His specification of two phases in this development, far from clarifying the issue, introduces more inconsistencies and contradictions. As regards the first period of the transformation of the novel form, Goldmann tells us that

the disappearance of the importance of the individual brings with it attempts to replace biography as the content of the work of fiction with values produced by different ideologies. For although, in Western societies, these values have proved to be too weak to produce their own literary forms, they might well give a new lease of life to an already existing form that was losing its former content. First and foremost, on this level, are the ideas of community and collective reality (institutions, family, social group, revolution, etc.) that had been introduced and developed in Western thinking by the socialist ideology.

As regards the second period, which begins more or less with Kafka and continues to the contemporary nouveau roman, Goldmann says that it is characterised by an abandonment of any attempt to replace the problematic hero and individual biography by another reality and by the effort to write the novel of the absence of the subject, of the non-existence of any ongoing search.

It goes without saying that this attempt to safeguard the novel form by giving it a content, related no doubt to the content of the traditional novel (it had always been the literary form of the problematic search and the absence of positive values), but nevertheless essentially different from now involves the elimination of two essential elements of the specific content of the novel:
the psychology of the problematic hero and the story of his demoniacal search), was to produce at the same time parallel orientations towards different forms of expression.18

There is also a third period:

Lastly, in the contemporary period, the rebirth of an ahistorical and non-individualistic rationalism centred on the idea of permanent and invariable structures and the appearance of the most recent forms of the literary avant-garde create a complex situation that is difficult to formulate without embarking on a deeper analysis of both sectors of reality.19

But this is so vaguely distinguished that it need not concern us here, except to remark that as the socialist and existentialist perspectives respectively characterise the first two stages, so structuralism seems to be the worldview of this stage.

The contradictions in his history of the novel are too numerous to indicate one by one, but they all stem from the same source - Goldmann's inconsistent use of the terms 'structure', 'form', and 'content', and his inability to distinguish which elements of the novel belong in each category. So he describes two stages in what he himself sees as the transformation of the form of the novel, in terms of the same form with different contents, but what he labels 'content' here are, in fact, worldviews, (or what he originally termed 'structures'). In the same way as Lukács wanted to perpetuate critical realism as a literary form, Goldmann seems reluctant to admit what he fully understands - that each perspective produces its
own forms - and so he writes of the form of critical realism as if it were something empty into which one could pour the different values of socialism or existentialism. But, of course, the form has altered - as he initially claimed - for if the critical realist form is characteristically the search for values by a problematic individual, one cannot describe as essentially of the same form a novel which has eliminated both of these elements.

What Goldmann has been concerned to demonstrate in general is that, contrary to traditional opinion, the novel with a problematic hero, although 'a literary form bound up certainly with history and the development of the bourgeoisie, [is] not the expression of the real or possible consciousness of that class'. In other words, believing that the novel which expresses the consciousness of society must promote bourgeois values, he sets out to explain that critical consciousness that he discerns in bourgeois realism. Goldmann's problem, as I suggested earlier, like that of Lukács, arises out of a naive conception of the nature of critical realism. He does not seem to understand that criticism does not have to take as its point of departure the ideals of an alternate system, that criticism of a system can be contained within allegiance to that system, for criticism does not necessarily imply insight into the system's ideals, but only into its failure to practise what it preaches. Goldmann, too, has fallen for that myth of critical realism that I
discussed at length in Chapter 8.

Having considered Goldmann in all his inconsistency, and having shown that his theory of the novel, like his general theory, is neither orthodoxly Marxist nor satisfactorily structuralist, I return to the question I raised at the beginning of Part III, namely, whether the failure of Goldmann's attempted synthesis implies that Marxism and structuralism are ultimately incompatible; in other words, whether it is his synthetic purpose that has forced him to do violence to both theories. I believe not. As regards his Marxism, the central problem that accounts for its contortions—the traditional one of how to explain what appears to be an immunity to ideology—would not have arisen if he had understood realism for what it actually is—an insight that the appropriate kind of structuralism would have provided. As regards structuralism, his failure here is due to a superficial and simplistic understanding of that extremely complex manner of looking at cultural creation. Those structuralist theories that he ignores, far from conflicting with Marxism, would supply the very dimension it lacks: in extending Marxism's sociological approach to include the conventional nature of literary forms and language, they would reveal to the orthodox Marxist the false basis of his attempt to account within a theory of social determinism for what he sees as an element of creative freedom in literature.
2. More Advanced Marxist-Structuralist Theories

In their book *Language and Materialism*, Coward and Ellis make a distinction between early semio-structuralism and recent radical developments in that field. They claim that the work of such writers as Barthes and Kristeva, based as it is upon the neo-Marxism of Althusser and the neo-Freudianism of Lacan, represents a considerable advance from a pseudo-materialism to a true materialism, from an idealism complicit with bourgeois ideology to a truly Marxist position, from the assertion of a constructing subject to a consideration of the constructed subject. Now Goldmann's structuralism belongs to the early type, and, as we have seen, is neither perfectly Marxist nor sufficiently structuralist.

In comparing Goldmann's ideas to those of other, more sophisticated structuralists, I want to follow Barthes in distinguishing what he calls the three 'imagininations of the sign' and their extension to the field of literature, showing in each of these interrelated areas the deficiencies in Goldmann's understanding, and suggesting certain elements that a satisfactory Marxist-structuralist approach would incorporate. Since structuralism is a vast and complex area of study, it is only possible to give the barest indication of these.

