They were looked upon as very important bodies, which could sway the sword any way they liked against a teacher. A teacher had very little to say to any parent who came with a complaint. They would say "I will go and tell the school board." 29

[The community] thought they were great, but the teachers couldn't say a thing. 30

...the illiterate...looked high on [the boards and committees] without seeing whether they are good. 31

Another part of the attraction of participation in the board and committee system was undoubtedly the possibilities for bribery, corruption and patronage which it offered:

In fact it invited much corruption. Because for promotion we knew the person (sic) to rely on was the school board, so great bribes were being provided. 32

The teacher had to crawl for the school board...You had to buy them liquor to keep your post. 33

The education authorities were thus able to exploit both social cleavages and patronage possibilities in order to attract participants into the new mechanisms of educational administration. The reality of the rapid growth of the boards and committees should warn us against a simple conception of the rise of Bantu Education in which "the people" rejected the system, while only a handful of "traitors" participate in it. There was broad based opposition to the system, but there were also significant constituencies, who, for varying motives, were willing to enter it.
But the boards did act in a way which rapidly justified the
time warnings of their opponents. In general the boards
operated in a manner which intensified teachers' hostility
toward the educational system, rather than incorporating
them. In addition they created new grievances in the
community. The boards were placed in a position where they
were responsible for carrying out the parsimonious state
educational spending policies of Dr Verwoerd. In many
matters the apparent discretion given to the boards was
quickly shown to be illusory. For example, the boards were
"allowed" to discontinue school feeding schemes if they
wished. The money thus saved could then be spent on
'amenities'. But 'amenities' were taken to include the
hiring of more teachers. The demise of feeding schemes
was thus assured. The boards also set about the
supervision of the raising of money by the committees for
the construction of new schools. Considerable resentment
was caused by the plight of areas which had been levied
heavily by a school committee but did not benefit
proportionately from new school buildings.

The boards also became the instruments of the state's purge
of politically dissident teachers from the profession
during the late 1950s. In a series of cases it seems
that school boards made spurious charges against teachers
as a way of simultaneously discrediting and getting rid of
them. A teacher at Langa Methodist School, for example,
was dismissed in 1956 for alleged sexual misconduct with a pupil. The student's father wrote to the school board saying that there was no truth in the charge. The teacher was then summoned to a meeting with the Secretary of the school board, who demanded that he sign a statement admitting his guilt. A scuffle broke out, and the teacher was charged with assaulting the school board chairman. But when the case was heard, the Magistrate threw it out, and advised the teacher to appeal against his dismissal.38 Similarly, the Unity Movement activist V.K. Ntshona was sacked by the Moroka-Jabavu School Board for supposed neglect of duties. When he applied to another school, he obtained a temporary appointment, but was then turned down by the school board on grounds of his political activity, after they had been visited by the Special Branch. A subsequent attempt to obtain a post for Ntshona was frustrated when the Native Affairs Department informed the school board that it would not provide a subsidy for any post held by Ntshona and the board duly excluded him from consideration.39

Some board members positively revelled in the power that they now enjoyed. Rev. Lediga, the Chairman of the Langa School Board, informed a meeting in 1958 that "...from now on he would see to it that the Board put its foot down and dealt more severely with the teachers". He went on to inform the gathering that "...there has never been such a learned government as we have in the present".40 Much of
the animosity between teachers and school boards was fuelled by the way in which teachers, a formerly prestigious social group, were placed under the control of bodies often consisting of persons less educated than themselves.\textsuperscript{41} There was an anti-democratic as well as a democratic component in the objections raised by teachers to the new structures. At the 1957 conference of the conservative Cape African Teachers Union (CATU), a resolution was passed that members of school committees ought to have completed primary education, and members of school boards some post-primary education.\textsuperscript{42} In recalling their experience of working under the school boards and committees, teachers commonly express a high degree of resentment at being under the control of people less educated than themselves:

...the elected group by the community were a rough lot: some were workers, some were not working.\textsuperscript{43}

...I don't like the whole thing. Now I'm sorry to say that we got some of the members of school boards who are illiterates. I'm sorry to say. Now you know some of them are taking advantage - they don't know the difficulty the teacher has.\textsuperscript{44}

...The teachers did not like the school boards... I have studied so hard to be in my profession then an ordinary person comes to interview me.\textsuperscript{45}

The common member of the committee was just anybody else - any labourer, even ash carriers could be committee members. ...It was not very sound. Generally, you could not take an uneducated man to control educationists.\textsuperscript{46}
...It was a painful set up - anybody could [be on the boards and committees] and qualifications did not count...Some were drivers and their qualifications did not count... 47

...school boards and school committees were not very popular with the teachers, because most teachers felt that most members of the school boards were illiterate and therefore that they could make decisions which would not satisfy the teachers, especially where their work was concerned. 45

Those were old people with old ideas. Some of them were chosen because of status. In our school boards you find that there's a member who hasn't gone to school but he is Mr. So-and-so... 49

The content of much teacher criticism of the school board system was based on a strong degree of inegalitarianism. But it was deeply felt. The consequence was that teachers, the crucial component in any attempt at a new hegemonic order in education, developed a strong, if quiescent, sense of grievance against the administration of Bantu Education. The process of creating some new sectors of support for the state's educational policy simultaneously alienated the teachers who were clearly a key component of any attempt to build a new educational hegemony.

The (Self) Destruction of the CATA

As the sole remaining bastion of African teacher militancy during the late 1950s, the Cape African Teachers Association (CATA) did undertake continuing activity
against government policy, despite being subjected to strong repression by the state. CATA continued its work in the rural Eastern Cape and Transkei, and was active to some extent in the Western Cape as well. The Association particularly focused its energies on the boycott of school committees and boards defending sacked teachers, and combatting the influence of the conservative Cape African Teacher's Union (CATU). The final collapse of the CATA was, however, largely self-inflicted. The Unity Movement's sectarian hostility to the ANC ensured that CATA members did not participate in or support the Eastern Cape's most important resistance to Bantu Education, the ANC's school boycotts. The logic of a divisive sectarian outlook eventually, led in 1958 to a split in the Unity Movement itself, which brought about the demise of CATA.

By the end of the 1950s the state appeared to have completely subdued African teachers. The militant Transvaal and Cape teachers' organizations were no more. Yet the Department of Bantu Education, established in its own right in 1958, could not capitalize on this victory. It proved unable to draw teachers fully into the new hegemonic order that Verwoerd aimed to create. The ham-handed authoritarianism of the school boards and the crass racism of most education officials proved insuperable obstacles to winning teacher allegiance to the new system.
For CATA members the implementation of Bantu Education represented both an assault on their organization, as the state attempted to purge them from the education system, and an opportunity to expand their political influence, as their campaign for a boycott of school boards and committees developed a considerable popular resonance. The repression to which CATA was subjected was substantial. Many teachers experienced redundancy during the early stages of the implementation of Bantu Education, as a result of the strict application of staffing quotas; by 1958 these resulted in 157 dismissals in the Cape alone. A number of the sackings made on these grounds were imposed for clearly political reasons. Between the beginning of 1955 and mid-1956, 29 CATA members were dismissed from their posts including the President, N. Honono, Secretary Z. Mzimba, Magazine Editor L. Sihali, and Treasurer J.L. Mkantane. The Transkei and other sections of the Eastern Cape were most affected, with the axe falling, during 1955 and 1956, on teachers in the districts of Queenstown, Elliot, Glen Grey, Tsomo, Umtata, Butterworth, Willowsvale, Ngamakwe, Ngqeleni, Qumbu and elsewhere. The purge also spread to the urban areas, with CATA members being sacked in Langa, and Port Elizabeth, both by their school boards.

Other forms of restriction were also imposed on the organization. It was forced to stop production of "Teacher's Vision" as a result of new regulations
preventing teachers from publishing their political views.55 This was a major blow as the magazine had appeared regularly since the early 1940s, and had played a major role in spreading CATA’s ideas. The January-March 1955 edition was the last to be published56 (an attempt to circumvent regulations and revive the journal as New Teachers’ Vision lasted only a few editions). Detectives attended CATA meetings, raided the association’s offices and tailed teacher activists when they travelled.57 Native Commissioners imposed stringent controls on CATA meetings, and would only grant permission for them to take place if full details, including the names of those attending, were supplied.58 The Native Affairs Department prevented the holding of the 1956 CATA conference in Port Elizabeth, by denying it hall facilities, refusing members the necessary pass documentation, and eventually imposing a ban on public meetings in the area.59 On occasion, CATA members were prosecuted for breaking regulations governing meetings by, for example, continuing them after the time laid down by the NAD’s representative.60 Inspectors took draconian actions to instil discipline amongst teachers: at Ngabara in Willowvale district, the inspector had all teachers who had not been appointed by the new School Board transferred within a fortnight, as a disciplinary measure. In justification of his action, the inspector cited the influence of CATA in two local schools and the hostility of the teachers to the School Board.61
However, the hardships experienced by CATA members did not prevent them from launching into a new round of agitation on educational issues. The state offensive aimed at getting school boards and committees set up, coupled with a drive to establish Bantu Authorities, provided a new terrain of action for CATA members. The state, in order to publicise the 'benefits' of Bantu Education, Bantu Authorities, and soil rehabilitation, took to organizing frequent public meetings in the rural areas, which chiefs were usually given the task of convening. CATA militants intervened energetically in these meetings, in order to spread their ideas and sabotage the NAD's initiatives. For example, in January 1955 Chief Kaiser Matanzima called a big public meeting at Qamata, drawing people from all over the Transkei and Ciskei, to hear a speech by the Chief Education Officer, F.J. Malan. No sooner had Malan finished his speech and sat down than a number of CATA and AAC activists got up and began asking embarrassing questions, including ones about "the various taxes and fines that formed part of the Bantu Authorities Act, the control of Bantu Schools, the overriding powers of the Minister of Native Affairs..." The meeting demanded to vote on the issues discussed, but Matanzima, sensing that the mood was against him, closed the meeting in a humiliating defeat. CATA also used other methods of popularising its views. In Willowvale in late 1954, for example, the local branch issued a series of Xhosa language
leaflets calling for a boycott of the establishment of a Tribal Authority and of the election of a school committee. Subsequent to this, the new chief was not recognized by the local people, seven out of eight villages boycotted the Bunga elections, and when an Inspector arrived in the area to hold an election for the school committee, he was driven away by the populace.63

CATA also attempted to defend sacked members through the courts. Funds were raised for a test case on behalf of two dismissed teachers, Mangcu and the prominent CATA leader Sihali against their respective school boards and the Secretary for Native Affairs.64 At the legal level this initiative achieved a certain success. After a protracted battle through the courts, in September 1957 the Appeal Court found in favour of Sihali and Mangcu, holding that their dismissal was invalid as they had been hired under an ordinance which gave them security of tenure and which had never been repealed by any Ministerial action.65 CATA hailed the decision as a major victory,66 but this was premature for teachers hoping to be reinstated under the Sihali/Mangcu ruling were simply re-dismissed under other regulations which were not legally challengeable.67

CATA's campaign to defend the sacked teachers evoked a degree of public sympathy. After the sacking of Honono and others from Nyabara Secondary School a farewell function was held at which a school student made a strongly Unity
Movement influenced speech. Students and parents were reported to be hostile toward teachers who took over the jobs of those who had been victimized. At Lamplough Secondary School, a teacher who had come to replace Sihali and another CATA member found written on his blackboard: "Are you C.A.T.A. or C.A.T.U.? Are you here or are you there? - please do not erase."

CATA continued to assert itself, with some success, against the more conservative current of Cape teachers. The mid 1950s saw a considerable struggle between CATU and CATA for leadership of the Cape teachers, especially in areas where CATA was particularly strong, such as Tembuland and the Ciskei. In general, CATU had the worst of this contest. Throughout the 1950s CATU's organizational efforts were remarkably unsuccessful, perhaps as consequence of trying to develop a fundamentally conservative and apolitical organization in a period of popular upsurge and radicalization. Only in the North Western Districts, where they organized about a third of the teachers, were they strong. In 1954 CATU possessed only 45 paid-up members in Western Province. By 1956, although CATU was claiming to have defeated its rival, there were complaints of "falling membership...comparatively meagre finances and apparent apathy."

In 1957, the CATU Regional Organizer in the North East Cape "painted a gloomy picture of his region", while in Pondoland the Regional Organizer spoke
of "difficulties" in trying to set up a regional organization. Elsewhere in the Eastern Cape teachers were reported to be "indifferent" to the Union, and in Tembuland it was reported that it was difficult to develop support in Umtata, Mqanduli or St. Marks. The subsequent year the CATU Regional Organizer for Tembuland, E.M. Titus, reported that in Transkei it was difficult to "have any dealings with the teachers". When Titus was able to convene a meeting of ten teachers at St. John's Practising School, he considered this "a very good response". By the late 1950s CATU was in a parlous state, with only 144 paid-up members in 1958. Such was its level of disorganization that the President, S. Burns-Noamase, failed to turn up for the 1959 conference. All of this testifies both to the lack of attractive power of CATU's ideology for teachers, and to the continued strength of CATA's influence, despite the difficulties which it was experiencing.

CATU's political direction remained fundamentally unchanged; it combined surprisingly sweeping attacks on aspects of the education system with a highly conciliatory and apolitical approach to the authorities. At their 1957 conference, for example, criticism was directed at the scope of the powers of school boards and committees and the low level of education of many of their members; at the low level of salaries and the lack of cost-of-living allowances; at the lack of industrial schools for Africans,
and at the civil services' refusal to address African teachers as Mr, Mrs or Miss. In the Presidential Address, the Bantu Education system's emphasis on 'race or tribe' and 'language' was attacked. Despite CATU's conservatism, its members could not help reacting against the burden of the new education system. But they did so in a way which avoided raising broader political questions. Their faith continued to be pinned on sending delegations to the government as a means of effecting change. In the context of the political upsurge of the 1950s it was only a minority of teachers who responded positively to this cautious approach.

Despite repression then, CATA was able to maintain some resistance to Bantu Education in the mid 1950s. Why then did it fade away by the end of the decade? A major part of the explanation for CATA's collapse in the late 1950s must be sought in its failure to relate constructively to the mass campaign against Bantu Education mobilized by the ANC in the Eastern Cape in 1955. In contrast to CATA's campaigns against the new system, the ANC's initiative was based in the urban areas. By refusing to participate in or to support it, CATA and the Unity Movement missed any opportunity of linking up with mass urban struggles on education issues. This was the result of the Unity Movement's hysterically sectarian attitude toward the ANC. A flavour of this can be given by quoting a "Torch" article
on the Defiance Campaign of 1952, in which the ANC is characterized as "the reactionary, collaborationist wing of the Africans..." The Unity Movement offered no analysis of the ANC's social composition or its political programme in justification of such abuse. The ANC was condemned purely on the basis of the NEUM's view that by participating in elections for Native Representatives, Advisory Boards, and other state-established structures they collaborated with the enemy. The Unity Movement's opposition to the ANC's campaign on education was strange as the ANC were using the NEUM's hallowed tactic of the boycott. However, the Unity Movement's argument was that the ANC was carrying out the wrong sort of boycott. In its view, it was pointless for school students to boycott classes as this was detrimental to their own interests, and exposed them to repression while not presenting a real challenge to the education system. In the Unity Movement's opinion, the main focus of opposition to Bantu Education should have been on boycotting the boards and committees.

The policy of the Unity Movement toward the school boycott was in some respects hypocritical. As we have seen, in 1952, they supported, along with members of the ANC Youth League, the pupil boycott and the establishment of an alternative school at Orlando, as part of the protest against the dismissal of the TATA leaders. It is
difficult to avoid the impression that the Unity Movement's main objection to the 1955-1956 schools boycott was the fact that the ANC was leading it. The consequence of the Unity Movement's abstention from the boycott campaign was that CATA stood aside from the most important urban struggle against Bantu Education in the Cape.

By 1958 the combined effects of state repression and its own sectarianism had significantly undermined CATA's organizational capacity. But the fatal blow to the organization was very much a self-administered one. Through the 1950s, certain tensions had manifested themselves in the Unity Movement. One revolved around the composition of the NEUM's affiliate, the Society of Young Africa (SOYA), which was strong in the Eastern Cape. The leaders of SOYA argued that, for tactical reasons, their organization had to be limited in membership to Africans only. This the Cape Town based, and largely Coloured, leadership of the Unity Movement saw as a breach of the principle of Non-European Unity. More importantly, tension grew between the Cape Town leadership and the Transkei and Eastern Cape supporters of the AAC over the issue of what policy should be pursued in relation to land reform. The Easterners, presumably because of their closer contact with peasant aspirations for land ownership, favoured the institution of the right to buy and sell land as the basis for land reform. While the demand of the
Unity Movement’s ‘Ten-Point Programme’ on land reform was ambiguous, the central leadership seems to have interpreted it as meaning a more radical form of redistribution. At the end of the AAC Conference at Pietermaritzburg on 16th December 1958, the conflict came to a head. The conference split into two factions and the Easterners attained a majority for their position. The minority then broke away from the AAC. At the conference of SOYA which followed immediately afterwards, a similar division took place, with a majority remaining loyal to Cape Town and issuing a statement accusing the AAC of revising the Unity Movement’s programme and "boosting up...nationalism, especially African Nationalism." The movement did not divide cleanly on a regional basis however, and extensive conflict amongst affiliated organizations in the Eastern Cape took place. For example, the Lady Frere branch of SOYA supported Cape Town in the SOYA split, and there was strong opposition to the AAC leadership in Queenstown. CATA simply collapsed in this round of division and feuding. The inquest on CATA must return a verdict of suicide by sectarianism.

But CATA did leave behind it a legacy of teacher activism which, I would suggest, played an important part in preparing the way for the peasant upheavals of 1958-1961. Certainly, officialdom and its allies saw the teachers as a dangerous group in the rural Eastern Cape. At a public meeting in Engcobo in November 1960, Headman Bungane
Mgudlwa "accused the 'teacher bastards' of being behind the resistance to the chiefs and the 'Bantu Authorities'." 96

The end of CATA brought major oppositional activity amongst African teachers to an end for nearly two decades. This might have created circumstances very favourable to the incorporation of teachers into the Bantu Education system. Not only did the department face a lack of structured opposition, but it could also offer significant inducements to greater teacher co-operation. The re-organization of the education system meant that inspectorial posts were opened up to blacks. The hope of personal advancement certainly attracted some: for example, at a 1954 meeting of the CATA branch at Mount Frere, a Mr Mahlati welcomed the Bantu Education Act, saying that it gave him the chance of promotion to the inspectorate. 37 The widespread dismissals ensuing from the establishment of the new system acted as a negative sanction, frightening teachers into quiescence in order to keep their jobs, for fear of the dire consequences which resulted from losing one's job in a labour market where few other posts of the same level of responsibility, interest and status as teaching were open to Africans. These consequences are suggested by an anecdote of Father Huddleston's. David, a teacher, resigned in protest against the Bantu Education Act. Huddleston found him a job in the packing department of a big store. When, sometime later, Huddleston asked him how he was faring, he
replied:

'It's all right, Father, except for that European lady. Sometimes, when I have to shift boxes or bales and put them on the counter, I have to move an account sheet or a weigh bill from one place to another. Then she shouts at me 'Don't touch that paper. Paperwork is white work, it's not for natives.'" 98

For a teacher, loss of his or her job meant rapid proletarianization and a new intensity of racial humiliation.

Yet, as we have seen in the case of CATU's failure to grow in the 1950s, the combination of promises and threats from the authorities did not generate a strong movement of cooperation with Bantu Education from any section of teachers. A number of reasons can be adduced for this. Firstly, the strength of the African nationalist movement meant that there was considerable social pressure on teachers not to act in a way which could be construed as collaborating with the authorities. We have seen this in the case of school board elections. But the political movements of the time were not insensitive to the problems facing teachers and could keep them in alliance through flexibility as well as coercion. For example, one interviewee claims that after attending a meeting about Bantu Education in Benoni location, he was approached by Oliver Tambo, who lived nearby. Tambo, he says, counselled him not to attend such meetings in future in view of the risk of dismissal. 99 The prestige and the social pressure of the nationalist movements was sufficient to keep the
teachers away from conservative movements. Secondly, Bantu Education undermined teachers' autonomy at work, and the status based on that. When the link between education and the churches was broken, teachers ceased to be employees of a respected social institution, and became employees of a resented racist state. They were exposed to the strains of double shift teaching, worsening student-teacher ratios, arbitrary sackings and poor salaries.

Another important reason for the failure of the new educational system to win teacher support in the 1950s was that Verwoerd's hegemonic vision was implemented by its agents in a way which prevented its objectives from being attained. The subjective and the insensitivity of education officials constantly undermined their attempts to win teachers' allegiance. Verwoerd's formal ideology of equality within separate ethnic spheres was constantly weakened by its underlying message of the rectitude of racial domination. Educational officials acted in general on their commitment to white domination, rather than on their formal commitment to promote some form of separate black self-determination. The possibilities of incorporation were undermined by the staggering crudity of the administrative and ideological practices of the central educational authorities. The change from provincial to central control of the educational apparatus meant that the liberal paternalism which had characterized much of the
administration of education was replaced by brute racism and authoritarianism. Inspectors with a knowledge of local conditions and African languages were often replaced by people who lacked this knowledge. Administrators with educational experience were sometimes replaced by Native Affairs Department officials who knew nothing of education and were notoriously rude to their subordinates. These developments in part reflected official determination to root out what were seen as liberal influences in African education, especially in the Cape where the government was particularly suspicious of the ideological proclivities of educational administrators. Dr Verwoerd himself is said to have commented to the Director of Bantu Education: "A lot of your inspectors are just plain liberals". Official racism in black education really came into its own however, when W.A. Maree became the first Minister of an independent Department of Bantu Education in 1958. Maree was responsible for the issuing of a circular to inspectors forbidding them to shake hands with blacks. Maree also occupied himself with such weighty matters as personally reprimanding Inspector Martin Potgieter for drinking tea with the black teachers at Lovedale. The Ministerial approach rapidly permeated to local level. At Adams College the dishwasher was upbraided for washing the cups of black and white staff in the same sink. For black teachers used to the paternalism of the mission, and the relative paternalism of the pre-1955 inspectorate, such experiences were shocking. The aggressive gut racism of
those charged with implementing Bantu Education over- rode the hegemonic imperatives of the system. Squeezed between the bullying of school boards on the one hand, and the abuse of racist administrators on the other, teachers fell into a grumbling acceptance of the status quo. But that did not amount to an allegiance to it.

**Student Resistance**

Initially, there was no spontaneous, student-led, reaction to Bantu Education. As has been seen in the discussion on the ANC's school boycotts, those were essentially parent-led movements. There was an absence of spontaneous revolts by urban youth. Student discontent in rural mission schools continued along the same lines as in the post-war period: occasionally there were violent outbursts, but these were generally over localized grievances and were not part of a wider political movement. There were, of course, important institutional changes in the rural mission schools as the state moved in to take over from the missionaries. By the early 1960s these changes, together with the critical national political situation, brought the mission-founded boarding schools to the boil. Coinciding with the Sharpeville crisis, and the 1950 Emergency, there were five major incidents resulting in 360 suspensions. But it was in 1961 that the militancy of the students in these schools reached its apex. The actions of that year differed in important ways from those preceding them.
Whereas the riots of 1960 had been around food or discipline issues (even if conveying hidden political messages), the incidents of 1961 were in many cases quite explicitly political protests against the proclamation of the Republic. Although the missionary-founded institutions continued to predominate in these events there were more incidents in urban schools. Transvaal schools seem to have played a greater role than before. This greater geographical and institutional spread reflects a rising politicization of youth. Trouble broke out in at least three Transvaal and eight Eastern Cape or Transkei schools and one Natal teachers' college.\textsuperscript{109} The level of conflict then dropped somewhat in 1962; the SAIRR, which kept the only consistent records of these events, recorded trouble at only three institutions;\textsuperscript{110} a decline apparently reflecting the setback which African Nationalism had received as a result of the repression of the early 1960s. But in 1963 there was once again a significant student upsurge centred in the mission foundations with conflicts taking place at seven schools and colleges,\textsuperscript{111} resulting in at least 471 expulsions.\textsuperscript{112} The circumstances of these upheavals lend credibility to the SAIRR's view that they were in part students' responses to the activities of Umkhonto we Sizwe and Pogo.\textsuperscript{113}

When the state began to take over the mission sector, and to impose its own educational model, student action did not
show a dramatic spontaneous response to this change. The tradition of student contention continued, but the number of incidents did not significantly accelerate. Nor did that tradition spread into the expanding new schools of the Bantu Education system. If one excludes events related to the ANC’s 1955 school boycotts, all the strikes and boycotts which took place in this period occurred in mission founded institutions, and most of them in the mission heartland of the Eastern Cape. I have found only one spontaneous student action during 1955 - at Xedaleni in Natal and, as this took the form of a boycott of hymn singing, and a demand for an end to compulsory services, and culminated in students setting fire to the chapel, it can hardly be interpreted as a protest against the state takeover of mission education!

However, as the boarding schools came under the control of the Native Affairs Department, conditions certainly worsened in a way that generated new frictions. There were complaints that school authorities were now tending to call in the police over trivial student offences; that African teachers found their position increasingly conflict-ridden; and that NAD officials had far more racist attitudes than the missionaries. But the incidents which took place followed established patterns. For example, at Blythswood in March 1957, students launched a one-day food boycott, to which the headmaster refused to respond. Subsequently, the boarding master called in the police to investigate the
case of boys who had taken and eaten maize from the school fields, and the culprits were given lashes by the police. Thereupon, the boys staged a mass walkout. The pattern of the food riot also recurred at Lovedale in 1959 where students in the Junior Hostel petitioned against the quality of their food and having to do manual work. Four were then expelled and twenty-six pupils left in protest. When further demands from the students were ignored, a boycott of school activities and church took place. A disciplinary committee was convened; it refused to bend to the students' demands. The students stuck to their position; and a mass expulsion of students was carried out, supervised by the police. Other student actions took the form of protests against classroom and disciplinary grievances. Complaints by women students, at Shawbury in 1957, about their hostel conditions led to the expulsion of the entire female student body, and there were similar protests at Mfundisweni in the same year. A boycott at Boitshoko Methodist Institution in 1958 was resolved without expulsions.

In some ways it was the authorities rather than the students who increased the tendency to politicize the conflict in the institutions at this time through their relentless searches for largely imaginary ‘instigators’ and subversion. At Xedaleni in 1955, the chief response of the mission authorities to the riot was to blame it on 'the
reading of 'subversive literature'.

