war against the Hutu-led government, peasants did not consider ethnicity to be an issue, but viewed the conflict as an issue of rich and poor, or north and south.

The case of Rwanda provides evidence of the potential of resource scarcity to generate intra-state conflicts. However, resource scarcity may also trigger inter-state conflicts, as leaders of nations with exploding populations consider the seizure of less-crowded land in neighbouring countries. Another potential source of conflict would be when states with relatively slow population growth employ stringent measures to exclude immigrants from nearby countries with high rates of growth (Klare, 1998). According to Klare (1998), liquid petroleum could begin to run out in the second or third decade of the twenty-first century, which may trigger armed inter-state conflict as the major oil-consuming countries become frantic in their efforts to control or gain access to major sources of supply. “Indeed the large US military presence in the Persian Gulf region is primarily intended to protect US access to the region’s vast oil reserves” (Klare, 1998: 73). However, oil is not the only natural resource with the potential to trigger armed conflict:

> Scarcities of other vital resources, including fresh water, fish stocks, and timber could also provoke fighting between competing states and peoples. Although fresh water is abundant in some (mostly northern) regions, it is not available in sufficient quantity in many areas with large and growing populations – leading, conceivably, to recurring conflict over access to vital sources of supply (Klare, 1998: 73).

As the above quote shows, water scarcity also has the potential to generate armed conflict. “Egypt has threatened to intervene in Ethiopia and Sudan if either of these countries diverts significant quantities of water from the Nile, the source of most of Egypt’s supply” (Klare, 1998: 74). According to Shiva (2002), wars over water take place between regions, within countries and within communities. However, many political conflicts over resources are hidden or suppressed. “Those who control power

\(^2\) According to Gasana (2002) the Tutsis who were fighting the government had fled to Uganda and neighbouring countries following the 1959 revolution that brought the Hutus to power.
prefer to mask water wars as ethnic and religious conflicts. Such camouflaging is easy because regions along rivers are inhabited by pluralistic societies with diverse groups, languages, and practices” (Shiva, 2002: x). Land and water conflicts between the Palestinians and Israelis have been presented as primarily religious conflicts between Muslims and Jews (Shiva, 2002). Meanwhile, Cock (1998b) argues that due to environmental degradation, “Southern Africa could become caught in a cycle in which environmental scarcity and degradation lead to tensions, local disputes and violence, which lead in turn to civil and inter-state wars, and thus to further environmental degradation” (Cock, 1998b: 8-9).

While, there is a growing recognition of the relationship between environmental security and armed conflict, others have argued that the notion of environment as a causal factor in conflict is simply too broad to serve as a useful analytical category (Dalby, 2002). Meanwhile, Deudney (1990) argues that inter-state violence is not likely to result from environmental degradation because of three factors. The first is that the robust nature of the world trade system reduces the potential for states’ resource dependency to threaten military security and political economy. Deudney (1990) further argues that there is no need for territorial control of sources of natural resources. Second, the prospects for resource wars are diminished since states find it increasingly difficult to exploit foreign resources through territorial conquest. Lastly, the notion of “substitutability” in which industrial civilisation is increasingly capable of taking earth material such as iron, aluminium, silicon and hydrocarbons and fashioning them into virtually everything needed, also reduces the potential for resource wars.

From the evidence provided above, it is clear that Deudney (1990) ignores the reality of resource wars. Resource wars, either as conflicts over abundant resources or scarce resources are a reality of the twenty-first century. Examples include conflicts in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. The link between demobilisation and these types of conflict is evident in the involvement of former soldiers who are employed by private security firms such as Executive Outcomes.

There is growing recognition that while the state remains the fundamental purveyor of security, it often fails to fulfil its security obligations, and at times has even become a
source of threat to its own people (Commission on Human Security, 2003). Hence, the Commission on Human Security (2003) argues for a shift from the security of the state to the security of the people – human security. The concept of human security recognises that threats to peace and security in the twenty-first century include not just international war and conflict but also civil violence, organised crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. “They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation since these can have equally catastrophic consequences. All of these threats can cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. All of them can undermine states as the basic unit of the international system” (United Nations, 2005: 24). As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan argues, human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict.

It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment—these are the interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore national, security (Annan, 2000: 1).