The first imagination of the sign is the relation between signifier and signified, that is, the relation between the literary work and 'reality'. Now the later
structuralist view, that art is a practice of language within ideology which helps build a particular reality that society constructs for itself, could derive naturally and logically from Goldmann's understanding of the three characteristics of human behaviour, but for all his theoretical talk about worldviews in terms of the functional construction of structures of significance, with literature as the coherent realisation of these, when he comes to discuss the concrete literary work, the novel, Goldmann obviously conceives of it in terms of the traditional concept of mimesis, that is, as an imitation of reality.

In his brilliant book S/Z, Barthes explodes this mythological understanding of the relation between signifier and signified in the realistic form. Realism is what Barthes calls a 'readerly' text: it presupposes an inert consumer who simply submits to what appear to be clearly established and conventional relations between signifier and signified. This type of work pretends to 'innocence', that is, to being merely a medium of communication for a real referent, and as such it serves to perpetuate an established view of reality. But, in his analysis of a story by Balzac, an ostensibly 'readerly' text, Barthes shows that it is not a reflective medium at all, but a message of infinite multiplicity that shapes reality in its own image and invites the reader to collaborate in the construction of meaning.
Perhaps Barthes's most significant contribution has been his stress upon the role of the reader in the activity that is literature, a dimension Goldmann ignores altogether, although he is aware that the coherent structure in the text may owe something to the critic. Of the two moments of genetic importance in the creation of literary meaning - writing and reading - Goldmann concentrates upon the former, but social determinism occurs after, as well as before, the act of composition.

The second imagination of the sign is the paradigmatic relation between the sign and a store of other signs; in literature this refers to the relation between this work and a body of other works. Semic-structural investigation here took two forms: the invention of eternal, ahistorical, narrative structures à la Propp, and the specification of certain historically specific forms of writing, or sociolects, which represent certain ways of seeing the world and of presenting the established vraisemblable of society. While Goldmann is not guilty of the Proppian-type reductiveness, on the other hand, his conception of the worldview never attains the subtlety of Barthes's and Kristeva's understanding of the sociolect, particularly the myth of literary realism. So, while he attempts to show the historical conditions determining literary texts and how the latter reflect the former, he never queries the actual process of reflection, the means by which this impression of reality-reflection
is achieved. This lack of concern with the operation of literary conventions and language both ties Goldmann to that literary form that appears pre-eminently to be a reflective medium - the novel - and accounts for his failure to understand its true nature.

Later structuralists, in discussing this question, have stressed the conventionality of all genres (including realism), each of which constitutes a sort of langue to the parole of individual works, except that the relationship is more dynamic than in language, for as the paradigm determines the text so individual texts can subtly alter the paradigm. The significant contribution in this area has been that of Kristeva whose concept, 'intertextuality', maintains that all writing takes place in the light of other writing and that each text bears traces of earlier texts. Again, sophisticated structuralism has pointed to the two dimensions of this relationship between individual work and its genre: the rules of genre are as important to the consumer-reader as to the producer-writer - in the case of the former, a set of expectations facilitates a decoding of the text in the same mode as it was encoded; in the case of the latter, it is to this set of rules rather than to reality that his work is significantly related.

The third imagination of the sign deals with the syntagmatic relation of the sign to those preceding and following it: in literature this concerns the relation
of the elements within the work one to another, in other words, the structure. Now where Goldmann's organicism, that is to say, his assumption of structural closure and coherence, leads him to analyse the structure as a finished product, the newer approach of such critics as Barthes is to concentrate upon the structuration as a process of production. Goldmann is concerned to establish two things: the meaning of a text and its source, that is, the reality that it reflects: Barthes, with his insight into the part played by the reader in the construction of meaning and his understanding of the richness and openness of the text, is concerned with the multiplicity of possible meanings and the autonomy of the text, that is, with the productivity of language.

In his approach Barthes combines a consideration of both langue and parole: he combines a synchronic analysis of the paradigm or structural form of writing that constitutes the frame of reference which gives this particular example its meaning, with a diachronic analysis of the potential meanings contained within this specific text. What we have here is neither Propp's understanding of similarity, nor the old critical idea of hermetic individuality, but, to borrow Derrida's vocabulary, difference in both its aspects - difference from the paradigm and deference to it.

The advantages of such a position over that of Goldmann is that certain stringent limitations fall away.
One is no longer confined to the realistic novel, but can handle those radical texts which are obviously neither structurally closed nor capable of being reduced to a system of narrative structures. Goldmann ignores these texts because he can only deal with finished reflective objects whose language is seen as merely instrumental. It is Barthes's approach, dealing as it does with the production of signification, seeing that language has a role beyond the communication of content, superficial or deep-structural, that is admirably geared for this task.