At Mfundisweni, African teachers who had intervened to try and resolve the 1957 dispute were reported to the authorities for inciting the students. Similarly, following the 1957 Blythswood incidents a department spokesman told a parents' meeting that students were getting 'poisoned' by people in positions of responsibility and that 'agitators' were influencing parents in country districts. Now, while it is certainly true that there was a high level of political agitation in the Eastern Cape region and that this may have increased student antipathy toward the authorities, the authorities certainly misunderstood the situation by adhering to a simple 'agitator' theory. Students had real grievances to do with their conditions of life in the schools at all levels - authority conflicts, racial oppression, educational problems and material conditions. In conflicts within the institutions, these factors combined with African nationalist political sentiment; agitators were not needed to spark so explosive a mixture. To take the 1959 Lovedale incident, for example: students' concerns were certainly informed by a political awareness - they demanded an end to ethnic segregation of living quarters, stamping this as 'tribalism' - a terminology which does suggest political awareness. But the unifying grievances which focused their discontent were around food and manual labour; issues which had not been discussed with people outside the Institution. Students were thus amazed when they were then told by the Regional Inspector at a
meeting that they had been "instigated by the same people who were behind the Victoria Hospital nurses strike in 1958". 126

The desire of the authorities to track down 'subversion' in fact frequently inflamed conflicts around the schools. In 1959 after pupils of St John's, Umtata, made congress salutes at Minister De Wet Nel's car, and one was expelled, six teachers at the school were dismissed by the department. This heavy handed reaction prompted a joint teacher/student/parent protest - which succeeded in blocking the department's move. 127

The troubles in mission institutions during 1960 appeared to have the same form and focii as before, but were differentiated by their greater frequency. Healdtown's difficulties, for example, focused on the bread ration and (an issue with far more far-reaching implications) the special seating given to white staff in the dining hall. 128 An incident at Healdtown was a classic food riot. A protest against the quality of breakfast led to the expulsion of a student leader. The students then embarked on a boycott and set fire to the buildings. Police intervened and eight students were arrested. 129 Another food riot was the affair at Moroka Training Institution where students attacked the house of the teacher who was responsible for catering. 130 Kilnerton's upheaval,
similarly, was a classic disciplinary riot. After friends and relatives of students were refused admission to an annual drama night, a class boycott, arson and an attack on the Matron of the hostel followed. At Tigerkloof the old protests against manual work resurfaced when the carpentry block was burnt down and the entire student body was arrested and held for nine days. Amongst these 1960s actions only one had an overtly education-political focus - one in which fifty students at Amanzimtoti walked out over the quality of the tuition.

But the next year showed decisive changes in the pattern of protest. The actions of 1961 were of three types - and two of these were new. For the first time there were school riots and boycotts on issues of national politics, centering on opposition to the coming of the Republic. Secondly, there were actions responding to unprovoked clamp-downs by the authorities. And finally, there was some continuation of the tradition of food and discipline boycotts. The significance of the existence of a particular tradition or repertoire of protest, in particular educational institutions, is well illustrated by the events of 1961. In the mission founded schools of the Eastern Cape, for example, there was an immense flare-up at the time of Republic, but the schools in the regional urban centre, Port Elizabeth, were quiet. The Regional Director of Bantu Education, J. Dugard, comments:
Boarding schools caused many heartaches while the far more numerous day schools went quietly on their way. 135

The capacity of the boarding schools to cause officialdom 'heartaches' existed precisely because their students could turn their strong tradition of internal protest in a direction which addressed the intensified political conflict at a national level; the urban students, without such an autonomous protest tradition, could not. A generalized political eruption took place in the Eastern Cape boarding schools. At St John's College, Umtata, students held a meeting defying the government's ban on gatherings, which culminated in the burning of a government vehicle, the college library and furniture. 136 Altogether 204 students were arrested in the Transkei alone around Republic Day incidents, and 106 were convicted of offences connected with illegal gatherings or public violence. 137 Action also spread to the Transvaal. At Emmarentia Bantu High School at Warmbaths on Republic Day, students refused to participate in the festivities which had been prepared and held a mass meeting instead. Police were twice called in to disperse them: a two day class boycott followed and twenty-nine students were expelled. 138

It is not clear to what extent the new wave of student action was organized. Unfortunately, much of the little data which is available on this expresses the views of the educational authorities who inclined to an excessively
conspiratorial view of student action. A conference of the senior officials of the Bantu Education Department in the Eastern Cape concluded that behind the disturbances lay "a powerful and ruthless organization brought to bear on the immature but politically conscious minds of young scholars", this being part of "a considered and prepared attack on the Government and White supremacy." They believed that there was a plan to oust "Europeans" from the institutions in order to place blacks in charge and create "strong Bantu political centres" which would become training grounds for "agitators and leaders of Bantu nationalism." One's initial suspicion that this was a fantasia which reflected the paranoia of the white inspectorate to a greater degree than any real knowledge of the state of black political organization is confirmed when one examines the inspectors' view of the issues. The Regional Director, J. Dugard, a humane and enlightened official, was, to judge from his contribution to the debate, unaware that the ANC and the Unity Movement were separate organizations. Furthermore, although he was convinced that there was a "cell" in each institution which "dictated" to the student body, he admitted that it had mysteriously proved impossible to find out who any of these "instigators" were. However, some of the points which arose at the officials' conference do help to explain what underlay the politicization of the schools. The inspectors virtually admitted that their relations with both students
and black teachers had totally broken down. The prefect system had been "neutralised". Prefects had either participated in the disturbances or become "negative". Those prefects regarded as "sell-outs" were subject to physical violence. Discipline was eroding as the sensitive situation compelled the authorities to ignore breaches they would otherwise have punished. Black hostel staff and teachers who supported the authorities were being ostracized. The majority of black teachers could not be relied on in a crisis, and some were suspected of encouraging and supporting student action. An understanding of why student action was able to move onto the political plane surely has to start with an understanding of how the mechanisms of social control had completely collapsed in the mission schools, both as a result of the direction of outside black public opinion against the education authorities and of the students' own challenge to the legitimacy of the institutions' disciplinary structure. There was, thus, space for more overt forms of political action to come to the fore. The students who told the authorities at this time that "Education is not everything" expressed a new form of political consciousness which was based on a local defeat of the legitimacy of the education system. It was to become generalized in the 1970s when there was a more thorough collapse of that legitimacy.
Heavy-handed interventions by the authorities also helped to escalate the level of conflict. At Healdtown, a few days before Republic Day, police staged a raid looking for 'weapons'. The trunks belonging to 200 students who refused to co-operate with the police were seized. A class boycott followed and the College was placed under Police guard. Following an attempt by pupils to burn down the Principal's office, the institution was closed.\textsuperscript{146} Measures against those who participated in protests also provoked trouble. At Lovedale in July 400 students boycotted classes in protest against the expulsion of 50 students for participating in the May demonstrations. All 400 were expelled.\textsuperscript{147} At Ndaleni 50 students walked out in protest at being required to sign a good conduct undertaking after returning from suspension over the May demonstration.\textsuperscript{148} At Kilnerton in June a strike took place in sympathy with ten expelled pupils and with Healdtown and Lovedale.\textsuperscript{145}

Few of the incidents reported in 1961 had the character of simple food riots. The food riot had, however, served as a bridge across which students could charge on to the political offensive. Disturbances in schools continued in 1962 although at a reduced level.\textsuperscript{150} However, in the first half of 1963 there was a renewed flare-up.\textsuperscript{151} A statement by the Minister of Bantu Education also indicated a larger number of incidents, but did not provide adequate details of them.\textsuperscript{152} Speculation that the incidents of this period
were linked to the activities of Umkhonto we Sizwe or Pogo should not be taken too literally in an organizational sense. But at the same time the battles in the schools in 1963 did take on a bitterness and intensity which suggests a deepened political anger. The mood of the students could be summed up by a slogan which was written up by students at Healdtown during the 1963 disturbances:

Why must we wear uniform? Are we convicts or soldiers? We are the future leaders of South Africa. 154

The last-ditch violence of the conflicts in society as a whole was reflected in the schools. At Wilberforce (Evaton) in February 1963, two students were expelled on allegations that they had incited others not to pay fees. Following this, the department sacked the Vice-Principal, Jack Lekala, who they claimed was inciting the pupils and was behind the campaign against fees. However, after his dismissal Lekala returned to the school and spoke to some students, a student meeting ensued and the Principal was stoned when he tried to intervene. The police then arrived and after being initially driven back by stones from the students, took control of the campus with the aid of a Saracen armoured car. When a boycott broke out the next day all the men students were expelled. After the Director of Bantu Education had intervened and been denied a hearing by the students, he had all the women students expelled as well. 155 In September 1962 students protesting expulsions
at Kilnerton used knives and sticks to attack students who were breaking their boycott and burnt a teacher's car.\textsuperscript{156} Students at Bulwer in 1962,\textsuperscript{157} and at Healdtown in 1963\textsuperscript{158} stoned members of staff. There was massive property damage: in an incident at Mfundisweni in April 1963 students stoned the church, smashed the mission lighting plant and burnt down a dairy: 92 of them were convicted in the magistrate's court.\textsuperscript{159}

What is interesting, however, is that, unlike the riots of 1961, none of the riots of 1962-1963 was launched on an overtly political issue. Everyone claimed to be either about a disciplinary issue, such as expulsions, or took the form of a traditional food riot. For example, after the violent boycott and confrontation at Healdtown in 1963, the students claimed that their grievances were insufficient food and broken beds, although, as pointed out earlier, the riot clearly had political undertones.\textsuperscript{160} As repression increased in the early 1960s, and as it became clear the existing order would not immediately be overthrown, the students became more cautious at putting forward overtly political claims. However, the underground activities of the time did have an impact on the students not, as contemporary officialdom believed, in a direct organizational sense, but rather in that these activities gave the students a sense of continuing struggle, and of the possibility of change.
Student riot in the late 1950s and early 1960s did manifest a deep discontent amongst school students at the state's educational and social policies. In this sense, it deserves to be included as part of the resistance to Bantu Education, especially because of the much more overtly political character it began to take on. But certain of its features prevented it from being an effective form of opposition. Firstly, it was deeply rooted in a mission boarding school tradition of revolt against local grievances. This provided a cultural context for revolt, but also intensified the tendency for protests to be localized and to be a confused mixture of local and wider grievances. Secondly, as a result, the student revolts had little impact in the urban areas. Thirdly, no strong school student organization emerged of the kind which could make school students a coherent social force.

In the case of student rebellion, once again there was a dialectic of successful repression and future conflict. By the end of 1963, the authorities had stabilized the situation inside the schools. But the tradition of student revolt did not quite die out. And whereas, in the period discussed in this chapter, it remained rooted in the rural boarding schools, and thus had limited impact, in the 1970s it would re-emerge, with much more devastating effect, in the new urban schools developed by Bantu Education.
Conclusion

The chapter has shown that opposition to Bantu Education had inherent weaknesses which undermined it and created possibilities for government to win support for the new system. The school board and committee system could offer real incentives for participation: on the one hand the control which parents could attain over teachers; on the other opportunities to engage in the patronage politics of bribery and corruption. Teachers were subdued not only because of their vulnerability to dismissal but because the labour market offered so few other opportunities to them. The riots in rural boarding schools were inherently unable to constitute a threat to the state education system because they were not based on any coherent student strategy, or organization, and isolated in rural educational centres. None of the movements that challenged Bantu Education had the resources of power to block the operation of the system.

Yet the apparent victory of the Bantu Education carried hidden dangers for the regime. The arrogance and corruption of the school boards, and the high-handedness and racism of officialdom would throttle any possibility of teachers becoming committed to the new education order. The tradition of student revolt would eventually resurface itself in the new urban schools that Bantu Education was creating.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

4. Idem.
17. Idem.


25. UW AD 1812 Ea 1.8.3, Untitled transcript of a meeting in Dube on 19 June 1955.


27. Interview No.16, Soweto, 1986.

28. Interview No.5, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986.

29. Interview No.4, Soweto, 1986.

30. Interview No.8, Soweto, 1986.

31. Interview No.18, Soweto, 1986.

32. Interview No.1, Soweto, 1986.

33. Interview No.18, Soweto, 1986.


37. See for example *The Torch*, 17 April 1958.


42. UNISA AAS 212, (File: CATU Conferences I), Resolution of the 1957 CATU Conference.

43. Interview No.1, Soweto, 1986.

44. Interview No.13, Soweto, 1986.

45. Interview No.16, Soweto, 1986.

46. Interview No.4, Soweto, 1986.

47. Interview No.18, Soweto, 1986.

326
49. Interview No. 8, Soweto, 1986.
50. The Torch, 4 February 1956.
51. The Torch, 3 July 1956.
54. The Torch, 17 April 1956.
56. Idem.
57. Idem.
58. The Torch, 7 May 1957.
59. The Torch, 3 July 1956.
64. The Torch, 20 October 1956.
66. CATA, The Defeat of the N.A.D. and School Boards (Cape Town, CATA, n.d.); a copy can be found in UNISA AAS 212, File 13.

70. Idem.

71. UNISA AAS 212, (File: CATU Conferences I), 1st CATU Conference 1954.

72. Idem.

73. UNISA AAS 212.3, CATU Newsletter, June 1956.

74. UNISA AAS 212, (File: CATU Conferences I), Annual Conference Report 1957.

75. Idem.

76. Idem.

77. Idem.

78. UNISA AAS 212, (File CATU Conferences I), 5th Annual Conference of CATU 1958: B.M. Titus Report by the Regional Organizer for Tembuland Region.

79. Idem.


81. UNISA AAS 212 (File CATU Conference I), The Sixth Annual Conference...

82. UNISA AAS 212, (File CATU Conferences I), Annual Conference - Uitenhage 3-5 July 1957.

83. Idem.

84. For example, UNISA AAS 212 - 13, CATU Newsletter 1957.

85. The Torch, 8 July 1952.

86. The Torch, 8 July 1952, 4 August 1953.

87. For examples of the Unity Movement position on this see The Torch, 3 May 1955, 24 May 1955; K. Hassim, "Interview: Hassim on Apdusa", Work in Progress, No.31, May 1984, p.16.

88. The Torch, 10 May 1955.

89. The Torch, 13 January 1953.

90. The Torch, 10 February 1959.


93. *Idem*.

94. *Idem*.


106. *Idem*.


108. M. Horrell, *A Decade of Bantu Education*, (Johannesburg, SAIRA, 1964), p.88; The incidents were at Adams College, Moroka, Tigerkloof, Kilnerton and Pax College.

109. Horrell (1964), *op.cit.*, p.88; CL MS 16 598/6, Memorandum on Disturbances at Bantu Educational Institutions in the Ciskei during June 1961 by Mr J.H. Dugard, Regional Director of Bantu Education, Kingwilliamstown, 1961. The institutions involved were Kilnerton, Swartbooi School, and Emmarentia High School at Warmbaths (Transvaal); Healdtown, Lovedale, Freemantle Institution in Queenstown, St John's at Umtata, Botha Sigcau High School at Flagstaff, Bensonvale, St. Matthews and Mount Arthur (Cape/Transkei); and Ndaleni Training College (Natal).
110. Horrell (1964), op.cit., p.88; these were Kilnerton, Mariazell and Matatiele.

111. Ibid., p.89; Wilberforce, Lovedale, Healdtown, Botha Sigcan, St Francis of Marianhill, Mfundisweni and Betal College at Butterworth were involved.

112. Idem.


115. Idem.


117. Idem.


119. The Torch, 14 May 1957.

120. Idem.

121. Idem.


123. SAIRR (1955), op.cit., p.186.


128. CL MS 16 598/6, A.E. Mathlabane to Rev. Mthembu, Healdtown, 13 May 1960.


130. Idem.

131. Idem.

132. Ibid., p.221.

133. Ibid., p.220; The Star, 8 June 1960.
134. CL MS 16 598/6, Memorandum... J. Dugard, 1961, op.cit.
139. CL MS 16 598/6, Memorandum Arising out of a Conference held under the Chairmanship of the Regional Director of Bantu Education (Gisela) at the Regional Offices, Kingwilliamstown, 23 June 1961.
140. Idem.
141. CL MS 16 598/6, Memorandum... J. Dugard (1961), op.cit.
142. Idem.
143. CL MS 16 598/6, Memorandum Arising... (1961), op.cit.
144. Idem.
145. CL MS 16 598/6 Memorandum... J. Dugard (1961), op.cit.
152. UW SAIRR Press Cuttings Box 124, Transcript of Hansard, 26 March 1964.


CHAPTER EIGHT: THE ZENITH OF 'BANTU EDUCATION': FROM THE EARLY 1960s TO THE EARLY 1970s

The defeat of opposition to apartheid education policy, as described in the last two chapters, was part of a tightening of governmental control over the entire society. This culminated in the early 1960s with the wholesale repression of popular oppositional movements. Together with the booming economic conditions of the 1960s, this opened the way for a more thorough going implementation of territorial apartheid in that decade. Bantu Education policy was pursued with intensified vigour and dogmatism. At first glance the educational developments of the 1960s would appear to support a simple reproductionist argument. The development of Bantu Education accompanied rapid expansion of the capitalist economy. This might seem to confirm that Bantu Education supplied an appropriate labour force to employers. The lack of public friction between government and representatives of capitalist interests might lead to the assumption they were in a symbiotic relationship. The apparent passivity of black communities, teachers, and students might encourage one to suppose that the schooling system was successfully disseminating dominant ideology, and strengthening dominant class hegemony. This chapter will argue that, in fact, state education policy was generating a set of social tensions which make any such reproductionist view unviable. It will
argue that the linking of education policy to the implementation of territorial apartheid created deepening differences of long term interest between bureaucracy and business. It is argued, in addition, that the state educational bureaucracy largely pursued its own ideological agenda and organizational interests, and that its actions are by no means reducible to defence of the interests of capital. It is contended that educational policies were creating a deep hostility amongst communities, teachers and students, which was effectively undermining any attempt to build a dominant class hegemony.

This chapter thus develops the position, argued in the first chapter, that education systems need to be understood as a contested field of social relations, and that the form they take embodies the outcomes of social conflicts. The state’s victory in the conflicts of the 1950s and early 1960s produced the stability of Bantu Education in the 1960s and early 1970s. But the very features of the education system thus established were to generate conflict in the future.

This chapter will begin by outlining how, in the period between the early 1960s and the early 1970s, Bantu Education seemed to reach the zenith of its success as an instrument of domination. A cheap mass education system had been put into place, and organized mass opposition to it had been swept away. The education system was harnessed
to the implementation of apartheid policy. In pursuit of the Nationalist government's aim of uprooting the urban African working class, the development of secondary, technical and higher education for Africans in the urban areas was strangled, so as to drive young people to seek their educational future in the Bantustans. The educational development which did take place was centred in the rural areas, in order to strengthen the 'homeland' states and their leaders. Signs appeared that black communities might reconcile themselves to the existing educational dispensation. The majority of African teachers were drawn into conservative professional organizations, which rejected political action and sought a co-operative relationship with the Department of Bantu Education (DBE). The school board system seemed to flourish, with tens of thousands of people participating in the boards and committees. Urban students showed few signs of resistance to the new educational order. It appeared that there was no obstacle to the effective use by the state of the Bantu Education as a building block of the Bantustan system.

However the chapter will go on to show that the 'successes' which the DBE had achieved were deeply ambiguous and contradictory. By denying urban African people effective access to post-primary education, bureaucrats and NP politicians were effectively ignoring the growing needs of industry for skilled and clerical employees. While this
conflict of interest remained largely hidden during the 1960s, it would emerge forcefully at the end of the decade. The financial and administrative structure which Verwoerd had established for Bantu Education proved increasingly unable to sustain even that level of educational development which the DBE wanted to pursue; by the end of the 1960s, the funding of black education was in a state of collapse. The material restrictions on the quality of urban education were creating a groundswell of urban discontent, even if this was barely visible. Nor were teachers as effectively drawn into the Bantu Education system as at first might have appeared to be the case. The docility of the existing teachers' organizations prevented them from aggressively pursuing their members' interests, and few major improvements in teachers' conditions of service and pay were achieved. This led in the long term to disillusion on the part of teachers with their organizations, and the Department. Teachers were further alienated from the DBE by its racist practices and heavy handed administrative style. Nor did the school boards effectively serve to draw communities into a new hegemonic order. The boards' subordination to unpopular policies of the DBE; their arbitrary actions and corruption; and their utilization by chiefs in the Bantustans as instruments of personal power, all generated considerable hostility from communities and from teachers. Finally, while the level of student revolt was low, the tradition of riot in rural boarding schools did continue. Parents, students and
teachers may have unhappily accepted the education system for lack of any alternative; but by and large they did not identify with it. Verwoerd's education system did not, even at the height of its strength, attain hegemonic success.

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**Bantu Education and Territorial Apartheid**

In the early 1960s, political and economic conditions changed in a way which enabled the NP government to implement Apartheid policies far more vigorously. This resulted in a serious disruption of the relatively accommodating and pragmatic relationship which had existed between government and industry in the 1950s. By 1962, the state had accomplished the defeat of the African nationalist movement. Thus the major political obstacle to a full-blooded attempt to establish the Bantustans as a 'solution' to the question of political rights for black South Africans had been removed. At the same time, the crushing of workers' organisation and a vast inflow of foreign investment provided the basis for the unequalled boom in the South African economy during the 1960s. This boom provided the state with a rare freedom from economic constraints in implementing its aims. Within the NP, the Verwoerdian ideologues were dominant: the supporters of the 'baasskap' politics of the Strijdom era lacked a coherent policy through which to address the problem of attempting to institute a hegemonic political order; and the rising
forces of Afrikaner capital, while adversely affected by some elements of government policy, were too reliant on the political patronage of the NP to step out of line.¹

The later years of the Verwoerd leadership, and even more, the early years of the Vorster government, thus saw an unprecedented attempt to restructure the whole social and political order of South African society. All Africans were regarded as 'temporary sojourners' in urban areas: they would become 'homeland' citizens, exercising political rights solely in the Bantustans. In order for this to come about the government moved toward granting the 'homelands' self-government. At the same time, energetic moves were made to reverse the flow of population to the cities. From the end of the 1950s the government tightened influx control through a more rigid application of the pass laws, and a toughening of policy within the labour bureau system.² The early years of Vorster's government deepened this new thrust. The construction of urban housing was virtually frozen,³ in an effort to stem the growth of big urban townships. The Physical Planning Act No. 88 of 1967 allowed the state to limit the proportion of black employees in new urban factories.⁴ This was part of an attempt to encourage decentralization of industry, in order that the black labour force might increasingly be based in the homelands. The educational component of this policy was that the state insisted that all development of
secondary, technical and tertiary education for blacks ought to be concentrated in the homelands. I will now outline how the state used education policy in this era as a means of controlling population movements to the urban areas, and of strengthening the Bantustan political structures. From the point of view of state officials, the urban school system came to be seen largely as a mechanism of influx control.

A policy of blocking secondary school expansion in black urban areas began to be made public by Ministers in the late 1950s, and was particularly energetically pursued by Dr. H.J. van Zyl, the Secretary for Bantu Education of the late 1960s and early 1970s. As with other aspects of apartheid policy, the concept seems to have been even more vigorously implemented in the early years of Vorster than under Verwoerd. In 1966 the Bantu Education Journal stated that there would never be enough urban high schools, and that urban Africans should go to the Bantustans for secondary technical and university education: urban people, the article pronounced, "will have a few high schools but never enough, because, according to Government policy, most of these schools should be situated in the homelands. They will never get a trade school in the white cities again". In a series of speeches in 1969 and 1970, Dr. Van Zyl reaffirmed the policy of providing no further secondary schools in urban areas and of concentrating instead on the provision of homeland secondary schools with hostel
provision for urban pupils. While admitting that existing hostel facilities were inadequate, he claimed that these were being expanded, and that there were adequate rural schools to absorb urban youth eligible to enter secondary school. He accepted that urban lower and higher primary pupils should remain with their parents and claimed (inaccurately) that efficient urban schools were provided for them.\(^7\)

This policy approach was combined with an attempt to institutionalize the low level of secondary provision in urban areas. New policies removed the possibility of black communities taking the initiative in this matter. White municipalities were made responsible for school building, but this had to be carried out within the constraints of tight restrictions on the finance available to them for this task, and of state decreed limits on the level of facilities which could be provided. In the early 1960s, white municipalities were responsible for the provision of African lower primary schools in their areas.\(^8\) The building of higher primary and secondary schools was dependent on black communities raising half the cost of each new school, with the rest of the money being provided by the state on a Rand-for-Rand basis.\(^9\) Raising this money was often difficult,\(^10\) and clearly the policy was one of placing the burden of financing education on the urban working class. Nevertheless, it did provide a degree of
community initiative in school building, and this was not in line with the state’s desire to control school expansion. In 1968 the government, therefore, ended the system of Rand-for-Rand contributions. In the subsequent year, white local authorities were ordered to take over all school building in townships, the money to be provided by a 20c levy on each township household. Integral to the new system was an official formula which laid down the level of facilities which municipalities ought to provide: 12 lower primary classrooms for each 800 families, 16 high primary classrooms for each 1,600 families, 10 junior secondary classrooms for each 3,200 families. Some municipalities, including Johannesburg, were given permission to finance building from funds other than the levy, but they were, nevertheless, expected to adhere to this formula. The new system, with its grotesquely inadequate level of secondary school provision, was obviously designed to channel pupils to the Bantustans.

The effects of this policy are exemplified by the case of Johannesburg’s Soweto townships. As the largest black urban concentration, Soweto was the most important focus of the Department’s attempts to contain urban educational expansion. Dr Van Zyl made no bones about proclaiming in public, in 1970, that only one secondary school per 3,000 families was appropriate. He forbade the building of additional classrooms in Soweto high schools which he considered ‘too big’, and bluntly told a meeting of
Soweto school boards that he wouldn’t allow Soweto schools to enroll too many pupils, as secondary schools would be provided in the homelands. The Department of Community Development, which also played a role in controlling school building, was equally unforthcoming. In 1971 a request by the city council for funds to build 674 classrooms in Soweto was refused by the Department, and permission granted to build 36 instead. When, after a considerable struggle, the City Council gained permission to build a further 167 classrooms from the Department of Bantu Education, it was informed in early 1972 by the Department of Community Development, which was responsible for providing the funds, that the money was not available. A little later the same year, Community Development turned down City Council plans for six new schools on the grounds that they exceeded the maximum unit cost.

These policies certainly acted as a pressure on township parents to send their children to rural schools. One teacher comments that:

...if a parent wanted his son to be trained he... had just to send his children out into the boarding school outside... 21

While another says that:

...urban communities sent their children to the rural areas... where these facilities were provided. 22
The education system was also linked, in much more direct ways, into the influx control system. Students from families without urban residence rights were prevented from attending schools in the urban areas. Where they had made their way into these schools, students of rural origin were, as far as possible, removed. Mr. Van Dyk, Van Zyl's predecessor at the DBE, argued publicly that the shortage of urban school places was because of the lack of effective influx controls on the children of migrant workers: this view appears to have reflected the DBE's analysis. In 1968 a DBE official announced that students registering at schools in 'white' areas would have to produce residence permits. Port Elizabeth was a particular centre of attempts to control rural influx through the schools. In 1964 pupils from rural areas around the city were forbidden to attend secondary or higher primary school in the urban area. In 1970 the municipal superintendents ordered checks in the city's schools on whether pupils were registered in the urban area, and were returning those who were not born in Port Elizabeth to the rural areas. To its annoyance the municipality found that black headmasters were, despite warnings on the matter, continuing to enroll out-of-town pupils. Van Zyl also introduced a policy in Soweto under which pupils, even if properly and legally enrolled, could be ordered to leave school if there were over 50 pupils in a secondary class or 55 in a primary class.
The DBE's policy was to develop technical instruction primarily within the Bantustans. In Port Elizabeth, when in 1964, the City Council called for a trade school for Africans to be opened in the city, the DBE refused the request on the grounds that technical education must take place in the rural areas, and announced that a trade school would be opened in Kingwilliamstown, Ciskei. In 1966 the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, which had acquired adequate funds and land to open a commercial college accommodating 1,000 African students, was refused permission to carry out the project by the government.

