Conflict early warning system: its challenges and the continental early warning system

by

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International Relations
Student declaration

I declare that Conflict early warning system: its challenges and the continental early warning system is my own work. It is hereby submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in International Relations at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination to any other university.

Signed: [Signature]

September 2017 in Johannesburg
Acknowledgements

This research report is dedicated to my father, Segomotso Anthony Sega. He has been my pillar of strength throughout this journey. Thank you for your constant support and words of encouragement. Thank you for being my light. To my late mother, Golaotseone Venetia Sega, thank you for everything that you have done for me in the short time we spent together. The great memories I have of you have kept me going.

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Abstract

The international community's security dynamics have undergone significant changes since the 1990s. Famine, economic insecurity, and ethnic and religious animosities have greatly contributed to the emergence of conflicts globally. Preventive approaches, tools and structures in dealing with emerging conflicts rapidly became a global trend. Early warning systems (EWS) were such preventive tools that bodies such as the African Union (AU) and the three regional economic communities (RECs) in Southern and West Africa and the Horn of Africa adopted to prevent conflicts on the African continent.

EWS are essential in anticipating and preventing emerging conflict/s and serve as a basis for decision making and early action and response. Despite the existence of EWS in the AU and three of its RECs, the levels of insecurity on the continent continue to raise questions as to whether the EWS have achieved their mandate.

With reference to the UN's recommended five elements of an effective EWS, the study aims to identify whether the AU's continental early warning system (CEWS) and its three RECs have included the UN's five key recommended elements in modelling their EWS.

The study reveals that even though the EWS have been implemented at regional and sub-regional levels to prevent the emergence of conflicts, they have not been sustainably effective in doing so. This is because these EWS have not included some of the key recommended elements that the UN has endorsed. The study also highlights that EWS do not operate in a vacuum, there are various factors such as lack of resources, communication, civil society participation and politics that can constrain its purpose.
Chapter 1: Background to the study

1.1 Introduction

The pursuit of security on the African continent using EWSs has been one of the focus areas within the African Union’s (AU) Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and among the RECs and it is the main interest of this research report. This chapter provides a foundation for the subsequent chapters in the report. It identifies the research question that the study will seek to answer, the objectives of the research and the structure of the study.

1.2 Africa’s early warning systems and the security complex

The international community’s interest in conflict prevention largely blossomed in the 1990s after the global community experienced an increase in conflicts from the 1960s until the 1990s. Between 1963 and 1998 the African continent experienced 23 armed conflicts, which resulted in 5.2 million refugees, 13 million people being internally displaced and seven million deaths (Kühnhardt, 2014).

These armed conflicts largely unfolded in the sub-regions of Sub-Saharan Africa. While the Ogaden War was raging in the Horn of Africa in the 1980s, Southern Africa was afflicted by guerrilla wars and conflicts in Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique. In the 1990s civil wars raged in Liberia and Sierra Leone in West Africa, the Congo Wars largely affected the Eastern part of the Congo, there were genocides in Rwanda and Burundi, liberation struggles in South Africa and the collapse of Somalia. These wars were mainly fuelled by the Cold War and ethnic intrastate conflicts (Adebajo, 2012).

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which was in existence during that period, had considerable successes in conflict management in all sub-regions of the continent. This includes the organisation’s efforts to resolve border disputes between Algeria and Morocco, Mali and Burkina Faso, Somalia and Kenya and Ethiopia and Somalia. The organisation also played a significant role in ending apartheid in South Africa (Kühnhardt, 2014).
However, the OAU’s attempts to promote peace and security on the continent during its first three decades between 1963 and 2002 were largely unsatisfactory. Factors such as limitations on the OAU’s mandate and conflict management institutions; the lack of political will among its members; the lack of capacity, experience and financial resources; and the impact of external intervention on the OAU’s capacity to manage conflicts have been pointed out as barriers to OAU dealings in the area of conflict prevention and management (Zartman & Touval, 2007).

Moreover, Article 4a and 4g of the OAU’s charter reinforced the principles of non-interference in the internal matters of member states and the sovereignty of member states (OAU Charter, 1963). Article 4(a) (b) have also been identified as hampering the OAU’s role in resolving intrastate conflicts. This was illustrated by the eruption of the Nigerian civil war and conflicts in Angola, Liberia, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea-Bissau, Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, the Comoros, Nigeria, Lesotho and Eritrea-Ethiopia. These conflicts ranged from small intrastate conflicts such as the secession-based conflict in the Comoros to bigger conflicts like that in the DRC, which began as an intrastate dispute and later took on a sub-regional dimension that had a great impact in both Central and Southern Africa. One of the OAU’s most troubling conflicts took place in the first decade of its existence. The republic of Biafra’s attempt to secede from Nigeria showed how the OAU was restricted from preventing the conflict because of its policy of non-intervention in the internal matters of a sovereign state. According to the OAU Charter, Biafra’s position not only threatened the territorial integrity of Nigeria, but the war was an internal matter and therefore one to be settled by Nigerians and not the OAU. This non-intervention principle was problematic in other conflict situations as well, especially in Ethiopia and Somalia, where for over 30 years the OAU was unable to act (Kühnhardt, 2014).

Another series of conflicts took place that the OAU were unable to prevent during the 1990s. In Rwanda, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RFP) invaded Northern Rwanda and
Uganda to force the sharing of political power. Between the years 1990 and 1992, the OAU tried to mediate the situation in the country by sending the Military Observer Group into Rwanda in 1991 (Thompson, 2007).

Following that, peace negotiations took place in Arusha in 1992 that saw the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi signed in 1993 to end the three-year Rwandan Civil War. In 1994, tensions in Rwanda erupted into violence, resulting in thousands of people being uprooted from their homes and massacred (Lind & Sturman, 2002). The scale of the genocide increased and the UN was not able to assist the OAU. The OAU agreed to deploy an estimated 6,000 troops, but the troops were delayed for five months due to a lack of logistical and other equipment. The troops that were eventually deployed by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda were overwhelmed by the situation and were withdrawn even as the genocide escalated with an estimated 800,000 people killed over a period of only three months (Kühnhardt, 2014).

In Burundi, after two consecutive murders of Hutu presidents in 1994, the OAU attempted to resolve the crisis through various measures. These measures included frequent visits by the secretary general of the OAU to Burundi as well as the deployment of the AU’s 52-person observer mission in 1997 (Rodt, 2011). The organisation also facilitated peace dialogues, but later withdrew the 52-person observer mission following a coup in 1996. In 1998, the OAU urged a revival of the Arusha Agreement that was signed by the government of Rwanda and the rebel RPF. This agreement eventually failed after the death of former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, who played an instrumental role in mediating a peace dialogue. In 1999, former South African president Nelson Mandela, was appointed as chief mediator to bring peace in Burundi, where already over 200,000 people had died since 1994 (Kühnhardt, 2014).

In 1997, two of the four islands in Comoros, Anjouan and Moheli, declared themselves independent from Grande Comoros. This resulted in the government sending troops to the islands and 40 people dying from this. The OAU attempted to restore calm by facilitating talks between the separatists and government, but this failed. The OAU then deployed a
24-person observer mission to monitor the situation. The mission had access to all the islands except Anjouan, which retaliated and drafted a constitution for their island. The OAU tried to launch a mediation agreement, the Antananarivo Agreement, which gave the two islands autonomy, but not independence. The Anjouanese delegation did not sign the agreement and this resulted in a coup in 1999 where several people lost their lives (Vogt & Muyangwa, 2000).

In the DRC in 1997, Laurent Kabila’s Alliance of Forces for the Democratic Republic of Congo (AFDL) ousted former president of the DRC, Mobutu Sese Seko. Kabila became President and in 1998 a rebellion broke out. Rwandan and Ugandan leaders who had previously supported Kabila in ousting Mobutu joined the rebels fighting Kabila. This resulted in the OAU attempting to restore calm by dispatching a fact-finding mission in the country and encouraging SADC to seek a solution to the crisis. The OAU has since then initiated discussions that culminated the ceasefire agreement and the mechanisms for setting up an OAU observer mission, but these discussions did not generate much success. Leaders from Tanzania and Uganda continued the regional efforts and eventually Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni signed a peace agreement with Kabila in 1999 (Mutisi, 2016).

During the same year, Kabila signed a defence pact with leaders of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe that committed the four leaders to a joint response in the event that one of them was attacked. The OAU had been active in its diplomatic efforts with measures such as the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1291 according to which a peacekeeping mission was to be sent to the DRC.

Furthermore, the territorial dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia resulted in thousands of civilians being killed. The OAU and the IGAD had been involved in seeking solutions to the crisis by establishing a high-level delegation that resulted in the formulation of a framework agreement (Clark, 2002). However, both countries expressed reservations about certain aspects of the agreement. A peace agreement was signed by October 2000, and the UN together with the OAU deployed observers to the disputed border region (Kühnhardt, 2014).
It should be noted that the OAU already had a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, which was established in 1993. This mechanism was put into place to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. It was guided by the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of states and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity (Cilliers, 2005). The OAU had also planned to establish several key units as part of its security mechanism. These included an EWS capacity to identify and gather information on impending conflict situations. This information would then be used to identify and implement appropriate actions for anticipating and preventing the outbreak or escalation of conflicts. A field operations unit, designed to enable the OAU to undertake observation and monitoring missions, was also established (Vogt & Muyangwa, 2000).

The mechanism was expected to ‘collect, collate and disseminate information relating to current and potential conflicts; prepare and present policy options to the Secretary General of the OAU; commission analysis and long-term research and support and manage political, civilian and military observer mission’ (Cilliers & Sturman, 2004:3). However, the early warning system (EWS) was never fully developed as there was no functional mechanism that could provide early warning information. Furthermore, the OAU did not develop a generally accepted conceptual framework for an early warning or a practical system under active management. This was largely because parties were sceptical about the viability of an EWS. This led to two member states not supporting the establishment of the mechanism. Issues that emerged included different interpretations of territorial integrity, forms of interventions and how an EWS may be repressed by governments who react defensively to external criticism. This eventually inhibited the development of an EWS (Nhara, 1998).

1.3. Conflict prevention as a norm

With the implementation of preventive policies, structures and tools by various international actors to assist in preventing conflicts before they emerge, conflict prevention rapidly
became a key focus of the new global security\textsuperscript{1} and global governance agenda in the post-Cold War era (Ackermann, 2003). During the Cold War, academics viewed conflict preventive action as synonymous with pre-emptive strikes (Wallensteen, 1998). This means that they considered conflict preventive actions to be attacks with nuclear weapons used to demolish an enemy’s capacity to plan an imminent attack. This changed after the Cold War as the emphasis shifted to peaceful prevention of emerging or possible conflicts. This was largely because the international community became cognisant of the fact that pre-emptive actions or using armed forces to settle political disputes can greatly destabilise efforts of economic, social and international development (Lund, 1996).

Conflict prevention is often divided into two categories. The first is direct prevention, which refers to action or measures to prevent an emerging conflict, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of conflict (Ghali, 1992). Such measures include economic sanctions, preventive diplomacy, deployments, and in extreme cases, military force (Weissmann & Swanstrom, 2005).

The second category, structural prevention, centres more on long-term actions or measures that address the root causes of a potential conflict. Such measures include economic development assistance, increased dialogues and political participation, legal and constitutional reform, resource-sharing agreements and security sector reform (Chen et al., 2005). The categories sometimes overlap, especially in the policy field, as measures such as military disarmament can have a structural prevention and direct prevention effect.

The concept conflict prevention has a wide range of definitions that has led to a lack of consensus on what it means. Scholars such as Michael Lund define conflict prevention in

\textsuperscript{1} The international agenda changed in fundamental ways following the Cold War. In place of a conflict dominated by two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, a number of issues emerged in the international arena, including civil wars, terrorism, mass migration, ethnic cleansing, environmental decay and humanitarian intervention. The new global security that is the United Nations, had to provide the international community with a means of finding peaceful solutions to such issues by using measures such as preventative diplomacy to avert threats to international peace and security. In the 1960s the UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, used the term preventive diplomacy in an annual report, but it specifically referred to conflicts being kept localized so as to prevent their violent spill over into the superpower arena. However, in 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary General, redefined preventive diplomacy as a policy aimed at preventing conflicts from emerging and escalating into violence.
a narrow manner by focusing on limited ways of conflict prevention. He defines conflict prevention as ‘actions taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from destabilising effects of economic, social, political and international change’ (Lund, 1996:11)

Some scholars define conflict prevention very broadly. David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel define conflict prevention as ‘a medium and long-term proactive operational or structural strategy undertaken by a variety of actors, intended to identify and create the enabling conditions for a stable and more predictable international security environment’ (Carment & Schnabel, 2003:6)

Scholars have had many debates on which definition is more appropriate. Many discussions have emerged as to whether a narrow definition of conflict prevention is more researchable or whether a broader definition is more suitable as it allows for a holistic view of conflict prevention and human security. The concept has nevertheless gained much momentum and rhetoric power in the international community as organisations such as the United Nations (UN), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the AU emphasise the need to adopt a culture of conflict prevention where states shift from reacting to emerged conflicts to acting against emerging conflicts (Weissmann & Swanstrom, 2005). The concept has nonetheless been less than successful in practice, as innumerable states and organisations have adopted this concept, but have not been able to prevent disputes in a timely manner.

1.4. The rise of regional security arrangements (APSA/AU)

Taking into account the old adage that it is better to prevent than to cure and that African problems need African solutions, the OAU transformed into the AU in 2002. The AU developed numerous institutions and mechanism for peace, security, stability and economic development on the continent. The organisation established the APSA in 2002 to adopt conflict prevention tools and to disassociate the newly formed AU from the OAU’s
political past of non-interventionism. It was considered sacrosanct by the OAU for decades. The APSA was established to act as a legitimizing institution and a coordinating body on matters on the continent (Vines, 2013). The AU also established the Peace and Security Council (PSC) (Engei U & Porto J, 2013) to act as a ‘collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa’ [(PSC Protocol of AU, 2001: Article 2(1)).

In order to achieve this objective, the AU established several pillars. The African Standby Force (ASF) was established with the aim to prevent crises from escalating and to restore peace militarily. The Military Staff Committee (MSF) should advise and assist the PSC on issues with military and security requirements. The Panel of the Wise (PoW) consists of a five-person panel that supports the efforts of the PSC and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention. Lastly, the CEWS are set to anticipate and prevent conflicts on the continent. Collectively, these bodies fall under the APSA (Tiruneh, 2010). The APSA works collaboratively with the continent’s RECs (Markus & Mulugeta, 2013) to coordinate peace and security matters.

In order to fulfill this objective, the PSC was launched in May 2004 to find ways to resolve Africa’s conflicts and to build a peaceful and secure continent. The PSC was put in place to ‘anticipate and prevent conflicts, undertake peace-making and peace-building functions and authorise the mounting and deployment of peace support mission [PSC Protocol, 2002: Articles 3 (a), (b) and 7]. It needs support from the PoW, ASF, a Special Fund and the CEWS [PSC Protocol, 2002: Article 2 (2)].

1.5. The rise of EWS (CEWS and REC EWS)

The PSC not only needed to develop these institutions to assist in anticipating and preventing emerging conflict in Africa, it also needed functional continent-wide systems such as the CEWS to harmonise and coordinate data from the already developed EWSs and from those that are currently under development in all of the continent’s sub-regions. The CEWS was in essence needed to ensure that early warnings on emerging conflicts on
the continent occurred in an integrated manner so that there is a shared purpose among the REC, EWS and the CEWS on the continent.

The AU has ensured coherence in the allocation of duties and responsibilities in advancing peace, security and development with various REC through the CEWS (Appiah, 2013). It does this by collecting information through various monitoring systems. The data captured from these monitoring systems are gathered in an observation and monitoring centre called the situation room, which is located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (APSA, 2002). Based on the warnings received in the situation room, the personnel are expected to compile a report on the warnings and submit it to the AU Chairperson of the Commission so that early action can take place. Upon receiving the report, the AU Chairperson of the Commission engages with the PSC and the PoW to find early solutions to the warning. These three bodies are the decision makers and the principal users of the CEWS, they are expected to provide recommendations with respect to the early warning report given to them (AU, 2008). These responses could take the form of mediation by the PoW, or, depending on the severity of the situation, military forces could be deployed to respond. In order for early prevention to take place, REC are urged to continuously inform the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission on their activities in the fields of peace, security and stability. Each REC already has or is currently developing its own EWS. Once developed, each REC's observation and monitoring centre will link to the situation room in Addis Ababa and will provide any information on emerging threats to peace and security from their respective sub-regions (Framework for the Operationalisation of the CEWS, 2006). The constant communication flow and alerts between the REC and the CEWS on emerging conflicts

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2 Monitoring systems are information-gathering tools that generate alerts to the CEWS personnel in Addis Ababa. These range from software systems such as the CEWS portal, media reports and the AU field missions and offices around the continent.
support the production of timely and relevant early warnings and responses to emerging conflicts.

Even though RECs were established as economic communities within sub-regions that also maintain peace and security, there has not been a standardised framework to clearly coordinate the economic and peace and security objectives the RECs with the AU. Moreover, these RECs have already developed their own norms, institutions and mandates on security, which in some instances do not correlate with those of the AU. This in essence makes it difficult to assess the functioning of each EWS as each is guided by their own mandates. Therefore, the UN’s five elements are used in this study to provide a neutral measure to assess all.

1.6. Research question

The research attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of CEWS by applying the ‘five elements’ UN model to CEWS activities. The UN has recommended that EWSs have five elements that they deem critical for the effective functioning of an EWS. These five elements are:

1) it should be people-centred;
2) knowledge of the risks faced;
3) technical monitoring and warning service;
4) dissemination of meaningful warnings to those who are at risk;
5) public awareness of the emerging conflict and prevention of the conflict (UN, 2006).

This study aims to assess the CEWS and the EWSs of the different RECs by examining whether the AU and its sub-regional organisations modelled their EWSs on the ‘five elements’ as set out by the UN.

The fundamental research problem is captured in the following research question:
Assessing the effectiveness of the CEWS and its RECs EWS using the five elements set out by the UN.

1.7. Aim

This study assesses the strengths, weaknesses and challenges of the CEWS and the EWSs of the different RECs by applying the five elements set out by the UN. The author has chosen the UN’s criteria because the UN is an intergovernmental body that works to maintain international peace and security. The UN takes the lead in determining the existence of threats to peace and security globally. In pursuit of this aim, the study provides an overview of the REC EWSs in West Africa, the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa as well as the CEWS because they are all functional and they show a number of methodological similarities and contrasting mechanisms. This in essence makes these EWSs ideal for an assessment based on the UN’s five elements of an effective EWS. The study expatiates on the missing elements to draw conclusions on the prospects for future conflict prevention on the continent. Conflict prevention is assessed by studying specific cases where EWSs responded to or failed to respond to an emerging dispute.

1.8. Rationale

The role of the different EWSs that have been put into place on the African continent remain of great relevance. The AU and its RECs form a complex and diverse set of stakeholders on the continent that each pursue their own national interests.

1.9. Discussion of methods

1.9.1 Methodology

This is a qualitative study. The strength of this method is that it allows for the interpretation of the variable under study, which in this case is the EWSs’ objective of averting potential conflicts on the continent. The study is based on descriptive and explorative approaches, which are best applied in qualitative research. A descriptive approach attempts
to describe a situation or a problem systematically through a process of data collection. Such an approach presents an opportunity to reconstruct the 'what is' of a topic. The explorative approach is concerned with exploring the 'why' questions of research and contributes significantly to investigating the possibilities of undertaking a particular research study (Maree, 2007:51). The study employs three main methods: policy analysis, document analysis and interviews with experts in regional security arrangements in Africa. Due to the qualitative nature of the proposed study, the research uses both primary and secondary data sources. Key primary sources used include AU and REC statements and official mandates, agreements and reports of the UN, African Union, SADC, Economic Community of West African States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development.

Secondary sources used in this study deal with the themes of EWSs and conflict prevention as discussed in books, doctoral theses, interviews, podcasts, speeches and policy briefs, among others.

1.9.2 Limitations and delimitations

A limitation of this research is that it included no fieldwork. The author analysed the literature by using document and policy analysis. As such, the author's access to some content may have been limited. The documents analysed may be representative of an institutional perspective.