The Commission on Human Security (2003) argues that any concept of human security must be dynamic because what people consider to be “vital” – what they consider to be “of the essence of life” and “crucially important” – varies across individuals and societies. This is because, depending on wealth, geography and power, we perceive different threats as the most pressing. However, the UN Secretary-General argues that people cannot afford to choose because the threats which each region of the world perceives as most urgent are in fact equally so for all. “In our globalized world, the threats we face are interconnected” (United Nations, 2005: 24). Human security does not replace, but complements state security, enhances human rights and strengthens human development (Bruderlein, 2000; Commission on Human Security, 2003). As the UN Secretary-General argues:

Even if he can vote to choose his rulers, a young man with AIDS who cannot read or write and lives on the brink of starvation is not truly free. Equally, even if she earns
enough to live, a woman who lives in the shadow of daily violence and has no say in how her country is run is not truly free. Larger freedom implies that men and women everywhere have the right to be governed by their own consent, under law, in a society where all individuals can, without discrimination or retribution, speak, worship and associate freely. They must also be free from want – so that the death sentences of extreme poverty and infectious disease are lifted from their lives – and free from fear – so that their lives and livelihoods are not ripped apart by violence and war. Indeed, all people have the right to security and to development (United Nations, 2005: 5).

In these terms, Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) is a priority security issue as it impacts negatively on individuals and institutions. As the UN Secretary-General argues, this is more than just a public health crisis: “AIDS undermines economic and social stability, ravaging health, education, agriculture and social welfare systems. While placing an enormous drag on economic growth, it also weakens governance and security structures, posing a further threat” (United Nations, 2005: 15).

The discussion of HIV/AIDS is relevant for demobilisation because, as various studies show, military personnel are a population group at special risk of exposure to sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), including HIV (Sarin, 2003; UNAIDS, 1998). Various studies have also identified military personnel as disease vectors, including HIV/AIDS (Healthlink Worldwide, 2002; Shell, 2001). Incidence of HIV/AIDS has been shown to be high among demobilised soldiers in several countries (Kingma, 1998).

2.4.3 HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue

In December 2004, the United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) estimated that 39.4 million people globally were living with HIV/AIDS. About 4.9 million people were newly infected with the virus. Meanwhile, 3.1 million people globally died from AIDS-related diseases in 2004 (UNAIDS and WHO, 2004: 1). The devastating nature of HIV/AIDS prompted the former US Secretary of the State, Colin Powell, to state, “I was a soldier. But I know no enemy in war more insidious or vicious than AIDS – an enemy that poses a clear
and present danger to the world” (cited in Sarin, 2003: 17). The International Crisis 
Group (ICG, 2001) observes that the HIV/AIDS epidemic poses personal, economic, 
communal, national and international security issues. ICG (2001) argues that AIDS is 
a personal security issue because as 5, 10, 20 per cent or more of adults become 
fatally ill, gains in health, longevity and infant mortality are wiped out. This also 
affects agricultural production and food supply because HIV/AIDS is more prevalent 
among economically productive adults. When families cannot perform their 
traditional roles of nurturing as well offering some economic security due to declining 
food supplies, families and communities break apart, and surviving young people 
cease to have a viable future. Divisions among ethnic and social groups may be 
exacerbated.

HIV/AIDS is an economic security issue because illness resulting from HIV/AIDS 
undermines social and economic progress. A Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) study conducted in Uganda in late 2001 found that 91 per cent of the 300 rural 
households that were surveyed had lost a family member in the preceding ten years. 
Those who were lost to death were in the 20-35 age bracket and, as FAO (2002) 
states, 56 per cent of the deaths were as a result of HIV/AIDS. FAO’s study in 
Uganda reveals that respondents were aware of the decline in production levels as a 
result of deaths. Two-thirds of households replied that they grew less food, over two-
thirds reported producing fewer cash crops, and over half said they were eating less 
(FAO, 2002). Food insecurity occurs because, when the majority of the economically 
active population is lost those who die are survived by relatives who are either too old 
or too young to work in farm production or are busy nursing the sick. This means that 
when economically active adults die from HIV/AIDS, and as the older generation 
becomes inactive as a result of age and death, there is no one to replace the 
economically active. HIV/AIDS reduces:

- food availability (through falling production, loss of family labour, land and other 
resources, and loss of livestock);
- food access (through declining income for food purchases); and
- the stability and quality of food supplies (through shifts to less labour-intensive 
HIV/AIDS is a communal security issue because it directly affects police capability, and community stability more generally (ICG, 2001). This is because national institutions that govern society break down or become inefficient as public servants are either too sick to work or die of HIV/AIDS. Apart from the weakening of national institutions, a generation gap results from HIV/AIDS-related deaths. This gap may lead to moral decay because of the lack of parental guidance and education, which are essential for socialisation of behaviour which is socially and culturally acceptable.