At the same time the state closed down eight Johannesburg commercial colleges, recommending them to open in the Bantustans. In the few instances where there was development of urban technical training facilities in the period, the government aimed to limit it to no more than Junior Certificate Level - as when the Jabulani Technical School in Soweto was established in the late 1960s. The government was determined to site all African teacher training and University facilities in the homelands. As teachers were subject to influx control regulations, having trained in these rural institutions, they could not take up posts in urban institutions, because they did not have residence rights. (And those who could get around the regulations and secure an urban job often could not find a place to live because of the government created urban housing shortage). The state's restrictive educational
spending policies meant that there was in any case a gross shortage of teaching posts. The DBE also refused to utilize some of the best qualified African teachers because they had been trained outside the Bantu Education system: in 1966, for example, a graduate of Roma University, Lesotho, with a BA and Dip Ed was dismissed on the grounds that this training had been received outside South Africa.

As a final measure to ensure control of the expansion of the urban school system, the Department sought to prevent or restrict any use of funds from private business by schools. Any donations to schools of over R50 had to be administered by the Department. Mr G. Rousseau, Van Zyl’s deputy, stated in 1971 that the Department simply would not allow school boards to raise money for buildings from private firms. Any attempt by boards to do so was met with a heavy handed reaction from the Department: in 1970, for instance, Vanderbijlpark African School Board was "warned" for obtaining a donation of R3,000 toward building classrooms and a library. A donation from the Anglo-American Corporation to the Soweto Secondary School, Naledi, in the same year was frozen by the department because the gift had not gone through official channels.

During this period the DBE was thus able to use education policy as a means to further the Grand Apartheid aim of uprooting the black urban working class, and building up
the homelands as, supposedly, the only arena for the realization of black political and educational aspirations. By most educational standards the educational consequences were been disastrous. But by the lights of the Verwoerdian bureaucracy, state policy was assessed in terms of its contribution to the creation of racial separation. From their standpoint, education policy was effectively playing its allotted role.

The Triumph of Teacher Conservatism

Another area in which the state did seem to achieve a degree of success was in winning teachers' acquiescence in the existing education system, and enlisting the cooperation of their organizations. As the conservative wing of the African teachers movement during the 1950s, the Transvaal United African Teachers Association (TUATA), and the Cape African Teachers Association (CATA) had made little impact and mustered insubstantial support. Their apolitical, passive approach, their dedication to cultivating a professional image, and their concern to build a good relationship with the Department of Bantu Education seem to have had limited appeal for teachers during that turbulent decade. Popular pressure on teachers to identify with the aspiration for drastic social change was strong. One of the major successes of Bantu Education during the 1960s was that this situation was transformed; most teachers were drawn into the structures of the
cautious TUATA, CATA and their equivalents in Natal and the Orange Free State. These bodies federated together as the African Teachers Association of South Africa (ATASA), became the dominant organization of the teaching profession for the next two decades.

The key component in this change was the defeat of the African nationalist political movement and the trade unions. With the destruction by the state of these movements and the exiling or jailing of their leadership, the hope of short-term social change receded. Fear of political activity became strong. A teacher who had participated in the AEM's Cultural Clubs, when asked to what extent she was able to inject her political ideas into her teaching in the 1960s replied that:

...I wouldn't say that I was able, because honestly, fear for victimization by the law...

The total crushing of popular organization created a sense of hopelessness amongst teachers as regarded any attempt to pursue radical political or social goals, even at the level of influencing students with their ideas. One teacher recalls:

...I wonder what indent I can make, because the situation is that you are like a sugar grain in the sea.

In these circumstances, teachers were now willing to respond much more enthusiastically to the appeals of organizations which held out the promise of attaining piecemeal improvements in their conditions of service. The
pursuit of larger social or political goals seemed unrealistic. The teacher quoted above says of the 1960s:

...that was the transitional period of Bantu Education, and this is the time when everybody was trying to look how... we could improve our lot in the educational sphere, that was the time when we were pressurizing some of our conditions to improve. 44

There were still very small possibilities for upward mobility out of the teaching profession open to African teachers; the 25,000 members of the profession in 1961 still formed substantially the largest occupational category of African salaried employees.45 The improvement of teachers employment situation thus offered the only apparently viable means to a better life.

Given the changed political circumstances, certain aspects of teachers' ideology and social position facilitated their desire to find a modus vivendi with Bantu Education. One was a belief that they could make a worthwhile social contribution by teaching, despite the political environment. For teachers who felt uncomfortable about teaching in Bantu Education schools it came as a great comfort to find that most aspects of the syllabi remained relatively unchanged. Some were able to adapt to the new system because they felt that despite its poor level of resourcing, they were still able to provide a sound educational service.
If I had discovered that what I had got from school is quite different from what is taught under the Department of Bantu Education, I don't think I would have remained in teaching. I consoled myself by saying even if people say the standard of education is inferior, but really what I am teaching is the same as what we were taught at school. I realise it was only a change of name as far as I am concerned - a change of name. 46

The education provided by the mission schools was actually the same... with that provided by the ordinary state schools today, because the syllabuses have not changed. 47

What I was taught in English during my days is still being taught in English today. That same sentence which I was taught by the missionaries in the missionary schools. 48

Another factor which aided a falling back to complacency, was the degree of respect which teachers were still often accorded by local communities. This could make the teacher a relatively privileged person:

People in those times thought teachers were great. 49

Well, the community still regarded teachers as leaders. 50

If you visited a house as a teacher the people felt nervous about it, you must give them two day's notice that you are coming to see them, [they] arrange the house inside and outside. 51

In the urban areas, the effects of state education policy had begun to undermine teachers' status, but it remained strong in the countryside:

...in the rural areas the teacher was all things to all men. They were held in higher esteem than in the urban areas. 52

It was not a pride to be a teacher except perhaps... for academics... refinement. But... when you look at the rural areas you find there
economically [the teachers] was the best among thor', so he enjoyed some respect there. 53

I taught in a rural area... where a teacher was held in high respect by the whole community. On a Sunday, if there was a wedding, the teacher was always invited after church services... and accorded high respect, a special seat at the table... Now, unlike what you get in the urban areas. 54

This deference could dispose the teacher toward a certain degree of conservatism.

How did TUATA and CATU leaders utilize this favourable situation to strengthen their support base? Firstly, they benefited from their semi-official position, being recognised by the Department of Bantu Education which had no objections to the existence of a strongly apolitical and 'professionalist' teaching body. A system developed, in the Transvaal for instance, where TUATA members put pressure on their colleagues to join the association through the holding of collections for it's activities. Because of TUATA's state-recognized position, teachers came to see these collections as having a compulsory character. 55 Secondly, the ATASA organizations used cultural events, and especially choral competitions, as a vehicle for building support and structuring the activities of their members. The music competition had a long history in teachers' organizations. They had flourished in the 1940s as part of a wider range of cultural activities which embodied a spirit of African self-assertion. 56 But by the 1960s they had taken on a much more neutral and ritualistic
character. Choral competitions, arranged on a regional and national basis, became almost the central activity of the teacher organizations. According to teachers interviewed:

\[ \text{ATASA wasn't truly a teacher organization. It was entertainment partly by music competition...} \]

57

TUATA has always been concerned mainly with music competitions. 58

Because these contests were extremely popular, they constituted a strong pressure on teachers to join ATASA organizations, as only those schools with ATASA-affiliated teachers could participate. 59 Thirdly, the ascendant teachers' organizations of the 1960s, although led by overwhelmingly male leadership groups, shrewdly orientated themselves toward organizing women members. This was a significant departure from the practice of the 1950s teachers groups, whether of the left or the right, which had generally marginalized women members. A CATA member wrote in 1954 that:

\[ \text{...we women take little or no interest in these Teachers' Meetings, and even when we do attend we do not participate fully in the discussions. What powers are lying dormant in us!} \]

60

During the 1950s, CATA's chauvinism had extended to opposing increases in the numbers of women employed as teachers on the grounds that they would displace male teachers from their posts and that women were incapable of handling disciplinary and physically demanding work. 61 The association described the DBE's policy of equal pay for men and women primary teachers as 'fascistic'. 62 In contrast, the organizations which were dominant in the 1960s despite
their generally conservative views, did make some effort to relate to the concerns of their women members. For example in the early 1960s TUATA organized a petition against the DBE's policy of discouraging the employment of married women as teachers. According to a leading teacher activist this somewhat less chauvinistic approach increased women's participation in teachers' organizations, but often involved manipulative control of women members by teacher leaders.

The change in approach led to spectacular growth of the ATASA affiliates. Under the leadership of I.E. Zwane, who was in office as President from 1961 to 1974, TUATA underwent a rapid expansion. The association mounted a diverse programme of social and cultural activities. During the 1960s, districts organized sports, ballroom dancing, plays and tours, and most importantly, music competitions involving teachers and pupils in choral singing. These cultural focii created a basis for rapid growth. In 1963 membership stood at 5,806; by 1972 this had risen to 11,300, and by 1974 to over 15,000.

CATU achieved an even more dramatic self-transformation. With the imposition of the State of Emergency in April 1960, many members feared that they would be arrested. Presumably they believed that all African organizations, regardless of political stance would be subject to the
clampdown. The result was poor attendance at meetings, a shortage of funds, and a very weak 1960 conference. The demoralization and disruption of community life which followed the crushing of the nationalist movement had its effects on CATU; through the early 1960s it struggled to survive. The union's 1962-1963 report stated bluntly that: "the Cape Teachers' Union has no funds and must very soon close 'shop'." However, the new political conditions of the 1960s rapidly created an audience for CATU's pragmatic message. A key part in its revival was played by the Port Elizabeth Teachers Union (PETU), an affiliate of CATU established by members of its Peddie branch in Port Elizabeth on 10 September, 1964, with R.L. Peteni as President. In 1966 Peteni became CATU's Regional Organizer in the Eastern Cape, and under his leadership a crowded programme of social events - receptions, rugby and netball matches, and choir competitions - was launched. In 1968 PETU diversified further, into a beauty competition, music festival, maths classes and amateur dramatics. In this era, a rapid growth of membership in the Port Elizabeth area took place. This was significant, as Port Elizabeth had been a stronghold of the ANC in the 1950s and a centre of political action. That CATU, with its political quietism and bland programme of social activities, could build itself there reflected the depth of the defeat of the nationalist movement in the area. Teachers in Port Elizabeth, who had previously been under the pressure of popular militancy, were now free to pursue...
their 'professional' interests. The Port Elizabeth developments were mirrored elsewhere in the Cape. By mid 1966 the turn-about was apparent: the conference of CATU at New Brighton in June was described as "an unqualified success"; the union was reported to have about 1,000 paid up members. By 1969 this total had climbed to 1,895, and by 1974 to 3,410, or almost half of the African teachers in the Cape.

The substantial organizations which thus emerged amongst teachers generated an ideology which provided far more scope for the DSE to work with African teachers than was the case in the 1950s. The rolling back of teacher radicalism was a major gain for the Department. ATASA ideology satisfied teachers' dissatisfaction with state education policy, by engaging in rhetorical criticism of the absence of compulsory education, of the material impoverishment of schools, and of certain unpopular departmental policies. But, more importantly from the point of view of the authorities, having thus harmlessly diffused teachers' discontents, ATASA ideology proceeded to assert that teachers should abjure any form of political activity, and that political and educational concerns were absolutely separate. It praised the virtues of the Christianized African middle class, in a way which evoked the most conservative side of mission ideology. In this way ATASA developed an ideology compatible in practice with...
TUATA, for example, did advocate a free compulsory education system. Frequent, well-publicized calls for this were made, culminating in a conference held at Atteridgeville in March 1968, which passed a resolution asking the DBE to introduce free compulsory education for all African children between six and 16 years. TUATA conferences during the 1960s also called for the end of the Department's practice of using vernacular languages throughout primary school, and for vernacular languages to be used only up to the end of standard 2; and for a reduction of the language requirements for pupils to pass standard 6. Such stances appeared to have given teachers a sense that they were avoiding incorporation into those aspects of educational system which they rejected. Two ATASA members interviewed felt that by taking such positions their organizations had maintained its distance from the state:

ATASA being a body which represents the various teachers' organizations... has never accepted Bantu Education... Because the various teachers organizations have never accepted Bantu Education on their own. They have rejected it from its inception.

ATASA felt that Bantu Education was an education for convenience, and until it was an education for citizenship it would merely be tolerated, but not accepted.

Yet, at the same time, the ideology of the ATASA organizations explicitly rejected any form of political
opposition to the state. CATU leaders, for example, continued to vilify the memory of CATA, and they went out of their way to assure the authorities that they would never follow its politicized path. C.N. Lekalake told the 1967 CATU conference in his Presidential Address:

...to the members of the Inspectorial staff of the various regions and to those Higher Officers of the Department of Bantu Education we say thank you, and promise solemnly as we did in 1953 that IT SHALL NOT HAPPEN AGAIN. Never again will the work of many years be reduced to shambles as it was in the late forties and early fifties. 85

The most coherent rationalization of ATASA’s position was provided by R.L. Peteni, when he took over the presidency of CATU at its 1968 conference at Taung. In Peteni’s address to the conference, the African middle class were held up as the creator of stability in an urban environment dominated by the disruption caused by the movement from the land:

The severing of ties between... young Africans and their tribal homes upset their traditional orderliness and their traditional respect for law and custom... The ranks of anti-social townsmen grew at an alarming rate...

The pattern changed slowly for the better as the urban community became more permanent and more settled. More schools were built and genuine church people grew. Some families built themselves good, solid homes, and many members of these families became sophisticated in a good sense, and assimilated many of the good things of Western culture. 86

The government’s policies of the development of Bantustans and population removals were criticized for “upsetting the
balance and stability\textsuperscript{87} thus created. However, Peteni's conclusion was a resounding reaffirmation of the concept of non-involvement in politics and dedication to 'professional' life as the best path for the teacher. His approach deemed that the effects of state policy ought not to be the concern of the teacher, emphasizing instead, the task of intellectual and moral formation of the youth:

...the movement from one part of the country to another, from one form of administration to another - these are not the real ills that beset us.

They are not the problems that we as a teachers' organization should concern ourselves with. There is not much that we can do about these matters in any case. Our main concern must be the individuals, the young people who have to be prepared for changing circumstances. \textsuperscript{88}

The conservative teachers' organizations, which had been unable to have a strong impact in the conditions of the 1950s and the early 1960s, flourished during the subsequent decade. Their apolitical and pragmatic outlook appeared to many teachers to be the most viable one, given the absence of any short-term possibility of any social change. The leaders of the ATASA organizations proved adept at developing organizational activities and an ideology which could provide teachers with a social cohesion and sense of self-worth. This era was the high point of teacher conservatism.
A Period of Acquiescence: School Boards and Students

The further entrenching of the school board system, and the decline of student contention during the mid 1960s, were other areas in which the state seemed to be gaining ground in establishing Bantu Education as a hegemonic system.

The defeat of the mass African nationalist movement in the early 1960s created a wholly different political context for the school boards. From then until the early 1970s, they were no longer under overt political attack. This brought about a situation in which they were potentially able to exert an influence over far wider sections of society. The new conditions did much to strengthen the boards. One senior departmental official found that in this period, holding a seat on a school board became far more acceptable in black communities. By 1969, there were 509 school boards and 4,108 school committees, involving over 50,000 persons. Some teachers established cordial relations with their local boards and committees:

During my time they were acceptable... And I did not have any experience where the school committee or the school board interfered with teachers. 91

...let me say some of them did their work very honestly, I must say they've got to be respected for what they did. 92

A similar analysis would appear to apply to the evolution of student action during the next decade. With the crushing of the underground political movements, the level
of student agitation subsided drastically. In fact, I have been able to find no major incidents in schools during 1964. The incidents which occurred between 1965 and the mid 1970s generally lacked the overtly political character of some of the student riots of the early 1960s.93

On the surface, Bantu Education appeared to be working well for its creators. It was being used to strengthen the Bantustan system and displace the black urban working class; teacher and student revolt had been replaced by seeming co-operation; and the school board system seemed to be winning the participation of growing numbers of urban and rural communities.

The Limitations of the State’s Policy

But each of the areas in which officialdom was making gains contained hidden conflicts of interests which were to prevent the Verwoerdian aims of Bantu Education from being attained. As a policy instrument, Bantu Education was miring the state in vast economic and administrative difficulties. As an attempt to impose a new hegemony it was largely a failure; the state could force popular acquiescence but not win allegiance.

The way in which Bantu Education policy was applied during the 1960s rendered itself increasingly unviable in several ways. Firstly, the strangling of post-primary black
education in the urban areas meant that the complementary relationship between the state and industrial capital which had developed in the 1950s was severely disrupted. By the 1960s, industry had new labour requirements, for more educated labour, which the schooling system was not meeting. The policies pursued by the DBE in the 1960s were ones with which industrial capital could live in the short-term, but which posed fundamental long-term conflicts of interest with the state. This needs to be looked at in the context of the type of industrial growth which occurred during the 1960s. As the boom proceeded there was a strong tendency toward a monopoly structure in industry, thus intensifying the trend to monopolization that had begun in the 1940s. As has been shown, the major labour requirement within monopoly industry tended to be for semi-skilled machine operators. This need could be supplied largely by the labour-power of the existing urban black working class, whom the government had not yet sought to remove wholesale from the cities. A primary education was sufficient to prepare such workers for the labour market, and as by the mid 1960s about 80% of the 7-14 age group of African children were in school, and by the end of the decade the total number of students had risen to over two and a half million, state labour and education policies were for the present, reconcilable with industrialists' needs. The continued emphasis on four year education (by 1971 only between a quarter and a third of students studied for...
longer) thus evoked little criticism from industry. But at the same time, the direction of state policy, in its long term implications, was more threatening to industrialists. It meant eventually the permanent urban working class would be uprooted. And in the educational field some important secondary problems were emerging. Monopoly industry increasingly required technicians and clerical staff, who could no longer be found on the white labour market. The government's attempts to confine secondary and technical education to the Bantustans, and the slow growth of the proportion of African students in secondary education (from 2.94% of the total number of students in 1961 to 4.5% in 1971), meant that the educational apparatus was not geared to this growing industrial need.

Just how inadequate the education system was in providing educated manpower suitable for skilled and clerical work can be seen from a brief examination of conditions in secondary education at the turn of the decade. By 1971 there were only 20 schools for Africans in urban areas that went up to Matric level, and only 74 that went up to Junior Certificate level. It was estimated that this represented only one high school for every 80,000 urban African families. The examination performance of secondary schools also spoke of the weakness of this sector of education. In Soweto in 1967 only 225 pupils sat Matric
and only 16 passed.102 In the Transvaal Senior Certificate exams of 1969, out of 9,000 who sat, 3,000 failed and 2,500 received a third class pass.103 Nationally, in 1967 only 485 out of 2,000 Matric candidates passed.104 There was a generally steady increase in the rate of matric passes, but the overall numbers remained pathetic; they rose from 182 in 1960105 to 1,824 in 1970.106 So disrupted and inadequate was primary schooling that the median age for entry into secondary school was 16 in the mid 1960s.107

The consequence of state education policy had been to create an educational system unable to meet the new labour requirements of industry. When the boom ran into difficulties in the late 1960s, the problems thus created for industry were to become more salient, and to propel it into action on the front of educational politics.

The second arena in which the viability of the policies of the 1960s became increasingly threatened was that of the coherence of the administrative and fiscal structures through which state education policy was run. The structures which had been established in the 1950s for the financing and direction of educational policy could no longer provide the material wherewithal to execute policymakers' decisions. In order to understand this point we need to examine closely the state as an organization.108 The difficulties which the state encountered here were not so much a reflection of external social forces but were rooted in the limited capacities of the structure with
which the DBE had been endowed in its formative period, and the difficulties of changing this. Even those educational services which the DBE did wish to provide during the 1960s, were undermined by a long term administrative malaise within the Department. The root of this malaise was the chronic financial crisis which developed within the Department, because of Verwoerd's decisions about its funding in the 1950s. By the late 1960s the Government was still adhering to the original 'R13 million plus four fifths of black tax' formula for spending on black education, with only 1.5 million added for the African universities. As inflation was rising, the real value of the R13 million was constantly declining, at a time when the government wanted to expand homeland educational facilities. By 1968 the Department was running a deficit of R2 million on its account, and a deficit of R6 million was predicted for the next year. In response the government put a subvention of an extra R9 million into the Bantu Education Account. But as this was not provided for in the legislation on Bantu Education, it remained formally a loan. Then, in 1969, changes in the black taxation system reduced the income available from that source. By the end of the decade then, the Department found itself in an intractable financial crisis, trying to run an expanding system on extremely constricted resources.

The third way in which the policy pursued in the 1960s was
self-destructive was that the impoverished facilities provided in the urban areas generated a growing resentment from teachers and communities of racial inequality in education. Teachers interviewed in the course of this research often noted the lack of resources affecting their schools in this period:

The classrooms were mostly made out of corrugated iron, so in winter it was extremely cold and in summer it would be extremely hot... I happened to be the librarian and it was small - I had to inch my way inside. There was no laboratory, there was no staffroom... 112

...if you talk of government supplied facilities... I must say, we had none, but parents used to contribute for sports facilities for instance... I had to buy some mobile labs because we just had no laboratory facilities... facilities were very poor before 1976. 113

...there was little equipment available, libraries were sparsely populated in books... we were demanding and asking for donations all the time... 114

...our library was very poor. 115

No libraries, no books. Equipment - the scholars had to pay and buy them...

...Nothing was supplied by the department. We had to build our own sports fields, set our own posts. 116

The implicit comparisons being made in these comments are with the well appointed libraries, sports fields and laboratories of white state schools. Bolder teachers articulated their sense of inequality to their students:

there are conditions within the subject that would force me to say: "we have to be on the same level as these ones".
...we say we feel it unfair... library and the like are provided in the European schools and we are denied them. 117

Similar resentments were aroused by the attempt to drive urban youth into rural schools. Contrary to the promises of Dr Van Zyl, rural secondary schools did not provide a solution for urban students whose chances of furthering their education in the urban areas had been blocked by government policy. Only a limited number of urban parents could bear the extra cost of sending their children to Bantustan schools, and thus many urban school students' education came to an early and involuntary end. A teacher points out:

our community being a poor community, most of them could not afford taking [their children] to those homeland boarding schools. That in itself brought about... a high drop out rate. 118

Even those urban parents who had the money to send their children to rural boarding schools were by no means certain of being able to find a school to take them. Despite the assertions of DBE officials, there is evidence that even in the rural areas demand for secondary schooling outstripped the available facilities. A visit by a reporter from the Star to 17 high schools in the North Sotho homeland in 1970 showed that all but four were essentially day schools serving the local community, and that most were already full. Students without local relatives could not get accommodation and were turned away. 119 A school principal
commented that there were "far too few schools in the homelands". Furthermore, where urban students did obtain admission to rural schools they could find themselves strongly resented as outsiders by their teachers and contemporaries: "children from Johannesburg were not favoured" a teacher comments.

The shortage of urban secondary school places was a source of deep resentment by students and teachers. By 1971 there were only eight secondary schools in Soweto as against 54 higher primaries. This bottleneck had catastrophic results. In 1969 Orlando High School had 50 pupils per class in Form I and in early 1970 Morris Issaacson High School had an average of 70 pupils in a class. When the 1970 school year commenced, Morris Issaacson had to turn away 500 applicants. Inevitably, these massive class sizes led to increasingly ineffective tuition and to a growing demoralization amongst teachers as to what they could accomplish:

...up to 80 in a class in high school, and they expect a teacher to teach!... If you have 100 it is impossible to work out the weakness of every child.

At Orlando High... I remember I had a matric class of 72 pupils. Now, teaching can't be effective in such cases. Form One, I had a geography class of 104 children; one class... 

This shortage of urban school places gave rise to signs of growing desperation, on the part of youths, to obtain access to educational facilities. In early December 1970,
primary school pupils in Soweto were reported to be queuing in Soweto for admission to high school in January 1971.128 So desperate were some students to be admitted to school that in early 1970, a hundred of them picketed Orlando High School for two months until Headmaster T.W. Kambule found places for them by arranging to use a church hall.129

There are, in fact, theoretical grounds for arguing that the state’s attempts to reduce the availability of urban secondary education had the unintended consequence of raising the intensity of urban youth’s demand for it. The policy was, I would hypothesize, largely counter-productive in its intended effect of strengthening influx control. Given that by the 1960s the wage was, as Hindson argues, not only the basis of reproduction of the urban working class, but now largely of the migrant working class as well, access to the largely urban industrial and commercial labour market became ever more essential to proletarian survival.130 This meant that the government’s attempts to ‘put the squeeze’ on urban secondary and technical education did little to increase the attractiveness of homeland education for urban working class children. A person who received his or her education or training in the homeland might end with a qualification, but, as industrial decentralization had failed, and as homeland residents were excluded from the urban labour market, he or she was likely
to be without employment opportunities. The urban student, on the other hand, was well placed to get into the labour market of the cities, especially if he or she could emerge with a qualification. So any level of urban education was by definition more valuable in the labour market than an equivalent level of rural education. By increasing the scarcity of urban education, the state succeeded in raising the demand for it. The DBE alienated even potentially supportive groupings within urban black communities, by ignoring the views of even those 'representative' bodies of black opinion which the state had itself established. The Soweto Urban Bantu Council repeatedly requested the establishment of a Teacher Training College in Soweto, but to no avail, as the government adhered to its policy of establishing all training facilities in the Bantustans.

The growing discontent of black urban elites with the state's education policies was manifested in organized form in 1968, with the formation of the Association for the Educational and Cultural Advancement of the African People (ASSECA). The organization was established as an educational pressure group of teachers, professionals, and business people, with its initial base in the main urban centres of the Southern Transvaal. Its formation was a reaction to the poor matric results of 1967, and it called for free compulsory education for black students. The organization established a free tutoring scheme in Orlando for pupils who had failed matric. It also sought to make
donations to High Schools. ASSECA’s president and a former teacher activist, (as well as being editor of The World, the Rand newspaper), in 1970 launched a somewhat ambitious scheme to raise a 10c donation from every African man and woman in South Africa. ASSECA did manage to obtain considerable funding from the Polaroid Corporation from 1971, although by 1973 this co-operation had collapsed, amidst barely veiled accusations of embezzlement from Polaroid. During the early 1970s ASSECA’s activities extended to the Western and Eastern Cape.