A further limitation of Goldmann's static reified attitude is that in conceiving of the work in terms of a single coherent structure of meaning, he cannot deal with the complex mode of existence of a literary work as both of the past and of the present. His single interpretation, which is presumably supposed to hold good for all readers and for all time, is a naive approach compared to that of Barthes, which copes perfectly with this problem of the changing meanings of the text over geographical space and historical time, not to mention political beliefs. Clearly, Marxist structuralism has progressed way beyond the point at which Goldmann stands, and, while it is necessary to guard against an incipient anti-humanism, it is, perhaps, in some of these more recent theories that one might now look for a more satisfactory combination of the best aspects of both perspectives.
CONCLUSION

It has been my intention here to distinguish orthodox and dogmatic Marxist literary theory, to reassess the former with a view to showing greater and lesser dogmatic tendencies within it, and to compare orthodox and dogmatic Marxist theory with a Platonic model of literature, revealing how the former's central problem arises as a deviation from the model - namely, as a desire to include a dimension of free creativity in an essentially dogmatic and pedagogic theory. I have then looked at the way in which two very different, but equally eminent, Marxists attempt to resolve this problem.

As regards Lukács, it is largely his respect for artistic creation, his reluctance to reduce it to either something totally determined or something totally subject to a demand for ideological conformity, that leads him to the contradictions that abound in his account of the relations between text and social context, form and content, and form as worldview versus form as genre/style/technique. On the other hand, Lukács's didacticism will not allow the individual imagination a completely free rein with regard to either the nature of the reality it presents or the manner in which it presents it, and this leads to further contradictions, which manifest most clearly in his inconsistent accounts of realism - realism, for Lukács, being synonymous with literature.
My position has been that Lukács's essential error is an insufficiently sociological approach and that this has two aspects. In the first place, he derives from orthodox Marxist theory a lack of critical self-consciousness that is revealed in the central concepts that underlie the notion of literary realism, that is, reflection and the transcendent critic. In the second place, he never successfully accomplishes those adjustments in the basically sociological Marxist perspective on literature that are necessitated by a concern with 'literariness' allied to an inherited set of bourgeois literary evaluations, a problem that plagued the founding fathers as well.

In tracing the development of Lukács's ideas on art, I have maintained that a certain methodological broadness that characterises his work at all stages and a doctrinaire narrowness that grows with time account for his unsatisfactory explanation of the relations between literature and ideology. I have argued that what his Marxist theory of literary realism needs is an injection of the different sociological dimensions to be found in the work of such Marxists as Habermas and such structuralists as Barthes and Kristeva, with their respective stresses upon the socio-historically situated critic and the conventional nature of literary forms and language. In other words, I have suggested that where Lukács goes wrong is in attempting to account on a non-sociological
or aesthetic level for 'literariness', instead of seeing both the concept of literariness and particular literary judgments as themselves social phenomena requiring a sociological explanation.

As regards Goldmann, my argument is similar. Driven by the same motive as Lukács, to allow for that degree of freedom which is conventionally understood to be an essential dimension of artistic creation, he tries to reconcile a particular kind of structuralism with orthodox Marxism. It has been my contention, firstly, that he chooses an unpromising brand of structuralism, and secondly, that in the process of attempting a reconciliation he contradicts certain basic sociological tenets of Marxism, so that he winds up with an end product - it can hardly be called a 'finished' product - that is remarkable for its tentativeness, its inconsistencies, its contradictions, and its omission of some of the more fruitful aspects of both structuralist and Marxist theory. In fact, what Goldmann achieves here is not a resolution of the two perspectives, but an uneasy yoking together of non-complementary aspects drawn from both. I have suggested that his failure must be seen on a personal level and that there is nothing inherent in either Marxism or structuralism that forbids an effective melding of certain strands of both, as the work of Barthes, for example, flawed as it is by a lack of critical self-consciousness, amply demonstrates.
On the level of literary theory rather than of literary theorists, I have been concerned in the process of the above argument to isolate the definitive characteristics of Marxist sociology of literature, orthodox and dogmatic, to set it within the tradition of literary theory, showing its affinities with other theories, and to analyse its peculiar problems. I have concentrated on the concept of realism which looms so large in Marxist sociology of literature and in which those problems crystallize, suggesting what I consider to be helpful discriminations within the blanket term, and offering a demythologising account of literary realism that reveals the problematic nature of this category, its dependence upon an insufficiently sociological understanding of language and literature, and its relation to a lack of critical self-consciousness upon the part of writer, reader, and critic.

In essence, then, it is a lack of insight into the pre-eminently ideological nature of their notion of 'realism' that accounts for the deficiencies in the various attempts by a traditionalist, Lukács, and an early innovator, Goldmann, to solve that central problem of a Marxist sociology of literature that they take up from Marx, Engels, and Lenin, namely, how to reconcile a conception of the text as a product of free human creativity with both a belief in determinism and a demand for conformity in such a way as to support their essentially bourgeois aesthetic standards and literary concepts.
Conversely, the promise of the more recent structural-Marxist accounts which conceive of literature in a truly dialectical fashion is that they try to satisfy the need I have demonstrated that such accounts include themselves in their conception. In extending to the critic the basic Marxian notion of a subject who transforms reality by praxis, and in applying to all the elements of the text the semio-structural understanding of the production of meaning, they indicate how one might supply the sociological dimensions that are lacking in the Marxists studied here.
NOTES

Introduction


Part I Sources of Marxist Literary Theory


2 Ibd.


4 J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston, 1971).


Chapter I Orthodox Marxism

1 See quotation from Marx on pp.30-1.

2 The exception is worth noting - M. Lifshitz, The Philosophy of Art of Karl Marx (London, 1973) - but his purpose is entirely different: he is not so much concerned to abstract an aesthetic theory as to show that an aesthetic dimension forms an integral part of Marx's entire oeuvre. See also I. Mészáros, Marx's Theory of Alienation (London, 1970).