HIV/AIDS is also a national security issue because military personnel are a population group at special risk of exposure to sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV. In peace time, STD infection rates among armed forces are generally two to five times higher than in civilian populations, while in time of conflict the difference can be 50 times higher or more (Sarin, 2003; UNAIDS, 1998). However, statistics are hard to come by, partly because some militaries cannot afford to or do not want to test serving soldiers, partly because many soldiers do not want to be tested, and partly because of the national security issues involved (Sarin, 2003; Healthlink Worldwide, 2002).

There are three factors which make military populations more vulnerable to HIV/AIDS infection than civilian populations. The first is that the military deployment of young adults (the high-risk section of the population) provides opportunities for risky behaviour, such as having sexual contact with sex workers or other members of the local population during deployment. The second factor is the risk-taking ethos and other attitudinal factors in the military (UNAIDS, 1998). Military operations are possible because during training soldiers are socialised into accepting risk in combat. It is probable that off the battlefield this may increase the soldiers’ willingness to engage in unnecessary risky behaviour such as sexual intercourse without a condom and sex with sex workers (Sarin, 2003; UNAIDS, 1998). The last factor relates to the soldiers’ separation from their conventional community. Posting military personnel far from their communities or families for long periods of time encourages the use of commercial sex (UNAIDS, 1998).

The HIV/AIDS epidemic impacts on the military in three ways. First, the combat readiness and capability of the military forces is bound to deteriorate (Sarin, 2003;
The high prevalence of HIV/AIDS has the potential to undermine the ability of military forces to deploy a full contingent on relatively short notice. Another factor that affects the military’s preparedness is the loss of institutional memory, as the skills and experience of highly trained individuals are lost due to HIV/AIDS and its opportunistic infections. (UNAIDS, 1998). The last way in which HIV/AIDS impacts the military is the risk of turning military personnel into the vectors of the epidemic due to deployments in different regions at different times. A number of studies reveal that high rates of HIV infection are often found in civilian populations living near military installations or are associated with the movements of soldiers (Healthlink Worldwide, 2002; Shell, 2001).

ICG (2001) argues that HIV/AIDS is also an international security issue because it threatens to hinder international attempts to respond to conflict, by threatening peacekeeping. Research indicates that soldiers from countries with high HIV/AIDS prevalence make up 11 per cent of UN force totals, while in countries with high HIV/AIDS prevalence the total is 37 per cent of all UN peacekeepers (ICG, 2001). HIV/AIDS may hinder international attempts to respond to conflict, as soldiers deployed in conflict areas may spread the epidemic or be infected by the local population, thus undermining the preparedness of the peacekeeping forces. Resolution 1308, adopted by the UN Security Council on July 17, 2000, recognises that HIV/AIDS is a potential threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, especially in the context of peacekeeping operations (United Nations Security Council, 2000).

The demobilisation of soldiers facilitates the spread of HIV/AIDS because affected soldiers do not disappear, but (re)join the civilian population. Mendelson-Forman and Carballo (2001) argue that given the generally high levels of HIV/AIDS in the armed forces, if demobilisation programmes do not include prevention and peer counselling, the reintegration of HIV-positive soldiers into new communities and the return of combatants to their original villages may result in major proliferation of the virus. There is a potential for demobilised soldiers to infect their spouses, who, for cultural and social reasons, often cannot resist or decline sexual intercourse (Mendelson-Forman and Carballo, 2001). However, Carballo, Mansfield and Prokop (2000) state that the multi-phase nature of demobilisation and reintegration presents many
opportunities for the inclusion of HIV/AIDS prevention initiatives and for providing or planning for the care and treatment of people already affected. Thus, given the very high HIV/AIDS rates in some militaries, demobilisation cannot be viewed simply as a means to collect weapons from former combatants; rather it must be seen as a tool for improving the health and economic potential of individuals (Carballo, Mansfield and Prokop, 2000).

The expanded concept of security received some criticism, the key argument being that the progressive widening of the concept endangered the intellectual coherence of security. As Deudney (1990) argues, if everything that causes a decline in human well-being is labelled a “security” threat, the term loses any analytical usefulness and becomes a loose synonym for “bad”. “If we begin to speak about all forces and events that threaten life, property and well-being (on a large scale) as threats to our national security, we shall soon drain the term of any meaning. All large-scale evils will become threats to national security (Deudney 1990: 266-7). Deudney’s (1990) criticism is unfounded because, while the concept of security has been broadened to include other elements that were previously ignored, the specific application of the concept is very much a situational and contingent matter (Ochoche, 1998). Thus, while personal and physical security might be a priority during armed conflict, environmental security, such as the preservation of water resources, might be prioritised by a community experiencing a drought in the context of peace. This is not to imply that different security concerns are incompatible. Another criticism of the expanded concept of security is that the broadening of the concept of security has brought with it the danger that matters that fall within the domain of development and non-military security issues could become securitised. “The social and environmental dimensions of security, for example, do not necessarily pose direct threats to security, but the political consequence of resource-based conflicts, for example, can clearly have security implications” (Du Pisani, 2004: 21).