1.9.3 Significance of study

Conflict and peace studies are burgeoning fields in international relations. A thorough examination of whether EWSs on the continent are effective in preventing and managing conflict is of great importance. In the recent past, the quest for peace in Africa has been a concern to the AU. The hope is that this study will contribute to new knowledge in explaining the importance of having effective EWSs. The research also sets out to identify shortcomings and to be policy relevant by providing recommendations on areas where EWSs can improve. It is hoped that this study will serve as a helpful source of information to research council personnel, military and security personnel, international relations
researchers and university students in exploring why conflicts and violence occurred even after the AU and its RECs took measures to prevent conflicts.

1.10. Chapter Outline

☐ Chapter One: Introduction, research question, hypothesis, rationale, research aims and discussion of methods.

☐ Chapter Two: Literature review

☐ Chapter Three: Conceptual framework, Buzan's regional security arrangements and the UN five elements

☐ Chapter Four: CEWARN, Ecowarn, and SADC EWSs

☐ Chapter Five: CEWS

☐ Chapter Six: Conclusion – Factors of failure and lessons for success

1.11. Conclusion

In pursuing peace and security on the continent, the AU and its RECs have implemented tools such as EWSs to prevent emerging conflicts. However, the role, effectiveness, modelling and the development and operationalisation of EWSs in promoting security on the continent is under-researched. This research assesses the effectiveness of the CEWS and the EWSs of the different RECs using the five elements set out by the UN. The objective of the study is to elaborate on the UN’s recommended five elements with a view to illustrating the imperative of employing such elements towards effective early responses to emerging conflicts. The second chapter focuses on the debates surrounding the concept of EWS. The chapter in essence deals with the complexities of EWS on the continent.
Chapter Two: Literature Review

2.1. Introduction

The central concern of Chapter 2 is to provide a critical overview of literature on the topic of EWS and regional security in Africa. By engaging in scholarly debate, the research sets out to show what is known about EWS and what considerations are still lacking or in their infancy. The chapter also considers some of the critical factors that scholars have highlighted for EWSs to be effective.

This chapter divides into four themes. The first theme examines the concept of early warning. The second theme examines one of the oldest EWS, namely the one used by the NATO to show how NATO structured and developed their EWS over time. The discussion examines whether this system is suited for the NATO mandate to maintain peace and security. The third theme considers what makes for an effective EWS. Lastly, the fourth theme provides elements that the UN has recommended for EWSs to be effective.

2.2. Early warning systems (EWS)

The concept and practice of early warning is not new, the practice was utilised by the military during the Cold War to anticipate situations and for the prevention of surprise attacks from enemies. These EWS came into use because military tactics often have a surprise element to them. Surprises can rely on numerous factors, such as the location of the anticipated attack, the route of the attack, the timing of the attack and the form of the arms. Defenders therefore needed EWSs to mitigate such surprise tactics (Goldberg, 2003). These systems could issue early warnings about strategic attacks and track developments. These EWS anticipated the steps an enemy would take to arrange for a military action. These indications were largely quantitative. Military decision makers can be warned about potential attacks (Kriendle, 2006). Such military EWSs played an important role in NATO activities.
These systems proved to be successful in their endeavours to attack what was perceived as the enemy. Most notably, the NATO's Military Early Warning System proved to be a success during its assumption of the command for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (Duffield, 2008). Moreover, the Alliances’ Airborne Warning and Control System surveillance played a pivotal role in the Balkans (NATO, 2016).

Subsequently, in the 1990s, EWSs were utilised for humanitarian purposes and in relation to the prevention of natural disasters. Even though natural disasters such as floods, droughts, famines, tornadoes, hurricanes or tsunamis cannot be prevented, they sometimes can be forecasted. These EWS were originally put into place so that the effects of natural disasters can be mitigated when potential affected communities are warned and prepared. For these systems to be effective in carrying such a task, there should be a scientific monitoring system that processes event forecasting data. The scientific data should translate in such a way that the public understands these warnings. Lastly, these warnings have to be widely disseminated to those who could be affected by the natural disaster (Grasso, 2002). The United Nations Humanitarian Early Warning System, launched in 1995, was the first EWS with a specific focus on averting potential outbreaks of natural disasters such as droughts and famine. The system gradually improved with the advances in information technology, which popularised the concept and practice of early warning (Rupesinghe, 1993). This system has increased its capacity through agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), which continuously monitors potential famine outbreaks, and the World Meteorological Organisation, which forecasts tropical cyclones and natural disasters. The FAO's EWS proved to be a success during a summer drought in Russia in 2010 that led a rise in food prices. The agency monitored this crisis through its Monthly Food Price Index and raised the alarm to governments and the private sector on the potential effects of the drought.
The agency furthermore promptly called a meeting with the intergovernmental groups (IGGs) on grains and rice to provide them with forecast information on the drought. This meeting contributed to calming markets and averting the crisis (FAO, 2016). Threats such as natural disasters and outbreaks of violent conflicts and diseases increasingly threaten the security and livelihoods of humans. This influenced a shift from focusing on national security and defence to the security and safety of people, who are now at the crux of human security-focused domestic and international policy (Krummenacher & Schnabel, 2009).

Initially, EWS depended largely on open sources such as news reports for information. However, this method was flawed as it was difficult to gather information in remote areas where insufficient public information existed. There was a need to know about the potential conflicts and to connect such warnings with responses. Such thinking resulted in the emergence of different forms of EWSs. Some EWSs incorporated capacity for early response, while others provided analysis and recommendations for key actors (Matveeva, 2006).

Political EWSs can be grouped into first, second and third generation systems. Kumar Rupesinghe (2005) defines the three generations of EWSs as follows:

‘The first generation early warning systems were the systems where the entire early warning mechanism was based outside the conflict region (namely the West). The second generation amended this approach by basing the monitoring mechanism in the conflict zones, namely by having field monitors to gather primary data. The analysis, however, continued to be conducted outside the conflict region. The third generation early warning systems are entirely located in the conflict regions. They integrate early warning and early response together as simultaneous processes.’
The third generation EWSs are considered helpful because, unlike the other two systems, they connect theoretical analysis of violent conflict to a response. These systems furthermore have an inclusive approach where they involve non-state and state actors from different systematic levels (local, national, international levels) in addressing insecurity. These systems also point out other processes apart from monitoring emerging conflicts that can be endorsed, such as peace-building (Krummenacher & Schnabel, 2009).

However, these EWSs have faced great obstacles in averting potential disputes. Often the potential success of such systems are held hostage by multiple factors, most notably the lack of political will to act on the warnings. Moreover, challenges such as a lack of capacity, absence of information, lack of coordination and resources and the gap that exists between early warning and early actions, are the hardest to address (UN, 2011). Such factors have been blamed for the Rwandan genocide. Months prior to the Rwandan genocide, Canadian general Romeo Dallaire, who at the time was a commander of the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda, received data from the Rwandan army signalling plots by members of President Habyarimana’s entourage. Such information was continuously shared with the UN Secretary General for presentation to the Security Council. However, this did not generate much reaction as there was no response to these warnings (Bowers, 1997).

2.3. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Adopting different generations of EWS to fit current security challenges has not been an easy task, especially for alliances such as NATO, which was formed for military purposes in 1949. NATO’s EWS was put into place to respond to the alliance’s compelling external security threats. It was used to provide warnings of strategic attacks and to enhance the capacity of predicting potential attacks. The indicators of the EWSs were considered to be steps the ‘enemy’ would have to take to prepare for military action.
These alerts would be sent to the military, commanders in the army or political decision makers for immediate action to be taken (Montanaro & Schünemann, 2011).

NATO’s EWS proved to be successful in Bosnia and Kosovo. The EWS enabled NATO and its member states to take action in the Balkans and in Kosovo. As a result, the alliance was able to maintain peace and security in the Balkans and Kosovo and they created an environment where political processes could work. However, the dramatically changed context of security has had a significant impact on the NATO EWS. The alliance has played a minor role in fighting and combating terrorism. They could not avert the terrorist attacks that took place in the United States of America in 2001, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, Paris in 2014, Brussels in 2016. Scholars have argued that NATO has gradually become a regional collective arrangement instead of a defence alliance. Terrorist attacks have rallied concern as to whether NATO has any enduring role at all, especially in the field of conflict prevention. During the Cold War, NATO only focused on one enemy, the Soviet Union’s ideological and nuclear threats. In the wake of the Cold War, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the alliance had to transform itself tremendously, especially in the sphere of early warnings of new security threats such as rogue actors, cybercrime and human insecurity. The alliance needed to take up a role beyond the Euro-Atlantic Community and the Washington Treaty Area, which it did in Bosnia, the Balkans and Kosovo. However, emerging threats have proved to evolve more rapidly than NATO’s abilities to prevent and manage them. This is evident in how NATO patrolled the Mediterranean after the 9/11 attack and how it also operated in the Indian Ocean against Somali pirates when it could have played more of a preventive role (Rodrigues & Dubovyk, 2011).
Moreover, the alliance has repeatedly defined itself with a very militaristic approach given the varied nature and sources of insecurity today. The alliance adopted a militaristic response to conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. This in essence points out that the alliance has to determine when and how it needs to respond to emerging conflicts rather than acting in an ad hoc manner when conflicts or security challenges have already emerged.

2.4. What makes an early warning system effective?

There are several definitions of EWS. Dorcas Ettang defines it as an analytical tool that serves as an important foundation for conflict management and peace-building (Ettang, 2011). Alexander Austin defines an EWS as an ‘initiative that focuses on systematic data collection, analysis or formulation of recommendations including risk assessment and information sharing regardless of topic, whether quantitative, quality or a blend of both’ (Austin, 2004:12). According to Laurence Woocher, an EWS means ‘any initiative that occurs in the latent stages of a perceived potential armed conflict with the aim of reduction, resolution or transformation’ (Woocher, 2009:3). Walter Dorn in turn defines EWS as the act of alerting a recognised authority such as the United Nations Security Council to a new threat to peace and security at a sufficiently early stage (Dorn, 2004). All of these definitions in essence point out that the EWS provides information. Most definitions refer to a variety of activities and processes to warn against impending disasters, either natural or man-made. The goal is to allow for effective and timely responses and action to be taken to stop further escalation of violence.
However, EWSs have often not led to timely and effective action against potential conflicts. According to scholars, this is because of the ‘early warning–early action gap’ problem, which is the extensive time gap between early warning and early action. This problem stems from various factors, such as actors not knowing what to do with the information once it has been gathered because simply giving people information on an emerging conflict does not necessarily mean there will be an early response. Another reason is that data may arrive too late to be able to influence decision making during real-time operations. Furthermore, early warning data may not be valued and could be ignored by actors. This problem could also emerge from actors who lack actionable strategies to convert early warning into early response. Cliffe and White (2002) believe that lack of political will widens the gap between early warning and action. Lack of political will could indicate that the actors do not favour peace but are interested in conflicts for political or economic reasons. The scholars also believe that political actors may lack collaboration or have inadequate, inconsistent, incoherent, contradictory or harmful response strategies to early warnings, and these result in late responses (Cliffe & White, 2002).

The early warning–early action problem stretches back from Pearl Harbour in 1941; to the Israeli under-evaluation of the movement of Egyptian troops and the unexpected attack on Yom Kippur in 1973; the collapsed state of Somalia in 1991 (Sahnoun, 1994); the Rwandan genocide in 1994; the 2008 violent crisis in Kenya and the coup d'état in 2008 in Mauritania (Call, 2012). In 2013, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) published a report confirming that early warning signals for the Horn of Africa famine in 2011 did not produce sufficient action in time, leading to thousands of avoidable deaths. Similarly, related research has shown that the 2010 Pakistan floods were predictable.

Some scholars believe that when formulating an EWS, relevant questions should be asked to minimise the early action and early response problem. An EWS should respond to five question.
These questions are *who* to warn, *when*, of *what*, *how*, about *which* factors and issues. Hutchinson points out that in order for an EWS to be effective, questions such as ‘early warning of *what*? Early warning for *who*? *How* early is early enough?’ should be asked before formulating a EWS (Hutchinson & Weiss, 1999:9). Jackie Cilliers recommends that questions such as ‘*which* issues underpin and drive the conflict?’ ‘*Which* factors put a brake on conflict and serve as the basis for peace?’ ‘*What* are the practical options available to policy makers, who wish to affect the emerging conflict, avoid human suffering in the short term and move towards a sustainable settlement in the longer term?’, should be considered when formulating an EWS (Cilliers, 2005:17). On the other hand, Sussanne Schmeidl recommends that questions such as ‘*What* do we exactly mean by early warning?’ ‘*How* are we supposed to do it?’ ‘*Who* would be responsible for the system?’ should be asked when formulating an EWS (Schmeidl, 1998:10).

The Organisation of Security and Cooperation and Development in Europe (OSCE) addresses the questions of what and who to warn by defining EWS ‘as a process that alerts decision makers to the potential outbreak, escalation and resurgence of violent conflicts and promotes an understanding among decision makers of the nature and impact of violent conflicts’ (OECD, 2013). The Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) defines early warning comprehensively as addressing the what, who, how elements of EWS by saying that an EWS is a ‘systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purposes of anticipating the escalation of violent conflicts, development of strategic response to these crises and the presentation of options to critical actors for the purposes of decision making and preventive action’ (FEWER, 2012).

Scholars often have different opinions on which procedures an EWS should follow to minimise this problem. They have distinguished EWSs into various stages of collection, analysis and response.
According to Siccama, an EWS should be divided into two stages. The first stage is that of data collection and analysis. If it is concluded that violence is eminent based on the data analysed and that an early response to this can make a difference, it reaches the second stage, where assigned decision makers are made aware of the warnings and should take immediate action to make certain that violence is averted on time (Siccama, 1996).

According to Austin, EWS refers to processes such as data collection, data formatting, data analysis. The scholar emphasizes that in order for early warnings to generate early response, there should be an understanding that there is a relationship between these processes for the system to operate efficiently (Austin, 2004). The former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali³ believes that EWSs should not include the responses to the warning. These should rather come under other measures of preventive diplomacy, such as confidence building, fact-finding missions, early warning networks, preventive deployment and demilitarised zones (Ackermann, 2003). Michael Lund joins the debate with regard to the related concept of preventive diplomacy by saying that an EWS should essentially encompass the early and non-escalatory stages of conflict and the escalation and post-conflict stages of a conflict (Lund, 1996. The report of the Carnegie Commission underscores that for conflict prevention to work, effective preventive strategies that rest on three principles must be in place. These principles include early reaction, a comprehensive, balanced approach to alleviate pressures or risk factors that trigger violent conflict, and an extended effort to resolve the underlying root causes of conflict (Carnegie Commission, 1997).

This debate centres on the cause of a conflict and the appropriate response to the conflict. There is a choice between operational prevention or 'light prevention', which is linked to eliminating the underlying causes of conflict, versus structural prevention, often

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³ In 1992, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali maintained that the causes of emerging conflicts should not only be addressed with early warning systems, but through economic and social development and five specific measures, namely confidence building, fact-finding missions, early warning networks, preventive deployment and demilitarised zones.
referred to as ‘deep prevention’, which is more long-term in nature and encompasses adherence to human rights, civil society building and economic, social and political stability (Ackermann, 1996, 2000; Lund et al., 1999). However, the relationship between these two types of prevention is very complex as they may run parallel to each other or even support each other. Therefore, one form of prevention cannot be considered more important than the other. One could discern Sudan and South Sudan as countries where both measures of conflict prevention are needed. Operational prevention measures such as the creation of channels for dialogue among contending groups, monitoring missions, negotiations and preventive deployments are needed. The two countries scored 167 and 169 respectively out of 188 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI) development report\(^4\) in 2014 (HDI, 2014). This indicates that much has to be done in terms of civil society building, human security and governance in both countries.

According to some scholars, this problem could be dealt with through the indicators\(^5\) on EWS. Schmid (2004) argues that there could be significant progress in responding to early warnings in a timely fashion through developing structural or operational indicators relevant to predicting various state conflicts and humanitarian crises. In light of the comprehensiveness of the concept ‘security’, organisations such as the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have different indicators that are gathered by an array of gathering tools allocated to its EWSs. The OSCE also considers various developments, events and phenomena as indicators of potential conflict (Siccama, 1996). In terms of national security, events such as unusual troop movement and hazardous military incidents are considered indicators of a potential national insecurity crisis (Höynk, 1994). Violation of human rights, fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and

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\(^4\) The HDI report on human development examines the intrinsic relationship between work and human development. Work, which is a broader concept than jobs or employment, can be a means of contributing to the public good, reducing inequality, securing livelihoods and empowering individual’s. Human development is a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions: a long and healthy life, which is measured by life expectancy; knowledge level, which is measured by mean years of education; and standard of living, which is measured by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. This is expressed in constant 2011 international dollars converted to purchasing power parity (PPP) rates.

\(^5\) EWS requires careful monitoring of indicators of rising tensions. Indicators fall into two categories when it comes to conflict prevention. Long-term structural indicators of conflict are often based on quantitative data produced on an annual basis. These indicators are often collected globally; the best-known example of a EWS that collects data in this way is the Minorities at Risk Project. Short-term indicators on the other hand are typically qualitative data such as information from grassroots organisations, academics, news monitors or locally generated information. Some indicators only focus on human security indicators that include protection of gender and minority rights and some focus on threats from other states on territorial security.
humanitarian principles are considered indicators of a potential human insecurity crisis (Zaagman & Huber, 1994).

This ‘indicator’ debate has resulted in two schools of thought. Some scholars believe that early warnings deferred early action because they focus on very broad human and national security issues, which leads to information confusion, lack of prioritisation and postponement of any action. These scholars believe that early warnings can lead to early action if systems were to funnel and crystallise their security approach. The other school of thought believes in the broader meaning of protecting individuals, meaning that they believe that EWSs ought to be broad and protect individuals from freedom of fear, indignity and want (Human Security Report, 2005). These scholars in essence believe that the indicators of EWSs should be inclusive of operational and structural indicators and essentially demonstrate the evolving nature of threats in our contemporary era.

Even though scholars have different views on what EWSs are and how they should be formulated and what contributes to the ‘early warning and early action gap’, the majority of the scholars stresses the need for EWSs to prevent conflicts. This offers a good basis for this research. The study defines an EWS as a tool for conflict prevention that assists in determining whether violent conflicts can be expected and with the main goal of averting this through early response by actors.

2.5. The Opportunities and Challenges of EWS

The task of assessing the effectiveness of any EWS has always been a challenge for scholars (Evans, 2008; Bellamy & Williams, 2011), as there has not yet been a system that can accurately measure the success/failure rate or the effectiveness of EWSs based on particular events where an EWS was able to avert or unable to prevent a conflict. Furthermore, EWSs are objects of analysis used by humans, which makes it difficult to measure its success or failure.

A decision maker might think that not responding to an alert is preferably given his/her motives, while another decision maker might not regard this as successful. According to Woocher (2009:48), measuring the success or failure of an EWS is a challenge because,
the best extant risk models are not precise enough to identify the very small of states that are most likely to experience an episode of mass killing without also catching a large number of ‘false positives’. A watch list naturally is only a starting point. Warning of events that can trigger mass atrocities in the near-term and identifying potential openings for external action that can avert or mitigate mass violence demand detailed knowledge of diverse social, political, economic and cultural contexts and of specific actors.’

Patrick Meier (2008) challenges the possibility of measuring an EWS by questioning whether the assessment of success of an EWS should be measured by the number of early warning reports issued per year. However, the quality or the number of early warning reports does not necessarily correspond with the success rate of the EWS. If EWS alerts and reports do not generate enough responses, they might as well not be reported at all (Evans 2008). Michael Lund (1996:81) points this out by saying that:

‘Early warning occurred in several instances but did not precipitate any action. Strong expectations of potential conflict or even the outbreak of violence were not in themselves sufficient to generate preventive action. For example, fighting and grievous human rights violations in northern Somalia were widely reported by human rights organizations as early as 1988 yet provoked no response; International Alert disseminated a fact-finding report and recommendations regarding the Russia-Chechen disputes to the United Nations and other bodies in 1992, but no action followed; in the Danube River dispute between Hungary and Slovakia, the disputants issued several requests for mediation assistance long before any third party stepped forward’ (Lund, 1996:81).

The UN has since recommended that EWSs should have five elements to be sustainability effective. According to the UN, an early warning will be ineffective if it lacks any of these five elements:

1) it should be people-centred;
2) knowledge of the risks faced;

3) technical monitoring and warning service;

4) dissemination of meaningful warnings to those who are at risk;

5) public awareness of the emerging conflict and prevent the conflict (UN, 2006).

The UN has not implemented a global EWS to avert disputes or socio-political crises. However, the UN is the only global institution that has seven country-based programmes and one ad hoc initiative that either have or are currently developing EWSs. The following systems monitor political and humanitarian crises: the UN Department of Political Affairs; the UN Development Programme; the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations; the UN OCHA; the UN World Food Programme, the UN Office of the High General on the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG) and the UN Global Pulse (formerly known as the Global Impact and Vulnerability Alert System or GIVAS) (Zenko & Friedman, 2011). The UN is furthermore the only global institution that has sought to recommend elements for an effective EWS. These elements provide crucial factors that provide for a successful execution of early warning and response execution as well as the management of potential emergency scenarios and preparedness for action.

According to the UN, EWSs should be people-centred. The UN recommends that EWSs should be inclusive of civil society. An EWS should have a community-based approach where civil society is empowered to act as stakeholders in alerting authorities of a potential conflict and to act on a warning in an appropriate manner to reduce the possibility of human and national insecurity (UN, 2006). According to the UN, it is crucial to draw in knowledge sufficiently from different stakeholders such as NGOs, research councils, academia and civil society when early warnings to an emerging conflict are detected.

Furthermore, the UN recommends that there should be knowledge of the risks of the potential conflicts and a timely response to that risk. Without knowledge of an emerging conflict, no action can be taken against it. Scholars believe that governments often do have knowledge of an emerging conflict, but have an unresponsive attitude towards warnings until potential conflicts develop into major catastrophes (George, 1999).
Decision makers may have low levels of conviction and motivation for some security dynamics and this may compromise their willingness to act. This could be based on decision makers receiving mass data or insufficient data with flawed analysis of a potential conflict, which may hamper their knowledge of the risks faced. This then leads to decision makers predominantly structuring responses with an element of political judgement, which may influence a reactive approach to early warnings (Montanaro, 2011). Moreover, some EWSs only alert based on the signal strength of potential warnings, which then minimises the knowledge of the risks faced. EWS often rely on media coverage for visibilities of any emerging conflict in the public realm. Once an EWS detects an emerging conflict, it sends signals to early warning personnel, who then alert decision makers on a possible conflict. If one issue receives plenty of media coverage from different media sources, the signal will be sent to personnel at numerous times regardless of how important the issue might be. This often leads to that signal being perceived as a ‘strong signal’ and it overpowers ‘weaker signals’, which are signals that do not receive as much media attention as the strong signals. This usually leads to strong signals overpowering weaker ones because weak signals are regarded as weak in significance and are often overlooked. This is problematic and leads to flawed analysis of warnings because of media coverage and ultimately reduces the chances of decision makers being able to react to ‘weak’ warnings that might become catastrophes. Personnel cannot alert decision makers because they have no knowledge on risks faced by that emerging conflict (Montanaro, 2011).

The UN also recommends that an EWS should include a dissemination of meaningful warnings to those who are at risk. However, leaders’ different interpretations of what role EWSs should play in sovereign states also contributes to them not disseminating information to those who are at risk in the region or within the state. Scholars such as Jackie Cilliers (2005), Ciru Mwaţra and Susanne Scheimeidl (2002) point out that EWSs have not worked in some contexts because of the different interpretations of territorial integrity and leaders or decision makers’ lack of political will to react to warnings. Leaders’ lack of political will and their interpretations of sovereignty have played a role in the plethora of conflicts that have taken place in the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa is regarded as a region that is plagued by weak governance, insecurity, increasing
degradation, entrenched poverty and a range of persistent development challenges (World Bank Group, 2015). Furthermore, the success of an EWS depends on the judgement and decisions of political authorities, the political will to act, dissemination of knowledge and response to a warning. These are more important than any factor that affects the activation of the EWS, no matter how well structured it is.

Public awareness of the emerging conflict is also another element that has been recommended by the UN. Scholars have reiterated that it is important to involve communities. Related mostly to improved democratic principles, the practice of making civil society aware of a potential conflict has rested on the presumption of democratic rule (Hutton, 2009). Political leaders should make people aware of not using the power of EWSs in pursuit of political agendas and human rights violations. Communities should not be excluded from knowing about the emergence of a possible conflict, people should be prepared and aware of the possible effects of violence and get out of harm’s way, they have to be capable of dispersion in a timely manner.

The UN also recommends that should be a technical monitoring and warning service. The lack of resources, both financial and human, to establish a technical monitoring and warning service has contributed to ineffective EWSs, especially in Africa. Acting upon an early warning depends on human and financial resources. According to the global survey of EWSs, developing countries often do not have basic capacities, equipment and resources and this exacerbates the early warning—early action gap (UN, 2006). There should be prerequisite resources such as human expertise, technological infrastructure, and finance to make EWSs effective. Without these, information will not be easily accessible and responses cannot be rapid.

2.6. Conclusion

The key aim of this chapter was to provide clarification on the concept of EWS. The chapter explored the various definitions of EWSs. The discussion probed whether NATO has been able to adjust its conflict prevention role in the face of complex non-military threats. It highlighted that the alliance needs to determine when, where and why it needs
to act against emerging conflicts rather than responding in an impromptu basis when new security threats have emerged.

Chapter 3 focuses on the increasing attention Africa’s RECs pays to EWS and the role that these systems ought to play in promoting peace and security on the continent. In addition, the chapter states the theoretical underpinnings of the research.
Chapter 3: Regional security arrangements – CEWARN, ECOWARN, and SADC EWSs

3.1. Introduction

The previous chapter focused among other things on the early warning–early action gap. The key point that emerged from the chapter is that the early warning and early action problem emerges from a number of factors such as actors not knowing what to do with the information once it has been gathered; lack of communication between actors; and lack of resources. These problems have to be addressed for EWS to be more effective in its mandate of conflict prevention.

Chapter 3 turns to an empirical examination of the continent’s three sub-regional EWSs in the Horn of Africa, West Africa and Southern Africa. This chapter consists of four sections. The first section on Africa’s RECs outlines the importance of these RECs in the African region. The second section analyses the three EWSs by employing the UN’s five elements. The third section compares the three EWSs to examine whether the RECs have been able to respond to conflict prevention and what barriers there are. The last section applies Buzan’s regional security arrangement framework in an attempt to explain how complex security in regions and security regimes operate and is managed with reference to regional security in the African continent.

3.2. Regional economic communities (REC)

The assumption is that regional networks create or improve security within and between states and bring peace, stability, and economic and social development in the relevant region. Through state integration, sub-regional organisations have sought to be involved in improving their security by implementing conflict response mechanisms such as EWSs to confront complex threats (Adetula et al., 2016). Developing such mechanisms has revealed that the AU and its sub-regions are gradually adopting new norms on how to confront the intertwined challenges of development, security and peace.
3.3. RECs and the AU

RECs play an integral role in the overall security architecture of the AU. In its simplest form, RECs are entities on the African continent that were designed to develop and promote a variety of strategic objectives in the social, economic, political and cultural dimensions in their respective sub-regions (Buthelezi, 2006). The working relationship between the AU and its RECs is set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in Algiers, Algeria in June 2008. In the peace and security realm, the AU recognises eight RECs on the continent. These include the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the SADC. In addition, the AU also recognizes two mechanisms for coordinating the ASF, namely the East African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism and the North Africa Regional Capability (Murithi, 2011). This study focuses the three EWSs in Southern Africa, West Africa and the Horn of Africa as these three regions have developed and implemented their conflict analysis and early warning mechanisms. The EAC has established a protocol to address insecurities such as cattle rustling, smuggling and human rights violations. The protocol also establishes an early warning regional centre. It has been proposed that this centre should be harmonised with the CEWARN (Mbugua & Nduwimana, 2014). The EWS has not been utilised yet (EAC, 2016). COMESA has established a system that links country level EWSs to the situation room at the headquarters (Mwagiru, 2014). This REC has not utilised their EWS either (COMESA, 2016). RECs such as CEN-SAD and ECCAS do not have operational and functioning EWSs.

3.4. The importance of Africa’s RECs

RECs are regarded as stepping-stones to accelerate social, cultural, economic integration on the African continent, including the need to maintain peace and security and as building blocks for the AU. These RECs were established to provide a basis for
harmonisation and coordination of policies, measures, programmes and activities in all fields and sectors (Protocol on Relations between the AU and the RECs, 2002). The continent’s RECs have been instrumental in establishing programmes such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which was adopted in 2001. Through NEPAD various initiatives have been implemented to promote industrialisation, science, technology and innovation, skills for the youth, employment and women empowerment, good governance and food security on the continent (NEPAD, 2016). These RECs have also been instrumental in adopting the AU’s Agenda 2063 and are central to the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of Agenda 2063 at the regional level (UN, 2013).

3.5. Conflicting mandates of the RECs

One of the greatest challenges when conducting a study on Africa’s RECs is that there are no appropriate reference points in determining the effectiveness of their EWSs as these RECs have conflicting mandates, definitions and delineation of the roles of their EWSs. The EWSs of these RECs were established at different times and have established their own mandates, objectives and targets, which in effect determine various factors in the functionalities of the EWS.

These differing mandates, functions and roles have given RECs grounds to determine how their early warning and assessment systems work. This includes how these EWSs collect and screen data from internal and external sources and how data is analysed by EWS staff. Moreover, the reporting mechanisms also differ, as some are aimed at internal distribution among member states and others are intended for external distribution to civil society and local/national/regional/international organisations to be aware and prepared for emerging disputes. In addition, these EWSs have a range of early warning outputs that vary in terms of frequency and formality. Some early warning reports are produced daily, while others circulate weekly or monthly. Some early warning reports take form of policy briefs, ad hoc briefings/meetings, colour-coded risk maps, and matrices or news reports (ACBF, 2008). The continuum of measures of conflict prevention also differs as some EWSs are second generation while others are third generation.
This study therefore aims to determine whether each of the RECs EWS has reached its target or objectives based on their specific mandates and to examine whether each REC’s EWS has been modelled according to the UN’s recommended five elements for an effective EWS.

3.6 The Economic Community of West African States Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN)

ECOWAS is a regional organisation in the Western part of Africa. It consists of 16 member states, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. The Economic Community of West African States Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN), which is ECOWAS’ EWS, was established in 1999 from the ECOWAS protocol for the mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security. This EWS has often been deemed the most developed peace and security mandate and mechanism in Africa (Powell, 2005).

This is largely because it instituted observation and monitoring systems in all 16 (16) member states (Draft roadmap for the operationalization of the CEWS, 2006) and it works collaboratively with the Early Warning Department (EWD). The EWD primarily observes and monitors peace and security indicators, including humanitarian, political and other human security issues, within the framework of conflict prevention (Rageau, 2009). The ECOWARN also works in collaboration with NGOs, civil society, academic institutions and the West Africa Network for Peace (WANEPE), which is a coordinating structure for peacebuilding in the region and other governmental focal points.

The observation and monitoring centres are linked to the central observation and monitoring centre and the situation room, which are situated in different locations within the region. The situation rooms are located in the four sub-regional zone offices in the West African region. These are Zone I – Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Gambia; Zone II – Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire; Zone III – Ghana, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone and Zone IV– Togo, Benin and Nigeria (WANEPE, 2015). ECOWARN personnel collect and analyse data on emerging conflicts in the situation
room. The analysis of the emerging conflict/s is then disseminated to the ECOWARN personnel in the Observation and Monitoring Centre branch in Abuja, Nigeria. The ECOWARN personnel produce reports on the analysed data and submit it to key decision makers in ECOWAS. According to the 1999 Protocol on Conflict Management, the key decision makers are the Authority of Heads of State and Government (HSG), the Mediation and Security Council, the Executive Secretariat (Commission). Furthermore, Article 17 of the protocol lists the Defence and Security Commission, the Council of Elders and the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as specialised institutions involved in the practical promotion of human security (Protocol on Conflict Management, 1999). These decision makers then have to act timeously on the matter to prevent the emerging conflict from escalating.

The ECOWARN is a second-generation system. Its activities are centred on monitoring and data collection. The system uses a quantitative methodology, which is an event-based method that produces incident and situation updates. Moreover, the system also uses qualitative conflict analysis methods to prepare situational reports. The REC’s EWS’s analytical capability is challenged by the social, cultural, linguistic, political and economic diversity across countries. Furthermore, analysts who are located in Abuja, Nigeria, often find it difficult to write reports on emerging conflicts in inaccessible areas or on complex issues from which they are far removed (Nyheim, 2009).

The main objectives of the ECOWARN are to:

- develop capacities at different levels (community, national and sub-regional) for early detection, early warning and early response through training, information sharing, database development, technical assistance;

- identify and monitor context specific conflict and peace indicators and analyse them for preventive action;

- foster collaborative relationships between civil society, think tanks, as well as existing national, sub-regional/regional and international early warning, conflict prevention and peace-building organisations;
share early warning reports, policy briefs, preventive instruments, mechanisms, tools and strategies with partners, stakeholders, policy makers and actors’ potential interveners; and to

promote proactive/pre-emptive and integrated approaches to conflict prevention and peace-building’ (WANEP, 2007:12).

The ECOWARN was established to give early warnings on the following:

- ‘Intrastate conflict
- Ethno-political or religious conflict
- Political instability or threats of such instabilities
- Environmental/resource-based conflicts
- Gross human rights violations
- Internal displacements, refugee flows, humanitarian crisis
- Insurgency, rebellions and illicit arms flow
- Sharp economic downturns’ (WANEP, 2007:12-13).

3.6.1. ECOWAS in the 1990s

The sub-region experienced an increase in conflicts in the 1990s. Liberia toppled into its first violent civil war in December 1989. This civil war lasted for a period of seven years and was beset with violent confrontations between President Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia. Taylor wanted to overthrow the president. The civil war ended in 1996 and the country relapsed into its second civil war in 1999, which resulted in a total number of 250 000 people being killed and one million being displaced. The second civil war only ended in 2003 when a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed by the government of the Republic of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia.
Neighbouring country Sierra Leone also experienced a conflict in 1991 that resulted in the killing of 50,000 people and the destruction of infrastructure. Similarly, Mali, suffered several coups and ethnic tensions during the 1990s and surged again into a violent conflict and coup d'états in 2007 and 2012 respectively. These disputes resulted in killings and mass forced displacement of civilians. Moreover, both Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire experienced violent conflicts in 1998, both of which only ended in 2002 (Nyheim, 2009). In view of these conflicts and the shattering effects that they have on the sub-region, the need to invest in conflict early warning and prevention was identified and the system was implemented in 1999.

3.6.2. Conflict climate since 2000

However, the implementation of the ECOWARN did not change the insecurity climate in the region. The sub-region still experiences numerous incidents of sporadic violence and insecurity. Since 2000, the rise of conflicts in the West African region has been of concern. There have been upheavals in Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Burkina Faso and Ghana (Marc et al., 2015). The disputes that took place in Côte d'Ivoire claimed 3,000 Ivoirians between 2010 and 2011. Mali and Guinea-Bissau experienced coup d'états in 2012 and the insurgency in the Sahel region continues to affect Nigeria and Mauritania (Nyheim, 2009).

3.6.3. Has the ECOWARN been able to fulfil its objective?

In 2015 alone, three issues that increased insecurity in the region emerged. Violent extremism in Nigeria, Mali and Niger; the Ebola crisis in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone; and constitutional crises in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau (WANEP, 2016). The following section examines whether the ECOWARN generated warnings on these issues it was established to avert and whether any of the interventions listed were deployed by key stakeholders. The section focuses on one country in each zone.

3.6.4. Ebola crisis (Liberia)

In 2014, an Ebola epidemic left the Liberian economy in tatters. The disease claimed an estimated 4,800 people after 10,600 infections (WHO, 2015). The country recorded a
decline in the number of Ebola cases and was declared free of the epidemic in May 2015. However, the epidemic resurged in November 2015. The Ebola resurgence was a major setback for the country.

3.6.5. What was ECOWARN’s role in the Ebola crisis in Liberia?

WANEP produced reports on the possibility of a resurgence of the Ebola crisis early on. In the 2015 report, WANEP highlights that the ‘traditional funeral practice which exposes people to the virus is of particular concern...should this practice persist it might be difficult to eradicate the virus’ (WANEP, 2015:18). This report was made available to all member countries, including Liberia. The report did not have much success, as the Ebola virus resurged as predicted in the country. The resurgence has been blamed on government’s inability to intensify health and safety measures, as well as the debilitated health care facilities and a lack of health care personnel in the country (Jaye & Afful, 2015). Another reason could be that even though communities in rural areas have been warned about the health risks associated with traditional funeral practices with infected corpses, some may have been too emotional to bury their family member without close contact as a way to pay their last respects.

3.6.6. Insurgency, rebellions and illicit arms flow (Nigeria and Mali)

In 2015, Mali and Nigeria experienced sporadic attacks from terrorist groups. In Mali, two significant attacks occurred. The Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako assault resulted in the deaths of 20 people. Another hostage situation in Sevare in August led to the deaths of 13 people, including five UN workers (WANEP, 2015). In Nigeria, Boko Haram continued with its insurgency in North-eastern Nigeria in Baga, which borders Niger and Chad. The attacks killed over 2,000 people in just five days (WANEP, 2015).

3.6.7. What was ECOWARN’s role in Mali and Nigeria?

Even though both countries put mechanisms in place, such as the peace deal that was signed in June 2015 by the Malian government and the Coordination of Movement for Azawad, which is the main rebel group, to deal with potential attacks from terrorists, further attacks occurred despite the peace efforts (Diarra & Diallo, 2015). In a 2015 report
by the WANEP’s National Early Warning System, authors recommended ways in which key decision makers can intervene in such attacks. It states that, 'governments should improve civil-military relationship to foster trust and confidence between security agents and the local communities for improved early warning alerts, information sharing and collaboration in fighting insurgency at all levels' (WANEP, 2015:19). The element of creating a substantial interface between local communities and intelligence gathering for alerts was missing in the ECOWARN. In an interview, Major General OB Akwa, the Commandant of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training (KAIPTC) in Ghana said that ‘the transition from ECOWAS of states to ECOWAS of people has not taken full effect yet’ (2016). The lack of trust and communication of alerts between the local communities and the military could be reason why warnings did not translate into prevention or mitigation of attacks by armed groups.

3.6.8. Human or national security?

ECOWAS still has a very militaristic approach to its conflicts, even though they have adopted a number of protocols such as the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, which emphasises the importance of conflict prevention in addition to the ECOWARN. This protocol provides protection against violence and threats from civilians by elaborating on mechanisms for early prevention and dealing with outbreaks of conflict. The mechanism applies in cases of aggression or conflict in any member state or between two or several member states. It also applies when there is an event that violates human rights and the rule of law and in the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government. The protocol stipulates that if any of these events emerge or whenever the need arises, there should be a deployment of a 'civilian and military force to maintain or restore peace within the sub-region' [Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security: Article 3 (h), 1999].

The heads of government have powers to act on all matters concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping, security, humanitarian support,
peace-building, control of cross-border crime, proliferation of small arms, as well as all other matters covered by the provisions of this mechanism. It acts upon the decision of the Mediation and Security Council or at the request of a member state, the AU or the UN. The procedure is as follows: the executive secretary informs member states of the Mediation and Security Council. The Mediation and Security Council then considers several options to the Council of Elders, which may include recourse, the dispatch of fact-finding missions, political and mediation missions or intervention by ECOMOG. The council then decides on the most appropriate course of action to take in terms of intervention. The Mediation and Security Council then issues a mandate authorizing the executive secretary to set up a mission and to define its terms of reference. The chairman of the Mediation and Security Council submits a report on the situation to the AU and the UN and in consultation with the chairman, takes all necessary measures needed (Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, 1999).

The ECOWAS also implemented the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance to address deep-rooted political causes of insecurity in the region (Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, 2001). The sub-region furthermore put in place the 2008 Conflict Prevention Framework ‘to guide the conceptualisation, implementation and evaluation of conflict prevention initiatives in the Commission and Member States’ (Ekiyor, 2008). However, ECOWAS still lacks readiness to actively intervene and protect people from an emerging crisis as the organisation is still rooted in traditional notions of security, although its conflict prevention framework stipulates that member states are expected to ‘provide alternative platforms for non-military intervention in internal crises through coalitions of civil society groups’ (Conflict Prevention Framework, 1999).

There is still an over-prioritisation of arms and territorial security within this REC. This is largely reflected in the defence budgets across West Africa, which is on the rise. Ghana doubled its annual military spending (2012–2013) to $306 million from $109 million. Donor funding provided another $47 million in 2013 (Perlo-Freeman & Solmirano, 2014). Mali increased military personnel by 50% in 2012. The country furthermore raised wages in the army by 37% in spite of a one-third drop in revenue (World Bank, 2015). Niger forced
significant resource allocation in 2012 and increased its military spending by 80% (Zounmenou, 2008). Nigeria’s military capacity remains the most developed in West Africa, with an annual budget of $2.2 billion (Adebajo, 2002). Given the picture of high human insecurity in the region, some would justify the large amount that is being spent on military capabilities.

The ECOWAS region has some of the highest numbers of young people who have been excluded from formal institutions of employment (economic security) and education. According to the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics, the country’s unemployment rate substantially increased from 10.4% in the last quarter of 2015 to 12.1% in the first quarter of 2016. With an estimated total population of 183.1 million in 2016, the unemployment rate increased from 105.02 million to 106.0 million in 2016 (NBS, 2016) This disempowerment has often led to the youth being involved in crime and rebellion. The humanitarian crisis in Eastern Chad during November 2006 has been largely a result of the youth militias (Human Rights Watch, 2011) who attempted to capture socio-economic and political spaces by causing violent clashes between civilians and state security forces. The REC has not done much to empower its youth. Integrating the youth into socio-economic and political spaces is hardly mentioned on the sub-region’s founding protocols. In fact, the only mention of the youth is found on Articles 85 to 88 of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) and it has nothing to do with integrating the youth into political or socio-economic matters. These articles largely touch on areas of capacity building (Olaiya, 2014).

3.6.9 Has the ECOWARN modelled the UN’s recommendations for EWSs?

According to the UN’s criteria, it is imperative for an EWS to be people-centred (UN, 2006). WANEP, which is a network of civil society groups, collaborates with ECOWAS in the field of conflict prevention and has the responsibility to collect data at a grassroots level, to provide capacity development of ECOWAS regional offices and to provide early warning, policy analysis and security issues in the region. WANEP did so in the build-up to the 2010 elections in Côte d’Ivoire. The civil society group produced its first report in September 2010, a month before the elections. The report largely focused on the tone of
political rhetoric, the destruction of public property, attempted political assassinations and other signs of election-related political violence (USIOP, 2011). However, decision makers in the region did not act on these reports.

Before the 2015 elections, the civil society organisation through its National Early Warning System produced two situation reports of pre-election threats across the country. It furthermore led a coalition of 21 CSOs and trained 2 000 reaction observers to monitor the election. The organisation also promoted freedom of the media, which in essence strengthened public discourse and provided enlightenment and sensitivity of political actors to nonviolent action during and before elections (WANEP, 2015). WANEP's contribution through capacity development and its early warnings proved to be a success for the 2015 Côte d'Ivoire elections. It is clear that the WANEP has made great strides in the past six years in not only producing warnings, but developing capacity and encouraging civil society participation and freedom of the media.

The UN also recommends that for an EWS to be effective, it should disseminate meaningful warnings to those who are at risk and that there should be public awareness of the emerging conflict and knowledge of the risks faced (UN, 2006). In 2014, when Ebola ravaged West Africa, open source reports were sent to Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria (Jaye & Afful, 2015). Nigeria was able to act on the warnings in a timely manner, while the other three states were not. This has largely been blamed on the fact that in comparison to the other three states, Nigeria is the biggest economy in the sub-region and on the continent and it has relatively stronger health infrastructure and human resources and was able to respond to the threat timeously. The other three countries found it to be a great challenge to sustain health infrastructures in the vulnerable and unstable conditions of post-war settings. In early 2015, all three countries were declared free of the virus; however, Liberia experienced a resurgence of Ebola. Even though WANEP did produce early warning reports of a possibility of resurgence, the country was unable to act in time (WANEP, 2015). This in essence points out that even though information was disseminated, a plethora of factors, such as infrastructural problems, the lack of health care personnel and traditional values played a great role in the return of Ebola to the country.
The UN has also recommended that a technical monitoring and warning service is needed for EWSs to be effective. It should be noted that the ECOWARN has instituted an observation and monitoring system in all its 16 (16) member states (Draft roadmap for the operationalization of the CEWS, 2006) which is linked to the Observation and Monitoring Centre and the Situation Room in different locations within the sub-region. The ECOWARN has furthermore increased activity on cross-border smuggling of illegal substances by implementing a Regional Action Plan to address illicit arms and drug trafficking, terrorism and extremist groups, as well as organised crimes in the region. The region put in place the Transnational Crime Units (TCU’s) for intelligence-based investigations nationally and internationally through the West African Coast Initiative. However, these TCU’s are only operational in three (Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau) of the 16 member states (Olawale, 2011). Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Niger and Chad have also established a regional joint force in a bid to combat terrorism and extremist groups (WANEP, 2015).

3.6.10. What are ECOWARN’s challenges?

According to Ifeanyi Okechukwu, programme manager in charge of the conflict prevention department of WANEP Nigeria, stated that the major challenge in preventing potential conflicts or disasters in ECOWAS can be attributed to ‘the reluctance of member states to open themselves for proper monitoring and risk assessment using the ECOWAS early warning system’ as ‘most states are concerned about what it entails in relation to their sovereignty and political control.’ Evidently, lack of political will and upholding principles of sovereignty can be detrimental to the effectiveness of an EWS. Another challenge is ‘the denial and rejection of reports from the Observation and Monitoring Centre by government institutions of member states’ (2016). Furthermore, factors such as language barriers, lack of skills, resources and expertise in conflict mediation and dialogue have also been pointed out as challenges to effective conflict prevention (Afalobi, 2009).
3.7 The CEWARN

In 2002, the Intergovernmental Authority Development (IGAD) secretariat in the Horn of Africa produced a framework and provisions to address conflicts in the REC. This paved the way for the establishment of the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), which was established under IGAD’s Peace and Security Division by the CEWARN protocol signed by its member states (CEWARN, 2002). The CEWARN protocol states that the mandate of the CEWARN is to ‘receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreaks and escalation in the IGAD region including livestock rustling, conflicts over grazing and water points, nomadic movements, smuggling and illegal trade, refugees, landmines and banditry’ (CEWARN Protocol, 2002).

At an institutional level, the CEWARN is the most advanced EWS on the African continent. Thus far, the mechanism has been operational with varying degrees of implementation. There have been no activities in Eritrea since the state suspended its membership in 2008 (Asento, 2013). The Conflict Early Warning Response Unit (CEWERU), is an in-state mechanism that operates at each member states’ national, sub-national and provincial levels. The CEWARN is only clearly established in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (Asento, 2013; Saferworld, 2015).

The operationalization of the CEWARN has gone through three significant stages. The years 2002–2006 was the pilot period, where the CEWARN protocol was signed by IGAD member states and the mechanism was operationalised for cross-border pastoral activities. Initially, the areas that were covered by the CEWARN were in the Karamoja cluster, which include Kenyan, Sudanese, Ethiopian and Ugandan borders, and the Somalia cluster, which includes Kenyan, Somali and Ethiopian borders (Mbugua & Nduwimana D, 2014). The second period was between 2007-2011, this period saw institutions such as Local Peace Structures, Rapid Response Fund and CEWERU being established in its member states and the recruitment and capacity building of Country Coordinators and Field Monitors. In 2012, member states adopted a new strategy which gave room for the CEWARN to essentially broaden its mandate and cover a variety of
conflicts in different geographical areas in the sub region. This strategy (2012-2019) was adopted to reflect a human security approach to alerts and to include stakeholders from the private sector (CEWARN Framework, 2013).

The main objectives of the 2012–2019 strategy are for the CEWARN to deliver on the following outcomes in the peace and security realm:

- Improved utilisation of CEWARN’s decision support tools in policy formulation and development;
- Early warning and early response entrenched in local, national and regional governance;
- CEWARN values, standards and benchmarks franchised by global, regional and national institutions;
- Communities, citizens, private enterprise and officials in CEWARN areas of operation collectively engaged in upholding human security;
- Sustained preventive response initiatives—particularly cross-border ones that combine local and national initiative and utilising them to influence scaling and best practices;
- Sustained monitoring and mapping of conflict and violent systems; and
- Financial and human resource base strengthened to support programme work’ (CEWARN Framework: 2013:9)

Unlike the ECOWARN, the CEWARN is a third-generation system. This system’s monitoring and responses are driven at the local level. It has 52 indicators including structural data, climatic data, data on human deaths or livestock losses. This data are collected by field monitors and fed into a data-based monitoring system. This data then generates reports that are produced at a national level then disseminated to the governments involved. Responses to alerts are either from local authorities directly or managed by Conflict Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs) at local and national
levels in member states (Nyheim, 2009). The CEWARN reports are produced monthly, quarterly, semi-annually and annually (CEWARN Framework, 2013).

CEWARN has reported a number of success stories. In November 2011, information received by country coordinators about an emerging conflict between the Gabra and Borana tribes in the Arero-Hudet-Dhas-Moyale area in Somali was sent to the Ministry of Federal Affairs. The information received by the ministry provided details on how the conflict chronicled and called for deployment of security forces and peace-making efforts. The ministry coordinated a response to the alert and deployed federal police to the area. The deployment had no impact as tensions escalated between the two tribes. Key stakeholders in the Ministry of Federal Affairs were dispatched to the area and held discussions with officials from the communities. It was agreed during the meeting that the conflict had to be solved on the basis of an agreement. An agreement that called for a return of IDPs was signed. This meeting yielded great success as tensions between the two parties were eased and IDPs returned to their neighbourhoods a week after the meeting (CEWARN Report, 2011).

The CEWARN also averted a further escalation of conflict between two cross-border pastoral communities, namely the Dassenech of Ethiopia and Turkana of Kenya in 2013. The conflict initially emerged when the two communities felt that an increase in fishing activities on Lake Turkana would deplete the fishing resources. This led to various attacks from both sides and nine lives were lost. After these incidents, the EWS produced and alerted decision makers. The decision makers recommended measures to avert a further escalation of such attacks. This resulted in the communities reaching an agreement in which they agreed on a joint utilization of resources. This resulted in a decline in the attacks (Aseto, 2013:41). On paper, the strength of the CEWARN lies in the cooperation that it has with various stakeholders at differing levels (local, national and sub-regional). The CEWARN Protocol sets out the importance of civil society communities at all stages of the warning and response (Apulli, 2009). The structure of the CEWARN consists of a policy arm, which includes the assembly, council and committee. The Secretariat of IGAD is placed as the administrative arm and the technical arm. The CEWERUs are considered to be in-state mechanisms and operate at each member states' national, sub-national and
provincial levels. The CEWERUs are composed of representatives from national and provincial governments and different individuals' governments may designate parliaments, the military and grassroots CSOs. These CEWERUs play a pivotal role as part of the technical arm because they are linked to the IGAD Secretariat through the CEWARN unit and liaise with government and groups at different levels on data to be analysed and communicate information on formulated responses. The fourth arm is the cooperating arm, which consists of optional interstate structures and optional sub-regional councils. Lastly, the CEWARN structure consists of a coordinating arm that is made up of the Committee of Permanent Secretaries and the Technical Committee on Early Warning. Combined, these arms are mandated to receive and share data on potential conflicts among member states and their potential outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region. They share analyses of that data and develop case scenarios before formulating options for response to the potential conflict (Apulli, 2009).

The IGAD, through the CEWARN, also established a Rapid Response Fund (RRF) in 2009. The RRF plays a fundamental role in financing short term projects targeted at preventing, de-escalating or resolving conflicts in the region. It is currently funded by international development partners and member states (Mbugua, 2014).

The RRF, which consists of heads of CEWERUs, civil society representatives, CEWARN director and a representative of IGAD Peace and Security Division, supports home-grown solutions to effectively respond to crises. It does so by involving civil society actors that principally emanate from the community level. The RRF interventions have significantly reduced the level of violence in the Karamoja, Somali and Dikihil clusters and have promoted peaceful co-existence of local actors and resource sharing (Aseto, 2013).

3.7.1 Conflicts in the Horn of Africa (1990s and 2000s)

It is important to note that this region has had long-standing conflicts that date back to the 1970s. The region is characterized by a complex interconnected set of historical, socio-economic, ideological, territorial and political factors that have been a great source of insecurity in the region. Moreover, environmental degradation and climate change have resulted in natural resource disputes across borders. Therefore, it is vital to
contextualize the conflicts that took place in the 1990s and 2000s by looking at past security issues.

In 1975, Uganda claimed that parts of Kenya were supposedly part of Uganda. This caused tensions that are still a concern. Both countries continue to face frosty relations due to conflicts emanating from livestock rustling, resource competition, smuggling and illegal trade (Mwaguru, 2004).

The border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea dates back to 1962 when Empire Haile Selassie of Ethiopia annexed Eritrea and claimed it as a province of Ethiopia. This annexation resulted decades of war for independence, which only ended when Eritrea became an independent state in 1992. Tensions between the two states arose again in 1994 due to ethnic disputes, economic issues and a border dispute that resulted in a military confrontation in 1998 (Kefale, 2013). A peace agreement was signed in December 2003 where both parties agreed to ‘a permanent termination of military hostilities and to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other’ (Algiers Agreement: Article 1, 2002). However, this agreement has not produced positive results as both countries have had elevated periods of tension and renewed acts of war which have led to an estimated 26,500 deaths and over 1.4 million people being displaced (Kefale, 2013).

Conflicts between Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia started in 1960 and lasted for 46 years. These conflicts were brought about by overlapping problems such as competition over resources, ethnic disputes and economic insecurities (Daniel, 2007). In Djibouti, a civil war broke out in 1991. The war was caused by the lack of representation of the nomadic Afar people in government. A peace accord was signed in 1994, which ended the conflict. However, the country still experiences periods of economic and political instability (Bezabeh, 2016). Uganda has had wars waged by armed groups that date back to 1966, one such is the war against the LRA, which the country is still grappling with.

Kenya in 1992 experienced an upsurge of violence that resulted in 2,000 deaths and 500,000 displaced persons (APRM Kenya, 2006). The country has also faced electoral disputes that are often marred with violence. The post-election violence that took place in
2007 resulted in 1,300 deaths and 600,000 displaced persons (Mengisteb, 2011). South Sudan’s six-year transition movement to gaining independence from Sudan in 2011 has been embroiled by violence. Many issues between the two countries still remain unresolved (Malwal, 2014). Somalia was a collapsed state in 1991 and did not have a functioning government controlling the territory. This led to a civil war in 1992 and resulted in the death of 250,000 people. It shaped a serious refugee problem in the country which the country is still grappling with. Moreover, the country has environmental stress, high levels of militarization and a deterioration of living standards for Somalians (Jamal, 2012).

The CEWARN has found it a challenge to address the security threats that have had different causes, dynamics and ramifications. Since its implementation, the CEWARN has gone through three stages where different methods and strategies were adopted to tackle insecurity. The following section analyses the progress thus far with the CEWARN’s 2012–2019 strategy objectives. The CEWARN strategy stipulates that various state and non-state actors, such as the private sector, CSOs and government at different levels should be engaged upholding human security. This has been gradually taking form in Uganda where members of the security sector work in close collaboration with CSOs to promote human security within communities. These CSOs have sensitized the security sector to do less harm and to engage in a constructive manner with communities when there is an eruption in violence. In terms of entrenching early warning and response at all levels, the CEWARN mechanism is gradually more active in South Sudan and Somalia. Field monitors have also been strengthened in countries such as Kenya. The country has expanded peace monitors beyond CEWARN’s identified cluster to address other conflict affected areas in the interior. The strategy further stipulates that resources have to be strengthened to make the CEWARN programme work. This has thus far not been addressed as country coordinators have not been remunerated for the work that they do for a number of years now. This has led to inconsistency as some country coordinators have resorted to making their own living outside of their CEWARN duties and responsibilities. Furthermore, CEWARN has consistently being depending on donor funding because some national governments have not been contributing to the CEWARN mechanism (Saferworld, 2015).
In terms of establishing a sustained monitoring and mapping of conflict and violent systems, the geographical spread of field monitors across the region has been inadequate for the work that is need in the region. Additionally, the lack of access to different methods of communication between country coordinators who are on the ground and key stakeholders in government has been a great challenge. The strategy stipulates that its objective is to have sustained preventive response initiatives, particularly cross-border ones that combine local and national initiative, and to utilise them to influence scaling and best practices. So far three states in the Horn have come up with such initiatives. Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia have established a cross-border commission that essentially deals in three pressing sectors in all the countries. These are education, immigration and the education sector (IIIDRSI, 2016).

Another objective is to improve utilisation of CEWARN’s decision support tools in policy formulation and development. The CEWARN has thus far not played a significant role in highlighting the policy interventions that are needed for emerging conflicts or drivers of conflict. CEWARN has also not been involved in policy advocacy to improve the effectiveness of its mechanism. However, countries such as Kenya and Uganda have taken steps to develop national peace policies. In Uganda, there is currently debate on which ministry should house this policy and in Kenya the policy has been put before parliament (Saferworld, 2015).

### 3.7.2 National or human security?

The region is highly militarised. The border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea cost Ethiopia over $2.5 billion and an estimated cost of $1.5 billion was spent by Eritrea. Between the years 1986–2002, Uganda spent three per cent of its GDP on internal and external conflicts. These costs are evidently significant enough to make a difference in the development of the member states and the region as a whole (Mengisteab, 2011). Furthermore, in 2003 Djibouti spent 7.2% of its GDP on the military (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003), in 2009 Ethiopia spent $345 million and Eritrea spent $65 million (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009).
The region has spent ample amounts of money on war and inadequate funds on human security. It continues to record an increasing number of people suffering from food insecurity. There was an increase from 18.2 million to 19.49 million cases of malnutrition and food insecurity in 2015 alone. The region is experiencing a deteriorating humanitarian situation which is driven by outbreaks of diseases such as cholera, economic shocks and the El Niño. The HDI is a combination aggregate of life expectancy, education and per capita indicators used to rank countries in terms of human development. Eritrea was ranked 186 out of 188 countries, Ethiopia was ranked 174 and Djibouti was 168 in 2015 (Human Development Index, 2015).

3.7.3 Has the CEWARN been modelled according to the UN’s recommendations for EWSs?

According to the UN, an effective EWS should have a technical monitoring and warning service. The CEWARN has developed a system of data collection and analysis with an advanced database of pastoral conflicts in the Horn of Africa (Karamoja & Somali cluster). CEWERU structures have also been established in the region and Kenya has even broadened their system on CEWARN’s identified border. The UN also recommends that EWSs should be people-centred and the CEWARN has managed to build confidence and cooperation among actors involved, especially with local actors who have been integrated into CEWERUs (Aseto, 2013). Moreover, CSOs in the Horn of Africa have played a constituent role in addressing security issues such as extremism and terrorism in the region. This has largely been carried out by empowering the youth and women and facilitating inter and intra-religious violence between communities. Mechanisms such as the centre of excellence for preventing and countering violent extremism have been utilized by CSOs to focus on preventive approaches to insecurities such as community tensions, regional instability, and conflict (Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016).

The UN also recommends that there should be knowledge of the risks faced and that the EWS should disseminate knowledge and meaningful warnings to those who are at risk. In a 2011 report titled Drought-related Tensions Noted in the Ethio-Kenya Border Areas of the Miyo Woreda warned communities in the Miyo Woreda and surrounding
areas of the decline in water due to the drought and the impact this would have on their livelihoods and livestock. The report identifies the risks if there is no intervention from CEWARN structures such as the RRF. According to the report, the RRF could provide funding to conduct consultations with the communities or could assist if local peace committees are not able to contain the situation (CEWARN, 2011). Even though this report was produced, not much is known as to whether the people in the area were told about the unfolding drought in the area and the risks they would be facing if interventions are not put into place.

The UN also recommends that there should be public awareness of the emerging conflict to prevent the conflict or insecurity. The lack of communication between member states and the ongoing patterns of mutual destabilization are deeply embedded in the political fabric of this region (Mwa`ura & Scheimeid, 2002). Almost all of the member states in the IGAD have had disputes with each other. These disputes have been long-drawn and some have not yet been resolved. Disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Somalia and Kenya, Kenya and Uganda, Sudan and South Sudan and Djibouti and Ethiopia have yielded an air of mistrust and non-cooperation between the countries, which has resulted in lack of dependence (Mbugua, 2014). This is an important factor that is needed for early warning to be communicated to those who need to respond promptly. Furthermore, issues of sovereignty and lack of transparency in the region defeat the whole purpose of open access and the CEWARN in essence loses its purpose of public awareness. The tendencies of protecting your 'own turf' and controlling information on potential conflict have created serious political and bureaucratic bottlenecks, which are a cause of concern (Wulf & Debiel, 2009).

3.8. The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The precursor to the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), was formed in the 1980s. The SADCC solely concentrated on economic development issues and excluded peace and security issues from its agenda. Issues of peace and security were largely dealt with by the Front Line States (FLS), which was an informal alliance of countries in the region who
supported the armed liberation movement (Cawthra, 2010). In 1992, the SADC succeeded the SADCC. The SADCC was transformed into the SADC to redefine ‘the basis of cooperation among member states’ (SADC, 2016). SADC consists of the following countries: South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Zambia, the DRC, Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania. The REC was formed to foster peace and security, economic growth and overall development. The REC furthermore supports the socially disadvantaged through regional integration based on democratic principles. The peace and security architecture of the SADC consists of ministers of foreign affairs, defence, public and state security from all member states (SADC, 2016).

Member states in 1996 met in Gaborone, Botswana, to launch the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation for conflict prevention, management and resolution purposes. The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation was only signed by member states in 2001 (Nathan, 2002). The Organ comprises of the different ministers of home affairs, defence and state security from member states. The protocol covers matters of state security, including: ‘recognising and re-affirming the principles of strict respect for sovereignty, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, good neighbourliness, interdependence, non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs of other States’ (Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, 2001). Establishing the protocol also involved putting in place a number of other structures such as the Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) (Macaringue, 2002).

This pact was a result of all the security structures such as the Strategic Indicative Plan for SADC Organ (SIPO) and the ISPDC that were established. The crux of the pact lies in Articles 6 and 9. Article 6 states that ‘an armed attack against a state party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security; such an attack shall be met with immediate act’ (SADC Mutual Defence Pact, Article 6). It furthermore stipulates that ‘each party shall participate in such collective action in any manner that is deemed appropriate’ (SADC Mutual Defence Pact, Article 6), providing leeway for states that consider such an act as a compromise to national security. Article 9 provides for cooperation and interaction in national security engagements such as the exchange of military
intelligence, joint research, development and production of military equipment (Nieuwkerk, 2003). The pact upholds principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty and in particular non-interference in the internal affairs of one another, making national security as a priority. However, the region has remained wracked by conflicts despite the implementation of the pact.

The SADC sought other measures to prevent, manage and resolve emerging conflicts in the sub-region. In 2010, the Regional Early Warning Centre was officially launched at the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana, to address insecurity. It was also established in line with the provisions of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and SIPO (Nathan, 2016).

The centre compiles a strategic assessment and analysis of data collected at regional level, sharing information on threats to security and stability of the region. It proposes ways to deal with such threats. It is expected to link with national early warning centres in all SADC member states and the continental early warning centre of the AU (Cawthra, 2013). The aim of SADC’s REWC is to strengthen SADCs mechanisms to the prevent conflicts in accordance with the stipulations of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the SIPO (Odey, 2015).

Its main functions are the following:

- Compile strategic assessment and analysis of data collected at regional level, region and share information on major issues posing threat to the security and stability of the region
- Propose ways and means for preventing, combating and managing such threats;
- It also provides key inputs for the SADC Regional Vulnerability Analysis and Assessment Programme’ (SADC, 2016).

The RECW was put in place to monitor political–military threats such as wars and coups, large- and non-military security (OSDP, 2001). Considering that the RECW was only established in 2010, the next section examines the conflicts that took place before and
after it was establishment to navigate if there were any changes to the security environment in the sub-region.

3.8.1 SADC in the 1990s

The Southern African region has been burdened by conflicts dating back to the time of occupation by colonial powers, through the struggles for independence and civil wars in the post-independence era. Since the establishment of SADC in 1992, there have been a number of violent conflicts in the region throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The Angolan civil war that lasted for 27 years started prior to the establishment of SADC, at the time of the country’s independence from Portugal in 1975. Even though a power sharing agreement was agreed upon when the country gained its independence, power struggles and ethnic tensions between the dominant liberation movements, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), caused the agreement to collapse (De Oliveira, 2015). Not only did the power struggle play a key role in the conflict, other elements played a role in the longevity of the war. The country was a major battle ground for the Cold War and was greatly involved in directly and indirectly opposing the Soviet Union, Cuba and South Africa (Pilger, 1998). The civil war only ended in 2002 after the assassination of the leader of the rebel movement UNITA, Jonas Savimbi. During this period, 500 000 people died, 70 000 suffer disabilities caused by landmines and 3 500 persons were displaced (Global Security, 2016). In the DRC, a full-blown war with state belligerents began in 1998. This war was complicated by foreign invaders, rebel armies and militia groups who fought for resources in Eastern Congo for more than 10 years. This resulted in 5.4 million deaths between 1998 and 2007. The vast majority of these deaths were not caused by the war, but by malnutrition and diseases (IRC, 2008). Although a peace agreement was signed in 2002 by the former belligerents to create a government of unity, violence is still pertinent in the Eastern part of the country (Nathan, 2002).

There was also a failed secessionist bid in Namibia that started in 1998 when the Namibian Defence Force discovered and raided a training group of the rebel group, the
Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA). This led to rebels fleeing to Namibia's neighbouring country, Botswana. In 1999, the CLA launched an attack in the Caprivi region that resulted in 14 deaths and 3,000 persons seeking refuge in Botswana (Nathan, 2002).

In Lesotho, tensions between the Prime Minister of Lesotho and King Letsie III escalated in 1994. This led to the King suspending the Constitution of the country and dissolving the Prime Minister. This act was condemned by Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa, who were SADC's mediating task team. Peace was eventually restored in the country. However, in 1998, the country slipped back into a political crisis when there were fears of an emerging coup. South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe intervened and launched an attack and deployed soldiers in the country without any authorization from the SADC to do so. This resulted in the death of 58 Basotho soldiers. The intervention caused an uproar in the country as public demonstrations against the intervention sacked Maseru, the capital city of Lesotho (Nathan, 2016). The SADC has remained committed to work with stakeholders in Lesotho to ensure that there is political and security stability in the country. Following the exile of three of Lesotho's opposition leaders, the SADC heads of states in June 2016 held a summit in Gaborone, Botswana, and mandated the SADC facilitator, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, to facilitate the return of the leaders to Lesotho. This was fulfilled in February 2017 when Lesotho opposition leaders went back home. The SADC continuously assesses the progress towards constitutional and security sector reforms and the implementations of the recommendations of the Phumaphi Commission of Inquiry, which was established to probe the killing of Maaparankoe Mahao, Lesotho's former army commander (SABC, 2017).

3.8.2 Conflicts in the 2000s

In 2000, the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) lost at the polls for the first time since independence in 1980. With the rise of the MDC, an opposition party, the Zanu-PF, developed ways to suppress the party through various acts of violence and intimidation. The SADC held a summit in 2002 and issued a communiqué that assured that free and fair elections will take place in Zimbabwe. In 2005 the Zanu-PF won the parliamentary elections. These elections were, however, flawed (Kagwanja, 2005), but
were endorsed as free and fair by the SADC. Although human rights abuses were reported during the elections and the SADC Parliamentary Forum was not invited to observe the elections, SADC still supported the Zanu-PF. By 2007, the country had reached its tipping point. The country reached an economic crisis with an inflation rate of 13 000%, emigration peaked as a quarter of Zimbabweans left the country, MDC leaders were arrested and there were multiple reported deaths of activists. President Mugabe furthermore changed presidential election dates unilaterally without any consultation with the SADC or political parties in the country. This increased tensions between the MDC and Zanu-PF. However, the SADC reported to the Organ that the two parties successfully concluded their negotiations (SADC Organ, 2008a). In May 2008, the Zanu-PF garnered only 43.2% votes and lost to the MDC, who won the elections by 47.9%. Since none of the two parties solicited more than 50% of votes in the elections, a run-off had to be conducted in accordance with the electoral laws of 2008. The Zanu-PF resorted to violence and intimidation to win elections. Former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, who was the mediator in Zimbabwe at the time, did not acknowledge the increase in insecurity in the country and said that there was no crisis in Zimbabwe. This caused deep divisions within the SADC as some member states believed that Mugabe had to leave, while others did not. The MDC later pulled out due to the ongoing violence and the Zanu-PF won the Presidential elections (Nathan, 2016). The situation in the country worsened post-election as a total of 200 000 people were displaced and 20 000 homes were destroyed and an additional 10 000 people suffered injuries (Odey, 2015).

SADC in 2009 failed to prevent the coup in Madagascar, which resulted in the suspension of the country from the organization. SADC, however, engaged in peace-making mechanisms by establishing a transitional roadmap towards the country’s elections following the coup. This mechanism assisted with the country’s first presidential elections in 2014. The SADC declared the elections free and fair and the country regained its SADC membership in 2014 (Nathan, 2016). During the same period, Lesotho slipped into a military coup. This was precipitated after Prime Minister Thomas Thabane fired Mothetjoa Metsing, the Chief of the Army, and later fled to South Africa. The SADC mediated the situation by establishing an agreement to contain the crisis, which was signed by key political stakeholders. The agreement called for early elections in 2015, which saw the
former Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisi, declaring victory in the elections. However, calm was not restored. The situation reached a crisis when Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) commander Maaparankoe Mahao was assassinated in 2015. This prompted the SADC to re-engage with stakeholders in Lesotho to understand the roots of the crisis in the country (Albuquerque, 2015). The SADC formed an inquiry probing the instability in the country after the murder of LDF commander Maaparankoe Mahao. They provided Lesotho with recommendations, which the country has implemented. The SADC Oversight Committee has also been mandated to be an early warning mechanism for instability in the country. The sub-region is also facing challenges such as climate change, election disputes, economic underdevelopment, unconstitutional change of governments, illegal migration, increases in organized transnational crime, drug and human trafficking, money laundering, illicit mining and maritime piracy.

3.8.3 Challenges in the SADC

At first glance the SADC appears to have been largely successful in preventing political crises in Madagascar and Lesotho in 2015 from erupting into greater violence. Yet, the way that the organization has conducted its role as a collective security regime that fosters peace and security in the region casts doubt on this conclusion.

The SADC’s lack of agreed norms, strategies and procedures has set the REC back in terms of conflict prevention, management and resolution. This was evident in 1998 when a minority of states in the REC took military action in Lesotho without any authorization of a SADC mandate for such an action. Leaders in the region behave in a disaggregated manner, driven by the overriding demands of national interest and sovereignty. Policies at national levels have militarist and authoritarian tendencies and SADC leaders have for years struggled to find a common strategy to forge a common regional policy approach to human insecurity (Born & Tuler, 2002), as was evident in the Zimbabwe crisis. There is also no consensus on democracy in the region, which has in essence encouraged violence and insecurity for some of its member states.

Moreover, the REC has ambitious regional goals, but its member states lack the resources, technical capacity and overall weaknesses to carry out these goals in a
successful manner. The region has a great number of members with a lack of resources and weak administrative capacity, which have in essence been detrimental to the success of the forums and programmes that have been put in place by the SADC (Nathan, 2016). Although member states in the SADC have EWS at national levels, South Africa and Lesotho are the only two countries that are able to produce timely reports. The other member states do not have the resources to carry out such a task (SADC, 2016). There is also no consensus on democracy in the region, which has in essence encouraged violence and insecurity some of its member states.

3.8.4 Has SADC’s Regional Early Warning Centre achieved its main functions?

The region continues to face multiple disasters that affect the security of its citizens. These disasters include both natural and man-made ones. Since the implementation of the Regional Early Warning Centre, the SADC has put much emphasis on addressing drought in the region. It has done so by developing programmes within the Regional Early Warning Centre to address this issue. These projects include the Regional Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis Programme, the Drought Monitoring Centre and the Drought Risk Reduction Unit. These programmes helped the Regional Early Warning Centre in 2012 to collect, analyse and disseminate early warning agrometeorological reports to SADC’s ministerial and summit meetings. According to the SADC annual report, some member states responded to the early warning agrometeorological reports by planning their crop production, monitoring vulnerability and preparing for potential disasters during crop growing season (SADC Secretariat, 2012). The SADC has also installed satellite receiving stations and advance fire information systems in the Ministries of Environment. It additionally employed the World Meteorological Organization to forecast severe weather (SADC, 2016).

In 2016, the centre produced an early warning report that forecasted the impacts of the El Niño, the potential rainfall and possible droughts that might be experienced between 2016 and 2017. The report discusses mitigation and adaptation mechanisms to the effects of climate variability. Based on the report, the Secretariat established a team to coordinate a regional response to the impacts of the El Niño. The response team was
mandated to analyse and communicate the impacts of El Niño in the region and the resources needed for an effective response (SADC, 2016). The outcome of the response team is yet to be communicated.

The report also stipulates that the Secretariat has strengthened the different systems at both national and regional levels to inform policy formulation, development programmes and emergency interventions (SADC, 2016).

However, this has not been evident. Although most member states in the region have EWS, these seldom produce early warning information due to inadequate financial and human resources. This has in effect hampered the ability of member states to make informed policy decisions to prevent insecurities in the region. Only South Africa and Lesotho are currently producing timely early warning reports (SADC, 2016). Moreover, few member states are willing to share sensitive information among each other in the region and with international donors due to the reluctance of diluting the principles of sovereignty by member states (Albuquerque, 2015).

The RECW has achieved considerable strides in its set of objectives, particularly in the weather and climate prediction frontier. Through these reports the RECW has collected alerts at a regional level and shared the information with member states on potential adverse climate events. These reports provided recommendations to member states on how to mitigate such threats as outlined in its main objective.

However, the RECW has not been able to address other human security threats in the sub-region. The SADC region is compounded by vast stocks of arms, economic underdevelopment and violations of human rights.

3.8.5 Human or national security

Southern Africa is a region of great contrasts. Although levels of human development in the region are higher than in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, income inequality within states is among the highest in the world. The region hosts the second biggest economy on the continent (South Africa) and poor island states. It is also home to six of the ten best-governed countries in Africa and the most poorly governed countries on the continent,
namely Zimbabwe and the DRC (Ibrahim, 2015). The region also has great contrasts regarding peace and security, democratic practices and governance within states. Such contrasting practices have largely been blamed on the region's colonial histories (Portugal, France, Britain and Germany) which have left a variety of legacies that have complicated initiatives for security in the region (Cawthra, 2010).

Member states have been reluctant to embrace a collective security regime that encompasses a common consensus of insecurity issues in the sub-region and binding decision making. This was evident from how the political crisis that took place in Lesotho was handled by the Mediating Task Team and the division within the organization over Zimbabwe. Moreover, member states hold sovereignty in high regard, and this has undermined the Organ and the integrity of the treaty.

There also appears to be a fixation with the Southern African Development Community Brigade (SADCBRIG). Often, when the SADC member states request standby arrangements, it is interpreted as needing a militarist response, leaving civilian input and participation absent and denying civil society participation in its operations and policy decisions.

3.8.6 Has the SADC RECW been modelled according to the UN’s recommendations for early warning systems?

The UN recommends that an EWS should be people-centred. In the electoral frontier, SADC has established institutions that have been developed from a collaboration of civil society organization and groups. These institutions include the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF), SADC Electoral Support Network and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA). Despite the formation of these institutions, some countries in the region have not had free and fair elections. Zimbabwe is the most obvious example and there have also been cases of unconstitutional seizures of power.

Civil society and other groups and organizations have not been involved in the overall participation of sending alerts to the SADC RECW. Representatives from CSO across the SADC region have been disgruntled about the lack of civil society participation and
engagement mechanisms in the regional organization’s decision making processes at both national and regional levels. In pursuit of creating a bridge between civil society and governmental regional leadership, CSOs have formed a forum to provide civil society with a platform to contribute to and create synergy with the agenda of SADC and dialogue on issues facing the SADC region (APDev, 2016). However, these CSOs do not have real policy influence in SADC, critical decisions are often taken in summits where CSOs are often not present and member states are in full control (Godsater, 2016).

Furthermore, although the SADC has agencies such as NEPAD’s APRM in place that do report on instigators of insecurity and have national programmes of actions, there are no modalities of working relationships between the two. According to the APRM’s Senior Technical Adviser to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Prof Melaku Desta, this is because ‘there are not any channels that the APRM reports can go through’ and that levels of coordination and a systematic way to follow up on reports is needed to make certain that conflicts are averted (2017).

Not having such channels has in essence meant that citizens and agencies such as the NEPAD within the sub-region cannot challenge policies and actions taken by the member states or pursue matters in a manner that will benefit the broader mandate of conflict prevention. Such closed EWS holds no guarantee for civil liberties, democracy and human security (Hutton, 2009).

The UN also recommends that EWSs should disseminate meaningful warnings to those who are at risk and make the public aware of an emerging conflict. SADC’s EWS is operated in a manner that is secretive and has in essence resulted in the security needs of people not being met. The xenophobic attacks that have plagued South Africa since 2008 revealed that SADC EWSs have been ineffective in its mandate of conflict prevention. It is of utmost importance for SADC’s EWS priorities to be shared openly to allow the public to assess what SADC considers threats to security. Not being able to make the public aware of such events provides a basis for ethically questionable operations, corruption, abuses of power, inadequacy and inefficiency (Motsamai, 2011).
The UN also recommends that an EWS should have a technical monitoring and warning service. The establishment of the SADC REWC was twofold. The first stage was making certain that issues concerning the concept of the RECW, the structure and human and financial resource issues were addressed. The second stage was making certain that the RECW is functional. The RECW has since then been established in the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana, and each member state has a national intelligence agency. The systems operate under such a blanket of secrecy that the indicators of how they collect information have not been openly being revealed to the public. The National Intelligence Agencies also do not allow for direct exchange of alerts with the AU, but only disseminates its strategic reports through the SADC Organ (Cilliers, 2014).

3.9 Analysis of the three RECs

All three RECs have made substantial progress in their respective regions in developing EWSs and they play an increasingly important role in the security of the continent. However, in spite of these milestones, all three RECs face serious insecurity issues. Some challenges include terrorism, food insecurity, unemployment and armed conflicts. In order to analyse the three RECs EWS in practical terms, this section adopt a comparative analysis of all three EWSs, notwithstanding that each REC is unique to its demographics, what it perceives a threat to be, the nature of conflicts and their differing mandates and mechanisms. The ECOWARN has taken critical steps in soliciting relevant expertise from CSOs since its inception, which plays a role in the early detection of conflicts. The ECOWARN works collaboratively with the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEPP), which is a network for collaborative peace-building in the sub-region, its secretariat is based in Accra and provides support to national networks in strategic planning and promotes information sharing among its members on potential conflicts (Abdi, 2015). The WANEPP has in essence facilitated that the ECOWARN be centred around civil society through some of its programmes. such as the West Africa Early Warning and Response Network (WARN); Capacity Building and West Africa Peace-building Institute (WAPI); WANEPP National Networks, Women in Peace-building Network Programme; Intervention and Special Initiatives Programme; Active Non-Violence Education and Justice Building (Opoku, 2013). Furthermore, the ECOWARN
works with the West African Civil society, which is an organization that brings together CSO within ECOWAS to promote peace and security in the sub-region. The importance of the partnership between CSO and ECOWARN was reflected in 2007 when recommendations and analysis from civil society on the crisis in Guinea played a significant role in ECOWAS being an effective mediator. Moreover, the WANEP and its programmes continue to highlight potential conflict situations and recommendations through advocacy measures and policy briefs. This has resulted in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations granting WANEP a Special Consultative Status to the UN (Opoku, 2013). The CEWARN continuously enhances its role to factor in security dynamics in the region. This is evident from how the REC has over the last 14 years broadened its mandate to a wider context of security.

It is clear that all three RECs' definition of security ranges from very broad to narrow interpretations. On paper, the SADC and ECOWASs' security includes both political-military and non-military security threats, while CEWARN only reflects a human security approach to alerts. However, all three sub-regions continue to prioritize more on national security matters than human security. In the case of SADC, this tendency has been attributed to the political history of the region and the independence struggles that most member states have experienced. According to Hartmann, the price paid by member states to gain independence is reason enough to uphold state sovereignty and national security (Hartmann, 2013). These member states furthermore do not have shared values on what they perceived as threats to security. In the case of CEWARN, it has been highlighted that states spend excessive resources on arms due to the predominance of a culture of external interference and mutual destabilization in the affairs of neighbouring states. This culture is rooted in authoritarian regimes in the sub-region (Mwaïra & Schmeidl, 2002). This has resulted in some country coordinators not being remunerated for the work they do and the CEWARN being overly dependent on donor funding. The ECOWAS inertia in responding to emerging human insecurity has also often been rooted in very traditionalist approaches.

This has in essence resulted in all three RECs suffering from serious resource and capacity constraints that has kept their EWS from preventing conflicts and in
implementing early responses to emerging conflicts. In SADC, only two member states have the capacity to produce early warning reports and ECOWARN has been dependent on donor funding countries such as France and Canada for their peace and security activities. Addressing such misaligned security prioritizations can only be influenced by the political will of the leaders, who want to go beyond addressing human insecurity on paper, but do not want to implement modalities of action to address this.

The implementation of the EWS monitoring systems at national levels vastly differ between the RECs. Although all the RECs EWSs are present at regional levels (SADC RECW in Botswana, Gaborone; CEWARN in Addis Ababa and ECOWARN in Abuja, Nigeria), the implementation of monitoring systems at national levels has been uneven. Two countries in the SADC have functional EWSs at member state level; the CEWARN is unevenly distributed in the different clusters. Such scattered and insufficiently integrated EWS constrain the capacity to collect and manage information on potential conflicts and in essence contribute to ineffective procedures for preventive action. The ECOWARN is the only EWS that has a regional monitoring system as well as different functioning observation and monitoring systems in all its 16 (16) member states, while in the CEWARN, monitoring systems are unevenly distributed.

Among intergovernmental agencies the CEWARN and ECOWARN systems have been deemed as the most technologically advanced systems. The CEWARN is a third-generation system and ECOWARN is second generation. Both EWS have sophisticated electronic monitoring tools and warning services. The ECOWARN and CEWARN also have vast indicators, which include structural data, climatic data and data on human deaths. This assists in providing important value for evidence-based decision making and helps identify alternatives for emerging conflicts. However, the basis of the effectiveness of the sophisticated systems lies in the hands of the decision maker. Even if these EWSs produce timely and accurate warnings, the early response requires effort from decision makers. Early action is impossible without political will. In terms of the SADC, very little is revealed about the monitoring tools and warning services at both the national and sub-regional level.
The different reporting structures also differ. The SADC member states have the option of sharing their alerts with the AU at both regional and national levels. These member states furthermore have the option of not sharing their EW information with their sub-regional counterparts. The ECOWARN observation and monitoring centres are all linked to the Observation and Monitoring Centre and the situation room, which are situated in different locations within the region. This facilitates a flow of information between the centres and the situation room, which in effect assists in ensuring that responses are drawn up for the security of the population. The CEWARN gathers data collected by field monitors on the ground and fed into a data-based monitoring system in Addis Ababa, easing the flow of information gathering, analysis and communication for an early response.

Each EWS faces an array of challenges. Being a melting pot of diverse and complex economic conditions, languages and cultures has posed a challenge for the ECOWARNs analytical capability as this system has to consider the different dynamics that are playing a role in escalating threats. The group has to be cognisant of the differences in the sub-region. In all EWSs the greatest challenge lies in the reluctance of member states to open themselves for information sharing. This is especially evident in the SADC where systems are shrouded by secrecy and CEWARN where even though on paper the CEWARN is stipulated to collaborate with civil society organization, member states have the power to deny civil societies any involvement in sharing alerts. The politicization of these systems remain evident, specifically the control of political information in cases of national security. Moreover, the CEWARN has found it challenging to address emerging conflicts that develop from long standing disputes which date back to the 1970s.

Lastly, when considering the UN’s five element criteria for an effective EWS, it is clear that all three RECs’ EWSs are ineffective. Although these RECs do have technical monitoring and warning services, they lack in all four of the other elements.

The next section deals with the theoretical underpinnings of the study and explain how complex security regimes in regions operate and are managed. This discussion considers regional security on the African continent.
3.10 Barry Buzan’s security complex

The question of regional security has long preoccupied the minds of international relations practitioners and the search for security has been an unending journey in the international arena. The concept of regional security has been most adequately dealt with by IR scholar Barry Buzan. In his analysis of regional security, Buzan vividly encapsulates how regional security is a relational and cooperative phenomenon: ‘one cannot understand the national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded’ (Buzan, 1991:187).

Through this particular analysis of regional security, he offers interesting concepts such as patterns of ‘amity’ and ‘enmity’ between states in regions. According to Buzan, ‘the concepts of amity and enmity cannot be attributed solely to the balance of power’ (Buzan, 1991:187). Issues that can affect enmity or amity can range from differences or similarities in ideology, territory, ethnic lines, and historical precedent (Buzan, 1991:187).

The two concepts of amity/enmity have led to the idea of a ‘security complex’, which is ‘a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another’ (Buzan, 1991:190). These concepts are pivotal in understanding the importance of amity relations and in using conflict prevention tools such as the EWS (Buzan, 1991:187). According to Buzan, ‘security complexes are exposed to four major types of threats and their interaction: balance of power contests among great powers, lingering conflicts that emerge between neighbouring countries, intrastate conflicts and conflicts that arise from transnational threats’ (Ayoob, 1995).

The concepts of ‘security complexes’ and patterns of ‘amity’ and enmity are important as every state can put its security in relation to at least one complex. This is also influenced by the level of enmity or amity that every state has in that complex (Stone, 2009).
When using the Horn of Africa as an example of how regional security is a relational phenomenon, we are able to identify how Somalia and Ethiopia, Ethiopia and Sudan, Sudan and Uganda, Uganda and Rwanda have played major roles in mediating each other's civil wars. However, neighbouring states such as Sudan and South Sudan or Eritrea and Ethiopia have been antagonistic towards each other (Buzan, 1991).

This has in essence debilitated the Horn of Africa's pursuit for security in the region. We witness through this particular example how the enmities among the states in the Horn have sparked territorial conflicts and different ideologies within the region. This in essence shows that the nature of security threats is complex and interdependent within the security complex. This creates complex security issues within the security complex. The states in the Horn of Africa are predominantly made up of weak states. They face multidimensional internal and external challenges involving 'logistical, institutional, linguistic, political and economic constraints' (Buthelezi, 2006: xiv).

The Horn has found it quite difficult to address 'old threats' that are now combined with 'new threats' and are causing complex security problems. The region has not been able to address contextual factors that were established by empires and the colonial states. Colonial powers left shattered economic and institutional systems and insecure ethnic identities that have played a big role in exacerbating issues of insecurity in the region. This is why we cannot understand the complex problems of the AU and its sub-regional organizations in isolation from the continent's history and present international forces, actors and processes (Malan, 2005).

By pointing this out, the scholar puts into clear perspective how regional patterns of relations between states are prominent in conflict prevention matters and how interdependent security is needed to holistically prevent conflicts. It is very important to take into account when considering how interdependent the APSA is. For early warnings to be heeded in a timely manner within the APSA structure and RECs, there should be smooth mutual interactions between states. If not, the general pattern will be that 'each state sits at the centre of a set of security interactions connecting it to the immediate neighbours with limits of power meaning that these individual patterns have not as a rule
linked significantly into wider patterns of security architecture’ (Ayoob, 1995:10). Buzan argues that in regional security terms, ‘military and political threats are more significant strongly felt when states are at close range’ (1991:188). By using the security complex, it is discernible that a group of states in each of the RECs are so linked together that they cannot realistically consider their national securities apart from one another. These RECs or ‘security complexes’ are either held together by shared interests or rivalries and there are different levels of security (Sheehan, 2005:49-50).

Applying this theory in the RECs provides insights as to how historical patterns of enmity can be detrimental to the effectiveness of an EWS. Furthermore, the lack of amity relations between states is reflected in the lack of effectiveness of an EWS, where constant fighting or lack of coherence of ideologies in a sub-region can contribute to insecurity.

Another contribution that Barry Buzan made with his colleague Ole Waever in regional security is the idea of ‘securitization.’ Securitization explains why political will is crucially important in EWSs and conflict prevention. According to these scholars, something is a security problem when the elites declare and accept it to be so (Waever, 1998:6). This points out that no matter how well-advanced or structured an EWS might be, its ultimate success depends on the judgement and decision of political leaders.

Barry Buzan should be credited for stimulating much needed revisions in the fields of international relations and international security and for the theoretical significance that his work has had. However, the scholar approaches security from a neorealist perspective.

Buzan repeatedly makes the state a referent object in his analysis and security. This is quite problematic because of the multifaceted forms of the insecurities in the context of the post-cold war African state. Conflicts stem from human and territorial insecurity, underdevelopment, non-state and state actors and their complex multifaceted interconnectedness. Therefore the state cannot form core when analysing regional security. We need to understand Africa’s insecurity issues with the forces, processes, actors and non-actors that have an impact on security.
It is important to stress that there are multifaceted security threats (human and national security) in our contemporary era that cannot be confronted separately, each one is intricately and complexly linked with the next.

It is of utmost importance to understand security from different micro- and macro-perspectives. Failure to have EWSs that do not take into account the different sectors and levels will only widen the early warning—early action gap and contribute to human insecurity. There should be indicators that consider how interlinked and porous security is as a result of globalization and how this has brought to the fore complex threats at all levels and in all systems.

3.11 The New Regionalism Approach (NRA)

The NRA is not excessively concerned with formal and state centric notions of regionalism. The NRA theorizes and reflects on issues of human security, development, the state and the region and the interconnectedness of these elements, which is very relevant to the African context.

The end of the Cold War bore two separate discourses, namely ‘new regionalism’ and ‘human security’. By using the NRA, scholars have joined these two discourses and essentially advanced the field of regionalism by reflecting on contemporary issues such as the interconnectedness and complexity of human security, development, the state and the region in Africa (Kevin & James, 2013).

This theoretical framework is of great importance within the African region because it goes to great lengths to take into cognisance that ‘the African state-society consists of actors that are fundamentally all linked together creating a wide range of complex regionalization patterns on the continent’ (Grant & Söderbaum, 2003:30).

The NRA helps to explain why EWSs are necessary in the context of the interconnected nature of security threats and challenges on the African continent.

This particular theory not only focuses on the state as the sole agency of security in a region, but also looks into non-state actors, the effects of globalization, the activities of
international forces and processes at different levels in a constellation of other factors that are relevant in the dealing with insecurity in the African continent (Grant & Söderbaum, 2003).

This in essence makes the NRA more eclectic and more dynamic. Even though Barry Buzan does concern himself with security, he does not reflect upon issues of human security, development, the state, the region and their interconnectedness, which are all critical for regional security, especially on the African continent. The fact that the NRA rethinks and reconceptualises the 'state' and other dimensions forms a strong basis. This gives scholars the platform to take into cognisance that 'security' on the continent essentially consists of a constellation of factors, elements and actors at local, national and international levels, which are increasingly becoming regional insecurity catalysts (Grant & Söderbaum, 2003).

It is critical to understand the complexities of Africa’s EWSs by being cognisant of the manifold connections and notions of regionalism.

3.12 The NRA and Buzan’s security complex

The NRA and Barry Buzan’s security complex are both complimentary to this study. When the AU in 2003 established the APSA and mandated the PSC to anticipate and prevent conflicts through a continent-wide EWS, it tasked REC s with similar responsibilities. The AU’S APSA through its PSC grounded its conflict prevention strategy in Barry Buzan’s notion of the regional security complex.

By forming a framework of interdependence between the REC s and the PSC, the AU rooted its regional security approach in the fact that security interdependence can be best addressed through regional structures of security cooperation tailored to fit their security environment.

The interdependent relations between the APSA and its REC s make it easier for the AU to ideally prevent and manage conflicts on the continent. This is because the different REC s’ geographical and cultural proximity can readily facilitate more rapid responses to potential violent conflicts.
Furthermore, the RECs have a better understanding of conflict dynamics and can offer better context-specific responses based on their patterns of relations. Moreover, based on the patterns of relations shared between the states, there is a possibility that the warring actors could be more comfortable in preventing the escalation of a possible dispute at sub-regional level as opposed to a regional level (Franke, 2006). This points out Buzan’s security complex, which entails that states in regions in close proximity to each other have interlinked security concerns and that none can guarantee its own security without cooperating with the other.

The discourse on human security and development was reinvigorated in 2005 when the AU and its RECs adopted a human security-oriented framework in responding to shared vulnerabilities, threats and repositioning the continent in global affairs. The adoption of the draft African Non-Aggression Common Defence Pact, which is an approach to advance human progress and to achieve peace and development, shows that the AU and its RECs made revisions of what should be included in the discussion of security on the continent. The draft African Non-Aggression Common Defence Pact states that:

‘Human security means the security of the individual with respect to the satisfaction of the basic needs of life, it also encompasses the creation of the social, political, economic, military, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival, livelihood and dignity of the individual, including the protection of fundamental freedoms, the respect of human rights, good governance, access to education, healthcare and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his/her own potential’ [(AU, 2005: Article 1(k)].

Through this pact, the AU and its RECs reflect on issues of human security and development through formal, institutionalized regional cooperation. This links it to the NRA, which is concerned with economic, food, health and environment considerations and reflects on issues of human security and development. With that being said, the AU and its RECs on paper no longer consider the state a sole agency, but takes into cognisance that societies also possess the monopoly of legitimate violence. However, in reality, the
APSA and its RECs’ EWS activities fit into Buzan’s framework. This shows that both theories offer important points of analysis in terms of regionalism on the African continent.

3.13 How does APSA and the RECs’ EWS mandates fit into Buzan’s framework and the NRA?

3.13.1 ECOWARN

The ECOWARN was established with the mandate to contain the possibility of an emerging conflict by various means. These involve developing capacities at different levels (community, national and sub-regional) for early detection, early warning and early response; identifying and monitoring context-specific conflict and peace indicators for preventive action; fostering collaborative relationships between various sectors of society; sharing early warning reports, policy briefs, preventive instruments, mechanisms, tools and strategies with partners, stakeholders, policy makers and actors potential interveners and promoting integrated approaches to conflict prevention (WANEPE, 2007). Its regional conflict prevention framework signifies that the ECOWAS is aware that conflict prevention can be successful since they are often interconnected to challenges of poverty, bad governance and weak states in the region. By increasingly placing civil society and other non-state actors at the centre of conflict prevention, human security and overall development, ECOWAS embraced a multifaceted approach that involves different actors at different levels, signifying that the ECOWAS has gradually adopted a NRA approach to its insecurity issues.

However, a substantial factor that has contributed to failure to prevent conflict has been the nature of the geo-politics of Francophone, Lusophone and Anglophone divisions as amity and enmity logics of regional integration have prevented the implementation of common values. The ECOWARN has played a vital role in sending alerts on Ebola and intervening in Guinea-Bissau before the emergence of a conflict. However, the REC has been confronted with challenges related to how member states perceive economic and security regionalism. Most Francophone and Anglophone countries were hesitant about ECOWAS expanding into the peace and security domain as they identified the REC as
primarily for economic integration. The Anglophone countries, on the other hand, perceived the REC as a security arm. This led to two ECOWASs (Francis, 2009).

Although the REC has attempted to resolve this issue by engaging the Francophone group, there are still underlying tensions and division in terms of a common approach to regional security and concerns and lack of trust over Nigeria’s hegemonic powers.

3.13.2 SADC REWC

Although SADC has established strong protocols on human security and conflict prevention and developed an EWS to assist in averting possible conflicts, the REC continues to operate on principles of national security and sovereignty. The REC has also disposed divisions in their approach to security. This was evident in 1998 when the REC intervened in the DRC by deploying two contradicting strategies led by two sub-regional powers (Williams, 2005). Moreover, SADC justified Zimbabwe’s interference in the DRC and later legitimized South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho. This has caused distrust between member states that endures to the present (Ajebijo & Landsberg, 2003). SADC developed the Strategic Indicative Plan in 2004 which recognizes the following challenges;

‘climate change, economic recession, unconstitutional change of governments, the growing vulnerability of national borders, illegal migration, increases in organized crime, drug and human trafficking, money laundering, illicit mining, maritime piracy and so forth’ (SIPO, 2004:12.8).

However, it has considered the national interests of member states rather than human security. The lack of trust and the death of common values and approaches to insecurity issues among SADC member states will pre-empt consensus early warnings and delay any timely rapid responses to such alerts (Ancas, 2011).

3.13.3 CEWARN

On paper, the CEWARN adopted a human security approach to alerts to essentially deliver outcomes in the peace and security realm. It has also involved non-state actors
such as civil society and the private sector in conflict prevention. However, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states is upheld in Article 6(A) of the Agreement establishing the IGAD. The IGAD member states have been known to only intervene in each other’s internal affairs when they fight proxy wars against one another by engaging in what Cliffe calls mutual interference (Mwatra, 2002:36). That is when governments support each other’s insurgency movements. Some have supported insurgencies in neighbouring countries because of ties they have with the rebelling groups or for the sake of destabilizing regimes they have antagonistic relations with. For instance, al-Bashir’s regime has been reported to have received support for civilian massacres from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda and the Janjaweed militias in Darfur, Sudan. The culture of ‘mutual interference’ is notable in North/South Sudan with authorities in Juba reportedly supporting the SPLM-North and rebel groups in Darfur and the authorities in Khartoum backing a range of armed actors in the Republic of South Sudan (William, 2011).

This suggests that the regional security in the Horn is linked to the survival and interests of regimes in place and rebel movements (Cliffe, 1999). According to Healy, this suggests that ‘interactions between the states of the region support and sustain the conflicts within the states of the region in a systemic way’ (Healy, 2008:44).

3.13.4 APSA

The APSA’s structure has brought to light the importance of different regional dynamics on the continent. As opposed to the bi-polar world where conflicts are defined in reference to the competition for influence by superpowers, the APSA has taken an approach that signifies that regional security in the post-Cold War setting can be understood through interdependence among states in a region. This includes the relations between state and non-state actors and moving away from state centric approach to more of a human security approach to better explain the complexity of a conflict in the post-Cold War context (Aggad & Desmidt, 2017). By emphasizing the importance of human security, state and non-state actors in the realm of conflict prevention, the APSA on paper has a strong mandate to engage in conflicts at an early stage.
However, despite the emphasis on human security, the reality on the ground is that the APSA continues to securities its responses to conflicts. This is amplified by the allocation of both human and financial resources, including those from donors such as the European Union (EU). The EU continues to prioritize Peace Support Operations (PSO), which the political economy of the AU Commission supports. Between the years 2004–2015, the EU, which is a key partner of the AU on the implementation of the APSA, contributed 1 555 million EUR to PSO, 131 million EUR for capacity building and only 30 million EUR to early warning response mechanisms (European Commission, 2015). As a result, matters of security on the continent have been crisis-driven and role players often adopt very militaristic approaches to insecurity. Furthermore, relations between the structures within the APSA have been problematic. This is noted in the APSA Roadmap (2016-2020), which confirms that there are poor relations between the PSC, PoW, the chairpersons’ envoys, representatives and mediators (AUC, 2015). This is evident from how the AU relied on mobilizing African elders such as former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo and its AU High Representative for South Sudan instead of its PoW.

Conclusion

This chapter presented an overview of the three RECs’ operational EWSs on the continent. The chapter sought to assess the development of the ECOWARN, CEWARN and SADC REWC. It discussed conflict situations before the implementation of the EWS and whether this has changed since they have been established. It also assesses whether these RECs have prioritized human security as a basis for preventing conflicts or whether EWS have been politicized to serve national interests. It concludes by noting that despite the efforts that these RECs have made to establish the EWSs and placing human security at the crux of their mechanisms, states still regard national security as more pertinent. The chapter also established that the RECs have not modelled their EWSs according to UN’s recommended elements.

It is important to note that both the NRA and Barry Buzan’s framework for securitization play a significant role in understanding regional security on the continent. The NRA is used to explain how the non-state actors, the effects of globalization, the activities of
international forces and processes at different levels form a constellation of other factors
that are relevant in the dealing with insecurity in the African continent (Grant & Söderbaum, 2003). It is based on the assumption that the term ‘security’ reflects on issues of human
security, development, the state and the region, as well as their interconnectedness. This
approach has been adopted through numerous mandates by the RECs and the AU’s
APSA. The sub-regions and the APSA have taken into cognisance the changing nature of
conflicts on the continent and the emergence of new security threats (climate change,
terrorism and migration). These threats require an approach such as the NRA, which
delves into different facets such as the political, social and economic governance
structures put in place in states.

A key assumption of securitization is the belief that security is about state survival rather
than human security. In reality, this has been evident in the RECs and the APSA. Although
these institutions do recognize the importance of human security in ensuring sustainable
peace and development, their approach has been focused more on state-centric military
interventions.
Chapter Four: The Continental Early Warning System

4.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) with reference to its stated mandate of anticipating and preventing conflicts in Africa within the context of the APSA. The author begins by outlining the CEWS background its structure and functions within the context of the APSA. The chapter proceeds to examine the effectiveness of CEWS by examining its role in conflict prevention on the continent. The examination finds that the probable factors that affect the effectiveness of CEWS are underscored by institutional, political and systematic weaknesses of the CEWS and its RECs’ conflict prevention mechanisms upon which CEWS and the overall APSA depend on.

4.2. APSA

Subsequent to the AU’s inauguration in 2002, the continental body adopted an array of normative and institutional mechanisms for peace and security. The AU adopted the Protocol relating to the establishment of Peace and security (PSC) in 2003 to uncover a broadened agenda for peace and security. Article 2 (1) of the PSC Protocol defines the PSC as ‘a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa’ (Protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC, 2002).

This is inclusive of conflict prevention, early warning and preventive diplomacy; peace-making (including the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry); peace support operations and intervention; peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; humanitarian action and disaster management (PSC Protocol, 2002).

The protocol expands into an APSA which has a set of interrelated institutions and mechanisms for conflict prevention at different levels on the continent (PSC Protocol, 2002).
At a sub-regional level, the APSA coordinates the activities of the eight RECs in the peace and security field. At a continental level, it coordinates a variety of institutions for crisis prevention, crisis management and peace consolidation, which is coordinated by the AU’s PSC. The PSC is in turn supported by five core pillars of the APSA, which are the PSC, PoW, the CEWS, the ASF and the AU Peace Fund (Murithi, 2014). Thus, in theory, the APSA is equipped with instruments for all stages of conflict prevention, diplomacy, mediation, de-escalation and termination.

4.3. CEWS

According to Article 12(1) of the Peace and Security Protocol, the CEWS was established to play a reciprocal role with all the other pillars of the APSA as well as other organs of the AU Commission. The CEWS is ‘responsible for data collection and analysis and is mandated to collaborate with the United Nations (UN), its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centres, academic institutions and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) with its information to be used by the Chairperson of the Commission to advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action’ [Peace and Security Protocol, 2002: Article 12(1)].

The AU Commission held a sequence of workshops and consultations on the establishment of the CEWS with officials from the different RECs, the UN and its system organizations; representatives from civil society and research councils. The recommendations made from these consultations was that member states, RECs, the UN and the African civil society, as well as research institutions need a process to explore the modalities for the development and operationalization of the CEWS. The Commission developed a draft roadmap for the operationalization of the CEWS in July 2005 to put in place a process of developing, operationalizing and institutionalizing the CEWS. The roadmap specifies the pivotal steps and requirements necessary for an effective CEWS. The findings from the roadmap are that the CEWS should be guided by three key stages, which involve a constant flow of information collection on early warnings and monitoring such alerts from the AU and its RECs.
There should also be cooperation between the RECs and AU on the analysis of such warnings and on formulating early response options from key decision makers (CEWS Roadmap, 2008).

Following that, in December 2006, the Commission summoned a meeting with government experts on early warning and conflict prevention, experts from AU member states and representatives of the RECs as well as representatives from academic institutions, NGOs, civil society and the UN. It was concluded during the meeting that the AU Commission and the RECs will take all necessary steps to ensure that the CEWS is fully operational by 2009. The Commission is required to submit regular reports on progress made and challenges faced to the relevant AU organs (CEWS Roadmap, 2008).

The meeting further urged member states, as well as AU partners, to ‘take all the necessary steps for the timely and full implementation of the Continental Early Warning System, including the mobilization of the financial and technical resources required from both AU Member States and partners, the speedy recruitment of the human resources needed and other relevant steps’ (AU, 2008: paragraph 31).

The development of the CEWS aims to provide political decision makers with timely information on emerging conflicts and corresponding timeous policy response options. Therefore, the information provided by the CEWS must be ‘timely, accurate, valid, reliable and verifiable by using open source materials that can be accessed and verified’ (Cilliers, 2005:1).

It does so to provide timely advice on threats to peace and security to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to a number of principle users of the AU, namely the chairperson of the Commission, the PSC and other departments within the Commission, as well as various organs and structures of the AU such as the Pan-African Parliament, the PoW and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (AU, 2008: paragraph 16).

The information and analysis gathered through the CEWS is used by the chairperson of the Commission to ‘advise the PSC on potential threats to peace and security in Africa
and recommend the best course of action' [PSC Protocol, Article 12(5)]. The Chairperson is also called 'to use this information for the execution of the responsibilities and functions entrusted to him/her under the present Protocol' [PSC Protocol, Article 12(5)].

The protocol furthermore stipulates that member states too are urged to 'commit themselves to facilitate early action by the PSC and/or the Chairperson of the Commission based on early warning information' [PSC Protocol, Article 12(6)]. In order to fulfill this objective effectively, the CEWS must be able to perform the following functions: data collection, strategic analysis, issue of reports and engaging with decision makers, as well as coordinating and collaborating with relevant actors and institutions timeously (CEWS Roadmap, 2008).

The CEWS is technically functional and collects actor-based data using the Indicators and Profiles Module. These indicators are enhanced with automated information gathering and management technology that generates alerts such as the Africa Media Monitor; the CEWS Portal; the Indicators and Profiles Module, the Africa Reporter; the Africa Prospectus and the Live-Mon (CEWS Roadmap, 2008).

The CEWS is envisaged as an open source system where information is gathered from a variety of different sources such as NGOs, the media and academia, as well as online data sources such as Oxford Analytical and BBC Monitoring. However, much emphasis is placed on African sources for data such as AU field missions and offices around the continent (CEWS Roadmap 2008).

The data from these sources are analysed by the CEWS personnel in the situation room, which has software programmes that allow access to a variety of information at its disposal. It is located in the Conflict Management Division (CMD) of the AU in Addis Ababa and is linked to the observation and monitoring units in the different RECs (CEWS Roadmap, 2008).

The system provides the following products:

1. Regular distribution of early warning information;
2. Daily news highlights of potential conflicts: daily news clippings;

3. Daily reports on emerging conflicts: five times a week;

4. Weekly wrap-up containing information on emerging conflicts: once a week;

5. SMS alert service which is only for AU Chairpersons (AUC), PSCs and PoWs (APSA, 2015).

It furthermore provides an analysis of current conflict situations in different countries and recommendations by producing the following:

1. Flash reports: summary of conflict situations;

2. SMS alerts on current conflicts: only for AUCs, PSCs and PoWs;

3. Situation update reports: conflict analysis, including policy recommendations. These are classified due to their political sensitivity;

4. Early warning reports: information on potential conflicts (APSA, 2015).

Lastly, it provides recommendations on current conflict situations that are reported to the PSC. The PSC meets on a regular basis to discuss data generated by the CEWS. However, decisions are often not taken in a timely manner due to different political interests of the Peace and Security Council members. The PSC has admitted to this flaw (APSA, 2015).

4.4. The CEWS and its RECs

The EWSs of the AU and three RECs (CEWARN, ECOWARN, and SADC REWC) have been physically established and envisaged to be connected to the CEWS. The CEWS critically relies on the RECs to feed the system with information on emerging conflicts from their sub-regional levels, while the AU gathers this data at headquarter level (Brosig, 2015). RECs are in essence building blocks for the CEWS because they play constituent roles in the early warning processes, while the AU provides framework for all initiatives
(Olooo, 2008). However, even though effective timely early warning data is the aim, it is only partially practised by the AU and its RECs (APSA, 2015).

4.4.1 Is there harmonization of CEWS with regional EWS of RECs?

The CEWS has developed an internet portal that connects the CEWS with the RECs. However, ECOWARN is the only REC that is fully connected to CEWS and the connection with SADC REWC is being developed. There are also regular meetings that take place between representatives of the RECs’ EWSs and the CEWS to improve the exchange of information between the systems. During these meetings, representatives are trained on managing and analysing data, drafting policy recommendations in early warning reports and refining and aligning all the RECs systems to the CEWS. The CEWS also conducts an exchange of staff for training purposes (APSA, 2015).

4.4.2 What are the challenges that the CEWS and RECs face?

The challenges faced are rooted in the lack of both financial and human resources at both REC level and AU headquarter level. There have been challenges regarding the remuneration of country coordinators in the CEWARN. Only two SADC countries are capacitated to generate early warnings in a timely manner and the ECOWARN is heavily dependent on external funding for its activities (Gutowski et al, 2016). The PSC has also acknowledged the lack of political will to act in time as a problem (PSC, 2015). According to Makda Maru, lack of political will can be traced to how decision makers have been unwilling to discuss early warning signals of African countries. Some financiers of the APSA and decision makers have struggled to put human security above national interests (Maru, 2016). This was indeed true for countries such as Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe in 2015. All of these countries have either significantly contributed financially or with troops, hosted one of the institutional headquarters for their RECs or chaired the AU during that period. This in essence creates the impression that the AU and RECs are less likely to intervene in these countries than in others (GIZ, 2015).
Maru furthermore points out that:

'The organizational culture of the AU-CEWS needs more political will, a more conducive organizational culture, and the depoliticization of its indicators and analyses to create a more robust and successful early warning-response nexus.' (Maru, 2016)

4.4.3 What are the achievements of the RECs and CEWS?

The AU and the RECs have increasingly committed to conflict prevention since the development of the APSA and the CEWS, which have reached different stages of functional capability. In 2015 alone, the AU and its RECs embarked on conflict preventive measures in emerging conflicts. In Burkina Faso the presence of an International Follow-up and Support Group for the Transition in Burkina Faso (GISAT-BF) was a preventive measure to coordinate the anticipation of a potential escalation. In Burundi, there were joint efforts from COMESA and the EAC to avert election violence. Furthermore, the AU's PoW in the run-up to the Burundi elections tried to mediate the potential conflict. However, this was not helpful as the situation in the country quickly deteriorated. Ahead of the 2015 elections in Guinea, the ECOWAS dispatched a high level mission ahead of the elections to assess the situation. The AU moreover sent a mission to assess the election situation. However, post-electoral incidents were noted and election results were disputed. In both Tanzania and Togo, the SADC and ECOWAS respectively adopted preventive measures such as election observation missions to avert potential election violence. This was partially successful as elections in both countries were largely peaceful. The AU furthermore sent a pre-deployment assessment mission to both countries. Conflicts did not escalate at all in Togo, but there were pockets of post-electoral incidents and elections were disputed in Tanzania. The RECs and the AU also failed to prevent violence in a timely manner in Nigeria, DRC, Sudan, Lesotho, Ethiopia, South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire and Republic of Congo in 2015. It is not known if the PSC or other decision makers within the different RECs were alerted on these potential conflicts (GIZ, 2015).
What should be noted is that the AU and RECs usually do not intervene in countries that uphold principles of sovereignty. Exceptions are only made in cases of severe crimes against humanity, such as genocide (GIZ, 2016).

4.5. The AU Commission, PoW, PSC and Peace Fund

The CEWS does not function on its own, but operates in an interrelated manner with the AU Commission, the PSC, the PoW and the Peace Fund. In essence, the CEWS only collects data on possible conflicts, but it should do this in an effective and speedy manner. The CEWS personnel have to compile a report on the alerts and send it to the AU Commission. The AU Commission then has to share this report with decision makers and act timeously. These ‘decision makers’ comprise of 15 members of PSC who are all elected by the AU Executive Council. Five members from the Council are elected for a three-year term and the other ten for two-year terms. Members are elected according to Article 5(2) of the PSC Protocol, which stipulates that members need to contribute to promoting and maintaining peace on the continent. They need to participate in conflict resolution, peace-making and peace-building at regional and continental levels. Members have to be able to take up responsibility for regional and continental conflict resolution initiatives, contribute to the Peace Fund, and have ‘respect for constitutional governance, the rule of law and human rights; and commitment to AU financial obligations’ [(PSC, Article 5(2) 2002).

The AUC of the Commission also has to engage and consult with relevant actors on the early warnings. ‘Relevant actors’ in this sense are the PoW, which is composed of five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent’ (Article 11 of PSC Protocol, 2002).

The PoW was essentially set up to support the PSC, particularly in the area of conflict prevention. Their mandate is to advise the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission on all issues pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent. They can advise other actors involved on bringing about peace and security at both a sub-regional or regional level (Touray, 2005).
In case of a conflict occurring before the CEWS and other actors in the APSA have prevented it, then the ASF has to ‘conduct peacekeeping missions, intervene in the affairs of a member state requests assistance in restoring peace and security, conduct preventive deployment and carry out peace-building operations’ (African Union, 2002, paragraph 13).

For all of this to happen, the AU should have sufficient funds in its Peace Fund which has been established as one of the key pillars of the APSA under Article 21 of the PSC Protocol. It is meant to provide financial resources for activities related to peace and security (PSC Protocol, 2002).

4.6. Has the CEWS been useful?

According to the APSA decision makers, the CEWS and the RECs’ EWS are useful for conflict prevention on the continent (APSA, 2015). Most CEWS products are used by the AUCs Peace and Security Department (PSD). Its early warning reports, analysis and policy options are forwarded by the AUC to the PSC who are supported by director of the PSC, PoW and the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. However, the CEWS does not receive feedback from key decision makers on the use of its early warning reports and policy recommendations and it is aiming to place much emphasis on policy recommendations in its early warning reporting and to strengthen the direct communication cooperation with the PSC on its early warning outputs. As a result of this, CEWS has been holding bi-annual policy briefings at the PSC since May 2016 and one matter that has emerged from the policy briefings is the need to increase member states’ contributions to the AU Peace Fund that different HSG have decided to implement. Such an increase is necessary for effective conflict prevention from the CEWS and for strengthening human and institutional capacities at headquarter and REC level (GIZ, 2016). It is, however, not known if member states have started to increase their contributions to the Peace Fund.

Crucially, violence has not been prevented from unfolding in all three sub-regions or on the rest of the continent. There have been frequent incidents of insecurity due to droughts in the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, xenophobic attacks in South Africa, election
violence in Burundi and terrorism and extremism across the continent. This is despite EWSs being in place, conflict prevention frameworks in the AU and the three RECs and the Protocols that have been established for peace and security in the region. EWSs are pivotal as they provide timely and reliable information for effective decisions on how to manage potential outbreaks. However, recent events such as cyclone Dineo that hit Southern Africa in February 2017 proved that EWSs have not been able to monitor or to warn on such disasters. Information on the cyclone was not delivered in a timely manner to create prepared and resilient communities. The impacts of this had great effects on multiple sectors as it caused damage to infrastructure and had a great effect on people’s health and resulted in loss of livelihoods.

4.7. Is there security on the continent?

Research by the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) and the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) suggests that the continent’s violent conflicts have substantially decreased since the 1990s (UCDP & GIGA, 2015). However, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)\(^6\), there has been an increase in violent events from 2011 to 2015. The ACLED reported that there was an average of ten fatalities from violent events per day at the end of 2011 in Africa. This has increased to four times that level by the middle of 2015 to 39,286 (ACLED, 2015).

On the other hand, the UCDP and the GIGA does acknowledge that the intensity of conflict and number of civilian casualties has increased on the continent (UCDP & GIGA, 2015). This is evident in countries such as Nigeria, DRC, South Sudan, Central African Republic (CAR), South Africa, and Sudan all of which represent a significant portion of events on the ACLED (ACLED, 2015).

These events include countries such as the CAR, Sudan, South Sudan and the DRC which were impacted by rebel activity; terrorism in Nigeria and Somalia and riots in South Africa. These violent events and fatalities are two trends that are complex and differ from

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\(^6\) ACLED is designed for disaggregated conflict analysis and crisis mapping. The dataset codes the dates and locations of all reported political violence and protest events in over 60 developing countries in Africa and Asia. Political violence and protest includes events that occur within civil wars and periods of instability, public protest and regime breakdown. The project covers all African countries from 1997 to the present, and South and South-East Asia in real-time.
country to country on the continent. The political turbulence in South Africa increased political conflict events, but it did not result in an upsurge of fatalities in the country. Still, simultaneous increases in fatalities did occur in countries such as Nigeria and were largely unrelated to the increase in politically violent events. According to the ACLED, 37% of the 39,286 political conflict events and fatalities recorded in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2015 occurred in Nigeria alone, this was by and large because of Boko Haram (Cilliers, 2014).

Furthermore, riots and protests that largely took place because of civil unrest occurred throughout the continent, but the largest number in 2014 took place in South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya (Cilliers, 2015).

4.8. NEPAD’s APRM as early warning?

With its primary focus being to foster security and stability, development and high economic growth by identifying deficiencies and needs for capacity building within African states (Kebonang & Fombad, 2010), the APRM is a significant tool to use in conflict prevention. This is largely because the APRM is a ‘self-monitoring mechanism that aims to promote and reinforce high standards of governance by analysing systematic or structural problems in countries under review, with a view to providing advice and recommendations before crises erupt’ (NEPAD, 2016).

The APRM’s strength is at national, provincial and local levels. It has national programmes of action where they identify issues or instigators of potential conflict/s, reach out to key stakeholders on these issues through various means such as meetings, briefings or through writing reports on such insecurity developments. In addition, the APRM conducts progress reports on how key stakeholders address such threats to security and provide action plans or recommendations to tackle these threats (Desta,

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7 Civil unrest in this sense refers to civilians who caused riots or protests because of their dissatisfaction with constitution design and/or reform, electoral processes (national elections and sub-national elections), parliamentary processes, justice and the rule of law, lack of access to information and transparency, lack of human rights, including freedom of expression and of association. These riots were in essence caused by civilians who felt that their human security was not defended.
2016). However, the implementation of such action plans and recommendations have remained problematic.

The APRM has in the past generated early warning reports which key decision makers did not react to in a timely manner. In Kenya, the review that was conducted by the APRM in 2005 gave an indication of the signs of violence that might erupt in the country by outlining critical issues that became factors in the country’s post-election violence in 2008. The country’s review report of the APRM pointed out that the country needed healing. It notes the following,

‘From all indications, it is obvious that the challenge in Kenya is beyond the mere adoption of a new constitution. The challenge remains that of resolving the following contentious issues: the nature and character of executive powers, devolution of power, constitutional provisions for religious courts, and the mode of transition to the new constitution. These issues, among others, cannot be resolved by simple technicalities or constitutional legalese, but will require a modicum of political sagacity to evolve necessary political solutions. Current prognosis suggests that a carefully managed mediatory and conciliatory intervention under the aegis of the AU may prove crucial in facilitating the much needed political compromise and solution in resolving these issues and minimize loss of face by the different power centres and factions. The sustainability of the proposed outcome will be hinged on the ability to devise a win-win formula while simultaneously responding to the collective aspirations of a highly divided society’ (APRM, 2006).

However, the recommendations were not followed up on. Furthermore, in 2007, the review indicated that South Africa’s systematic socio-economic difficulties would serve as a driving factor for xenophobic attacks. The report stipulated that ‘xenophobia against Africans is on the rise and should be nipped in the bud’ (APRM, 2007). These findings were, however, not addressed and the country experienced xenophobic violence in 2008 and 2015 where more than 60 people lost their lives. The APRM continuously
profiles instigators of potential conflict in African countries, but does not have a systematic way to follow up on such recommendations as stakeholders are not obliged to provide the APRM with feedback. According to Professor Melaku Desta, who is the Senior Technical Adviser to the CEO of the APRM Secretariat, this has ‘created a feedback loop’ (2016).

Moreover, there are not any established modalities or formal working relationships that the NEPAD’s APRM has with EWS across the continent and the CEWS on conflict prevention. According to Professor Desta, ‘there needs to be greater collaboration and coordination in terms of warning alerts between the APRM and the AU’ (2016). In this way the feedback loop will be closed. He points out that that EWS signal or report does not necessarily mean that decision makers will acknowledge the recommendations and act accordingly, ‘the CEWS might not even be aware of the reports published by the APRM’ (2016).

However, if taken seriously, EWS reports or signals can prevent potential conflicts from evolving into serious crises. Professor Desta points out that the APRM has to reflect and question whether they are communicating to the right decision makers. Have they been successful in doing so? Whether they follow up will play a significant role in closing the feedback loop and making sure that recommended actions are prioritized and acted upon. The APRM has been meeting with representatives from the CEWS in the hope of forming a formal structure where both institutions could work more collaboratively together as their functions are complimentary. This will in essence assist in averting potential conflicts in future.

4.9. Has the CEWS modelled UN criteria?

The AU has established a technical monitoring and warning service in the form of the situation room in Addis Ababa. However, on 4 April 2016, the ISS PSC Report, which is a publication that monitors developments and issues covered by the AU PSC (ISS, 2015), interviewed Ambassador Frederic Ngoga Gatoretse, who is the head of the Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Division in the AU PSD. The ambassador touched on elements that contribute to the CEWS being ineffective. The ambassador made reference to the human resource constraints that have been a challenge that continues to beset the
CEWS since 2010. An assessment study was done and published in 2010 by the AU’s PSC department on the APSA and its pillars. In assessing the capacity of human resources in the situation room, it was discovered that at the time (2010), the situation room in Addis Ababa only had ten (10) situation room assistants working 24/7. The report also identified a shortage of staff members within the EWSs of the RECs (AU, 2010).

The lack of human resources to manage information on emerging conflicts results in great fragility on the continent. Lack of funding has also been problematic to the AU. The AU’s Peace Fund, which is one of the building blocks of the peace and security architecture, is meant to be a standing reserve to call upon in case of emergencies. By the time the CEWS was operationalized in 2009, the Peace Fund did not have enough funds to deploy peace operations as it had a negative balance (Security Council Report, 2016). Moreover, the AU is overly reliant on external states for funding. This undermines the AU’s conflict management aspirations of coming up with African solutions to African problems. Between the years 2008 to 2012, AMISOM received nearly $800 million from the UN in addition to the nearly $40 million pledged to the UN’s AMISOM Trust Fund between 2009 and 2011 (William, 2011). Moreover, the AU and its member states have not been able to fund the most of the continent’s centres of excellence for peacekeeping training, with most of these centres relying on foreign sponsorship from states within the EU and NATO for the provision of equipment and education (Malan, 2008).

Centres include the Command and Staff colleges in Koulikoro (Mali), Libreville (Gabon) and the peacekeeping school in Zambakro (Côte d’Ivoire) which is supported by the French. Canada provided C$3.0 million to the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) to deliver courses and train African trainers. The United Kingdom government sponsors training needs analysis for ECOBRIG and made a financial contribution to the Bamako Tactical Training School in Mali. With Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance and International Military Education and Training, the United States government provides field training exercises to military personnel on the continent and has provided peacekeepers in Sudan, Burundi, Ethiopia and Liberia with equipment support (Ramsbotham, Bah & Calder, 2005).
The ambassador also mentioned in his interview that there is a lack of ‘necessary information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure to enhance data collection efforts and exchange information more efficiently with our RECs’ (AU, 2016). The absence of the necessary ICT infrastructure brings a high level of risk to the continent. It undermines the credibility of the CEWS and its REC and essentially weakens the mandates of the EWS.

Furthermore, the lack of communication and exchange of data between the CEWS and its RECs is problematic. Some RECs have developed or are in the process of developing their EWSs at varying rates and methodologies. This has in essence contributed to the CEWS situation room not receiving insufficient real-time early warning reports. Moreover, CEWS personnel cannot easily access national and supranational intelligence sources, forcing them to rely on what African leaders choose to share with them (Williams, 2011). It is at the stage where leaders choose to selectively share information at both sub-regional and regional levels that sovereignty tends to be strongest. The tendencies of protecting your territory and control information will continue to result in great ineffectiveness of the CEWS. The lack of disseminating meaningful warnings to those who are at risk is discernible between the CEWS and its RECs. The UN also requires for its EWS to be people-centred. During its conceptualization, the CEWS involved NGO’s, academia, research councils etc. It furthermore collects information from these sources and the media and online data sources (AU, 2008).

Lastly, according to the UN, an EWS should raise public awareness of the emerging conflict and act to prevent the conflict. The CEWS and the APSA are lacking in this regard. The CEWS did not raise public awareness of the crises in Mali and Guinea-Bissau in 2012. In Mali, the AU, the military coup that took place in 2012 President Amadou Toure happened days after the PSC held talks to consider the situation in the country. The PSC was aware of the potential conflict from the situation, but did not raise any public awareness of the potential insecurity in the country. Furthermore, in April 2012, the ECOWAS and the AU had a ministerial meeting on Guinea-Bissau the situation in the country, but both organizations failed to raise any awareness of the potential conflict and was therefore not able to prevent the conflict on time.
4.10. Conclusion

The benefits that an effective CEWS could have for the continent are obvious. It could provide high level decision and policy makers with sufficient time to prepare, analyse and plan a response to an emerging conflict. It will not only save the lives of people in conflict-affected contexts, but can also help protect livelihoods and regional development gains.

Moreover, it can facilitate a shift from crisis management to conflict prevention and address security challenges on the continent in a more comprehensive way. It should be noted that the CEWS works collaboratively with the other pillars of the PSC and therefore pillars such as the PoW, the AU Commission, the Peace Fund and the PSC also have an active role to play in the overall prevention of conflicts. The early warning and early response gap has been detrimental to conflict prevention. This is owed to a number of factors, such as a lack of funding for the Peace Fund, the manner and time in which the AU Commission responds to warnings or the lack of information dissemination to those who are at risk as recommended by the UN. Furthermore, regime survival and lack of political will has played an integral role in the ‘security’ equation in African states. As with other issues faced by the AU – any lasting solution to the early warning–early action gap depends on finding the necessary political will to implement the UN’s recommended elements for an effective EWS. It is crucial to address this, even though the African peace and security environment is characterized by strong normative instruments, their effectiveness have to be enhanced. Therefore, the AU and the PSC should make a greater effort towards making the CEWS and the other pillars more useful components of APSA.
Chapter Five

Summary, conclusion and recommendations

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this study was to examine whether the CEWS and its three RECs’ EWSs have been effective in their mandates of conflict prevention. The author did this by assessing whether the AU's CEWS and its RECs modelled their EWS according to the UN’s five recommended elements for an effective EWS.

The author chose the UN’s criteria because the task of assessing the effectiveness of any EWS has always been a challenge to scholars as there has not been a system developed that can measure the effectiveness of EWS based on particular events where an EWS was able to avert or able to prevent a conflict. The UN has, however, provided key elements that are critical to the effectiveness of EWS.

The case study of the AU’s CEWS and the three RECs was used to show that the continent’s RECs have not modelled their EWS according to the UN’s recommended EWS. In addition, while studies on EWSs have been extensive, not much has been undertaken on measuring the effectiveness of the three RECs in West, East and Southern Africa and the AU’s CEWS by using a recommended model by the UN. Studies have furthermore not assessed the impact that these EWS have had in their respective regions by evaluating the security issues before and after these EWS were implemented.

The significance of such a study stems from the fact that it serves as an overview of the EWS that have been implemented on the continent; how they have been modelled and the role that they have played in the realm of peace and security in the region. This study also serves as a recommendation for the CEWS personnel, the three RECs’ EWSs personnel and key decision makers in the APSA as well as the RECs that have not yet implemented EWS by highlighting challenges need to be overcome so as to make conflict prevention possible.
5.2 Summary

The thrust of this research is based on examining whether the CEWS and its RECs have been effective by applying the UN’s recommended elements for an effective EWS. These elements serve as a measurement against which the author examined the different EWS. Chapter 1 provided an overview of the insecurity challenges that the continent has faced and introduced the study. It is evident that the OAU was unable to deal with the upheaval of conflicts from the 1960s until the 1990s. This realization manifested in the desire to deal with these conflicts with prevention tools. It was only with the inception of the AU, however, that conflict prevention tools were concretely realized and adopted under the broad umbrella of APSA. Within the APSA, the CEWS was established to harmonize and coordinate data from the RECs EWS. The APSA denotes high levels of interdependency and has created a network of security interdependence between states within the region for conflict prevention. It has essentially done so by taking into cognizance the high levels of mutually felt insecurity within the African region and implementing an enlarged EWS to promote interdependence of shared interests and the notion of mutual trust and friendship among African states to support and sustain conflict prevention within its immediate geographical region in a systemic way.

The research methodology was primarily qualitative. In addition, the study employed three main methods: policy analysis, document analysis and elite interviewing of experts of regional security arrangements in Africa. The data used in the study were gathered using primary and secondary sources. The research relies on document and policy analyses of AU and REC mandates, resolutions and missions as primary sources. Secondary sources dealing with thematic analysis were accessed through policy briefs, primary documents and podcasts. However, there were barriers to accessing data. Insider information on the CEWARN, SADC REWC and CEWS was difficult to obtain and assess. This in essence limited comparable findings.

The second chapter discussed conceptual issues of EWS. It revealed that scholars have different definitions and perceptions of what EWS are and the role they should play. The
chapter furthermore revealed that scholars engage in critical debates on the early warning–early action gap by tackling issues such as who should be responsible for the system, which indicators should be incorporated into EWS to make it more comprehensive and effective, how early is early enough, who should be warned about emerging conflicts and what are the practical options available to policy makers who wish to prevent the emerging conflict. A crucial point that came out of Chapter 2 is that even though scholars do not share similar views and perceptions of what the cause of the early warning–early action gap is, the common underlying opinion among scholars is that the sole purpose of EWS is to prevent emerging conflicts in a timely and effective manner.

Additionally, the thrust of Chapter 2 was to provide the detail and analysis of EWSs by reviewing the critical elements that the UN has recommended for EWSs to be effective. The advantages of EWSs are well documented in the chapter. It was established that EWS can be used as a tool to:

- enable key decision makers to take early action against emerging conflicts thereby have an impact;
- bridge the early warning and early action gap,
- facilitate a shift from crisis management to conflict prevention,
- deliver a basis for evidence-grounded decision making
- address threats to both human and national security.

What emerged from examining the recommended five elements by the UN was that EWSs should harness CSOs in contributing and playing a critical role in early warning and response process. Furthermore, there should be a technical monitoring and warning service that will allow EWSs to essentially maximize its potential to act as an effective structure. A technical monitoring and warning service should have an efficient process for the collection and analysis information as well as disseminating critical early warning information and raising public awareness among those who are facing risks. Furthermore, technical monitoring and warning service will allow the EWS to gather credible data for
high quality analysis and will serve as a mechanism that will provide key decision makers with analysis of violent conflict risks and responses in a timely manner. The chapter also delved into the NATO EWS and analysed how it was structured and how they developed their EWS over time. Although the NATO has revised its indicator methodology to encompass non-military insecurity issues, it has struggled to decide when best to become involved in an emerging crisis.

The purpose of Chapter 3 was to examine the three RECs' EWSs, which are namely CEWARN, ECOWARN and SADC's EWCS in relation to their mandate of conflict prevention. The chapter analysed the security priorities and dynamics in each of the RECs and examined whether the EWSs in the three regions have adopted the UN's criteria in making certain that EWSs are sustainably effective. Notably, there are fundamental differences in the EWSs of all three RECs. Their outlook and application reflects different perceptions of what threatens the sub-regions, the different trajectories for peace and security, the level of interaction and transparency between the key decision makers and civil society, and their intervention strategies towards peace and security. In addition, these RECs overlook the contemporary approach to security and have not incorporated different human insecurity issues such as political, economic and social issues into security. This has resulted in the three EWSs not being able to tackle key threats to human security, such as xenophobic attacks, electoral violence, crimes against humanity, terrorism and transnational crimes. Barry Buzan's security complex, which is a dominant paradigm employed in international security studies, was applied to understand the RECs' EWSs. The theory is based on the following assumptions: security is a relational phenomenon; patterns of enmity or amity among states can fall on a continuum from friendship or alliances to enmity and can have a great impact on conflict prevention tools such as EWS. The theoretical perspective also puts forward the notion that key actors in states perceive territorial security as more pertinent than human security.

The NRA criticizes the view of national security as the crux of security in states and points to the fact that it is important to stress that there are multifaceted security threats (human and national security) in our contemporary era that cannot be confronted separately. Each one is intricately and complexly linked with the next.
The key point that emerged is that the APSA and its RECs have in theory through their mandate and protocols acknowledged the importance and the great role that human security can have on development. These institutions have furthermore restated the usefulness of having conflict prevention tools such as EWSs in place. However, the reality is that most key stakeholders have adopted realist approaches to security in their regions. This essentially highlights Barry Buzan’s notion of how key stakeholders perceiving territorial security as more important than that of human security.

Chapter 4 examined the CEWS with reference to its stated mandate of anticipating and preventing conflicts in Africa. This was done by conducting an analysis of whether there has been an increase or decrease of insecurity on the continent since the implementation the CEWS. It furthermore examined the effectiveness of the CEWS by analysing whether the CEWS has adopted the UN’s elements for a sustainably effective EWS. There are major obstacles in the way of building an intercontinental robust peace and security architecture for the CEWS. The lack of resources, efficient communication between RECs and the CEWS, the lack of information dissemination of risks faced between RECs and the CEWS, the inconsistent manner and approaches and strategies to peace and security are some obstacles that the CEWS together with its RECs need to collaboratively tackle for the promotion of conflict prevention on the continent.

5.3 Discussions of findings

Overall the study achieved its aim of identifying whether the CEWS and its three RECs have included the UN’s five key recommended elements for an effective EWS. The study found that even though the CEWS has been implemented in the AU and its three RECs has established EWSs to prevent the emergence of conflicts, they have not been sustainably effective in doing so. This is because these EWSs do not include some of the key recommended elements that the UN has endorsed.

For that reason, the APSA and the REC’s key decision makers have to work on incorporating these elements to ensure that EWSs are sustainably effective in their mandate of preventing conflicts on the continent.
Several issues have emerged from the study. Although there is general consensus on the need of EWS, there are various factors constraining its purpose. The lack of resources, EWSs not involving civil society participation, the lack of disseminating information to those who are at risk, regional decision makers lacking the motivation to ensure conflict management, the lack of common norms in promoting cooperative relations between states, lack of resources, lack of technical monitoring and warning service, lack of public awareness of the emerging conflict and ultimately the lack of political will are some of the factors that have limited the EWS on the continent.

Political will on the part of RECs and the APSA goes beyond list-ticking and plays a critical role in social protection, human security and regional security. Once there is overall consensus on what all EWSs are meant to achieve, what resources are available to carry out its objective and what it can achieve, it will become easier for EWSs to be sustainably effective.

The strength of a common political will and firmness of common mandates and mechanisms is required to follow through steadily to carry out conflict prevention and not to be thrown off course by various diversions. Political will and EWS are closely interlinked and can therefore not be compared as if they existed separately. Instead, more sustainably effective EWSs are facilitated by the political will to intervene.

Moreover, EWS in the African region do not operate in a vacuum; they operate in an intertwinement of security complexes. The level of security or lack thereof at a sub-regional level is defined by the patterns found within the security practices at a sub-regional level rather than systematic factors shaping the nature of security systems at a regional level. If sub-regional arrangements promote norms of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, mutual destabilization, territorial security as well as systems which do not exercise oversight and accountability because they function in secrecy, essentially establish conditions of ineffectiveness of EWSs.

The patterns of relations shared between member states are of crucial importance because states that are geographically close to each other are more likely to understand the basis of a potential conflict and share norms that will make it easier to control the
emergence of a conflict. Neighbouring countries are more equipped to deal with particular sub-regional issues than those who are not familiar with the regional context. The effectiveness of EWS depends on the promotion of stability and cooperation between member states in terms of their views or threats to human and territorial security and adherence to the UN's criteria. If values and norms clash, conflicts will be the defining characteristic of the region. Hence RECs and the APSA need to be strengthened. The insecurity in the region is due to the lack of convergence of values between the AU and its RECs in terms of communication channels between the institutions and tenets to guide RECs on how to conceptualize and operationalize EWS to have a common mandate of maintaining security in all sub-regions of the African continent.

In addition, at sub-regional levels, it is evident that the three analysed RECs uphold neorealist views of security. This is evident from their large budgets for their military sector amidst high levels of human insecurity. When an REC is defined by military regimes that perceive territorial security as the crux of security matters, paying little attention to security of communities, this permits notions that will restrain the overall security of a region. Furthermore, because EWSs are part of conflict prevention, good governance priorities that are inclusive of RECs that are accountable, transparent, responsive and have a participatory civil society have to be accentuated.

In general, this study serves as a guide for the APSA, the key decision makers in the three REC EWSs. It offers an overview of the UN's recommended elements for a sustainably effective EWSs and their objective to achieve security. Due to the lack of a system that measures the effectiveness of EWS based on the number of conflicts it was unable or able to avert, the study is limited to detailing the recommended elements of the UN. As such, since the system is not in place, further research should be conducted on how to measure the effectiveness of EWSs based on the number of cases it was unable or able to prevent conflicts.

This is necessary on two accounts. First, EWSs are objects of analysis used by humans. This proves to be quite a challenge when it comes to measuring its success or effectiveness. A decision maker might think that not responding to an alert is successful
for his/her motives, while another decision maker might not regard this as successful. Therefore, special attention has to be given to formulating such a measurement that will give understanding to the complexities of EWS.

Second, future research on this topic is crucial for the dissemination of EWS and the provision of mechanisms that will measure the success or failure rate of the EWS per case.

5.4 Recommendations

The AU has set clear policy commitments to peace and security in the region. However, the EWSs have not lived up to their full potential. The CEWS and EWSs should shift from a reactive to a preventive approach to conflict prevention. In terms of EWS being people-centred, there should be an emphasis on better exploiting the potential of open source information in all RECs’ EWSs. This will strengthen individual and collective capacity to alert EWS and help in receiving and weaving together substantial information and analysis from different sources on an emerging conflict.

There is a need to forge and channel common areas of priorities, vision, levels of intervention and approaches between RECs and the CEWS. This will facilitate communication channels that will effectively create linkages to disseminate meaningful warnings to those who are at risk within the REC and between the RECs and the CEWS.

There should furthermore be guidance or principles for key decision makers and EWS personnel for fluidity of meaningful information for early action. EWS personnel and key decision makers need to understand the value of EWS and how it works.

At a regional level, the APSA should be aware of key decision makers’ political motives, dominant beliefs and the evidence they consider credible to avoid cognitive biases related to threat perception or predominance of national interests over early action. Furthermore, an effective CEWS should have effective links with its RECs that will essentially facilitate a constant flow of information, analysis, communication of the risks faced and a response between the RECs and the CEWS. This will also address the issue of scattered and insufficiently integrated EWSs on the continent. It is critical to have in place a plan that
emphasizes a cost-effective management of scarce human and financial resources to have more of an impact in preventing emerging conflicts and sustaining peace. This requires strengthening the focus on the underlying causes of conflicts to have a more sustainable impact.

The CEWS and its EWS should focus on improving cross-cutting issues that range from effective governance and institutional arrangements, political will, a multi-hazard (both national and human security) approach to early warning, which is also critical for an EWS to be effective. Moreover, pronounced leadership is needed to advance the EWS and the mechanisms that are already implemented for conflict prevention.

5.5 Conclusion

The study reveals that the CEWS and the three RECs have not included some of the recommended elements that the UN has prescribed for a sustainably effective EWS. These EWSs can therefore not be considered sustainably effective. In addition, this study shed light on the how RECs approach the concept of security in their sub-regions. Even though the international community has emphasized the importance of human security, RECs have not committed to seeking mechanisms that will not only protect its states, but will also protect human within states.

Notwithstanding the fact that great strides have been made by the CEWS and the RECs’ EWSs in implementing these mechanisms, the elements that the UN has recommended should be included and cross-cutting issues such as human and financial resources, governance institutions and common approaches to conflict prevention should be strengthened to essentially leverage the EWSs capability of providing security in the region.
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