4 Although the themes enumerated in this paragraph are the central concerns of Hegel's philosophy, it is misleading to speak of Hegelian Marxism, for while 'Marx includes Hegel' (F. Jameson, Marxism and Form (Princeton, 1971), p.xv), it is the Marxian transformation of Hegel
that is significant, and the tendency to describe Lukács as adhering 'to a Hegelian approach' (G. Lichtheim, Lukács (London, 1970), p. 9), ignores the diachronic development of his ideas and denies his Marxist orthodoxy. Here, as elsewhere, the terminological problems arise from a confusion between theoretical orthodoxy and political dogmatism.

5 In an essay written as a preface for the Hungarian edition of an anthology of the aesthetic writings of Marx and Engels, Lukács says that although the selection and organisation was not done by the authors themselves 'this does not mean ... that the fragments assembled here do not provide an organic and systematic view.' (G. Lukács, Writer and Critic (London, 1970), p. 61). There is more to be said for Lukács's argument than for Swingewood's contention that what we find are 'merely hints, ambiguity, and some dogma'. (D. Laurensen and A. Swingewood, The Sociology of Literature (London, 1972)).

6 Marx did not only study literature: as a young man he wrote lyric poetry and attempted a verse drama (Oulanem) and a comic novel (Skorpion und Felix) as well. In later life he planned, but never wrote, a study of Balzac, a treatise on aesthetics, and a journal of literary criticism. He also wrote, but never published, a paper on art.

7 In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, for example, Marx quotes from both Shakespeare's Timon of Athens and Goethe's Faust to illustrate the effects of money as a false god.

8 Les Mystères de Paris is a sentimental novel in serial form. It was a bestseller in its time. It is a hybrid type: a gothic novel set in the social world, infused with vaguely socialist ideas, and foreshadowing naturalism.


10 Ibid., p. 240.

11 Ibid., p. 227.


13 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 95.
I use the expression 'mirror' reality, rather than 'represent' or 'render' or 'reveal', in accordance with common Marxist practice. I believe this expression is preferred because it suggests total objectivity where the alternatives introduce the notion of mediation and therefore the possibility of subjectivity and distortion. In Marxism and Literature Williams comments on the problem of the notion of reflection:

The metaphor of 'reflection' has a long history in the analysis of art and ideas. Yet the physical process and relationship that it implies have proved compatible with several radically different theories. Thus art can be said to 'reflect the real world, holding the mirror up to nature', but every term of such a definition has been in protracted and necessary dispute. Art can be seen as reflecting not 'mere appearances', but the 'reality' behind these: the inner nature of the world, or its 'constitutive forms'. Or art is seen as reflecting not the 'lifeless world', but the world as seen in the mind of the artist. The elaboration and sophistication of argument of these kinds are remarkable.


16 These writers, together with Balzac, appear to constitute the 'great tradition' of classical realism for Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Lukács.

17 This is a tragedy set in sixteenth-century Germany. It dramatizes an incident in the civil wars, an abortive rebellion against the princes led by the hero of the play, von Sickingen, a supporter of Luther.


19 Ibid., pp. 208-9.

21. Ibid., p. 44.

22. See, for example, Swingewood in Laurensone and Swingewood, The Sociology of Literature, p. 45. In any case, it appears that Marx did not intend the introduction to be published with the Contribution - in the preface written in 1859, he particularly mentions omitting a general introduction 'which [he] had jotted down' - and it was found amongst his papers after his death.


24. Ibid., p. 216.

25. An adult cannot become a child again or he becomes childish. But does the naiveté of the child not give him pleasure, and does not he himself endeavour to reproduce the child's veracity on a higher level? Does not the child in every epoch represent the character of the period in its natural veracity? Why should not the historical childhood of humanity, where it attained its most beautiful form, exert an eternal charm because it is a stage that will never recur? There are rude children and precocious children. Many of the ancient peoples belong to this category. The Greeks were normal children. The charm their art has for us does not conflict with the immature stage of the society in which it originated. On the contrary its charm is a consequence of this and is inseparably linked with the fact that the immature social conditions which gave rise, and which alone could give rise, to this art cannot recur.

(Macmillan, p. 217).

Marx's utopian streak is in evidence here. He envisages a past as well as a future golden age and explains our pleasure in Greek art as the result of a nostalgic delight in a reflection of the childhood of man (shades of Rousseau!) when he was in harmony with nature, before the advent of our modern and transitory age of alienation and fragmentation. This is, of
course, also Hegel’s view in his aesthetic. There is something in this idea that is disquietingly reminiscent of certain religious interpretations of life as a transitory stage of chaos between two forms of perfect integration and reconciliation.