In several of the seven countries studied by the World Bank (1993) restoring security following conflict posed a complex challenge which appeared to be influenced by many factors, including “the political environment, porous borders with countries with active gun markets, low police capacity to professionally and evenly enforce civil laws, poor or dispersed control over weapons by splintered factions [and the]
prevalence of a ‘weapons’ culture” (World Bank, 1993: 29). Thus, ideally, disarmament should be a central element of demobilisation-reintegration strategies, especially when demobilisation involves a multiplicity of armed forces. In this context, disarmament of soldiers is meant to ensure that none of the parties emerging from conflict uses violence or the threat thereof to derail the peace-building process. However, the success of disarmament depends on the willingness of individuals to surrender their weapons, either during or at the end of a demobilisation-reintegration process. Disarming soldiers and guerrilla fighters is complicated, since many own more than one weapon; if they turn in one, another might be hidden elsewhere (Kingma, 1998).

2.5 Demobilisation and Disarmament

It is important to note that even when disarmament as part of a demobilisation-reintegration process is relatively successful, there are often other sources of small arms and light weapons. This is because protracted internal conflict leads to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the hands of both the civilian population and armed groups. According to the definition adopted at the United Nations General Assembly in 1997, small arms are those weapons designed for personal use, and light weapons are those designed for use by several persons serving as a crew. According to this definition, small arms include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, and light-machine guns. Light weapons include heavy-machine guns, grenade launchers that are hand-held, under-barrel and mounted, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns and recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, and mortars of calibres of less than 100 millimetres (United Nations, 1997).

Disarmament carried out during demobilisation cannot on its own address the problem of small arms and light weapons proliferation. There are various sources as well as various reasons for the demand of these weapons. Small Arms Survey (2004) estimates that 92 countries worldwide have the capacity to produce small arms, light weapons and ammunition. This is a decrease from a total of 98 countries reported in the Small Arms Survey 2003. However, these figures should be treated with caution.
“In some countries, a lack of reliable information, both official and unofficial, makes it difficult to ascertain whether any small arms or ammunition is currently being produced and, if so whether regularly or only on an *ad hoc* basis” (Small Arms Survey, 2004: 9). Another problem is that some countries produce only components rather than finished products; in others, small arms production involves relatively marginal activities such as loading or filling ammunition cartridges. An estimated 1,249 companies produce the world’s small arms and ammunition. This is an increase from the 1,134 estimate reported in the *Small Arms Survey 2003*. Nearly half of these companies (42 per cent) are located in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The United States has the largest number of producers and dealers – a quarter of a million federally licensed firearms dealers, 20 times the number of McDonald’s restaurants (Renner, 1997).

Faltas and Paes (2001) estimate that there are at least 500 million military-style small arms and light weapons in the world today, of which 125 million are assault rifles. It is estimated that in the United States alone there are between 190 and 250 million small arms in private ownership, comprising both military and civilian models. The number of small arms in developing countries is likely to amount to at least some 100 million (Faltas and Paes, 2001). However, other sources argue that there is no reliable source of information on the number of small arms and light weapons in circulation among the general population of most countries (Renner, 1997). Various organisations, including the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), have long compiled data on transfers of major weapons systems; however, no organisation currently provides such information on light weapons (Klare, 1997). Presently the international community has a very limited capacity to identify, monitor and disable illicit arms-trafficking networks (Klare, 2001a). This is because the illicit arms trade is more sophisticated than the legal arms trade. Unlike in a legal trade, where control may occur at either side, by restricting supply or by curbing demand, illicit trade includes arms traffickers who serve as intermediaries between the suppliers and recipients. The relationship is such that the supplier and the recipient rarely have any direct conduct. “This is so because the intended recipient is an insurgent group, ethnic militia, warlord, or other such entity and is therefore (in most cases) barred from acquiring arms through legal channels” (Klare, 2001a: 44).
Former soldiers remain in coherent groups for years with the ability to quickly mobilise around a set of grievances. The availability of small arms and light weapons increases the potential use of violence and the potential for dangers at various levels: “It increases the risk that disputes between individuals are settled with deadly violence, since most ex-combatants have learned little else than solving problems by using violence. These weapons could also fuel banditry; and political groups could more easily arm themselves and disturb non-violent and democratic political processes” (Kingma, 1998: 16). While the availability of small arms and light weapons are not the causes of armed conflict, their abundance increases the potential for disgruntled ex-combatants to initiate and sustain armed conflict.