Overall, ASSECA was a fairly ineffectual organization based on the township elite. It was conciliatory in its approach to the DBE. But it did represent an organized expression of the widespread urban discontent over education that the approach of the DBE was generating, even amongst the more instinctively conservative elements in township communities. Thus, the policies pursued in the 1960s provided a basis for an increasing popular hostility to the state’s education programmes. It was in this decade, a teacher interviewed argued, that “the man in the street began to suspect the intention of Bantu Education.” The drive to use Bantu Education as an instrument of influx control cut across the possibilities of the state building alliance with sectors of urban black communities.
Teachers: An Underlying Resentment

The servility of the ATASA organizations toward the DBE was far from the full picture of teacher response to the educational authorities in the 1970s. To a considerable extent the teachers' organizations failed to hold the loyalty of their members, or to reflect their true sentiments. And the ideology and administrative practices of DBE officialdom prevented the department from fully capitalizing on the opportunity for co-option that teacher conservatism presented. The pragmatic acquiescence of African teachers in the education system hid a deep resentment of apartheid schooling.

The very caution of the ATASA teachers' organizations, which had enabled them to grow in the changed political climate of the 1960s, inhibited them from taking any form of action which could bring real material gains to their members. In the long run, the lack of gains to show in return for the moderation of the ATASA organizations undermined their members' confidence in these associations. Firstly, they proved to be unable to defend their members against dismissal or victimization. For instance, in 1965, the school board of Witbank arbitrarily dismissed five teachers. But TUATA took no effective action to defend them. One of the sacked teachers, J.M. Kananda of Lynnville Township, wrote to J. Kumalo of TUATA in December 1965:
What has become of your efforts as far as we
"Sacked (sic) Witbank teachers are concerned?"
(sic)... Tell me, Jimmy, what's TUATA busy at?
Competitions, competitions and competitions?
What about the Safe Guard (sic) of so many sacked
teachers we read about in the papers? 142

In 1967, T.W. Kambule, Orlando Highs' Principal, and
Chairman of the local TUATA branch, made the following
shrewd critique of the association's inability to protect
its members:

The prerequisite of the association is that it
should safeguard the interests of the teacher
against the employer. If the association can do
this, much can be gained. At the moment it does
not give the teacher the assurance that under its
wing he can carry out his duties without fear.
All it does is organise music competitions
effectively. I want to see it give the teacher
the courage to pursue the truth.

If the association were strong, no teacher would
be afraid of being victimised... 143

Secondly, the services arranged by the ATASA leaders for
their members were of dubious value. A case in point is
TUATA's relationship with Atlantic and Continental
Assurance (ACA), who were appointed its official insurers.
ACA's business ethics appear to have been somewhat
deficient, and they treated TUATA members contemptuously.
For instance, a TUATA member, after having been told by ACA
that he had to continue paying his premiums for three years
in order to claim surrender value, was then informed, on
completion of these payments, that he would have to
continue paying for a period of three months.144 In
another case, an ACA representative, a Mr De Beër, 'sold' a
policy to a teacher in Kwa Thema by posing as a Bantu Education Department 'investigator', and telling her that he was sent by the Department to instruct all widows to sign the policy forms.145

Finally, the organizations do not seem to have been able to attain many really significant improvements in teachers' pay or conditions. The ATASA organizations would not go beyond a gentle lobbying of the DBE as a means of raising wage issues.146 Even by the mid 1970s, TUATA was unwilling to support either an open call for the closing of the wage gap between black and white teachers, or the idea of a minimum wage for teachers.147 ATASA organization members interviewed on the role of both the national body and its provincial affiliates in this period tended to be negative in their view of their organizations' achievements:

on my side I disagree that [the ATASA affiliates] were important, because they couldn't organize loans or houses. 148

There were no good benefits, and that is one reason why... I just decided no, no more benefits to be a member of TUATA. 149

I've never been excited about teachers' organizations because I don't think they serve any purpose at all. They are supposed to try to improve the lot of the black teacher but I'm not aware of any meaningful change they have brought about, and so I think what they really do is to concentrate on cultural matters like music. 150

I do not remember anything which came about as a result of TUATA's negotiations. 151

[ATASA] were always criticizing [Bantu Education] but as a force to take action, they were poor. 152
Yet the hostility of many teachers to the DBE was not only due to their organizations' inability to extract a better employment package from it. The state's failure to obtain real support from teachers was also underpinned by its inability to articulate an ideology which could effectively draw teachers into a new perception of their role, in line with the aims of apartheid institutions. It is true that the Bantu Education Department and its publications did make much of the concept of professionalism, which certainly had a resonance with sections of teachers. But for the most part, the department's ideologists put forward themes that were crudely racist and loaded with menace against any form of dissent: "Such approaches could scarcely gain the allegiance of many black teachers. The department's mouthpiece, the Bantu Education Journal provides notable examples of this. On one occasion it informed its teacher-readers that to them South African whites were the most important whites in the world: "They are honest and sincere in their actions to all, people whose word is their bond and who will not be frightened by violence". Even more bizarre was this 1965 editorial in the B.E.J.:

It is about time that we take a look at our South African Bantu population to see in what respects they have exceptional qualities... choral singing is one of our strong points... Another talent which is manifested in our children is their neat handwriting... subversive activities and sabotage are not our strong points. There are some of our fellow men who, following the instigation of strangers attempted this but they were bound to fail. They failed because their things have
never had a share in our traditional way of life and because they are not intrinsic abilities of the Bantu. 155

These messages of white superiority, and the impossibility of blacks bringing about any form of social change, were incapable of forming an ideological rallying point for the educated black strata of society. They could only be counter-productive for the state. The racism of DBE officialdom was, in fact, subverting their own attempts to create a coherent ideology which could hegemonize black teachers.

The racist ideology of the DBE was coupled with an authoritarian administrative style which further reduced the possibilities of integrating teachers into the education system. Some teachers had positive experiences of personally helpful and well disposed inspectors; 156 but these seem to have been individual exceptions to an approach which generally failed to accord recognition to teachers and headmaster's opinions and expertise, and which stifled their professional autonomy. Teachers experience of the DBE's administrators was often bitter:

The Department of Bantu Education obviously dictated... all decisions were from them... there was no consultation. If there was consultation it was what we call rubber stamp consultation. 157

They told us what to do. They didn't give us a chance to decide what to do... [teachers] felt bad but there was nothing they could do. 158
It made me feel that here was the policy made by whites for the benefit of whites and now the inspectors are intermediaries to pass it over.

Ideologically, the disaffection of teachers expressed itself in a profound dissatisfaction with elements of the syllabus, and in putting across their objections to the syllabus to their students. As suggested above, changes in the school syllabus after the introduction of Bantu Education were often not experienced as particularly dramatic by teachers. But the history syllabus, which was heavily loaded with themes derived from the work of Afrikaner Nationalist historians, did contain material which teachers often found deeply offensive. One particular idea in history textbooks - that the 'theft' of Boer cattle by Africans during the early colonial period was the cause of frontier wars - seems to have become a symbol and condensation of all that teachers resented in the education order. It seems to have evoked a feeling of deep injustice, for it was seen as stigmatizing Africans as criminals, whereas from an African Nationalist perspective, they were the victims of settler depredations. Indeed, the removal of African land and cattle was seen as the primal act of colonial dispossession. The image of the African as cattle thief was so resented precisely because it inverted these deeply held perceptions. When teaching such material teachers would often use it as an occasion to give vent to their resentment of the existing political dispensation.
That such a process occurred is further evidence of the inadequacy of the 'brain-washing' view of Bantu Education; far from simply reproducing dominant ideology, its classrooms were often an arena of ideological contestation.

Teachers recall:

...with History, I changed certain things I had read in the books - Kaffir wars, the stealing of cattle - I tried to correct it. 160

I was very unhappy with the kind of History I was teaching: where you had to tell your students that their forefathers were thieves, they stole cattle from the whites... 161

In Afrikaans Geskiedenis [History] anywhere where perhaps a black man has to claim [cattle] he is perhaps called a thief, a wrongdoer. 162

The History that was taught... the black man always stole cattle. 163

While teachers were often in a state of considerable fear as to the consequences of raising their political ideas in class, some found stratagems for doing so which were hard for the authorities to pin down:

Those who are clever hear it eventually, those who don't hear you, leave them alone. 164

The apparent practical accord between the DBE and the ATASA organizations thus hid a great reservoir of teachers' anger and frustration. Teachers' organizations were viewed with scepticism by many teachers who resented ATASA's inability to defend them, to provide good services or to win increased benefits. The DBE's racist ideology and brutal administrative methods were loathed. The high point of
Bantu Education saw substantial teacher resentment of the whole education system, and their place in it, lurking just beneath the surface.

The Tyranny of the School Boards

Verwoerd's conception of the school boards had been that they would play a crucial role in drawing black communities into a new hegemonic political order centred on tribal loyalties and the Bantustans. But as time passed it became apparent that the state was only securing the adherence of very limited minorities through the system and that at the same time, in doing so, it was creating deep discontent amongst teachers and other sectors of black communities. The administrative abuses, corruption and association with unpopular state policies of the school boards constantly threatened their credibility. And in the rural areas their utilization by chiefs and traditionalist elements as instruments of power made them unpopular.

Teachers were placed in a structurally powerless position by the school board system, and this explains, to a major degree, their lack of incorporation in the new education order. Through the 1960s and 1970s there were complaints from teachers and parents about intimidation by the boards; about manipulation of boards by the inspectors; about what one teacher called the "incompetent and unscrupulous management of our
schools"; and about extortion of bribes by board members in matters of teachers' employment, transfer or promotion. An editorial in The World in 1956 reflected the attitudes of black salaried employees and the urban 'petty bourgeoisie' toward the system when it denounced the situation where teachers "are more and more being exploited by small men who are in power over them in some school boards".

Teachers interviewed in the course of this research echoed these complaints. They had often experienced contemptuous treatment by the boards and committees:

You got some school boards where some school board members kept getting a high handed manner, you see, interfering in the domestic life of the teachers. Those people had a tendency of not consulting the teachers, of just giving instructions of how the school was to be run, and how things are to be done. You do it this way, failing which you are fired.

They did not give you a chance, you know, to lay out your case if they accuse you of something.

They were rather viewed with a "bad eye" in the community, in the sense that they were always threatening a number of people with expulsion.

[School boards were responsible for] the dismissal of teachers without giving any reason... [and] calling parents' meetings and arguing at length with teachers on matters which they really knew very little about.

The complaints of bribery and corruption also seem justified. In the Rand townships, the school boards took
bribes and engaged in sexual exploitation of their position:

Some were even threatened with dismissal if they didn't pay the secretary of the school board in cash or kind. For instance, in one area of Wattville, it was a known fact that if you didn't bring a bottle of brandy, you won't get a post, and for ladies, it was something else they had to bring. 175

...there was a lot of dishonesty, there were lots of malpractices, and the government connived in these malpractices... 176

While the numbers of those serving on the school boards may have increased, their structure and policies of the boards continued to be ones which generated friction between them and community members. The lack of accountability of the boards to parents allowed them to trample over grass roots opinion. A memorandum by Transvaal teachers in 1966 complained that school boards were ignoring or overturning recommendations made by school committees. 177 The board and committee system continued to be used by the state to extract financial contributions to education from parents. By 1971 these contributions had risen to the level of R1,7 million - of which only R350,000 was spent on repairs and new buildings, while the remainder was spent on teachers' salaries. 178 Urban parents, in particular bore a heavy burden because of officialdom's determination during this period, to restrict funds spent on urban black schooling. In 1964 in Moroka, 100 out of 600 teachers were being paid by the board. 179 This practice also further alienated
teachers from the boards as board salaries could be 45 to 55 per cent lower than regular departmental salaries. The authorities thus generated a relatively limited amount of extra finance for education services, while at the same time creating a powerful source of parent and teacher disaffection.

The DBE's treatment of urban school boards themselves also served to undermine their credibility and their loyalty. Members of Boards and Committees who were politically suspect were arbitrarily removed from their positions. In at least one case where the Department disapproved of the actions of members of a school board, the board was dissolved. The Department also stifled the initiative of the boards by refusing them permission to raise funds from outside donors.

The contradictions of the boards were further intensified through their being loaded with responsibility for the state's policy, introduced in the late 1960s, of separating out urban schools on an ethnic basis. The policy did to some extent have its intended effect of increasing ethnic consciousness amongst black communities. Teachers say of the period:

...it really happened that there was war: Zulus and Sothos.

Instead of bringing the children together to know and understand each other at an early stage, children were led to view each other differently... to the extent that there were
physical clashes, even on sports fields, when a Zulu school was playing against a Tswana school, for instance... 186

...it brought more tensions among the teachers and in the community... because now we started pointing at... Zulu schools, Tswana schools. 187

However the effect of this ethnic separation was by no means only the one desired by the state. In part this was because of the way that the change of policy was imposed from without on urban communities which were already fairly well integrated. A teacher comments that

The communities, I think, saw through it, and it tended to cement relationships between the different ethnic groups. 188

The administrative chaos which resulted from the new ethnic policy adversely affected the quality of urban schooling, and this further undermined its popularity with parents and students. When it was implemented in Meadowlands in 1968, artificial overcrowding was created in the Tswana schools. 189 In other cases disastrous mismanagement of the ethnic reorganization brought about such consequences as the allocation of junior primary students to a secondary school. 190 The Department acted with its customary lack of finesse in the matter, engaging in the wholesale expulsion of Zulu speaking students from a Soweto school where they constituted the majority in 1973, 191 and bringing about a situation where in 1975 there were no junior secondaries for Tsonga and North Sotho speakers in Diepkloof. 192 All of this scarcely brought much lustre to the boards.
During the 1960s and 1970s, school boards in the Bantustans increasingly became a means by which the chiefs and homeland politicians exercised their sway over rural society. The boards provided these groups both with ways of disciplining parents and teachers and with profitable sources of misappropriated funds. These tendencies were accelerated from 1967 when the state moved to transfer administrative control over education in the Bantustans to their 'territorial authorities'. The rural school boards exercised their authority over the teachers ferociously: at one school in the Tswana Territorial authority area the Vice Chairman of the school board told the school committee that "Teachers are but dogs. We can dismiss them at any moment." Once again, the way in which such school boards and committees operated undermined their hegemonic purpose. While they were able to underpin the incorporation of chiefs and some homeland elites into the bantustan scheme, the arbitrary way in which they exercised their authority alienated numbers of potential supporters amongst teachers and parents. The dominant groups in the homelands tended to loot the institutions which were placed in their trust for wealth and power, rather than using them as instruments of a hegemonic strategy. It is not surprising that in a village in Sekhukuneland the school board were viewed as "agents to the chief."
Illustrative of these processes is the story of Philip M. Malebye, the Principal of Itotleng-Baralong Secondary School, Lichtenburg area, during the late 1960s. Malebye came into conflict with the local authorities over the various forms of corruption to which they subjected the school. The local chief imposed on those pupils who came from outside the Ratlou Baralong Tribal Area a R6 tax, which was paid into tribal funds.\(^{196}\) The school committee raised a R3 a head levy from students for the building of latrines but then did not carry out this work.\(^ {197}\) In November 1968 they bought 100 bags of cement for the flooring of four new classrooms. The cement was then mysteriously used up without the planned work being done—presumably appropriated by members of the committee.\(^ {198}\)

Malebye's resentment of such corruption apparently engendered tensions between him and the school board and school committee. The conflict was finally precipitated when a pupil approached Malebye in 1968 with evidence that she had been sexually harassed or abused by the Principal of the primary school. Malebye passed this evidence on to the school board for their action.\(^ {199}\) However, the primary school principal was an ally of the chief, and so instead of attempting to investigate the issue, the chief and school board began to try to get rid of Malebye. An allegation of embezzlement was then brought against Malebye. But an investigation by the responsible administrative official found that no money was missing.\(^ {200}\)
A charge was then brought against Malebye in the Delareyville Magistrate’s Court that he had stolen a R15 cheque from the Local Storekeeper. However, during the trial, in February 1969, the storekeeper admitted that he had conspired with the chief to frame Malebye for the offence. After a brief respite the board and committee moved to simply dismiss Malebye. An advertisement for his post was placed in The World and he was given notice to quit his post by 1 April 1969. To add insult to injury, the chief’s henchmen also stole some of Malebye’s property. Although Malebye had plans for legal action, it seems that little came of this. Malebye’s tale illustrates well the manner in which those who exercised power in Bantustan structures enhanced their power through their control of the school boards, but also shows how this control was not exercised in such a way as to bring these bodies greater popular support.

Some of the most intense conflicts involving teachers in rural areas took place in the central and northern Transvaal during the early 1970s. Two dimensions of Bantustan politics need to be understood here. Firstly, in Lebowa the period was dominated by a conflict between those forces linked to the chiefs, who wanted to bolster chiefly power, and a grouping, apparently led by sections of the petty bourgeoisie and educated employees, who stood for a reduction in chiefly power. Up to 1972, the Lebowa
Territorial Authority had been led by Chief Masermule Matlala, a stern traditionalist and extreme conservative. However in 1972, with the transition of Lebowa to "self governing" status, Matlala was replaced by Cedric Phathudi, who became Chief Minister as the leader of an anti-traditionalist faction. In 1975, after Phathudi had failed, because of South African government opposition, to force the chiefs into a separate upper house in the Lebowa legislature, he brought about a compromise with Matlala, joining together to fend off attacks from a group around the former Interior Minister, Collins Ramusi, who wanted a more determined attack on chiefly power.

Secondly, there was considerable political turmoil within Lebowa, Bophuthatswana and surrounding 'white' areas over the creation of KwaNdebele. Government had originally not intended to establish a separate Ndebele 'homeland' but rather to allow the existence of Ndebele territorial authorities within Lebowa and Bophuthatswana. However, a combination of the particularism of the existing Bantustan leaders who wanted to force out 'foreign' elements; particularist forces amongst the Ndebele chiefs; the labour needs of the Southern Transvaal industrial region; and the ideological dynamics of the states commitment to a distinct ethnic basis for Bantustans brought about, during the 1970s, an attempt to construct a single ethnic unit for the Ndebele. The result was the formation of the least viable of all the homelands - KwaNdebele. This process
involved considerable friction between Ndebele communities and the Lebowa and Bophuthatswana governments.

The 1970s thus saw severe friction in the region between traditionalist and "modernizing" leaderships and between various ethnically defined leadership groupings, and this had severe impacts on teachers in particular. The most spectacular results of this were incidents in which teachers were forcibly circumcised by traditionalist elements. These actions were, I would suggest, a way in which traditionalists warded off the threat to their power by more urbanized and educated groupings by subjecting them to a supposedly traditional ritual. These actions underscored the conflict in rural society between rural elites: teachers, the bearers of a heavily westernized identity, defined themselves against the forms of tradition invoked by the more conservative elites. A teacher who had been subjected to such a forced circumcision replied in this fashion to his cross-examination during the trial of the culprits in the Potgietersrust Regional Court.

- Was the circumcision done according to Bantu custom?
- I don't know.
- Do you have no knowledge of the customs of the tribe involved here?
- The heathens, yes, they use this custom. 209

Here the distance between "the heathens" - a term of abuse drawn straight from a missionary vocabulary - and the teacher is clearly demarcated.
In one such case, Amos Motsepe, Principal of Metsangwana Primary School and Chairman of the TUATA Elands River Branch, was the victim. On 31 May 1970, Motsepe was dragged out of his motor car, beaten and taken to a circumcision school run by Headman Lesolo Maloka, under the control of Chief Motodi Matlala. The next day he was forcibly circumcised. Motsepe was later moved to another camp, and held until the end of July, when he was released. Eventually, with the financial assistance of TUATA, Motsepe was able, in 1974, to bring a legal case against Chief Matlala, Headman Maloka and their henchmen. Motsepe duly won the case, and considerable damages against Chief Matlala; however, when he tried to collect these damages he found it virtually impossible to do so. Motsepe’s attempts to recover what had been awarded to him were an object lesson in the difficulties faced by anyone trying to challenge chiefly power in the Bantustans. An investigator sent to the Chief’s area by Motsepe’s attorneys, found that the Chief, and his brother Chief Mokogome Matlala, had a considerable income, as they imposed their own poll tax in the area, and an annual levy on patients at the local mission hospital, received salaries as officials of the Lebowa government, split the proceeds of tribal funds between them, and pocketed half of any fines imposed in their Lekgotla. In addition the Chiefs received a portion of the produce of all land farmed. But it was to be very difficult for Motsepe to
lay his hands on any of these assets. Matlala dispersed his cattle amongst the herds of the local people, thus making it impossible for them to be identified and seized; and it became clear that further investigations would place the attorneys' agent in danger.\textsuperscript{215} When the attorneys tried to serve a writ on the Chief, they could not find a deputy Sheriff who was willing to enter the area for this purpose.\textsuperscript{216} In 1980, the attorneys were still struggling to have the judgement enforced, even though Matlala had now suffered a decline in his fortune and was in jail on a charge of stock theft.\textsuperscript{217}

In other cases the results of forced circumcision were more tragic for those involved. In 1971, a group including school teachers, were forcibly taken to a circumcision school in the Zebediela area, and subjected to circumcision. One teacher, Gideon Mokoena, suffered a sepsis and died as a result. When those charged with the crime appeared in the Potgietersrust regional court, they were let off with a fine.\textsuperscript{218}

Another aspect of the conflicts within the Bantustans was the way in which the Bophuthatswana authorities tried to use schooling to force non-Tswana minorities out of their 'state'. In particular, there was a determined attempt in the mid 1970s to force the ama Ndebele-a-Moelatlane tribe under Ch'haftainess Ester Kekana, to leave for KwaNdebele.\textsuperscript{219} The Bophuthatswana government tried to force
the tribes schools to teach in Tswana, but this was met with resistance from the tribal authority. Eventually Chieftainess Rekana was deposed from her position.

In summary, there was extensive conflict among and within Bantustan elites. In this conflict the school boards often became instruments of those who were strongly placed within the Bantustan social order — especially the chiefs. Because the most conservative of these elements often saw teachers as bearers of ideas contrary to their interests, and because of the avenues of corruption which school boards opened up, they were often operated by chiefs in a way which adversely affected teachers and parents. Thus although the boards brought some benefits to dominant Bantustan elites, they did not really serve to build large, strong constituencies supporting the apartheid order.

Verwoerd had begun with a conception of school boards as a means of creating a new hegemony in the educational field. But because he, his officials and his successors had been unwilling to grant the boards any autonomy, and had subjected them totally to racist and authoritarian administration, the possibility that they could play this part was never really explored. Instead they became vehicles for the implementation of resented policies, for personal corruption, and for the worst elements of chiefly power.
The Continuation of Student Protest in the Heyday of Apartheid

The discontent of school students was in fact far from subdued. The apparent quiescence of students in the mid 1960s did not continue for long. While urban areas remained generally immune from school student protest, in the rural, mission-founded boarding schools, the long tradition of riotous behaviour, especially over food, continued. Once again the importance of an established repertoire and tradition of protest was demonstrated. From 1965, the familiar pattern of protest began to flare up again. It generally took two forms - one being that of the food or discipline riot - the other being anonymous acts of arson. Overt political issues were never raised, though the occasional hint of underlying political discontents sometimes emerged. The level of action fluctuated but the pattern never quite disappeared. Interestingly, despite continuing urbanization, it was in the rural boarding school that the tradition of student upheaval remained - few incidents occurred in the expanding urban primary school sector. Students in the boarding institutions responded to the change in the national political situation which had occurred by the mid-1950s. In the repressive situation of the mid and late 1960s they could not make political calls for mobilization which were as overt as those of a few years before: nor did they have the space to be as aggressive. Their attention turned once again to the
internal conflicts of the school; once again food and discipline became the metaphors of power.

The food riot was thus once again a major vehicle for the expression of discontents. At Botshabelo Training Institution, Middelburg, in April 1965, there was a strike after the boarding master had dismissed student complaints about the food and medical facilities.222 A protest against the hostel master at Vryheid government Bantu School in November 1965 led to nineteen expulsions.223 There were expulsions at Ngoma Vocational Training School in February 1968, following a food riot.224 In September 1968 200 boys were detained at Clarksbury following a riot over food in which buildings had been stoned and two cars damaged.225

Various disciplinary issues also became a basis for protests: in 1965 Marianhill pupils broke windows in protest against expulsions.226 In 1965 a search of a classroom at Moroka Mission by prefects looking for weapons led to attacks on buildings.227 At Lovedale in 1966, 300 pupils were expelled after they refused to attend classes in protest against two teachers whom they said were unqualified.228

Despite the generally lower level of conflict some incidents had very violent outcomes. At Moroka Mission,
following the 1965 incident, arsonists set the mission on fire, causing R30,000 damage.\textsuperscript{229} Shortly thereafter, Roodekuil Community School at Brits was burnt to the ground.\textsuperscript{230} It was still possible too, to find signs of deeper political meanings in school disturbances. During the 1965 food riot at Botshabelo, the students were heard to be singing ANC songs.\textsuperscript{231} While the level of student unrest did not rise sharply on a national scale before the mid-seventies, there was one localized revival of activity in the Transkei/Eastern Cape, around 1970-1971.\textsuperscript{232} This regional upsurge was fairly intense, with high levels of violent rioting taking place.\textsuperscript{233} Interestingly, of the thirteen institutions in the Transkei and Eastern Cape at which I have evidence of student action, five were missionary founded boarding institutions with long traditions of student action in this latter period St John's, Clarkesbury, Mwenyane, Buntingvale and Healdtown.\textsuperscript{234}

The motivations for this wave of student action are not particularly clear. At Healdtown a teacher commented that when students who had attacked the headmaster's house, attempting to break his door and to beat him, were interviewed,

Their complaints were all very petty indeed... the trouble does not lie with any individual, but with the boys who will not accept the rules and discipline... \textsuperscript{235}

In a sense this grasps the nub of the issue - the breakdown in the internal social relations of rural boarding schools,
which had taken place under the missionary order, had never been overcome. Neither Bantu Education nor the neo-Bantu Education of the Transkei and Ciskei 'states' could restore the credibility of the educational process sufficiently to reintegrate the students into it. They thus turned to violence around issues which could focus their broader resentments at the authority relations of the school and the society. It is tempting to suggest that the moves of the Transkei and Ciskei toward self-government were linked to the discontents of the students, but I have found no hard evidence of this. However, it is clear that the political tensions involved in this process sometimes acted in a way which provided the students with more space in which to act. In the case of the 1971 Healdtown incident, a row had broken out between the warden of Healdtown, who had closed the hostel and suspended classes, and the Ciskeian Territorial Authorities education department.236 The Department reprimanded the warden for taking this action: their view was that he should have tried to bring the school back to normal. The Ciskei's Acting Director of Education wrote that:

The Church is running the hostel for the Territorial Authority which represents the Xhosa people of the Ciskei, the parents of the children. The Executive Councillor must be able to say that every possible effort was made to keep the hostel operating, and that the Department was satisfied of the need to close. 237

The point is that the Ciskei Bantustan leadership wanted to build its political base and that the suspension of the
children of the local elite who attended Healdtown was an obstacle to this. I do not suggest that the particular configuration of events at Healdtown was widespread, but it does suggest that the strains of transition to pseudo-independence may have contributed to the Ciskei and Transkei authorities difficulty in handling students at this time.

Conflicts continued at a reduced level in 1972. There were 296 arrests of students at five schools, in connection with which there were 37 convictions. In 1973 there were arrests at six schools resulting in 472 convictions. These incidents took place in Lebowa, the Transkei, Zululand and Ciskei. The classic pattern of the food riot often continued. For example, at Bulwer in August 1973 the students were affected by food poisoning on a large scale. A doctor was called for consultations. But after he had left the students continued to be ill and no action was taken. A meeting to discuss this was held with a teacher, Mr Hlengwa, but he refused to show students the minutes he had taken. On Sunday, 12 August, the male students announced that there would be a boycott. Once it started on Monday, the police were called, but the boycott went ahead. On the Monday evening the students met with the circuit inspector, whom they presented with a list of no fewer than ninety-two grievances. The boycott continued throughout the day. In the evening students met with the
Principal, Mr Mthiyane. Four main demands were made: that a doctor should be called; that the students should have access to the minutes of the meeting; that staff should stop opening students letters; and that there should be no striking - "clapping" - of students by teachers. The head agreed only to the last of these demands. On the Wednesday the students went back to school, and shortly thereafter a teacher struck a female pupil. This incensed the students and during the night they attacked school buildings. The police arrived and fired on the students. Two female students were wounded. The remaining students fled into the countryside. On the Friday school was suspended. After a few weeks students were allowed to return but, when they found that some were being expelled for trivial offences, others left voluntarily. This was a classic food riot situation. While there were real material issues - the students being poisoned by their food and the lack of medical attention - there were also underlying feelings that this situation was part of the injustice intrinsic to students' relations with authority. "To our surprise" one of the students wrote "the police were called within five minutes time after school time was past, but the doctor was not called immediately after we had eaten poison." It was this sense of injustice in the student experience of dealing with authority that fuelled their anger around more concrete issues.

Student resentment of the racist and authoritarian
structure of school and society clearly had not been uprooted effectively in the areas where, in the 1940s and 1950s, it had posed problems for the authorities. The existence of a tradition of student revolt and repertoire of actions expressing this revolt in the rural boarding schools provided an accepted means of expression for student discontent which they could use in a way appropriate to the changed political situation. The authority relations in rural schools had apparently not been successfully reconstructed either by DBE officials or by homeland authorities.

Conclusion

This chapter began by showing that the Nationalist bureaucrats would have had some justification for regarding the era from 1962 to 1972 as a triumph for their policies. The administrative structures of black education had been fully mobilized in the service of apartheid policy. Teachers had submitted completely in the political sphere; school boards were functioning; students were largely quiescent. But this success was to give rise to new crises. Schooling no longer was meeting the labour needs of industry; the DBE's financial structure was not viable; the starving of urban education was producing widespread popular resentment. Moreover teachers, students and parents were largely hostile to the education system. In
the apparent calm of the 1960s, conflicts multiplied. The next decade would give them expression.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT


10. Idem.


22. Interview no.11, Soweto, 1986.
34. R.D.M., 29 May 1968.
35. Idem.
42. Interview no.19, Soweto, 1986.
43. Interview no.5, Soweto, 1986.
44. Idem.
45. UW AD 1181, N. Mkele, "The Emergent African Middle Class", (Mimeo, June 1961).
46. Interview no.6, Soweto, 1986.
47. Interview no.10, University of the Witwatersrand, October 1986.
48. Interview no.11, Soweto, 1986.
49. Interview no.8, Soweto, 1986.
50. Interview no.6, Soweto, 1986.
51. Interview no.1, Soweto, 1986.
52. Interview no.18, Soweto, 1986.
53. Interview no.5, Soweto, 1986.
54. Interview no.11, Soweto, 1986.
56. Interview no.5, Soweto 1986.
57. Interview no.18, Soweto, 1986.
58. Interview no.11, Soweto, 1986.
59. Interview no.10, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986.
62. The Torch, 1 April 1958.
64. Interview no.20, Eldorado Park, April 1984.
66. Idem.
67. Ibid., p.65.
68. UNISA AAS 121, (TUATA Correspondence), I.E. Zwane to the Secretary General, ATASA, 28 August 1972.
71. Idem.
74. Ibid., p.16.
75. Ibid., p.20.
76. UNISA AAS 212 (File 6.1), S.M. Ngcola, "General Secretary's Reports to ATASA Conference, Johannesburg, December 12th - 13th 1966".
77. Idem.
78. UNISA AAS 212 (File 6.9), F.M. Tonjeni, "General Secretary's Report Presented to ATASA Conference held at Admiral Hotel Durban on 17th and 18th December 1969".
79. UNISA AAS 212 (File 6.14), "General Secretary's Report to the A.T.A.S.A. Annual Conference held at Mafeking on 14th and 16th December 1974".
82. Ibid., p.64, p.68.
83. Interview no.11, Soweto, 1986.

401
84. Interview no.17, Soweto, 1986.

85. UNISA AAS 212 (File 4.15), "Presidential Address 14th Annual Conference (1967 CATU Conference): Pres. C.N. Lekalake".

86. UNISA AAS 212 (File 4.16), "Cape African Teacher's Union Presidential Address Delivered by R.L. Peteni to the CATU Assembled in Pingare College Hall, Taung, from 24.6.68 to 26.6.68".

87. Idem.

88. Idem.


91. Interview no.11, Soweto, 1986.

92. Interview no.5, Soweto 1986.

93. This is substantiated in the final section of this chapter.


100. Star, 26 March 1971. Junior Certificate was an examination taken after three years of secondary school.


108. This point reinforces the significance of Skocpol's work: see T. Skocpol, State and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985).
112. Interview no.3, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986.
113. Interview no.5, Soweto, 1986.
114. Interview no.10, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986.
117. Interview no.1, Soweto, 1986.
118. Interview no.5, Soweto, 1986.
120. *Idem*.
121. Interview no.5, Soweto 1986.
125. *Idem*.
126. Interview no.4, Soweto, May 1986.
127. Interview no.5, Soweto, 1986.
133. Idem.
134. Idem.
140. Interview no.17, Soweto, 1986.
141. TUATA, May 19.5, September 1965.
142. UNISA AAS 121, (File: TUATA Correspondence), M.B. Kananda, Witbank, to J. Kumalo, 2 December 1965.
144. UNISA AAS 121, (TUATA Correspondence), S. Motlhake to the Secretary, Rustenburg District TUATA, 15 April 1967.
145. UNISA AAS 121, (TUATA Correspondence), Mrs. V. Nkabinde, KwaThema, to the Inspector of Bantu Schools, Boksburg Circuit, (circa. 1973).
148. Interview no.8, Soweto, 1986.
149. Interview no.6, Soweto, 1986.
150. Interview no.7, Soweto, 1986.
151. Interview no.11, Soweto, 1986.
152. Interview no.18, Soweto, 1986.


156. Interview no. 4, Soweto, 1986; Interview no. 10, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986; Interview no. 11, Soweto, 1986.


158. Interview no. 8, Soweto, 1986.

159. Interview no. 18, Soweto, 1986.

160. Interview no. 16, Soweto, 1986.

161. Interview no. 3, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986.

162. Interview no. 19, Soweto, 1986.

163. Interview no. 10, Soweto, 1986.

164. Interview no. 18, Soweto, 1986.


169. Ibid.

170. Interview no. 11, Soweto, 1986.

171. Interview no. 6, Soweto, 1986.


175. Interview no. 5, Soweto, 1986.

176. Interview no. 3, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986.

177. TUATA, May 1966.


181. R.D.M., 19 July 1968; the case is that of a former Treason Trialist, Henry Tshalala, who was removed from two committees and a school board.


185. Interview no. 4, Soweto, 1986.

186. Interview no. 11, Soweto, 1986.


188. Interview no. 7, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986.


194. UNISA AAS 121 (File: TUATA correspondence - unsorted), J.M. Ditlhage. Phokeng Higher Primary School, Rustenburg, to the General Secretary TUATA, 30th January 1968.


197. *Idem.*

198. *Idem.*
202. UNISA AAS 121, Malebye to Regional Director, Letter cited; UNISA AAS 121 (File: TUATA correspondence - unsorted), P.M. Malebye, Itotleng-Baralong Secondary School, Lichtenburg, to the General Secretary, TUATA, 7 March 1969.

205. UNISA AAS 121 (File: TUATA correspondence - unsorted), P. Malebye, Swartruggens to the General Secretary, TUATA, 7 August 1969.


209. UNISA AAS 120 (File: L.M. Taunyane - legal cases), In Die Streekhof Van Die Streekafdeling Van Transvaal Gebou Te Potgietersrus; Die Staat Teen Patrick Kekana...... (My translation - J.H.).
210. UNISA AAS 120 (File: L.M. Taunyane - legal cases), McMullin, Bowens Attorneys to the Vice President of TUATA, 11 March 1974.

211. Idem.


213. Idem.

214. Idem.

215. UNISA AAS 120 (File: L.M. Taunyane - legal cases), McMullin, Bowens to Taunyane, TUATA, 7 February 1977.

216. Idem.

217. UNISA AAS 120 (L.M. Taunyane - legal cases), McMullin to Taunyane 2 May 1980.

218. UNISA AAS 120, "In Die Streekhof...", document cited.


221. Surplus People Project (1983), op. cit., p.50.

222. R.D.M. 15 April 1965.


224. Idem.


235. CL MS 16 598/5, unsigned letter from Healdtown to the Director of Education, Ciskeian Territorial Authority, 15 March 1971. Specific grievances mentioned were compulsory wearing of long trousers and refusal of permission to ask questions in class; R.D.M., 19 March 1971.


239. Ibid., no citation.

240. Idem.

The period from 1972 saw a major shift in government policy toward black education. This was the outcome of conflicts caused by the underlying contradictions of the Bantu Education system, as described in the last chapter, especially of the divergences between state education policy and industries' labour needs, and of the internal organizational and financial problems of the Department of Bantu Education. This chapter will seek to explain how this policy shift took place.

The argument put forward in this chapter underpins a number of the central propositions of this thesis. Firstly, it supports the view that the relationship between Bantu Education and capitalism was contingent and changing, rather than a fixed one. While the implementation of rigid apartheid policy in the educational sphere did take place, in the 1960s, at the same time as a boom in the capitalist economy, it does not follow that the former process assisted the latter. In fact, as the last chapter suggested, and as this chapter will demonstrate, the state's education policies from the early 1960s to 1972 undermined the possibilities of economic development by failing to meet the needs of the most advanced sections of industry for skilled labour. The policy change of 1972 did
bring education policy somewhat more in line with capital's labour requirements. But nor did the shift of 1972 unproblematically bring the education system into line with the needs of the dominant classes. As we shall see in the next chapter, it also prepared the way for the revolt of 1976.

Secondly, the chapter emphasizes the point that the state educational system is a contested field of social relations, in which conflicting social forces are embodied. There was no absolute necessity that state education policy would change in the early 1970s in a way which would be beneficial to the leading sectors of capital. That the changes made were designed to be beneficial to these sectors, was the result of a political struggle waged by capital to assert its interests inside the state. Without this struggle the reorganization could certainly have taken other forms. The state only responded to capital's interests to the extent that capital was able to organize cultural, ideological and political interventions on behalf of its interests and to win forces inside the state to its perspectives. A powerful campaign by business interests and a changed composition of the National Party's social basis made a victory for capital possible; but the outcome was not guaranteed.

Thirdly, the chapter suggests the importance, in interpreting policy change, of investigating the
capabilities and organization of state structures. The lack of viability of the DBE's internal financial structure was a major impetus toward restructuring of education policy. This problem had a dynamic of its own, which cannot be reduced to a reflection of external social forces. If the state had been adequately able to finance the DBE's activities within the existing financial-administrative structure it is doubtful whether the pressure toward change would have been so acute.

More generally, the specific interests and nature of the bureaucracy are important in explaining the earlier insistence of the Bantu Education bureaucracy on pursuing policies which were at variance with capital's needs. Following the 1948 victory of the NP, the civil service had been reforged to pursue the interests of the Nationalist alliance of Afrikaner workers, petty-bourgeoisie and agriculturalists. It was therefore unresponsive to the needs of big business. The bureaucracy flourished through, and was trained on the basis of, pursuit of apartheid policy. Monopoly capital had virtually no access to the levers of power in the state. There is thus no reason to expect that bureaucrats would have been particularly amenable to capitalist interests.

Finally, the chapter reinforces the point that Bantu Education policy cannot be seen as simply reproducing
unskilled labour, and that state policy, in fact, was
directed toward reproducing different forms of labour at
different times. In the early 1970s, there was a major
attempt to reorientate the system toward the reproduction
of skilled labour.

This chapter contends that by the early 1970s the shortages
of educated employees facing industry and commerce had
become sufficiently acute for industrialists to begin
putting public pressure on the state to change its
restrictive policies toward urban secondary and technical
education. It will be shown that this process was
facilitated by the way in which, during the 1960s, liberal
groups had developed a critique of state education policy
as an obstacle to economic development, and an argument
that educational reform could help to contain political
conflict. These themes of liberal thought were deployed by
commerce and industry in their attack on state policy.
After some resistance the state did indeed change its
orientation.

It is argued that two factors were particularly important
in the state's eventual shift in policy. One was that the
rising influence of Afrikaner industrialists in the NP,
together with the somewhat declining weight of populist
forces fully committed to Verwoerdian apartheid, created a
greater degree of flexibility in the implementation of
apartheid policy. While the NP still aimed toward full
apartheid in the long term, the economic difficulties which these policies presented by the rigid application of job reservation, industrial decentralization and existing education policy began to be apparent; shortages of skilled labour and the slowing of industrial growth threatened. The NP, as a party in which big capitalist interests were now gaining a voice, was prepared to make short term, pragmatic policy adaptations in the interests of industry and commerce. Secondly, the internal organization of the DBE had reached a point of critical difficulty. The state's commitment to Verwoerd's 'R13 million plus 4/5 of black taxation' formula for spending on schools had hamstrung the DBE. The policies which it was pursuing before 1972 could not be funded on such a budget. The state was having to make loans to the DBE to prevent it going bankrupt: clearly a re-organization was needed. The result of these pressures was that from 1972, the state did allow the expansion of urban secondary and technical education, and it began to fund the DBE directly from revenue, thus raising the amount available for black education considerably. The state also began to encourage private sector initiative in education to a greater extent, and capital became fairly active in the funding of educational projects. The next chapter will, however, argue that far from helping to stabilize the educational arena, the rapid urban school expansion made the Bantu Education system increasingly unstable.
Political Struggles Around Education Policy (1968 - 71)

The poor articulation of Bantu Education with the needs of industry, and the schooling system's own internal difficulties, resulted in a policy conflict over the future of Bantu Education between important sections of capital and the state, and within the Nationalist political leadership, between 1968 and 1971. This conflict was resolved by way of an overhaul of education policy which brought education into a far closer alignment with the needs of urban industrial capital, by expanding urban secondary and technical education provision, and thus producing a far greater range of types of labour-power.

The course of the conflict can briefly be outlined as follows. During the boom of the 1960s industry showed little interest in criticizing government education policy: the economic conditions of the time were buoyant, and shortages of skilled and clerical labour could be borne. Educational matters were only addressed by two significant groupings within white politics. The first were liberals, - the Progressive Party, the SAIRR and others - who placed a great deal of emphasis on education for blacks as part of a long term political aim of gradual change and improvement in economic opportunity. The others were the United Party (UP) controlled white municipalities, notably Johannesburg. While the U.P. was generally moribund on the education issue, as it was on most others, the
municipalities which it controlled were up against the practical problem of directing the reproduction process of the working class within their areas, and found that the resources which the state allowed them for school provision were inadequate to this role. They therefore fought a long battle with government for greater resources in African education. When the boom of the 1960s came to an end in 1968, industry rapidly came to feel the consequences of the prevailing educational order. The recession allowed further concentration of capital to take place. Now, with monopoly conditions totally dominant in industry, the need for the technical and clerical staff required became more acute, and given the change in the economic climate, efficiency became of more pressing concern for capital. By 1971, organized business began to take up the educational themes which had been advanced by ideologists and politicians associated with the liberal and municipal educational lobbies. Industry and commerce began to make a major pitch for new policies which would develop urban black education, particularly at the secondary and technical levels. This shift in stance coincided with certain developments inside the Nationalist Party. As Afrikaner capitalist interests had become stronger during the 1960s, the wing of the NP sympathetic to a pragmatic adaptation of policy to industrialists' needs became stronger, and there was opposition from this wing to some of the government's more spectacular attempts to undermine the existence of the urban working class. This development
gave rise to the verligte-verkrampte division in Nationalist ranks, with, broadly, business interests, the urban middle class and Cape agriculture on one side and conservative intellectuals, the lower middle and working classes, and northern agriculture on the other. The Vorster leadership largely succeeded in straddling these diverse interests. However by about 1972, its policy tilted somewhat in favour of the verligtes. Although its political ideology remained based on the concepts of classical apartheid, there was a limited shift to greater accommodation of the long-term reality of an urban working class, and the need to accept this reality in policy development. In education this resulted in a considerable expansion of funding, especially for urban education, and better technical and secondary provision in the urban areas. Close cooperation on these issues developed between capital and the state. The education system remained that of classical Bantu Education, but there was, within that framework, a greater degree of articulation with the reproductive process of a capitalist society.

Liberal Pressure and Education

During the period from the mid 1960s to 1971 most public pressure for change in state education policy came from liberals - the Progressive Party, the SAIRR, journalists on the Rand Daily Mail, The Star and others newspapers. Education could be seen as a gradualist strategy for
change, in a situation where liberals felt trapped between submission to a Juggernaut state on the one hand, and the equally unpalatable option of a revolutionary attack on it on the other. The mid and late 1960s saw rising levels of liberal activism on educational issues. The English press played a prominent role in criticizing government education policy with The Star and the Rand Daily Mail taking the government to task for the low level of spending on black education, and the lack of secondary education and skill training. There was also some vocal criticism from such bodies as the Witwatersrand Council of Education, and a constant flow of critical statements and analysis from the SAIRR. One of the most important initiatives was the 1961 Education Panel, a body dominated by the English universities and by Anglophone educationists, with a few representatives of major capitalist concerns. The second report of the Panel, published in 1966, focused on the economic implications of the government's educational policies. The report's message was that unless there was a liberalization of racial restrictions on job opportunities, and increased access to skill training for blacks, the shortage of skilled labour would increase to a point where economic growth would be threatened. In order to provide the necessary educational structure for manpower needs, the panel called for big increases in expenditure on black education and teacher training. They also advocated an end to school fees. The Panel's liberalism, however, had
its limits. It believed that "teachers should be of the same cultural group as their pupils", with the exception that it was considered advisable to use 'Coloured' teachers in African schools, in order to raise the standard of English and Afrikaans. The Panel advocated that the country maintain a two-tier education system: one level based on the "best modern standards" and another aimed at "educating the balance of the population as best it can". This was viewed as inevitable in a developing country; however, the panel argued the division should no longer be on strictly racial lines: there should be an 'advanced section' of black education, which was equal in quality to white education.

Particularly in the years around 1969-1971, there was a great deal of liberal activism at a local level on education. For instance, in the Eastern Cape, the SAIRR and the 'African Books Committee' engaged in energetic fund raising to buy books for black school students. A group of white school students in 1970 organized a public meeting of 800 people in Rondebosch Town Hall, to call for the issue of free books to African pupils and greater spending on education, and established an 'African Scholars Education Fund'. A body known as National Youth Action circulated a petition for the issue of free books to African pupils amongst young whites and succeeded in obtaining 5,000 signatures in Natal alone. However most
sections of business, and their United Party political representatives, showed little interest in campaigning on these issues. Benjamin Pogrund, a Rand Daily Mail journalist in this era, has written of it that:

...the business community was in general monumentally unconcerned with the debased nature and standard of 'Bantu Education': as an illustration, trying to get money out of business people to contribute to the Rand Bursary Fund (which was backed by the Rand Daily Mail) to provide small scholarships to keep youngsters at school was a grinding, humiliating and largely unsuccessful battle." 17

John Jordi, the editor of The Star, commented in 1971 on the initial "disappointing" response of business to his paper's attempt to raise money for black education that:

There are none so blind as those who cannot recognise their own self-interest. 18

The UP displayed little enthusiasm for taking up the issue of black schooling. When it did, its proposals were less than sweeping: in 1970 Catherine Taylor MP advocated compulsory education up to Standard 2; 19 while another MP, Walter Kingwill, argued for the training of blacks as motor mechanics on the grounds that whites could be moved up to foreman positions. 20 The Progressive Party was considerably more vigorous on education issues, 21 but with only one M.P. and a narrow support base at this time, they were able to have little impact.
The Johannesburg Levy Conflict

The most important conflict over education policy in the period of the late 1960s and very early 1970s took place between the Johannesburg municipality and the state over the development of schooling in Soweto. While the state sought to restrict educational growth in the city, the City Council opposed this policy. There were, I would suggest, two basic reasons for this conflict. Firstly, the City Council as an entity dominated by the United Party, reflected interests that were more in line with those of manufacturing capital and its need for a stable, growing and skilled urban workforce than were those represented by the Nationalists. Secondly, given that at this time the municipality was, as a bureaucratic entity, responsible for the administration of Soweto, (this being before the introduction of administration boards), it had an interest in maintaining a level of social services which could maintain the process of reproduction of the working class, and thus prevent the rupturing of the fabric of working class life, with the attendant dangers of crime and potential riot.

It may seem strange that the City Council received little direct backing from business interests in this conflict, given that both of the objectives just described were in the interests of Johannesburg based manufacturers. But the explanation is to be found in the nature of the chief issue
at stake. The City Council wanted to raise funds for school expansion through a large increase in the levy imposed for this purpose on township residents, an increase which the government refused to allow. Now for business, such a levy was a double-edged sword. On the one hand it would provide industrialists with labour of a higher calibre. But on the other hand it would raise the level of the minimum wage necessary for social reproduction of the working class, and hence raise the wage bill. Thus the lack of enthusiasm from industry for the City Councils stand.

In the search to find funds for the financing of educational expansion in Soweto, the Advisory Board (from 1968 the Urban Bantu Council - (UBC)) which was the state-established representative body for urban blacks, and the Johannesburg municipality, came to an agreement. It was decided that the education levy imposed on township residents should be raised by 20c, from 18c to 38c. At a series of meetings between the two bodies in 1967 and 1968, the proposal was discussed and agreed on. The proposal was by no means popular with all Soweto residents, and a Mr. S.W. Pikoli of the "Joint Soweto Residents Committee" led a campaign of denunciation against it. However, I have found no evidence of mass opposition to the levy.

Before 1969, only the older areas of Soweto had paid the levy. The government now decided to allow municipalities
to impose a 20c levy through the UBCs for education, which meant that the new sum would be paid by all Soweto residents. But the City Council believed that the current shortage of schools — which they put at ten secondary, 24 higher primary and up to 63 lower primary schools — could not be met from the levy, but required an increase to the 38c sum. However, a request to the Minister for this increase was refused. At the end of 1970, a major row broke out between the City Council and the UBC, when the City Council announced that because it was R55,000 in debt on the maintenance of the Soweto schools, the money from the levy would have to be used for that purpose. With understandable exasperation, a UBC member asked:

How are we going to tell the people who elected us that the money they are paying for extra classrooms is being used for something else.

However, members of the UBC who went with a School Boards delegation to Secretary Van Zyl of the Department of Bantu Education must have found him even more unsympathetic: he merely argued that those who couldn’t find places in Soweto schools must seek them in the homelands. In December 1970, Johannesburg City Council met with Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Piet Koornhof, who essentially repeated Van Zyl’s argument in slightly more diplomatic terms. Koornhof argued that the government could only countenance the 38c levy if the extra 18c raised
were spent on homeland education. The situation was worsened by new government restrictions on the building of higher primary schools by local authorities. As a partial sop to the municipality, early in 1971 this was relaxed slightly, with local authorities that had surplus funds from lower primary construction being allowed to use them for higher primaries. By early 1971, a City Council survey estimated the school shortage at 450 classrooms. Further approaches were made to the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development on the levy issue, but as the year dragged on, despite some hopefulness on the part of the municipality as to a change of policy, a positive reply was not received.

Capital Moves on Education Policy: 1971

It was only during 1971 that big business and its allies moved decisively to a more activist stance on education. This was a result of the coming together of several different factors. The recession of 1968-1969 had forced business into a reappraisal of future strategy, and it had become clear that the issue of the lack of black employees with suitable education and training had now come to the crunch. The concentration of capital in the monopoly sector, with its growing demand for administrative and technical staff, was stronger than ever. At the same time, liberal agitation on the issue of education had popularized the question of schooling, and made ideas and criticisms on
educational policy available to business. Furthermore, the more politically perceptive sections of business were becoming aware of the strains on the fabric of working class life which current state policy imposed; they began to sympathize with the liberal view of education as a panacea for social and political ills.

It is important, though, that one should not take the rhetoric of 'skill shortage' which capital advanced at face value. The shortage of skilled and clerical workers was real enough. In 1963 it had been estimated that employers needed 49,000 white apprentices at a time when there were only 23,000. And demand for black clerical labour was exploding - for example in the construction industry black clerical labour increased about ten-fold between 1964 and 1976. But as Webster has shown, the basic thrust of social transformation in South African industry in the 1960s and 1970s was toward a semi-skilled proletariat. Industry saw the skill shortage as both crisis and opportunity: it wanted not so much to replace white artisans with black artisans as to replace expensive skilled white workers as far as possible with cheaper, semi-skilled forms of black labour. The 1966 report of the Education Panel had identified employer's concerns when it complained that apprentice-trained artisans comprised a 'conservative and unadaptable' work force. It also expressed the fear that the lack of training of many of the blacks who de facto carried out artisan work would also
render them less adaptable. The model that the report put forward was a work force with a 'formal and theoretical' training, but who did not have the rigidity of those coming from an artisan tradition. The opening of more skilled work to blacks was seen as offering the possibility of saving on the wage bill. Percy Thomas, the secretary of the Natal Chamber of Industries, argued in 1971 that artisan wages were inflated, and that newly introduced black skilled workers could not expect to receive the wages of their white counterparts.

During 1971 there was a rapid shift in the position of business toward a more engaged attitude on the question of education training. Public criticism of current education policy was voiced by Dr. Frans Cronje of Netherlands Bank. B.R. Cooke, the President of the Natal Chamber of Commerce, asserted that better education and vocational and technical training for blacks would have economic benefits for capital, by creating a higher standard of living which would enlarge the domestic market, and thus bring down unit costs to an extent, which would improve South Africa's position in external markets. The Free State Chambers of Commerce conference called for a free supply of books to students at African schools. At the annual conference of Chambers of Commerce, the Johannesburg Chamber proposed a motion calling for action to improve educational facilities for Africans, and urging vocational training centres to be
established in or near the main economic centres.47

Another new phenomenon was that of substantial business donations toward educational causes, which emerged as a trend in 1971. Polaroid (partly because of anti-apartheid activism in its US plants) donated funds to the black education group, ASSECA.48 Reckitt and Coleman declared that it would invest R100,000 in bursaries and school extra-curricular activities.49 Anglo-American donated R160,000 to Johannesburg City Council for a junior secondary school in Soweto,50 and Barlow Rand set up the C.S. Barlow Foundation, with a first project of spending R700,000 on establishing a trade school in Lebowa.51 (Such donations were possible because they were made to the City Council or individuals, thus circumventing the DBE's prohibition on gifts to schools).

At the same time, the wing of the UP most closely linked to monopoly capital, the so-called 'Young Turks' group of Harry Schwarz, leader of the UP on the Transvaal Provincial Council, began to address the issue more vigorously, calling for equal educational facilities for all ethnic groups.52 Schwarz urged large firms to offer low interest loans for school buildings and demanded greater government spending, a crash programme of school building, and an intensive teacher training programme.53 Schwarz also convened a committee of chairmen and managing directors of
leading companies to raise money for the building of schools in Soweto.54

Another initiative which gave great impetus to business involvement in education was the launching by The Star of its TEACH fund, with which Schwarz also appears to have been linked.55 The fund aimed to raise money to supplement the Johannesburg City Council’s school building efforts,56 and can partly be seen as a response to the crisis arising from the debacle over the levy increase. The campaign nicely combined altruism with more down-to-earth aims. The Star said that the campaign’s motives were:

Simple justice to a section of Johannesburg people whose educational institutions were starved of funds, 57

and

...the enlightened self-interest of employers whose firms will gain immensely in efficiency if their African staff are trained to be literate and responsible. 58

Dr. R. Jordan, the President of the Chamber of Commerce, amplified the latter point in calling for support to TEACH, saying that "Basic primary and secondary education is a pre-requisite for more advanced technical and vocational training."59 Initial business response to the fund, was sluggish, but after Len Miller, Chairman of the OK Bazaars, donated R1,500 for a classroom in January 1972, and called on his colleagues to do likewise, there was a rapid increase in the level of donations.60
Policy Shift in the National Party 1969 - 1972

The pressure exerted on the government by the business community during 1971 for an education policy more related to the needs of urban industry was just one component of an array of forces pushing the Vorster administration toward an overall labour policy which accepted to a greater extent the continued existence of the urban black working class, and the need for minimal provision for its reproductive needs. An important force in bringing about such a shift was the increased strength of Afrikaner urban capitalist interests within the NP. These interests, although tied into the NP by state economic patronage and political tradition, were nevertheless increasingly experiencing the same difficulties consequent on the governments labour policies, as their Anglophone counterparts. As early as 1968, leading Afrikaner industrialists such as A.J. Wessels of Veka and Dr. P. Rousseau of Sasol were publicly calling for more technical training for blacks. Simultaneously, the break-away of Dr. Albert Hertzog’s WP from the NP in 1969, removed an important faction of the party which believed that Vorster’s policies involved educating Africans ‘too fast’ and spending too much money on black education. This enabled Vorster to move in the direction of slightly more pragmatic policies, as ‘verligtes’ became ascendant in the NP and the Broederbond. During 1970 there were strong signs of tensions over urban labour policy within the NP. In his 1970 get speech Dr. N. Diedrichs
expressed himself in favour of more non-white labour being available for industries in 'white' areas. More conservative Ministers vociferously denied that Diedrichs had been referring to African (as opposed to 'Indian' or 'Coloured') labour: but to contemporary observers the real import of the speech was clear. There was a shift in the rhetoric of some top Nationalists on labour issues toward the 'skill shortage' concept. In 1970, T.J. Gardner, Administrator of Natal, stated in a public speech that black education and training could "help to ease the manpower shortage." There were signs that the government's confidence in carrying through a dogmatic Verwoerden vision of apartheid was eroding. In 1969 a bill to prevent any further acquisition of Section 10 black urban residence rights was dropped. In 1970, measures introduced to impose draconian forms of job reservation in commercial and clerical work were first undermined by the conceding of extensive exemptions, and then never followed through. In 1971, the government backed down on the Physical Planning Act's restrictions on the employment of black labour in urban industry (which had arguably brought about the 1968 recession, while achieving little in the way of decentralization). Now the establishment of new industries in all areas except the Southern Transvaal was deregulated, and even there industries which were 'locality bound' or 'white labour intensive' were exempted from labour controls. Thus the basis was laid by late 1971
for important changes in state labour and education policies.

A New State Policy Toward the Education of the Urban Working Class 1972 - 76

Around the beginning of 1972, a change took place in government policy toward black education. The change was, I would argue, part of a wider policy turn. This represented a renewed attempt to accommodate the requirements of capital for skilled and permanent urban labour. There was no break with the overall ideological rationale of Grand Apartheid. But there was a willingness on the part of government to accept, within that framework, the continued existence of the black urban working class, and the need to do more to meet the reproductive needs of that class. In education this meant a greater commitment to government spending, a rationalization of the school system, and a new acceptance of urban secondary and technical education.

The decisive shift came early in 1972, when the government finally accepted that spending on urban black schools would be financed from state consolidated revenue funds and no longer linked to black taxation. An important factor in this decision appears to have been the obvious impracticality of continuing with the existing funding formula for black education. The government had in the
immediately preceding years already bent the Verwoerdian rules for spending on black education considerably. From the late 1960s, Bantu Education had been subsidized from the loan account, and in 1970, in order to prevent Bantu Education from becoming hopelessly in debt to the loan account, the government made a R17 million contribution to it from the revenue account. With the 1972 decision to remove statutory controls on educational spending, the total budget of Bantu Education rose sharply, from R55 million in 1970-1971 to R72.1 million in 1972-1973, and R97.45 million in 1973-1974. The per capita expenditure ratio between white and black students began to narrow slightly, from 18 to 1 in 1971-1972 to about 15 to 1 in 1975-1976.

The change in spending policy provided the financial basis for a considerable expansion of secondary and technical education for the urban African working class. Dr Van Zyl, not a man to be left out on a limb, articulated the new policy as enthusiastically as he had the old. In a 1972 statement he stressed the need for a "diversified system of secondary education (academic, general, technical and commercial)" to meet the need for "trained middle and top manpower" in the white areas as well as the Bantustans. A major initiative toward providing urban training facilities for black workers was taken; by 1974 the government was involved in a scheme to establish 16 training centres in the major urban areas (half of them run
by the state and half by industry), and favourable consideration was being given to the setting up of trade schools in the urban areas.

There was a definite change in the educational ideology prevalent in government circles: to a considerable extent the need to provide for the skill training of the black urban working class was openly espoused, and the private sector's role in promoting it was welcomed. Leading Nationalist ideologues and technocrats like Dr. S.P. Du Toit Viljoen of the Bantu Investment Corporation used the rhetoric of skill shortage to support the development of the skill centre programme. As the state dropped its previous hostility to private sector educational intervention, TEACH was publicly praised by Deputy Minister Punt Janson, Dawie De Villiers M.P., and even by Dr van Zyl himself.

In the Johannesburg-Soweto area, the policy change had a dramatic impact. At last the 38c levy was granted, coming into effect in August 1972. In March 1972, the government gave Johannesburg City Council the go-ahead for a programme to build 500 classrooms at a cost of about R1 million. By April, the City Council had received the first R250,000 of this, as a government loan to be paid off at six per cent a year. During the subsequent year, the pace of school building increased so rapidly that the
housing section of the city's Non-European Affairs Department had to double the number of its employees. By mid 1974 there were 40 new schools in Soweto, although half of these had been financed by TEACH, which suggests that in the end Johannesburg municipality had had to rely much more heavily on the private sector than originally envisaged. The new policies on urban training were reflected in the opening of two new industrial training centres in Soweto in 1975. And in 1974 urban teacher training was reintroduced in Johannesburg when 70 student teachers enrolled at Jabulani technical college.

The Growth of Private Sector Educational Intervention

The changes in state educational policy unleashed a virtual stampede of industrial participation in educational projects. I would explain this largely in terms of the fact that a state policy geared to the reproduction of more appropriate forms of skilled urban labour-power provided appropriate channels for private sector funds which had not been there before. It made more sense to industry to put money into education now that the state was prepared to re-organize the system to produce the clerical and technical workers that were needed by enterprises. The period 1972-1973 saw increasingly substantial employer involvement in attempts to upgrade the education system. General Motors began to provide free school books for children of employees. In 1972 South African Breweries announced
that it would donate R$100,000$ to black education over a three year period,$^{90}$ while the sugar industry put R$25,000$ into its bursary fund.$^{91}$ Associated British Foods and Twins Pharmaceutical Holdings donated R$25,000$ and R$24,000$ respectively to TEACH in 1973.$^{92}$ In the same year, Mobil Oil gave the KwaZulu authorities R$50,000$ for technical training,$^{93}$ and the Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery sank R$25,000$ into the establishment of an educational fund.$^{94}$ Donations by industry targeted to educational development in particular localities became a feature of the new pattern. An electrical company provided R$25,000$ for a school in Daveyton,$^{95}$ while the Elandsfontein Industrialists Association donated R$50,000$ to education in Tembisa.$^{96}$

The industrial unrest of 1973 raised the intensity of employer concern about the inadequacy of the education system. Concern increasingly centred on two issues: the political implications of a failing urban educational system, and the need for technical and clerical workers. Spokesmen for commerce and industry presented lack of educational opportunity as a grievance which had given rise to the strike wave and possibly to political discontent: they argued that moves to improve the education system would quiet the situation. In this way, the liberal conception of educational change as an alternative to political change began to infuse business thinking: for capital, education was an alternative to worker power and
independent trade unionism. Not unnaturally Durban, the centre of the strike wave, produced some of the most vigorous activism from business leaders along these lines. The statements of the Durban Chamber of Commerce reflected the feelings of a business community which had been deeply shaken. In May 1973, Walter Lulofs, the outgoing President of the Chamber, told its annual conference that a 'radical rethink' of the country's educational policy was necessary, and asserted that neglect of African education was a cause of worker discontent. Unless action was taken, Lulofs argued, a 'national emergency' would result.

Rev. A. Hedgeson, of the Bureau of Literacy and Literature, noted in 1974 that the labour unrest had created pressure on employers to address the problems of 'improving relationships' and the training of blacks.

Concern with the technical and clerical training issue was reflected in far more concrete thinking by spokesmen for industry on what problems they faced in this regard, and more urgent action to confront the problem. Lulofs pointed out that inadequate basic education would undermine the success of technical training schemes. This was a theme enthusiastically taken up by The Star which solicited donations from industry and commerce to its TEACH scheme, on the basis that it was in the interest of employers to ensure that "in 10 years they will be able to call on a
more educated - and therefore a more 'trainable' workforce." One of the clearest projects to link school education with technical training was that of Consolidated Gold Fields, which gave R186,000 to TEACH for junior secondary schools which were planned to be sited next to the industrial training centres, so that pupils could be taken to the centres for technical courses. In the field of clerical labour there was growing concern as well about the need for facilities to translate the general skills learnt at school into specific office skills. At a sub-committee meeting of the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce in February 1975, for example, a discussion was held on a plan to establish a commercial college in Soweto. Members were concerned about the need to train black "cashiers, clerks, secretaries etc.", "the young person with a Junior Certificate interested in clerical work" and "bank clerks in Soweto".  

To a considerable extent industry and commerce's inability to assert its interests within the state during the 60s had left it with a backlog of difficulties in the field of labour reproduction, which it was not easy to solve, even in the context of a more receptive policy on the part of government. While the NP leadership now shared industry's skill shortage fears, and was endeavouring to provide a more extensive basis for the reproduction of the urban working class, it certainly didn't see the issue of urban educations explosive possibilities in the way that Lulofs
Initially, aspects of the new policies were well received by black urban communities. In particular, state acceptance of secondary school expansion in the townships meant that the pressure on urban parents to send their older children to school in the rural areas fell away:

The community felt this was a good idea in the sense that they did not necessarily now have to send... their children... to boarding schools outside, and pay a lot of money. The children could live at home, and go to school daily. 103

The expansion of urban specialized facilities, especially technical training and teacher training, evoked some positive responses as well. Teachers claim that:

Particularly technical training was accepted open-handedly by the black because it was something they had not had before. The expansion of education in general was welcomed by most blacks as a step in the right direction. 104

These allowed many students to go to school and training college, because the schools were there, the facilities were there. 105

Yet as the next chapter will show, the restructuring did little to defuse, and much to increase, the tensions in the educational system. For one thing, an enormous amount of distrust of state education policy had been built up by urban peoples' experiences of the previous decade. According to one teacher there:
were still suspicions... that now the coming of these [changes], they did not really mean a clear benefit. 106

For another, the re-organization of schooling which was taking place would put great pressure on the school system, building up new social tensions.

**Conclusion**

Thus during the early 1970s, capitalist interests, using the ideological arguments developed by liberal activists during the late 1960s, launched a critique of state education policy. This focused on its role in stifling the generation of urban secondary and technical training. Because this campaign took place at a point at which the NP's receptivity to accommodating the interests of industry and commerce had increased, and at which the DBE's internal organization was in a structural crisis, the state was willing to go some way to meet the criticisms that were being made. Yet the changes laid the basis not for an era of prosperity and stability, but, as we shall see, for the conflict of 1976.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER NINE


6. See *Race Relations News*, and, for example, M. Horell *A Decade of Bantu Education*, (Johannesburg, SAIRR, 1964).


8. Ibid., pp.28-33.

9. Ibid., p.43.

10. Ibid., pp.48-49.

11. Ibid., p.76.

12. Ibid., p.124.

13. Ibid., pp.124-35.


32. Idem.


36. Idem.


42. 1961 Education Panel (1966), op.cit., p.08.
44. Star, 18 May 1971.
47. R.D.M., 19 October 1971.
53. Idem.
55. Idem.
56. Idem.
57. Idem.
58. Idem.
64. Idem.
67. Ibid., pp.298-99.


75. R.D.M., 6 February 1974.


77. Transvaal, 14 August 1975.


86. Idem.


103. Interview no.10, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986.
104. Interview no.17, Soweto, 1986.
105. Interview no.8, Soweto, 1986.
106. Interview no.18, Soweto, 1986.
This chapter sets out to explain the origins of the school student uprising of 1976. In doing so it raises the central theoretical problem of the first chapter - how to describe education systems in a way which both recognizes their role in perpetuating existing social structures, and the way in which active challenges to those structures are generated. Part of the answer which has been given in this thesis is that the education system is a contested state structure in which dominant groups attempt to impose their aims but which can inadvertently summon up opposing reactions from subordinate groups. Thus it will be argued that the changes in education policy described in the previous chapter created conditions in which school students' sense of common identity and grievance were sharpened. Another part of the answer which has been offered is that the internal structure of the state educational bureaucracy is itself the scene of conflicts which must be given due weight. It will therefore be argued that the pursuit of particular objectives by a section of the bureaucracy was important in precipitating the revolt. A further part of the answer which has been given is that there is a struggle for hegemony in the arena of education, and that popular culture plays an important role in moulding responses to educational structures. It will be contended that the period leading to the 1976
revolt saw significant changes in urban black youth sub-culture, which helped produce a new political culture amongst young people. This provided the basis for a potentially transformative challenge to Santu Education.

The chapter will contend that in the period from 1972, by rapidly expanding the urban secondary school population, but doing so within a still poorly resourced educational system, the state inadvertently brought about the growth of a highly politically combustible social force. This tendency was intensified by a badly managed re-organization of the year structure of the schools from the beginning of 1976. These changes created intensified discontent amongst urban pupils and teachers.

This structurally overstretched school system at the same time began to encounter a rising ideological challenge from the youth. Changing patterns of urban popular culture made the youth receptive to new ideological messages. One important political influence was Black Consciousness (BC), which emerged out of black University campuses in the late 1960s. It spread into the schools through young teachers, providing school students with new political ideas. Students were receptive to these influences for a number of reasons: discontent over school overcrowding, the changing political situation which was making the state look more threatened than it had in the 1960s, and growing economic uncertainty as the boom of the 1960s tailed off. The
The events which triggered the uprising of 1976 were another effect of the restructuring in education. Conservatives within the DBE reacted against the pragmatic policies of the 1970s. The attempt to enforce the teaching of Afrikaans was a reaction against what this wing of the Afrikaner bureaucracy saw as a dilution of apartheid policy. The refusal of the DBE to take any notice of the opposition which the language policy aroused from its own creatures, the school boards, prevented any negotiated solution of the issue. In 1976, the determination of a reactionary inspectorate to enforce this policy collided with the radical aspirations of a new generation of school students.

Origins of the 1976 Revolt: The Impact of Educational Restructuring

The most important result of the education policy turn of 1972 was that of rapid expansion of the number of students in secondary school, especially in the urban areas. Previous policies had led to almost total neglect of this sector; by 1965 there were a mere 67,000 African secondary school pupils. Largely Bantustan-based growth had permitted this figure to rise to 122,000 by 1970. But the new policy allowed the secondary enrollment to soar to
Thus the sector of the school going population most likely to become politicized was drastically increased. By squeezing larger numbers of older pupils into an under-resourced school system, the state was itself generating an environment in which rebellion might grow.

Moreover, the higher level of state expenditure also permitted the continued expansion of primary education. In the second decade of Bantu Education, the rate of growth of the combined primary and secondary pupil populations was almost as rapid as the astonishing doubling of the student population in its first decade. Total pupil numbers grew from two million in 1965 to 3,700,000 in 1975. This astounding growth involved an increase in the weight of students as a social force. In 1955 only 10% of the African population had been school students: by 1975 21% of all African people were school students. Thus the sector of black urban society constituted by school students was proportionally far greater than in the 1950s, and very substantial in absolute terms. The possibility of school-goers emerging as a distinct social force was created by the numerical expansion of schooling. The expansionary policy introduced in 1972 created growing discontent amongst students. The injection of larger numbers of students into an educational system of limited resources led to declining educational standards, as well as
demoralization and disaffection on the part of teachers:

...from the beginning of the 70s... when our classrooms in the secondary schools were becoming overcrowded... I noticed that there had been a remarkable change now, in the methods of teaching applied by the teachers in the schools... no longer do you find teachers marking the individual students books or scripts. Students are told to exchange books and mark their own books... if you are not satisfied with that type of thing, and you still feel that you want to pile yourself with books to mark... you become very unpopular in the schools. 6

...it was now obvious classes were too big... The teacher himself was now sick of the set up. 7

The strains of overcrowding and lack of resources also encouraged the use by teachers of harsh methods of corporal punishment; the resulting student resentment leading to what one student described as a 'deadlock' between pupils and staff. 8

Part of the re-organization of Bantu Education after 1972 was a fateful decision to change the year-structure of black schooling. The structure had traditionally comprised an eight year primary course and a five year secondary school course. The 1972 decision was that there was now to be a six year primary course and a six year secondary course. 9 Implementation was planned for the beginning 1976 - when both those who had passed Standard V in 1975 and those who had passed Standard VI in 1975, would go into secondary school. The consequence was to be a 'bulge' - the 1976 first year secondary class would be at least twice the size of the class the previous year. 10 Applied on a
small scale, and on an experimental basis, the new structure had been tried out in Soweto schools and found by headmasters to have been an educational success.\textsuperscript{11} But the implementation of the policy on a mass scale would be a different story. The expansion of school building in Soweto from 1972 had taken some pressure off the schooling system: this had also allowed the top secondary schools to specialize in teaching only the upper levels of students (Forms IV and V).\textsuperscript{12} But this was before the doubling of the first year intake, and already in 1975, massive pressure on places in the high school system was being reported in Pretoria,\textsuperscript{13} in the Eastern Cape,\textsuperscript{14} Ciskei and Transkei.\textsuperscript{15} When this ill-planned measure was implemented at the beginning of 1976, the result was chaotic overcrowding and overstrained facilities. A teacher recalls that:

\begin{itemize}
  \item It brought about absolute confusion... although [the government] planned it, but they had not prepared for it... they didn’t have ready grants for teachers to be able to cope with those numbers... they did not have accommodation... 16
\end{itemize}

Teachers found the change a strain because the younger classes of children promoted from primary school were not equipped to cope with secondary school work:

\begin{itemize}
  \item It had a bad effect because the kids were not ready to go to secondary school. 17
  \item It reduces the quality of students because the primary had been thrown into the high school. 18
\end{itemize}
In the judgement of a number of teachers this intensification of already chronic overcrowding in the high schools played a direct role in bringing student discontent to the boil in the first half of 1976:

These students came into secondary school and found crowded classrooms, big groups, and they started to compare conditions... with conditions elsewhere, with different race groups... 19

It was one of the immediate causes of the revolt... by making conditions worse... 20

...it was overcrowded and they rejected that...

The attempt by the state to resolve the economic difficulties which its policies of the 1960s created for capital had the unforeseen consequence of placing unbearable strains on an impoverished and debilitated educational service. This in turn produced further disaffection amongst teachers and kindled a greater level of resentment amongst school students. Paradoxically, it was the youth's common experience of a poor quality mass schooling system that created a common sense of identity and grievance amongst young black people. As one teacher memorably put it: "Bantu Education made us black." 22 Yet it is unlikely that this student resentment would have been sufficient, in itself, to generate the basis for the 1976 revolt, if it had not interacted with the development of a new political culture amongst urban youth.
Origins of the 1976 Revolt: The New Political Culture of Urban Youth

The expansion of secondary education brought a new generation into the schools: not just a chronological generation, but what Bundy, drawing on Mannheim, calls a sociological generation: a group with its own generational consciousness. As Lunn has shown, the period saw the growth of a distinctively urban youth culture, as the sub-cultures of youths, who were relatively educated, totally urbanized, and sympathetic to statements of black political identity, began to differentiate out from the previously dominant, rather lumpen, sub-culture of the ‘mapantsula’. From the early 70s, historical process was rapidly reshaping the consciousness of this generation.

The changing internal and external situation of the regime had the effects of creating the conditions for a new outlook. The 1973 strike wave presented the state with the first oppositional mass mobilizations for over a decade. The discontent of labour made an impact on students. A teacher comments that students:

...listened to their parents talking and listened to how their parents are treated by their employers, and became aware that their parents are underpaid and therefore are unable to afford the bare necessities that the children require, so I think that’s one of the most important things that influence the children politically.
The period was also that of the fall of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique; the failed South African military intervention in Angola; and the rise of guerrilla warfare in Zimbabwe and Namibia. These events placed the South African state, which had seemed so invulnerable in the 1960s, under pressure and created a sense that it was isolated and could be challenged. The political thinking of urban school students about their own ability to effect the course of events began to change, as these new models of political self-assertion influenced them. When Maree carried out research in a Soweto High School in April 1975,26 she found students formulating their vision of the future not only as one without apartheid and homelands but also in ways which emphasized a new belief amongst sections of students in their own ability to challenge the existing social order. One student in her study wrote that:

Riots are now going to occur. We are going to event things for ourselves (sic). 27

The rapid expansion of the job market which had taken place in the 1960s slowed very considerably in the 1970s.28 Bundy29 argues that rapid educational expansion is likely to generate political unrest if, as was the case in the 1970s, employment opportunities do not increase at a similar rate. Yet while the overall number of jobs was growing slowly, many more blacks were being taken on in clerical, technical, skilled and supervisory jobs.30 So
the prizes for succeeding in the educational lottery were becoming more attractive, just as the penalties for failure were becoming harsher. This created a volatile compound of ambition, frustration and economic fear amongst students. Particularly intense was the anguish of those students who managed to enter secondary school, and thus developed high employment aspirations, but were not able to pursue their education sufficiently far to secure the jobs they desired. These students found themselves, as a teacher puts it, "too educated to sweep floors, but too uneducated to join management."  

The common experiences of youth provided the basis a new outlook. These included, centrally, the experience of a segregated and inferior school system, which was increasingly resented. Urban young people were creating new cultural responses to, and understandings of, their situation. The changing political circumstances inside and outside the country were favourable to a new hopefulness about the possibility of resistance. Economic developments created new aspirations and new fears. These experiences created a generational consciousness; but this consciousness was transformed into a political culture largely by the influence of a new ideology. The political calm of the 1960s ended with the emergence in 1969 of the university-based South African Students Organization (SASO), the spearhead of a new political current - Black Consciousness (BC). BC stressed the need for blacks to
reject liberal white tutelage, the assertion of a black cultural identity, psychological liberation from notions of inferiority, and the unity of all blacks including "Coloureds" and "Indians". BC was weak in the organizational sphere. From 1972, its school student arm, South African Students' Movement (SASM) was active in the schools, but it never developed really strong structures. However, the ideological content of BC had a pervasive influence on urban youth, feeding into the frustration and deprivation they experienced. Kane-Berman's contention that the creation of a new politics in urban schools was in large part the outcome of the influence of BC-orientated teachers seems correct. BC views were prevalent at the time amongst younger teachers, especially those who had passed through the separate black universities established during the 1960s, and these teachers passed on their political ideas to their pupils. A teacher who graduated from the University of Zululand in the early 1970s and taught on the Rand in the period from 1972 recalls how he and teachers of his generation tried to raise the political consciousness (in BC jargon, "conscientise") their pupils:

A student that got through varsity during the SASO era was so conscientised that you just get into class and really be prepared to conscientise. When the very same students reached Standards 9 or 10, they were already conscientised...
was in the profession in the early 1970s recalls, "the staff were divided into young and old — they called us SASO." But older teachers agreed in interviews that the newer generation of teachers had a powerful impact on their students:

"Children came to understand through these young men, that the battle for political rights had started long ago. Young teachers started to talk freely about the black leaders... it was the young teachers, and I must say, particularly from Fort Hare that brought about the revival of the political history of our people."

"...at that time the black consciousness movement was already active, and the teachers were from the universities, and in a way they did influence the children by making them aware of... the fact they were being given an inferior type of education, so certainly they played an important role in making the children conscious."

BC activists also influenced school students through publications; members of the BC organizations, for example, wrote the texts of the magazines disseminated by SASM.

The ideological sway of the new political trend over school students was intensified by the way in which it succeeded in displacing the influence of more conservative elites in urban educational politics. Increasingly, the influence of conservative black political groups such as ASSECA and TUATA was reduced. On the other hand, a greater political assertiveness on the part of sections of the township elites was reflected in a more critical stance toward the DBE on the part of some of the school boards. In early
1971, ASSECA met with representatives of SASO and five other bodies to discuss the setting up of a BC organization. The leaders of the BC current were at this time still groping towards a definition of their role. Their emphasis tended to be on the need for blacks to transform their attitudes towards themselves, and on community action, rather than on overtly political activity. It was this lack of political emphasis and stress on 'practical' projects that enabled ASSECA to cooperate with them. At a follow up conference in August 1971, a committee was established under Moerane's chairmanship to draw up a constitution for the projected organization. But at a third conference in December, it became clear that the strata of youth and intelligentsia grouped around SASO were moving in the direction of creating a clearly political movement. This was resisted by the ASSECA delegation, who wanted an emphasis on economic and cultural projects. Nevertheless, the majority of the conference backed SASO, and when the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) was founded in July 1972, it was on SASO's terms.

A similar estrangement developed between BC activists and the ATASA teachers' organizations, with the teachers groups increasingly losing the initiative to the young radicals. In the Transvaal, TUATA proved unable to respond to the challenge of Black Consciousness. During 1972, SASO subjected the teaching profession to a stern critique for
its lack of political militancy. TUATA responded defensively, declaring in a magazine editorial that:

We are not going to prejudice our case and course in order to please SASO's generals by being militant... We shall always criticise the Department of Bantu Education, and the Government of the day, as we always do, in a manner suitable to us, and in our own responsible way... SASO's attitude is bound to lead to head on collisions... Why can't SASO live and let live?

TUATA was infuriated by the radicals' criticisms of the way in which they worked with the Department of Bantu Education; they saw these attacks as undermining their status and that of the educational system. Amongst teachers, the influence of a younger and more radical generation began to undermine the prestige of the ATASA organizations. One of its former members comments that:

Many teachers lost confidence in the provincial organizations like TUATA... As a result of the ideas of the young teachers who came into the field.

This process in turn led to conflicts between teachers and Principals about how to handle the new political awareness in the schools:

Principals feared the spirit of Black Consciousness... whereas it was something exciting to the students... you found there was polarity between the teachers and the principal, because the principal feared if this would come out there would be trouble...

A shift in urban political attitudes was taking place, especially in urban black politics, and this was lessening the impact of the conservative currents who had flourished
in the different circumstances of the 1960s.

Conversely, those elements of the urban elite who wanted to be more politically assertive were strengthened. The school board system provides a case in point. In the early 1970s, the consequences of the failure of this system for the state became apparent when school boards and committees in urban areas became foci of protest against aspects of state educational policy. In the urban areas it was harder for the state to find appointees for the boards who would be tractable, than it was in rural areas where conservative groupings around chiefs could easily be yoked in. Moreover, there was more space for parents to elect competent people to school committees than in the rural areas, because of the lesser element of nomination by official structures in the way these were chosen. With the rise of new oppositional politics, there was an increasing confidence on the part of urban black elites of their ability to assert themselves. Thus in some urban areas, especially on the Rand, from around 1971 there was growing protest from school boards and committees about various state policies. This is not to suggest that the boards and committees were simply transformed into some form of popular leadership. But it is to say that in certain areas they began to articulate themes contrary to those of state policy, even if they were in fact too enmeshed in a supplicant relationship with the state, to be
bodies which could organize mass opposition.

The first such issue around which conflict arose was the state's attempt in the early 1970s to separate urban schools along ethnic/tribal lines, and to establish similarly distinct school boards for different ethnic groups. In late 1971, at a meeting with departmental officials, members of Soweto school boards expressed their opposition to the state's plans to re-organize the boards, saying that this move would create administrative problems and generate conflict between different groups. The following year, in March, a meeting of Soweto school committee members and parents objected to the scheme to establish 'tribal' schools and threatened to withdraw their children from the schools if it were imposed. In Alexandra township in 1973 school committees and parents met and protested about the ethnic separation of the schools. The Alexandra school board then withdrew its instructions to principals to pursue this policy.

There were also some incidents in which school boards came to the defence of politically victimized teachers. In two such incidents in 1972, Abraham Tiro, the Turfloop student leader (later to be assassinated in Botswana), and Edward Kubayi, who had also been expelled from Turfloop, were ordered by the DBE to be removed from the teaching posts they had taken in Soweto. However the responsible school boards both refused to implement the DBE's decision.
Thus by 1974, urban school boards, at any rate on the Rand, had developed a degree of autonomy from the department, and were in some way voicing educational and other grievances within the community.

The changed social and political environment began to create a student movement of a type never seen before. During 1974 student activity superficially displayed its traditional pattern. Transkei schools continued to predominate as the main centres of action, although there were isolated incidents in the OFS and Natal, and in the older rural boarding schools. But the following year showed a striking change in the geographical and spatial location of unrest: there was a noticeable trend for student action to spread to the urban areas of the Eastern Cape and to urban areas outside the Cape, with a number of incidents in Pretoria and Mafikeng. There was a movement of student activity toward the urban day schools and away from the missionary boarding establishments. The secondary and higher primary schools of the townships were awakening politically, for the first time developing their own autonomous tradition and repertoire of action. This repertoire represented both a break and a continuity with that of the mission schools. A break because it was marked by a new strength and coherence of organization, and because it posed well articulated demands on education issues, in a way which pointed to the broader political
implications of those issues. A continuity because the
tradition of challenging authority relations in education
through the tactics of boycott and riot were carried over
into the new period, and surely, were legitimated by their
history.

The new-style struggles in urban day-schools around
educational and political issues emerged were far more
organized and more explicit in their aims than the actions
which had been mounted in the boarding schools. One school
where these new currents emerged was Thembalabantu High
School at Zwelitsha. In October 1974 three students there
were expelled for contributing to SASM's magazine.54
Following this, in May 1975 pupils presented a list of
grievances to the head, who responded by expelling one of
their number. The students then called a strike and held a
meeting to discuss the issue. The police arrived and 140
students were arrested.55 A similar new combativeness was
demonstrated by students at Morris Isaacson school in
Soweto in September 1975. When Security Police returned to
school a student whom they had been interrogating, they
found their way blocked by protesting students.56

The new type of student action was however exemplified most
clearly by the actions of the students at Nathaniel Nyaluzu
High School, Grahamstown, during 1975. Here students
clearly articulated and ferociously fought for their
demands. In May they staged boycotts and demonstrations.
They put forward clear, serious complaints. The teachers, they said, were poorly qualified, had drinking problems, sexually harassed female pupils, and punished students for exposing their misdeeds. There were also complaints about the conduct of the inspector, disciplinary procedures, shortages of books and the poor quality of the buildings. For the first time the serious and central problems which students experienced within Bantu Education were being articulated by them, and in action. But even more striking was the determined form of action the students took - they occupied the school buildings for two weeks! Mass meetings were held to discuss progress. The teachers, who were objects of much of student's wrath, fled the school fearing that they would be attacked and eventually 19 of them were sacked for refusing to return to their posts. A new and tempestuous generation had arrived.

Origins of the 1976 Revolt: The Issue of Afrikaans

This new militancy was to be transformed into mass revolt by a particular issue - that of enforced use of the Afrikaans language in the school system, a policy which the DBE implemented strongly from 1974. It would seem at first glance that the language policy of the mid 1970s merely arose out of the dynamics of Afrikaner Nationalism, that is, out of some reckless ideological drive to propagate the language. But in fact, the language policy was a by-
product of the internal struggle in the NP generated by shift in the orientation of the NP leadership toward a greater degree of accommodation with big capital in the early 70s. The language policy represented part of a reaction by the right wing of the Nationalist Party, and its supporters within the state administration, against that shift. The more extreme wing of the NP feared that the coming together of the NP leadership with Anglophone business interests represented a sell out of Afrikaner interests. Their promotion of the use of the Afrikaans language was a symbol of national self-assertion and an attempt to test government commitment to Afrikaner identity. The policy provoked such a violent response from students not just because of the symbolic role of Afrikaans as the language of an oppressive government, but also because the policy cut across the need of students to prepare to sell their labour-power on the labour market of urban centres dominated by English speaking concerns.

For most of the period between 1955 and 1976, the DBE was quite ready to subordinate the NP ideological drive toward the promotion of Afrikaans to the needs of the labour market, and to accept the reality that few black teachers were fluent in Afrikaans. From the inception of Bantu Education, the DBE formally subscribed to the policy that in secondary schools, half of the exam subjects should be taught in English and half in Afrikaans - the so-called
'fifty-fifty rule'. However this policy was not practicable, given the small numbers of African teachers who spoke Afrikaans, and a system was introduced under which schools were given permission to depart from the rules concerning equal use of language. During the 1950s a majority of secondary schools were granted such permission, and the DBE was willing to consider other factors than lack of teachers with the right linguistic abilities (such as shortage of textbooks) as a basis for exemption. In 1959 there was an attempt to tighten up on exemptions, when lack of teaching staff with the right language aptitude was declared the only basis of exemption: but in fact this rule seems to have been flexibly enforced. The situation which emerged was one in which the language of local employers became the main determinant of which official language was used in the classroom. J. Dugard, as a senior department official, found in the 1960s that African teachers in the OFS and parts of the Northern Transvaal had a good grasp of Afrikaans, but those in the Cape and Natal and on the Rand did not.

In 1973, the DBE moved to consolidate this tailoring of language policy to the needs of the labour market. Departmental Circular No. 2 of that year laid down that exam subjects could now be taught either purely in English or purely in Afrikaans, as alternatives to the 'fifty-fifty' basis. Whether Afrikaans or English was used
would be decided on the basis of which was the predominant language amongst the white community in the area involved. In this way provision was made for education to be conducted on the basis of local employers' need to communicate with their work force. This policy was acceptable to both parents and students as it enabled students to study in the language which would be of most use to them in obtaining work; it reflected the new element of pragmatism and accommodation with industry in DBE policy.

But this relatively widely acceptable language policy was soon to be dramatically reversed. As I have argued above, there took place in the early 1970s a political re-orientation by the Nationalist leadership in which, while remaining close to the traditional political ideology of apartheid, they attempted a greater degree of detente with the needs of capital. This led in NP circles, to intensive infighting between the verligte (enlightened) faction supporting the new orientation, and the verkrampte (narrow) group who represented interests - the petty bourgeoisie, the white working class and northern agriculture - which clung to Verwoerdian ideology. In 1972, Gerrit Viljoen, a leading verligte, displaced the verkrampte Andries Treurnicht from the leadership of the Broederbond, and subsequently, in 1974, beat off a challenge by Treurnicht to regain the leadership. It seemed that the verligtes
were clearly ascendant within the NP. But Treurnicht rapidly emerged as the leader of a strong conservative group in the party. Prime Minister Vorster, in order to contain the dissension in the ranks, began to tilt in his public pronouncements (although not in his practical policies) toward the verkramptes, directly attacking the verligtes in a 1974 speech.

In this context, right wing Nationalists within the educational apparatus came to see the role of Afrikaans as one of symbolic political importance. The lack of assertiveness in DBE policy on the use of Afrikaans was seen as part of a pattern of weak commitment to traditional Nationalist values, and as something that had to be set right. This feeling emerged most clearly at the 1975 conference of the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings. The conference passed a motion calling on the government to promote Afrikaans in all possible ways to achieve its 'rightful position' in schools for blacks and Asians. Proposing the motion, Prof. J.H. Senekal said there was concern about the position of Afrikaans as a language of use amongst black people, especially in the black urban schools. For the continued existence of Afrikaans it was important that it should become 'a language of use of the black man'. Former Minister W.A. Maree supported the motion.

But already the verkramptes within the DBE had launched an
offensive on the issue. A meeting of Transvaal inspectors in January 1974 passed a resolution that Arithmetic and Social Studies ought to be taught in Afrikaans. Departmental Circular No. 6 of 1974 re-asserted the need to apply the fifty-fifty rule; and while the Afrikaans version of the circular added the qualification 'where possible', the English version did not. The circular stressed the need for application to be made to the Secretary for any deviation from the fifty-fifty rule. It thus represented a clear policy reversal. From late 1974, there was a stricter application of the fifty-fifty rule, and a greater rate of refusal of applications for exemption. This was especially the case in the southern Transvaal, where Regional Circular No. 2 of 1974 imposed the earlier decision of the inspectors to force the teaching of Maths and Social Studies in Afrikaans; the circular failed to draw attention to the possibility of obtaining exemption.

The policy of enforcing instruction in Afrikaans was almost universally unpopular in urban areas, because it forced teachers to teach in a language in which few of them were proficient, and which was little understood by their pupils:

Almost all the African teachers were never taught through the Afrikaans medium... and therefore could not teach... children.

You are a teacher and you have not read a single book or paper in Afrikaans, then you are demanded...
to teach in Afrikaans. 84

...only some of us understood Afrikaans and it was difficult for us to express ourselves, then what about to teach?... A lot of kids didn’t even know what to do or how to write anything in Afrikaans. 85

...the teachers... could not cope with handling a scientific subject in Afrikaans. 86

...we encountered some difficulty in getting teachers who can teach these subjects through the Afrikaans medium. 87

ATASA itself was sufficiently antagonized by the policy to send a delegation to Pretoria to complain about it. 88

The insistence on the IAW policy of elements of the white inspectorate generated immense friction between the DBE on the one hand and teachers and students on the other. One headmaster speaks of

...the intransigence of the inspectors who were predominantly Afrikaners and who were not interested in the black child at all, but they were interested in the black child being Afrikanerized. 89

He had found the inspectorate totally unsympathetic to the fact that many teachers who had claimed to have been able to speak in Afrikaans, in order to get a post, were in fact unable to do so. 90 Another principal, finding that his students were making no headway in Mathematics when using Afrikaans, instructed his teachers to change to English, and lobbied the department through the school board for approval of this change. The response of the inspectors was to have him summoned to the department to account for
his deviation from departmental policy. The new policy thus in practice not only failed to strengthen the ideological influence of Afrikaner nationalism on blacks, but created a new grievance in the educational sphere, which was strongly felt by teachers and students alike.

Writings on the student uprising of 1976 have generally ignored the role of the school boards in opposing the imposition of Afrikaans as a teaching medium from 1974. But popular opposition to the policy first manifested itself in the resistance of certain school boards. However, throughout the period from 1974 to 1976, the Department showed no inclination to listen to these views. It responded to the boards' opinions with threats or disciplinary action. Here was the central contradiction of the board system: namely that the authorities wanted it to incorporate blacks into a sense of participation in the education system, but they were not prepared to give the boards the decision-making powers that would have been essential if they were to establish a real social base. The DBE wanted community participation in education, but only as long as the community's views coincided with its own. This approach guaranteed in advance the failure of boards as a hegemonic structure.

Discontent about the Afrikaans policy resulted in a meeting of 91 delegates from school boards of the PWV and Western Transvaal areas, held in Atteridgeville on December 21st,
The tone of the meeting was relatively mild but, nevertheless, strongly opposed to the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. A memorandum was drawn up demanding an end to the policy, and a deputation was chosen to meet the DBE on the matter. The views of the meeting were couched in terms of support for the homeland leaders' views that secondary education should be conducted in English. The meeting also supported the idea of seeking a Supreme Court injunction if the DBE proved to be intractable. Some however, did express more combative views: Mr. M. Peta, a member of Atteridgeville school board, called for a school boycott if the policy were not reversed. The very limited demand of the school boards was met with implacable opposition from the DBE. A further meeting of school boards was held in January at which "great dissatisfaction" was expressed at the department's refusal to compromise with the boards. However, the DBE was determined to repress any opposition to its policies. A later planned joint meeting of school boards at $elokeng was banned by the circuit inspector of Vereeniging. In Atteridgeville, the chairman of the school board was sacked for his opposition to the Afrikaans policy, and this provoked a school boycott. Circulars number 6 and 7 of 1975 were issued by the DBE to firm up its position: they reaffirmed the 50-50 English-Afrikaans rule, and forbade school boards to decide on the medium of instruction in their schools. W.C. Ackermann, the Regional Director of
Bantu Education for the Southern Transvaal, told one school board, which had instructed its teachers to use English, that its grants for teachers' salaries would be cut off if it did not co-operate.101

These strong-arm policies did not however crack the school boards' opposition to the Afrikaans medium of instruction policy. Several school boards in Soweto persisted in instructing their teachers to use English as the sole medium.102 Boards in the Port Elizabeth area also took up the issue. The school boards in the Port Elizabeth townships, in February 1975 presented a joint memorandum to the Inspector in the area calling for abandonment of the 50/50 policy.103

With the beginning of the 1976 school year, the conflict in Soweto deepened. On 20 January the Meadowlands Tswana school board met the local circuit inspector to discuss the issue. The inspector took an approach which was characteristic of his department: he argued that as all direct tax paid by blacks went to homeland education, black education was being paid for by whites: the DBE therefore had a duty to 'satisfy' white tax payers.104 Not surprisingly, the board members were unimpressed by this analysis, and voted unanimously that English should be the medium of instruction in schools under their control.105 Following this, two members of the school board were
dismissed by the DBE and the other seven members resigned in protest. The story of the period leading up to June 1976 is, in part, one of the refusal of the DBE to listen to its own school boards.

Despite the widespread evidence of the unpopularity of the policy on Afrikaans, the NP government did not act in a way which was likely to reduce tension on the issue. Rather, underestimating the potential of popular opposition, it went in the opposite direction, playing to its rightist constituency. Thus, Vorster clearly did not obstruct the ideological thrust of the Afrikaner right. To a considerable extent his policy was one of giving the right of the NP their head in the cultural and social sphere, while carrying out a slightly more pragmatic orientation in the economic field. As part of his attempt to placate the verkramptes, in 1976 Vorster made the decision to reassign the notably reformist Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Piet Janson, and replace him as Deputy Minister of Bantu Education with the Verkrampte leader, Andries Treurnicht. This clearly strengthened the hand of the extreme right within the educational bureaucracy. And Treurnicht's unshakeable commitment to the hard line language policy played an important role in triggering the uprising. He relentlessly pursued the fifty-fifty policy in secondary education, despite the opposition of parents and teachers and rising student discontent. It was he who on 11 June 1976
announced that applications to depart from the fifty-fifty rule by five Soweto schools had been rejected. This position was taken despite the fact that these schools were on strike. During the parliamentary discussion the Deputy Minister protested ignorance of a violent incident at Naledi, on which the Cillie commission commented that it was "hardly possible that the Minister would not have received the correct and full details." 

The intransigence of the DBE over the Afrikaans issue provided a single political focus for the pent-up anger and frustration of school students. The new political culture that had arisen amongst the urban youth during the first half of the 1970s began to express itself on a wider scale, and more forcefully, as the school students of Soweto began to revolt against the DBE's policy from the beginning of 1976. Having ignored the representations of teachers and school boards against the policy, the DBE had itself opened up a situation where the students could no longer have any hope that the mediation of township elites would resolve their problems.

The first indication of trouble in Soweto schools over the Afrikaans issue took place on 24 February when students at Mofolo Secondary School argued with their headmaster about it, and he called in the police. During March the Black Peoples Convention, SASO and SASM were active in Soweto
schools on the issue. In the next month strikes began to take place in schools around the sacking of three school principals by the Tswana school board in a row related to the Afrikaans issue. Orlando West Junior emerged as a storm centre of the crisis. On 30 April, students there went on strike against the Afrikaans medium of instruction policy, and on 17 May they held another boycott over the dismissal of a member of the school board, bombarding the principal's office with stones. They proceeded to draw up and present to the head a memorandum of their grievances. By 16 May a boycott over Afrikaans had developed in Phefeni Secondary School; it then spread to Belle Higher Primary School, and on to Thulasizwe, Ethonjeni, Khulo Ngolawazi Higher Primary Schools. The involvement of higher primaries is, as pointed out, significant because their highest form was affected by the DBE's Afrikaans decree. The actions were of a militant character, including a demonstration at Thulaizwe and at Belle, the locking out of staff and boycott-breaking students by the militants. On 24 May, pupils rejected a call to go back to school by the Orlando-Diepkloof school boards and the strike spread to Pimville Higher Primary. SASM moved to consolidate the situation, holding a conference at Roodepoort at the end of May which discussed the campaign against the enforced use of Afrikaans.

The explosive anger of Soweto youth is suggested by two
incidents which occurred at this time. On 12 May a woman teacher was walking to school when she was stopped by two youths who intended to rob her. She yelled for aid and more than 100 students from Orlando North Secondary School rushed to help her. They pursued the robbers, caught them and beat them to death. In another incident during May, a teacher at Pimville was stabbed by a student. When police tried to arrest the student they were stoned by his colleagues. These events suggest a rising willingness on the part of students to define what was just for themselves, and a willingness to use force to back those conceptions.

The intensity of the Afrikaans conflict continued to mount. In early June there was fighting at Senoane Junior School and elsewhere between boycotters and students trying to return to work. On 8 June Security Police arrived at Naledi High School and attempted to arrest the secretary of the SASM branch. Students attacked and stoned the policemen and burnt their car; they had to be rescued from the principal's office by reinforcements. The next day police who returned to the school were driven off by stone-throwing pupils. The situation worsened as exams began, and students at several schools refused to write. By this time collective action was being called for, and, in this context, SASM convened the meetings of the 13th June, which founded the Soweto Student Representative Council.
(SSRC). This body then organized a mass student protest against the use of Afrikaans for 16 June.127

Conclusion

The reorientation of state policy on labour supply in a more pro-capitalist direction, provoked an internecine struggle within the state, as right wing elements attempted to prevent what they saw as a drift to ideological compromise. In the course of this struggle the right took up the language issue in the Bantu Education system. The general drift of state policy in the early 1970s was toward a closer harmonizing with the need of industry for skilled urban labour. But this attempt was doomed to frustration. Firstly, the state was trying to conduct it in the framework of Grand Apartheid. This meant that an urban working class was being reproduced within a system that could not conceivably accommodate its political aspirations. Secondly, the ambiguity of trying to conciliate different Afrikaner sectional and class interests within the NP undermined the possibility of the state carrying out decisive and effective educational policy. Thirdly, the vast expansion of numbers in the educational system drew vast numbers of urban youth into an under-resourced system that could give them a common identity, but could not effectively carry out its intended socializing role. Finally, the youth had themselves created a new political culture which provided them with
the resources to challenge the state, as they did on 16 June. When on that day, police and students met, the subsequent shootings by the police and the ensuing nationwide revolt by students turned South African history in a new direction.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER TEN

2. Idem.
3. Idem.
5. Ibid., p.22.
7. Interview no.18, Soweto, 1986.
17. Interview no.8, Soweto, 1986.
18. Interview no.18, Soweto, 1986.
20. Interview no.11, Soweto, 1986.


25. Interview no.7, University of the Witwatersrand, October 1986.


27. Ibid., p.156.


31. Interview no.17, Soweto, October 1986.


33. Kane-Berman (1979), *op.cit.*, p.229. My research tends to confirm Kane-Berman's emphasis on the influence of Black Consciousness on the youth of 1976. This view is also supported by Lodge (1983), *op.cit.*, pp.332-333. The role of the ANC in the 1976 student revolt has been a point of contention amongst historians, with B. Hirson *Year of Fire, Year of Ash: The Soweto Revolt: Roots of a Revolution* (London) Zed Press, 1979, tending to stress it, while Kane-Berman and Lodge play it down. It is undoubtedly the case that the presence of individuals who had been active in the ANC in the 1950s and 1960s cannot be discounted as a force for
politicization of youth. It is also the case that by the mid 1970s, the changed situation in Mozambique gave the ANC the opportunity to re-establish networks inside the country. On balance however, I would suggest that to emphasize the ANC's role in 1976 is to project backward in time the growth of its prestige amongst youth which occurred in the Post-1976 period. See Lodge (1983) op.cit., pp.339-341.

34. Interview no.3, University of the Witwatersrand, June 1986.
37. Interview no.7, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986.
40. Idem.
41. Idem.
42. Ibid., pp.292-93.
43. TUATA, August 1972.
45. Interview no.11, Soweto, 1986.
46. Interview no.5, Soweto, 1986.
47. See the discussion of the composition of the school boards in chapter 5.
52. SAIRR, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1975, (Johannesburg, SAIRR, 1975), p.75; The Daily Dispatch, 17 May 1975. Marianhill, Osborn, Clarkeburg and Buntingville were among the institutions affected.


58. Weekend Post, 24 May 1975.

59. Ibid.

60. Eastern Province Herald, 24 May 1975.


63. R.D.M. Extra, 13 June 1975.


65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., p.43.

67. Ibid.


70. Ibid.


74. Eastern Province Herald, 10 October 1974.
75. Sunday Times, 7 July 1974.
76. Transvaler, 10 July 1975.
77. Ibid.
79. Ibid., p.51.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., p.56.
82. Ibid., p.53.
83. Interview no.11, Soweto, 1986.
84. Interview no.1, Soweto, 1986.
85. Interview no.8, Soweto, 1986.
86. Interview no.5, Soweto, 1986.
87. Interview no.5, Soweto, August 1986.
89. Interview no.17, Soweto, 1986.
90. Ibid.
91. Interview no.5, Soweto, 1986.
93. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid., pp.61-63.


110. Idem.


113. Ibid., p.76.

114. SAIRR (1978), op.cit., p.3.


118. Idem.


121. Ibid., pp. 84-85.

122. Ibid., p. 77.

123. Ibid., p. 83.


CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION

In concluding, I will return to the issues raised in the first two chapters. Chapter One identified certain problems in existing theoretical approaches to the analysis of educational systems and conflict within them, especially the tendency of reproductionist theories toward functionalism, and culturalist theories toward voluntarism. It argued that educational systems were best analysed as part of the state, which should not be understood in an instrumentalist manner, but rather as a contested field of social relations. The chapter suggested that such an approach, by recognizing both the structural character of education systems, and that they were the terrain of conflict and shaped by it, enabled us to integrate the valuable insights of reproductionist and culturalist theories, without falling into their respective over-emphases of the objective and the experiential. In Chapter Two, on the basis of the position developed in the previous chapter, a number of propositions about the specific nature of the South African educational system and its conflicts were developed. It was claimed that these represented a more adequate analytical approach to the issues in question than could be derived from a simple application of existing reproductionist or culturalist theories. The central section of the thesis sought to test the validity of the propositions by examining the social history of African
education and educational conflicts between the 1940s and 1976. This chapter contends that this historical investigation has demonstrated the validity of these propositions, and therefore also the validity of the theoretical approach developed in Chapter One. The present chapter will consolidate the argument of the thesis by returning to the central propositions which were put forward earlier in the thesis, and will show how the subsequent historical study has provided support for them. It will also suggest how developments since 1976 support the type of analysis developed here.

Firstly, it was argued that there was no fixed and necessary relationship between Bantu Education and capitalism, but rather a contingent and changing one. Reproductionists have tended to see apartheid education as fulfilling the needs of capitalism. The 'liberal' critique of apartheid has implied that state policy, including educational policy, blocked capitalist development. What has been shown here is that neither of these simple, one-dimensional relationships holds consistently. In certain periods and in certain ways, Bantu Education met the needs of capital; at other moments, and in other ways, it obstructed capitalist development. We have seen that in the 1950s, by drawing urban youth into the school system and providing semi-skilled labour, state policy did answer the needs of urban capitalists for social control of the urban working class and the reproduction of the industrial
labour force. In addition, the financing structure of the policy enabled it to be implemented without imposing a massive tax burden on employers. However during the 1960s, officialdom pursued apartheid policy in a much more ideologically rigid way. The deliberate refusal of government to develop black urban secondary education, and the strangling of urban technical and further education, which were part of the Verwoerdian attempt to push black people into the Bantustans, ran directly against industrial capitalists’ interests. The resulting lack of adequately educated employees became a major problem for industry by the end of the 1960s. It was only after a major political campaign by industry in the early 1970s that government moved to remedy the situation, by expanding black urban secondary education, and reintroducing urban black further education from 1972. Thus the relation between Bantu Education and capitalism was supportive in some conjunctures and conflictual in others.

This argument implies that there was also no fixed relationship between state educational policy-makers and capitalists. The state education system did not function as a simple instrument of capital; bureaucrats had their own ideological and organizational interests which they did not hesitate to pursue. The thesis has suggested that the complementary relationship between state education policy and urban capitalists’ needs in the 1950s were the result
of relatively contingent factors. Government was faced with an urban crisis which required urgent resolution. In order to regain social control of the cities it embarked on a radical reorganization of urban life, including the expansion of the education system. This coincided with the needs of industrialists for stability and semi-skilled labour, but was not dictated by these needs. Real constraints on government policy - the urgency of the problems in the cities, the existence of mass political opposition, and the need to avoid disrupting a fragile economy - pushed it toward relatively pragmatic policies, which would stabilize urban life. However in the 1960s, government, having broken political resistance and entered a period of economic boom, was able ruthlessly to pursue Grand Apartheid policy. The Bantu Education bureaucracy which had been created by the restructuring of the state in the 1960s pursued their ideological interests in a way which was quite contrary to the interests of industrial capital. The change toward an education policy more adapted to industrialists' requirements in the early 1970s was in part the result of the new influence on government of a growing Afrikaner manufacturing sector. Without direct access to the bureaucracy or the NP hierarchy, Anglophone capitalists had to lobby very energetically to get a hearing.

The independent interests of the bureaucracy were also apparent in the campaign for Afrikaans language instruction
by sections of the bureaucracy in the 1970s. As we have seen, this in fact cut across the earlier (and eminently reproductively adapted), policy whereby the predominant language of employers in a particular area dictated the medium of instruction. The Afrikaans instruction policy was a negative response by conservative Nationalists to the pragmatic, somewhat pro-capitalist, shifts in apartheid policy made by the Vorster regime. While the policies pursued by the educational bureaucracy and the needs of capital overlapped on occasion, they were not necessarily linked.

Secondly, the thesis has argued that the Bantu Education system did not, as reproductionists tend to assert, only reproduce an unskilled, migrant labour force. Rather, education policy had the effect of reproducing different forms of labour at different times and in different places. We saw that the emphasis on primary education in the 1950s effectively generated a semi-skilled work-force. The move to a greater emphasis on secondary education in 1972 helped create a labour force with a much greater proportion of black technical and clerical employees. Rural education was geared to supporting the Bantustan structure, in a more effective way than was urban education. The relation between schooling and the labour market changed across time, and differed between urban and rural situations.
Thirdly, the thesis has argued that urbanization and secondary industrialization were central to the origins and evolution of Bantu Education. We have seen how the urban crisis of the 1940s and 1950s produced wide-ranging dominant class sentiment in favour of the development of a mass education system. In its initial phase, the late 1950s and early 1960s, the new schooling system was primarily shaped by the pressures of the urban crisis. The policy was an integral part of the urban restructuring of the 1950s and early 1960s. The neglect of secondary schooling during the 1960s caused growing internal strains in the education system and the labour market, which focused in cities. The change in policy in 1972 was a desperate attempt to overcome these tensions.

Fourthly, following from our view of the state as a contested field of social relations, embodying the outcomes of conflicts, it is argued that the shape of the education system was moulded in part by popular struggles. The restructuring of the cities in the 1950s, of which Bantu Education was a part, was to a significant extent a response to the urban social movements of the period. Although popular resistance in that decade was unable to stop the implementation of Bantu Education, it did impose limits on how drastically apartheid could be implemented. Paradoxically, the resistance itself constituted part of the demand for education which government tried to contain through the new education system. The absence of popular
organization in the 1960s was a major reason why government was able to pursue so extreme a variant of apartheid education policy. We have shown too, how concern over popular discontent with education in the early 1970s increased pressure on government for restructuring. It has been suggested that the struggles which shaped Bantu Education were not only between dominant and subordinate classes. As the discussion above suggests, the conflicting interests within the dominant classes also shaped the education system, as did divergences within the bureaucracy.

Fifthly, the thesis has argued that the struggle over Bantu Education was one which involved a battle for hegemony. The regime did have a conception that it needed to lead the masses, rather than merely repressing them, if it was to rule effectively. The Nationalist administrations hoped that Bantustan policy would provide the basis of such a new hegemony. Education, insofar as it attempted to win popular allegiance to the Bantustan system, did have a hegemonic aim. We have seen that some successes in this direction were achieved by the state in the late 1950s and the 1960s. The school board and committee system did actively incorporate large numbers of people into the running of Bantu Education. Teachers gave their support to organizations prepared to bargain within the existing educational system. On a bigger scale, the expansion of the education system, by providing more people than ever
before with some schooling, was a 'material substratum' for mass participation in the education system.

Yet, we have seen that Bantu Education was unable to win the active support or allegiance or the mass of the population. It faced severe resistance in the 1950s from the ANC's school boycott, local boycotts of the school board system, and from the campaigns of radical teacher organizations. While a combination of repression, the attractions of an expanded schooling system, and parents' knowledge that state schools had a monopoly of certification accepted in the job market, ensured the defeat of these movements, they both reflected and helped create a popular hostility to Bantu Education. We have seen that officialdom undercut its own attempts to build a new educational hegemony. The racism and authoritarianism of the Department's officials alienated parents, students and teachers. The board and committee system generated great resentment: it was too little of a democratic policy-making structure to attract lasting popular support; yet it had enough power at a local level to act in a tyrannical fashion toward teachers and thus lose their sympathy. More fundamentally, it has been shown that the material deprivations to which Nationalist governments subjected the education system created constant new resentments, particularly in the light of the obvious racial inequalities in education. The events leading up to 1976 typify these failure to win allegiance. The government
rammed through the Afrikaans instruction policy, despite the protests of school boards and students, and in the context of a system collapsing under the strain of a rapid and poorly funded expansion. The popular response to the education system in the 1960s and early 1970s, in general was one that we have characterized as one of acquiescence: acceptance of a pragmatic kind, lacking any element of active identification.

The most coherent attempt to generate an educational counter-hegemony was the ANC's school boycott campaign. Despite its remarkable achievements, it could not compete with the state system's capacity to provide child-care and marketable qualifications. The other resistance movements which we have examined never approached the counter-hegemonic character of the ANC's campaign. Boycotting school boards did not in itself provide an educational alternative. Teachers' organizations were too small and sectional in the scope of their activities (in the case of the Transvaal) and too sectarian (in the Cape) to address the challenge of creating a new educational hegemony. Student protests were too localized and diffuse to be a serious political threat to the DBE. The re-emergence of student protest in the early 1970s was initially small and ideologically incoherent.

Sixthly, the thesis has argued for the significance of
popular culture in moulding responses to the education system. We have seen that in the 1950s, the predominance in urban areas of an individualistic, gangsterized street sub-culture created an inhospitable environment for the ANC's attempts to organize youth. A strong sub-culture of localized, anti-authoritarian resistance existed in the rural mission-founded boarding schools, which gave rise to a series of riots reflecting student hostility to racial authority, but urban schools proved fairly passive. We have seen that Bantu Education helped create, by the early 1970s, a new sub-culture amongst youth. A common education created a common experience and identity for youth at the same time as the urban and political environments were changing rapidly. This new sub-culture was to prove more conducive to politicization than the forms of youth sub-culture that existed in the 1950s. By the mid-1970s a repertoire of resistance was developing in urban schools. The difference in the political effects of the 1950s and 1970s youth sub-cultures underpins the insistence in the thesis that not every form of oppositional behaviour has transformative potential.

Finally, the thesis has argued that analysis of teachers' responses to the educational system need to be informed by understanding of their ambiguous structural position which makes them vulnerable to political and ideological cross-pressures. We have seen how the social crisis of the 1940s precipitated a teacher radicalization, and how in the
context of mass popular resistance in the 1950s, radical teachers' organizations came to the fore. The repressive conditions of 1960s on the other hand, created ideal conditions for the growth of conservative teachers' organizations. We have seen that the ideology of professionalism has been ambiguous in its implications for teachers. While for some it was an ideological prop for conservative views, for others it engendered a deep sense of dedication to education, which was outraged by state policy. The ultimate irony of Bantu Education's effect on students was that its flagships, the homeland Universities, produced, by the early 1970s, a new generation of radicalized teachers who proceeded to 'conscientise their pupils.

To what extent can these perspectives be applied to analysis of the crisis-ridden black education system of the 1970s and 1980s? I would argue that subsequent events serve to reinforce the validity of the approach taken in the thesis.¹ The relation between apartheid education policy and capitalism continues to be shifting and complex, rather than a straightforward one. During the 1980s, the ruling party shifted from an overtly racial ideology of education to a technocratic one.² The linking of education policy to capitalist economic development is expressly located by government leaders. In keeping with this ideology, tertiary education and private schools have "en
desegregated, and private sector initiative in education encouraged. Racial inequality in educational spending has narrowed markedly. In part this reflects the greater weight of capitalist interests in the NP, as compared with earlier periods. Yet the NP government has a commitment to racial structuring in education that cannot be reconciled with any view of the state educational bureaucracy as an instrument of capital. State schooling remains effectively racially separate. Integrationist measures such as the creation of a single education ministry, which are strongly supported by leading capitalist groupings, continue to be rejected by the NP leadership. The NP's policies may overlap with those of capital, but are in no sense simply dictated by them.

The manner in which the education system reproduces the labour force continues to change dramatically. The late 1970s and early 1980s saw a vast expansion of black secondary education, to over a million pupils in the mid-1980s. This underpinned a continuing shift toward higher levels of skilling of the workforce. Bantu Education is, even less than in the period discussed in this thesis, simply a source of unskilled labour. But nor does the relation between educational growth and the labour market suggest a simple economic explanation of educational growth. For between the mid 1970s and the mid 1980s, total black primary and secondary school enrollments grew massively from 3,700,000 to 6,000,000, while the number of
formal sector jobs available virtually stagnated. Popular political pressures for educational provision, and calculations by government that schooling would control youth discontent better than their being on the street, have certainly played a role in this expansion.

Urban issues have remained at the centre of policy conflicts and changes in education. The mass school student movements of the period have been centred in the towns. Government educational policy in the 1980s has focused on addressing the educational problems of the urban economy, and the political pressures of predominantly urban popular movements.

Far more dramatically than in the period considered in the thesis, popular movements have shaped education policy, in the last decade and a half. The revolt of 1976 led to the withdrawal of the Afrikaans instruction policy, and some modifications of departmental policy. The De Lange report, which proclaimed the attempt to reform education in the 1980s, emerged from the period of the 1980 school boycotts, which finally brought home the lack of viability of Verwoerdian educational policy. The reduction of racial inequalities in educational spending has been part of government's attempts to refashion education to contain the massive youth revolts of the 1980s.
More clearly than in the 1950s too, a popular challenge for hegemony in the educational sphere has emerged. The National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) made, during the mid-1980s, the most substantial attempt yet to forge a popular vision of education which could unite teachers, students and community. This experience may well have a formative influence on post-apartheid education. In contrast to the 1950s, there is a serious possibility of popular-based recasting of the education system.

Finally youth culture, for better and for worse has moulded popular response to educational issues. A culture of militancy has developed amongst youth. It has on the positive side, generated unprecedented levels of organizational and political coherence amongst youth; more negatively it has also legitimized random violence and factional strife. It thus seems more valid than ever to make a distinction between transformative and non-transformative oppositional behaviour.

Teachers continue to be cross-pressured by changing political and ideological currents. African teachers organizations continued to take a conservative position until the early 1980s. But with younger teachers joining more radical organizations and pupils and teachers coming into conflict, a realignment took place. In the mid-1980s both the more staid and more militant teachers organizations allied themselves with the NECC. The
militancy of the 1950s seemed to have re-emerged. Yet teachers were often also deeply demoralized, and poorly trained. The loss of the sense of 'professionalism' of the mission era was not necessarily to the good.

As this discussion suggests, the consequences of Verwoerdian educational policy are very much still with us. South Africa's people will be tragically burdened with them in confronting the task of creating a post-apartheid educational system.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER ELEVEN


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Weekly Mail
APPENDIX A:

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

The theoretical discussions in chapters one and two have direct implications for the methodological approach adopted in this thesis. There it was suggested that a one-sided emphasis on either structuralist perspectives stressing external constraints on social action or culturalist perspectives stressing the capacity of individuals to generate their own autonomous responses to a situation was misleading. This methodological note will argue that South African historical sociology has become excessively polarized between such emphases on structure and agency. The methodological thrust of this thesis is to attempt to bridge this division by addressing the concerns of both trends.

The 1970s saw immense advances in our understanding of the macro-patterns of South African historical development, notably through the work of Harold Wolpe, Martin Legassick, and the 'Poulantzian' theorists. Such contributions charted the major developments in capitalist production and the state in modern South Africa and attempted to theorize these in a new and coherent way. However during the 1980s a strong school of social historians developed, who criticized the work of the previous decade for failing to examine the subjective
experiences of groups and individuals involved in social processes. The social historians produced a substantial body of work charting the cultural, political and ideological responses of South Africans to the transformation of their society. There was a strong focus on the construction of identity, on the specificity of the experience of local communities, and on the validity of personal testimony as a historical source.

It is in a sense inevitable that such a division should arise: as Giddens points out, the emphasis given to structure or to agency is a perennial issue in Sociological analysis. However, in the South African case, the polarization of these emphases has become counter-productively intense, as can be seen in the case of the recent attack on the social historians by Mike Morris, who presents the social historians as simple empiricists. Morris is correct to suggest that there was a tendency amongst social historians to be dismissive of social theory. At its worst this did lend toward a situation in which local case studies proliferated without any attempt to draw out their broader implications for our understanding of the social structure. However, a position such as that of Morris fails to recognise the valid contribution of the social historians. Their work is soundly based in three centrally important respects. Firstly, it recognizes that the active responses of groups
and individuals to their society actually mould social outcomes: it is only by detailed investigations of the process of such struggles that we can understand how such moulding takes place. Secondly, subjective responses to social changes are not somehow outside of social reality; the ideology and cultural activity of social groups is itself part of the reality which needs to be explained. Thirdly, the validity of broad-scale explanations of social change needs to be tested against empirical case studies. In taking this view, I follow Perry Anderson's defence of the notion of falsifiability. No theory can be finally validated; a theory is necessarily a provisional explanation of our present evidence and thus subject to disproof through empirical investigation. If studies of South African social history reveal phenomena which cannot be accounted for by an existing theory, then it is the theories which must be discounted, not as Morris appears to suggest, the evidence.

The way forward for South African historical research is, I would argue, to draw on the strengths of both the structuralist and culturalist strands in modern historiography. It is necessary to attempt to theorize the implications of our research, and thus to develop an increasingly sophisticated understanding of broad historical patterns. Yet, at the same time, such theorization must take account of the active struggles which shape structural relations; must recognize the
significance of the subjective within social reality; and must be subject to the testing of its ability to explain historical evidence. The thesis strives to achieve such a synthesis. It sets out to obtain a broad national picture of education conflict in our period. In order to sharpen the focus it concentrates on two key regions - the Rand and the Eastern Cape. Within this wide-ranging framework it seeks however, to understand how those located within, and in opposition to, the structures of Bantu Education experienced it.

The thesis pursued the concerns of structuralist-inclined work insofar as it sought to examine the educational system on a national scale, and over an extended time-period, and to theorize the process of change within it in relation to a broader analysis of South African society. The approach taken was largely that of using documentary methods: archival sources, official publications and newspapers. These were examined with a view to assessing whether they provided evidence supporting or contradicting my existing understanding of change in the education system.

As Bulmer⁹ points out, methodological discussions in social science may sometimes tend to reconstruct the process after the fact to suggest that an ideal experimental model of research has been followed. I will resist the temptation to do this. My experience was that there was a more
dynamic relationship, in my research on documentary sources, between evidence and theorization than notions of 'testing a hypothesis' would suggest. When I set out to investigate the nature of conflict in education, I was looking primarily for material on popular movements and developments in the schools. My view of the state was such that I saw understanding its policy initiatives as unproblematic. I believed that apartheid education and capitalism were mutually reinforcing and that state education policy necessarily supported capitalist interests. Insofar as my research impinged on state policy I expected to find adequate confirmation of this perspective. However, as my research progressed, I found more and more material which could not be accommodated within this instrumentalist account of the state. Further theoretical reading and reflection led me to realize the need to change my theoretical assumptions, if I were to give an adequate account of educational conflict. Thus I began to recast my approach to analysis of state, reproduction and resistance, toward the viewpoint indicated in Chapters One and Two. The new theoretical approach which I had developed, then became the basis of my new analysis. Thus I had discarded my existing perspective in favour of one more able to explain the process I was studying.

(One limitation of the research in respect of state policy is that I have not used material from the state archives. This was because when I commenced my research the material
dealing with the period of the implementation of Bantu Education was not open. I did obtain access to the Department of Education and Training records, but the documents which I was allowed to see were statistical returns which were not appropriate for a study such as the present one).

Research which related more to the concerns of the social historians was that based on interviews with teachers, as well as some of the archival work. Over forty interviews were carried out in the course of this work, of which nineteen provided material of sufficient interest to be used in the thesis. (One interview used in the thesis - number 20 - was conducted at the beginning of the research with an important teacher leader). As the research was directed toward obtaining qualitative material, it was not important for the interviews to represent a probability sample.\textsuperscript{10} I was primarily interested in teacher's testimony for what it could tell me about their experiences of Bantu Education, rather than in trying to assess the support for particular viewpoints amongst them. The teachers were a 'snowball' sample.\textsuperscript{11} an initial group of black secondary school teachers was contacted and those were then asked to recommend other teachers who could give worthwhile insights into their experiences in the period. There was an attempt to include both older mission trained teachers, and teachers who had been educated within the
Bantu Education system, and to obtain interviews with teachers who had experience of both the Eastern Cape region, and the Rand.

A questionnaire was drawn up on the basis of a period of extensive documentary research: the issues which had been identified as important ones in the documentary research were transformed into open-ended questions. During the interviews, the semi-structured format was pursued by the interviewer, in which the questionnaire was followed, but when the interviewee raised interesting points, the interviewer was free to ask further questions about these issues. The interviews were tape-recorded and subsequently transcribed for analysis.

Such oral history methods have established themselves, through the work of pioneers such as Paul Thompson, as a unique source of historical material on popular life and culture. The South African social historians have adopted these methods enthusiastically. To some extent this adoption has been wholesale and uncritical, privileging the perceptions of the interviewee, so that the social scientist abdicates the task of analysis in favour of merely providing a 'view from below'. There are also some inherent difficulties in the method. In attempting to interpret the material in a way which was useful to my larger enterprise, some of these characteristic problems of situating material chronologically emerged. Eliciting
adequate detail on the quality of daily life in the schools proved an elusive goal. In the complex and shifting South African political situation, the involuntary psychological repression of traumatic or politically uncomfortable pasts is a factor. Paserini's\textsuperscript{16} account of her interviews with Italian workers who had 'forgotten' many aspects of life under Fascism strikes an echo in my experience. Yet the interviews do, I believe, strengthen this study, not only by showing the impact of state policy in the classroom, but also by illuminating the consciousness and activities of teachers, students and communities in a way which it would be difficult or impossible for written sources to do. Without oral history techniques I doubt that I could have produced evidence of, for example, the role of teachers in resisting dominant ideology in the classroom, or of the role of militant young teachers in influencing students politically before 1976. In this regard the methodological contribution of this thesis is to emphasize that oral history techniques can usefully be applied to macro-studies, as well as to biographies and community studies. In the international historical literature this has already been well demonstrated by Fraser's oral history based account of the Spanish Civil War,\textsuperscript{17} and the collaborative international study of the 1960s student movements edited by him.\textsuperscript{18} South African macro-historians should not be dismissive of oral history, any more than social historians should be shy of theory.
At the same time I was struck by the continuing richness of traditional archival sources in illuminating social movements. In this respect the Treason Trial collection in the South African Institute for Race Relations Archive at the University of the Witwatersrand, which comprises the ANC's correspondence of the late 1940s and early 1950s, proved particularly fascinating. Interesting material on the mission schools' declining years was provided by the Cory Library at Rhodes University, and on African teachers organizations by the collection in the University of South Africa archive. Material produced by organizations is inherently problematic, because of their need to present a positive picture of themselves to the outside world and the desire of leading members to portray themselves in a favourable light to their base and their superiors. It was thus difficult to assess, for example, the extent of teacher organizations support in a particular period. Yet documents and newspapers can be surprisingly revealing if comparatively and critically read.

The use of distinct methods in the study — interviews, studies of documents and studies of published material enabled me to strengthen my findings by means of triangulation.19 I could test the validity of a particular interpretation I was making by considering whether evidence of another type confirmed or contradicted it.
My hope is that the study has brought together the positive features of both the trends of historical work which I have identified in contemporary South Africa. The study seeks to address both the structural and experiential dimensions of social change.
FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX A


APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION 1: SCHOOLING EXPERIENCE

(a) Did you enjoy your own time at school? Why/Why not?

(b) What did you like best about school? What did you like least?

(c) In what ways was your education different from that which children would get today?

(d) What values did the teachers stress as important when you were at school?

(e) Did you respect your teachers? Why/Why not? Do students have the same attitude to teachers today?

(f) What kinds of work did your school friends go into?

(g) Was there any one teacher or older person who influenced you strongly? Who, and in what way did they influence you?

SECTION 2: TRAINING EXPERIENCE

(a) When you trained as a teacher did you find your studies interesting?

(b) Were your educational studies helpful when you started teaching?

(c) What ideas were emphasised by those who taught you during your training? Did you agree with these ideas?
(d) Have you had any upgrading courses since you first trained? (When and on what?) Have these been helpful?

(e) Some teachers organizations say that it is important for teachers to view themselves as professionals, similar to doctors and lawyers. Do you agree with this perspective?

SECTION 3: VIEW OF THE INTRODUCTION OF BANTU EDUCATION

(a) Compare the education provided by mission schools with that provided by Bantu Education schools.

(b) Were the relations between missionaries and the students in their schools good or bad? Give details from your own experience or knowledge.

(c) Do you remember instances of strikes at mission schools in the 1940s and 50s? Give details and explain their causes.

(d) Did black communities' views of mission schools change in the 40s and 50s?

(e) What were the main changes that the Bantu Education system brought about in the schools of the community where you were living?

SECTION 4: RESISTANCE TO BANTU EDUCATION

(a) What can you remember of how communities reacted to Bantu Education when it was introduced in the 1950s?

(b) What can you remember of particular cases of resistance to the introduction of Bantu Education?

(c) (To older teachers) What do you remember of the activities of (Cape teachers) CATA (Tvl. teachers) TATA in the 1950s? Did they play an effective role in opposing Bantu Education? Why/Why not?
What do you remember of the school boycotts in 1955? How successful do you think they were? Why did they not succeed in stopping Bantu Education?

SECTION 5: THE EXPERIENCE OF TEACHING

(a) Describe the different classroom buildings in which you have taught? Have these improved or got worse over the years?

(b) In the period before 1976, what kinds of equipment/library facilities/sports facilities were available in schools in which you taught?

(c) Have you often taught double sessions in schools? What effect did this have on the quality of education? Has this situation got better or worse over time?

(d) Did you feel that the syllabus you taught expressed the ideas of dominant white groups? If so, give examples.

(e) Were you able to put your own political ideas into your teaching? If so, give examples.

(f) Did the greater use of African languages in primary school under Bantu Education cause problems in teaching secondary school pupils?

(g) Were teachers under any pressure from the department to teach in Afrikaans before the mid 70s? (When policy on this issue was more strongly enforced).

(h) When teaching do you believe pupils should be involved in class discussion?

(i) Are you in favour of corporal punishment? Why or why not?

(j) Have your methods of teaching and your ideas about teaching changed while you have been in the profession?
SECTION 6: RELATIONS WITH THE AUTHORITIES

(a) Describe your personal relations with departmental inspectors.

(b) What was your personal experience of the way in which the Department of Bantu Education made decisions on matters affecting your school?

(c) What did teachers feel about the Department of Bantu Education?

SECTION 7: RELATIONS WITH SCHOOL BOARDS

(a) What kinds of people were members of school boards and committees between the 1950s and 1970s? (For example what sort of work did they do and what were their political views?)

(b) What were relations between teachers and the school boards and committees like at that time? Identify any issues of conflict between them.

(c) How were the school boards and committees viewed by the local community in your area?

(d) In the 1960s and 1970s, the government tried to set up separate schools boards and separate schools for different 'tribal' groups in the towns. Do you remember this? If so, what effects did this policy have?

SECTION 8: TEACHERS, THE COMMUNITY, AND EDUCATIONAL POLICY

(a) During the time from the 1950s to the 1970s what did people in the community think of teachers?

(b) Did people in rural areas have different attitudes to teachers than people in the urban areas?
(c) How did teachers view the setting up of the Bantustans? What were their relations with Bantustan politicians like?

(d) In the late 1950s and the 1960s Bantu Education expanded and many more people than before went to school. How did people in your community view this development?

SECTION 9: STUDENT ACTION

(a) Can you remember examples of student strikes during the 1960s and in the 1970s before 1976? What caused these?

(b) Did such riots express political discontent? Or were they mainly about local problems students were experiencing?

(c) During the 1960s, was there much hostility on the part of students to Bantu Education?

SECTION 10: SCHOOLING POLICY AND WORK

(a) In the 1960s the government tried to stop the growth of secondary schools, technical education and teacher training in the towns. What effect did this have on your community?

(b) Around 1972, the government allowed more secondary schools, some teacher training and technical facilities in the urban areas. Do you remember this, and what effects did this have on your community?

(c) During the 1960s, the economy grew fast. Did this make it possible for your students to get work when they left school?

(d) During the 1970s there were many more economic problems. Did this have an effect on your former students who were seeking work? In what way?
(e) In the 1960s and 1970s, do you think that your students felt frustrations about the limited opportunities for professional and technical education open to them?

SECTION 11: TEACHERS ORGANIZATIONS

(a) Do you belong to a teachers' organization at present? Have you belonged to any in the past? (Give names of organizations and dates of membership).

(b) During the 1960s and 1970s the ATASA teachers' organizations seem to have been the most important bodies. What is your view of these organizations? Why were they successful in recruiting members at that time? Did they provide good benefits for their members? Did they respond to their members' needs? What was their view of Bantu Education at that time?

(c) (If a member of a non-ATASA group): How does the group of which you are now a member differ from ATASA? What does your group see its role as? What kinds of activities does it carry out?

SECTION 12: 1976-77

(a) Did young teachers bring Black Consciousness ideas to the schools during the early 1970s, and if so, what effect did this have?

(b) What political ideas other than those mentioned in (a) influenced students before 1976. Were you aware of student political organization in the early 70s?

(c) At the beginning of the 1976 school year, the government introduced the change from a 13 year system of schooling to a 12 year one. This doubled the numbers of students in the first year of secondary school. What effects did this have? Could it be considered to have helped bring about the 1976 uprising by making school conditions worse?
(d) Did you experience more pressure from the Department for Afrikaans to be used in school from around 1974? What impact did this have at your school? How did students and teachers react? Was there any opposition to the use of Afrikaans from your school board? Is it true to say the issue of Afrikaans was the cause of the 1976 events?

(e) What was your experience of the 1976 uprising?

(f) Which political organisations do you think were most important in leading the 1976-7 student movement?

SECTION 13: ASPIRATIONS

(a) (If a former teacher) If you compare teaching with other jobs you have done, which gave you the most satisfaction and why?

(b) (If a teacher at present) Do you want to continue working as a teacher?

(c) (If no to (b)) Why do you want to leave teaching? What kind of work would you like to do? What do you find attractive about that kind of work?

(d) (If yes to (b)) What do you enjoy about being a teacher?

(e) Why did you originally decide to become a teacher? Do you feel that was a good decision and why?

SECTION 14: POLITICAL VIEWS

(a) Should teacher organizations get involved in political issues affecting the community?

(b) Should individual teachers get involved in community organizations?
(c) What do you think of the student movement since 1976?

(d) Have your political views changed much since you first began working as a teacher?

(e) What kind of educational system would you like to see in South Africa?
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