28 See quotation bottom of p. 30.

29 See quotation bottom of p. 30.

30 See, for example, Steiner, Language and Silence, pp. 305-7.

31 See, for example, Laurensen and Swingewood, The Sociology of Literature.

32 F. Engels, letter to Margaret Harkness, 1888, in Craig, Marxists on Literature, p. 270.

33 Steiner, Language and Silence, p. 306.

34 F. Engels, letter to Minna Kautsky, 1885, in Craig, Marxists on Literature, p. 268.

35 Engels, letter to Margaret Harkness, p. 269.

36 Ibid., p. 271.

37 Engels, letter to Minna Kautsky, p. 269.

38 Williams, Marxism and Literature, p. 75.

39 Ibid., p. 82.

40 Ibid., pp. 76-7.

41 These are the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon. The actual text of the Preface specifies
the ideological forms in which men become conscious of an ideological conflict and fight it out: these are legal, political, religious, aesthetic, and philosophic.

42 K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, quoted by Williams in Marxism and Literature, p. 76.

43 For example: 'on which arises a ... superstructure', 'to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness', 'material life conditions ... intellectual life' (The Preface). 'Upon the social conditions of existence a whole superstructure is reared', 'the whole class produces and shapes these out of its material foundation' (The Eighteenth Brumaire).

44 Others are: the letter to Joseph Bloch discussed earlier, and an essay by Engels on 'Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy' in which he recognizes that 'the interconnection between conceptions and their material conditions of existence becomes more and more complicated, more and more obscured by intermediate links.'


46 Ibid.

47 Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 197.

48 Easton and Guddat, Writings of the Young Marx p. 294.

49 Ibid.

50 This is one of the basic tenets of Marx's that Goldmann will controvert in his attempt to 'update' Marxist aesthetics. See note 54.

51 For Marx these 'laws' appear to resemble an Aristotelian idea of measure.

52 See The Holy Family for his criticism of idealism.

53 Lifshitz, The Philosophy of Art of Karl Marx, p. 77.
As it is for Goldmann - another non-orthodox aspect of his theory. See note 50.

I refer here to writing, but later Marxists, such as Roland Barthes, would include reading. See Ch.11.2 of this dissertation.

Chapter 2 Dogmatic Marxism

1Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. ix.

2If 'dilemma' seems too strong a word, it should be noted that these are not peripheral issues for Marxism, confined to the field of aesthetics: what is involved is the past versus the present, culture versus science, subject versus object, 'is' versus 'ought', and so on.

3Those who support the content-form distinction might argue that even where content is conditioned or decreed, the writer enjoys freedom of form; but I believe the dichotomy to be an artificial one, and 'freedom of form', in this case, to refer only to a type of stylistic-variations-on-a-theme, whose very lack of integration with the content constitutes its lack of value as art.


6In his book, Marxism and Literary Criticism, pp. 40-1.


11V. I. Lenin, On Literature and Art (Moscow, 1967).
Chapter 3 Elements of a Marxist Sociology of Literature


8 See, for example, the 1800 Preface to his *Lyrical Ballads*, in E. D. Jones (ed.), *English Critical Essays (Nineteenth Century)*, (London, 1956).

Part II  Lukács and Orthodox Marxist Aesthetics

Chapter 4  An Introduction to Georg Lukács


3In Laurensom and Swingewood, Sociology of Literature. Swingewood's account of Lukács indirectly supports my contention that it is possible to separate the true Marxism from the forced Stalinism, for he abstracts the latter and concentrates upon that alone. This results in a grossly one-sided, oversimplified account of Lukács and a cursory dismissal which owes more to a narrow, prejudiced perspective than to a broad, objective assessment.

4Taylor, Aesthetics and Politics, p. 152.

5Burns, Sociology of Literature and Drama, pp. 164-5.

6Some of these arguments are collected in Aesthetics and Politics.


Chapter 5  The Promise of the Early Works

1G. Lukács, Soul and Form (London, 1974).

2Ibid., pp. 56-7.
Apart from the notion of the transcendental subject.

Soul and Form, p. 144.

I refer to Plato the idealist philosopher and essayist, not Plato the dogmatic literary critic and pedagogue discussed in Part I. It was Emil Lask, professor of philosophy at Heidelberg University, whose semi-phenomenological position influenced Lukács and whose work provided the logical grounds that legitimated Lukács's neo-Platonic tendencies.

Soul and Form, p. 113.

Compare Goldmann's idea of a limited number of possible worldviews with historical variants. Admittedly his belief rests upon a psychological preconception rather than an idealist one. In The Hidden God he writes: 'Since a "world vision" is the psychic expression of the relation between certain human groups and their social or physical environment the number of such visions which can be found in any fairly long historical period is necessarily limited', and 'Since the number of coherent replies that can be given to these problems is limited by the very structure of the human personality, each of the replies given may correspond to different and even contradictory historical situations'. However, 'the same vision can assume different aspects.' The un-Marxist belief in a universal human nature that emerges clearly here will be discussed in Ch. 10.

Ibid., p. 115.

Ibid., p. 40.

Ibid., p. 7.

Ibid., p. 8.

Ibid., p. 1.

Ibid., p. 9.
Realism is a word of many meanings. Here again 'the real' is the ideal is the non-material transcendental realm of Platonic-type ideas. Lukács uses the word loosely: 'the real' is also used of life and concrete experiences, but 'souls and destinies' is an expression used to suggest an 'ideal reality' beyond this.

Compare, for example, the first essay in Soul and Form (1910), whose object is to demonstrate that criticism is an art form, with Roland Barthes's contention that criticism is creative writing (literature) in his essay 'The Two Criticisms' (1963), in R. Barthes, Critical Essays (Evanston, 1972).

Soul and Form was published in 1910, Saussure's Cours de Linguistique Générale only in 1916.

What is not Hegelian is the fact that these stages do not constitute an evolutionary progression of the good-better-best or lowest-to-highest kind. Lukács appears inconsistent here: he says that 'drama, lyric poetry and the epic, whatever the hierarchy in which we may place them, are not the thesis, antithesis and synthesis of a dialectical process; each of them is a means, qualitatively quite heterogeneous from the others, of giving form to the world', but he also claims that 'he was looking for a general dialectic of literary genres'.

The Theory of the Novel, p. 35.

Ibid., p. 41.

See Chapter 6 for discussion of how his Marxist account of the history of the bourgeois novel, conversely, shows traces of the Hegelian method.

Lukács, p. 25.

Lukács, Ch.2.

See Jameson, Marxism and Form, pp. 180-2.

The Theory of the Novel, p. 34.

Ibid., p. 64.

Ibid., p. 32.

Ibid., p. 62.

Ibid., pp. 63-4.

Ibid., p. 20.

In some of the works of Thomas Mann, for example.

Quoted by Fokkema and Kunne-Ibsch, Theories of Literature in the Twentieth Century, p. 116.

The Theory of the Novel, p. 21.
Although some of the necessary pre-conditions for such a theory are already present, firstly, in the distinction between the epic as objective reflection and the novel as subjective creation; and secondly, in the suggestion that the former reflects a real totality while the latter creates an ideal unity.

While Lukács may have drawn on Hegel here, this is an antithesis common to many nineteenth-century philosophers, sociologists, and others who were concerned with the effects of historical change, e.g. Simmel.

As mentioned earlier Marx, too, has a highly romantic view of ancient Greece, which he describes as the innocent childhood of man. Perhaps all utopian thinkers see a golden future as a return to, or revival of, a golden past. The implication is that man is naturally good, corrupted by society, and society must be altered so that he can fulfill his true nature. George S. her writes in "Most history seems to carry on its back vestiges of paradise. At some time in more or less remote times, things were better, almost golden. A deep concordance lay between man and the natural setting. The myth of the fall runs stronger than any particular religion. There is hardly a civilisation, perhaps hardly an individual consciousness, that does not carry inwardly, and answer to, intimations of a sense of distant catastrophe. Somewhere a wrong turn was taken in that "dark and sacred wood", after which man has had to labour, socially, psychologically, against the natural grain of being. In current western culture or "post-culture" that squandered utopia is intensely important."
Although some of the necessary pre-conditions for such a theory are already present, firstly, in the distinction between the epic as objective reflection and the novel as subjective creation; and secondly, in the suggestion that the former reflects a real totality while the latter creates an ideal unity.

Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. 182.

While Lukács may have drawn on Hegel here, this is an antithesis common to many nineteenth-century philosophers, sociologists, and others who were concerned with the effects of historical change, e.g. Simmel.

The Theory of the Novel, p. 30.

Ibid., p. 32.

Ibid., p. 46.

Ibid., p. 30.


The Theory of the Novel, p. 32.

Ibid., p. 56.

Ibid., p. 55.

As mentioned earlier Marx, too, has a highly romantic view of ancient Greece, which he describes as the innocent childhood of man. Perhaps all utopian thinkers see a golden future as a return to, or revival of, a golden past. The implication is that man is naturally good, corrupted by society, and society must be altered so that he can fulfill his true nature. George Steiner writes in In Bluebeard's Castle: 'Most history seems to carry on its back vestiges of paradise. At some time in more or less remote times, things were better, almost golden. A deep concordance lay between man and the natural setting. The myth of the fall runs stronger than any particular religion. There is hardly a civilisation, perhaps hardly an individual consciousness, that does not carry inwardly, and answer to, intimations of a sense of distant catastrophe. Somewhere a wrong turn was taken in that "dark and sacred wood", after which man has had to labour, socially, psychologically, against the natural grain of being. In current western culture or "post-culture" that squandered utopia is intensely important.'
62 The Theory of the Novel, p. 70.
63 Ibid., p. 35.
64 Ibid.
65 For Hegel literary history demonstrates an evolution of forms in terms of the proportion of matter to spirit that they display. They move from the totally materialistic symbolic forms of Oriental art to the Romantic expression of spirit in language in which matter begins to fall away, and eventually art will transcend itself and become philosophy, thus completing the movement of intellect from the naive projections of religion through the materialisations of art to the self-consciousness of philosophy.
66 The Theory of the Novel, p. 37.
67 Ibid., pp. 60-2, passim.
68 Ibid., p. 84.
69 Ibid., p. 85.
70 Ibid., p. 116.
71 Ibid., p. 118.
72 Ibid., p. 124.
73 Ibid., p. 99.
74 Ibid., pp. 90-100.
75 Ibid., p. 113.
76 Ibid., p. 133.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., pp. 133-4.
79 It is interesting that Lukács sees Goethe's elitism in Wilhelm Meister as a formal aesthetic problem not an
ethical one. Thus he describes Goethe's handling of the
nobility as follows: 'Certainly, by the nature of the
marriages which conclude the novel, the nobility as a
social estate is interiorized with the maximum epic and
sensuous intensity, so that the objective superiority of
a class is transformed to mean a better opportunity for
a freer, more generous way of life for anyone possessing
the necessary inner potentialities. But in spite of this
ironic reservation, a social class is nevertheless raised
to a height of substantiality to which it cannot inwardly
be equal ... In other words, the world thus confined
within a single class - the nobility - and based upon it,
partakes of the problem-free radiance of the epic' - and
thus fails as a novel. See p. 141.

80 The Theory of the Novel, p. 145. This significant
observation could have led to a Barthesian-type exposé
of the myth of the nineteenth-century realistic novel if
only Lukács had pursued its implications.

81 Ibid.

82 In The Sociology of Literature.

83 The Theory of the Novel, p. 60.

84 Ibid., p. 29.

85 Ibid., p. 32.

86 Ibid., p. 37.

87 Ibid., p. 38.

88 Ibid., pp. 40-1.

89 Ibid., p. 49.

90 See discussion in Jameson, Marxism and Form, pp. 178-82.

91 History and Class Consciousness, p. 126.

92 Ibid.
Chapter 6  A Lukácsian History of Bourgeois Literature


2Ibid., pp. 9-10.

3Ibid., p. 11.


5Ibid., pp. 15-16.

6G. Lukács, Writer and Critic, p. 25.

7Ibid., p. 26. Lukács is quoting Marx.

8Ibid. Lukács is quoting Lenin.

9Ibid., p. 34.

10Ibid., p. 43.

11Ibid., p. 53.

12The Historical Novel, p. 20.

13Ibid., p. 96.

14Ibid., p. 284.


16The Historical Novel, p. 286.

17The Meaning of Contemporary Realism, p. 25, Lukács is quoting the German poet Gottfried Benn.

18The Historical Novel, p. 221.

19The Meaning of Contemporary Realism, p. 29.

20See, for example, Studies in European Realism, p. 167.
Chapter 7  The Theoretical Foundations


2. See Chapter 4.

3. See Keat and Urry, Social Theory as Science, p. 183.


6. History and Class Consciousness, p. xlvi.


8. Writer and Critic, p. 27.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., p. 100. We shall see in Part III how Goldmann drew on Lukács here.


13. Ibid., p. 66.
Studies in European Realism, p. 137.

History and Class Consciousness, p. 137.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 138.


In History and Class Consciousness.

The history of aesthetics shows that theorists, including Marx, find appreciation more difficult to explain than creation.

Presumably he is referring to the combination of re-shaping and reflecting that he describes in 'Art and Objective Truth'.


None of these words are really satisfactory - perhaps 'reproducing' is truer to what Lukács intends.

This is what Lukács means by partisanship as opposed to propaganda.

One of the aims of the sociology of literature has been to disprove this notion.

Chapter 8 Literary Realism

The Historical Novel, p. 290.

Bywater (trans.), Aristotle: On the Art of Poetry, p. 43

Ibid., p. 35.


The Historical Novel, p. 289.
6. Ibid., p. 403. The inadequacy referred to is the lack of insight associated with forms other than realism.

7. Ibid.

8. The Meaning of Contemporary Realism, p. 49.

9. Ibid., p. 50.

10. Ibid., pp. 50-1.

11. Ibid., p. 53.

12. Ibid., p. 17.

13. Ibid., p. 19.


15. Ibid., p. 45.

16. Ibid., p. 66.

17. Ibid., p. 74.


23. Defined by R. Coward and J. Ellis in Language and Materialism (London, 1977) as 'the generally received picture of what may be regarded as "realistic" or as "that reality articulated by the society as the "Reality"'.
24 See Ibsen's *Ghosts* for a realistic representation of the conventional, social world that makes his heroes and heroines what they are, and a poetic, symbolic expression of their romantic aspirations - the former brilliant, the latter unsatisfactory. See also George Eliot's *Daniel Deronda* which falls into two neat sections - brilliant realistic social criticism and an extremely disappointing romantic presentation of an alternative.


Part III Lucien Goldmann

1 Strictly speaking, I have conflated two issues here, the relation between a writer and his work and the relation between the work and the world. The unacknowledged pre-conception is that a determined writer's work reflects the determining world, a problematic notion that gave rise to the theory of dissociation. The issue is further complicated by a specific view of the true nature of reality and a normative idea of the relation that must hold between that reality and the text.

2 These are, of course, not the only options, but those relevant to this discussion.

3 Besides the more usual subject-object duality.

4 See, for example, his *Cultural Creation* (Oxford, 1977) p. 106:

To comprehend a phenomenon is to describe its structure and to isolate its meaning. To explicate a phenomenon is to explain its genesis on the basis of a developing functionality.
which begins with a subject. And there is no radical difference between comprehension and explication ...
Research is always situated at the two levels of structure and functionality.

See also his discussion with Adorno of description, understanding and explanation, pp. 129-145.

5Diachronic, historical, determined, reflection, explanation, value versus synchronic, structure, autonomous, creation, interpretation, fact.


8Ibid., pp. 10-11.
To say that in the first quotation Goldmann is referring to content while in the second and third he is dealing with form is not an acceptable answer, since his method's claim to be structuralist is based upon his conception of the worldvision as that system of formal relations underlying the superficial level of content - as his analysis of Racinian drama illustrates.

9See, for example, Towards a Sociology of the Novel, p. vii.

10Ibid., pp. 15, 18 and 170.

11See The Hidden God, p. 7.

12L. Goldmann, "Genetic Structuralism" in the Sociology of Literature", reproduced in English in Burns (eds.), Sociology of Literature and Drama.

Chapter 9 General Theory

1See Goldmann, Lukács and Heidegger, pp. 67, 76, 88-90. Also Cultural Creation, pp. 93-6.

2See further on in this chapter discussion of how Goldmann, too, eliminates becoming, praxis, and the generating subject.

4. Ibid., p. 7.

5. Cultural Creation, p. 35.


7. I have already discussed the question of the orthodoxy of so-called Hegelian Marxism apropos of Lukács. See Chapter 7.


9. See Williams, Marxism and Literature, p. 4.

10. See, for example, Mayrl's introduction to Goldmann's Cultural Creation, pp. 3-29.

11. In the case of the Frankfurt School because their aim was to liberate human consciousness, in the case of Goldmann because his primary interest lay in the literary and philosophical products of that consciousness.

12. For a detailed account of these alternative positions see G. Adey and D. Frisby (eds. and trans.) The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (London, 1976).


15. See Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests.

16. See 'Dialectical Thought and Transindividual Subject' in Cultural Creation, pp. 89-107.

17. There is ample justification for Goldmann's criticism, but it could be argued that functionality is what accounts for this transformation rather than any other.
The 'text' referred to here is Marx's Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.

19 Cultural Creation, p. 94.

20 Ibid., pp. 9-10.

21 Ibid., p. 95.

22 Power and Humanism, p. 39.


25 Jameson, Marxism and Form, p. 222: 30-33.

26 It must be noted that purists claim that the term 'structuralism', strictly speaking, applies only to those theories that are based on Saussure's linguistic model. Indeed Jameson expressly excepts Piaget and Goldmann. See F. Jameson, The Prison-House of Language (Princeton, 1974), p. ix.


28 Compare to Lukács in Soul and Form.

29 Keat and Urry, Social Theory as Science, p. 120.

The italics are mine.

30 For a discussion of this see M. Hollis, Models of Man (Cambridge, 1977), Ch. 1. See also the Preface to The Hidden God where Goldmann himself acknowledges that 'every philosophy implies an anthropology'.

31 'Genetic Structuralism' in the Sociology of Literature', pp. 115-17.

32 Ibid., p. 118.

33 Particularly in view of the element of inevitable unfolding in Marx himself.
Although it is the recognition of the need to survive that is usually held to distinguish materialism from idealism, Goldmann has assimilated it to the latter. Neither Marx nor Lukács are the source of Goldmann's particular understanding of human needs and functionality.


Chapter 10     Cultural Creation

1 See last paragraph of quotation on pp. 345-6.

2 The Hidden God, p. 7.

3 'Genetic Structuralism', pp. 111-112.

4 This is superficially similar to the Lukács of History and Class Consciousness where aesthetics and creation provide the model for philosophy and life, but there are essential differences. It is not merely a question of psychological jargon imposed upon a Marxist framework that has clouded rather than clarified the issues, it is a question of certain basics that Lukács would label positivistic and bourgeois.

5 Ibid., p. 113. This preliminary definition of Goldmann's concept of a worldview will be enlarged upon later in Part III.

6 See The Hidden God, Part I Chapter 1.

7 Ibid., p. 113.

Towards a Sociology of the Novel, p. 6.

There is another equally unsatisfactory and more radical solution to the problem of the homogeneous consciousness of bourgeois society and that is to bypass consciousness altogether and posit a sort of unconscious reflection — as Goldmann does in Towards a Sociology of the Novel. See Chapter 11, section 1 of this dissertation.

Genetic Structuralism', p. 114.

Ibid.

'Group' here, we recall, is an analytical category. These are individuals not conspirators.

A typically bourgeois idea.

'Genetic Structuralism', p. 115.

Which in itself is permissible, but is a far cry from Marxism's understanding of the notion of class and the relation between class and consciousness.

See quotation pp. 353-4.

P. Worsley et al., Introducing Sociology (Harmondsworth, 1974).


The Hidden God., p. 15.

Ibid.

In T. Eagleton, Criticism and Ideology (London, 1976).

To mention a few of the explanations given for insight.
Chapter 11 Theory of the Novel

1 Towards a Sociology of the Novel, pp. 1-5 passim.

2 Ibid., p. 2.

3 Ibid., pp. 1-10 passim.

4 Ibid., p. 8.

5 Ibid., p. 10.

6 Ibid., p. 11.

7 L. Goldmann, 'Structure: Human Reality and Methodological Concept' in Macksey and Donato, The Structuralist Controversy, p. 100.

8 Ibid., p. 106.


10 Goldmann, Towards a Sociology of the Novel, p. 149.

11 Ibid., p. 11.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., p. 12.

15 Ibid., p. 10.

16 Ibid., p. 13.


18 Ibid., p. 13.

19 Ibid., p. 169.

20 Ibid., p. 13.
21 Coward and Ellis, *Language and Materialism*.


24 See Coward and Ellis, *Language and Materialism*, p. 44.
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