Accumulations of small arms and light weapons by themselves do not cause the conflicts in which they are used. The availability of these weapons, however, contributes towards exacerbating conflicts by increasing the lethality and duration of violence, by encouraging a violent rather than a peaceful resolution of differences, and by generating a vicious circle of a greater sense of insecurity, which in turn leads to a greater demand for, and use of, such weapons (United Nations, 1997: 10).

There are five features of small arms and light weapons that make them suitable for contemporary intra-state conflicts. The first is the low cost and availability of these weapons. “A second-hand AK-47, for instance, can be acquired for $100 or less in many areas, while even the cheapest second-hand tank sells for $100,000 or more” (Klare, 2001b: 21). More importantly, the production of small arms and light weapons requires little in the way of sophisticated technology, and because these weapons are manufactured for military, police and civilian use, there are numerous suppliers around the world.

The second feature relates to the increasing sophistication and lethality of rapid-fire assault rifles, automatic pistols, and submachine guns. “The incorporation of new technology into shoulder-fired rockets, mortars, and light anti-tank weapons has only increased the firepower that warring factions can bring to bear in civil conflicts” (Boutwell and Klare, 1999b: 6).
Thirdly, small arms are easy to use, require little maintenance or logistical support, and remain operational for many years. Such weapons require little training to use effectively, which greatly increases their use in conflicts involving untrained combatants and children. For demobilised soldiers, their experience in using small arms and light weapons is an added advantage. “What sets small arms apart from major weapons systems is the fact that they are personal weapons, intended for use by an individual combatant, and requiring no great expertise, training wealth, or logistical capacity on the part of the user” (Klare, 1999b: 11).

Fourthly, small arms and light weapons can be carried by an individual soldier or light vehicle, are easily transported or smuggled to areas of conflict, and can be concealed in shipments of legitimate cargo.

Lastly, unlike major conventional weapons, which are most often procured solely by national military forces, small arms and light weapons cross the dividing line separating military and police forces from the civilian population. They possess many civilian uses, including hunting, sport shooting and self-protection, and as a result such weapons are available for sale to civilians in many countries (Klare, 1999b). Depending on the gun-control laws of a particular country, citizens are permitted to own anything from pistols and sporting guns to fully automatic rifles (Boutwell and Klare, 1999b).

The majority of weapons circulating in developing countries were originally produced and supplied by industrialised countries. The Cold War led both the United States and the former Soviet Union to scramble for allies. The result was an unprecedented high level of military aid. In Somaliland, a study reveals that “large numbers of small arms came into Somaliland during the Cold War period when Somalia was aligned to the Eastern bloc countries which armed Somalia as a socialist ally against capitalism” (Omar, 2002: 19). Meanwhile the US arms transfer policy was largely governed by the belief that “the United States bore primary responsibility for the defence of the ‘free world’ against communist aggression” (Klare, 1988a: 78). Hence, successive US administrations advocated the supply of arms and military equipment to friendly governments. A number of these countries received weaponry either free of charge or on very favourable terms (Ball, 1988). Since the 1950s, the US government has given
away or sold cheaply almost three million military-style firearms (Renner, 1997). In some countries, such as Mozambique, these weapons are still held by both former soldiers and civilians (Vines, 1998).

The end of the Cold War led to a change in the nature of armed conflict, accompanied by a change in the nature of weapons used. The nature of armed conflict has changed from inter-state conflict involving a clash between the regular armed forces of established states to conflict consisting largely of ethnic and sectarian warfare within states (Faltas and Paes, 2001; Klare, 1999b). Typically, participants in the latter type of armed conflict are irregular forces which include guerrillas, ethnic separatists, private militias, criminal bands and so on. “These forces are rarely in a position to obtain and operate major weapons systems and so rely, for the most part, on small arms and light weapons” (Klare, 1999a: 9). This is because the belligerents involved are normally barred from access to major weapons systems and/or lack the training and logistical capacity to operate such systems (Klare, 1999a). On the other hand, it is relatively easy for these forces to acquire small arms and light weapons. This is through gifts from the government, theft, or purchases from black market dealers.

The end of the Cold War has also produced a sharp reduction in the military aid programs of the wealthier countries. Consequently, governments engaged in internal conflicts often have had to confine their arms procurement to small arms and light weapons. This is because some of the states involved in armed conflict are too poor to afford conventional weapons, thus they have to limit their purchases to smaller and less costly items (Klare, 1999a).

A World Bank (1993) study outlines three ways in which different countries have approached disarmament and weapons control. The first method is through the enforcement of a prohibition of open and public carrying of weapons. The second is persuasion, which involves encouraging those who own weapons to trade them in exchange for cash or in-kind benefits. The second may apply more to the process of demobilisation-reintegration in which only those who hand in their weapons qualify for benefits. The last method is forceful seizure, which is typically carried out immediately following a conflict situation, either by an armed force or through reliance on searches, surveillance and rewards for tips on location of caches. The
weakness of all these approaches is the failure to recognise that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is social and thus requires a social solution (Cock, 1997a; 1998). Cock (1998b) observes that gun violence is connected to social relations, values, beliefs, practices and different identities. “The demand for guns is socially constructed and embedded in a given gun culture; the supply is socially organized” (Cock 1998b: 123). Thus, a demand-side analysis is the key to a social solution to the spread of small arms and light weapons. This means moving beyond an analysis that focuses on the structural or root causes of the spread of small arms to investigating the ideological and cultural factors that contribute to the demand for small arms.

Gebre-Wold (2002) notes that in some parts of the Horn of Africa, there is a militarised culture of vendetta or warrior culture, which promotes the demand for small arms. According to the culture, “if a person from a family is killed, then revenge as we call it, or justice, as they call it, must be carried out, often before the victim’s burial ceremony” (Gebre-Wold, 2002: 14). This warrior culture is the most important part of the people’s identity and thus to reduce the demand for small arms would require altering this identity. The solution includes altering the meanings, allegiances and identities, which underlie gun violence. In the Republic of Montenegro, SEESAC and Small Arms Survey (2004) found that there is a culture of “celebratory shootings”, which involves the firing of weapons during celebrations such as birth, birthdays, weddings, Christmas, et cetera. In September and October 2003, “seven cases involved policemen, while in another case the Minister for the Protection for Minority Rights was arrested by the authorities for several hours after shooting his weapon during a celebration (SEESAC and Small Arms Survey, 2004: 19). Dealing with the proliferation of guns in this context would mean confronting the culture of celebratory shooting. The social meanings and uses of guns in South Africa are discussed in the last chapter.
2.6 Definition of Concepts

2.6.1 Demobilisation and Reintegration

The process through which soldiers are released from either the statutory forces or guerrilla armies and receive assistance in returning to civilian life differs from one context to the next. There are two interlinked concepts that are used to describe the process – “demobilisation” and “reintegration”. Demobilisation is defined as “the process by which the armed forces (government and/or opposition or factional forces such as guerrilla armies) either downsize or completely disband” (World Bank, 1993: vi; United Nations, 2000b: 15). Another definition is “the process that significantly reduces the number of personnel in the armed forces. It includes the reduction of the size of regular military and paramilitary forces, as well as the number of civilian personnel employed by the armed forces” (Kingma, 2000: 26). These two definitions, while they describe what happens during demobilisation, are not helpful as analytical tools. Kingma’s (2000) definition is further limited by its focus on the process of reduction and does not include the complete disbandment of an armed force, for example, the disbandment of a defeated armed group. The United Nations (2000a: 2) provides a more useful definition of demobilisation which is “the process by which parties to a conflict begin to disband their military structures and combatants begin the transformation into civilian life”. However, the definition is limited because it only relates to the disbandment of soldiers and does not cater for a situation in which the military reduces the number of people under arms without disbanding the whole structure.

The most useful definition of demobilisation is “the process of converting a soldier to a civilian. A soldier is in the process of demobilising when he or she has reported to an assembly area or camp, has surrendered his or her weapon and uniform, but is awaiting final discharge” (Clark, 1995: 50). It is only when the soldier has been disarmed, received discharge papers and has – officially and de facto – left the military command structures, that the soldier is regarded as demobilised (BICC, 2000). The definition is applicable to different contexts, whether the downsizing of the armed force or the reduction in the number of people employed by the military.
However, for the purposes of this study, demobilisation as a process of converting a soldier to a civilian does not end with the discharge of a soldier from the military or armed force. The process encompasses reintegration, which is the most important part of the process of transforming the soldier’s identity. The definition of demobilisation excludes the general “turnover” of personnel, which occurs in every defence force (Kingma, 2000). Demobilisation also differs from dispersion, which refers to a process where the government in power disbands ex-combatants of the opposition over a short period, often without any kind of compensation, in order to reduce political tension (Ejigu and Gedamu, 1996).

The concept of reintegration is commonly used to define a process through which soldiers return to civilian life or return to their communities. For example, the World Bank (2001) defines reintegration as the return to normal functioning of society, which may apply to both military and non-military returnees, who must rebuild family and social life within the community. This definition assumes that former soldiers are people who left their communities to join the military. Reintegration thus becomes a process to help them “return to civilian life within their communities”. In this sense, the concept presents demobilised soldiers as people who left their communities, who during their participation in military activities went through a process of change, and who, when they leave the armed forces, have to adapt to what they left behind. Contrary to this view of static social categories, both the soldiers and the communities they leave behind usually go through extensive processes of change during a period of armed conflict.

The incorporation of people into the military impacts on individuals in different ways. First, they are exposed to a different social environment, with persons of different ages and experiences of life. Their accepted social values may not apply since the military is a unique institution with its own culture and structures of authority, both of which may go against established social norms. Second, the military often exposes individuals to different geographical and cultural areas for many years. During the soldiers’ absence, society does not remain static. At the end of war both the returning soldiers and those who remained behind are in the process of adjustment—psychologically, culturally and, in some cases, economically. Thus, a comprehensive definition of reintegration is one that takes into account the fact that both the
individual and the community he/she comes from go through a process of change. Reintegration should involve different programme elements, including psychological and financial counselling, skills development, financial assistance and, most importantly, the conscientisation of receiving communities (see Kingma, 1998, on Mozambique; Kazoora, 1998, on Uganda).

The United Nations (2000a: 2) defines reintegration as “the process which allows ex-combatants and their families to adapt, economically and socially, to productive civilian life”. A similar definition is “the process of facilitating the ex-soldiers’ transition to civilian life” (Clark, 1995: 50). Each of the two definitions is inadequate if used separately. Thus, for the purposes of this study, reintegration refers to the process of facilitating the transition of ex-soldiers to civilian life, which allows ex-combatants and their families to adapt, economically and socially, to productive civilian life. The word “process” implies that reintegration is not a once-off event, but that it is ongoing with improvements and changes along the way. The word “facilitate” is central to the definition because it moves away from a top-down approach which views demobilised soldiers as passive objects of reintegration. It is argued that reintegration is meant to provide an enabling environment for transition to civilian life. Demobilised soldiers are ultimately responsible for making choices and determining their destiny within such an enabling environment. The phrase “transition to civilian life” as used here takes into consideration the fact that demobilised soldiers do not necessarily have an in-depth knowledge of the civilian life they are about to enter. “In certain situations, after the ending of the war, villages from which soldiers or guerrilla fighters came sometimes no longer exist… In several countries, many combatants have no memory of the pre-war times; they have never known ‘peace’” (Kingma, 2004a: 135).

While demobilisation and reintegration are often separated for conceptual clarification, the two concepts are inextricably linked. The definition of demobilisation indicates that the concept used on its own is not a useful tool to analyse the process of releasing soldiers from the military and their reintegration into civilian life. It is argued that the release of soldiers from the military or the complete disbandment of an armed force without reintegration assistance is not demobilisation. In the context of this study, demobilisation is a shorthand term for the multi-staged
process of converting a soldier to a civilian. This encompasses the release of soldiers from a statutory force or guerrilla group and their reintegration into civilian society. The provision of reintegration programmes is central to the process of transforming the soldiers’ identity. “Reintegration programmes are assistance measures provided to former combatants that would increase the potential for their and their families’, economic and social reintegration into civil society. Reintegration programmes could include cash assistance or compensation in kind, as well as vocational training and income-generating activities” (United Nations, 2000b: 15). In African countries reintegration programmes may also include cultural and religious rituals such as cleansing ceremonies to facilitate the soldiers’ reintegration into their communities. Thus the most appropriate concept is demobilisation-reintegration.

2.6.2 The Contested Nature of the Concept “Combatant”

In the context of this study the words combatant(s) and soldier(s) are used interchangeably without distinguishing between former members of statutory and non-statutory forces. It is common to refer to members of a statutory force as soldiers and those of a guerrilla group as combatants. A soldier is often defined as “a person who has enlisted with, or has been conscripted into, the armed forces of a sovereign country and has undergone training and received equipment to defend that country or its interests. In most countries, the term soldier is limited to such people who serve in the land branch of the armed services (usually known as the army)” (Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soldier). While the term combatant is also used in reference to soldiers in a conflict situation, members of guerrilla armies define themselves more as combatants than as soldiers. During the course of the study, demobilised members of the Azanian People’s Liberation Army and uMKhonto we Sizwe defined themselves as former combatants.

The identity of combatant was highly contested within the ranks of MK and, to a lesser extent, APLA. This study refers to APLA even though there were two military groups, one consisting of members of the guerrilla army (APLA) and another consisting of the Task Force, “the PAC’s version of a people’s militia, whose role was to defend the organisation’s members from political thugs” (Mphahlele, 2002: 163). The PAC armed the Task Force better than APLA, and there were even times when
APLA had to borrow money from the Task Force (Mphahlele, 2002). Cock (1993) identifies four different categories of MK soldiers: first, those who left the country (were trained externally for long periods of time and remained in the camps while waiting for deployment in military operations inside South Africa); second, those who trained internally for shorter periods (which may have included one or two weeks training in Swaziland or Botswana); third, those who assisted and provided support for MK (in the form of safe houses, courier work and reconnaissance); and lastly, those who did non-military tasks such as building underground structures.

During the course of the study, MK informants themselves identified three groups within their ranks. The first group consisted of those who were trained (and in some cases spent long periods) outside the borders of South Africa. Those in this category regarded themselves as proper MK soldiers, since they endured hardships in military camps away from their loved ones. The second group consisted of those who were trained inside the country (in some cases for periods between two weeks and three months). However, this category excluded former members of the Self-Defence Units (SDUs), who were trained by returning MK combatants after the suspension of the armed struggle in the early 1990s. While some people were sent to countries such as Uganda and Tanzania for military training at the time when exiles (including MK soldiers) were returning to South Africa in the early 1990s, they were also excluded from any of the categories. (This issue is discussed in Chapter 4). The last category consisted of former MK members who were detained on Robben Island for a number of years. Former MK soldiers who spent most of their lives in exile regarded the “Islanders” as the least important category of MK soldiers, because of a perception that they had an easy time on the island.

In 1994 all the categories of combatants from both APLA and MK were recognised for the purposes of integration to form the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Hence, one could argue that the APLA and MK categories were used more for internal divisions than as tools of identification. Since the present study is an evaluation of the process of demobilisation, the concepts “soldier” and “combatant” refer to anyone who belonged to any of the categories of APLA or MK identified above. Furthermore, the concept does not distinguish between statutory and non-statutory force members.
2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined various challenges that face countries emerging from armed conflict. The central argument has been that demobilisation is a necessary but not sufficient component of demilitarisation. Based on the assumption that the nature of transition from authoritarianism to democracy shapes the civil-military relations in a democracy, the first section focused on transition theory, drawing largely on the work of Przeworksi (1991). His work, while helpful in an analysis of the role of the military in transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, has been criticised for ignoring the role of civil society, especially the labour movement in South Africa (Adler and Webster, 1995). While various examples were cited of how the military may influence the transition process and the creation of a democratic pattern of civil-military relations, it was argued that there is nothing inherent about militaries that make them obstacles to democratisation. There are instances where the military may favour democratisation in order to safeguard their institutional interests, and other cases where civilians co-opt military forces to stall or undermine democracy.

The second section flowed from this and discussed civil-military relations, especially in a democracy. Drawing from the work of Luckham (2003) and others, it was argued that “democratic control” is a more relevant term than “civilian control”. This is because even under democratically elected governments the term civilian control cannot expose the misuse of the security forces by certain individuals. Thus democratic control which emphasises the loyalty of the armed forces to democratic institutions instead of individuals is the most preferred state of affairs. It was further argued that democratic institutions and democratic constitutions do not guarantee democracy unless they are accompanied by democratic politics.

Civil-military relations depend in part on how the government deals with the legacy of militarism. Hence, the third section of this chapter focused on the concept of militarism and demilitarisation. It discussed various elements of militarization, including the mobilisation of resources for war at economic, ideological and political levels. While these resources may later be converted for civilian use, the main challenge is the ideological level of militarism. The chapter argued for a “deep demilitarisation” which involves demilitarising the mind and emphasising non-violent
means of conflict resolution. The mobilisation of resources for war and the reliance on violence is to some extent shaped by people’s perceived sense of security.

The concept of security was discussed in the fourth section. Two non-military security threats, HIV/AIDS and the environment, were identified. The former was identified as a personal, economic, communal, national and international security issue. HIV/AIDS is a real threat because, while it attacks individuals, it poses a national and international security threat. It is a national security threat because it impacts on institutions such as education, as civil servants fall victim of the pandemic. Most importantly, it impacts on the military as an institution which traditionally was the main custodian of security. The military population consists of young adults, a population at risk of contracting HIV/AIDS.

The environment can also represent a security risk, because both the abundance of natural resources (resource wealth) and its scarcity (resource scarcity) might lead to armed conflict.

The potential for armed conflict sparked by resource wealth or resource scarcity increases with the availability of small arms and light weapons. In section five, it was argued that disarmament should not be confined to soldiers alone, but should encompass the control of the flow of weapons that may be circulating among civilians. While various measures to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons were mentioned, it was argued that dealing with them requires a social solution which includes tackling the social and cultural meanings of these weapons and most importantly dismantling the ideology of militarism.

The next chapter focuses on experiences of demobilisation-reintegration in Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe.