CONSERVATION HISTORY, HUNTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN THE SOUTH WESTERN MOZAMBIQUE BORDERLAND IN THE 20th CENTURY

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Humanities of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History

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Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa
August, 2017
DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is a product of my own work. It is submitted to the Faculty of Humanities of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. This study has not been done before nor submitted for any other degree or examination in any other institution, academic or non-academic. I also declare that all the sources used or quoted in this work have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

Signature

...........................................

Johannesburg, 11th August 2017
DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my parents, José Samboco (in memory) and Rufina Manhice, my wife Helena Mahumane and to my daughters Izza Melaní Paulo Samboco and Liliane Nyeleti Paulo Samboco
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ABSTRACT

Conservation history, hunting policies and practices in the south western Mozambique borderland in the 20th century

This study uses both primary and secondary sources to investigate the history of the communities living in the southern Mozambique hinterland in the 20th century. It specifically examines the evolution of the colonial hunting laws and the establishment of hunting reserves in southern Mozambique. In this thesis, I argue that the Portuguese colonial administration put little effort into the protection of fauna and ecosystems in the south western Mozambique hinterland. Portuguese hunting laws were issued to provide the colonial system with revenue – through a system of fees imposed on licensed hunters when entering Mozambican forests and hunting reserves – rather than to improve fauna management. Colonial laws (particularly fees for the hunting permits) made it difficult for the majority of local African peasants to access game resources, on which during periods of drought and lack of foodstuffs they depended for subsistence. The study explores the extent to which postcolonial development projects affected conservation and the livelihoods of communities living in conservation areas. It shows how the period following independence was also characterised by mass killing of wildlife. In 1978, as part of the construction of the Massingir dam, Frelimo government officials relocated families living along the Elephants valley to areas having poor soils in Coutada 16, thus reducing the ability of the cultivators to produce enough food to sustain their families. Lack of food supplies increased the dependence of local families on bush meat for food. The armed conflict, which broke out immediately after independence in 1975 and lasted until 1992, contributed to the mass killing of wildlife, as both government soldiers and RENAMO fighters exploited bush for food. The end of the armed conflict allowed the Government of Mozambique (GoM) to implement projects aimed at rehabilitating the ecosystems destroyed by war and the transformation of Coutada 16 into the Limpopo National Park (LNP) in 2001. In 2002, the integration of the LNP into the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP) turned into reality Hertzog’s 1927 desire to create a transnational conservation area across the South Africa – Mozambique border.

Keywords:
Agriculture, conservation, coutada, dam, development, displacements, ecosystems, environment, fauna, game, hunting, hunting policies, game reserve, migration, park, livelihoods, relocations, trade war.
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AHM – (Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique) Mozambican Historical Archive  
ALGR – Alto Limpopo Game Reserve (Reserva de Caça de Alto Limpopo) known in some of the literature as Guijá or Pafuri Game Reserve  
ANAC – (Administração Nacional de Áreas de Conservação) National Directorate of Conservation Areas  
ANC - African National Congress  
AWF- African Wildlife Foundation  
AWPS - African Wildlife Protection Society  
BSAC - British South Africa Company  
CAIL- (Complexo Agro-Industrial do Limpopo) Agro-Industrial Company of Limpopo  
CAMPFIRE - Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources  
CBNRM- Community-Based Natural Resource Management  
CCLM – (Comissão the Caça do Distrito de Lourenço Marques) Lourenço Marques Game Board  
CCM – (Comissão de Caça da Colónia de Moçambique) Mozambique Game Board  
CIO - Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization  
CNAC – (Comissão Nacional de Aldeias Comunais) Comunal Villages National Board  
DCA- (Direcção de Administração Civil) Department of Civil Administration  
DNA – (Direcção Nacional de Águas) Mozambique National Directorate of Water  
DNFFB – (Direcção Nacional de Florestas e Fauna Bravia) Mozambique National Directorate of Forests and Wildlife  
FLECS –UEM (Faculade de Letras e Ciências Sociais – UEM) Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences - UEM  
FRELIMO – (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) Mozambican Liberation Front  
GFW – (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) German Development Bank  
GGM – (Governo-Geral de Moçambique) Mozambique General-Government  
GIZ – (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) German Agency for International Cooperation  
GKGP - Gaza Kruger Gonarezhou Park  
GLTP - Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park
GoM - Government of Mozambique
IIAM- (Instituto de Investigação Agrária de Moçambique) Mozambique Institute of Agricultural Research
ILWD - International Law on War and Displaced Persons
IMF - International Monetary Fund
INE – (Instituto Nacional de Estatísticas) Mozambique's National Statistics Institute
IOM - International Organization for Migrations
ISANI- (Ispecção Superior sobre Administração e Negócios Indígenas) Superior Inspection of Natives Affairs
IUCN - World Conservation Union
JSAS – Journal of Southern African Studies
KNP - Kruger National Park
LNP - Limpopo National Park - in Portuguese literature PNL or Parque Nacional de Limpopo
MCC - Mozambican Christian Council
MCT – (Missão de Combate a Tripanossomíases) Mozambique Mission to Combat Tripanosomias
MITUR – (Ministério do Turismo) Mozambique Ministry of Tourism
MNR/RENAMO – (Resistência Nacional de Moçambique) Mozambique National Resistance
MoP-(Ministério de Obras Públicas) Mozambique Ministry of Public Infrastructure
MoU- Memorandum of Understanding
MSF-F - Medicines Sans Frontières-France
MSG – (Mestrado em Sociologia Rural e Gestão de Desenvolvimento) Masters Programme in Rural Sociology and Development Management
MZM – (Missão Zoológica de Moçambique) Mozambique Zoological Mission
NAR – (Núcleo de Apoio aos Refugiados) GoM department responsible for refugees
NET – (Núcleo de Estudos de Terra) Land Studies Unit at Eduardo Mondlane University
NGO- Non-Government Organization
PIU - Project Implementation Unit
PPF- Peace Park Foundation
PRE- (Programa de Reabilitação Económica) Economic Recovery Programme
SADC - South African Development Community
SADF- South Africa Defence Forces
SERLI – (Secretaria do Estado para o Desenvolvimento Acelerado da Região do Limpopo e Incomati) State Secretariat for the Development of the Incomati and Limpopo Region
TFCA - Transfrontier Conservation Areas
TNS - Total National Strategy
UEM – (Universidade Eduardo Mondlane) Universidade Eduardo Mondlane
UNCHR- United Nation Council for Refugees
UNHCR - United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees or UN Refugees Agency
USAID- United States Agency for International Development
WNLA / WENELA - Witwatersrand Native Labour Association
WRRP - University of the Witwatersrand Rural Research Program
WWF - World Wildlife Foundation
ZANU - PF- The Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZNLA- Zimbabwe National Liberation Arm
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Administrative posts - administrative units within circunscrições encompassing many African villages. During the colonial period, administrative posts were the smallest organisational units directed by a white Portuguese officer (chefe de posto) appointed by the colonial government, serving under the administrator of the circunscrição.

Assimilado - literally, an assimilated person, an African with sufficient education and material wealth to qualify for supposed equality under civil law with whites.¹

Chefe de posto – administrator of African villages.

Cipaio - African police officer working for the colonial administration

Circunscrição or circunscrições (pl.) - small territorial units created within a colonial district and encompassing several administrative posts. In the present political administration in Mozambique, the circunscrições are equivalent to districts. Within circunscrições, there were administrative posts (postos administrativos).

Concelhos – colonial townships in Mozambique.

Escudo - Portuguese unit of currency created in the Republican period (1910-1926).

Hosi – designation used for a king in southern Mozambique.

Lobolo – bride price.

Machilla - palanquin used to carry (Portuguese) colonial officials in rural areas.

Nduna – African task manager or assistants of régulo and traditional authorities in African villages.

Regedorias - groups of African settlements.

Régulo - traditional leader and a headman of an African village.

Reis - the basic unit of Portuguese currency until 1910.

Sul do Save - Mozambique south of the Save River.

Xima - African name for maize porridge.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Background
In the late 19th century, the Portuguese came to dominate the southern Mozambique hinterland and established administrative structures to take control over the local populations and exploit natural resources especially the local forests and fauna. As in most white settler colonies in Africa, from 1896 to 1897 the Portuguese forced Africans from the age of 18 years and above to pay taxes for each hut used as a house. Accordingly, Africans from remote rural areas were compelled to leave their home villages and seek employment in the cities and towns in Mozambique or migrate to South Africa in search of employment to earn some money to meet the new hut tax obligations, buy goods for their families, and pay for lobola or bride price.

In 1910, the Portuguese administration unified into a single regulation the hunting rules of the Sul de Save Province. From then onwards, all individuals wishing to hunt in Mozambique, whatever their social status, had to apply for hunting licences and pay a fee for the activity. Further restrictions were imposed on Africans as they were only allowed to hunt small, and not big game or caça miúda in forests surrounding their villages.\(^2\) Literally, the colonial hunting laws were aimed at limiting Africans from continuing to engage in hunting for commercial purposes; presumably, to limit competition between them and white settlers. However, in areas beyond the sphere of Portuguese control, some Africans continued to hunt for food while others were engaged in hunting for commercial purposes. These Africans used a part of their incomes to pay for their hut taxes.

In the early 1920s, the government of the Union of South Africa worked toward the establishment of game reserves along the Eastern Transvaal border with Mozambique (the Sabi and Shingwedzi game reserves).\(^3\) In 1923, these game reserves were merged into a national park,


which, in 1926, became known as the Kruger National Park (KNP).\textsuperscript{4} From 1926 onwards, South African authorities imposed greater control over hunting along the Eastern Transvaal border with Mozambique and demanded that the Portuguese establish a national park in Mozambique contiguous to the KNP. Such a park would have dual objectives. It would simultaneously function as a buffer zone to the KNP and protect wildlife in Mozambique. The Portuguese authorities rejected this request. They argued that the region south of Elephants River to the south end of the colony near the KNP had a high number of African settlements with local people devoted to agriculture and cattle keeping as part of their subsistence. Therefore, creating a national park in such an area would lead to evictions and relocations of the local communities in areas outside the park. Such measures, argued the Portuguese authorities with a tinge of benevolence, would worsen the already bad living conditions of the local cultivators and their families because, besides the land that they used to produce crops for their survival, they did not have any alternative means for their survival.\textsuperscript{5}

Owing to the growing interest of the Portuguese administration in demarcating areas for hunting related activities, in 1930 the Portuguese administration transformed the Natives Reserve of the circunscrição of Alto Limpopo into a hunting reserve. Despite this shift, no measures were put in place to relocate Africans to villages situated outside of the reserve. Instead, Africans continued living within the hunting reserve despite the threats that hunting activities posed to their lives. In the late 1930s, Africans were to experience another change in their lives. The Portuguese introduced cotton production in Mozambique and coerced Africans in the reserve to grow cotton. Quite often, the cotton promoters used the best African lands to grow cotton and consumed cultivators’ time that could otherwise had been spent on food crops. Such situations resulted in crop failure and famines and compelled Africans to rely on hunting for food. Indeed, the increase of hut taxes from 1942 onwards gave rise to an upsurge in hunting for commercial purposes. The money Africans got from the sale of bush meat at Mavodze shops (cantinas) was used to pay the hut taxes and other services.


\textsuperscript{5}AHM- Fundo do Governo-Geral. Cx 178/C3: Pasta Caça, Transgressões e Multas, 1926/1933: Nota da Direcção dos Serviços de Administração Civil nº 926/2675 de 27/10/1927
In 1961, the Portuguese authorities turned the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve into a wildlife utilization zone, popularly known in Portuguese as *Coutada* 16. This shift was made to enable private safari companies to participate in the management of the area and contribute to the improvement of biodiversity management through the development of tourism infrastructure.\(^6\) The Portuguese wanted to transform the lands situated north of the Elephants River into an area reserved to exclusive protection of fauna and resettle the local communities in villages situated out of the Coutada 16. Nonetheless, this objective was not achieved due to a combination of factors. The company appointed by the state to control the hunting reserve made few investments in infrastructure and hired a limited number of Africans to supervise hunting. Additionally, after independence, the Frelimo party that came into power in June 1975 changed the resettlement plans designed by the Portuguese government to relocate families in Massingir district affected by the construction of the Massingir dam.

In early 1978, the Frelimo government officials moved families that lived in the flood plains along the Elephants valley to the upper lands in Coutada 16. This was done regardless of the fact that the area was uninhabitable as it lacked necessities such as sources of drinking water, fertile soils for cropping and appropriate vegetation for cattle keeping. The situation resulted in widespread stomach diseases, animal diseases, and famines. Once again, hunting for food and gathering became alternative livelihood strategies for the survival of these communities. Some families went back to the dam shores to open new fields to plant maize and grow vegetables to enable them to survive until the next maize season.\(^7\)

Immediately after the relocation of these communities to communal villages in Coutada 16, an armed conflict broke out involving the Mozambican government army and RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance) rebel forces. The intensity of armed conflict from 1985 to

\(^6\)The representative of the Governor-General of Mozambique Rui de Araújo Ribeiro by the Ordinance nº14987 of 1/05/1961 converted the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve into a Hunting Concession nº 16 known in Portuguese as Coutada 16

\(^7\)The removal of the families that had their houses and fields along the Elephants valley and in the area designed for the Massingir dam reservoir to upper lands in Coutada 16 started in early February 1977. Due to the quick filling of the reservoir some of the families that had not yet completed maize harvesting were obliged to leave their production behind.
1992 forced the local communities to leave their villages and seek refuge in safer places within and across national borders. The armed conflict contributed to the devastation of the wildlife not only in Coutada 16 but also in almost all rural areas in Mozambique. The end of armed conflict in October 1992 enabled about 5000 displaced people from the district of Massingir to return to their home villages. The resettlement of Mozambican refugees along the KNP east border with Mozambique was a huge concern for the South African authorities who feared an increase in illegal hunting along the common border in periods of crisis (drought and crops failure). Moreover, due to international criticism of the KNP’s elephant culling methods, the South African authorities began to see Coutada 16 as an alternative place to relocate large numbers of elephants from the KNP, thereby reducing their negative impact on the environment.

The end of Apartheid in South Africa and armed conflicts in Angola and Mozambique enabled southern African states to work on regional plans for preservation of wildlife and natural ecosystems along the common borders. From 1996 to 2002, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) member states worked on both legal and financial issues for the establishment of Trans-frontier Conservation Areas (TFCA) in the region. In 2001, the GoM transformed Coutada 16 into the LNP and later in 2002, it was included in the GLTP. The establishment of the GLTP turned into reality Hertzog’s 1927 desire to create a transnational conservation area across South Africa and Mozambique. The adoption of the KNP management model (where communities are excluded from parks) in the LNP is currently forcing the GoM to relocate about 7,000 people living in the “core conservation zone” in village situated outside the park. Effectively, the local communities will lose their ancestral land and resources (forest and wildlife) that for many years they depend on for their survival.

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11Although, the Mozambican Land Law (19/97) and the Forest and Wildlife Law (10/99) restricts local populations presence in national parks, nowadays, without any exception, all national parks and game reserves have communities inside.
Aims
The aims of this study are to investigate the history of the communities living in the south western Mozambique borderland in the 20th century. Its central focus is on how the changing nature of conservation politics and practices impacted on the lives and livelihoods of these communities and fauna. The research seeks to deepen our understanding of the history of this particular region and to demonstrate the importance of focusing on the intersection of environmental and socio-economic factors in the processes of rural transformation in Mozambique and specifically in the south western region. The study analyses the implications of the advent of colonialism in hunting in southern Mozambique and deepens our understanding of the impact of the monetization of African economies in relation to hunting. It specifically examines hunting practices and the evolution of hunting regulations in the colonial and post-colonial periods and the establishment of hunting reserves in southern Mozambique.

The beginning of construction of the Massingir dam in 1972 resulted in removals of families that had their houses and fields in the flood plain areas along the Elephants River and their relocation to upper lands in Coutada 16. By focusing on this particular project, the study seeks to elucidate the extent to which the late colonial and early post-colonial development projects affected the lives of remote rural populations, local ecosystems, and fauna in Mozambique and particularly in my area of study (the south western Mozambique borderland or Coutada 16). Lastly, the study examines the disruption caused by armed conflict in Mozambique with particular focus on the Massingir region and the extent to which the armed conflict affected local peoples’ lives, their livelihoods, and fauna. Accordingly, the study also documents the process of rehabilitation of fauna in Coutada 16 undertaken by the Government of Mozambique soon after the civil conflict and its transformation into the LNP as well as its further integration into the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP). It brings new insights to the relationship between conservation and community development in Mozambique, particularly in the Massingir region in the period following independence.

In 1927 the South African government first requested that the Portuguese authorities establish a conservation area in Mozambique contiguous to the Kruger Nation Park (KNP). However, lack
of financial resources of the colonial authorities in Mozambique, poor planning in the period following the independence (construction of the Massingir dam and resettlements caused by the filling of the reservoir) and the war that followed Mozambique’s independence hindered the accomplishment of such an objective. In 2001, the Mozambican Government (GoM) transformed the Coutada 16 into the Limpopo National Park. In fact, this transformation was achieved due to a combination of factors. The GoM needed to rehabilitate ecosystems destroyed by war in south western Mozambique as well as implement community conservation and development projects. The end of Apartheid in South Africa, and the ensuing political, economic and environmental cooperation between SADC countries allowed Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe to work on a transnational conservation Project that in 2002, resulted in the establishment of the GLTP (Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park). This is composed of the LNP in Mozambique, the KNP in South Africa and the Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe (GNP).

Wolmer argues that KNP authorities’ concerns about resettlement in the border region of Coutada 16 of Mozambican refugees, who in times of crop failure would rely on bush meat for food and enter KNP territory to hunt “illegally” as well as the need to remove fences to allow dislocation of some elephants to neighbouring parks, especially to Coutada 16, are other reasons that led the South African government to persuade Mozambique to transform Coutada 16 into the LNP and its further integration in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park. Indeed, this study discusses the first steps toward the establishment of the LNP and its integration into the GLTP.

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12AHM: GG. Cx. 178/C3; Reservas e Parques de Caça - Letter from J.B.M. Hertzog to the Mozambique General Governor in Lourenço Marques. 9/8/1927
13The working group was co-chaired by Mr. Abdul Adamo from the National Directorate of the Forestry and Wildlife in Mozambique and by Dr. S C Joubert the then warden of the KNP. For more detailed information on this regard see Joubert, S. 2007. The Kruger National Park: A History. Volume II, High Branching, Johannesburg, p. 320
14The establishment of the Limpopo National Park and its further integration into the GLTP was financially and technically supported by the Government of Mozambique, international donors (World Bank, the German Development Bank) and conservation agencies such as the Peace Park Foundation (PPF) and the World Conservation Union (IUCN); see Wolmer, William 2003. “Transboundary Conservation: the politics of ecological integrity in Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park.” JSAS, 29 (1): 262-278; see also DNAC. 2003. Limpopo National Park: Management and Development Plan. Ministry of Tourism of Mozambique: National Directorate for Conservation Areas. Maputo; Milgroom, Jessica & Marja Spierenburg. 2008. “Induced volition: resettlement from the Limpopo National Park, Mozambique” Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 26 (4): 435-448, Soto,
The study also discusses the literature about African history and the beginning of international conservation policies in Africa. This literature provides useful links to understand the problems faced by the Portuguese to implement measures to protect fauna and to enforce hunting regulations in Mozambique. It also helps to understanding philosophies underpinning conservation and development projects worldwide and particularly in my area of study. The construction of modern state by Frelimo in the years following the independence and its development policies are also topics discussed in this study. Considering the paucity of literature on colonial conservation policies and practices in the south western Mozambique borderland, the study answers the following core questions and related ones:

- How did the establishment of the Portuguese administrative system in the south western Mozambique borderland affect the lives of the communities and how did they affect the environment as well as fauna?
- What broad colonial and post-colonial state conservation policies state were introduced and how did they specifically affect the socio-economic dynamics and environmental transformations in the south western Mozambique borderland?
- How did the late colonial and early post-colonial development policies affect the environment in the Massingir region (construction of the Massingir dam and armed conflict)?
- What national and regional initiatives were implemented in Mozambique to rehabilitate ecosystems destroyed by the civil conflict?

Rationale

When I was in primary school, I came across some texts about hunting and slavery in the Gaza-Nguni state and since then I have remained fascinated by how hunting has been central to shaping the economy, social relationships, increase political power, or cleavages amongst African chiefdoms and between them and the colonial state and its various constituents. One of the texts was written by Diocleciano Fernando das Neves, a Portuguese hunter and trader who in the 1800s travelled to the hinterland of southern Mozambique in search of ivory. Das Neves had been to Gungunhane’s kraals and wrote a diary about elephant hunting in southern Mozambique. This and other texts enlightened me on the centrality of hunting and especially elephant hunting in the making of the political economy of southern Mozambique before the advent of colonialism.¹⁵

Despite the fact that the late 20th century academic texts have traced the origins of hunting in pre-colonial Mozambique, they paid little attention to the evolution of conservancy in colonial and post-colonial periods.¹⁶ A considerable number of historical studies on southern Mozambique have given much emphasis on the colonial war in the Gaza state, labour migration from southern Mozambique to the South African mining industry and its impact on both colonial and local economies.¹⁷ This study is important to the extent that it expands the readers’ knowledge on

¹⁵Das Neves book is amongst the oldest books focusing particularly on slavery and hunting in the southern Mozambique hinterland and the East Transvaal. Das Neves, Diocleciano Fernando. 1878. Itinerário de uma viagem a caça dos elefantes. Lisboa: Typografia Universal
environmental historiography on Mozambique, as it re-examines existing colonial and post-colonial texts (primary and secondary sources) on conservation and development, and brings about fresh insights on conservancy in Mozambique.

To date, there is very limited academic literature on hunting and conservation and more broadly on the environmental history of Mozambique. The existing studies on forest management, environmental transformation or the extent to which local communities were involved in the management of local resources, were written by ecologists, environmentalists and geographers in the period following the establishment of the GLTP. These texts, however, paid little attention to the history of environmental transformations in the area. The literature does not examine hunting practices by both Europeans and Africans and their implications for conservancy. For example, how colonial rule or the imposition of hut taxes, hunting fees, cotton production affected the lives of the local communities and what strategies Africans put in place for their survival (e.g.: hunting, labour migration, etc.). This study provides fresh historical analysis and insights into migration and conservation practices in the south western Mozambique borderland; it illuminates conservation politics and practices in Mozambique more broadly, and makes a significant contribution to Mozambique environmental history by documenting the evolution of conservation policies and development practices in the Massingir region.

The changing paradigms of conservation from fenced national parks to trans-boundary conservation parks are forcing southern African states to bring down the fences and create

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transnational parks also known as Trans-frontier Conservation Areas (TFCA). Presently, communities living in the core conservation area of the LNP are being relocated in different villages outside the park. This research is therefore relevant to the extent that it documents the history of the communities living in the LNP prior to its inclusion in the GLTP and their relocation in villages situated outside of the LNP.

During the development of this study, new texts on colonialism and hunting in southern Mozambique came out, namely an article and PhD thesis by Dias Coelho and McKeown respectively. These historians have made substantial contributions to the conservation and hunting history of Mozambique. Dias Coelho focuses on general issues pertaining to colonial law with regards to hunting in southern Mozambique but does not focus on any specific region. My thesis complements Dias Coelho’s work as it focused particularly on the south west Mozambique borderland and it covers a wider period (20th century) while Coelho’s thesis focus on the period from 1885 to 1930. McKeown’s thesis focuses on the history of the Gorongosa National Park (1960s to the late 1990s) but did very little research on my area of study. Nonetheless, this thesis complements my work as it focuses on conservation areas that my work has also paid little attention to.

**Delimitation of the study and rationale for the selection of the area of study**
This work interrogates colonial and post-colonial conservation policies and practices in the south western Mozambique borderland. The research pays particular attention on the triangle formed by the South Africa border in the west, the Limpopo River in the north and east and the

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Elephants River in the south. The use of this unit of study allows me to deepen my and the readers’s knowledge about the impact of colonial and post-colonial policies and practices on the local population, ecosystem and fauna in this particular region, while exploring the rationale behind the establishment of the TFCA in the area.

The period of study of this research commences in 1900 when the British invited delegates from France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the Congo Free State to the Convention on the Preservation of Wildlife, Birds and Fish in Africa, which took place in London on 19th May 1900. This Convention represented the beginning of conservancy in Africa. Moreover, it appears that it was only after this Convention that the Portuguese colonial administration in Mozambique issued laws (1903, 1904, 1906, 1910, 1932, 1936, 1941, 1944, 1951 and 1956) to regulate hunting and allow the collection of revenues through a system of fees imposed on licensed hunters. Therefore, the beginning of the 20th century marked a new era in conservation policies in Mozambique.

The study ends in 2002 when the LNP was included in the GLTP. The inclusion of the LNP into the GLTP was followed by measures to protect the elephant and other species. As a result, hunting is controlled and local populations are forbidden to kill wild species. From then onward, only the officials of the Park’s staff have the responsibility to control human and wildlife conflicts. From the inception of the GLTP, it became clear that about 7000 people living in 8 villages located in the Shingwedzi catchment would be resettled outside the LNP to allow the protection of fauna and development of tourism.

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Figure 1: Regional setting of the Great Limpopo Conservation Area

Map 2: Villages of Limpopo National Park in Mozambique

Geography of the area of study

This study focuses on the south western Mozambique borderland or the triangle formed by the South Africa border in the west, the Limpopo River in the north and east and the Elephants River in the south. The administrative governance of this area of study underwent several permutations. The changes were a direct result of the administrative transformation introduced by the Portuguese in the southern Mozambique. For example, before 1942 when the Portuguese introduced administrative changes in the Gaza district, the area of study (triangle formed by the South African border in the west, the Elephants River in the south and Limpopo River in the north and east) was part of the region or circunscrição de Guijá. From 1942 to 1975, this area fell into two different administrative regions or circunscrições; the region north of Elephants River to the south bank of the Shingwedzi River was part of the circunscrição de Guijá while the regions located south of the Elephants River were part of the Circunscrição de Massingir. In 1923, the area was designated as a Native Reserve. However, in 1930 it was transformed into the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve. Similarly, in 1961 the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve was transformed into Coutada 16 and finally in November 2001, Coutada 16 was transformed into the Limpopo National Park. Because of the administrative changes that implied changes in the names of the same area, I have used in this thesis different designations for the same area when referring to it in different periods.

Currently, the Limpopo National Park is located in Gaza province and it covers 1,123,316 ha of Mopane and mixed Combretum woodlands in the adjacent areas located along the international border with South Africa to the south of the international border with Zimbabwe, in the west of Gaza Province. The climate of the area can be classified as subtropical with warm wet summers and mild dry winters. The average maximum day temperatures increase from south to north, with absolute maximum temperatures of above 40° C being common for the months of November to February and mean annual rainfall also decreases from south to north. Precise rainfall figures are not available for the area. Based on adjacent KNP long-term figures mean annual rainfall varies from the order of 360mm in the far northern part to over 500mm along the Lebombo Mountain crest in the south western part of the Park. Effective rain occurs from September to April with a short dry period of 4 months. The semi-arid climate and agro-ecological conditions influenced
population distribution patterns within the area and resulted in concentration of population along the river banks, namely the Elephants (locally known as O’balule), Limpopo (locally known as Mithi) and Shingwedzi (locally known as Shingwitsi). Moreover, cultivators use the alluvial soils found along these rivers to practice agriculture and to access water for their own and their cattle’s consumption. Away from the main rivers, agriculture is risky as droughts occur regularly, often with devastating consequences to crops and pastures.  

**METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES**

This study is based on qualitative methods ranging from an examination of secondary to primary and oral sources. Based on these sources, I sought to interrogate colonial and post-colonial conservation policies and practices in the south western Mozambique borderland. In 2012, I registered at the University of the Witwatersrand as a PhD candidate. The registration enabled me to access, in the University’s libraries, academic literature such as books, theses and dissertations, as well as online journals through the Wits portal. The review of the secondary sources enabled me to set an analytical approach and develop an argument that guided my research. Based on lacunas of the existing literature and information gathered during my first visit to the fieldwork in the Massingir region, I developed a questionnaire, which I was able to use during my subsequent fieldwork trips in the LNP in 2013, 2014 and 2016.  

**Colonial newspapers**

At the library of the Mozambican Historical Archives, I was able to access colonial journals and newspapers with particular reference to “Jornal Noticias”. The articles included in the

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27 In June 2012, I benefited from a small grant from Elizabeth Lunstrum (Geographer from York University/Canada) to conduct a study on community mobility, conservation and community development in the LNP. This research work enabled me to visit my area of study and conduct preliminary interviews used in my research proposal.

28 *Noticias* is one of the most relevant newspapers in Mozambique, founded in 1933; it contains the day-to-day news about the social, economic and political life of Mozambique. Copies of this newspaper are available at the AHM. I used it to review trends and discussions of issues regarding management of conservation areas and particularly changes in management policies in southern Mozambique in the later 1950s and 1960s. The access to these sources is particularly difficult because there is no index of topics. Due to degraded environment in the newspaper storehouse, access is restricted. I would like to thank the director of AHM Professor Joel Tembe for having allowed me to spend an hour (during many days) reading the newspapers and Professor David Hedges who gave
Portuguese colonial journals were concerned about colonial policies and assessment studies done for the construction of irrigation schemes in southern Mozambique. Although the studies in the colonial journals were meant to benefit a colonial audience, they are very useful sources of information regarding the political and economic life in colonial Mozambique and particularly in my area of study.

Unpublished sources: documents and reports

In 2013, I spent a considerable part of my time researching primary sources at the Mozambican archives namely, Mozambican Historical Archive, Mozambique Institute of Agricultural Research (IIAM) and at the Library of the National Directorate of Water (DNA). At the library of the Ministry of Agriculture – IIAM, I accessed reports produced by the GoM soon after the country’s independence. The reports include assessment studies regarding climate conditions and the fertility of soils in the Massingir region. These documents informed me about conditions of life of the communities removed along the Elephants valley and relocated in communal villages in Coutada 16; the collection includes assessment reports conducted to inform the development of irrigation schemes, a few kilometres downstream of the Massingir dam (Chibotana, Marrenguele and Banga). The documents illuminate my understanding of the colonial and early post-colonial development projects in the Massingir region.

At the library of the Ministry of Public Infrastructure/ National Directorate of Water, I accessed information concerning the construction of the Massingir dam, namely assessment studies, maps, contracts, and annual reports produced by different teams working on the construction of the Massingir dam. The documents in this collection enabled me to understand the State’s objectives in constructing the Dam as well as the process of its construction.

The AHM primary sources repository includes documents about colonial rule in Mozambique; the repository is divided into collections known in Portuguese as *fundos*. During the archival research, I used a reference book that helped me to locate some particular newspapers containing articles on conservation and hunting; without such assistance the research would not have been possible.

29The most important journals accessed at AHM are *Boletim de Estudos da Colónia de Moçambique, Sociedade de Estudos da Colónial de Moçambique, Boletim Trimestral* and *Boletim da Junta de Investigação do Ultramar*. 
research at AHM, I examined documents from the collection of the Governo-Geral de Moçambique; Inspeção Superior sobre Administração e Negócios Indígenas (ISANI), collection or fundo das circunscrições (districts) of Alto Limpopo, Gwijá, and Magude and the collection or fundo do Conselho Nacional das Aldeias Comunais (CNAC). Most of the documents at the AHM are written in Portuguese. My education up to honours degree in History was done in Portuguese. I therefore had no problems in working with Portuguese documents. At the AHM, I also found correspondence written in English and I did not find any problems in reading such documents.

The *Fundo do Governo-Geral* or General-Government collection includes files and documents on colonial rule such as colonial laws and hunting regulations. The section includes official documents and correspondence between the central government and state departments (Interior, Agriculture, Veterinary, and Africans Affairs). This collection includes a special section on Reservas, Parques de Caça e Munições (hunting reserves, parks, hunting and firearms). The collection includes licence books issued to people wishing to hunt in southern Mozambique and dockets of people related to illegal hunting. The use of this collection allows the researcher to know the problems in the hunting fields and responses given by the Portuguese administration (at local levels) to such problems. This repository, accordingly, provides information on the processes through which national and foreigner hunters had to go to obtain hunting licences. The sections also contain documents on the fauna and flora conferences of 1900 and 1933, hunting regulations, diverse correspondence and maps on the delimitation of the southern Mozambican border with Swaziland, Natal and the Transvaal.

The *Fundo da Direcção dos Serviços de Administration Civil* (African Affairs Department collection) includes files and documents of the correspondence between the colonial government and the local administrations. It contains drafts of the 1903 Hunting Regulation and the later regulations. The documents in this collection allowed me to understand the evolution of the colonial hunting regulations and the circumstances in which hunting regulations were issued. Indeed, some documents explain constraints faced by the colonial authorities in the enforcement of each of the hunting regulations. The section also contains a collection of correspondence
between the Portuguese government in Mozambique and neighbouring states. It includes documents dealing with the establishment of the game boards in Mozambique, namely the Lourenço Marques Game Board (Comissão de Caça do Distrito de Lourenço Marques) and the Mozambique Game Board (Comissão de Caça de Moçambique).

The analysis of this section enlightened my knowledge regarding the establishment of colonial borders, the nature and extent of trade between Mozambique and South Africa, animal diseases, erection of fences along the Transvaal and the south western Mozambique border and their effects on surrounding border communities. From the analysis of the files and documents of this section, I understood structural and legislative changes that took place during the colonial period, as well as conflicts arising out of the implementation of colonial rule and measures to resolve them or decisions taken by colonial staff working at the local levels.

The Fundo de Inspeção Superior de Administração dos Negócios Indígenas or Superior Inspection of Native Affairs collection (ISANI) is another important source of information regarding colonial rule. The section includes reports of colonial inspectors about what happened at the local levels in relation to the imposition of colonial rule in southern Mozambique. The reports of the colonial inspectors about colonial administration in southern Mozambique included in this collection cover the period from 1942 to 1956. The reports included what was then confidential notes describing the reality on the ground showing how Africans organised themselves to claim their rights and to solve specific problems, such as cotton production in Alto Limpopo and Guijá, hunting and control of clandestine migration from southern Mozambique to South Africa. The reports of the colonial inspectors on “native affairs” are useful sources of first-hand information regarding the lives of Africans and their relationship with the colonial administration.

The limitations of the documents accessed at the AHM stems from the fact that they do not refer to the daily life of ordinary people (e.g. the social organization, trade, agricultural production, hunting techniques, and environmental transformation). Thus, interviews were used to fill the gap left by official records and complete the narrative by privileging the voices of ordinary
people. Additionally, documents at the AHM are not organised by themes but according to the geographical areas from where they were collected. This categorization of primary documents was time consuming, as I had to go through all documents of a given area and collection (e.g.: circunscrição de Guijá) to identify documents that were relevant to the study.

It has to be acknowledged that colonial texts and documents are profoundly shaped by colonial culture and values. However, used carefully and critically, colonial texts are useful sources of information, which can enable historians to write or re-write the history of ordinary people. For the analyses of colonial documents and texts, Moore-Gilbert suggests that the historian should read between the lines of the colonial text in order to detect the multiple meanings of events and other historical data that are useful for the reinterpretation of the past. The above-mentioned documents were analysed critically and compared with, and read against, other sources, which have different perspectives from those of the coloniser. The use of oral sources was very useful to fill the glaring gaps left by colonial documents.

**Oral sources: engaging with the local communities**

The historian’s position as an ‘outsider’ of a community may possibly inject greater neutrality and objectivity into the process of collection of oral testimony but could also make the project unfeasible and there can be no oral sources if people are not willing to speak. The way the researcher asks questions is crucial in helping interviewees bring to the present their memories of the past. The interviewees were sources of information, which were further interrogated in the light of the available written sources.

During the fieldwork research, I did not only look at the stories as tales by interviewees but I tried to understand the underlying logics and interconnections behind such stories and tales. I conducted about 60 interviews that ensured that all contents are covered and that the trends

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displayed in interviews together with other sources allowed me to write a thesis on the environmental history of the south western Mozambique borderland or former Coutada16.

**Overcoming constraints during fieldwork**

In May 2012, while I was in Maputo, I met my old classmate, Mr. Germano Dimande, who worked for the LNP from 2002 to early 2012. Dimande provided me with useful information for the preparation of the fieldwork research in 2014 and indicated some very important informants that I had to meet in the LNP. In June 2012, I visited the area for the first time. During my visit, the park officials were conducting a census to inform the LNP resettlement programs. One of the park officials advised me and my colleagues, Filipe Mate from the Eduardo Mondlane University-Mozambique and Francis Massé from York University-Canada, not to conduct collective interviews of more than 4 interviewees so that people would not identify our work with resettlement meetings. The park officials advised us to send our local guide, Mr. Rafael Mbumbi in advance to introduce our work in the community. After Rafael had been granted permission, we went to introduce ourselves to the interviewees and conduct the research.

During my fieldwork trips in LNP in June 2012, July 2013, January, February 2014, and April 2016, I visited 5 villages, namely Massingir Velho, Mavodze, Mbingo, Machamba, Chimangue and the new village of the Massingir Velho community established in Mucatine in August 2016. In November 2013, when was I working on logistics that would allow me to conduct my research in the further northern village of LNP, namely Makandazulo A and B, I was advised by the LNP staff to not go to such areas because of the existence of RENAMO soldiers north of the Save River, which made the area insecure. Moreover, community members were furious because weeks earlier the KNP rangers had killed four rhino illegal hunters from the local villages. Given

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34Mr. Germano Mausse Dinamde was my colleague at the History Department - Eduardo Mondlane University when we were still doing honours in History (1996-2001).

35When I visited the village of Massingir Velho in 2012 to 2014, the local communities were still living in the LNP. In August 2015 the LNP transferred the about 500 families from the Village of Massingir Velho in the core conservation area of the LNP to Mukatine. This village is located about 50 km southwest from the main entrance gate of the LNP.
this security situation, I limited my fieldwork to the south bank of Shingwedzi River to the north bank of the Elephants River.

Fortunately, I conducted interviews in the most populated villages that had undergone the main social and environmental transformation, i.e. relocations due to the construction of the dam, cotton production, labour migration, displacement during the civil war and resettlements that followed the war. I feel that the situation described above did not negatively influence the final quality of the study. Moreover, north of Shingwedzi (Makandazulo) there is a good anthropological research done by Rebecca Witter from Georgia University-Canada, which I appreciated so much and I have used in this thesis.36

Due to the nature of my research topic, I conducted semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions. The use of semi-structured interviews with “key informants” enabled me to collect people’s experiences that are not available in any other recorded formats. The use of interviews allowed me to capture information about different processes and dynamics of the local communities over time. Interviews with key informants informed me about events that happened in the past and the views of the informants on such events.

Owing to the nature of my research, i.e. analysis of colonial and post-colonial conservation policies, my interviewees were constituted mainly by elderly people - men and women, former hunters, former mineworkers, cultivators, herders and traditional leaders – who had information about the key issues being discussed. I included some youth particularly to discuss issues related to post-colonial economic and political contexts including the lives of the local populations during the civil war and the process of the transformation of Coutada 16 into LNP. I am proficient in local languages, Shangane and Portuguese, therefore, there was no need for me to rely on translators. The language proficiency enabled me to have access to the nuances, proverbial and even idiomatic expressions articulated in these languages without any difficulty.

The use of interviews enabled me to recover past experiences of communities in former Coutada16. These experiences are not available in official documents, reports, newspapers, etc. Moreover, the communities live in a remote rural area. As such, most of their experiences regarding their relationship with the environment are not registered in the official records. The use of interviews allowed me to recall memories about their experiences while representing themselves as actors of the same past (what happened in their past, activities, their jobs, wishes, relationship with colonial authorities and Frelimo government).

During the fieldwork research I came to understand that while men were open to talk about hunting, labour migration to South Africa and the impact of the Massingir dam, women were more open to talk about social and labour transformations in Coutada 16 (cropping, their role in hunting, cattle keeping and the burden of work imposed by the opening of new family farms and communal farms, etc.). The female interviewees had tales on cotton production in the Massingir region, involvement of the traditional authorities in cotton production systems and punishment by the Portuguese when Africans were not able to collect first class cotton. Thus, I put much effort into collecting stories that both men and women wanted and felt free to talk about. At the end of the research work, I felt that information given by men complemented that given by women and vice-versa. Issues on war were very difficult to talk about. I remember that in 2014, while I was conducting interviews in the village of Massingir Velho and talking with an elder woman about the armed conflict, she recalled the horrors of the war and the way she lost her belongings, her parents and started crying. That was a very emotional moment. Unfortunately, one had to manage such delicate situations to allow research to continue.

**REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE**

The review examines literature and debates on the rise of conservation in Africa and particularly in the southern Africa region. It pays attention to analytical models of politics underpinning the construction of large projects (dams and irrigation schemes), where implementation implies, and often results in, forced resettlements, rupture of the social fabric of communities and the undermining of their livelihoods. Above all, this section is meant to examine the strengths and shortcomings of the existing body of literature in methodological, historical and empirical terms.
In general the literature under review can be classified into eight main categories: pre-colonial environment and African environmental history; the rise of conservation in Africa; the changing narratives of conservation; community-based conservation, environmental management in former Coutada 16; ethnicity and livelihood strategies in former Coutada 16 and resettlements in former Coutada 16 and labour migration to South Africa.

**Pre-colonial environments and African environmental history**

In the 1970s, historians in the United States began to have much appreciation of descriptions of nature. In southern Africa, the new Environmental History has allowed historians to re-write African History on the eve of colonialism and even during the colonial period. The close relationship of history and other scientific fields such as geography, anthropology and medicine has allowed more in-depth analysis of African environments. Rather than focusing only on the history of colonial institutions in Africa or the relationship between the colonizers and colonized, white and black, environmental historians have come to focus on the environmental transformations (landscapes, water, fires, fauna) and the way political, social and economic factors influence them or how they, in turn, are influenced by the environment.

In the late 1970s, a considerable number of historians who wrote on the causes of the 17th century Mfecane and its legacies re-examined pre-colonial and existing contemporary texts. They have produced historical texts on the geopolitics in southern Africa in the late 18th century and the life of Africans before the imposition of colonial rule. These texts offer clues and explanations about the socio-economic transformation (environmental changes, migrations,

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population pressure, struggle for the control of fertile land, political organisation of local chiefdoms) in Zululand and its consequences in southern Africa as well as the establishment of the Gaza-Nguni state in southern Mozambique. The reconstructive debates in southern African history, particularly the *Mfecane Aftermath* are useful sources to understand environmental changes in the southern Africa in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.\(^{41}\)

The development of trade and hunting in the hinterland in the 18th and 19th centuries, particularly the ivory trade had an impact on the environment, socio-economic activities and resulted in the formation of new powerful political units.\(^{42}\) Indeed, in the southern Mozambique hinterland, hunting for commercial purposes and specifically the ivory trade led some African cultivators to abandon their activities and became professional hunters known as *phissa* or *maphissa* (pl.). Junod, a Swiss missionary and anthropologist who analysed the life of people of southern Mozambique on the advent of colonialism classified African hunters of southern Mozambique in two categories. He attributed the first category to the ordinary hunters or people who hunted for subsistence known locally as *balhoti* and the second category to the professional hunters known as *phissa* or *maphissa* (pl.).\(^{43}\) Accordingly, other Africans were involved in the long distance trade, transporting European manufacturers from Indian Ocean ports (mainly Delagoa Bay and Inhambane) to the southern Mozambique hinterland and East Transvaal and African goods from East Transvaal and southern Mozambique hinterland to the Indian Ocean ports.\(^{44}\)

The *maphissa*, as the African traders involved in long distance trade between the interior and Delagoa Bay, could stay long periods away from home and acted as intermediaries between African elites and the white hunters and traders. By the late 19th century, understanding their difficulties as they operated with inferior firearms compared to those used by Europeans and lacked mobility (donkeys instead of horses used by their European counterparts), the *maphissa*


sought alliances with African chiefs as a means of survival. They gave half their hunting produce to the chief in whose land the animal was killed. These offerings functioned as a hunting “licence” and they would be allowed to stay and hunt within the local forests. In the early 20th century, the *maphissa* used dogs and donkeys in hunting. Junod argues that the declining ivory trade in early 20th century forced some of these African professional hunters to settle permanently in the Transvaal, while some returned and settled permanently in southern Mozambique.

Today, there is lack of evidence to conclude that African hunters of southern Mozambique are part or descendants of these skilled hunters. Moreover, it seems that after the colonial occupation of Mozambique, the term *maphissa* was no longer used to refer to professional hunters. Thus, all hunters (professional and non-professional) became known as *valhoti*. However, the early 20th century hunters of south western Mozambique had many similarities with professional hunters described by Junod and other historians. My reading of this situation is that the change of terminology was made to avoid their persecution by the colonial authorities as the colonial hunting regulation prohibited Africans from hunting of big game or just hunting for commercial purposes.

Evidences indicate that at the turn of the 19th century, game decreased considerably in southern Africa owing to a combination of factors. Liesegang points out that Rinderpest, which struck the region in 1867, contributed to the reduction of the populations of ungulates such as buffalo, zebra and several species of antelopes and cattle. Additionally, in the same period the area witnessed droughts and locusts, which had a negative impact on agricultural production and also led to famines. Undoubtedly, the decrease of both wild and domestic stock led to a scarcity of meat and Africans tended to exert intense pressure on the available natural resources and

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escalating hunting. Delius’s analysis of the impact of drought, famines and cattle diseases on Pedi societies of the Transvaal offers us clues into the responses of African societies to periods of crises. Accordingly, Delius has convincingly argued that hunting and labour migration became strategies that were put in place to cope with the crises. 

The works of Diocleciano das Neves, Alan Smith, Roger Wagner, António Rita-Ferreira, Patrick Harries, Jean Penvenne, Genrhard Liesegang, Kenet Hermele, and Lisa Ann Brock provide additional insights for the analysis of the politics, economy and society in southern Mozambique and its hinterland on the eve of colonial occupation. The main topics discussed in these studies are related to the ivory trade at Delagoa Bay and southern Mozambique hinterland, the decrease of game north of Delagoa Bay and increase of hunting in southern Mozambique hinterland to East Transvaal, the establishment of colonial rule and labour migration from southern Mozambique to South Africa. This study goes further than the above mentioned authors as it bring about new knowledge of the relationship between hunting, conservation and development in the 20th century.

The changing narratives of conservation

The re-writing of pre-colonial environmental history allows historians to review colonial environmental politics and the extent to which ordinary people were affected by conservation politics and the strategies adopted by ordinary people to cope with the changing systems of natural resource management. In this this regard, John Mackenzie argues that the study of

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Environmental history is always conditioned by the existence of sources. Accordingly, African environmental history writing is severely influenced by the nature of colonial documents and has tended to be the history of the conservation institutions in Africa or the impact of colonial and post-colonial conservation policies on local communities.\(^{51}\) As a result, there is a tendency by some environmentalists and historians to see pre-colonial societies as living in harmony with nature, or living lightly on the environment and not depleting forest resources and wildlife. However, it is important to acknowledge that all human activities alter the composition of the world. I tried to overcome such limitations by bringing into historical analysis the voices of the local communities in south western Mozambique and the way they understood colonial institutions.\(^{52}\)

Historical accounts indicate that hunting in Africa dates back to the pre-colonial period and most often it was done to fill the gaps of food or to supply local communities with meat. Probably, the monetization of African economies and development of the ivory trade contributed significantly to push Africans to engage in hunting for commercial purposes. Carruthers examined the evolution of scientific game ranching in South Africa and observes that western researchers who investigated colonial conservation in Africa did not analyse the implications of colonialism in hunting activities. For Carruthers, the colonial authorities sold firearms to Africans. She further argues that the monetization of African economies led to the need for sources of income. Accordingly, in the later 19\(^{th}\) century the market was the main driver of game hunting. In other words, it was the Europeans who pushed Africans to embark on the ivory trade.\(^{53}\) Hunting by Africans and Europeans is at the centre of analysis in this study.

The increase of hunting, of course, leads to the reduction of game. Indeed, by the late 19\(^{th}\) century, the perceived diminution of game in many regions of Africa, led pressure groups


\(^{53}\)Carruthers, Jane. 2008. “Wilding the farm or farming the wild?” p. 164
(colonial government staff, hunters, tourists) to become more active in promoting hunting legislation and establishment of societies dedicated to wildlife preservation. These groups, acting under the umbrella of their colonial counterparts attempted to shape, in a variety of ways the interaction between people and natural resources. These groups contributed to the establishment of colonial hunting regulations, parks and hunting reserves. However, it appears that their objective was the control of the access to hunting frontiers and controls the game for their own benefits rather than to benefit local communities. For example, in the later 1880s, the British in Kenya, Southern and Northern Rhodesia and the Germans in East Africa created regulations and excluded Africans from hunting pursuits. They also imposed several restrictions on hunting techniques (nets and fire) and in some areas removed the local population from hunting reserves.

In the late 19th century, the British and the Germans began to put pressure on the Portuguese authorities to improve wildlife policies in their African colonies. At the convention on the preservation of wild life, birds and fish in Africa which took place in London on 19th May 1900, Portugal and other European states (German, Italy, Spain, Belgian and United Kingdom) agreed to put forward measures to prevent mass killing of wild animals and create wildlife sanctuaries as national parks and hunting reserves. In the early 20th century, the Portuguese passed hunting laws for the territory under their direct administration (southern Mozambique) and persuaded the Nyassa and Mozambique chartered companies to introduce hunting regulation in territories under their administration. In 1921, the Mozambique Company that controlled much of central Mozambique region ordered the creation of a hunting reserve of 1,000 km² in the Gorongosa region. However, no game reserves were created in this period in southern Mozambique.

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56 Gibson, Clark C. 1999. *Politicians and poachers*, p. 27
57 Gifibl, Bernhard. 2006. “German colonialism”, p. 126
58 In 1960 an additional area of 4,300 km² was added to the game reserve and then transformed into Gorongosa National Park. Since 1960s, Gorongosa National Park is the largest national park in Mozambique.
The review of the literature demonstrates the late 19th century and early 20th century colonial conservation politics and practices in the British and German colonies of southern Africa were dominated by western conservation approaches where conservation required the establishment of areas for human dwelling aside from nature and fauna (Fortress conservation or Coercive conservation). This approach sees inclusion of people in protected areas as harmful to conservation.  

Research conducted in Mozambique demonstrates that the Portuguese administration was not concerned with environmental sustainability but economic gains from fees charged for hunting licences and for private logging. For example, in 1923, the South African government merged the Shingwedzi and Sabi Game Reserves and in 1926 created the KNP. On the Mozambican side, the Portuguese put little efforts into protecting fauna along the Mozambique and South African border. Instead, the Portuguese administration gazetted hunting regulations that allowed it to take advantage of hunting fees paid by sports and professional hunters. Only in the 1930s, they established hunting reserves in southern Mozambique, namely: Maputo Game Reserve for the preservation of elephants, Alto Limpopo Game Reserve in the now Gaza province, Panda and Zinave hunting reserves in Inhambane province. However, these game reserves remained “paper reserves” with lack of staff to supervise its areas and to enforce the game regulations.

The diminishing of wild stock in the southern Mozambique hinterland due to uncontrolled hunting and the proximity of the area to the KNP forced hunters from southern Mozambique to find in the KNP a new hunting frontier. This resulted in conflicts involving South African police and “illegal African hunters” from Mozambique. The difference in conservation practices

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between the Portuguese and the South African government explains why the South African government demanded that Portugal establish a conservation area on the border with the KNP. By obliging Portugal to establish such a conservation area, the KNP authorities were sure that it would contribute to the protection of the Kruger’s Park’s wildlife as well as in Mozambique. As can be seen, the study of conservation politics and practices in the south western Mozambique borderland implies a deep understanding of the conservation philosophies underpinning conservation objectives of the South African and the Portuguese colonial authorities and of the extent to which their practices affected ordinary peoples’ lives along the common border.

As mentioned earlier in this section, after the establishment of protected areas (parks and game reserves), colonial authorities in South Africa, Kenya, Rhodesia, West Africa and Tanganyika forbade indigenous communities from engaging in traditional hunting pursuits, and Africans who hunted for the pot or for trade were labelled as “illegal hunters” or “poachers.” According to Ellis, the pursuit of conservationist initiatives in most southern African countries led colonial states to restrict the local population’s access to natural resources and in some cases, ordinary people were forced to abandon their ancestral lands to make space for the establishment of colonial parks. Based on the research I conducted in south western Mozambique borderlands, I elucidate under what circumstances Africans hunted for commercial purposes, or for their households survival.

Similarly, Gibson takes up the discussion on the concept of “poachers” in Zambia and Zimbabwe. He argues that wildlife policies in Africa are affecting local communities’ interaction with the wildlife. Gibson also argues that there is a difference between “hunting practices” and “poaching”. While local communities hunt for their survival, “poachers” and “outsiders” hunting activities are driven by economic gains. As he states, for most of the time, poaching activities escalate when wildlife products like ivory and rhino horns are given high economic value on the market. My argument is that when people in rural areas lack incentives to secure

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65Gibson, Clark C. 1999. *Politicians and poachers*, p. 54-57
their basic needs, the tendency is for local communities to seek alternative means of survival by, for example, escalating hunting activities. In this thesis, I did consider as poaching the killing of wild species by individuals who are conscious of their practices. i.e, hunting forbidden game or practice hunting in a forbidden territory (ex: Killing of big game for commercial purposes and hunting parties by Mozambicans in the KNP territory), and not in cases where the local communities are engaged in hunting in forests surrounding their villages to extract bush meat for their and their families consumption.

Ellis analysed the relationship between parks and war in southern Africa. According to Ellis, there is a strong relationship between parks management and the army. In most of the South African parks, ex-soldiers were employed as wardens. According to Ellis, this management strategy was used in South African parks to capture the potential of the wardens’ military expertise to fight against illegal hunters. During the civil conflict in Mozambique, some high officials of the South African Defence Forces (SADF) used KNP territory as training ground for RENAMO soldiers, which at that time were fighting against the Frelimo Government. The strategic location of the KNP in relation to Mozambique (unpatrolled forest along the border), enabled RENAMO to use KNP’s forests as corridors used to transport military equipment from South Africa to Mozambique. Ellis’s study demonstrates that there had always been a lack of control by central governmental institutions in parks and game reserves in southern Africa. Most often, soldiers took such opportunity to enrich themselves through illegal hunting. Ellis’ analysis also revealed that RENAMO guerrilla forces contributed to the over-exploitation of wildlife in Mozambique as its armies depended considerably on hunting and livestock for their survival. This study expands knowledge about the relationship between war and conservation practices in the south western Mozambique and maps the consequences of war to wildlife and to local ecosystems.

67Ibidem
68Interview with Simião Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 16/7/2012
Community based conservation
Adams and Hulme’s article provide useful analysis on the philosophy underpinning colonial conservation policies and practices or the way local communities should be empowered to become active partners and beneficiaries of post-colonial conservation projects. In fact, if communities participate in the management of ecosystems and fauna surrounding their villages and share the benefits from their participation in conservation projects, they are more willing to take part in community based conservation programs. Indeed, in the late 1970s, up to the early 1990s there were several debates on the involvement of local communities in the management of local ecosystems. These debates led the conservationists and park managers to abandon the old approaches of conservation that sees inclusion of people in protected areas as harmful to conservation principles and progressively integrate local communities in the management of forests and ecosystems surrounding their villages. This management principle became known as Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) initiatives.

Although the CBNRM approach enjoys consensus among environmentalists and with some examples of success in some of the areas, the approach was not used in the area under study. In November 2001, the GoM converted the former Coutada 16 into LNP. According to the Mozambican Forests and Wildlife Law, all social and economic activities that are harmful to conservation (opening of new areas for farming, grazing and hunting) are prohibited within national parks. For that reason, communities now living in the LNP are being resettled in villages located out of the Park. In other words, it means that in Mozambique the use of CBNRM

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69Adams, William and Hulme, David. “Conservation and communities”, p. 7
72See Mozambican land law, 19/97 and the Mozambican Forest and wildlife law, 10/99
approach to involve communities in the management of the forest surrounding their villages is applicable only to community forests and not to national parks.\textsuperscript{74}

**Environmental management in the LNP**

Few authors have paid attention to the history of the Upper Limpopo or the south western Mozambique borderland, the area that in 1961 became known as Coutada 16. The few sources about this specific area are dissertations by African, American and European scholars who investigated the establishment of the GLTP and some other researchers who paid attention to issues related to politics and practices of trans-frontier conservation in the GLTP.\textsuperscript{75} Although the work of these scholars describes rural transformations in the south western Mozambique borderland now part of the LNP, they pay little attention to lives of the Africans in my chosen area of study and their relationship to the environment.

In a co-authored article, Mavhunga and Spierenburg used archival material to reconstruct the history of the GLTP. They argue that the establishment of conservation initiatives in the areas that now compose the GLTP (KNP in South Africa, Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe and Coutada 16 in Mozambique) destroyed the livelihood strategies of the ordinary people. However, due to the existence of different management principles of the colonizers, the Portuguese on the Mozambican side of the border allowed ordinary people to continue living in the wildlife utilization area (Coutada 16). The work of these scholars is nevertheless important to the extent that it illuminates our understanding of the early history of the south western Mozambique borderland now part of the LNP.\textsuperscript{76}


Apart from the works quoted above, Carruthers’ historical study of the KNP provides a refreshing and comprehensive analysis and offers some very important insights into the relationship of the KNP authorities and communities located on both sides of the border. Although she writes on the environment and conservation history of the KNP, she offers insights into the establishment of the trans-boundary initiatives in southern Africa and early migration history in the south western Mozambique borderland. Carruthers’ work has undoubtedly provided a useful framework and basis for a number of subsequent studies interested in similar issues.\(^\text{77}\) In the same vein, my work builds on and extends her work by looking specifically at a localised study that she hardly paid attention to but resonates with some of her central arguments and themes such as conservation policies and practices in colonial Mozambique.

Carruthers also shows that farming and conservation practices often exist in conflict with each other. The existence of communities in the conservation area means that their lives and livestock are endangered due to their proximity to wild animals like lions.\(^\text{78}\) This means also that wild animals and domestic livestock would compete for grazing spaces and transmittable wildlife diseases would be a threat to the livestock. So far, this dimension of farming and conservation practices has not yet been explored in the former Coutada 16. As is now known, the Portuguese allowed Africans to continue with their livestock-keeping practices in Coutada 16. This situation has implications for preservation of fauna because in periods local people were not able to grow enough food for their subsistence they tend to look for alternative food sources. Thus, my study demonstrates that during droughts and period of crisis (war and famines) gathering and hunting of wild animals became alternative livelihood strategies for their survival.

In a study about women memories of past in Magude district in the period following the civil conflict in Mozambique, Gengenbach demonstrated rural border communities in southern Mozambique has used hunting as source of food in periods of drought or when food is lacking. Equally, they use bush meat as source of proteins to make meat soup which is eaten with rice or


\(^{78}\)Carruthers, Jane. 2008. “Wilding the farm or farming the wild?” p. 160
xima (African name for maize porridge). Gengenbach study is drawn from a complex analysis of oral histories collected in Magude district in the period following the civil war in Mozambique (1992). Although Gengenbach study does not focus particularly on the relationship between conservation and rural development, effectively it useful to this study as it offers a compressive analysis of life, chieftaincies, livelihood strategies and the ways women fight to survival in rural southern Mozambique.79

**Border dynamics, ethnicity and livelihood strategies in Coutada 16**

Scholars agree that the establishment of the colonial borders was a result of state consolidation of territorial space where colonial states created frontiers as a way to demonstrate their areas of influence, control and political autonomy.80 Connor argues that the colonial borders were demarcated without in-depth studies or due regard for their impact on the social relationships and economic interdependence of the local communities. In separate works Connor and Stevenson-Hamilton argue that the result of such colonial practice is that communities and sometimes, ethnic groups found themselves divided between different colonizers.81 As demonstrated in this thesis, along the Mozambique and South African border, kinship ties were and still very useful to allow the survival of local communities during the period of crises (war, draught). During the civil war in Mozambique Shangane communities from Mozambique found refuge in other fellow Shangane communities in South Africa.

Border analysis helps to understand human mobility and social networks that are created or recreated after the establishment of borders and determine the interdependence or lack thereof of the countries and communities located in the border areas. Niehaus’ research in southern Mozambique demonstrated how borders are not closed entities. Populations situated along borderland regions have taken advantage of living in borderlands by exploring the kinship ties

and ethnic relationships existing amongst them. The examples of Shangane communities of the south western Mozambique borderland are illustrative of this scenario. During Manikusse’s massacres in southern Mozambique (1820s), the Zulu and Sotho raids on the Gaza-Nguni state (mid-19th century) Shangane communities from southern Mozambique migrated and established in the Transvaal.

According to Stevenson-Hamilton (the first warden of the KNP), in the early 20th century, differences in hut tax collection in the Transvaal and Mozambique (collection during winter in the Transvaal and summer in Mozambique) also enabled Shangane communities to evade tax payment; during winter, they stayed in Mozambique and in the summer, they returned to the Transvaal. As referred earlier in this section, during the armed conflict of the 1980s, border communities from southern Mozambique left their villages and settled in adjacent Shangane territory in South Africa. These examples demonstrate that people living along the borders have no exclusive identities. They can belong to either one side or both according to factors favourable to their survival at a given period.

Lack of clear demarcation of colonial borders can result in cleavages between colonial powers. In the late 19th century, the Portuguese and the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) authorities claimed the area of south western Mozambique bordering Eastern Transvaal as being part of

83Connor, Teresa K. 2003 “Crooks, commuters and chiefs: home and belonging”; also see Rodgers, Graeme. 2002. When refugees don't go home: post-war Mozambican settlement across the border with South Africa; [PhD] Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand
their territories.\textsuperscript{87} The disputes for the control of the area resulted in cleavages between the Portuguese and the ZAR authorities. In the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century, the Portuguese approached the Transvaal authorities to seek a solution to end the conflict and delimit the borderline separating East Transvaal and south western Mozambique.\textsuperscript{88} As a result, in 1864, a joint commission to discuss the delimitation of the Transvaal and Mozambique border was created and on July 1869, the Portuguese and the Boers reached an agreement and signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Borders, which demarcated the borderline between south western Mozambique and the Transvaal.\textsuperscript{89}

Nowadays, there is a lack of information on the reasons why the two colonial states (Mozambique and South Africa), did not fence the border. Almada states that confrontation and the adoption of opposed political philosophies by neighbouring states are reasons that lead neighbouring states to demarcate and erect fences along their borders.\textsuperscript{90} During the colonial period, the absence of conflicts between the two colonial powers may be the reason explaining the absence of fences along the border.\textsuperscript{91} More recently, scholars have analysed border dynamics on the south western frontier of Mozambique. In such studies, socio political analyses have been useful to explore the social, cultural, power dynamics and political transformations in the communities living in border regions.\textsuperscript{92}

Rodgers explored the lives of Mozambican refugees in South Africa during the Apartheid and post-Apartheid periods. His study is concerned with the strategies used by Mozambican refugees to integrate themselves in the South Africa society (what he calls living away from home). In his study, Rodgers analyses the meaning of “home” to Mozambicans as a strategy they used to remember the social, economic and cultural linkages that they have with home communities in the Massingir region. As Rodgers argues, from the mid-20th century to the 1990s, the livelihoods of the communities of south western Mozambique not only depended on agriculture but also on labour migration. Consequently, the political changes that occurred after 1975 influenced considerably the livelihood strategies of the local people, with the civil war contributing to pushing entire communities near Mozambique’s south western borderland to seek refuge in South Africa. Therefore, once again, kinship ties were crucial to establish network to find employment in South Africa and places to live.

Rodgers argues that although the South African government knew the harsh conditions under which the Mozambicans lived due to the widespread civil conflict it never opened “officially” its borders to help the fleeing population affected by war. More often than not, KNP rangers arrested and deported Mozambican migrants found crossing the border on foot using the KNP bush route. According to Polzer, during Apartheid, the South African government was not a signatory of the relevant international conventions and refused to give assistance to Mozambican refugees in South Africa. In line with Polzer, Connor states that social networks and ethnic ties have played a major role in the integration of Shangane refugees in South Africa. Shangane speaking people were welcomed and allowed to stay in the former homeland of Gazankulu in the area today known as Bushbuckridge.

The work of the scholars who analysed border dynamics between South Africa and Mozambique is important to understand the relationship of the Mozambican Shangane who went to South Africa in search of refuge. Equally, it built a comprehensive framework to analyse the extent to which kinship ties helped them to find accommodation, work and places to live in former Gazankulu homeland and how this relationship implies new migration dynamics from Massingir to South Africa or vice-versa. This relationship has implications for conservation because returnees from South Africa always needed to open new fields for cropping and grazing within the LNP. Since the scholars were concerned with Mozambican refugees in South Africa, they did not pay attention to the lives and livelihood strategies of Shangane communities of south western Mozambique hinterland that did not migrate to South Africa in search of work and refuge. As such, my work complements and deepens the work of these scholars by focusing on the experiences of the Shangane communities in Mozambique before leaving to South Africa.

In general, the shortcomings of the work discussed in this section of literature review are the lack of historical analyses. Historical data and present-day events are presented and analysed separately, there is thus a lack of chronological and intertwined link between events. The literature lacks analyses of the causes and consequences of events. This study goes further back in history to explain the relationship between events and the development of conservation politics and practices in former Coutada 16 now LNP in order to show that, indeed, history matters in explaining, among other things, contemporary phenomena.

**The construction of the Massingir dam and relocations in Coutada 16**

Isaacman and Isaacman suggest that any analysis of the dynamics of dams in colonial and post-colonial Mozambique has to take into account that social and ecological concerns are inextricably linked to broader questions of sustainability and security. Isaacman and Isaacman’s research on the Lower Zambezi is illustrative of how changing patterns of the environment influenced negatively the lives of local communities living downstream of the Zambezi River.


97 For example: Causes informing labor migration from the southern Mozambique hinterland to South Africa, reason informing the construction of the south Africa and Mozambique border, etc.
According to Isaacman and Isaacman, the construction of dams in colonial Mozambique also revolved around power dynamics and power dominance.\textsuperscript{98} The study of the Massingir dam is important as it clearly elucidates how post-colonial authorities took over the colonial projects. In this particular project, the consolidation of independence implied a reformulation of the politics and philosophy underpinning its construction. Although Isaacman and Isaacman’s research pays attention to environmental transformations in the Zambezi valley, their research offers an alternative analytical approach for the study of environmental impacts of dams elsewhere in Mozambique.

After independence, local communities in the Massingir region expected that the dam would offer great opportunities for their development (irrigation schemes) and contribute to improve their lives. However, rather than benefiting the local communities, the construction of Massingir dam (1972-1978) contributed to worsen the living conditions of the families that had their homes and fields along the Elephants valley who due to the filling of the Massingir dam reservoir had to be relocated in poor soils in Coutada 16. Moreover, Frelimo’s social and economic policies implemented in the countryside conflicted with the existing social networking and livelihood strategies. Frelimo obliged remote rural communities to live in communal villages. This situation affected negatively the lives of the local communities who saw independence as a panacea for their freedom and a platform for their social and economic development.

Lunstrum’s study on transformation of land and spaces in Massingir region during the construction of the Massingir dam demonstrates that communities living along the river banks of the Elephants river lost their fertile lands on which they have depended for agriculture and grazing. Lunstrum does not give much emphasis to the lives and livelihood strategies of local communities before the construction of the Massingir dam or how did the ordinary people

organise their daily life before the relocations. My study addresses this shortcoming because without the perspectives of the people of the former Coutada 16, the history of the LNP would be incomplete.

Whiteside’s article on relief and development in Mozambique offers important insights into the linkages between war and relocation and refugees’ livelihoods during and after conflicts. Whiteside noted that almost all displaced Mozambicans who went from Mozambique to the neighbouring countries faced two kinds of dilemmas. The first dilemma was the lack of resources in the destination country because, most often, the refugees left their belongings in their home villages and fled without anything. The second dilemma was the conditions that refugees found in their home villages after returning from exile. In most cases, refugees found that infrastructure they had left behind had been destroyed by war. Whiteside also noted that returnees were strongly dependent on food supply agencies because they needed to survive and plant crops until harvest. Whiteside makes a general analysis of the situation of Mozambican refugees in southern African countries and their reintegration in their home villages; hence, he pays little attention to specific processes of migration such as those of Massingir communities during the civil war and the process of their resettlement after the civil war. Whiteside’s analysis is significant to my research to the extent that he reviews migrants’ livelihoods experiences in exile and their integration in the economic and social life in their home villages.

**Labour migration from southern Mozambique to South Africa**

Labour migration from Mozambique to South Africa started in the later 19th century when Africans from the southern Mozambique migrated to work in farms in Natal and to the mining industry in the Witwatersrand region. During the early 20th century, migration of Mozambicans to South Africa was transformed into a cultural factor. Many young boys from rural areas of southern Mozambique grew up dreaming of going to South Africa in search of

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99 Lunstrum, E. M. *The making and unmaking of sovereign territory*
100 Whiteside, Martin. 1996 “Realistic rehabilitation: linking relief and development in Mozambique.” *Development in Practice,* 6 (2): 121-128, p. 124
101 Whiteside, Martin. “Realistic rehabilitation: linking relief and development in Mozambique” p. 124
better-paid jobs. There is a range of literature analysing the causes and consequences of migration of Mozambicans to South Africa. Many scholars agree that drought and the decline of agricultural productivity in southern Mozambique and existence of better-paid jobs in South Africa are factors that pushed Africans to migrate in search of employment in farms in Natal and mining industry in the Transvaal. After the Portuguese victory over Gungunhane, the last emperor of the Gaza-Nguni state and imprisonment of Portuguese radicals in 1895, the Portuguese unified the administration of Mozambique and obliged the ordinary people to pay taxes. African males with a *palhota* (hut) had to secure a source of income to earn money for the payment of the hut taxes. Thus, those who had no alternative source of income were pushed into the mining industry of South Africa.

Covane, a historian from the Department of History- Eduardo Mondlane University, analysed the causes of labour migration from the Lower Limpopo region to South Africa. Covane’s works help us to understand the Portuguese colonial authority’s policy toward migration in the late 19th century and during 20th century. Covane indicates that from 1887 to the 1970s, several agreements were signed between the South African government, the Chamber of Mines and the Portuguese to allow Mozambicans to work in the mining sector in South Africa. These agreements were revised periodically in response to changes in the political and economic contexts. The agreements also allowed the establishment of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA) recruitment posts in Mozambique including the Pafuri post in Upper Limpopo. Covane’s works also look at consequences of migration of mineworkers on the economy and society in Lower Limpopo. Covane’s work does not give much emphasis on

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106 Diário do Governo de Moçambique, Lei nº 31896 de 27/21942
migration of Mozambicans to South Africa through the KNP and on migration and environmental transformation in the Upper Limpopo. This lacuna is addressed in my study.

In terms of the post-colonial period, the works of various scholars such as Hensen, Witter, and Wolmer render valuable insights into routes and challenges faced by migrants from southern Mozambique to South Africa using the Pafuri border gate.\textsuperscript{108} However, my study does much more than this in the sense that it distinctly discusses the history of labour migration from Massingir to South Africa during the colonial period and its implication on the local polity. It does this by identifying the cause, the routes and consequences of labour migration on local economy and development of hunting. The research seeks to deepen knowledge on the impact of labour migration to South Africa on environment (e.g.: opening of new farming fields in Coutada 16), hunting (use of rifles and gunpowder in the Massingir region brought from south Africa by migrants) and decision making for the resettlement of populations affected by the building of the Massingir dam.

**Outline of the chapters**

Including this introductory chapter and the conclusion, the thesis is organised into six (6) chapters.

**Chapter 2:** This chapter explores the evolution of hunting activities and the ivory trade in southern Mozambique during the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries and its impact on the life and polity of the local population. The chapters demonstrate that during the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries, hunting and trade between the interior and the Indian Ocean Coast influenced the socio-economic and political life of the local people in the southern Mozambique hinterland. The need to ensure monopoly over local resources, particularly animal products (animal skins, ivory, rhino horns, etc.) in order to continue to supply the global markets influenced how African elites particularly the Gaza-Nguni rulers framed their hunting and trade policies to ensure benefits from long

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distance trade from the southern African interior to the Indian Ocean coast. Above all, the chapter provides insight to understand pre-colonial African environment before advent of colonialism.

**Chapter 3:** This chapter looks to the general transformation of hunting in relation to colonial policies. It seeks particularly to deepen our understanding of the Portuguese conservation policies and particularly changes made to hunting regulations (1903, 1904, 1906, 1910, 1932, 1936, 1941, 1944, 1951 and 1956). The chapter brings to the knowledge of the reader the life and practices of the border communities in Mozambique and their relationship with Mozambique and South African authorities. Therefore, it examines the establishment of the KNP and early efforts made toward the establishment of a national park in Mozambique and contiguous to the KNP. Equally, it explores the establishment of hunting reserves in southern Mozambique and analyses the challenges faced by the Portuguese administration to control hunting in southern Mozambique from the early 1940s to the late 1950s.

**Chapter 4:** This chapter analyses the impact of colonial rule on the lives of Africans as well as conservation in Guijá and particularly in the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve. The chapter places particular emphasis on the impact of forced cotton production on the lives of Africans. In fact, the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique introduced cotton during the 1920s. However, cotton production in southern Mozambique became compulsory from the early 1930s to later 1950s. Therefore, this chapter documents the impact of forced cotton production on local communities and fauna of my study area. The chapter also describes the evolution of labour migration from Guijá to South Africa and its impact on the economy, society, and wildlife. Labour migration provided resources (money, rifles and gunpowder) to the migrants which had a great impact on the environment. The chapter seeks to explain how such resources were channelled to Mozambique and describes their impact in relation to hunting. The last section of the chapter analyses the outbreak of animal diseases in southern Mozambique and implications on the preservation of fauna. This section does not only describe the outbreak of animal diseases in southern Mozambique but explains how the South Africa and Mozambique authorities resolved the problem. The chapter provides useful information to understand Portuguese
conservation policies in the 1960s and early 1970s (leasing of conservation areas to private safari companies).

**Chapter 5:** This chapter attempts to examine the extent to which the construction of the Massingir dam affected local peoples’ lives, local political structures, the local peoples’ livelihoods, local ecosystems and wildlife. It analyses the post-independent rural development policies in Mozambique and particularly it seeks to document the experiences undergone by the down-river communities of the north bank of the Elephants valley displaced by the filling of the Massingir dam’s reservoir and relocated in communal villages in Coutada16. It explores how the rupture between the colonial government and Frelimo affected the continuation of colonial projects in the postcolonial period and explains how the late colonial projects affected the lives of the local families in the Massingir region.

**Chapter 6:** This chapter examines armed conflict in the Massingir region and its impact on the lives of the local communities and the environment; it documents experiences undergone by the local communities in Coutada 16 to escape the war and routes followed to find refuge within and across national borders. Accordingly, it analyses the return of the same communities from exile and the process of rebuilding lives in Coutada 16. It seeks particularly to document the transformation of Coutada 16 into the LNP and its further integration into the GLTP. In this chapter, we conclude the writing up of the history of communities of the south western Mozambique borderland as well as the process undergone toward the establishment of a national park in Mozambique contiguous to KNP. In fact, the process toward the establishment of a national park in Mozambique contiguous to KNP began in 1927 when the South African authorities through its Prime Minister J.B.M. Hertzog requested that the Portuguese government in Mozambique establish a national park alongside the KNP.109

109AHM: Governo Geral – Cx. 178/C3 - Note for the clarification of the case n° 778/2106 - Theft of cattle in Massingir. South Africa: Secretary-General of the interior - Provincial Services, Reference series of 1927-332. In this note, nothing was said concerning the cattle stolen in Massingir region; instead, the South African authorities attached to their note Hertzog’s appeal for the establishment of a game reserve in Mozambique alongside the KNP. Hertzog attached to his letter a map of the KNP with the following statement “… I have the honour to point out that the Portuguese game reserve should adjoin the full length of the Kruger National Park, I. e. from Crocodile river in the south to the confluence of the Pafuri and Limpopo rivers in the north and should be about
CHAPTER II: ENVIRONMENT, POLITICS AND BRANCHES OF PRODUCTION IN PRE-COLONIAL SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE

2.1. Introduction

In the 17th to the early 19th century, the economy and settlements in southern Africa underwent constant change owing to factors such as climate, agro-ecological conditions and conflicts over the control of ivory and slaves for trading at Delagoa Bay. In the early 19th century, competition for the control of the local resources (land and ivory) and trade from the southern African interior to the Indian Ocean coast led to the outbreak of conflicts opposing the most powerful African political units in Zululand. I.e. the Mthethwa kingdom headed by Dingiswayo and the Ndandwe kingdom headed by Zwide.

After the death of Dingiswayo in 1817, Shaka, one of Dingiswayo’s adopted sons, took over his father’s power, ruled the state with terror and began a fierce persecution against his enemies. The less powerful political units were obliged to pay allegiance to Shaka. Parts of the Ndandwe royal lineage opposed to the Mthethwa migrated to distant lands out of the reach of Shaka. Among the Ndandwe fugitives was Soshangane, also known as Manikuse, who in 1821 established the Gaza-Nguni state on the south bank of the Limpopo River. From 1821 to 1895, the Gaza-Nguni kings dominated the life, politics, economy and particularly hunting activities in the southern Mozambique hinterland. The Gaza-Nguni chiefs also established trade networks with Europeans and exchanged European goods with African commodities such as slaves, ivory, rhino horns and amber. They also imposed hunting fees in their territories and obliged traders to pay fees when passing through their territories.

This chapter analyses pre-colonial environments, politics and branches of production in southern Africa and particularly in the southern Mozambique hinterland before the advent of colonialism. In light of the existing literature, it reviews the 18th and early 19th century environmental and

political transformations in Zululand and the establishment of the Gaza-Nguni state in southern Mozambique. The chapter examines the development of the ivory trade between African elites and Europeans and the occupation of the southern Mozambican hinterland by the Portuguese army in the late 19th century.

From the review of the existing historical sources, the chapter sheds new insights into understanding the development of the ivory trade and the relationship between hunting and the monetization of African economies. The chapter is particularly important because it allows the reader of this thesis to understand rural transformations in southern Mozambique and to demonstrate how this was a product of the development of the ivory trade in 18th and 19th centuries and commercial hunting in the early 20th century. The review done in this chapter is a framework to understand facts and events presented and discussed throughout the thesis and particularly those related to hunting, colonial hunting laws and conservation policies.

In this chapter, I argue that the demand for animal products, especially ivory, by European traders led to an increase of hunting near Delagoa Bay and in the wider southern Africa hinterland and contributed to the professionalization of a group of African hunters who became the main supplies of ivory and other hunting products to European traders. In the late 18th century and during the 19th century, apart from labour migration to plantations in Natal and the goldfields in Transvaal, the trade of animal products became a source of income to African elites and thus contributed to partial monetization of the economy. In southern Mozambique, the use of firearms for hunting facilitated hunting by professional Africans known as maphissa and the demand for animal products especially ivory and rhino horns increased hunting for commercial purposes.

The sections of this chapter are organised to answer the following questions: What were the main economic activities in southern Africa on the eve of colonialism? What is the social, economic and political impact of the ivory trade in southern Africa and particularly in southern Mozambique? How did African pre-colonial societies manage their environments and fauna on the eve of colonialism?
Besides this introduction, the chapter is structured into five sections. The second section explore the establishment of Europeans at Delagoa Bay and the development of trade between African elites and European traders. The third section examines the establishment of trade networks between African elites and European traders and the development of hunting and the ivory trade in the southern Mozambique hinterland. The fourth section analyses the environmental and political transformation in Zululand and the establishment of the Gaza-Nguni state in southern Mozambique. The section also pays particular attention to the Gaza-Nguni state polity and its impact on hunting regulation. The fifth section analyses the pre-colonial economy and society along the Mozambique and Transvaal border. It looks specifically at how local populations’ activities (hunting, gathering, livestock keeping and fishing) and the extent to which the local politics (Gaza-Nguni state policies) affected local populations’ lives. The last section analyses the politics behind the definition of the southern Mozambican borders, the actors involved in the process, their roles as well as the conquest of the area in 1895 by the Portuguese army.

2.1. The Europeans and trade at Delagoa Bay before the 19th century

Although the Portuguese presence in Mozambique dates back to the 15th century, this presence was confined to the Ilha de Moçambique and Indian Ocean ports and, in some periods, to the hinterland of the Zambeze River where they established European settlements and traded with African leaders. During the 17th and 18th centuries, Europeans (French, Dutch, Portuguese and English) competed against each other for the control of Delagoa Bay and trade routes between the Indian Ocean Coast and the African interior. In the 16th century, the Portuguese established a trading post at Delagoa Bay and exchanged Asian and European manufactured goods for ivory, rhino horns and amber from the neighbouring African states. In 1777-1783, the English also came to settle at Delagoa Bay and traded with the neighbouring African chiefdoms. They exchanged ivory for

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English manufactured goods (hoes, cloths, guns, etc.). Smith indicates that after the establishment of the English at Delagoa Bay, Africans from the neighbouring states preferred to trade with them rather than the Portuguese who they considered as having products of low quality. Smith indicates that although the presence of the English traders at Delagoa Bay became noticeable in the later 17th century, it seems that during this period there was not a direct confrontation between the English and the Portuguese. In 1703, combined factors such as the presence of English traders at the bay, lack of ivory suppliers and French pirates forced the Portuguese to close the trade at the Bay.

In 1721, the Dutch East India Company occupied the Bay and established trade networks with African elites. From 1724, the Dutch bought slaves from African elites and used them in their plantations in the Cape and Natal colonies. Due to conflicts at the bay involving African chiefdoms of Tembe and Machavane, in 1726 and 1727, the trade routes linking the southern African hinterland and the bay were closed and Europeans traders had difficulty buying goods from Africans. Therefore, fearing the worst, the Dutch abandoned their settlements at Delagoa Bay in 1730s. In 1770, the English-Austrians came to dominate trade at Delagoa Bay. In 1777, the Austrian Asiatic Company of Trieste formally occupied the Bay. Like their predecessors, they also bought from Africans ivory in exchange for European goods.

The demand for animal products, especially ivory increased hunting near the port of Delagoa Bay and neighbouring areas and led to the extermination of African elephants in the region. A contemporary Portuguese historian, António Rita-Ferreira, indicates that in 4 years (i.e., from 1777 to 1781) of trade, the Austrian company based at Delagoa Bay was able to purchase 20,000

112The supremacy of the English at the Bay forced the Governor-General of Mozambique to suggest the interruption of voyages between Portugal and Delagoa Bay because the Portuguese vessels from Delagoa Bay returned to Portugal nearly empty. See in Smith, Alan K. 1970. “Delagoa Bay and trade of south eastern Africa.”, p. 271-2
elephants tusks. In other words, it means that in just 4 years more 10,000 African elephants were killed to fuel the ivory trade.\textsuperscript{116}

In the late 1770s, the need to control trade and commerce and political influence at the Bay and trade routes connecting it to ivory suppliers (mainly African elites in the hinterland) impelled the Portuguese to return to the Bay and forced out the Austrians. Accordingly, as a measure of security of the Portuguese traders living at Delagoa Bay, in 1789 the Portuguese authorities began the construction of the Presidium of Lourenço Marques. However, the stability of the Portuguese did not last long. Due to French attacks, in 1796, the Portuguese were again forced to abandon the Presidium. The French reoccupied it and stayed at the presidium for 3 years when in 1799, the Portuguese army forced them out and settled permanently at the Bay.\textsuperscript{117}

The re-occupation of Delagoa Bay by the Portuguese army allowed the Portuguese traders and settlers to develop a small town alongside the Bay, which later became known as the town of Lourenço Marques. Existing historical sources indicate that in the late 18\textsuperscript{th} century, the Portuguese authorities at the Bay established trade networks with the local communities of the neighbouring states and exchanged European manufactured goods for African goods. Historical research indicates that in the late 18\textsuperscript{th} and early 19\textsuperscript{th} century, hunting products continued to be the main goods given by Africans to European traders. The increase of trade at the Bay pushed many Africans to become professional hunters who were responsible for the killing of African wild stock and thus sell the products of hunting to European traders.\textsuperscript{118}

\textbf{2.2. The increase of hunting in the southern African hinterland}

Existing historical accounts indicate that slaves and ivory were the main drivers that pushed the Europeans and particularly the Portuguese to travel from their trading posts located along the

\textsuperscript{116} Rita-Ferreira, A. 1980. \textit{História pre-colonial do sul de Moçambique: uma tentativa de síntese}, p. 25


Indian Ocean Coast to the southern African hinterland.\textsuperscript{119} From the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the Portuguese armed with muzzle loading guns travelled mainly from Delagoa Bay and Inhambane to the southern African hinterland to hunt elephants and establish new trade networks, which allowed them to hunt and buy ivory from Africans.\textsuperscript{120} They also bought from Africans ambergris, rhino horns, hippopotamus teeth, cattle, pigs, goats, gold dust and wild animals’ skins in exchange for beads and cotton.\textsuperscript{121}

The trade between Africans and Europeans provided Africans with guns and ammunition. Consequently, Africans were involved in hunting to supply the Europeans with ivory and received ammunition for additional hunting journeys.\textsuperscript{122} During the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries, the development of the ivory trade and animal skins in southern Mozambique resulted in the abandonment of agricultural activities by some Africans to engage in hunting, with some Africans becoming professional hunters.\textsuperscript{123} To this end, Carruthers has argued that during the pre-colonial period hunting by Africans was limited to consumption. The opening of global markets for animal products and use of sophisticated firearms led to indiscriminate killing of African fauna and environmental destruction.\textsuperscript{124}

The professionalization of African hunters made the \textit{maphissa} different from \textit{balhoti} and gave them a special status, which was seen as being important if compared to other activities.\textsuperscript{125} If the game could not be found near their villages, the \textit{maphissa} could travel dozens or more kilometres

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{120} During a trip from Lourenço Marques to the hinterland for elephants hunting, Das Neves noted that elephant hunting in southern Mozambique hinterland was well-rewarded activity and easily hunters accumulated wealth on expense of elephants killing. Das Neves, Diocleciano Fernando. 1878. \textit{Itinerário de uma viagem a caça de Elefantes}
\item \textsuperscript{121} Eldredge, Elizabeth A. 1995. “Sources of conflict in southern Africa, 1800-1830”, p. 131-132; also see Liesegang, G. 1983 “Notes on the internal structure of the Gaza Kingdom of southern Mozambique”, p.180
\item \textsuperscript{122} Junod, Henri Alexandre. 1924. \textit{The life of a South African tribe}, Vol. II, p.55; See also Wagner, R. 1976. \textit{Zoutpansberg: some notes on the dynamics of a hunting frontier}, p.34
\item \textsuperscript{123} Harries, P. 1994. \textit{Work, culture and identity}; p.13, also see Hedges, David, 1978. \textit{Trade and politics in southern Mozambique and Zululand}, p. 57
\item \textsuperscript{124} Carruthers, Jane, 1993: “Police boys and poachers Africans, wildlife protection and national parks, the Transvaal 1902 to 1950.” \textit{Koedoe}. 36(2): 11-22, p.12-13
\end{itemize}
to find game in distant areas in the southern Mozambique hinterland as far as the Zoutpansberg in the Transvaal. In fact, in the 18th century, there had been a considerable increase in the price of ivory at Delagoa Bay. Due to the increase of the price of ivory and the involvement of the maphissa in world market economy, these hunters were able to gain some cash incomes used to buy European commodities.

The analysis of the African and European trade in the 18th and 19th allows me to conclude that the demand of animal products by European traders proved to be a factor that pushed African to be involved in hunting and long distance trade. The trade did not lead only to specialization of a group of African hunters (maphissa) but also provided to African elites products that were not available locally (hoes, beads, coats, blankets, bandoliers, clothes and other European manufactured goods) used in their daily life. Thus, the African professional hunters or maphissa could now use European products like knives, rifles, and gunpowder to facilitate their activities. Massingir oral history indicates that this class of African hunters spent more time on hunting and trade rather on agricultural production. Therefore, while the hunters were on their hunting trips and trade, the hunters’ families were involved in agriculture. This survival strategy allowed the hunters’ families to produce for their survival and use incomes from hunting to buy European goods. When food was scarce in their families, they exchanged the hunting products for grains and other commodities.

Beside the maphissa there were other Africans involved in long distance trade between the interior and Delagoa Bay. These Africans were the “porters/carriers” used by African elites and European traders to transport goods from the interior to Delagoa Bay and vice-versa. Within the class of African traders there was a sub-category of Africans acting as intermediaries between

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125Ibid, p. 55
126Ibid, p.50
127Delius, P. 1984. The land belongs to us: The Pedi polity, the Boers, p. 18; Bannerman, J.H. 2006. Hlengweni: The history of the Hlengwe of the lower Save and Runde Rivers, from late eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century, pp. 1-44, p. 16-17 [This article was revised by the author in 2006. The original version was published in 1981 by Zimbabwean History, 12]; also see Das Neves, Diocleciano Fernando. 1878. Itinerário de uma viagem a caça dos elefantes
128Harries, P. 1994. Work, culture and identity; p, 13-14
Africans elites and whites traders (Europeans and Asians, the latter well known in this period as Banyan or Hindu traders). Like the *maphissa*, African traders and porters could stay long periods away from their families. They traded iron, copper, gold, tin, civet, animal skins, ostrich, marabou, crane fathers and oil seed from the Eastern Transvaal in exchange for hoes, beads, coats, blankets, bandoliers, knives, rifles, gunpowder, clothes and other European manufactured goods.130

In the early 19th century, ivory in the southern Mozambique hinterland and the Eastern Transvaal continued to be the main commodity traded between Africans and Europeans and enabled the traders in a short period of time to accumulate wealth at the expense of African elephants. Due to the amounts of profits acquired in the ivory trade, some Portuguese government officials based in the Mozambican towns such as Lourenço Marques, Beira and Inhambane left their positions and engaged in elephant hunting and the ivory trade.131 As explained in subsequent sections, this group of Portuguese hunters and traders collected information about African resources and culture. The information was further used by the Portuguese administration during their conquest of the southern Mozambique hinterland. Additionally, some Portuguese hunters and traders served as intermediaries during the first efforts made between the Portuguese and the Transvaal government for the establishment of a common border between Mozambique and the Transvaal.132

2.3. Pre-colonial environments, politics, trade and the formation of the Gaza-Nguni state

Scholars who investigated the 18th to early 20th century history of southern Mozambique have related the establishment of the Gaza-Nguni state to trade, environment and socio-political transformations that took place in Zululand in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.133 Historical

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129 Interview with Fabião Vuqueia, Chimangue February 2014, see also Interview with Jeremias Mafanate Valoi, Mbingo 24/2/2014
130 Harries, Patrick. 1977. “Labor migration from Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa; 1852-1895”, p. 69
131 Das Neves, Diocleciano Fernando. 1978. *Itinerário de uma viagem a caça de elefantes*
132 See Neves, Diocleciano Fernando Das. 1978. *Itinerário de uma viagem a caça de elefantes*
writings on this issue gave room to different views on the causes of the 18th and early 19th century Mfecane and its legacies. Accordingly, it is still a hard task to definitively say what the actual causes of the Mfecane were, as debates are underway and re-examined in light of the existing sources and contemporary texts.

Notwithstanding these debates, Mfecane aftermath changed the geopolitics of southern African chiefdoms and imposed new political structures among the mixed farmers south of the Limpopo River. Historical accounts indicate that as from 1810 to 1830 there were some dispute in Zululand and political changes that resulted in a separate set of migrations. These transformations are, of course, a result of complex interaction between factors and no single factor can help to understand the whole set of transformations. However, the context and the factors (environmental changes, migrations, population pressure, struggle for the control of fertile land, political cleavages between the local chiefdoms) taken together offer clues to the explanations of the socio-economic transformation in Zululand and its consequences in southern Africa.

As discussed earlier, during the in the late 18th and early 19th century, trade at Delagoa Bay and especially the ivory trade enabled some Africans to accumulate power. However, during the first two decades of the 19thcentury, the southern Africa region was struck by a severe drought and ecological problems leading to competition for natural resources and control of trade in the southern African interior. In Zululand, this completion ended up in cleavages between existing

136 Etherington, Norman. 1995. “Putting the Mfecane controversy into the historiographical context”, p. 19
138 Ibiden
political units and the less powerful political units were obliged to pay allegiance to the strongest ones.139

In separate historical research, Smith and Hedges have asserted that the struggle for control of the ivory trade at Delagoa Bay is likely to have been one of the causes that led to a direct confrontation between the Mthethwa kingdom headed by Dingiswayo and the Ndwandwe kingdom headed by Zwide.140 After the death of Dingiswayo in 1817, Shaka took over his father Dingiswayo´s power and ruled the state with terror. The Shaka polity increased conflicts between the Mthethwa and the Ndwandwe and resulted in direct confrontations.141 During the conflicts, a considerable number of the members of the Ndwandwe kingdom were integrated into the victorious regime but some members of the Ndwandwe royal clan migrated to distant lands out of the reach of Shaka. Among the group of fugitives was Soshangane (also known as Manikuse) who in 1821 established the Gaza-Nguni state on southern bank of the Limpopo River to the northern bank of Zambezi River.142

After the imposition of his rule in southern Mozambique, Manikusse designated as Shangane the people who adopted his lifestyle and “Tsonga” or amathonga those who were not integrated in his political structure or were part of his vassals. Thus, the Lower Limpopo valley where Manikusse had established the capital of his kingdom became known as Ka-Shangane and the

141Eldredge, Elizabeth A. 1995. “Sources of conflict in Southern Africa, 1800-1830”, p.123; Conflicts amongst African elites in Zululand was also stimulated by the increased demand on African slaves. Thus, African elites fought each other to have control of the area the population and control of the slave trade. This issue is at the centre of the argument of Cobbing on causes of Mfecane in the early 19th century. The Cobbing argument is rejected, as he does not see Africans as autonomous of their actions (see Wright, p.113). Cobbing arguments and interpretation of the causes of the Mfecane have been challenged by several scholars. Moreover, trade in Delagoa Bay was so intensive from 1824 onward several years after the Mfecane has begun. See Hamilton, Carolyn. 1995. The Mfecane Aftermath: reconstructive debates in the southern African History. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press and Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press
people Ma-Shangane.\textsuperscript{143} Thereafter, the language spoken by a considerable number of people of southern Mozambique became known as \textit{Shangane}.\textsuperscript{144}

Contemporary historians in Mozambique have tended to use the term \textit{Shangane} rather than \textit{Tsonga} when referring to people of southern Mozambique. In this way, the use of the term \textit{Shangane} rather than \textit{Tsonga} is made to avoid the insulting meaning of the term \textit{Tsonga}. Hereafter, to avoid confusion, in this thesis, I use the term \textit{Shangane} to designate the people of southern Mozambique, north of Delagoa Bay not because other contemporary historians did, but because during my fieldwork in Massingir region and particularly in the LNP, the local people and the interviewees preferred to call themselves \textit{Shangane} and not \textit{Tsonga}.\textsuperscript{145}

After the conquest of the southern Mozambique hinterland, Manikusse also tried to dominate the social, political and economic life of the local populations. During his rule (1820-1859), Manikusse conducted several raids on the neighbouring states. I do not discuss in this thesis Manikusse’s kingdom external policy, but it seems that some Manikusse’s army raids were made to demonstrate his power to the neighbouring states, as well as gain economic and political

\textsuperscript{143}Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. \textit{From kingdom to colonial district}, p. iii; see also Stevenson-Hamilton, James. 1929. \textit{The Lowveld: its wildlife and its people}, p. 165

\textsuperscript{144}Today, there is controversy over sources of information used by Junod in his work and some authors have even questioned the accuracy of information provided to Junod by his informants, Harries has criticised Junod as his work was based on 4 Africans converted to Christianity. According to Harries, these Africans were living near Lourenço Marques and they could be probably unaware of the specific details of the life of Shangan living north of Lourenço Marques. Nevertheless, despite methodological constraints Junod work still useful for the study of southern African societies in the 19th century: Harries, Patrick. 1981. “The Anthropologist as Historian and Liberal: H-A. Junod and the Thonga” \textit{JSAS}, 8 (1): 37-50

\textsuperscript{145}In the present days, there are subdivisions of the Shangane people of southern Mozambique, Junod classified the Shangane who inhabited the north bank of Elephants River as \textit{Nwalungu} or the people of the north and the Shangane of the south bank of the Elephants River were classified as a sub group of the Dzonga or Shangane of the south. Within the area of study or the triangle formed by the Elephants and Limpopo rivers and the Mozambique and South Africa border there are small sub groups of \textit{Nwalungo} being the Baloyi and Ngovene or Ngonyama (lion) the dominant lineages. The further north region is inhabited by the Maluleke lineage extending all along the Limpopo as far as its confluence with the Lebvubye River. Further north of the Limpopo River there are also some groups of Shangane that occupy low lands of South Africa being more or less mixed with the Venda and Shona or Nyai. According to Junod, the Maluleke are one-half of a larger clan called the Nwanati whose in the second half of the nineteenth century settled near the mouth of the Limpopo under the name of Makwakwa of Kambane and Ndindane. See Junod, Henri Alexandre. 1924. \textit{The life of a South African tribe}, p.16-17; also see Jacques, A. A. 1995. \textit{A Swivongo swa Ma-shangana}. Johannesburg: Savona Publishers and Booksellers, p. 94
advantages.\textsuperscript{146} During the raids, Manikusse’s soldiers confiscated goods and cattle that were given as trophies and women that were given as wives to Nguni soldiers. In 1833, Manikuse’s soldiers went on successful raids against the Portuguese fort in Lourenço Marques and, in 1836, he attacked the Portuguese fort of Capitão-Mor José Marques da Costa in Sofala.\textsuperscript{147} Manikusse and his predecessors also imposed fees on hunters and traders passing through the territory of the Gaza-Nguni state. This measure was implemented to establish a monopoly over hunting and the ivory trade in his kingdom.\textsuperscript{148} North of Save River, Manikusse’s son Umzila also tried to regulate hunting by imposing fees on hunters passing through territory. Equally, he collected taxes and monopolized the export of ivory.\textsuperscript{149}

Although, after the establishment of Manikusse in southern Mozambique, the ivory trade continued to be the main source of income for African elites, it clear that from 1824 to 1870 those (Africans) captured in Zulu raids also fuelled trade at Delagoa Bay. Harries argues that a considerable part of male captives seized by the Zulu during raids in neighbouring states were sold as slaves at Delagoa Bay and women captives were often integrated to Nguni societies as mostly child-bearers. Since there was no lobola for the captives’ wives, marriage with female captives proved to be highly profitable and a way to avoid the bride price (paid in cattle) demanded for Nguni wives.\textsuperscript{150} Moreover, due to the arduous nature of the plantation work in the Americas, slave owners paid relatively high prices for male slaves rather than female ones. Within the Gaza-Nguni state and due to their reproduction value, female slaves had commercial value, which could be 5 times that of male captives. Thus, most often the Ndawandwe/ Gaza elites procured wives by exchanging them for raided cattle.\textsuperscript{151}

The analysis of pre-colonial society in southern Mozambique suggests division of activities. In the Gaza-Nguni state, hunting was very important as it served as a kind of rite of passage for

\textsuperscript{146} For more comprehensive analysis in this regard see Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. \textit{From kingdom to colonial district}  
\textsuperscript{147} Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. \textit{From kingdom to colonial district}, p. 30-31  
\textsuperscript{148} Das Neves, Diocleciano Fernando. 1878. \textit{Itinerário de uma viagem a caça de elefantes}  
\textsuperscript{150} Harries, P. 1983. “Slavery amongst the Gaza Nguni”, p. 219  
\textsuperscript{151} Harries, P. 1983. “Slavery amongst the Gaza Nguni”, p. 213
young men who had to demonstrate their power and state of masculinity and power before entering the army. Thus, young men were expected to engage in hunting where it was argued that besides bringing food home (bush meat) they would gain courage and bravery. These attributes were important as young males took part in the Gaza-Nguni regiments.\footnote{Junod, Henri-Alexandre .1924. \textit{The life of a South African tribe}. Vol I, London: Macmillan, p.84-85} It would seem, therefore, that during the rule of the Gaza-Nguni emperors, hunting was a male-dominated activity. Hence, historical accounts offer limited information about direct participation of women in hunting.\footnote{Junod, Henri-Alexandre .1924. \textit{The life of a South African tribe}. Vol I, London: Macmillan, p.84-85} Unlike young males that were involved directly in army and hunting, young females were involved in domestic activities such as cultivation, cooking, gathering and fishing. This division of activities enabled women to take care of the house, the family and children while men were away from home participating in hunting parties or on military duties.\footnote{Interview with Nalina Zitha, Massingir Velho, 22/1/ 2014}

Although it is not clear in the contemporary historical texts, it appears that the division of activities in pre-colonial southern Mozambique revolved around power dynamics and gender dominance. Thus, men were involved in activities that bring honour to home (war trophies) wealth (animal products that could be exchanged for European commodities) and women were involved in activities related to the survival of the family (child-bearers, cooking, take care of the family, etc.).

Earlier, I described the role of \textit{maphissa} or African professional hunters who hunted for commercial purposes and \textit{balhoti} (ordinary African hunters) who hunted for food and subsistence for their families. Beside these groups of hunters, Junod, indicates that in the pre-colonial period \textit{Shangane} communities of southern Mozambique also used to organise hunting parties which involved a large number of community members. These hunting parties supplied all the families in a given village with meat despite having or not having a member participating in it.\footnote{Das Neves states that after a big mammal, such as a hippopotamus, was killed by an outsider (European hunter) and extracted the tusks, horns, and teeth the meat was given to the} Das Neves states that after a big mammal, such as a hippopotamus, was killed by an outsider (European hunter) and extracted the tusks, horns, and teeth the meat was given to the
villagers living near the forests where the hunt took place. This gift, besides supplying the local communities with fresh meat, functioned as a sign of recognition of the power of the local chief by outsider hunters. Accordingly, they first handed the dead animal to the chief of the village where the animal had been shot dead and when the chief had taken his share of the meat, it was given to the communities to share it among themselves. During the pre-colonial and colonial period in southern Mozambique the prospect of receiving such ‘gifts’ propelled chiefs to continue to allow the outsider hunters to continue to be involved in hunting in forests surrounding African villages.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the earlier kings of the Gaza-Nguni state also tried to control hunting and mass killing of African fauna, especially the extermination of African elephants and rhinos, by imposing taxes on hunters and traders passing through their territory. The imposition of taxes specifically on Portuguese hunters and trades led to cleavages between the kings of the Nguni-Gaza state and the Portuguese traders who wanted to be exempted from payment of taxes during their hunting trips or trade expeditions to the Gaza-Nguni state. For example, in 1862, during the conflict that opposed Gungunhane’s sons Umzila and Mawewe, in an attempt to try to take control of elephant hunting and thus curb elephant killing, Mawewe imposed taxes on hunters and traders passing through his territory. As a reaction to this measure, the merchants at Lourenço Marques and their allies in the interior provided support to Umzila (rifles, guns and money) to fight his younger brother Mawewe. This offer was made in exchange for monopoly control on elephant hunting in the Gaza-Nguni state, a land devastated by war and drought.

155 Interview with Jeremias Mafanate Valoi, Mbingo 24/2/ 2014; see also Bannerman J. H. “Hlengweni’ the History of the Hlengwe of the lower Save and Runde rivers - From the late eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century. The originally text published in Zimbabwean History (1981), XII. Revised 2006, p.16
156 Das Neves book describes hunting that he undertook in Gazaland and Zoutpansberg in South Africa in the late 19th century; See Das Neves, Dioclesiano Fernando. 1878. Itinerário de uma viagem a caça de elefantes. Lisboa: Typographia Universal
157 Das Neves, Dioclesiano Fernando. 1878. Itinerário de uma viagem a caça de elefantes
158 Interview with Salomão Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014
Historical accounts regarding the conflict that opposed Gungunhane´s sons Umzila and Mawewe indicate that the Portuguese helped Umzila in exchange of allowance to hunt without paying fees in his territory. On 27th May 1862, the Portuguese sent to Umzila a friendship treaty (*Tratado de vassalagem, amizade e comércio*) to be put in place in case of his victory. In such a document, the Portuguese demanded free trade in his kingdom, friendship relations between the Portuguese and Gaza kings and subordination of Umzila to Portuguese administration. Notwithstanding the Portuguese support, Umzila was not able to defeat Mawewe. During the conflict, Mawewe got support from the Swazi king Mswati and was able to defeat Umzila at the battle of Macontene on 15th February 1862. The intervention of the Swazi king, Mswati (1838-1865), in the Gaza State succession war (1861-1863) had the objective of expanding the Swazi king influence into the Gaza-Nguni state and thus enabling him to access local resources, especially ivory and captives. According to Delius, Swazi raiders supplied the Boers of the Transvaal with young captives that were exchanged for hunting dogs, horses, cattle and guns. Expanding his influence to southern Mozambique, the Swazi king would have more resources (animal products and captives) to offer to the Boers of the Transvaal in exchange for hunting dogs, horses, cattle and guns.

Mozambique historical accounts are silent regarding the relationship established between Mawewe and the Swazi king. However, oral tradition from the Massingir region point that in the second half of the 19th groups of Sotho communities (local known as Bveshuas or Amabveshua) travelled from Transvaal and settled in the region north of Elephants River. Probably these groups lived in southern Mozambique under the aegis of friendship which existed between Mawewe and the Swazi King.

After the defeat of Umzila at battle of Macontene on 15th February 1862, He and his allies tracked northwards to Mussorize on the north bank of the Save River where Umzila established

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160Ibiden
the capital of his kingdom (1862-1883).\textsuperscript{163} It is important to point out here that during conflict that opposed Manikusse sons, Umzila and Mawewe (1861-3), male slaves provided a useful contribution to the Gaza state as some of them were incorporated into the army while others were used as producers in order to free Gaza labour for military duty.\textsuperscript{164}

The defeat of Umzila did not allow the Portuguese to establish a monopoly over hunting in the Gaza-Nguni state. Until at least 1895, the defeat of Gungunhane the last emperor of the Gaza state, the Gaza-Nguni rulers continued to exert their control on hunting and imposing taxes on European hunters and traders when entering or passing through their territories. As explained in Chapter 3, the Portuguese conquest of the southern Mozambican hinterland had the objective of extending the Portuguese administration to this area and ending the monopoly that the Gaza-Nguni rulers had over trade and hunting. This, therefore, allowed the Portuguese colonial administration to impose its rule and limit the participation of Africans in commercial hunting.

Slavery in Nguni societies implied structural changes in productive systems, military affairs, hunting and labour migration. Delius’ analysis on Nguni captives offers fresh explanations in this regard. Although numbers involved in the Mfecane aftermath migration need fuller analysis, it is a fact that Mfecane drove a considerable number of people from Zululand to southeast Africa (Swazi and Gaza are some of the examples).\textsuperscript{165} Thus, domestic slavery practised by the Nguni who incorporated female captives as dependents and wives, besides providing productive capacity contributed significantly to increasing the population in southern Mozambique in a short period of time.\textsuperscript{166} Population growth usually has dire consequences especially as it exerts undue pressure on available natural resources. Certainly, in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, a considerable part of the over-exploitation of natural resources that was witnessed south of the Elephants River could be attributed to such population growth.

\textsuperscript{162}Simeão Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6,7/6/2012; see also Mendes, António Martins. “Serviços Veterinários de Moçambique – 2º período, p. 9-10
\textsuperscript{163}Pelissier, René. 1988. História de Moçambique: formação e oposição, p. 203-204
\textsuperscript{164}Harries, P. 1983. “Slavery amongst the Gaza Nguni”, p. 215
\textsuperscript{165}Delius, P. 2010. “Recapturing captives and conversations”, p. 11, 14
The period from 1875 to 1878 is also known as “gun boom”. Shangane migrant workers in Natal used their wage earnings to buy guns at Delagoa Bay for £2-£3 and resell to the Zulu, Pedi and Swazi. According to Harries, a £3 gun could be exchanged for a £10 ivory tusk in the Transvaal.\(^{167}\) In the late 19\(^{th}\) century, after the opening of the mining industry in the Transvaal Shangane could work some time in South Africa and use their wages to buy firearms. During this period firearms were one of the major European commodities exchanged along with cloth, with African traders for African products. Firearms were increasingly used by skilled elephant hunters in the interior and by traders themselves due to physical insecurity. Elephant hunters and traders most likely began seeing firearms as a necessary tool of their profession”\(^{168}\)

As suggested earlier in this chapter, the ivory trade and elephant hunting contributed to the extermination of elephants near the town of Lourenço Marques and its surroundings and pushed the hunting frontiers beyond the confines of the small town. The precise numbers involved in this trade are not known, as the official records of this trade are scarce. However, it is known that by 1860, the ivory frontier had moved from the Oliphant-Nkomati area to the Limpopo and Elephants River.\(^{169}\) By the 1870s elephants could be hardly seen south of Elephants-Nkomati area to the Elephants-Limpopo area, and the best ivory hunting frontiers were to be found north of the Save River.”\(^{170}\)

It should, however, be noted that the ivory trade during the 18\(^{th}\) and 19\(^{th}\) centuries was of course one of the drivers that contributed to the decrease of the population of elephants, while pests and droughts could have been other factors.\(^{171}\) Indeed, during the late 19\(^{th}\) and early 20\(^{th}\) centuries, the area north of the Elephants, Limpopo and Save Rivers was controlled by white adventurers particularly the Boers from the Eastern Transvaal who, besides hunting elephants from

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\(^{166}\)Delius, P. 2010. “Recapturing captives and conversation”, p. 12

\(^{167}\)Harries, Patrick. 1977. “Labor migration from Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa; 1852-1895”, p. 69

\(^{168}\)Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district, p. 71

\(^{169}\)Harries, Patrick. 1977. “Labour migration from Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa”; 1852-1895, p.70, see also Harries, P. 1994. Work, culture and identity” p.13; see also Murray, Martin J. 1995. Blackbirding at ‘Crooks corner’: Illicit labour recruiting in the Northeastern Transvaal, 1910-1940” JSAS, 21 ( 3) : 373-397, p.381

\(^{170}\)Harries, Patrick. 1977. “Labor migration from Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa” p.70

\(^{171}\)Liesegang, Gerhard. 1982. “Famines, epidemics, plague and long periods of warfare”
horseback, also bought animal skins from Africans.\textsuperscript{172} Lack of control of the region north of the Limpopo to South Africa’s interior by both Mozambique and Transvaal authorities resulted in the development of uncontrolled trade from the coast to Eastern Transvaal. Since the traders paid relatively high wages to the carriers when compared to the money that Shangane unskilled workers could earn in the emerging cities of Lourenço Marques and Inhambane, many Africans preferred working as carriers of high value goods such as hoes and guns from the Eastern Transvaal to Mozambique and vice-versa.\textsuperscript{173}

The late 19\textsuperscript{th} century trade from southern Mozambique to the Transvaal also contributed to the development of intelligence networks. According to Murray, north of the Elephants River the rule of law was virtually non-existent. Trade and contraband was a normal way of life for the few Europeans living among dispersed African settlements. Tropical diseases, especially malaria, hampered the presence of the Transvaal police within the area. In early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, these adventurers controlled the traffic of clandestine migrants from southern and central Mozambique to the Eastern Transvaal.\textsuperscript{174} From the 1940s to the 1960s, this corridor became a preferred route for smugglers who imported goods from the Transvaal (beverages and other merchandise) to Mozambique avoiding both South African and Mozambican customs authorities.\textsuperscript{175}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{172}Bannerman J. H. 1981. “Hlengweni’ the History of the Hlengwe of the lower Save and Runde, p.16; see also Wagner, R “Zoutpansberg, 1977. “Some notes on the dynamics of a hunting frontier”, p. 34
\item \textsuperscript{173}In the late 19\textsuperscript{th} there were two routes connecting the Indian Coast to the eastern Transvaal; the first route linked the eastern Transvaal to Inhambane port and the second connected the eastern Transvaal with Delagoa Bay. Both routes passed through southwestern Mozambique hinterland where the climate is semi-arid and inhospitable to humans with a partially dispersed population. The climatic conditions and the existence of extended areas of forest and tsetse fly made the area practically very difficult for effective control by the governments of Mozambique and Transvaal, and European and Indian traders did not want to cross it. Given the route conditions, European traders preferred to hire local people as “carriers” to transport their goods in both directions. Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. \textit{From kingdom to colonial district}, p. 74, see also Wagner, R. 1977. “Zoutpansberg: some notes on the dynamics of a hunting frontier”, p. 33
\item \textsuperscript{174}Murray, Martin. 1995. “Blackbirding at ‘Crooks’ corner
\item \textsuperscript{175}AHM, Administration of the district of Lourenço Marques - Sábiè, Ref nº491/50 of 2\textsuperscript{nd} December 1927. Note of the Civil Administration Director to the Civil Administration Director in Lourenço Marques.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Map 3: Labour routes from colonial southern Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia to Transvaal\textsuperscript{176}

\textsuperscript{176} Source: Martin J. Murray. 1995. Blackbirding at 'Crooks' corner', p.375
2.4. Economy and society in the south western Mozambique borderland

Scholars who researched economy and society in southern Mozambique during the 17\textsuperscript{th} to late 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries have put much emphasis on the development of the ivory and slave trades at Delagoa Bay and its relationship with the neighbouring states. However, some specific aspects of the economy of the local population north of Delagoa Bay hinterland remain untouched. North of the Elephants to south of Save River, the semi-arid climate and the soil types (predominantly limestone) which dominate the area militated against dense human settlement and those people who chose to settle were mostly concentrated along the main rivers of the area.\textsuperscript{177}

During the 18\textsuperscript{th} and the early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, semi-nomadic population inhabited the area north of Shingwedzi River to the south bank of the Limpopo and sedentary communities inhabited the area stretching from the southern bank of Shingwedzi River to the north bank of the Elephants River.\textsuperscript{178} Until recently, climate and agro-ecological conditions influenced population distribution patterns within the area and resulted in concentration of population along the river banks, namely the Elephants (locally known as O’balule), Limpopo (locally known as Mithi) and Shingwedzi (locally known as Shingwitsi).

In relation to cultivation and tsetse fly control, Harries argues that in the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century cultivators used to burn vegetation and pastures to enable its regeneration during the rainy season. It appears that during the civil war in the Gaza state (1858-62) this practice was abandoned contributing to the spread of tsetse fly northward, which devastated cattle in the region extending 30 miles to the east of the Lebombo Mountains in the Mozambican hinterland. Moreover, the rinderpest panzooic, which struck in 1896-7, affected considerably both domestic and wild cattle and contributed to their decrease.\textsuperscript{179} Additionally, periods of drought that followed this animal plague contributed to the decrease in agricultural crops, leading to a shortage of agricultural products and domestic livestock leaving the local communities

\textsuperscript{177}Liesegang, Gerhard. 1982. “Notes on the internal structure of the Gaza Kingdom”, p.182
\textsuperscript{178}Morais, J. 1988. “The early farming communities of southern Mozambique” \textit{African Archaeology} 3; Maputo: Eduardo Mondlane University, Mozambique and Stockholm: Central Board of National Antiquities, p. 25-26
\textsuperscript{179}Liesegang, Gerhard. 1982. “Notes on the internal structure of the Gaza kingdom of southern Mozambique” p.182; see also Delius, P. 1983. \textit{The land belongs to Us}.; p. 68, 75-77
dependent on hunting for their survival.\textsuperscript{180} In fact, before the conquest of the area by the Portuguese in 1895, hunting of wild game, fishing in the rivers, and collecting of fruits in the southern Mozambique borderland was done to bridge the food deficits in periods of drought or bad harvests (1827-35, 1839-62, and 1889-95).\textsuperscript{181} This problem helps to explain why before the conquest of the southern Mozambique hinterland by the Portuguese army in 1895; some communities located north of Shingwedzi Elephants River remained semi-nomadic. With regards to life in pre-colonial southern Mozambique and particularly in Guijá and Massingir, José Tomossene an old man from Massingir (Mbingo Village) informed me the following:

“My grandparents told me that before the arrival of the Nguni in the area (c.1821-26?), they planted sorghum and maize. Despite the production they had, they continued relying on wild fruits and bush-meat for their survival. The early practice of large-scale farming is a recent activity. Until 1940s, the population relied on wild dried meat locally known as M’tonga (Biltong) for survival”.\textsuperscript{182}

Although Harries’ descriptions of African cultivators of the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries are limited to African chiefdoms and settlements located near the town of Lourenço Marques, his descriptions offer valuable insights into the relationship between agriculture and hunting in southern Mozambique. Harries records that as from the 18\textsuperscript{th} until the early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, the Shangane depended largely on subsistence agriculture known as “slash and burn” for their subsistence.\textsuperscript{183}

Using this mobile system of cultivation, African cultivators grew mainly sorghum, maize, pumpkin and beans in upper lands while along the riverbanks land that was wet all over the year was used for the production of maize and vegetables. North of the Shigwedzi River local population attributed the use of this mobile system of cultivation to factors such as poor soils in upper lands that after some years of cultivation lose fertility. As a result, cultivators had to shift from one plot to another in search of fertile land. This cultivation system was not observed along

\textsuperscript{180} Liesegang, Gerhard. 1982. “Famines, epidemics, plague and long periods of warfare”


\textsuperscript{182} Interview with José Tomossene, Massingir Velho, 10/07/2012; also see Junod, Henri Alexandre. 1924. \textit{The life of a South African tribe}, Vol. II, p. 58

\textsuperscript{183} Harries, P. 1994. \textit{Work, culture and identity: migrant laborers in Mozambique and South Africa}; p. 8
the main rivers where the fertile alluvial soils allowed local population to use the same plots for longer periods.\textsuperscript{184}

Nowadays, along the Shigwedzi River near Mbingo village, many iron hoes can be found in the forest. Some of these hoes are kept under a big tree near the local leader house, where the local ceremonies are performed (Pachelo). According to the traditional leader of the Mbingo village, the hoes came to the area long before anyone knew that the Portuguese would come to their land (probably early 19\textsuperscript{th} century). Concerning their origins and social activities, the headman of Mbingo village told us the following story:

“We are originally from Mabalane and our grandfathers have come to live in this area following his son who was an elephant hunter. When they arrived in this area (Massingir), the local people were devoted to agriculture and hunting of small mammal like gazelles, rabbits, impala, etc. and they never killed hippos, rhinos and elephants. They used small handled hoes that they brought from Uvendha (northeastern Transvaal). The same hoes were used to pay lobola (bride price). When our grandparents arrived here, the area had plenty of game. The local population grew small maize (which could be sorghum or millet); they had no houses and lived in the bush. They kept their production in pits opened in the ground. I grew up living in the bush; at that time (1930-40?), people built granaries and barns to keep their harvest and slept under shady trees.”\textsuperscript{185}

From 1840 to 1855, 80-100 hoes constituted a bride price valued at 8 to 10 cattle.\textsuperscript{186} In the later 19\textsuperscript{th} century, large quantities of imported hoes from Europe (England and Germany) were given to Africans in southern Mozambique in exchange for ivory. The influx of European hoes contributed to the devaluation of the price of the hoes and they lost their importance as currency for the bride price or lobola. Accordingly, British souvenirs and money earned in British South Africa replaced hoes in value.\textsuperscript{187} In the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century when the Portuguese introduced hoes with long handles the cultivators in the Massingir region abandoned the use of the small handle hoes.\textsuperscript{188}

\textsuperscript{184} Interview with Augusto Fanequisse, Machamba 26/2/ 2014
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{186} Harries, Patrick. 1977. \textit{Labour migration from Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa, 1852-1895}, p. 67
\textsuperscript{187} Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. \textit{From kingdom to colonial district}, p.48; see also Harries, Patrick. 1977. “Labour migration from Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa”, p. 67
\textsuperscript{188} Group interview with Rosina Mbombe, Elina Malhaule, Naquirosa Valoi Mbingo, 24/2/ 2014
People interviewed during my fieldwork in the Massingir region pointed out that in the pre-colonial period hunting skills, especially the hunting of big mammals like elephants, rhinos, and hippos, were a symbol of prestige and honour in society. The oral tradition of Mbingo village (one of the villages located along the Shingwedzi River) indicates that a part of the population of that village is originally from Mabalane region (northeastern part of the former circunscrição of Guijá); they came to Mbingo village in search of game. Since the Mbumbi clan had knowledge and skills of using iron to make arrows and bows for elephant hunting, they were allowed to stay in Mbingo by agreeing to teach the local population their skills:

“Our grandparents did not know the skills of killing elephants; they asked a young man from Mabalane to teach them the skills of killing elephants. In order to teach the local people his skills, the young man demanded to be given a place to live with his family in Mbingo village. After such agreement was made, the young man taught our grandparents how to kill elephants. This is the reason why there are many members of Mbumbi clan here in Mbingo. Before the arrival of the Portuguese in the area (c.1908) some members of the Mbumbi clan settled in Transvaal and continued devoted to elephant hunting.”

Relying on interviews, it was difficult to determine precisely when the Mbumbi clan came to settle in Mbingo and when a part of their members trekked to the Transvaal. Other fragmentary evidence indicates that the professionalization of African hunters happened during the ivory trade period. Thus, it appears that the group of Mbumbi that migrated to the Transvaal for elephant hunting purposes may have been from among the professional hunters described by Junod and Wagner. In this regard, Junod asserts that the decline of the ivory trade in the early 20th century forced some of these hunters to follow the game and settle in areas where game was still abundant. Thus, some professional hunters settled permanently in the Transvaal, while others returned to Mozambique and continued hunting for their subsistence.

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189 See the map of the Sul de Save province and the colonial districts of Guijá, Massingir and Alto Limpopo on the following page.
190 Interview with David Fenias Noquiri, Mbingo 24/1/2014
191 Wagner, R. 1976. Zoutpansberg, some notes on the dynamics of a hunting frontier, p. 34-37
Map 4: Sul de Save province and the colonial districts of Guijá, Massingir and Alto Limpopo

Source: Adapted from Souto, Amelia. 1991. Moçambique: A delimitação de fronteiras. A look to this map it is easy to notice that migrants from the coastal area preferred to converge in the Wenela recruiting station and then sail to Lourenço Marque where they used a train to South Africa, p.38
In the early 20th century, the scarcity of game especially north of the Elephants River forced some hunters to look for alternative hunting frontiers. Some of them crossed the frontier to hunt in South Africa. Oral sources indicate that in order to compete with European hunters who used horses as mean of transport during their hunting parties, in the early 20th century, hunters from Shingwedzi catchment used donkeys for their transport and transport of bush-meat. To fulfil their objectives hunters left the donkeys near the border and advanced with their dogs. After slaughtering the animals, they returned to Mozambique to take the donkeys to carry the bush-meat to places where the meat was processed into biltong and transported to their villages.194

Similarly, donkeys were used for transporting dried meat to the Portuguese shops or cantinas at Mavodze along the Elephants valley where the meat was exchanged for grains and other commodities. During the same period, dogs became indispensable partners for hunters as they helped to chase the game. It would be from this period that almost all households of the villages located north of Elephants River started keeping donkeys and hunting dogs in their homesteads.

In reference to the lifestyle of Africans living along the Mozambique and East Transvaal border, Stevenson-Hamilton, the first warden of the KNP, argues that at the turn of the 19th century, due to the difference in the period of hut taxes collection (winter in the Transvaal and summer in Mozambique) the Shangane hunter-cultivators did not fix permanent residences. Accordingly, being nomadic allowed them to evade payment by planting and reaping crops in the Transvaal during the summer and autumn seasons and relocating themselves with all their belongings to the Portuguese territory for the Winter and returning to the Transvaal each spring.195

According to the oral history of the central LNP, the communities of that area continued to lead semi-nomadic lives until approximately the 1930s when the Portuguese administration began to be effective in the area.196 They began to fix permanent residences on the area and to rely on

194 Interview with Carlos Ntongane, Machamba, January, 26/2/2014
196 The south end of Coutada16 is a very populated area; consequently, the game in this area is scarce or has been pushed to distant areas. Moreover, the area is located at 15 minutes (Mavodze Village) and 45 minutes (Massingir Velho Village) driving from the Massingir town. Patrol by KNP rangers is frequent in the area. In the central part
both agriculture and hunting for survival. Nowadays, hunting as a survival strategy in the LNP is still a practice of the local communities and at least in the north end of the LNP consumption of dried bush-meat is still a common subsistence strategy of the local population when food is scarce.

Besides cultivation and hunting, the collection of wild fruits in former Coutada 16 is an activity that dates back to pre-colonial times. The most important fruit collected within the area is nkanyi, a fruit from the Marula tree (Sclerocarya birrea) which is found in abundance in the area. Even today, the collection of nkanyi is still a common practice in southern Mozambique at the beginning of each nkanyi season (January to February). The fruit can be eaten when it is ripe, transformed into juice or used as an ingredient in alcoholic beverages (Marrula cream liquor).197

There are also numerous other wild fruits and plants that are collected in the area for consumption and medicinal plants which villagers confirmed to have power to heal many diseases. From pre-colonial times, wild fruits and medicinal plants have been and are collected by women and children. Research done in this regard indicates that the collection of wild fruits does not offer any threat to the environment as the activity does not lead to logging or deforestation. Moreover, during the colonial period lack of suitable roads for the transportation of the wood restricted its movement within and out of the former Coutada 16 and trees were only used for the construction of houses and kraals and even firewood was collected among the dead and dry trees.198

197Witter, Rebecca. 2010. Taking their territory with them when they go, p. 135, 141
Archaeological work done by Macamo and Risber in Massingir and along the Elephants valley indicates that in the 17th and 18th centuries livestock represented an important asset to the local population. Moreover, besides its importance in providing milk, hides, cleansing fat, dung fertilizer and cement used in the construction of hut floors, during drought or shortage of food, livestock sales played a key role in attaining food security. In the second half of the 19th century, raids by the Swazis and the Zulus who apprehended cattle decreased the importance of cattle in the area. A Portuguese account of this period indicates that due to raids by the Bveshuas (in Shangane pronunciation Amaveshua), the local people preferred to devote themselves to hunting rather than to cattle keeping. The reason given was that it was easier to keep the products of hunting safer, specifically the ivory, than to keep the cattle which were subject to attacks by the Bveshuas raiders.

Table I: livestock in the district of Lourenço Marques in 1908

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Circumscrições</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Goats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lourenço Marques (town)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marracuene</td>
<td>2.851</td>
<td>7.530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhiça</td>
<td>1.031</td>
<td>10.705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabie</td>
<td>2.804</td>
<td>4.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magude</td>
<td>6.134</td>
<td>14.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo</td>
<td>1.832</td>
<td>4.737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M’chopes</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>14.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xai-xai (municipal area)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xai-xai (rural settlements)</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xai-xai (town)</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>11.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilene</td>
<td>1.251</td>
<td>6.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chibuto</td>
<td>2.819</td>
<td>17.776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guijá</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>9.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20.660</td>
<td>99.709</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


200Harries, P. 1994. Work, culture and Identity: migrant laborers in Mozambique and South Africa; p. 10

201Mendes, António Martins. 2006 “Serviços Veterinários de Moçambique – 2ª periodo”
Oral tradition of the Massingir region indicates that the rivalry between the Amaveshua and the Shangane continued until the late 19th century when the Amaveshua left the area and trekked toward the Transvaal. The same sources also indicate that the departure of the Amaveshuas may be related to the civil war, which opposed Gungunhane’s sons Umzila and Mawewe (1861-1863). The uncertainly about the future of the Sotho in the Gaza-Nguni state may be one of the reasons that forced them to trek back to the Transvaal. Umzila who in the mid-1860s came to control the Gaza-Nguni state from Mussurize, a new capital in Mossorize on the north bank of the Save River was not loyal to the Swazi king and to the Portuguese. Stevenson-Hamilton indicates the year of 1870 as the departure of the Sotho from southern Mozambique. The departure of Amaveshuas encouraged the development of cattle keeping in Alto Limpopo. As can be seen in the table above, during the late 19th and early 20th century, a combination of factors (droughts, pests and raids by neighbouring chiefdoms) contributed to low rates of livestock possession in the Guijá and Alto Limpopo areas if compared to other parts of the district of Lourenço Marques.

Historical accounts in southern Mozambique have given little attention to fishing practiced by ordinary Africans. Maybe this lack of pre-colonial evidence is related to the lesser importance given to the fisheries in local economy than the prominence rendered to activities such as cultivation and hunting. Moreover, was said that the Nguni did not eat fish. Thus, the people who adopted the Nguni non-fish-eating tradition relegated fisheries as a less important economic activity. For example, while ivory was exchanged for European goods, biltong was exchanged for hoes in eastern Transvaal. In this context, fishing was done only for local consumption.

202 Adapted from Mendes, António Martins. 2006. “Serviços Veterinários de Moçambique” p. 6; Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district, p.46
204 Fuller, Claude. 1923 “Tsetse in the Transvaal and surrounding territories” An historical Review. Pretoria: Division of Entomology, p. 30
205 Mendes, António Martins. 2006 “Serviços Veterinários de Moçambique”, p.6
206 Xavier, Alfredo Augusto Caldas. 1894. Reconhecimento do Limpopo: os territórios ao sul do Save e os Vátuas, p.13
During the pre-colonial period, rudimentary techniques and methods were used to catch and dry fish. According to Shangane oral tradition the existence of fishing and fertile land along the riverbanks are some of the reasons why a considerable part of the Djonga people (Shangane of the south bank of Elephants River) settled in this area. During the colonial period and even as recent as now (2016) men and women still undertake fishing and the gendered distinctions in terms of the allocation of responsibilities between men and women are as still as clearly defined as they have ever been. Thus, while men use fishing traps (chiranga) for fishing, women are involved mainly in the preparation and drying of the fish. During the dry season, the Elephants and Shingwedzi rivers form a complex of pools where women and children organize themselves for fishing using traps to catch the fish.207

2.5. Historical geography and the establishment of the Portuguese in southern Mozambique hinterland

The southern western Mozambican borderland covers the adjacent areas located along the international border with South Africa to the south of the international border with Zimbabwe. Until the late 19th century, beside the natural barriers such as the Lebombo Mountain ridge there was no physical border between the territories of south western Mozambique and the Eastern Transvaal. This situation facilitated the circulation of hunters and traders from the Mozambican coast mainly from Inhambane and Delagoa Bay to the Eastern Transvaal and vice-versa.208

In the mid-19th century, the Boers in the Transvaal claimed control of the trade route between the Mozambique Coast and the Eastern Transvaal.209 In 1844, a group of 24 Voortrekkers adequately armed and under the command of Andreis Potgieter visited Delagoa Bay.210 During his visit, Potgieter tried to establish diplomatic relations between the Transvaal and the Portuguese and to find common interest for the establishment of a trade route between the Bay and the Transvaal.

207 Interview with Jeremias Mafanate Valoi, Mbingo 24/2/ 2014
208 Brock, Lisa Ann. From kingdom to colonial district, p. 74; see also Das Neves, Diocleciano Fernando. 1878. Itinerário de uma viagem a caça de elefantes
209 Mota, Carlos Teixeira. Presenças Portuguesas na África do Sul e no Transval
In the following year, Carel Trigardt visited Lourenço Marques with the clear intention to expand the Transvaal territory to the sea.\(^{211}\)

The disputes over the control of the trade route between the Mozambique Coast and the Eastern Transvaal resulted in cleavages between the Portuguese and the Boers. Fearing more raids of the Boers of the Transvaal to southern Mozambique and especially to Delagoa Bay, Portugal felt compelled to define the borders claimed since 16\(^{th}\) century. In early 1847, João Albasini (1813-1888), a Portuguese hunter and trader owing shops and land in Zoutpansberg, negotiated the establishment of a friendship treaty between the Transvaal and the Portuguese.\(^{212}\)

In the same year, Albasini sent to the Governor-General in Lourenço Marques the first report on the possible special conditions for the relationship between Mozambique and the Transvaal. Thus, contacts between the government of the Transvaal and Mozambique started officially in 1855 and on 14\(^{th}\) August of the same year the first treaty on Friendship was signed by the Governor-General of Mozambique and President Marthinus Pretorius of the Transvaal. Although this treaty focused much more on the increase of the trade between Pretoria and Lourenço Marques and the construction of roads and railways from Lourenço Marques to Pretoria, the Treaty also mentioned the need to define the borderline between the two countries.\(^{213}\)

In 1864, the Portuguese administration in Mozambique and the Transvaal authorities created a joint commission to discuss the delimitation of the Transvaal and Mozambique border.\(^{214}\) On 29\(^{th}\) July 1869, Portugal reached an agreement of understanding with the Transvaal authorities and signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Borders, ratified on July 10, 1871. This treaty defined

\(^{211}\)Mota, Carlos Teixeira. *Presenças portuguesas na África do Sul e no Transval*, p. 51
\(^{212}\)João Albasini was a Portuguese citizen who abandoned his position as a Portuguese officer and settled in the African hinterland and devoted himself to elephant hunting; Albasini was also involved in the slave trade between the Transvaal and Delagoa Bay; see Eldredge, Elizabeth A. “Delagoa Bay and the hinterland in the early nineteenth century”, p.152
\(^{213}\)Roque, Ana Cristina. 2009 “Rethinking borders in south Mozambique”. *Aborne - Conference on how is Africa transforming border studies?* Johannesburg, 10-14th Sept, p.8
\(^{214}\)Roque, Ana Cristina. 2009.“Rethinking borders in south Mozambique”, p.8
the borderline between south western Mozambique and the Eastern Transvaal. As the treaty was valid for only 6 years, a new treaty was signed in 1875.\footnote{Roque, Ana Cristina. 2010. “Sources for the history of the southern border of Mozambique”, Preliminary results of a Project on the Archives of the Portuguese Commission of Cartography. \textit{Journal of Borderland Studies on African Borders}, 25 (2): 77-93}

The new treaty preserved the principles of that treaty signed in 1869. This was finally ratified in Lisbon in October 1882.\footnote{Despite the establishment of the Treaty of Friendship and Borders between the Transvaal and Mozambique, the specific work of delimitation of the borderline (placement of markers on the frontier line) had many problems as a result of political instability in the region. At the turn of the century, Transvaal was in an open war with England (the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902) which interrupted the work of demarcation of the border. In 1926, Portugal signed with the government of the South African Union the ultimate agreement on the delimitation and demarcation of the Mozambique-Transvaal border. Thus, the work of demarcation of the border-would stretched for more than 50 years until the completion of the demarcation of the Pafuri border and the confluence of the Limpopo. See Roque, Ana Cristina. 2009. “Rethinking borders in south Mozambique”, p.10} The Treaty defined the border between Mozambique and the Transvaal in a straight line passing through the Lebombo Mountain crest from the 26º 30’ latitude south up to the confluence of the Pafuri and Limpopo. From this point, the borderline continues along the crest starting in an easterly direction and then inflecting northeast until Pokiones-kop, north of the Oliphant River, and the nearest point of the Chicundo Mountain. From this point, the borderline is defined in a straight line until the Pafuri-Limpopo confluence. The final demarcation of the section from Shingwedzi to Pafuri was concluded in 1894.\footnote{The Commission for the delimitation of the southwestern frontier between Mozambique and Transvaal was created officially in 1890. This commission was chaired by Joaquim José Machado who later was appointed Lourenço Marques district Governor (June 1890). See Roque, Ana Cristina. 2011 “O sul de Moçambique na viragem do século XIX. Territorio, exploração científica e desenvolvimento” \textit{Africana Studia, n°}. 17: Edição do Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade do Porto, pp.103-112, p.106}

The establishment of the colonial borders did not mean the pacification of the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. The area north of Delagoa Bay continued under the rule of the Gaza-Nguni state elites.\footnote{Roque, Ana Cristina. 2011 “O sul de Moçambique na viragem do século XIX. Territorio, exploração científica e desenvolvimento” \textit{Africana Studia, n°}. 17: Edição do Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade do Porto, pp.103-112, p.106} The need to undertake effective control of the southern Mozambique hinterland led the Portuguese army to subdue the Nguni-Gaza state and other African chiefdoms that had control of some territories. In mid-1895, the Portuguese tried to establish with Gungunhane a treaty on commerce, friendship and to negotiate the subordination of the Gaza ruler to the Portuguese administration. Similarly, to the treaty that the Portuguese tried to establish with Umzila the document gave more powers to the Portuguese rather than Gungunhane. Therefore, if
Gungunhane accepted the treaty, he would lose his authority and become a subject of the Portuguese. However, Gungunhane did not accept the treaty and continued to resist colonialism in his territory. The Portuguese resolved the problem by sending an excursion to the capital of the N Gaza-Nguni state with the objective of capturing Gungunhane and take control of southern Mozambique.

In November 1895, Mouzinho the Albuquerque the commander-in-chief and his army travelled to the capital of Gaza in the hinterland of southern Mozambique and attacked Gungunhane’s citadel. On 28th December 1895, at the battle of Coolela the Portuguese army forced Gungunhane to surrender. During the battle, Gungunhane with some of his allies were captured and taken to Portugal. After Gungunhane’s defeat, Maguiguana one of the Gungunhane’s regimental commanders was able to gather some of his subjects and escape to the southwest toward the Lebombo Mountains, from where they sporadically attacked the Portuguese troops.

North of the Elephants River, African leaders loyal to Maguiguana continued resisting the Portuguese occupation of southern Mozambique. In early 1897, the Portuguese sent Lieutenant Alfredo Chamusca to the north of Elephants River to pacify the local chiefdoms. Chamusca and 9 Portuguese soldiers were killed by African leaders at N’fucua when they were about to cross the Elephants River. The revolts against the Portuguese colonial regime continued until about August 1897 when Albuquerque shot down Maguiguana. The death of Maguiguana led to the decline of African resistance against the Portuguese colonizers in southern Mozambique. From the early 20th century, Portugal started the establishment of its administrative structure in the southern Mozambique hinterland. The strategy of the colonizer was to take advantage of the existing local structures and to force local authorities to work for the Portuguese authorities.

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Thus, village headmen who were loyal to the colonial authorities replaced those who were not loyal to the colonizer.\textsuperscript{225}

From 1902 to 1908, the Portuguese established an administrative post on the south bank of Shingwedzi River. At that time Hosi Massingir Ngovene, one of the descendants of Hosi Nzuzule Ngoveni was the most influential African leader north of the Elephants River.\textsuperscript{226} In recognition of the authority that Massingir Ngoveni had in the area, the Portuguese named the region south of Shingwedzi River to the south bank of Elephants River as Massingir.\textsuperscript{227}

The establishment of colonial rule in the Gaza hinterland was followed by the imposition of commercial licenses and hut taxes on Africans. Africans, 18 years older and above and owning a hut were obliged to pay 900 Reis per hut used as housing). The hut taxes became mandatory as from the fiscal year 1896-7 onward.\textsuperscript{228} Soon after the hut taxes had become mandatory, the Portuguese hired militias known as *cipaios* to help the Portuguese local chiefs (*chefes de posto*) to enforce the implementation of colonial rule and collect the hut taxes.\textsuperscript{229} Lack of jobs in Guijá forced many Africans to migrate to South Africa in search of employment.\textsuperscript{230} The migrants’ earnings, obtained in South Africa, enabled them to pay taxes, buy clothes, pay for *lobola* and buy useful goods for their families.\textsuperscript{231}

\textsuperscript{224}Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. *From kingdom to colonial district*
\textsuperscript{225}In the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century there were in the Massingir region powerful chieftaincies and lineages that held the local political power. These chieftaincies governed villages located along the left and right banks of the Elephants and along the Shingwedzi River.
\textsuperscript{226}Interview with Samuel Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 22\textsuperscript{nd} January 2014. Using oral tradition it was difficult to determine precisely the arrival of the Portuguese authorities in the Massingir region. There are no official records referring to the arrival of the Portuguese in the Massingir region. However, using the intersection of information, I can argue that the Portuguese arrived in the Massingir region in the early 1900s (1900-1908?). The Portuguese established themselves in Guijá and travelled to the surrounding areas including Massingir to collect hut taxes. See Ferrão, Francisco. 1909. *Circuncriaes de Lourenço Marques: respostas das circunscrições aos quesitos feitos pela Secretaria dos Negócios Índígenas*. Lourenço Marques: Imprensa Nacional
\textsuperscript{227}Interview with William Number One Valoi, Massingir Velho, 10/07/ 2012
\textsuperscript{228}Roesch, Otto. 1991. “Migrant labour and forced rice production in southern Mozambique”, p. 243
\textsuperscript{229}Serra, Carlos. (Coord) 2000. *História de Moçambique: primeiras sociedades sedentárias*, p. 318
\textsuperscript{230}Interview with Samuel Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 22/1/2014.
\textsuperscript{231}Covane, L. A. 2001. *O trabalho migratório e a agricultura no sul de Moçambique*; p. 49
In 1897, Portugal signed with the Transvaal government (and later with the South African Union at its formation in 1910) protocols and agreements to regulate the recruitment of mineworkers in Mozambique to work in the South African mining sector.\textsuperscript{232} The protocols allowed the Witwatersrand Natives Association Labour Association (WNLA which Africans widely chose to pronounce as WENELA), a recruiting company affiliated to the Chamber of Mines, to establish its agents and recruiting offices in villages and towns in southern Mozambique. In the following years, WENELA established about 23 recruiting offices in southern Mozambique. In the Massingir region, the Breyner & Wirth Company was the WENELA agent responsible for the recruitment of workers from Mozambique and other African countries to South Africa.\textsuperscript{233}

Due to fear of anti-colonial movements in the Gaza region, from 1895 to 1907, the colonial administration held the region under the status of a military district. This status conferred more autonomy to the Portuguese to administer the region under military law and conduct military campaigns against African leaders that were opposed to the establishment of colonial administrations in their territories. In 1907, the region became part of the Lourenço Marques district and in 1918 it came to be administered according to Portuguese Civil Law. In 1928, the region was transformed into the civil district of Gaza.\textsuperscript{234}

Changes made to administration structures in Gaza show the difficulties that the Portuguese administration underwent to have effective control of the southern Mozambique hinterland. In fact, the administrative control of the district of Gaza was not immediately achieved after the defeat of African elites opposed to the establishment of colonial administrations in their territories, but after the establishment of the colonial administration structures at local levels. For that reason, the Portuguese organised African villages in units known as Postos Administrativos or Administrative Posts.\textsuperscript{235}

\textsuperscript{232} Covane, Luís. 1989. \textit{As relações económicas entre Moçambique e a África do Sul}
\textsuperscript{233} Hansen, Heidi Suzanne. 2008. \textit{Community perceptions of a mine recruitment centre in Pafuri}, p.15
During the colonial period, administrative posts were the main Portuguese administrative units at local levels and were directed by a white Portuguese administrative officer (*chef de posto*) appointed by the colonial Government.\footnote{Decreto Lei nº31896; 27/27/1942 1ª Série nº. 47; see also Decreto nº 35733, 4/7/ 1946. See also Feliciano, J. *Antropologia económica dos Tsonga do sul de Moçambique*, Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, Maputo, 1998} During their work, the Portuguese local chiefs (*chefes de posto*) relied on the collaboration of African militias known as *cipaios*. As explained in the next chapters, the *cipaios* and *chefes de posto* were the most prominent persons working at the local levels (*administrações*) to enforce colonial rule. *Chefes de posto* and *cipaios* controlled the payment of the hut taxes, labour migration to South Africa and cotton production in the remote rural areas of Mozambique. The colonial regime also integrated in its administration former African leaders who were not opposed to colonialism. In fact, the Portuguese administration considered the traditional leaders (*régulos*) as guardians of natural resources surrounding their villages.\footnote{Interview with Augusto Fanequisse, Machamba 26/2/ 2014; See also Interview with Fabiao Vuqueia, Chimangue February 2014, see also Interview with Jeremias Mafanate Valoi, Mbingo 24/2/ 2014} This position allowed the traditional leaders (*régulos*) to command in their communities, access to land for farming and pasture and to supervise hunting activities.

Jeanne Penvenne and the Department of History of the Eduardo Mondlane University (Maputo-Mozambique) criticized the idea of integration of Africans in the colonial administrative systems. They indicate that before 1961, when Portugal abolished the policy of the natives or indigenous people (*política do indigenato*) for its African colonies (introduced since 1899), it was quite difficult to Africans to acquire the statute of civilized natives, *assimilado* or *assimilados* (pl.).\footnote{Penvenne, Jeanne Marie. 1982. *A history of African labor in Lourenço Marques*; Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. *From kingdom to colonial district*; p174 - 176; see also Hedges, D and Rocha, A. 1993. “Moçambique durante o apogeu do colonialismo português, 1945- 1961: a economia e a estrutura social.” UEM- Departamento de História (Ed.) *História de Moçambique Vol. 3: Moçambique no auge do colonialismo, 1930 – 1961*. Maputo: Imprensa da UEM; pp. 129-195} The process entailed a lot of requisites (good behavior, be financially stable; know to write and speak correctly Portuguese, etc.). In many ways colonial laws in Mozambique considered Africans inferior to their European counterparts and thus, Africans did not enjoy the some advantages as their European counterparts (“legal” access to natural resources, access to schools, right to vote; exemption from the payment of hut taxes, etc.). The use of the traditional leaders as guardians of natural resources at local level was a way of overcoming the problem of
lack of financial resources to hire Portuguese officials to work at the supervision of natural resources at local level rather that a way of empowering African leaders.

This thesis has paid less attention to the Portuguese administrative system in general and has focused mainly on the effects of colonial systems in relation to access to natural resources and particular to fauna. In terms of civil administration, a group of administrative posts formed another administrative structure known as circunscrição. In general, the territories south of the Save River formed one province, the Sul de Save Province, or Província de Sul do Save. The province had three districts, namely Inhambane, Gaza and Lourenço Marques. In this administration, the districts encompassed concelhos (townships) and circunscrições. The Gaza district had 5 concelhos (Gaza, Baixo Limpopo, Bilene, Chibuto and Muchopes) and 3 circunscrições (Guijá, Massingir and Alto Limpopo).239

The complex administrative structure established by the Portuguese in southern Mozambique and particularly in Gaza had the objective to increase revenue to the bankrupted Portuguese administration as well as to establish mechanisms for further exploitation of Africans and their resources. Brock analysed colonial receipts (1900-1908) and concluded that the Portuguese administration in Mozambique depended more on money from commercial licenses and hut taxes than from government-controlled land.240 From the early 1900s, to the early 1960s, laws governing access to natural resources in southern Mozambique were aimed at (i) expanding the revenue base of the Portuguese administration (hunting, logging and natural resources exploiting fees) and (ii) allowing settlers to take opportunity of the local resources (land for agriculture, logging and hunting) to implement projects for their own benefit.

Given the lack of capital to undertake direct administration of its African colonies and threatened by German and British pretentions of sharing the Portuguese territories of East Africa (central and northern Mozambique), in the late 19th century, the Portuguese leased the central and

240 Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district , p. 208
northern regions of Mozambique to privately owned companies. The central part of Mozambique was leased to the Companhia de Moçambique, the Quelimane district was leased to the Companhia da Zambezia and the districts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado were leased to the Companhia de Niassa. These companies operated in many ways like independent states. Until 1942 when these territories came under the direct administration of the Portuguese authorities, Portugal had under its administration the territories south of Save River to Maputo River (province of Sul de Save), the district of Tete in the central part of Mozambique and Nampula in northern part of Mozambique.

2.7. Conclusion
During the 17th and 18th centuries, the demand for animal products especially ivory at Delagoa Bay contributed to an increase in hunting at the Bay and surrounding areas and pushed Europeans to travel to the southern African hinterland in search of ivory and slaves. Owing to the easy profits of the ivory trade, in the 18th and 19th centuries, some Portuguese officers abandoned their civil service positions in the burgeoning Mozambican towns to engage in elephant hunting. Historical accounts indicate that some of these Portuguese hunters were able to accumulate wealth and prestige. A Portuguese historian known as Mota-Lopes indicates that among the prosperous Portuguese hunters-traders was João Albasini a Portuguese national who managed to buy some land and had fixed his residence in Transvaal. Albasini played a key role in the establishment of friendship agreements between Mozambique and the Transvaal authorities. This agreement established the bottom lines for the establishment of the formal (interstate agreements) trade route between Transvaal and Mozambique and played a key role on the identification of key elements to be considered on the demarcation of the Transvaal and Mozambique border.

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241 Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. *From kingdom to colonial district*, p.178. The Mozambique and the Nyassa charted companies were dominated by British capital. The Zambezia Company was dominated by British capital but with substantial Portuguese capital on it.

242 Moçambique: Decreto Lei nº 31896; 27/27/1942 1ª Serie , nº 47

The 18th to early 20th century the ivory trade in southern Mozambique also shaped lives, led to the formation of powerful African states, and contributed to the professionalization of a group of African hunters known as *maphissa*. These hunters were responsible for the killing of elephants and selling them to European traders. As a strategy to access the game near forests surrounding African villages, they gave half their haul to the chief in the forests where the hunt was conducted. The offering functioned as a hunting “licence” and allowed them to stay and hunt within the local forests. It appears here for the first time that hunting fees were not a product of colonialism. African leaders used it in pre-colonial period to share products of hunting when the hunting was undertaken in forests surrounding their villages.

Existing historical accounts have also related the formation of the Gaza-Nguni state to environmental and political transformation in Zululand. Accordingly, the fight for the control of local resources such as land and trade routes between the East Coast and the interior resulted in cleavages between the Mthethwa and Ndwandwe. The cleavages became intensified when in 1817 Shaka took over Dingiswayo’s power and began to fiercely persecute the Ndwandwe. A part of the Ndwandwe who did not want to pay allegiance to Shaka migrated to distant lands. Amongst the fugitives was Soshangane who in 1821 established the Gaza state on the southern bank of the Limpopo River. From 1821 to 1886, Soshangane and his descendants obliged the local population to pay tribute in kind and cattle. The conquest of southern Mozambique by Soshangane implied a new type of control over local resources, specifically hunting. Soshangane and his descendants imposed hunting fees on traders and hunters passing through his territory. This imposition resulted in cleavages between the Gaza-Nguni state rulers and the European hunters and trade who wanted to have unlimited access to game in the Gaza-Nguni state.

In the later 19th century, the Portuguese administration sent its army to the capital of the Gaza-Nguni state to fight and defeat the Gungunhane’s army and eliminate the authority that the Nguni aristocracy had in the southern Mozambique hinterland. The defeat of Gungungane allowed the Portuguese to dominate the southern Mozambique hinterland, have access, control and exploit the local resources and its people. As explained in Chapter 3, after the establishment of the colonial administration in southern Mozambique, the Portuguese passed laws that helped its
administration to take control over the local resources and limit Africans to continue their participation in commercial hunting. Beyond hunting control, the colonial hunting regulations were meant to transform the African hunters into a labour force for the colonial system. The procedures imposed to Africans when applying to hunting permits were aimed at limiting them to engage in hunting and thus reserve hunting for professional hunters and sportsmen who could afford to pay the hunting fees. Therefore, Africans would be freed from hunting to work as cheap labour for the colonial system.
CHAPTER III: WILDLIFE AND HUNTING IN SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE, 1900-1956

3.1. Introduction
The previous chapter analysed the establishment of the Europeans and particularly their settlement at Delagoa Bay. It described the evolution of the ivory trade at the Bay, its surroundings and in the southern Mozambique hinterland. The chapter reviewed the economy and life of Africans in southern Mozambique in general and particularly in the southern Mozambique hinterland on the eve of colonialism. It described the establishment of the Gaza-Nguni state by Soshangane a member of the Ndawandwe royal lineage. It also examined the political economy of the Gaza-Nguni state (1821-1895) and particularly its policy in relation to hunting.

Soon after the conquest of the southern Mozambique hinterland, the Portuguese established in the Gaza district administrative structures to enforce colonial rule and regulate access to local resources. Owing to the fact that the regions of Guijá and Alto Limpopo are arid, the Portuguese administration did not invest in the development of white settlements and agro-industrial projects. Instead, they relegated the area to the status of a hunting frontier. Nevertheless, they did not resettle the local communities in villages situated out of the limits of the hunting frontiers. The local communities continued residing in their villages practicing agriculture and hunting for food while some villagers hunted for commercial purposes. From the fiscal year 1896/7, the Portuguese administration imposed hut tax on Africans to force them to work for the colonial system or migrate to South Africa in search of work to earn some cash used to pay the colonial hut taxes. They also passed several hunting regulations (1903, 1904, 1906, 1910, 1932, 1936, 1941, 1944, 1951 and 1956) to take control of the hunting and collect revenue through a system of fees imposed on licensed hunters when entering the Mozambican forests and hunting reserves.

244 After his exploration journeys to the territories located south of Save River and some territories located along the Limpopo river, Alfredo Augusto Caldas Xavier wrote a report to the colonial administration where he stated that the Alto Limpopo region was not appropriate to agricultural developments and thus he did not incentive the development of large scale agricultural projects in that area. He also emphasised that the climate in that area was not favourable for white settlements”. See Xavier, Alfredo Augusto Caldas. 1894. Reconhecimento do Limpopo: os territórios ao sul do Save e os Vátuas. Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, p. 25
The analysis of the colonial documents and information collected during the fieldwork suggest that the Portuguese colonial rule in southern Mozambique had never been effective. Africans often exploited the gaps in hegemonic colonial control for their own benefit. For example, lack of staff to patrol the Mozambican forests and hunting reserves and in order to enforce these regulations, allowed African engagement in hunting of big game in the forests within the proximity of their villages. In some cases, non-licensed hunters and particularly white hunters relied on their African counterparts to conceal them in their villages and hunt for commercial purposes, sometimes Africans hunted on their behalf. At the same time that the colonial administration was issuing laws to regulate hunting practices, factors such as the demand for animal products (animal skins, ivory, rhino horns) in the world markets and the imposition of hut taxes pushed Africans to evade hunting laws and hunt big game for commercial purposes to obtain cash to pay taxes.

As explained earlier in the introductory chapter, colonial borders in southern Mozambique separated villages, families and communities in areas where border passed through. In such a situation, the access to game by a given community was driven by their; they could cross the border to access the resource notwithstanding the fact that this was now located in Mozambique or South Africa. Moreover, the absence of fences along the Eastern Transvaal and Mozambique enabled border communities from Mozambique to enter KNP territory for grazing and hunting.

In 1923, the South African authorities merged two game reserves (Sabi and Shingwedzi) located along the East Transvaal border with Mozambique, forming the larger park that in 1926 was named as the Kruger National Park. Archival evidence of correspondence between the colonial authorities in Mozambique indicates that from late 1926 to the early 1930s there were conflicts involving the South African police (patrolling the Mozambique and South Africa border) and Africans from border villages in Mozambique. Indeed, African hunters from southern Mozambique had crossed the border and killed a police guard in the KNP. Equally,

some police guards of the KNP crossed the border, raided African villages and apprehended cattle, which were taken to the KNP. These incidents raised the issue of the need to strengthen cooperation between South Africa and Mozambique and to establish strategies and policies to better manage the fauna along the common border so as to prevent the escalation of illegal hunting by borderland communities. Accordingly, in 1927 the South African authorities requested that the Portuguese government establish a national park alongside the KNP.246

Although the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique denied the South African request to establish a national park alongside the KNP, in 1930, they established a game reserve covering the north section of the KNP (i.e., from Elephants River in the south to south bank of Limpopo Riveri in the north). For that reason, the Portuguese transformed the Native Reserve of Alto Limpopo (created in 1923) into Alto Limpopo Game Reserve. Lack of financial resources by the colonial administration to develop touristic infrastructure within the hunting reserve resulted in the use of the protected area as a hunting ground to adventurers, sports and trophy hunters. Moreover, the Portuguese did not relocate the Africans living in the reserve. This situation made it difficult for the Portuguese local administrative staff to exert control over illicit hunting within and outside the limits of hunting reserves.248

This chapter analyses the evolution of colonial hunting laws and conservation policies in southern Mozambique (1900-1956). Its central focus is on the southwest Mozambique borderland. The contents presented in this chapter seek to answer the following core questions and related ones: What were the main conservation regulations (laws) gazetted by the Portuguese for the control of hunting in Mozambique and particularly in southern Mozambique? What was the rationale behind their introduction? What were the implications of Portuguese conservation policies for the use of protected areas in Mozambique? What problems were encountered in the process of implementing these laws?

246 AHM: DAC. Cx 384. Nota do Tribunal Indígena convocando as testemunhas de acusação e policías sul-africanos do Kruger, Johannes Nyvemane, George Makubela, Foscholo Massinga – District Pilgrims Rest Transvaal. December 1927
247 For more detailed information on game reserves established in Gaza district see Portaria Provincial nº 485, 9/6/1923 - Boletim Oficial nº 23, 1ª Série. Portaria Provincial nº 608, 1/12/1923 - Boletim Oficial nº. 47 2ª Série
248 Limits of Alto Limpopo Game Reserve - Portaria Provincial nº 485, 9/6/1923 - Boletim Oficial nº 23, 1ª Série; Portaria Provincial nº 608, 1/12/1923 - Boletim Oficial nº 47, 2ª Série; Moçambique: Provincia do Sul de Save - Decreto nº 1145 de 1930
policies for fauna and for the lives of the local communities? How did the Portuguese conservation policies affect fauna management along the Mozambique border with South Africa?

In this chapter, I argue that the weakness of Portugal's capitalist economy limited its ability to implement effective measures to protect fauna in Mozambique. Portugal lacked resources to hire sufficient and qualified staff to work for the protection of local forests and fauna and to suggest effective measures to improve fauna management. This situation resulted in an indiscriminate exploitation of natural resources and extermination of fauna in the Mozambican forests and hunting reserves. Due to the lack of control of hunting activities along the Mozambique and South Africa border by the Portuguese authorities, the KNP board introduced police units to control hunting activities along the border zone and therefore curb the killing of the fauna in the KNP.

Apart from this introduction, the chapter is divided into four sections. The second section analyses the rise of conservation policies in southern Africa in general and in southern Mozambique in particular. The third section describes the establishment of hunting reserves in southern Mozambique. The fourth section analyses the escalation of hunting in the 1930s and the evolution of conservation policies in southern Mozambique. The last section examines the challenges faced by the Portuguese administration to control hunting in southern Mozambique (1940s to the late 1950s).

3.2. The institutionalization of hunting in southern Mozambique, 1900-1910

During the colonial occupation of Africa, the European settlers brought from their countries colonial armies to fight against African resistance. In most African countries, after the wars of colonial occupation some colonial soldiers did not return to the colonial metropolis but continued their lives in the burgeoning colonial villages and towns. Some former colonial soldiers engaged in sports and increased commercial hunting in Africa.\(^\text{249}\)

\(^{249}\)Serra, Carlos. 2000. “Novas unidades políticas em Moçambique: O Nfecane e o Estado de Gaza” Serra, Carlos (Coord.) História de Moçambique, Parte I: As primeiras sociedades sedentárias e o impacto dos mercadores,
From the 18th to the later 19th centuries, the ivory trade dominated the economy, politics and social life of colonial settlers in southern Africa and contributed to the decimation of elephants in southern Africa. Due to increased hunting and the mass killing of elephants, in the late 1890s, Julius Von Soden (Governor of the German East Africa) restricted hunting to European hunting parties. In the same period, he introduced in the Zanzibar and Moshi (near Kilimanjaro) districts a hunting licensing system that obliged Africans and European hunters to pay an annual fee of 50 and 500 Rupiers respectively.250

In East Africa, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) also introduced hunting licenses, which could be acquired from the Company head office in London. It seems that the company introduced the measure with the express objective of excluding Africans from accessing the game. Ironically, it was unthinkable for Africans to travel to Europe to apply for hunting licenses, unlike their European counterparts. Souza Correa pointed out that the German and the British early hunting regulations did not stop extermination of fauna in Africa because most often the colonial states exempted the colonial officers and military staff from the payment of hunting fees. As he recognized in the late 1890s, colonial officers and military staff are the ones that contributed to the mass killing of African wildlife.251 Equally, in Mozambique, the colonial hunting laws exempted all government staff working at the local level from paying hunting fees when applying to hunting licenses. This was done because the regulators (the government) assumed that all the government staff at local level were responsible for enforcing colonial rule including hunting laws. However, the reality at the hunting fields showed that due to the easy profits in hunting these officials abandoned their activities to engage in hunting or hired Africans to hunt on their behalf. Therefore, besides controlling hunting, this measure contributed to its escalation.

251Souza Correa, Sílvio Marcus De. 2011. “Caça esportiva e preservacionismo na África colonial.” p. 3
Recognising that hunting regulations alone could not stop the extermination of the wildlife in Africa, the Governor of German East Africa, Hermann Von Wissmann, influenced by the American conservation model and the establishment of Yellowstone Park in the USA (1872) began to think of establishing game reserves and national parks in Africa. For that reason, the national parks would be set aside and away from human dwelling for exclusive protection of the wildlife and in the game reserves hunting was to be allowed, but subjected to a fee and restrictions (hunting seasons) to protect the endemic species.\textsuperscript{252}

In the later 1880s and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the Germans in East Africa, the Boers in the Transvaal and the British in central Africa gazetted hunting laws and established game reserves and national parks to protect fauna. However, each colonial state came to consider its natural, local contexts and political situation and accordingly established regulations in keeping with these considerations. For example, the British in Central Africa and the Boers in the Transvaal forced African communities living within the game reserves and national parks to move out. Gißibl and Souza Correa agree that the British game tradition was not probably influenced by the German conservation policies. Hence, the establishment of game laws in German East Africa opened discussions about the preservation of fauna by European colonial powers in southern Africa, such as the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{253}

An analysis of the colonial documents suggests that the institutionalization of hunting by the Portuguese in southern Mozambique was in response to the decrease of game near the emerging urban areas and the need to take control of the game in the southern Mozambique hinterland. In the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the increase in the demand for animal products (skins and ivory) in western markets resulted in the increase of hunting near main towns in southern Mozambique and particularly near the ports of Inhambane and Delagoa Bay and its neighbouring areas resulting in the reduction of fauna near the Mozambican main cities and towns.\textsuperscript{254} Indeed, drought and

\textsuperscript{252}Gißibl, Bernhard. 2006. “German colonialism”, p.124
\textsuperscript{253}Souza Correa, Silvio Marcus De. 2011. “Caça esportiva e preservacionismo na África colonial”
locusts resulted in crop failure and the Rinderpest that struck the sub-continent in from 1869 to 1877 aggravated the situation as it contributed to the reduction of both wild stock and livestock forcing Africans to search for alternative livelihoods such as hunting for food.\textsuperscript{255}

In the southern Mozambican hinterland and particularly in the region or circunscrição de Guijá and Alto Limpopo, the ivory trade and labour migration contributed to African possession of muzzle-loading guns.\textsuperscript{256} In May 1895, Gungunhane had been able to buy more than 120 muzzle-loading guns from an English trader based at Lourenço Marques. After the Occupation War, which ended with the defeat of Gungunhane in November 1895, some of the rifles remained with Africans.\textsuperscript{257} During the war, the Portuguese army also sent a considerable number of firearms to local administrations to protect the colonial administrative posts.

In 1897, soon after the war against Gunhunhane, the Portuguese administration tried to collect the firearms owned by Africans. António Enes, then commander of the Portuguese army considered that such equipment was dangerous because Africans could use the firearms to fight the Portuguese or for hunting purposes. Dias Coelho indicates that the colonial administration was not successful in collecting firearms owned by Africans because they preferred to hide the firearms instead of handing them over to the colonial administration.\textsuperscript{258} Owing to the lack of control by the colonial authorities of such military equipment, dishonest officials working at the administration offices stole the firearms and sold them to Africans. Nowadays, the oral history of the Massingir region acknowledges the impact of the firearms brought by the Portuguese on the increase of hunting in the region. Regarding the firearms and hunting in colonial southern Mozambique an old woman in Massingir confirmed this.\textsuperscript{259}

\textsuperscript{255}Gißibl, Bernhard. 2006. “German colonialism”, p.125; see also Liesegang, Gerhard. “Famines, epidemics, plague and long periods of warfare”; see also Delius, P. 1983. The land belongs to Us, p. 75
\textsuperscript{256} Das Neves, Diocleciano Fernando. 1878. Itinerário de uma viagem a caça dos elefantes, p. 19-20
\textsuperscript{257}Dias Coelho, Marcos Vinicius Santos. 2015. Maphisa & sportsmen”, p.75-77
\textsuperscript{258}Dias Coelho, Marcos Vinicius Santos. 2015. “Maphisa & sportsmen”, p.106
\textsuperscript{259}The area of study or the triangle formed by the Elephants River, Limpopo River and the South African border was part of the Circunscrição de Guijá, which had its headquarters at the village of Caniçado. Before 1942 when the Portuguese introduced administrative changes in the Gaza district, the Massingir region was divided in two parts; the region north of Elephants River to the south bank of the Shingwedzi River was part of the Circunscrição de Guijá while the regions located south of the Elephants River were part of the colonial district or Circunscrição de Massingir. Thus, the area of study or the triangle formed by the Mozambique and South African border in the
"A white man called Nkosa in Guijá collected the muzzle loading guns from the administration and sold them to our grandfathers.... Nkosa also supplied our fathers with gunpowder. Africans used the muzzle-loading guns for hunting, particularly to hunt elephants." 260

The use of muzzle-loading guns made hunting easier and thereafter Africans who did not have abilities to hunt big mammals such as elephants, rhinos and hippos before could now do so using the firearms. Penvenne has quoted an unpublished account of the early 20th century to make the point that at the turn of the 19th century the Portuguese tried to restrict Africans from hunting by proscribing the use of firearms for hunting and went as far as introducing hunting licences in the territories under their administration. It seems, however, that until the early 20th century, local governments imposed such limitations because no official hunting regulations were published. Away from Portuguese control, African males continued to hunt for food and trade.261

Knowing the lack of effective measures to protect fauna in the Portuguese African colonies and in Congo region, Paul Kayser, the director of the German Colonial Department approached the British Ambassador in Berlin in July 1896 and enquired him about the idea of organizing an international conference on the protection of African wildlife. The conference would be an opportunity to disseminate to other European nations lessons and experience learned from the implementation of conservation policies by the British and the Germans in their African colonies.262

After logistical arrangements, the British invited delegates from France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the Congo Free State to a conference that became known as the Convention on the Preservation of Wildlife, Birds and Fish in Africa that took place in London on 19th May 1900. Delegates present at this meeting requested that colonial states introduce hunting

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260 Interview with Maressane Foliche Mbombe; Mbingo, 24/2/ 2014
262 Gißibl, Bernhard. 2006."German colonialism” p. 130
regulations in their African colonies to protect wildlife and restrict some hunting techniques harmful to fauna (use of fires, nets, pits and sniffing dogs).\textsuperscript{263}

I will not analyse here the contents discussed in the Conference. It is a fact that the colonial powers (German, Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Belgian and the UK) agreed to put forward measures to prevent mass killing of the African wildlife. However, each country, particularly France and Portugal conditioned the establishment of the hunting regulations on the political and economic contexts of their colonial territories, the neighbouring countries and the will of the chartered companies that administered some territories of these colonial powers.\textsuperscript{264}

As a response to the appeals made at the Convention for better preservation of fauna in the European colonial territories, in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, Portugal urged the Nyassa and Mozambique chartered companies, which controlled the central and the northern provinces of Mozambique, to introduce game laws to regulate hunting in the territories under their administration.\textsuperscript{265} In addition, Portugal urged the government of the Sul de Save Province (territory under Portugal’s direct administration) to look into issues of fauna protection and hunting regulation more seriously.\textsuperscript{266} As a result, in March 1903, the Lourenço Marques District established its game board, which became known in Portuguese as Comissão the Caça da Província de Lourenço Marques, or Lourenço Marques Game Board (CCLM).\textsuperscript{267} This board produced a draft of a hunting regulation which, later in the same year, the district government

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263Gißibl, Bernhard. 2006.\textquotedblleft German colonialism and the beginnings\textquotedblright, p.133
264Gißibl, Bernhard. 2006. \textquotedblleft German colonialism and the beginnings\textquotedblright p.126
265The Portuguese lacked capital to undertake direct administration of its African colonies. In the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, they leased the central and northern regions of Mozambique to chartered companies; the southern Mozambique region, the districts of Tete and Nampula in the central and Northern provinces respectively remained under the Portuguese direct administration.
267Coelho, Marcos Vinícius Santos Dias. 2013. \textquotedblleft A comissão de Caça de Lourenço Marques” p.107-113, see also Portaria nº212 de 4/3/1903
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transformed into the first hunting regulation of the Lourenço Marques district. In the following year (1904), the government of the district of Inhambane gazetted its own hunting regulation.

Until 1904, only the districts of Inhanbane and Lourenço Marques had hunting regulations and there was no official hunting law for the district of Gaza. So far, there are few colonial documents on how hunting control was made after defeat of Gungunhane, the last king of Gaza, who until his defeat in 1895 had control of hunting and imposed fees on hunters passing his territory. With the establishment of the Portuguese in the Gaza hinterland, there was a need to implement a hunting control on such territories or at least unify the existing regulation and create a hunting regulation for southern Mozambique or the Sul de Save Province.

In 1905, the Governor-General of Mozambique requested that the Department of Civil Administration (DCA) of Lourenço Marques reviewed the Lourenço Marques and Inhambane hunting regulations and came up with a new regulation for the Sul de Save Province. Accordingly, in 1906 a new hunting regulation was issued for the Sul de Save Province. From 1906 onward, hunting in the Sul de Save Province was governed by the same regulation. As explained in the next paragraphs, this regulation was shaped by the discriminatory colonial policy as it limited Africans engaged in hunting for commercial purposes. It also detailed the instruments to be used in hunting in southern Mozambique, the periods (months) allowed for hunting, the time of stay in the forest and fees paid by hunters (hunting licenses). Thus, Africans who could not afford to pay the fees were excluded from hunting large game and could only hunt small game (known in Portuguese as *caça miúda*) in the forests located near their villages.

Before 1906, there were no official limitations to Africans to engage in big game hunting. As discussed in the previous chapter, African professional hunters could hunt in forests located far from their villages as long as they had obtained permission from leaders of the villages they

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269 AHM: DSAC, Cx. 80. Moçambique: Regulamento de Caça do Distrito de Inhambane, 1904
270 Soto, Bartolomeu. “Protected areas in Mozambique”, p. 85
wanted to carry out hunting. After a successful hunt, they gave part of the slaughtered animals to
the local leaders as payment for being accepted to hunt in their forests. The gifts functioned as a
hunting fee or licence and it was paid after the hunting party.\textsuperscript{272} The 1906, Hunting Regulation
obliged applicants for hunting licenses to pay fees in cash. In reality, the Portuguese
administration in Mozambique used this regulation to exclude from hunting Africans who could
not give proof of having financial resources to buy an appropriate rifle for the activity and pay
the appropriate fees. Thereafter, African hunters could no longer share the products of hunting
with the leader of the villages where hunting was undertaken, as a having permission to hunt in
forest located away from their villages.

The 1906 Hunting Regulation incorporated many of the aspects of the German East Africa and
the British East Africa hunting regulations, such as the banning of fires, pits, sniffing dogs and
iron traps for hunting by Africans.\textsuperscript{273} For example, after the establishment of the 1906 regulation
Africans were allowed to use iron traps only when asked to kill an animal threatening the life of
people in their villages and even in such circumstances, the use of traps had to be approved by
the Portuguese local authorities.\textsuperscript{274} Sources regarding African response to this specific regulation
are scarce. However, as other colonial hunting regulations, it limited the instruments that
Africans could use for hunting and they could only use bows and arrows to hunt small game or
caca miúda in forests located near their villages.

Due to the need to control hunting not only in southern Mozambique but also in the whole
colony of Mozambique, in 1910, the Portuguese authorities established a game board for the
whole colony of Mozambique, the Mozambique Game Board known in Portuguese as the

\textsuperscript{271} Moçambique. Regulamento de caca de 1906
\textsuperscript{272} Alpers, Edward A. 1984. “State, merchant capital, and gender relations in southern Mozambique to the end of the
\textsuperscript{273} Moçambique: Regulamento de Caca de 1910
\textsuperscript{274} AHM, DSAC, Cx.80; the 1906 hunting regulation classified the hunting licences into two different types. The
first type was the licenca simples (the limited hunting licence) and the second type was the licenca especial
(special hunting licence). The holders of the licenca simples were allowed to hunt caca miúda or small game
(animals such rabbits, kudos, impalas, inhales, etc.), while the licenca especial holders were allowed to hunt big
game or caca grossa (animals such as rhinos, elephants, buffalos, giraffes, hippopotamus and crocodiles). See
Moçambique, Província do Sul de Save: Regulamento de Caca de 1906. The specific hunting regulation for the
Lourenço Marques district was gazetted by the Portaria Provincial nº 821, 12/10/ 1910
Comissão de Caça da Colónia de Moçambique (CCM).\textsuperscript{275} This board was composed of government appointed staff and members from the hunting association. The CCM had the responsibility to issue advice to the governmental institutions working on fauna protection and to the Governor-General for the establishment of hunting reserves; opening of hunting seasons and proposed changes to improve game management and hunting practices. In order to undertake its activities, the institution relied on fees charged to professional sports and adventurous hunters.\textsuperscript{276}

Just after the establishment of CCM, the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique gazetted another hunting regulation, which was meant to increase the dominance of the white hunters over Africans whom the Portuguese considered to be of inferior status compared to white hunters. Just like the 1906 Hunting regulation, the 1910 Hunting Regulation also separated Africans from the game and limited their access to bush meat that they depended on for their survival. Africans who, due to their social condition, were not able to apply for hunting licences could no longer (officially) hunt big game or \textit{caça grossa}. The 1910 Hunting Regulation had the effect of transforming local hunters into illegal hunters (poachers) in their own forests. From then onward, if a person without a licence was found hunting \textit{caça grossa} he could be arrested and obliged to pay fines. In reality, this regulation served also as an instrument and expression of the power of the Portuguese officers at a local level known as \textit{chefes de posto} and their militias (\textit{cipaios}) that allowed them to arrest Africans found hunting without valid licenses and send them to jail or hard labour at colonial administration offices.\textsuperscript{277}

The hunting licenses were not the only regulations that allowed the colonial administration to have free labour to work for the colonial system. The colonial work regulation (\textit{Regulamento para a execução do serviço nas circunscrições}) also penalized to 3 to 15 days of forced work at

\textsuperscript{275}AHM, DSAC, Cx 80, Regulamento de Caça 1903-1906  
\textsuperscript{276}For the purpose of the establishment of game reserve in Mozambique, the Governor-General did not rely only on assistance and advice from the Mozambique Game Board (CCM), but also advice from the government departments of Veterinary and Agriculture. Owing to threats of the advance of tsetse fly from regions north of the Save River to the southern regions, as from the 1950s onward, change on hunting regulation and establishment of game reserves came to consider advice from the Mozambican Mission to Combat Trypanosomiasis (MCT).  
\textsuperscript{277}The 1910 hunting regulation defined the hunting season as from May to October; types and prices of the hunting licences and procedures for the establishment of institutions to provide support to hunting (e.g.: National Game
local administration offices all Africans found drunk by the Portuguese authorities or failed to comply with any other colonial law. In acting in such a way, the colonial regime used the hunting regulations also a way to get local free labour to work at the local administration offices (clear the administration yards, chefes de posto fields and even the fields of the militias) or pay penalties equivalent to between 10 and 15 sterling Libras.

We know from oral sources that there had never been effective enforcement of the hunting laws in southern Mozambique. Far from Portuguese administrations, Africans continued to engage in hunting near forests surrounding their villages without holding hunting licences or hunting books known in Portuguese as cadernetas de caça. People interviewed during fieldwork in Massingir recorded that apprehensions of Africans found hunting without hunting licences became more noticeable in the 1940s and later rather than in earlier periods. Cross checking of data allowed me to conclude that this situation is related to the fact that the colonial authority in the southern Mozambique hinterland began to be more noticeable during the Salazar regime (1930-1974) well known as Estado Novo (literally ‘New State’) rather than the earlier period. Moreover, the first attempts to establish hunting reserves in southern Mozambique dates back to 1930s. Literally, it means that before 1930 licensed hunters could go hunting in whatever forests of the districts they got their hunting licenses.

In an archival search of files of persons who requested hunting licences in the region or circunscrição of Magude (located south of the Massingir region, bordering the south of the KNP), I found out that in the early 20th century few Africans could successfully apply for the hunting licences. For example, of 25 licences issued in 1929, only 3 licenses were given to Africans. The archival documents do not indicate the reasons why only few Africans were able to apply successfully for the hunting licenses. The procedures that hunters had to follow in order to get a hunting licence (fill in the application forms, give proof of having an appropriate rifle for

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278 Regulamento para a execução de serviços nas circumscrições. Boletim Oficial de Moçambique, nº 51 de 12/12/1896.
279 Dias Coelho, Marcos Vinícius Santos. 2015. Maphisa & sportsmen. p. 100
the activity, and pay the appropriate fee) were probably some of the limitations for many Africans who intended to legally participate in hunting.

During the application for hunting permits, the hunters had to prove to the local hunting commissions that they had appropriate rifles for the game or had secured the sources to purchase a recommended rifle. Owing to the fact that some Africans had acquired rifles as compensation given by white hunters after working for them or hunting on their behalf, they could not declare their rifles because they did not have ownership certificates. In addition, even the few Africans that could apply (had the necessary financial resources to pay the fees, rifle, known to write or assistance to feel the forms to apply for the hunting licence) for the hunting licences were limited to using specific rifles and bullets. For example, while white hunters were allowed to use rifles up to calibre 22mm, Africans were only allowed to use rifles up to calibre 12mm. This limitation clearly demonstrates that besides making it difficult for Africans to acquire hunting licences they were considered inferiors to their white counterparts. Moreover, they had to use the less powerful rifles making it difficult to hunt big game. The explanations given above indicate clearly that the Portuguese administration in southern Mozambique also used the hunting regulations as a way to transform African professional hunters or maphissa into labour force for colonial system and reserve hunting to sportsman or people who hunted for fun.

The 1910 Hunting Regulation also tackled specific issues related to the protection of fauna in each district. It allowed, among other things, the government of each district to list and limits the hunting of animals considered to be threatened by extinction. From October 1910 to June 1917, the district of Lourenço Marques alone produced more than 10 specific amendments to clarify issues considered that were not clear in the 1910 Hunting Regulation (e.g., hunting fees charged to hunting licenses holders engaged in hunt of big game and wish to kill animals such as hippos,

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281 Moçambique. Regulamento de Caça de 1921; See Article nº 14
elephants, rhinos, hunting seasons, etc.). However, none of these regulations indicates, for example, the role of local communities on the supervision of hunting or the limits of the hunting frontiers. In other words, the amendments were concerned with money that the colonial administration could lose in a given hunting season if some of the above mentioned issues were not taken into account.

In 1914, the Portuguese administration in Mozambique issued another regulation, which made even more difficult for Africans to apply for hunting licenses. The 1914 Regulation for the import, sale, use and carrying of firearms made it even more difficult for Africans to apply for hunting licenses. The regulation considered Africans as dangerous to the settlers and European security and consequently they were not allowed to use firearms. This regulation clearly demonstrated the discriminatory characteristic of colonialism as it allowed Portuguese citizens to apply for licences to carry firearms. Despite the limitations imposed on Africans, the colonial government’s lack of resources to effectively control game allowed Africans to continue hunting in the forests located near their villages without hunting licences in their possession. Evidence suggests that beyond the gaze of the Portuguese administration offices, Africans continued to engage in hunting for food and even for commercial purposes.

3.2.2. Wildlife “preservation” in southern Africa and Mozambique

The establishment of the colonial borders in the late 19th century did not considerably change the life of Africans living along the border. Africans from Mozambique crossed the border to take their cattle to graze and look for water in the Sabi Game Reserve or to look for employment in the Transvaal, particularly in the LNP (known in southern Mozambique as Skukuza). Owing to the absence of a border fence, depending on the availability of pasture and water, the herders

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283 Regulamento para importação, venda, uso e porte de Armas de fogo, de 1914 Portaria Provincial nº 2292 de 07/12/1914. Boletim Oficial nº 51/1914.
284 AHM. DSAC. Cx. 80. Direção dos Serviços de Administração Civil; see also Portaria 821 –12/10/1910
from the border villages in Mozambique crossed the border and drove their cattle to graze or drink in the KNP.\textsuperscript{285}

In the early 1900s, colonial authorities in the Transvaal claimed that Africans from Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique) were crossing the border and entering KNP territory for hunting pursuits.\textsuperscript{286} Indeed, MacDonald argues that control of these hunters was particularly difficult as they were armed with guns and knew fairly well the hunting grounds and could easily remain concealed in the hunting grounds and wait for the best opportunity to move and in the event of conflict arising, these hunters did not hesitate to kill the guards.\textsuperscript{287} Furthermore, if one of their colleagues was arrested, they launched raids on police guards to recapture those in custody. In 1905, illegal hunters killed a guard in the Sabie Game Reserve, and another one narrowly avoided the same fate in 1912.\textsuperscript{288} The archival documents are silent on conflicts involving African hunters and cultivators from Mozambique with South African police in the period from 1912 to 1926. It is known, however, that after the establishment of the KNP there was more conflict involving African hunters from Mozambique, herdersmen and South African police.\textsuperscript{289}

In 1923, the South African government merged the Shingwedzi and Sabi game reserves and created a national park, which on 31\textsuperscript{st} May 1926 was named as the Kruger National Park.\textsuperscript{290} In late 1926, the KNP board strengthened security measures to discourage unlicensed hunting and poaching. A confidential document of the South African police from the district of Pilgrim indicated that as from 1926 onwards all foreigners entering illegally in KNP territory were

\textsuperscript{285}AHM: Governo-Geral, Cx. 154/B1 Auto de Noticia- Relatório do Chefe do Posto Administrativo de Massingire Joaquim Paela sobre roubo de gado por um Policia Sul-africano, 29/12/1926
\textsuperscript{286}Birkbly, Carlel. 1939. Limpopo Journey. London: Frederic Muler LTD, p.246
\textsuperscript{287}Indeed, Carruthers points out that African hunters from Mozambique who entered KNP territory for poaching were accompanied by donkeys for transport of bush meat and hunting dogs to chase the wild. Carruthers, Jane. 1995. The Kruger National Park: a social and political history, p. 93
\textsuperscript{288}Macdonald, Andrew. 2012. Colonial trespassers in the making of South Africa's international borders 1900 to c. 1950 [PhD Thesis] London: St John’s College
\textsuperscript{289}AHM: Direcção de Administração Civil. Cx 384. Nota do director da secretaria do interior para o director da circuncricao de Magude, 9/12/1927; see also in the same file: Nota do Tribunal Indígena convocando as testemunhas de acusação e polícias sul-africanos do Kruger, Johannes Nyvemane, George Makubela, Foscholo Massinga – District Pilgrims Rest Transvaal.
considered illegal hunters and could be arrested and judged according to South African Law.\textsuperscript{291} The documents do not indicate the reasons why the transgressors were judged according to the South African law. I assume that the South African authorities acted in such a way because it was easy to charge Africans found in KNP for the crime of illegal hunting or grazing in inappropriate areas rather than charge them for crimes related to illegal trespassing and grazing in foreign territory. It should also be underlined that up to the later 1920s there were no border fences separating African villages in Mozambique and South Africa. Consequently, it was also difficult to differentiate Africans from Mozambican villages with fellow Shangane living in border villages in South Africa.

In the late 1926 when the KNP guards began to arrest Mozambicans entering “illegally” in KNP territory, there were reported cases of violent confrontations between Portuguese Africans and KNP police guards, causing different types of casualties. Indeed, some Portuguese Africans who entered KNP territory in late 1926 and early 1927 were amongst the above-mentioned hunters, but others were young herders who used to take their cattle to grazing fields along the border. Reports in the Mozambican Historical Archives make reference to a number of incidents which occurred along the border. I highlight a few to show the different dimensions of the conflicts:

“On 24 November 1926, 3 South African rangers, based in the KNP office of Satara patrolling the area of the Tivoli Farm, intercepted a group of Africans who had killed a waterbuck and a strembuck. The police caught one of the Africans and the others ran away. On the following day the Africans from the nearest village where the incident took place went back to rescue their friend and killed one of the rangers and took some of his belongings (overcoat, khaki drill tunic, clothes, knives, ammunition and some money).”\textsuperscript{292}

In early September 1926, a South African police officer from Pashela Police Station patrolling in the KNP abandoned his mission and went to the African village of Tocumbane located in the circunscrição of Massingir in Mozambique and stole 18 cows and 3 donkeys belonging to an African known as Tingalane. At the time the cattle were stolen, they were in the care of two young men known as Sidume and Pepelane. Indeed, it was a practice in southern Mozambique to

\textsuperscript{291}AHM. Governo-Geral, Cx. 154/B1 Auto de Notícia- Relatório do Chefe do Posto Administrativo de Massingire Joaquim Paela sobre roubo de gado por um polícia Sul-africano, 29/12/1926

\textsuperscript{292}AHM: DSAC. Cx. 384; Letter from the colonial Governor-General in Mozambique to the Governor of the South African Union - Pretoria. Ref nº 1066/G - 29/12/1926
send children aged 8 to 12 years to take care of the cattle. The police officer drove the cattle to the KNP side and hand them over to a KNP ranger known as Gungunhane.  

The incidents along the border circulated in ‘confidential’ correspondence between the Governor-General of Mozambican and the South African Consul in Lourenço Marques (now city of Maputo) highlighted these incidents. In 1927, the Prime Minister of South Africa J.B.M. Hertzog wrote a letter to the Governor-General of Mozambique asking him for close cooperation in the field of environmental protection. Hertzog requested that the Portuguese establish a national park in Mozambique alongside the KNP (i.e. covering 50 miles from the Crocodile River in the south to the Limpopo River in the north). According to Hertzog, the establishment of a park in Mozambique contiguous to KNP would have a dual purpose. It would function as a buffer zone to the KNP and at the same time make it possible for the protection of the environment and fauna of the Portuguese territory.

The incidents along the border also raise issues of lack of clear delimitation of the borderline between South Africa and Mozambique. A note from the South African Consul in Lourenço Marques indicated that in December 1927 there was a secret meeting between Colonel James Stevenson-Hamilton (the first KNP warden) with the authorities of the region or circunscrição de Magude to discuss the boundary line between the KNP and the circunscrição de Magude and to find lasting solutions to end the conflicts. Details on the outcomes of such meeting are

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293 AHM: Governo-Geral, Cx. 154/B1 Nota sobre maus tratos por parte das autoridades portuguesas; see also AHM. Governo-Geral, Cx. 154/B1 Auto de Notícia- Relatório do Chefe do Posto Administrativo de Massingire Joaquim Paela sobre roubo de gado por um Policia Sul-africana, 29/12/1926

294 AHM: Governo Geral - Cx 178/C3 - Note for the clarification of the Case nº 778/2106 - Theft of cattle in Massingir. South Africa: Secretary-General of the interior - Provincial Services, Reference series of 1927-332. In this note, nothing was said concerning the cattle stolen in Massingir region; instead, the South African authorities attached to their note Hertzog’s appeal for the establishment of a game reserve in Mozambique alongside the KNP. Hertzog attached to his letter a map of the KNP with the following statement “… I have the honour to point out that the Portuguese game reserve should adjoin the full length of the Kruger National Park, i.e. from Crocodile river in the south to the confluence of the Pafuri and Limpopo rivers in the north and should be about fifty miles wide…” also see AHM: Governo-Geral – Cx. 178/C3; File Reservas e Parques de Caça - Letter from J.B.M. Hertzog to the Mozambique Governor-General in Lourenço Marques. Dated 9/8/1927, see also Joubert, Salomon, 2007. The Kruger National Park: A History. Volume I, p. 43

295 AHM: DSAC. Cx 384. Nota do Director da Secretaria do Interior para o Director da Circunscrição de Magude, 9/12/1927; see also in the same file: Nota do Tribunal Indígena convocando as testemunhas de acusaçao e policias sul-africanos do Kruger, Johannes Nyvemane, George Makubela, Foscholo Massinga – District Pilgrins Rest Transvaal.
scarce.\textsuperscript{296} It is known that after the incidents the Portuguese warned communities living along the border not to enter KNP territory.\textsuperscript{297} Besides this warning, no other measures were implemented to end conflicts along the border. With regards to conservation, the South African appeal for the establishment of a conservation area alongside with the KNP elucidates that there was a need to coordinated efforts between the two countries to protect fauna along the common border. Therefore, that objective would be easily achieved if the colonial government in Mozambique established a national park along side with the KNP.

Mavhunga and Spierenburg analysed the early history of the GLTP in southern Africa and point out that after exchange of correspondence (letters) between the Portuguese and South Africa authorities, the Portuguese commissioned a study aimed at elaborating a framework for the establishment of a national park contiguous to KNP.\textsuperscript{298} In October 1927, the reports from the colonial government departments in Mozambique (Agriculture, Interior, Veterinary, and Civil Administration) rejected the idea of establishing such a park. Initially the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique refused to establish a park contiguous to the KNP because they felt that the conservation area would come close to the city of Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) and would involve a large area of prime agricultural land located near the city and surroundings.\textsuperscript{299}

Moreover, in the regions south of Elephants River to the Incomati River in the south of the colony there were a considerable number of local people who relied on agriculture and cattle-raising almost throughout the year as their means of survival. The transformation of the area into a national park would mean driving out the local population and relocating them to villages outside the area. The measure would almost certainly lead to poverty for those populations, which did not have alternative means for survival but depended on their land and the available

\textsuperscript{296} AHM: DSAC; Cx 384- Note from the Mozambique Governor-General to the Governor-General of the South African Union – Pretoria; Ref nº 1066/G, 29/12/1926
\textsuperscript{297} AHM, Administration of the district of Lourenço Marques - Sabie, Ref 491/50 of 2/12/1927: Note of the Civil Administration Director in Magude to the Civil Administration Director in Lourenço Marques.
\textsuperscript{299} AHM- Fundo do Governo Geral. Cx. 178/C3 File Caça, Transgressões e Multas 1926/1933. See also in the same file: Nota da Direcção dos Serviços de Administração Civil nº 926/2675, 27/10/1927
natural resources. Notwithstanding, the fact that the colonial authorities in Mozambique had refused to establish a park contiguous to the KNP, in the following 70 years, the South African authorities, especially the KNP board kept appealing to the Portuguese government to improve fauna management along the common border.

3.3. The establishment of hunting reserves in southern Mozambique

In his book *The empire of nature: hunting, conservation and British imperialism*, Mackenzie states that by the late 19th century and early 20th century, the perceived diminution of game in many regions of Africa led pressure groups (colonial government staff, hunters, tourists) to become more active in promoting hunting legislation and establishing societies dedicated to the preservation of fauna. In southern Africa, the German, Boers, and the British pioneered experiences of regulating hunting. They used game laws to control hunting within the hunting reserves and established game sanctuaries (national parks) for exclusive protection of fauna.

In the late 19th century, the Transvaal authorities also established two game reserves (Shingwedzi and Sabie game reserves) along the Transvaal east border with the former Portuguese East Africa territory (Mozambique) where the hunting of the wild species was controlled and only allowed to white people in some periods of the year. But, in the early 20th century, they noticed that in Portuguese colony of east Africa (Mozambican) no action were taken to demarcate areas for exclusive protection of fauna. The absence of a map of protected areas in Mozambique resulted in continued pressure from international wildlife organizations and the South African government appealing to the Portuguese administration to establish conservation areas in Mozambique, particularly along the South Africa and Mozambique border.

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300 AHM: Governo-Geral - Cx 178/C3; File Reservas e Parques de Caça - Letter from J.B.M. Hertzog to the Mozambique General Governor in Lourenço Marques. Dated 9/8/1927
304 Joubert, S. 2007. *The Kruger National Park: A History*, Volume II, p. 43; See also 1910 hunting regulation. The 1910 Hunting Regulation differentiated *open hunting zones* where hunting could be undertaken during the hunting seasons (i.e. from May to October) from game reserves where sport hunting was allowed during the hunting seasons but with several restrictions for the protection of fauna.
In the early 1900s, the Portuguese administration delegated to the Mozambican Game Board (CCM) the responsibility of reviewing the recommendations of the London Conference and bring about advice to improve measure for the preservation of fauna. It seems, however, that in the first decades of the 20th century, the Board concentrated its efforts in drafting game regulations rather than working toward the establishment of game reserves and national parks in Mozambique.305

Lack of delimitation of hunting frontiers and inefficient supervision of hunting in the Sul de Save Province, allowed that some individuals who got hunting licences from Companhia de Moçambique (Mozambique Charted Company that administrated the territories of Sofala and Manica) to cross the limits of the Companhia to hunt in the territory of Sul de Save Province. According to the then governor of the Gaza district, Luís Augusto de Oliveira Franco, this problem was leading to loss of income by the administration because the hunters paid the hunting fees to the Mozambique charted company and not to the Gaza district administration. In 1921, the governor of the Gaza district addressed a letter to the High Commissioner of the Mozambique Province in Lourenço Marques explaining that such this problem was a result of bureaucracy installed at the Civil Administration office in Chai-Chai [sic]. The administrator reported that the Civil Administration staff there took a lot of time to issue hunting licenses. As a result, hunters from the neighbouring countries preferred to apply for hunting licenses to Companhia de Moçambique and use them in the territory of the Sul de Save Province (north of Limpopo to south of Save rivers).306

305 AHM: DSAC, Secção A; Cx 83. File Armas, Caça e Munições.
306 A note from the Governor of Gaza district Mr. Luis Augusto de Oliveira Franco to High Commissioner of the Mozambique Province indicate that because the colonial institution in Chai-chai [sic] were taking long periods to issue hunting licenses, some hunters ended up requesting licenses to Companhia de Moçambique and hunt in their territory (north of Limpopo to south of Save River). This problem was making the administration of the Gaza district to lose incomes because the hunters pay fees to Mozambique Charted Company and not to Gaza district administration. See AHM Cx. Carta do Governador do distrito de Gaza Sr. Luís de Oliveira Erasmus para a secretaria geral do Alto Comissariado Provincial de Moçambique. Chai-chai [sic] 15/9/1921 AHM: DSAC, Secção A; Cx 83. File Armas, Caça e Munições.
I did not find any response of the High Commissioner of Mozambique Province in Lourenço Marques to the governor of the Gaza district. It is known that a couple of months earlier, i.e. before the governor of Gaza district had sent the letter referred to above, the CCM had already noticed the problem and was working to establish game reserves in Mozambique. Accordingly, in June 1920, it requested the Governor of the Gaza district to establish two hunting reserves in his district. The first was to be located on the north bank of the Shingwedzi River and the second in the Massingir region on the south bank of the Elephants River. After analysis of the requests of the CCM, the governor of Gaza district responded to the CCM, highlighting that the areas earmarked for the establishment of the hunting reserves had considerable clusters of African villages, especially on the south bank of the Elephants River. Accordingly, it was not feasible to transform the areas into hunting grounds with African populations still living inside those areas. Instead, he channelled the CCM requests to the DCA in Lourenço Marques for further analysis.

After a study of the indigenous population of the area, the DCA requested that the Governor-General establish on the north bank of the Elephants River a State Reserve for indigenous people rather than a hunting reserve. As a result, from 9th June 1923 the area, forming a triangle limited in the East by the Transvaal border, in the North and West by the Limpopo River and in the South by the Elephants River was declared a State Natives Reserve.

As in the early 1920s, the government of the Sul de Save Province did not consider the CCM’s request for the establishment of two hunting reserves in the Guijá region in the late 1920s. The Board reviewed its proposal and re-submitted them to the Governor-General in Lourenço Marques. The CCM requested that the Governor-General establish three hunting reserves, namely in Maputo, Guijá and Chibuto. As a response to this request in April 1930, the

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308Ibidem.
309For more detailed information on game reserves established in Gaza district, see Portaria Provincial nº. 485, 9/6/1923 - Boletim Oficial nº 23, 1ª Série. Portaria Provincial nº 608, 1/12/1923 - Boletim Oficial nº. 47 2ª Série
310AHM-GG. Cx. 384 Comissão de Caça do Distrito de Lourenço Marques. Nota nº 17 para a Direcção de Administração Civil, 21/6/1930
Governor-General converted the Natives Reserve of the Circunscrição de Guijá into a hunting reserve. However, no further actions were taken to relocate Africans living in the hunting reserve.\textsuperscript{311}

In reality, until the early 1960s, this conservation area remained as a “paper reserve” as no touristic infrastructure was built in the area and had no staff working for the control of hunting. It seems that even the South African authorities had no information of activities carried out in the hunting reserve. Joubert states that the KNP authorities received information from the Portuguese about the creation of the hunting reserve along the Mozambique and KNP border, but soon after its creation, they did not hear about any activity implemented in the reserve.\textsuperscript{312}

The reason for transformation of the Natives States of Alto Limpopo into a hunting reserve is not explained in the archival files. An analysis of the colonial economy and administration systems seems to suggest that Portugal wanted to use the area as a means to collect some income through the establishment of fees imposed on licensed hunters when entering this area rather than protection of fauna. Colonial documents show that the revenues gained from hunting fees were used to pay the CCM staff and some provincial administration expenses.\textsuperscript{313}

In fact, the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve was a hunting ground for licensed hunters and a source of revenue for the Portuguese administration. Moreover, since the Portuguese considered that the number of Africans living in this game reserve was particularly insignificant (½ inhabitants per km\textsuperscript{2}), they did not consider measures to relocate the Africans in villages located outside of the

\textsuperscript{311}See Portaria 1145/ 1930; see also Diploma Legislativo nº 343/5 1932; see also Diploma Legislativo nº 765 de 13/8/1941, see also Mozambique: Decreto governamental nº 2704 – 8/4/1936, see also Diploma legislativo nº 765 - 13/8/1941


\textsuperscript{313}AHM. Administração Civil. Cx. 80. Direção dos Serviços de Administracao Civil; see also Portaria nº 821 – 12/10/1910. Secretaria da Comissão de Caça do Distrito de Lourenço Marques. 15/8/1927. The government set that 50% of the fees paid by the hunter was for the Lourenço Marques district Game Board (CCLM) and the remaining money could be used to pay local government expenses. A caça em Moçambique é uma fonte de receita. Entrevista com o tectnico Warmer Von Alverenestein da Moçambique Safarilandia. Jornal Noticias, 11/5/1963, see also Em defesa da grande riqueza que é a fauna cinegetica, Jornal Noticias, 30/10/56
hunting reserve.\textsuperscript{314} Thus, the local populations continued living inside the hunting reserve despite all threats that their presence in the area represents to their own safety and to conservation.\textsuperscript{315}

There is no information of any response regarding the establishment of a hunting reserve in Chibuto region. Existing sources indicate that during the colonial and post-colonial periods, there has never been a hunting reserve in Chibuto.\textsuperscript{316} It is known that in April 1932 the Portuguese established south of the Lourenço Marques city (now Maputo) a hunting reserve for sports and trophy hunting (Maputo Game Reserve). However, the concentration of African villages with inhabitants devoted to agriculture and livestock farming in the eastern part of the hunting reserve was threatening the conservation purpose of the reserve. To resolve the situation, in October of the same year, the Portuguese administration excluded the Eastern part from the limits of the hunting reserve. The Portuguese colonial administration converted the remaining areas into a sanctuary for the protection of African elephants (\textit{Elephas Africanus}). Later, this hunting reserve became known as Maputo Special Reserve.\textsuperscript{317} In 1936, the Portuguese established another two game reserves, namely the Panda and Zinave hunting reserves in Inhambane district.\textsuperscript{318} Like other protected areas of Mozambique, these hunting reserves also lacked financial resources, touristic infrastructure, and staff for supervision of hunting and enforcement of hunting regulations.

\textbf{3.4. Evolution of conservation policies in southern Mozambique, 1930-1940}

The establishment of hunting reserves in southern Mozambique coincided with political changes in Portugal, which resulted in the introduction of the institution of a dictatorship known as ‘Estado Novo’ (literally the ‘New State’) 1932-1974. The policies of the ‘Estado Novo’ and particularly those implemented by Antonio Salazar, Minister of Finance (1928-32) and then

\textsuperscript{314}Nota Ps/MJ nº 44/1º; Acerca da regulamentação da caça – Direção dos Serviços de Administração Civil em Lourenço Marques, nota assinada por Arnaldo de Almeida Gomes, 28/2/ 1951

\textsuperscript{315}I don’t discuss in this thesis the resettlement program undertaken as a result of the transformation of this area into LNP. Resettlement programs were designed after 2002. Moreover, my study covers a period before the beginning of the resettlements in the LNP.


Prime Minister (1932-1968) had a considerable impact on the life, economy, society and wildlife in southern Mozambique. The conservative and authoritarian ideologies of Salazar led him to establish an anti-democratic and authoritarian regime through which he proposed to put Portugal on the map of the developed nations, and lessen its growing dependence on other European states.\textsuperscript{319}

From the early 1930s to 1950s, the Salazar administration in southern Mozambique increased the exploitation of local resources and its population through the continuation of collection of hut taxes (introduced since 1897) labour export to the South African mining industry and production of raw materials specifically cotton to feed the emerging Portuguese textile sector.\textsuperscript{320} The Salazar administration also continued to exploit local resources through a controlled system of licenses issued for timber companies exploiting wood (logging licenses) in the Mozambican forests and hunters (hunting licenses) entering the Mozambican hunting reserves.\textsuperscript{321}

In order to achieve its goals, the Salazar administration hyped the propaganda about the existence of game in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{322} The entry of foreign tourists into Mozambique represented a source of revenue that helped the colonial administration to pay its expenses. From the early 1930s to the late 1950s, many white hunters among them nationals and foreigners applied for hunting permits to hunt in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{323}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{319}AHM. Administraç\~ao Civil- Cx. 80. Nota: A Comiss\~ao de Caça propõe a extinção da Reserva de Caça de Elefantes de Zimane. See also Portaria nº 2704- 8/4/1936 or Boletim Oficial nº 33 III Série – 19/8/1936
\item \textsuperscript{320}For more details on this regard see Chapter IV.
\item \textsuperscript{321}The Mozambican hunting regulation (1931, 1936, 1941, 1944, 1946 and 1955) gave much emphasis on fees paid by the hunters rather looking to issues considered important to better fauna preservation in Mozambique. See also “A Caça em Moçambique é uma fonte de receita”. Entrevista com o tético Warmer Von Alverenstein da Moçambique Safarilandia. Jornal Noticias, 11/5/1963, see also “Em defesa da grande riqueza que é a fauna cinegética”, Jornal Noticias, 30/10/56
\item \textsuperscript{322}Souza Correa, Silvio Marcus de. 2011. “Caça esportiva e preservacionismo na África colonial.” p.3
\item \textsuperscript{323}AHM. DSAC; Cx. 80 Pasta Armas, Caça e Munições
\end{itemize}
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In the 1940s, owing to the easy profits arising from hunting many Portuguese citizens left their jobs in cities and towns in Mozambique to engage in hunting. In 1942, the president of the CCM, Dr Mário Alcantra, recognised that due to the lower prices paid by the hunters for their hunting licenses and owing to the lack of staff to control hunting, illegal hunting had become an activity much more rewarding than working as a government officer.  

Since unlicensed hunting was increasing along the Mozambican and South African border and some hunters entering KNP territory, the South African authorities started using international conservation forums to make their case. During the Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa held in 1933 in London under the direction of the Society for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire, the South African Consul in Mozambique appealed to Portugal to strengthen conservation measures in order to protect wildlife along the South Africa and Mozambique border.

In the early 1930s, the southern African was affected by a severe drought, which negatively affected fauna and flora. In some regions along the Mozambican side of the border, water was still available in natural ponds. Some animals of the KNP left their habitats and crossed the frontier in search of pasture and water and it was reported that Mozambican hunters killed some elephants. The Consul argued that the establishment of a park in Mozambique along the KNP border would contribute to the protection of these mammals and other migratory species, which usually cross the borderline in both directions. While diplomatically, the South African authorities were still lobbying the Portuguese, locally the preservation of wildlife required immediate intervention. In order to mitigate the impacts caused by drought on fauna, Colonel James Stevenson-Hamilton, the first warden of the KNP sunk boreholes within the KNP to provide water for the fauna and avoid its migration to Mozambique.

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324 AHM, DSAC; Cx 80, Pasta Armas e Caça 1946-57; Nota 24/1952 da Comissão de Cça da Colónia de Moçambique datada de 17/3/1942. Assinado pelo presidente Mário de Carvalho Alcantra
325 Souza Correa, Silvio Marcus de. 2001. *Caça esportiva e preservacionismo na África colonial*
The increase in unlicensed hunting, especially poaching, in southern Mozambique did not only impact on the reduction of fauna but resulted in human and wildlife conflicts. As is commonplace, hunting practices lead to movement of wild animals. Sometimes, the movements of wild animals can endanger the lives of the local communities if the wild animals chased by the hunters run in the direction of local villages and chase undefended women and children. In order to take control of the situation, the Portuguese gazetted in 1936 a hunting regulation that allowed licensed hunters to kill an unlimited number of elephants found outside the limits of the hunting reserves. This issue became problematic because there were no fences limiting the game reserves in southern Mozambique. 327

Archival date alludes to the dishonest hunters who entered into the hunting reserve and killed as many elephants as they wanted and in their reports, purported that the slaughtered elephants had been found outside the limits of the reserves. 328 In March 1939, during the closed season for hunting, the representatives of the CCM of the district of Lourenço Marques received reports from the authorities of the Maputo Game Reserve stating that hunters were killing elephants inside the limits of the game reserves. The reports also indicated that herds of elephants in that district were leaving their habitats because the hunters who sought the bigger animals chased them away. 329

In the late 1930s, the preservation of fauna in southern Mozambique and particularly along the South African and Mozambican borders no longer concerned the South Africans only but also Portuguese naturalists and ecologists. In 1938, a Portuguese ecologist known as Gomes de Sousa wrote a letter to the Portuguese authorities proposing friendly negotiations between Mozambican and South African authorities for the establishment of trans-frontier parks along the common

327 Mozambique, Governmental Decree nº 765; 13/8/1936
328 Mozambique, Governmental Decree nº 765; 13/8/1936
border. Ecological reasons for the protection of migratory species were some of the concerns that Gomes de Sousa had.330

Gomes de Sousa and the Portuguese educated class defended close cooperation between Mozambique and South Africa and the creation of multiple teams to protect fauna along the Mozambican and South African border to facilitate the monitoring of migratory species, especially the elephants and zebras that from time to time moved between the two territories. In the Mozambican archives, I did not find information of further negotiations between the Mozambican and the South African authorities (including the KNP Board) for the period from 1938 to 1954. Available archival sources indicate that as from 1955 to 1956 the KNP exempted visitors from payment of entrance fees and assisted Portuguese researchers who went to the KNP to study the methods used for wildlife conservation to adapt them to the Mozambican contexts.331

Although the KNP’s authorities had trained some Portuguese officials working on conservation initiatives to improve their knowledge and skills about programs aimed at monitoring fauna along the common border, no initiatives were taken by the Portuguese government in Mozambique to improve fauna management along the South Africa and Mozambique border zones. Information regarding lack of cooperation by the Portuguese on initiatives to design programs to monitor fauna movements along the common border is scarce. However, as I have been arguing the Portuguese were more interested to capture revenues from the hunting activities, which were used to pay some of the government expenses at the district level, including the salaries of the CCM staff, rather than creating condition for better preservation of the fauna.

330Moçambique; Provincia do Sul de Save: Decreto nº 6 de 1921; see also AHM- Fundo do Governo Geral, Cx. 78/C3 - Nota 25- 7/5/1925 da Secretaria da Comissão de Caça para o Administrador da Circunscrição de Guijá-Caniçado

331AHM. Governo-Geral, Cx. 384 Nota sobre os trabalhos da Missão Zootecnica de Moçambique elaborada pelo Chefe da Missão, o Professor F. Frade Viegas da Costa para o Governador da Provincia de Moçambique. Relatório datado de 3 de Novembro de 1955; see also AHM-GG, Cx. 384- Governo-Geral de Moçambique. Arquivo da Repartição de Gabinete. Ano 1948-58 – Processo A/ 10 F. The Mozambican team was admitted to the KNP without the payment of entrance fees. Dated 24/8/1955 [the composition of the Mozambican team: 9
3.5. Challenges in protecting fauna in southern Mozambique, 1940-1950s

In the 1930s and early 1940s, lack of touristic infrastructure (roads, scouts camps) sufficient qualified staff to work on the control of the hunting reserves and means of transport for the mobility of the scouts continued to hinder the preservation of fauna in Mozambique. However, when analysing the Mozambican regulations (1940-1950) I got the impression that the Portuguese legislators were not aware of conditions, which existed in the hunting grounds and because of that reason, they passed hunting regulations that did not respond to the local needs to improve the preservation of the fauna.

In another case, the 1941 hunting regulation established that at sunset the licença especial or special licenses holders had to report to the local authorities of the area in which they had carried out hunting for registration of the slaughtered animals. In practice, this obligation could be achieved only if the hunter was undertaking hunting near a Portuguese administration. However, in most cases, the Portuguese administration offices where hunters had to go for registration, verification of their licences and registration of slaughtered animals were located far away from the hunting grounds.

For example, the colonial administration office in the Massingir region was situated at the Mavodze village at the south of the reserve – about 120 km from the north end. As there was no transport infrastructure like roads, travel on foot from one end to the other took at least one week. In addition, owing to the existence of many rivers within the forest, in the rainy season it was practically impossible to make the journey. The authorities in Mavodze lacked staff to work specifically on control of hunting. The same staff dealing with African affairs (enforcement of colonial rule, collection of taxes, etc.) also had to deal with issues related to conservation and specially the control of hunting.\textsuperscript{332} This situation resulted in agreements between the hunters and government staff working at local levels. The negotiations allowed the hunters to declare weekly members, being 5 qualified veterinarians and 2 administrative staff, 2 white administrative assistants and 2 non-qualified Africans]\textsuperscript{332} Interview with Carlos Ntongane, Machamba, January, 26 February 2014
or monthly the species and numbers that they had killed. Accordingly, the government officers had to rely on the numbers given by the hunters to fill the hunters’ registration books.\(^{333}\) The above-mentioned fact illustrates the differences existing between the hunting regulations and the reality at the hunting field. Thus, it was practically impossible to undertake effective control of the area and supervise hunting with lack of both staff and vehicles.\(^{334}\)

While the 1941 Hunting Regulation raised issues about lack of staff (to locate in different control posts within the hunting reserves to control hunting), infrastructure (roads within the game reserves) and transport for the mobility of the staff, the 1944 Hunting Regulation gave room to the extermination of wild stock by herders and farmers living near the hunting reserves. The 1944 Game Regulation allowed livestock farmers to request the Governor-General to give them permission to exterminate wild stock that was perceived as endangering the development of livestock near their farms. The misinterpretation of the article nº43 was at the centre of the problem.\(^{335}\)

“The owners of plots of land located within hunting reserves, who develop the livestock industry and related activities may within the areas of their concessions exterminate game that can bring threats to their activities”.\(^{336}\)

Apparently, the regulation was clear; but farmers misinterpreted it to justify the slaughter of animals to feed their staff and sell the extra meat in the neighbouring villages and towns. The regulation stated that in the development of livestock farms in open spaces, the owners of the livestock had to protect their cattle by fencing off the grazing areas to prevent the intermingling of wildlife and livestock. Farmers could only request the slaughtering of wild stock in the nearby areas only in cases of threat of the spread of infectious diseases. Moreover, applicants should necessarily be working on a special regime within or near the hunting reserves. Owing to the


\(^{334}\) See a copy of a Hunting License book and pages to register the slaughtered animals in appendix 1 document 1 and 2, pages 263 and 264 respectively.

\(^{335}\) AHM, GG. Cx. 80 - File Armas, Caça e Munições: Ano: 1944-5. Análise pela Comissão de Caça do Sul de Save de Requerimento da Empresa Pecuária do Sul de Save dirigida ao Senhor Governador Geral, 8/11/1944

\(^{336}\) Moçambique - Regulamento de Caça aprovado Diploma Legislativo nº 765, 13/8/1944
fragility of the system, even companies outside of the reserves came to request the General-Governor to authorise the extermination of game in their areas.\footnote{Moçambique - Regulamento de Caça aprovado Diploma Legislativo nº. 765, 13/8/1944}

In addition, Portuguese journalists and the South African authorities also made several appeals on the need for Portugal to strengthen measures to improve the preservation of fauna in Mozambique and particularly along South African and Mozambican border. They argued that lack of financial and human capacity and game laws that did not fit into the local contexts was undermining effective protection of fauna. As a result, in 1943 additional appeals came to the Governor-General office indicating the need for Mozambique to strengthen its conservation measures. A letter from the African Wildlife Protection Society (AWPS) to Governor-General office in Lourenço Marques besides appealing for the increase in efforts to protect fauna, it offered support to the Portuguese government to establish a Wildlife Protection Society in Mozambique, which would work on specific issues for the protection of Fauna.\footnote{AHM. Fundo do Governo-Geral, Cx 178/C3 – File: Caça Transgressões e Multas. Carta da WLPS – South Africa, 15/4/1943 see also AHM. Fundo do Governo-Geral. Cx 178/C3 – File: Caça, Transgressões e Multas. Carta da African wildlife Protection Society. Assunto: Criação de uma Wildlife Society para a protecção da fauna em Moçambique, 23/9/1943}

Owing to criticisms over the lack of measures to improve the management of wildlife in Mozambique, in 1947 the Governor-General created a multidisciplinary team to frame a new conservation policy and hunting regulation for the colony. For the transparency on the investigation process, the Governor excluded members from the CCM.\footnote{The team was composed by five members and directed by Dr. Francisco Paiva, a veterinarian and director of the MMCT and other members from the departments of health, agriculture, railways and the administrator of the city of Lourenço Marques. AHM. Fundo do Governo-geral. Cota 178/C3 – File: Caça, Transgressões e Multas. Carta da African Wildlife Protection Society. Assunto: Criação de uma Wildlife Society para a protecção da fauna em Moçambique, 23/9/1943} Before the report of the multidisciplinary team came out, in later September 1948 the Portuguese consulate in Nairobi sent another letter to the Governor-General’s Office accusing the CCM of not doing anything about elephant slaughter in southern Mozambique. The letter was then channelled to the CCM for explanations. The CCM explained that one of the reasons leading to the extermination of
elephants in the Sul de Save Province was related to the fact that hunters holding special licences could hunt an unlimited number of elephants within the areas indicated in their licences.\textsuperscript{340}

In October 1948, the report of the investigation undertaken by the multidisciplinary team was released.\textsuperscript{341} It concluded that the different hunting regulations implemented by the government in the Sul de Save Province did not meet faunal protection needs.\textsuperscript{342} To correct some of the practices largely denounced by Portuguese citizens and international organizations, the government limited to three (3) the number of elephants allowed to be killed by special licence holders in the Mozambican forests and hunting reserves. Accordingly, hunters had to pay 1500 escudos (60USD) for the licence and 165 escudos (6.5 USD) for the official stamps. For the national hunters the costs of the licence was fixed at the price of 500 escudos (20USD). All hunters either Portuguese or foreigners had to pay 1500 escudos (60USD) for each elephant they killed.\textsuperscript{343}

The colonial administration intended that this measure would increase incomes paid by the hunters as it increased according to the number of elephants each hunter had killed. However, the problem was always the same. How did the colonial authorities assess the number of elephants killed by each hunter? How many new scouts/guards did the colonial authorities put in the Mozambican forests and game reserve to supervise hunting activities? The over exploitation of game in southern Mozambique was not related to lack of hunting regulations but lack of staff to enforce the regulation and clear delimitation of conservation areas where game would be driven and experts would take care of it.


\textsuperscript{341}The team was composted by five members and directed by Dr. Francisco Paiva, a veterinarian and director of the MMCT and other members from the departments of health, agriculture, railways and the administrator of the city of Lourenço Marques. AHM. Fundo do Governo-Geral. Cx. 178/C3 – File: Caça, Transgressões e Multas. Carta da African Wildlife Protection Society. Assunto: Criação de uma Wildlife Society para a protecção da fauna em Moçambique, 23/9/1943

\textsuperscript{342}In 1948, the exchange rate 1 Escudo was equivalent to 98 Sterling Libra. Note that in the same exchange rate sterling Libra to rand was equivalent to 1 to 1. Source: Leite, Joana Perreira. 1989. \textit{La information de economie colonial au Mozambique} [PhD] Paris, Ecole de Hautes Etudes en Scenecie Sociales, p.385

\textsuperscript{343}AHM.GG, Cx80: Comissão de Caça da Colonia de Moçambique. Chefe de Repartiçao do Gabinete. Oficio Actual I55/1948- Resposta em Referencia ao Oficio nº 1860/ C3 da Comissão de Caça ao Governador -Geral, 21/10/1948
The colonial authorities also requested foreign hunters applying for hunting licences to deposit an amount of 25,000 escudos (1000 USD) in the CCM account in Lourenço Marques. This sum was to be used to pay fines if the hunter infringed the hunting regulation but the hunter was refunded if there was no infringement. However, the fact that a hunter had to deposit a warranty in the CCM’s account did not stop him hunting outside the limits set by the hunting regulations. Moreover, the warranty was deposited into the account of the CCM in Lourenço Marques and the licence holder could then hunt in Guijá, (450 km north of Lourenço Marques). Owing to difficulties in the channels of official communication, hunters returned to Lourenço Marques and claimed their warranty back before a report on their activities was available in the capital.

In the late 1940s, the evidence of fauna extermination north of the Elephants and Limpopo rivers (Guijá and Alto Limpopo) came out. In 1948, a brigade of the Mozambique Zoological Mission working in the reserve noticed that species of animals that were once declared as abundant in the region were becoming scarce. For example, the brigade reported that in previous decades, eland (*Taurotragus Oryx*) were easily seen in the area, but in 1948, the brigade did not find many eland within the reserve. The Mozambique Zoological Mission accused both hunters and the companies working on the maintenance of local roads of exterminating fauna and complained about lack of attempts by the local authorities to stop the decimation of wildlife.

Responding to this accusation, the administrator of the *circunscrição* of Massingir blamed the central government for the killing of wild stock in the area. According to the administrator, the central government and companies that had staff working in Alto Limpopo did not send enough foodstuffs for their workers. Consequently, workers relied on wild stock for food.

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344 AHM.GG, Cx. 80: Carta da Comissão de Caça de Moçambique endereçada ao Chefe da Repartição do Gabinete do Governador Geral; Ref 155/1948, 21/10/1948
345 AHM.GG, Cx80: Carta da Comissão de Caça de Moçambique endereçada ao Chefe da Repartição do Gabinete do Governador Geral; Ref 33/1949, 17/2/1949
346 AHM. GG Cx 384, Relatório da Missão Zoológica de Moçambique, assinado pelo Doutor Frade Viegas da Costa; 2/11/1948
In the early 1950s, Portuguese environmentalists used the Mozambican newspapers to criticize the Portuguese authorities’ attitudes towards the control of hunting in Mozambique. They demanded that the government should hire qualified staff to work in the hunting reserves. They also demanded that before the government came up with new hunting regulations it had to undertake detailed and scientific research on the state of the environment in the colony and specific needs for the better management of the ecosystems and wildlife.

As a response to growing criticism, in 1953, the colonial government started to hire people with recognised hunting skills to work as scouts in southern Mozambique forest and hunting reserve. The archival sources are silent on the numbers recruited by colonial authorities. However, in the *Jornal Notícias* I was able to find, some announcements made by the CCM to hire people with abilities to work as scouts in southern Mozambique.

Since criticisms were coming not only from Mozambique, but also from all Portuguese African colonies in 1955, the authorities in Lisbon issued a normative document to regulate hunting and forest uses in all Portuguese African colonies. The Decree 40.040 consolidated all the previous forest and hunting regulations and promulgated a single regulation for all Portuguese overseas territories. Like other Portuguese forest and wildlife regulation, the document contained many definitions of concepts for hunting, reserves, and competencies of institutions involved in the management of fauna and flora, rather than clear strategies to improve their management in Portuguese African colonies.

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347 AHM. GG Cx 384, Relatorio da Missao Zoologica de Moçambique assinado pelo Doutor Frade Viegas da Costa; 2/11/1948
349 “A caça em Moçambique e o clube de caçadores” *Noticias*, 8/2/52
351 Announcement of a vacancy to people willing to work as scouts in the southern Mozambican forests and game reserves, *Noticias*, 7/5/ 1953; Anúncio nº 56194; see Vacancy announcement for scouts/ hunting supervisor for forests and game reserve in colonial southern Mozambique in Appendixes 1 Document 1, p.260
352 Moçambique: Decreto Governamental nº 40040- 20/1/55
3.6. Conclusion
The Portuguese administration in Mozambique issued game laws to limit Africans from continuing to engage in hunting for commercial purposes. Thus, they used the national forests as a means to collect revenue through the establishment of a system of collection of fees paid by the licensed hunters when entering the Mozambican forest and hunting reserves. In 1909, the Portuguese created the Mozambique Hunting Board (CCM) an institution that had as part of its duties to issue advice to the governmental institutions working on fauna protection and to the Governor-General for the establishment of hunting reserves; opening of hunting seasons and proposed changes to game management and hunting practices. However, as suggested by the South African wildlife Society, only institutions concerned with wildlife protection would work toward the establishment of laws, regulations and strategies to better wildlife management. the composition of the CCM (government appointed staff and professional hunters) did not encourage it to issue good advice to the government concerning the protection of fauna.

Most often, effective implementation of conservation practices entails suspension and sometimes temporarily or permanent closure of hunting activity and therefore the CCM did not want to see its members out of the activity. As the game board was concerned with sports and commercial hunting it influenced the government to look to hunting regulations as a way to protect fauna. Throughout the years 1910 to 1956 the Portuguese government kept changing the hunting regulations. However, no hunting regulations met the specific needs for the better management of wildlife in Sul de Save Province. The colonial hunting regulations tackled issues related to hunting fees paid by licensed hunters, penalties to those found hunting illegally, hunting seasons, etc. In reality, the problems of protection of fauna in southern Mozambique were related to the luck of clear demarcation of hunting reserves, where hunting of some species would be restricted in some periods of the year or banned if considered that could lead to extinction of some species. Moreover, owing to the large number of hunting permits issued by the colonial government and the limited staff working within the hunting reserves, it was not possible to control the hunters and their activities. Thus, licensed and non-licensed hunters ended up acting on their own free will and killing fauna beyond the limits set by hunting regulations.
It has to be acknowledged that conservation areas located along the border need special attention for the better management of the wildlife. For that reason, cooperation between countries is crucial for a better management of such areas. Since the establishment of the KNP, the South African authorities became concerned with best management practices for the preservation of wildlife along the South Africa and Mozambique border. From the early incidents along the border (the killing of a South African police officer by Mozambican hunters in 1927), the South African government appealed to the colonial authorities in Mozambique to establish a national park along the KNP border. The Portuguese authorities did not establish such a national park in Mozambique. Existence of population and cattle south of the Elephants River was one of the reasons alleged by the Portuguese to not establish such a park. This situation would remain unresolved until 2001 when the GoM finally transformed Coutada 16 into the LNP.

In the early 1930s, the Portuguese established hunting reserves in Mozambique. However, they did not relocate Africans living within the reserves in villages situated out of them. Indeed, Beinart and Coates have stressed that farming and conservation practices often exist in conflict with each other because if local people are not able to grow enough food for their subsistence, they tend to look for alternative food sources including hunting of wild animals.353

During drought and lack of foodstuffs local communities relied on bush meat for food. The presence of communities in the hunting reserves made control of the areas particularly difficult, as African hunters could remain concealed in the local villages and forests. In the 1930s to 1950s ecologists, wildlife organizations, and South African institutions systematically denounced the extermination of fauna in Mozambique and particularly along the South African and Mozambican border but little efforts made to improve fauna management. As examined in Chapter 4, the state of wildlife management in southern and particularly in the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve, was worsened by introduced forced cotton production. From the early 1940s to later 1950s, cotton production in the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve contributed to degradation of the local ecosystems, poverty, and hunger.

353Beinart, William and Peter Coates. 1995. Environment and History
CHAPTER IV: CHANGING LIVELIHOODS: COLONIAL RULE AND THE LIVES OF AFRICANS IN THE SOUTH WESTERN MOZAMBIQUE BORDERLAND, 1940s-1974

4.1. Introduction

Chapter 3 examines the impact of the Salazar administration on Mozambique´s economy and natural resources. The Salazar administration in Mozambique issued hunting regulations that contributed to the decimation of fauna. It appears also that the regime had very limited cooperation with neighbouring African states, especially South Africa. The Salazar regime in Mozambique did not even cooperate with environmentalists and international conservation agencies that were concerned about the state of environmental affairs in the southern Africa and were keen to help the colonial government in Mozambique to improve the management of fauna.

This chapter analyses the impact of colonial rule on the lives of Africans in general and specifically focuses on the impact of colonial conservation practices in the south western Mozambican borderland. The chapter focuses particularly on the period from the 1940s to 1974. In the beginning of the 1940s, the Portuguese administration in the southern Mozambique hinterland forced the cultivators´ families to produce cotton to supply the emerging Portuguese textile sector. Additionally, in 1942 they increased the amounts of taxes that Africans had to pay for each hut used as a house. These measures increased the workload of African families and brought about misery to the cultivators’ families, as they had to spend much time on the production of cotton rather than on production of food crops. Moreover, money gained from the sale of cotton was used to pay the taxes. In 1974, there were political changes in Mozambique, which culminated with Mozambique independence June 1975. September 1974 marks the victory of Frelimo over the Portuguese and marks the end of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique.

By focusing on the analysis of the lives of Africans in the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve, the chapter aims to examine the differences that existed between the colonial rule and their local practices. The chapter seeks to answer to the following question. What was the impact of the colonial rule on the life of Africans in Alto Limpopo Game Reserve? How did the colonial
authorities articulate their economic objectives (exploitation of local populations though hut taxes and cotton forced cultivation) with conservation objectives? What strategies were put in place in South Africa to overcome the increase of hunting along the border with Mozambique?

From the late 19th century to the late 1950s, the south western Mozambique region was affected by animal diseases, particularly foot and mouth diseases and trypanosomiasis. These diseases had adverse consequences for cattle, fauna, economy, and society not only in Mozambique but also in South Africa and implied the establishment of measures to control animal diseases along the Mozambique South Africa border as well as in the whole southern Mozambique hinterland. Thus, the chapter examines how the colonial government in Mozambique and South Africa deal with the outbreak of animal diseases in the above-mentioned period.

This chapter comprises three main sections. The first section analyses the impact of colonial rule and conservation policies on the lives of Africans in Alto Limpopo Game Reserve; it describes the evolution of labour migration from Alto Limpopo and Guijá to South Africa and its impact on economy, society and wildlife. It lays particular emphasis on the impact of forced cotton production on the lives of Africans, fauna and ecosystems. The second section analyses the outbreak of animal diseases in southern Mozambique and their implication on the preservation of fauna. The third section describes changes introduced by the Portuguese to improve management of hunting reserves in southern Mozambique.

I argue in this chapter that the Portuguese development policy in Mozambique pushed Africans to misery and contributed to the depletion of local resources. While, on the one hand, colonial conservation policies enhanced the need for the preservation of fauna and local ecosystems, on the other hand, the Portuguese staff at local levels coerced Africans to open up cotton farms in the reserves leading to the destruction of local forests and ecosystems. Forced cotton production in Alto Limpopo Game Reserve resulted in crop failures. Accordingly, hunting became a means of survival and an alternative source of income to pay hut taxes.
In 1930, the Portuguese transformed the State Reserve of the Circunscrição de Guijá into a hunting reserve. Regardless of this transformation, no measures were implemented for the safety of the local populations or to relocate them to villages outside the hunting reserve. Africans continued to live in the reserve despite all the threats that hunting practices presented to their lives. Moreover, even within the reserve, the Portuguese required African people to pay hut taxes. Owing to the lack of employment in the area, many Africans were forced to search for new sources of income including migrating to South Africa in search of employment to earn some money to pay the hut taxes and buy commodities for their families. Africans who remained in the reserve were forced to engage in cotton production. The Portuguese also hired militias known as cipaios to help colonial staff (chefes de posto) working at the local levels (administrações) to enforce colonial rule. Chefes de posto and cipaios controlled the payment of the hut taxes and labour migration to South Africa and cotton production which was meant to feed the emerging Portuguese textile sector.

4.2.1. Labour migration from the south western Mozambique borderland to South Africa

Hunting and labour migration in south western Mozambique borderland were important livelihood strategies undertaken by Africans to cope with periods of food scarcity. Indeed, in the late 19th century ecological crisis, a war that hit the Gaza-Nguni state, raids by neighbouring states (the Zulu, Swazis, and Nguni) and animal diseases that destroyed cattle forced some populations in southern Mozambique to migrate to the Transvaal and many Africans were driven to sell their labour to recover the losses.

Existing sources indicate that Manukussi, the first king of the Gaza-Nguni state (1833-1858), ruled the state by terror and many people in southern Mozambique and particularly from the area of study (Nwalungo, Loyi and Ncunas) fled to the Transvaal in search of refuge. Therefore,

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during the Gungunhane’s war of resistance against the Portuguese, a considerable number of Africans migrated to the Transvaal.  

Academics and historians have convincingly argued that the development of an agro-industry in Natal and the discovery of gold and diamonds in the Transvaal boosted labour migration from southern Mozambique to South Africa. Hence, the Portuguese economic situation favoured export of African labour from Mozambique to South Africa. Lack of capital and resources to develop jobs and to productively employ local labour in Mozambique forced the Portuguese authorities to use hut taxes and labour export to South Africa as ways to collect revenue. Since the mining industry paid a lot better than the farms in Natal, Cape or Mozambican cities, many Africans preferred to work for the mining industry rather than in the Mozambican emerging cities and towns.

In 1897, the Portuguese and the Transvaal administration signed accords on labour export from Mozambique to South Africa. These accords allowed Portugal to set the basics of the Transvaal’s overseas trade that passed through the Port of Lourenço Marques. The accords also enabled the Portuguese to benefit from a deferred payment scheme for migrants' earnings, which ensured that the migrants would not spend all of their salaries before returning to Mozambique. This scheme was introduced to force the Mozambicans to return to their home villages and use their money in the local rural shops known in Portuguese as cantinas. Migrants also used the money earned in South Africa to pay the hut taxes and buy consumer goods for their families.

357 Stevenson-Hamilton, James. 1929. The lowveld: its wildlife and its people, p. 72
360 Brock, Lisa Ann. From kingdom to colonial district, p. 68
362 The 1928 Labour Migration Agreement made between Mozambique and South Africa made deferred payments compulsory for Mozambican mine workers in South Africa. This meant that half of their 18 months’ pay had to be
The accords on labour export from Mozambique to South Africa were updated in 1896, 1989, 1901, 1909 and 1928 to accommodate specific contexts and needs in both countries. In general, the accords gave monopoly to the South African recruiting companies and specifically to the Witwatersrand Natives Labour Association (WENELA) to recruit labour from southern Mozambique to the South African mining sector. In 1918, WENELA was allowed to build a road in the northern section of the Shingwedzi Reserve to be used for the transportation of migrants from southern Mozambique to the South African mines.

In the 1920s, WENELA built a recruitment post within the Shingwedzi Reserve near the border between Mozambique, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). This recruitment benefited migrants from Southern Rhodesia and southern Mozambique and particularly travellers from the districts of Gaza and Inhambane. Hansen has pointed out that due to the fact that communication between the capital (Lourenço Marques) and Pafuri could take more than two weeks, officials working in this facility were left to their own devices. At times, they could leave their work and hunt in the forest and therefore have bush meat for their survival. Hansen’s statement highlights some of practices of the Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique toward the management of forests and fauna (i) use of hunting as a survival strategy for colonial officers working in remote rural areas; (ii) lack of staff to supervise hunting in the game reserves; (iii) and exemption of payment of hunting fees by the Portuguese officials working at local levels. Portuguese officers understood that they were exempted from the obligation of applying for hunting licenses and that they could hunt whenever they pleased as long as they did it in the districts they had been appointed to work in. In the late 1930s, WENELA paid to the Portuguese administration £1 for each African from southern Mozambique they secured for the mines. Accordingly, Africans willing to go to work on their own account in South Africa had to pay the

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received in the nearest administration center to the migrants’ home villages after the end of their contracts. 


Portuguese £1 to get their permits or passes to do so. Migrants from southern Mozambican willing to work in South Africa and in companies different from those under the aegis of WENELA and unwilling to pay the £1 to the Portuguese authorities, travelled from their communities to the KNP and handed themselves over to KNP authorities as trespassers. After being sentenced to 14 days of work they got permits or passes that allowed them to go to work on their own account in South Africa. The passes also allowed them to choose the companies they wanted to work for as well as the time of their stay at the worksite.\textsuperscript{367}

The system of exchanging passes for 14 days of work in the KNP in lieu of the £1 became known in south western Mozambique as \textit{a-mafourteen}. Between the 1940s and 1960s, the 14 days pass system allowed the KNP to have free labour from southern Mozambique and it also used the same system to select candidates for permanent appointment. Up to the late 1960s, more than 80\% of the KNP rangers were Shangane selected through this system.\textsuperscript{368} Migrants who found jobs at Skukuza (local name for KNP) did not proceed to other places.\textsuperscript{369}

In the 1940s, the increase in the hut taxes forced many Africans in Guijá and particularly in the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve to seek wage incomes and consequently increased labour migration from the area to South Africa.\textsuperscript{370} The migrants used the money they got in South African to pay the hut taxes, buy clothes, pay the bride price or \textit{lobola} and buy useful goods for their families.\textsuperscript{371} Migrants from Massingir and border villages preferred to use the bush route to travel from their villages to South Africa rather than to walk the long distance to the official border gates. For example, from Massingir to the nearest border point is 37 km and 100 km to the Pafuri border gate.\textsuperscript{372}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{366}Hansen, Heidi Suzanne. 2008. \textit{Community perceptions of a mine recruitment centre in Pafuri}, p. 15
\textsuperscript{368}Van Rooyen, Lynn. \textit{Mbazo: footprints through the Kruger National Park: the memories of Lynn Van Rooyen's 30 year career in the Kruger National Park}. Trafford Publishing, 2012, p. 38
\textsuperscript{369}Interview with Samuel Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 22/01/2014
\textsuperscript{370}Interview with Samuel Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 22/01/2014
\textsuperscript{371}Covane, L. A. 2001. \textit{O Trabalho Migratório e a Agricultura no Sul de Moçambique}; p. 49
\textsuperscript{372}AHM-ISANI. Cx. Santos, António Policarpo de Sousa. ‘Relatório de inspecção ordinária feita à circunscrição de Guijá – Sede do posto de Massingir – do período de Agosto de 1942 à Janeiro de 1957’, p. 100, p.337. In
\end{flushright}
As mentioned earlier, WENELA was a recruiting agency affiliated to the Chambers of Mines and accredited by the Mozambique government to recruit labour from Mozambique to South Africa. However, in South Africa companies not affiliated to the Chambers of Mines could not benefit from workers recruited by WENELA. Such companies hired their own recruiting agents, who were placed along the South Africa border with southern Rhodesia and Mozambique. The agents offered incentives (such as issuing all the necessary documentation and transport to travel from the recruiting posts established along the border to their worksites). Moreover, differently from mining companies’ contracts which forced migrants to stay at the worksite for a period of about 12 to 18 months, migrants employed in other sectors of the South African economy (construction, agriculture, conservation in the KNP) were not obliged to stay long periods. Migrants, could return to their villages after one or two months of work and help their families in agriculture and some engage in hunting.

Thus, while the colonial state administration was concerned with agreements that could keep migrants in their worksites and ensure more direct benefit to local commerce from miners’ spending at the end of their contracts, a number of migrants from border villages in the southern Mozambique hinterland were concerned with jobs that would allow them to earn only sufficient cash to pay hut taxes and the bride price or lobola and then return to their villages. Thus, migrants found in illegal migration a way to go to South Africa without passing by the local colonial administration offices where they would be registered and forced into work for the South African mining companies, which would force them to stay in South Africa for a period from 12 to 18 months.

December 2005, the governments of South Africa and Mozambique opened the Giriondo border post for tourists use only. See Notícias Newspaper or Jornal Noticias 6/12/2005

373AHM. ISANI; Cx. 26. António Policarpo de Sousa Santos. Relatório de inspeção ordinária feita à circunscrição de Alto Limpopo povoados de Massangena Saíte e Mavue – no período de 12 de Dezembro de 1942 à 14 de Maio. Relatório final elaborado em Maio de 1956, see also Hansen, Heidi Suzanne. 2008. Community perceptions of a mine recruitment centre in Pafuri

374Interview with Samuel Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 22/01/2014
A confidential report of a Breyner & Wirth agent based in Pafuri, indicates that between 1942 and 1956 many migrants from border villages in southern Mozambique migrated to South Africa without passing through the legal points of entry that allowed them to be registered by the legal recruiting companies and then proceed with their trips to South Africa. The report highlighted that between 1942 and 1956, there were 4 paths from southern Mozambique that gave access to the KNP.375

1) From Madousse and Tomo villages people walked to Chifubje within the Guijá Hunting Reserve and from then they crossed the border and entered into the KNP;

2) From Mapulangune in the circunscrição de Sabie along the border with the south end of the KNP people walked to Isweni within the KNP and

3) The local people from the villages of Macaene, Pandzane, Matunganhane and Machautine converged at Mangalane where they took the path to Saliji in the KNP; from Salige they walked to Skukuza where they got their passes in return for 10 to 14 days of work. From Skukuza, Africans who used this route could walk until Nhamdene where they caught vans to Bush Buck Ridge and Graskop.

4) Migrants from the Massingir village walked to Mala-mala within the KNP. In Mala-mala, migrants were taken to Lethaba where passes were issued in return for 2 to 6 days of work; from Lethaba migrants caught transport to Zoekmakare in South Africa where they were delivered to agents recruiting migrants for diverse companies in South Africa. The passage from the KNP to Lethaba allowed the migrants from Massingir to meet other migrants who had crossed the border using the Pafuri border post.376

Migrants who preferred to work for the mines were obliged to pass through inspection. The others could choose whether to work for the farms or for the construction companies in towns located on the other side of the border.377 The workers using these routes had to keep their passes to use on their return so that they could not spend more time in the KNP. There are no official

377 Interview with Simião Sitoi, Massingir Velho, 21/1/ 2014
records of numbers of Mozambican migrants that were employed in the KNP during the period of study of this thesis. There is also lack of information on the numbers of those who passed through the KNP to work in diverse sectors of economy in South Africa. Existing official records only refer to migrants recruited in Guijá and Massingir by WENELA. The table below shows the number of mineworkers recruited in Guijá and in the Massingir region by WENELA from 1944-1955.

**Table 2: Migrant labour recruited by WENELA in Guijá and Massingir, 1946-1955**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nº of workers</th>
<th>Guijá</th>
<th>Massingir</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1632</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>2433</td>
<td>162</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1358</td>
<td>162</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1601</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1189</td>
<td>172</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1665</td>
<td>174</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1673</td>
<td>184</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1421</td>
<td>199</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above clearly demonstrates that there were many Mozambican migrants recruited in Guijá rather than in the Massingir region. As explained above, due to the proximity of the border, migrants from Massingir could easily get to labour recruitment posts in South Africa rather than migrants from Guijá. Because of the long way to the border, the latter preferred to follow the procedures imposed by the Portuguese administration. In the 1940s, the Portuguese administration in south western Mozambique complained that clandestine companies were illegally recruiting many workers from the area and officials companies had problems finding workers for the mining industry. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, colonial authorities tried to...
control illegal migration by policing the Shingwedzi River. They used militias to arrest illegal migrants from southern Mozambique found on their way to South Africa. These efforts failed because migrants used different routes from those the colonial militias were placed and indifference of the militias.\textsuperscript{380}
Map 5: WENELA recruiting posts in southern Mozambique and routes used by official and clandestine migrants from Southern Mozambique to South Africa.\textsuperscript{381}

\textsuperscript{381}Souto, Amelia. 1991. \textit{Moçambique: A delimitação de fronteiras}. A look at a map shows why migrants from the coastal area preferred to converge in the Wenela recruitings station and then travel to Lourenço Marques where they boarded a train for South Africa, p.38
From the late 1950s up to the early 1970s, the roles of the villages’ headmen became more efficient in controlling illegal migration in the region. They informed the Portuguese administration about the passage of migrants from other regions through their villages. In most cases, foreign migrants arrested were brought to the public administration or taken to plantations to perform forced labour. It was for this reason that, in the early 1960s, migrants began to use more conventional routes and facilities created by WENELA in the region. Thus, migrants from the Massingir region preferred to be registered at the local administration offices, get the necessary documentation and travel documents and walk to Caniçado to take transport to South Africa rather than use the bush route. In doing this, they avoided to be arrested by the colonial administration officials and penalized 3 to 15 days of forced work at local administration. Moreover, they avoided all kinds of challenges of the bush route where some migrants were lost and starved to death; some were killed by poisonous animals like snakes, lizards, spiders or eaten by wildcats like lions and leopards. \(^{382}\)

Labour migration from southern Mozambique to South Africa had a direct impact on the development of agriculture and hunting practices. Migrants used their incomes to buy firearms used in hunting and invest in agriculture. In the early 1930s, migrants introduced the first ploughs in the area. The migrants’ families that used cattle to pull the ploughs were able to increase the size of their plots and their production rather than those who continued to rely on small handle hoes. \(^{383}\)

In the 1950s, a considerable proportion of migrants from Elephant and Shingwedzi catchments bought ploughs from South Africa to use in agriculture in their home villages. Thus, cultivators who produced enough for their consumption could sell their surplus to shopkeepers (cantineiros) at Mavodze village. They used the money they obtained from the sale of their surplus for the payment of hut taxes and to buy basic domestic commodities and some went as far as re-investing some of it in agriculture. \(^{384}\)

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382 Interview with Simion Mahori, Massingir Velho, July, 13th 2012
383 Interview with Salomão Zandamela, Guijá, February 1979. In Manghezi, A. Trabalho forçado, p.19
384 Ibiden
Agricultural development along the Elephants and Shingwedzi rivers brought about social differentiations in Massingir region. The families that had some of their members working in South Africa were amongst the wealthiest families. They could afford to buy cattle, ploughs and ox wagons. Thus, they could increase the size and productivity of their farms. They also used ox wagons for the transport of corn from the field to the granaries (barns) in their homesteads or used ox wagon to transport grains from their houses to the nearest villages (Mavodze shops) to exchange by other commodities. Those who had no money to buy ox wagon built slergs (locally known as slay) to use in transporting crops and other goods. While in south of the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve local communities used oxen carts and slays for the movement of their goods, due to rough terrains and rivers in the inner villages, local communities preferred to use donkeys to transport their goods, dried bush meat and grains to sell or exchange and buy other commodities at Mavodze shops.

Oral accounts in the Massingir region also indicate that migrants brought from Transvaal, iron traps, firearms and wires used for the construction of traditional traps (Thithaga) and construction of kraals. Conventional iron traps and the traditional ones (made of wire) were very important instruments for hunting and security of African villages. They were used to kill wild animals for food and hunt predators that approached African villages to kill cattle. In some occasions, traps were used to kill predators that approached African villages and panic the villagers. Although the colonial hunting regulations allowed Africans to request to the colonial officers at local levels (chefes de posto) the permission to use traps to kill predators that approached African villages and panic the villagers, my interviewees referred that local hunters rarely approached the chefes de posto. Africans hunters knew that in such cases they would get permissions to use traps to kill predators. However, they feared that after they kill the predator the Portuguese authorities would confiscate the traps and they would have access to them only in other cases where presence of predators near their villages panics the villagers. However, the hunters needed the traps for their daily activities.

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385 Interview with Winalse Mathe, Mavodzi, 23/1/ 2014
386 Interview with Winalse Mathe, Mavodzi, 23/1/ 2014
387 Interview with Winalse Mathe, Mavodzi, 23/1/ 2014
The increase of firearms with Africans used particularly for hunting brought about changes in the trade of firearms and gunpowder in southern Mozambique. Owners of the shops, which sold gunpowder and bullets used in hunting and related activities were requested to keep names and identities of their customers. In the early 1960s, when shops in Lourenço Marques started to request shooting licences to sell gunpowder, migrants working in the mines in South Africa began to use the opportunities they had in their companies to collect gunpowder to bring home and use for hunting. Carlos Ntongane recalled how difficult it was to collect gunpowder at his work place and take it to Mozambique.

“In 1961, I was working in a goldfield in the Free Estate in South Africa. I was informed by a friend of mine who came after me that the Portuguese were no longer selling bullets and gunpowder to Africans without a proof of licence for gun use. I began to collect gunpowder from my work. I was working in a mining company. I was working underground; my team was responsible for the opening of new paths for the extraction of gold. We had to break down big pieces of stone used in the production of gold. We worked with sticks of dynamite and had a white supervisor behind us. When the white was not there, I took my chance to steal dynamite to extract the gunpowder. The dynamites weighed around 100g. There were days that it was practically impossible to steal the dynamite. It took me long time to collect about 4 kg of the gunpowder. Moreover, it was not easy to take the gunpowder home. If someone was found by the customs office at the border gate in Ressano Garcia with gunpowder the person was immediately arrested. I hide the gunpowder in my luggage. Arrived at home I used the gunpowder to load the guns. At that time, I used a muzzle-loading guns known in Shangan as xibamo xa muguinguelua. Once a person shot the gun, he had to reload it again”.

The weakness of Portugal’s capitalist economy limited its ability to implement effective projects to explore the potentialities of land and use local labour to work toward the development of capitalist agriculture in Mozambique. Thus, labour migration in southern Mozambique and particularly in Guijá and Alto Limpopo became the mean of getting income to pay the colonial taxes and buy commodities for their families. Besides bringing home money to pay for the lobola and buy goods for their families, Africans found in labour migration an opportunity to acquire instruments used in hunting (conventional traps, wires used for the construction of traditional traps, gunpowder) that they could not access locally due to impositions of the colonial rule.

388 Interview with Carlos Ntongane, Machamba, January, 26/2/ 2014
As examined in the next section, the migrants were not exempted from other forms of colonial exploitation. While they were working in South Africa their families were requested by the colonial administration to engage in cotton production. Thus, some migrants brought ploughs from South Africa to help their families in agriculture including the opening up of cotton farms.\footnote{Interview with Simião Sitiö, Massingir Velho, 21/1/ 2014}

4.2.2. Cotton production in the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve


In the late 1930s, Salazar, Portugal’s Prime Minister, opted for forced cotton production to overcome lack of capital by the Portuguese administration. Accordingly, cotton enterprises or\textit{ concessionárias} were created to promote the production of cotton.\footnote{Complaints presented to the colonial inspectors by the villages headmen in Mongoë and Chaque, see AHM-ISANI. Cx. 26. Santos, António Policarpo de Sousa. ‘Relatório de inspecção ordinária feita à circunscrição de Guijá – Sede do posto de Massingir – do periodo de Agosto de 1942 à Janeiro de 1957’, p. 108; In southern Mozambique the Algodeeira do Sul de Save (ASS) was the cotton enterprise created to promote cotton production.} Given the increasing demand for cotton by the European textile industry on the eve of World War II, Salazar centralized cotton production and its trade in the colonies and created the Colonial Cotton Export Board known in Portuguese as Junta de Exportação de Algodão da Colonia (JEAC).\footnote{Isaacman, Allen “Coercion, paternalism and the labour process”, p.518} “To contain dissatisfaction and to stimulate production, the concessionary companies employed a number of European field agents known as propagandistas and overseers or capatazes in whom the state vested de facto police powers. The former were supposed to select the most suitable
land and to provide the peasants with minimal technical instruction. They did neither. Instead, they relied on force and headmen of the local villages to increase output.”  

In order to enlist the collaboration of the local villages’ headmen or regulos, the Portuguese empowered the régulos as their representatives at local levels. The Portuguese also exempted the régulos from the payment of hut taxes, and forced labour at the administration. From the early 1940s, the régulos became very important allies of the colonial administration for the enforcement of colonial laws at local level. People interviewed in the Massingir region acknowledge that régulos were the closest allies of the Portuguese within their villages. They produced information about numbers and ages of people in their villages and areas suitable to grow cotton. Accordingly, the Portuguese used such information to plan cotton farms and people to be involved in cotton production in each village. During their work, the régulos relied either on their village militias known as ndunas or on the colonial state militias known as cipaios.

From 1946 to the late 1950s, all adult males in southern Mozambique (i.e., aged 18 to 55) had to have a farm of 1 (one) hectare of cotton and half (½) hectare of cotton for each of their wives. The introduction of cotton in Guijá resulted in the scarcity of fertile land along the valleys of main rivers. The propagandistas (propagandists) and the concessionaries took the best land along the river valleys, near the water courses, roads and local markets for cotton production leaving the marginal land for food production.

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395Isaacman, Allen. 1985. “Chiefs, rural differentiation and peasant protest”, p. 24-25. A number of material benefits accompanied the position of state-appointed chief. The colonial administration exempted the regulos from burdensome labour and tax requirements, provided them with uniforms and shoes, and, most importantly, paid them an annual salary as government functionaries. In the 1950s, most southern Mozambican regulos used tributary labour and plough to cultivate their fields. Since this exploitation of peasant labour enabled the régulos to fulfil their twin obligations as labour supervisors and model farmers, colonial officials not only sanctioned, but enforced, this practice. An elder from the southern region of Chibuto bitterly recalled that “every sunday Chief Cossa sent his madodas [assistants] to bring all the people to work his land. If they refused they were sent to the administrator where they were beaten and imprisoned.
396Interview with Augusto Fanequisse, Machamba 26/2/ 2014; see also Interview with Fabião Vuqueia, Chimangue February 2014, see also Interview with Jeremias Mafanate Valoi, Mbingo, 24/2/ 2014
397Interview with Simeão Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6/6/2012
398Interview with Assista Doutor Valoi, Massingir Velho, 27/1/ 2014
Cotton production in the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve did not only use the best lands but also consumed most of the peasants’ time that could otherwise be spent on the production of food crops. Moreover, whereas in the family plots people could choose the size of the area they wanted to plant, the cotton fields were required to have standard sizes.399 Peasants in Guijá and Massingir recall famines that occurred in the region from the 1930s and 1940s related to combined factors such as cotton production and drought. Isaacman’s paper on cotton production in Mozambique clearly elucidates the difficulties that the peasantry in southern Mozambique experienced with the opening of new cotton farms (clearing the brush, burning vegetation in the heavy clay soils).

“Cotton is a thankless crop. It demands everything from us but what do we get in exchange? We have to sell it at the price the government wants; we cannot dispute the price like corn, with the chestnuts, or with the mafurra seed. If it is a bad year and we lose all the cotton, does someone, pay us for the work we did? If, in the bargain, we have the misfortune of not getting anything from our field, what will we eat during the year? How will we clothe our children? Where can we go for help? In addition, on top of all that they say we do not want to work.”

From the early 1940s to the early 1950s, the weakness of the Portugal’s capitalist economy did not allow Portugal to invest in modern agriculture in southern Mozambique. It nonetheless exploited local labour to benefit the Portuguese economy by coercing Africans to engage in cash crop production to feed the Portuguese emerging textile industry. Lack of investment in agrarian extension led the Portuguese to rely on local authorities to choose areas for cotton production. In the Guijá region, cotton promoters forced the local cultivators to open cotton farms in the reserve. The introduction of forced cotton production in Alto Limpopo Game Reserve demonstrated that there were big differences between the general colonial policies with local practices. The same authorities, on the one hand, promoted ideas of fauna and ecosystem protection forced Africans to cut down trees to clear fields to grow cotton, on the other hand.401

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399 Isaacman, Allen “Coercion, paternalism and the labour process”, p.518
401 Interview with Maressane Foliche Mbonbe; Mbingo. 24/2/ 2014
Colonial administrative inspections made in the Guijá region in the period between 1942 and 1957 noticed that there were many claims against cotton promoters. Africans reported to the government inspector that farmers who did not clear the cotton fields to increase cotton plants productivity were taken by the *capatazers* (overseers) or *çipaios* to be beaten at the administration.\textsuperscript{402} For fear of being arrested or being beaten up by the colonial authorities if they failed to collect cotton of good quality (known as cotton of 1\textsuperscript{st} class), many people from the Guijá and particularly from Alto Limpopo Game Reserve left their villages and went to live in the Transvaal.\textsuperscript{403}

In 1958, cotton promoters forced local communities of the western part of Guijá (just at the east limit of the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve) to grow cotton inside the hunting reserve. As a result, the local communities requested a meeting with the administrator of Guijá to explain to him that they were not going to open cotton farms in the hunting reserve. This group of African cultivators had the assistance of an educated African who worked for the Portuguese authorities and knew the Portuguese law. Africans lodged such complaints as a strategy in order to buy time to enable them to work on their farms while the administration was looking for other areas to open up cotton farms. Nevertheless, a considerable number of Africans did not know about the existence of such regulations and grew cotton within the limits of the hunting reserve.\textsuperscript{404}

Interviews with local people in LNP (former Alto Limpopo Game Reserve) indicated that during the colonial period almost all the families living in the reserve had cotton farms. Although the numbers of people involved in forced cotton production are not available from statistics, interviews demonstrate the significance that cotton had on the Portuguese economy. Most often the colonial authorities working at local levels, instead of promoting values and rules that helped the protection of ecosystems in conservation areas, their policies resulted in devastation though the opening of new fields. Cotton production in Alto Limpopo Game Reserve showed there were

\textsuperscript{402}For more details on cotton politics in Mozambique see Lemos, Manuel J. C. de. 1885. *Fontes para o estudo do algodão em Moçambique: documentos de arquivo, 1938-1974*. Trabalho de Diploma, Licenciatura em História com Especialidade em Documentação, UEM; see also Isaacman, A.1992. “Coercion, paternalism and the labour process”

\textsuperscript{403}Interview with Gabriel Mukavi, Guijá, 16 February 1979. Manghezi, A. *Trabalho forçado*, p.46
differences between colonial rules and their enforcement. This contradiction was an inherent part of Salazar’s economic policy (1930-1974), which prompted economic growth in the colonies by exploiting them through a highly regimented labour regime requiring little capital investment.\footnote{Interview with Gabriel Mukavi, Guijá, 16 February 1979. Manghezi, A. \textit{Trabalho forçado}, p.45}

It seems that, in the view of Salazar’s policies, Portuguese officers at local levels were forced to expand activities that contributed to expand revenues for the Portuguese (collection of hut taxes, labour migration, cash crops, etc.) whatever these were sustainable or in the local environments. In fact, north of the Elephants River, hunting fees paid by the sports and professional hunters entering the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve constituted another source of revenue for the colonial state.

Interviews with local people in the LNP also indicated that during the colonial period cotton prices were very low and even during years of good production a family of about 6 to 8 people owning two (2) hectares of cotton could not live by income from cotton sales alone. Quite often, they used incomes from cotton sale to pay the hut taxes and buy some basic consumer goods. Due to complaints made by the local people about the abuses committed by cotton promoters, in the late 1950s, the colonial government recommended the abandonment of forced cotton production within the reserve.\footnote{Interview with Salomão Zandamela, Guijá, February 1979. Manghezi, A. \textit{Trabalho forçado}, p.35-37} Forced cotton production was not abandoned immediately. During the 1950s, it was a source of income of some families, which did not have most of their members working in South Africa. These families continued to rely on income from cotton to pay the colonial taxes. Along the alluvial soils of the Elephants River cotton production rendered much more rather than in the arid upper land north the Elephants River. Interviewees did not establish a direct relationship between elimination of forced cotton production and hunting north of Elephants River. However, cultivators interviewed on this issue mentioned that in the 1950s and 1960s, a considerable number of the villagers of north of the Elephants River exchanged biltong for grains and other commodities at Mavodze shops and some sold biltong to get cash to pay the colonial hut taxes.

\footnote{For more comprehensive explanation on this regard see cotton production in Massingir in previous chapter}
4.2.3. Hunting for survival

In the 1940s, the Portuguese administration in southern Mozambique increased the hut taxes from about 200 escudos in 1942 to about 250 escudos (9 USD) in 1949. Such taxes were too heavy for the local population. Just to elucidate on this point, a European hunter paid about 40 escudos for a license that enabled him to kill four (4) elephants and put ivory on the market at a price of about 150 pounds each (at that time, the exchange rate for 150 pounds was equivalent to 500 Escudos). In the early 1950s, the price of cattle in southern Mozambique was about 150 to 200 escudos per head. In practice, in the absence of other sources of income all adults owning huts used as houses had to sell their cattle or the surplus of their production to pay the taxes, migrate to South Africa to look for employment or engage in hunting to gain some cash to pay the taxes.

Oral accounts in the Massingir region indicate that soon after the establishment of the Portuguese administration in the area, shopkeepers known in the Portuguese literature as cantineiros also came to open shops near the Portuguese administration office at Mavodze village. The cantineiros traded a wide range of commodities with Africans. The barter system practiced by the cantineiros at Mavodze village allowed them to buy grains and dried bush meat locally known as mitonga or biltong from Africans and sell to them basic consumer goods such as clothes, salt, alcoholic beverages, matches and kerosene.

Ntongane recalls that until the early 1950s, there was no hunting control in the area. Colonial documents indicate that due to deficient registration of hunters on their arrival at the Reserve and lack of communication systems between the Portuguese administration’s offices allowed hunters

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407 The exchange rate in 1949 was 1 USD to 28$75 escudos; see also AHM, ISANI; Cx 26. António Policarpo de Sousa Santos. Relatório de inspecção ordinária feita a circunscrição de Alto Limpopo povoados de Massangena Saúte e Mavue – no periodo de 12 de Dezembro de 1942 à 14 de Maio. Relatório final elaborado em Maio de 1956 p.11-13
408 Covane, L. A. O trabalho migratório e a agricultura no sul de Moçambique , p. 49
409 Interview with Maressane Foliche Mbombe Mbingo, 24/2/ 2014
410 Interview with Carlos Ntongane, Machamba, 26/2 /2014
to stay in the forest without the knowledge of local authorities. Since some Africans had the ability to use hunting rifles and knew the areas of concentration of the game, most often white hunters came to rely on the assistance of Africans for hunting and in some cases Africans hunted on their behalf. The case described below illustrates just how fragile the hunting control system in southern Mozambique was:

“The case described below illustrates just how fragile the hunting control system in southern Mozambique was:

“In 1949, a South African citizen of 46 years known as Charles White was arrested and accused of contraband, illegal hunting and prostitution in Saute Village, circunscrição of Alto Limpopo. The population of Saute village in Alto Limpopo reported to the administration that a South African citizen had settled in their village, hunting elephants, smuggling goods from South Africa to Mozambique, offering alcohol to young women and seducing them for sex. In 1947, White had applied for a hunting permit in Lourenço Marques district. His request was denied and he left Lourenço Marques and went to Inhambane where he applied for another hunting permit. Without knowing White’s behaviour, the government of Inhambane granted him a hunting licence, which he then used to hunt in Alto Limpopo. When the Gaza government had the information that White was using a permit issued in Inhambane to hunt in Gaza, it cancelled the licence. However, he continued hunting in Magude and Guijá in exchange for the payment of 10 pounds to his assistants for each elephant he killed. Disrespect shown to local authorities and general misconduct (prostitution and smuggling of alcoholic beverages from South Africa to Mozambique) led community members of Saute village to report to the local administration the presence of Charles White in their village. White was arrested and taken to Lourenço Marques for judgment.”

The arrest of Charles White was only a sign of the lack of intra-institutional communication and collaboration between the local and provincial authorities in southern Mozambique. Oral accounts indicate that the increase of hut taxes in Guijá region and lack of employment in the area forced Africans to migrate to seek employment in South Africa and those who stayed behind sought alliances with white hunters who paid them with rifles, bullets, clothes and money as compensation of their work. In the 1940s and 1950s, Africans used these rifles to hunt for themselves and sell the products of hunting to cantineiros at Mavodze. Before the late 1950s,

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411 Ibid
412 In the late 1940s special licences holders were allowed to stay 90 days in the bush and take with them 250 bullets; see AHM. G.G. Cx 178/C3; Caça, Transgressões e Multas. Comissão de Caça da Colonia de Moçambique, Nota para o Chefe de Repartição do Gabinete do Governador Geral de Moçambique em Lourenço Marques. Oficio nº 33/1949 - Projecto Portaria para acabar com a caça livre do elefante em Lourenço Marques.
413 Ibid.
414 Ibid
415 Interview with Carlos Ntongane, Machamba, 26/2/2014
when the Portuguese restricted the sale of bush meat to hunting licences holders, many Africans in the reserve used incomes from hunting to pay the Portuguese hut taxes.\textsuperscript{416}

Archival documents point to the inefficiency of the Portuguese administrative system as one of the reasons that contributed to the increase the number of illegal hunters in Alto Limpopo. The legislative decree nº 956 of 12/3/1945 authorized European citizens living in the Mozambican rural areas to buy self-defence weapons as long as they had applied for licences for use of self-defence rifles. In the early 1950s, the Development of irrigated schemes and Portuguese planned settlements (Colonatos) in Chokwe region contributed to an influx of European families to the area (carpenters, masons, peasants, mechanics, and missionaries). After their arrival, the settlers requested the Portuguese authorities if they could obtain licenses for use of weapons for personal defence on allegations that Africans in southern Mozambique were violent.\textsuperscript{417} Most often, these settlers instead of using the rifles for self-defence, they used the rifles for hunting and thus contribute to escalate hunting in southern Mozambique.\textsuperscript{418} To solve the problem, in 1954, the Portuguese administration commissioned a study to examine the issue of firearms licenses in the district of Lourenço Marques. The commission concluded that dishonest citizens were using firearms not for self-defence only but also for hunting.\textsuperscript{419}

Based on the conclusion of the study, the Portuguese authorities differentiated the types of rifles that had to be used for the purpose of self-defence from those used for hunting. Therefore, it defined that applicants had to use pistols for self-defence and rifles of one or two pipes for hunting. Nevertheless, hunting continued to escalate in southern Mozambique and contributed to human and wildlife conflicts. As is commonplace knowledge, hunting practices represent threats to the lives of the population living in the hunting reserves because they can lead to movements of the wild as they flee from hunters chasing after them. Sometimes, the animals chased by the hunters ran in the direction of local villages, leading to panicking and endangering the

\textsuperscript{416} Interview with Carlos Ntongane, Machamba, 26/2/2014
\textsuperscript{417} AHM. Fundo de Administração Civil, Cx. 83. Pasta Uso de armas de defesa para caça na Província de Lourenço Marques.
\textsuperscript{418} Ibid
\textsuperscript{419} See License for carrying and use of the self-defence rifles in Appendix 1, document 7, p. 266
defenceless villagers especially women and children. In 1957, Oscar Ruas, the then governor of the Gaza district got reports from local Portuguese administration in Guijá and Alto Limpopo indicating that hunting practices in the south Mozambique hinterland were leading to the random movement of herds of Elephants, thus threatening the lives of the local communities. In response to such reports, Ruas demanded that the central government relocate the population of the reserve to villages outside it or abolish the hunting reserve to re-establish the state reserve (created in 1923 and transformed into hunting reserve in 1930) to save the local peoples’ lives.420

Regardless of the demand, no measures were implemented to protect the local families. The DCA alleged that because the population density in the area was very low (½ per km²), the soils were very poor for the development of agricultural projects and that there were no Portuguese interests to defend, it was therefore unfeasible to think about relocations or abolish the hunting reserve.421 As the government of the province did not implement any measures to protect the local communities, the government of Gaza district sent militias to the area to chase the elephants away from the local villages and kill them in severe cases. The government of Gaza district also gave orders to the militias not to leave a wounded animal in the proximity of the villages to prevent the injured animals to terrorize the villages.422 The governor of Gaza district solved this specific problem but did not resolve issues regarding measure to better fauna management in southern Mozambique. Over exploitation of natural resources, special fauna owing to uncontrolled hunting and animals diseases continued to be the problems of the Mozambican conservation areas and particularly of the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve.

4.3. Animal diseases and conservation in the south western Mozambique borderland

The study of animal diseases is an issue that needs fuller and comprehensive analysis in the history of conservation in Mozambique. Existing historical accounts have documented the effects

420 Ibid
421 AHM-GG, Cx. 384 - Governo do Distrito de Gaza. Ref Gov/MC. N 226/A/8; Carta assinada pelo chefe de Repartição de Gabinete do Distrito de Gaza em João Belo para o Director dos Serviços de Administração Civil de Lourenço Marques, 22/1/1957; The Governor of Gaza district had a meeting with population living in the reserve. In such a meeting he and the population debated the increase of hunting within the area and impacts on the local populations and to fauna. Accordingly, the population demanded that the Government abolish the reserve.
422 Ibid.
of animal diseases on wildlife and cattle. However, they paid little attention to the relationship between animal diseases and conservation. In the following pages, I examine the outbreak of animal diseases and game policies along the south western Mozambique borderland.

Before the advent of colonialism in Mozambique, African societies developed strategies to deal with animal diseases specifically the tsetse fly. As discussed in Chapter 2, cultivators in southern Mozambique used to burn vegetation and pastures to enable its regeneration during the rainy season. This practice allowed them to kill the tsetse and its germs and keep their villages free from the depredations of tsetse flies. During the civil war in the Gaza state (1858-62) this practice was abandoned contributing to the spread of tsetse fly northward which devastated cattle in the region extended 30 miles east of the Libombo Mountains in the Mozambican hinterland.423

Mackenzie indicates that in the 1860s and 1860s, Umzila combined human settlements and large scale hunting to combat tsetse fly in the region north of the Save River.424 Little is known about further interventions made by Umzila’s son Gungunhane after he had left Mussorize and tracked to Mandlakasi in southern Mozambique where he established the capital of the Gaza state and ruled until 1895 when he and his allies were forced to surrender by the colonial army.

Gargalho has argued that despite the fact that in the early 20th century several cases of the outbreak of the disease were reported in central Mozambique, the Portuguese did not develop an efficient method to control the disease.425 In the 1920s and 1930s, some fragmented tsetse belts continued to be found north of the Save River right up to the Zambezi River.426 Curiously, almost all the game reserves in southern Mozambican were created during the 1930s (Maputo Special Reserve, Alto Limpopo Game Reserve, Panda and Zinave game reserves) and some (Alto Limpopo Game Reserve, and Zinave Game Reserve) were located near the region prone to

423 Harries, Patrick. “Labor migration from Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa”
infection by the tsetse fly. Nevertheless, the colonial authorities in southern Mozambique did not develop strategies to combat the tsetse fly and other animal diseases in the game reserves. Nor did they hire qualified staff to work on the protection of fauna in cases of outbreak of animal diseases within and outside of the “limits” of hunting frontiers.

In the late 1930s, the southern Mozambique region was affected by foot and mouth disease, which reduced the population of wild stock and cattle.427 The statistics of such losses in Mozambique are scarce but very detailed on the South African side. It is known, however, that the Portuguese and the South African authorities introduced import restrictions on timber, fruits, vegetables and live animals (pigs, sheep and cattle) and animal products (skins, lather, wool, feathers, milk, cream, blood, meat, manures, forage, dry hay and cattle food) between the two territories.428

Due to the absence of a border fence between the Transvaal and Mozambique that could deter animal movements from Mozambique to the KNP, the South African authorities feared that animals from Mozambique could enter the South African territory and thus contribute to widespread of the disease into the KNP. The South African authorities also feared that the situation could result in a wide loss of the KNP wild stock. As a measure of protection, in early January 1938, the South African authorities began to erect fences on some sections along the Transvaal and Mozambican frontier and in March of the same year, they requested that the Portuguese administration in southern Mozambique move back (7 km) the cattle of the villages located along the border.429 For that reason, the South African authorities argued that cattle from

427AHM. Direção dos Serviços de Administração Civil Cx. 80 Portaria nº 821 –12/10/1910; see also Portaria Provincial nº 47 – 14/2/1925/ 84, 84- 18/2/1925; see also Correspondence from Consul General for the Union of South Africa to Governor-General of Mozambique Later reference - C.G. 29 Vol. 2 - FFP/CAP 15/10/1938
428The statistics in South Africa indicates that in Barbeton district altogether 2741 cattle and 493 small stocks were destroyed. Nota para a Repartição Técnica dos Serviços de Veterinaria em Lourenço Marques. 22/4/1938 - Referência informação recebida da África do Sul em 29/1/1938
429AHM. Direção dos Serviços de Administração Civil Cx. 80. Nota da União da Africa do Sul Referência N.C.G. de 14/1/ 1938 - Registado na Repartição do Gabinete dos Serviços de Veterinária de Moçambique em 14/1/1938 sob Oficio nº 114 – Assinado pelo Chefe interino dos Serviços com a aprovação do Governador-Geral José Cabral - Oficio do Consulado da União da África do Sul: See correspondence from Mozambique General-Governor to the to the South Union High Commissioner’s Office in Cape Town, Reference 161/L-18 on 13/3/1938, see also Correspondence from Mozambique General-Governor to the to the South Africa Union High Commissioner’s office in Cape Town on 14/3/1938, See also Correspondence from the Mozambique General-Governor to the to
Mozambican villages in the south KNP were crossing the border to drink water in a waterhole in Munwuenei Spruit. Therefore, since the wild stock in the KNP also used the same waterholes, cattle from Mozambique were considered a threat to the wildlife in the KNP because they could infect water and in turn affect the wild stock in the KNP. In the AHM, I did not find further correspondence between the South Africans and the Portuguese regarding foot and mouth disease and the construction of fences to avoid contamination of wild stock in the KNP by cattle from Mozambique. Nevertheless, it is known that fences along the border between the South East Transvaal and Mozambique (Crocodile to Sabi rivers) were only erected in 1961 and completed in 1962 and the northern section was concluded in the late 1970s.

Joubert also traced some scenarios and routes that the disease would have followed to reach the KNP. However, he concluded by saying that the KNP authorities suspected that the diseases could have been brought to KNP territory by Africans from northern region of the KNP including those from Mozambique entering KNP mainly from the border of Pafuri. But, colonial documents indicate that the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique rejected the hypothesis that the foot and mount diseases, which affected both wildlife and cattle in the KNP, would have entered the South African territory coming from the south western Mozambique. Lack of written evidences does not allow me to conclude from which side the disease appeared. Nevertheless, it is clear that in the 1920s to the late 1950s the Pafuri border gate was the main entry point used by migrants from northern regions of Sul de Save Province.

the South Africa Union High commissioner’s Office in Cape Town, Ref. 161/L-18 on 13/3/1938, see also Correspondence from Mozambique General-Governor to the to the South Africa Union High Commissioner’s Office in Cape Town on 14/3/1938


As mentioned above the outbreak of foot and mouth disease had forced the South African authorities to implement some measures to protect KNP animal from the disease. However, until the early 1940s, only a few sections of the border were fenced.\textsuperscript{434} The natural conditions, which existed north of the Limpopo to Save River, were favourable for the development of \textit{Glossinas Morsitans}. Moreover, the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve was just a hunting ground for professional hunters as it lacked staff to supervise hunting or take care of the fauna in the case of outbreak of infectious diseases.

Unfortunately, between the 1940s and 1950s, the regions north of Save River came to be devastated by animal disease caused by the tsetse fly, the \textit{Glossina Morsitans}. Thus, the continuation of hunting practices south of Save River to the north bank of the Limpopo River represented a serious threat to livestock ranchers as hunting practices could have resulted in movements of wild stock from the areas of concentration of \textit{G Morsitans} to the southern regions.\textsuperscript{435} Of course, the contact between the infected wild stocks with cattle represented a disaster for African herders.\textsuperscript{436} Additionally, lack of physical boundary between the Mozambique and South Africa represented a threat to cattle and wildlife not only in Mozambique but also to the KNP’s wild stock because the infected stocks could move from one country to another.\textsuperscript{437}

As a measure to curb the quick spread of the disease from north of Save River to the southern Mozambique region in 1951, the Portuguese government recommended a complete closure of hunting in the Sul de Save Province for a period of two (2) years. The Government needed time to harmonize strategies between the Department of Civil Administration (DCA), the Mozambican Game Board (CCM) and the Mozambique Mission to Combated Tripanossomiasis

\textsuperscript{434} For more comprehensive details see Chapter V.
\textsuperscript{435} The limits were set as follows: west side - a straight line from the right bank of the Limpopo River in front of Machambo (now the village of Machamba) to the village of Massingir on the left bank of the Elephants River. Decreto Provincial n\º 765, 13/8/ 1941
\textsuperscript{436} AHM. Direcção dos Serviços de Administração Civil Cx. 80; North of Limpopo River the hunting seasons were restricted to 3 months, i.e., from July to September. See also Comissão de Caça da Provincia de Moçambique. Lourenço Marques. Ref. 68/57 de 8/3/1957. Carta da Comissão de Caça assinada pelo Presidente da Comissão Sr. Mário de Carvalho Alcantra para o Director dos Serviços de Administração Civil em Lourenço Marques.
\textsuperscript{437} For more comprehensive details see Chapter V.
(MCT) and bring about a new strategy to fight tsetse fly and the spread of *G. Morsitans* from the north bank of the Save River to southern Mozambique.\(^{438}\)

Unfortunately, it seems that from 1951 to 1954, no efficient methods were developed to deter the advance of the tsetse fly southward. In August 1955, the CCM reported that five kraals in two villages located along the street Massangena-Chigamane-Maxaila in the north bank of the Limpopo River had been devastated by tsetse fly causing considerable loss of cattle.\(^{439}\) Another report dated 19th September 1955 from the headman of a village located just a few kilometres from the north bank of the Limpopo River indicated that infection of the area by tsetse fly resulted in the loss of 552 cattle in 27 kraals.\(^{440}\)

In 1956, the president of the CCM, Andrade da Silva Alantra, as a way to justify the spread of the disease from central Mozambique to region located south of the Save River, accused the Departments of veterinary, civil administration and agriculture for being the institutions responsible for the widespread of *G. Morsitans* southward. For Alantra, the spreading of *G. Morsitans* southward was a result of the restriction of hunting activities, which had been imposed by the government from 1945 to 1952 and from 1953 to 1956. From the viewpoint of the head of the CCM, the only way to stop the spread of *G. Morsitans* southward was not the complete closure of hunting activities but the development of agriculture along the south bank of Save River particularly in Massangena region, as the farms would create a tsetse free belt preventing the advance of the fly southward.\(^{441}\)

\(^{438}\) The records of Department of Veterinary indicate that in the 1950s, there were more than 70,000 head of cattle in the district of Lourenço Marques, being Alto Limpopo (20,000) and Guijá (52,000): See: AHM. G.G- Direcção dos Serviços de Administração Civil. Cx, 104; Carta de Arnaldo de Almeida Gomes chefe da Repartição de Caça da Direção dos Serviços de Administração Civil para a Comissão de Caça da Colônia, Carta datada de 22/6/ 1951


\(^{441}\) Ibid.
Given the weakness of the Portugal’s capitalist economy, the plan of the president of CCM was unrealistic and came out as a response of restrictions of hunting imposed by the government. The area north of Limpopo River to Save River is arid and lacks water. Therefore, the development of agriculture in that area would imply considerable investment in infrastructure and human resettlements. Clearly, this kind of investment takes time and at that period, the government plans were focused on the development of irrigation schemes in the Lower Limpopo and studies for the construction of the Massingir dam.\textsuperscript{442} It was not feasible to invest many resources for agricultural development in an arid area with poor soils and lacking water. In fact, until the late 1960s no agricultural projects were developed in the area proposed by Alcantra.

According to Mutwira, in the late 1940s and 1950s trypanosomiasis scares led to massive \textit{game sweeps} (killing of game) in Southern Rhodesia in an attempt to clear areas infested by the disease. A Rhodesian veterinary report circulated during the International Scientific Committee Meeting held in Salisbury in September 1956 indicated that 41,576 animals were slaughtered only in 1951.\textsuperscript{443} After this conference, the MCT proposed the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique to use \textit{game sweeps} as a measure to prevent the spread of \textit{G. Morsitans} southward. Despite the fact that the CCM disagreed with the mass killing of the game (The CCM proposed to slaughter the infected livestock) to fight the tsetse fly because it considered that the measure would lead to an irrecoverable loss of livestock and damage the environment. In the late 1950s, the colonial government in Mozambique came to use \textit{game sweeps} as a measure to prevent the spread of \textit{G. Morsitans} from the north bank of Save River to the southward regions.\textsuperscript{444} Archival accounts demonstrate that the strategy of using animal slaughtering for disease control was an inefficient method to deter the advance of tsetse fly southward. The MCT and the CCM lacked staff, financial and technical resources to deter the advance of the tsetse fly southward. The two joint teams created by the colonial government (the teams were composed of members

\textsuperscript{442}For more detailed information in this regard see Chapter V


\textsuperscript{444}AHM. G.G; Cx. 384. Missão de Combate as Tripanossomíases – Assunto: Sobre a forma como decorreu a acção de caça na área da circunscrição do Alto Limpopo por brigadas subordinadas a Comissão de Caça em que a Missão de Combate as Tripanossomíases devia assistir. Informação nº. 18, de 20/12/1956; assinado por M. A. Andrade da Silva., Presidente da MCT.
from the Entomology services, Veterinary Department and hired hunters) and coordinated by staff of the CCM and the MCT had 42 members each and had to control an area approximately 200 km inland from the seaside sand dunes. Moreover, only 15 hunters in each team were armed with rifles, the other members assisted the hunters, cleaning the slaughtered animals and clearing the paths used by trucks for the transportation of the meat.

The joint commission worked for a period of 5 months a year. Consequently, even in the case of a successful round up where the wild stock from infected areas was driven back to the north (Mabote, Manhone and, Chituta), the wild stock returned to the southern areas when the mission was interrupted (October to May each year). Moreover, unlike elephants, mammals like kudus and zebras lived not in organized herds but scattered in the bush, thus making their control practically impossible.

Until the late 1950s, only few sections of the Transvaal and Mozambican border had fences. Therefore, the expansion of the tsetse belt southward was a concern not only of the Portuguese but also of the KNP board, which feared a disaster in the Park. To avoid the encroachment of the tsetse belt onto KNP territory, the KNP board demanded the disinfection of cargo and people entering the KNP from the Mozambican districts of Alto Limpopo and Guvuro. In response to this appeal, in 1957, the colonial government in Mozambique installed in Alto Limpopo and Govuro 4 disinfection posts for the purpose.

The numbers of the slaughtered animals presented by different commissions involved in the programme varies significantly. It is estimated that from 1947 to 1969 the brigades working on the control of the wild stock diseases in Alto Limpopo killed at least 230,000 mammals, among them elephants, rhinos, hippopotamus, buffalos, zebras, gazelles and antelopes. The use of animal slaughtering for disease control was severely criticized by different institutions and

“Clapperton Mavhunga & Marja Spierenburg “A finger on the pulse of the fly”
AHM: G.G. Cx. 384 Comissão de Caça da Província de Moçambique. Instrução para o funcionamento das brigadas de controlo de caça na Coutada do Save; Lourenço Marques, 21/1/ 1957.
Ibiden
conservationists who defended the idea that Portugal had to take the issue of fauna protection seriously. In the 1940s and 1950s, Portuguese citizens from the main Mozambican cities and international organizations recommended that the authorities create national parks in southern Mozambique where the wild stock would be confined and where the government would implement effective disease control for wild stock, avoiding its contact with cattle. The criticism focused particularly on lack of supervision of the hunting reserves and forests.

Besides the above-mentioned problems, the program to combat the tsetse fly on the north bank of the Limpopo had social and economic implications for Africans. Africans involved in the programme were paid 100 escudos monthly as against 900 escudos paid to the Portuguese non-qualified staff and 20000 to Portuguese qualified staff. In the same period, unqualified black employees in industry had a salary of 180 escudos. Besides the low salaries, the workload of these Africans was quite heavy. They had to cut down trees to build fences to prevent the movement of animals from one side to the other. Very often, Africans had to call their family members to help transport the slaughtered animals to sites where the meat was loaded into trucks for transport to the nearest villages and towns.

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448 AHM: G.G. Cx. 384. Carta do Chefe da Missão de Combate a Tripanossomíases assinada pelo seu director
Andrade Silva para o directir da Administraçao Civil em Lourenço Marques. Note 2/3/ 1957, p.6
449 Clapperton Mavhunga & Marja Spierenburg “A finger on the pulse of the fly”, p.130-132
450 Souza Correa, Silvio Marcus de. “Caça esportiva e preservacionismo na África colonial, p. 7, see also Clapperton Mavhunga & Marja Spierenburg “A finger on the pulse of the fly, p.131
451 Peixe, Amadeu. Como me tornei caçador guia e um bem sucedido atirador”, p.230
452 In 1941, the exchange rate 1 escudo was equivalent to 99 Sterling Libra. Note that in the same exchange rate sterling Libra to rand was equivalent to 1 to 1. Source: Leite, Joana Perreira. 1989. La information de economie colonial au Mozambique [PhD] Paris, Ecole de Hautes Etudes en Scenecie Sociales, p.385
453 AHM: G.G. Cx. 384 Missão de Combate as Tripanossomíases – Assunto: sobre a forma como decorreu a acção de caça na área da circunscrição do Alto Limpopo por brigadas subordinadas a Comissão de Caça em que a Missão de Combate as Tripanossomíases devia assistir. Informação nº 18, 20/12/1956, assinado por M. A. Andrade da Silva. Presidente da MCT.
454 AHM: G.G. Cx. 384 Comissão de Caça da Província de Moçambique. Instrução para o funcionamento das brigadas de controlo de caça na Coutada do Save; Lourenço Marques. 21/1/ 1957.
In reality, it meant that the Portuguese paid 100 escudos for two or three Africans from the same family working in this programmes. Having 2 to 3 members of the same family working for a very low salary meant reduction of labour force for the production of food crops. During my fieldwork in the Massingir region, I did not find people who participated in these programmes. People interviewed about colonial programs undertaken within the area for the control of animal diseases reported that it was practically impossible to refuse the call from the administration to join such a programme in which participation was compulsory.

4.4. New management approaches for hunting reserves in southern Mozambique

In the late 1950s, Portugal sought cooperation from private firms to improve the management of the Mozambican hunting reserves in Mozambique. In the early 1960s, they leased the administration of the Zinave Hunting Reserve in Inhambane district to Mozambique Safarilandia owned by two brothers, namely Rui Abreu and Mário Abreu. The company built some tourist chalets to host the visitors and some gravel roads within the hunting reserve. The company also hired up to eight professional hunters to work as scouts and accompanied visitors during their stay in the reserve.

In 1961, the Portuguese converted the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve into a Hunting Concession nº 16 well known in Portuguese as Coutada 16 and delegated the Veterinary Department to undertake detailed studies for the final delimitation of Coutada 16. The transformation of the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve into Coutada 16 was aimed at better fauna management in the area as well as the provision of sport and adventure opportunities to licensed hunters on the payment of a fee to the colonial government. Official documents on activities undertaken by the Portuguese from 1961 to 1972 are scarce. Personal notes of Amadeu Peixe, a professional hunter who worked for Moçambique Safarilandia, indicate that Coutada 16 was leased to a private

455 AHM: G.G. Cx. 384. Missão de Combate as tripanossomíases – Assunto: sobre a forma como decorreu a acção de caça na área da circunscrição do alto Limpopo, por brigadas subordinadas a comissão de caça em que a MCT devia assistir. Informação nº 18, de 20/12/1956, assinado por M. A. Andrade da Silva. Presidente da MCT.
456 These brothers owned the Tivoli hotels in Lourenço Marques and Beira: see Peixe, Amadeu. Como me tornei caçador guia e um bem sucedido atirador”, p.197
457 Peixe, Amadeu. Como me tornei caçador guia e um bem sucedido atirador”, p.19
safari company known as Limpopo Safaris belonging to a Portuguese executive named Manuel Sarnadas.458

In the early 1960s, Sarnadas built some tourist facilities in Coutada 16 near the Machampane River (a tributary of the Elephants River) where he had a Portuguese professional hunter known as Madaulene.459 In the late 1960s, Madaulene hired some Africans who assisted him to develop the infrastructure, and he forbade local people to hunt near the areas surrounding his facilities.460 From 1961 to 1974, the Limpopo Safaris was one of the most often-visited safari reserves in Southern Mozambique. In his notes, Peixe emphasised that many of the clients of the Zinave or Coutada 4 asked him to assist them to acquire permits to hunt on the south bank of the Limpopo (Coutada 16), where by 1964 elephants could still be found. Peixe, who made notes while on his hunting trips, noted the following: “We chased a group of Cambaco (name given to big elephants by Portuguese) trying to kill the big ones for trophies … unfortunately, they run and entered KNP territory. We were able to kill the small one.”461 This statement demonstrates that despite the establishment of private Safari companies to improve the preservation of the fauna in southern Mozambique hunting reserves, the control on hunting frontiers had never been effective and hunters who got their licences in Mozambique sometimes entered the alien territories for hunting.

While Coutada 16 operated south of Limpopo River, in the north banks another private safari company known as Nyalaland Safaris owned by Jose Ruiz Cartigas was devoted to sport hunting of Inyala (Tragelapusphus anglasi). Due to the absence of clear limits between Coutada 16 and Nyalaland Safaris, some of the clients of the Nyalaland Safaris ended going beyond its limits to hunt in Coutada 16. This problem was definitively solved in 1969 when the Portuguese

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458 Peixe, Amadeu. Como me tornei caçador guia e um bem sucedido atirador”, p.197
459 Interview with William Number One Valoi, Massingir Velho, 25/8/ 2013
460 After independence Madaulene and his assistants abandoned the area leaving the infrastructure unattended. In 2002, soon after the establishment of the Limpopo National Park, the area was leased to a South African enterprise, which is currently developing new touristic facilities. Interview with Carlos Ntongane, Machamba, 26/2/2014
461 Peixe, Amadeu. Como me tornei caçador guia e um bem sucedido atirador, p.197
government defined the limits of Coutada 16, the so-called “final demarcation” of the limits of Coutada 16.462

People interviewed during my fieldwork in the Massingir region indicated that from the early 1960s to 1974, the Portuguese administration used to send African scouts known locally as mbocotanas regularly to the area to undertake supervision of the reserve. Normally, the scouts travelled in groups of two to three people. During their mission, they stayed three to four days in a village and then moved to other villages where they could stay for a number of extra days. Most often, the mbocotanas entered private spaces such as houses and corn granaries looking for vestiges of hunting. Those who were found with bush meat, animal skins were taken to the administration where they were beaten or imprisoned and subjected to hard labour. 463

The mbocotanas faced many problems in their work. The area for their supervision was quite big. Quite often they commuted by bicycles or donkey. Consequently, hunters knew the direction that they had taken. Moreover, after remaining in Coutada for 2 or 3 weeks they returned to Guijá- Caniçado (the former headquarters of the circunscrição de Guijá) to submit their reports to colonial authorities. Therefore, Africans hunted during the time mbocotanas were not present in the area.464 In the later 1960s, the working condition of mbocotanas had improved significantly; they had a vehicle (Land Rover) which they used as transport during the supervision activities. They also had a tent used for camping. Since there were no roads within Coutada 16 the vehicle could only reach some of the villages located at the southern end of Coutada and the mbocotanas had to use bicycles to reach the distant areas.465

462 The representative of the Governor-General of Mozambique Rui de Araujo Ribeiro by the ordinance 14987 of 1st of May 1961 converted the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve to Safari Game Reserve nº 16 and set the precise coordinates of Coutada. North: a point situated on the border with Transvaal and five km distance from the right bank of the Limpopo river, following in parallel the right bank of the river until this changes direction toward the southeast; Esat: Continuing the previous boundary, parallel to the river, 5 km distance until arriving in front of the Mapai Village, following the axis of the river; from here move on to accompany the course of the Limpopo River until its crossing with the Elephants River. South: it follows the course of the Elephants River upstream until the international border next to the frontier L. West: from the frontier [L] following the line of the border until the 5km from the Limpopo River.

463 Interview with Mareassane Foliche Mbombe, Mbingo 24/2/2014
464 Interview with Mareassane Foliche Mbombe, Mbingo 24/2/2014
465 Interview with Carlos Ntongane, Machamba, 26/2/2014
As explained in chapter 5, in the early 1970s the Portuguese began the construction of Massingir dam along the Elephants River. The dam was built to regulate water in the Lower Limpopo and enhance the development of irrigation schemes in the Massingir region. Therefore, the Portuguese planned to relocated people living along the Elephants valley in villages located at the confluence of Shingwedzi-Limpopo Rivers. Therefore, this measure would allow them to benefit from irrigation schemes that were to be built by the Portuguese administration few kilometres downstream of the Massingir dam as well as resettle the families that had its houses and field along the Elephants valley in new villages situated out of Coutada. The Frelimo government, which came to power on 25 June, 1975 did not follow the colonial resettlement program. Instead, it moved the communities from the Elephants valley to poor soils in upland areas in Coutada 16, reducing the ability of these communities to produce crops for their sustenance and thus increasing their dependence on bush meat for food.

4.5. Conclusion

Despite the establishment of the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve in 1930, Africans continued to live in the reserve and relied on rain fed agriculture, cattle keeping and hunting for their survival. The implementation of the Salazar rule in the colonial districts of Guijá and Alto Limpopo (1930s to 1950s) increased the exploitation of the local resources and its population. Thus, Africans were coerced to grow cotton to feed the emerging Portuguese textile sector. Cotton farms used the best African lands and consumed cultivators’ time that could otherwise be spent on food crops. Such situations resulted in crop failure and famines and pushed Africans to rely on hunting for food.

In the 1940s, the Salazar administration in southern Mozambique also increased the hut taxes, a situation that pushed many youths and men to look for sources of income to pay the taxes. Thus, hunting and labour migration to Skukuza and other places in South Africa were some of the strategies used by Africans to earn some cash income. Labour migration in the colonial districts (circunscrição) of Guijá and Alto Limpopo was responsible for the introduction of ploughs, which contributed to the increase in farming areas. Africans also brought from South Africa
gunpowder and iron traps used for hunting. Lack of staff, lack of inter-institutional coordination and inefficient control of the hunting reserves in southern Mozambique allowed illegal hunters to take control of the reserves and hunt out of limits imposed by game regulations. Most often, European hunters hired African hunters to assist them in hunting. As compensation, they offered them money, alcohol, rifles and ammunition. Accordingly, Africans used the rifles and ammunition given to them by Europeans to hunt for their own survival and sell the products of hunt to *cantineiros* at Mavodze village.

From the early 20th century to the late 1950s, the outbreak of animal diseases resulted in new challenges for the Portuguese government in Mozambique to improve its capacity to control wild stock diseases inside and outside the limits of the reserve. In the late 1930s, the outbreak of the foot and mouth disease was controlled by import restrictions on wood and animal products between South Africa and Mozambique. In the late 1950s, the Portuguese administration tried to control the advance of tsetse fly from the central region to southern Mozambique by introducing mass killing of fauna along the Limpopo River and Save River corridor. Lack of resources and staff hindered the control of the disease and in the mid-1950s some regions in southern Mozambique were devastated by the tsetse fly with considerable cattle loss.

In 1961, the Portuguese transformed the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve into a Safari Game Reserve. The measure was introduced to allow private institutions to apply for the control of the area and introduce effective game control measures. Four years later, the Frelimo liberation movement began a war to overthrow the colonial regime (see chapter five for more details) and in 1975, the country gained its political independence and Frelimo rose to power. The next chapter (See Chapter V) examines how independence and Frelimo development policy affected conservation and development programmes started during the colonial period. Due to the construction of the Massingir dam, the government relocated the communities living along the Elephants’ valley specifically in the area designed for dam reservoir in poor lands located above the food plain in Coutada 16. This situation resulted in widespread famines and hunger and hunting for food became a means of survival.

5.1. Introduction
In the previous chapters, I demonstrated that from the early 1900s to the mid-1940s the Portuguese administration made very few investments in the southern Mozambique hinterland. The Portuguese administration in this area put much of its efforts on the collection of fees imposed on hunters when applying for hunting licenses, collection of hut taxes, control of labour migration to South Africa and exploitation of the local population by coercing them to produce cotton to supply the Portuguese textile industry.

By the early 1950s, the Portuguese administration had embarked on infrastructure development programmes such as the construction of railways, dams and irrigation schemes designed to ‘improve’ Portuguese African colonies and set up the conditions for the establishment of Planned Portuguese Communities (colonatos) in the fertile lands of their African colonies. In this period, the development of the Lower Limpopo irrigation scheme in Chokwe region demonstrated that effective use of its potentialities depended on the regulation of the Limpopo River water flows upstream of the irrigated areas. During the dry seasons, the irrigation scheme received limited flows of water and in the rainy season, it received too much water that flooded the irrigated areas and destroyed crops.

In 1954, the Portuguese began the construction of Macaretane dam along the Limpopo River (a few kilometres upstream from the Lower Limpopo irrigation scheme) to regulate water flows for the irrigated area. However, during the rainy season this dam alone was not capable to control water passing through the irrigation scheme as the Elephants River, a tributary of the Limpopo River, continued to discharge water in the Limpopo River. Thus, the construction of a second dam along the Elephant’s River would help regulate water flows passing thorough the irrigation scheme and enhance the development of agriculture in Choke (about 130 km) downstream the Massingir region. The Construction of the Massingir dam would also set up conditions for the development of irrigation schemes in Massingir region to allow the establishment of Planned
Portuguese Communities (*colonatos*) 10 kilometres downstream of the Massingir dam.

The construction of the Massingir dam began in 1972, eight years after Frelimo had started an armed struggle in the northern province of Cabo Delgado to overthrow the Portuguese in Mozambique. In 1975, the Frelimo government rose to power before the completion of the construction of the dam. Frelimo government took the responsibility to continue and to finalise the construction of the dam. The construction of the Massingir dam caused displacements of families living along the Elephants valley. In 1978, Frelimo relocated the displaced families in the bush in Coutada 16 where most of the families lacked fertile land for cropping; famines and the proximity of the families to hunting frontiers increased pressure on fauna as hunting became a mean of survival.466

This chapter examines the pitfalls of the late colonial period; it explores how the rupture between the colonial government and Frelimo affected the continuation of colonial projects in the postcolonial period. By focusing particularly on the construction of the Massingir dam, the chapter seeks to highlight the extent to which the late colonial and early post-colonial development projects affected the lives of remote rural populations, local ecosystems, and fauna in Mozambique and particularly in the Massingir region. Equally, it describes the process of removal of communities that had their houses and fields along the Elephants River and their relocation to upper lands in Coutada 16. Rather than contributing to an improvement in local communities’ lives, Frelimo development policies implemented in this area contributed to deterioration in the living standards of the local families. Frelimo government officials relocated the families in poor soils of a conservation area known as Coutada 16. This measure contributed to a degradation of the local ecosystems, to poverty and hunger.

The chapter seeks to answer the following question: How did the late colonial projects impact on the lives of the local families in the Massingir region? How Frelimo government managed the rupture between colonialism and its governance? How did the rupture affect the construction of

466 Salomão Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014; see also William Number One Valoi, Massingir Velho, 10/7/2012; 25/8/ 2013
the Massingir dam? How changes introduced by Frelimo to colonial resettlement program for people displaced by the construction of the Massingir dam affect the resettlement process, the lives of the displaced families and preservation of fauna in Coutada 16. What were the main social and development policies introduced by Frelimo in Massingir region soon after independence, and how did such policies affect the preservation of wildlife?

The findings from the fieldwork demonstrates that regardless of the Frelimo rhetoric about uplifting the livelihoods of the poor, the Massingir dam project worsened the living conditions of the local population who had hoped to find in independence a panacea for their freedom and a way to improve their lives. The construction of the Massingir dam contributed to the depletion of fauna as it threw the displaced families in poor lands in the forest in Coutada 16 resulting in famines and increased dependence on bush meat for food. The chapter documents experiences undergone by the down-river communities during the resettlement process, the impact of this relocation on local ecosystems and wildlife management practices by both governmental institutions and relocated families.

The research findings in Coutada 16 demonstrate that during the planning for relocation of families from the north bank of the Elephants River, Frelimo government officials underestimated regional and local socio-economic factors such as labour migration policies, the retrenchment of workers in the South African mining industry and local politics (the power and authority of the villages’ headmen or regulos). These factors played a key role in decision-making by the displaced families on whether to leave or not, and where to go.

A process of establishment of communal villages followed the relocation of the displaced families in upper lands in Coutada 16. This process entailed profound transformations not only of territorial organization (the establishment of communal villages or aldeias comunais), but also in modes of production (from individual plots to collective production based on peoples’ farms or machambas do povo) and the polity (from villages commanded by traditional leaders to villages commanded by new chiefs or secretarios and grupos dinamizadores (dynamizing groups).
The chapter is structured into five sections. The second section analyses the politics behind the construction of the Massingir dam; the third section analyses the relocation of families from the north bank of the Elephants valley to new villages in Coutada 16. The fourth section analyses the lives of the families relocated in communal villages in Coutada 16. The last section examines the measures implemented by Frelimo in the late 1970s and early 1980s to improve the lives of the impoverished families of the villages of the south of Coutada16.

5.2. The dam built on the eve of independence

During the 1930s and early 40s, the Salazarist government in Portugal tried to intensify Portuguese economic growth by decreasing investment in the colonies and exploiting them through a highly regimented labour regime requiring little capital investment. The Salazar government continued to impose hut taxes on the African population and labour exports to the South African mining industry. The state also made it mandatory for African populations to produce cash crops specifically cotton to feed the emerging Portuguese textile sector.\(^\text{467}\) North of the Elephants River, hunting fees paid by the sport and professional hunters entering the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve constituted another source of revenue for the colonial state.

By the late 1940s, the Salazar government came under severe censure from anti-colonial movements within and outside Portugal. To appease its critics, the administration embarked on the development of its colonies. Infrastructure development programs such as the construction of railways, dams and irrigation schemes were designed to improve the development of Portuguese African colonies. The implementation of the infrastructural development programs (\textit{Planos de Fomento}) set up the conditions for the establishment of Planned Portuguese Communities (\textit{colonatos}) in the fertile lands of the Portuguese African colonies. In the \textit{colonatos}, Portugal allocated land and agricultural inputs to settlers to help them to start agricultural production.\(^\text{468}\) In

\(^{467}\) For more comprehensive explanation on this regard see cotton production in the Massingir region in previous chapter  
\(^{468}\) Covane, L. A. \textit{O Trabalho migratório e a agricultura no sul de Moçambique}, p 222. The Portuguese authorities selected the fertile land along the river valleys in Revue, Lichinga and highveld in Montepuez and Angónia to establish the Portuguese Planned Communities (\textit{colonatos}).
the 1950s, the establishment of the colonato of Chokwe in the Lower Limpopo region resulted in the expropriation of fertile land from the local populations.  

During the development of the Lower Limpopo irrigation scheme, the constructors noted that the location of the irrigation schemes in the Chokwe region (i.e., floodplains regions located downstream of dams built in South Africa along the Limpopo River and its tributaries) made the irrigation scheme highly dependent (dry season) and vulnerable (rain season) on discharges made upstream. During the dry seasons, the irrigated areas received limited flows of water and in the rainy season, the irrigated areas received too much water resulting in floods and destruction of crops. In the later 1940s, Portuguese engineers started the design phase for the construction of two dams, one along the Limpopo River and the other along the Elephants River.

In the early 1950s, the Portuguese started the construction of Macarretane dam along the Limpopo. This dam was completed in August 1956 and in the same year was handed over to the settlers for its use and supply with water settlers’ farms along the Limpopo valley as well as regulate water flow of the Limpopo River to avoid floods and the destruction of crops. Accordingly, in 1972, the Portuguese began the construction of the Massingir dam on the Elephants River. The dam would allow the regulation of water flow of the Limpopo River (a tributary of Limpopo River) and allow the development of irrigation schemes.

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469 In the later 1950s, the South Africans authorities build 10 small dams along the Elephants River and its tributaries; See in Cabrita, Viriato de Noronha Castro.1961. “Possibilidades energéticas do Rio dos Elefantes/ Limpopo na albufeira de Massingir.” Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos de Moçambique, nº 126 (Secção F), pp. 3-17, p.4; the main tributaries of the Limpopo River are the Elephants River, Nuanitze and Shingwedzi: See Barradas, Lereno Antunes. 1961. “O aproveitamento do Limpopo.” Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos de Moçambique, nº 126 (Seccao F), pp.1-8
471 The planning of the building of the lower Limpopo irrigation infrastructures was based on early studies undertaken in the later 1920s and 1930s. Cabrita, Viriato de Noronha Castro. 1961 “Possibilidades energéticas do Rio dos Elefantes/ Limpopo na albufeira de Massingir”, p. 2
472 Trigo the Morais was the Portuguese engineer responsible for development of the lower Limpopo Irrigation Scheme. See Cabrita, Viriato de Noronha Castro. 1961 “Possibilidades energéticas do Rio dos Elefantes/ Limpopo na albufeira de Massingir”, p. 2
in Massingir region to benefit Portuguese settlers.\textsuperscript{475} As other dams built during the last years of colonialism in Mozambique, the Massingir dam was of great importance for the Portuguese, as it would allow the generation of electricity to supply cities and towns in southern Mozambique and lessen the dependency that southern Mozambique had on South African power suppliers.\textsuperscript{476} The building of the Massingir dam would also allow the transformation of the lands located downstream of the dam into irrigated areas where white farmers were to settle and engage in irrigated agriculture.

The construction of the dam led to resettlements of hundreds of Africans whose villages were located along the Elephants and Shingwedzi valleys to use their limited arable lands to produce cotton for the colonial economy, leaving them vulnerable to the vagaries of food insecurity.\textsuperscript{477} In October 1971, the Portuguese government granted the construction of the Massingir dam to a Portuguese company known as the Tâmega Consôrcio.\textsuperscript{478} The Portuguese authorities aimed to develop the project in two phases; the first phase comprised the construction of the dam wall, the reservoir and the relocation of the downriver (riverside) communities displaced by the filling of the reservoir. After the completion of the first phase, the contractor would start the second phase of the project, which would comprise the building of the hydroelectric power plant to generate electricity for southern Mozambican villages and towns.\textsuperscript{479} Just like the Cahora Bassa dam constructed on the eve of independence (1969-1974) in the central province of Tete-Mozambique, the construction of the Massingir dam in the hinterland of Gaza province represented an indication that the Portuguese were still interested in continuing their rule in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{480}

\textsuperscript{477}Manghezi, A. Trabalho forçado, p.45
\textsuperscript{478}Moçambique – Decreto Governemental nº 41968; 22/11/1958 and Portaria nº 712, 17/10/ 1973; see also the Portaria 413; 06/8/1971; by these decrees the Portuguese Oversee Ministry authorised the Mozambique Governor-General to sign a contract with the Portuguese construction company [Tâmega Consórcio, Lda] to start the building of the Massingir dam and its social infrastructure.
\textsuperscript{479}https://asuldomundo.wordpress.com/2010/02/27/barragemdemassingir/ accessed May 2014; see also Portaria 712, 17/10/ 1973
The building of the Massingir dam started in 1972 and gave rise to a modern village in a remote rural area, Tiovene, where for many years there was a lack of facilities such as roads, schools, markets, hospitals, etc. As a direct consequence of the infrastructural improvements made at Tiovene, the headquarters of Massingir district moved from the remote rural village of Mavodze in the north bank of the Elephants River to Tiovene (7 km south of the dam). The construction of the dam, instead of adding hope to the local communities, increased the uncertainty of the downriver cultivators who feared displacements due to the filling up of the reservoir.\footnote{AHM - CNAC. Cx Informação sobre o distrito de Massingir – Gaza. CNAC, 1980-1982} The Portuguese planned to settle the upriver cultivators (area reserved for the dam reservoir) in new villages that would be established 10 km downstream of the dam wall, namely Marrenguele, Chinhangane and Chibotana. About 1,700 people living in the villages of Massingir Velho and Mavodze in the north bank of the Elephants valley and 1,275 people from the villages of Canhane and Cubo in the south bank were to be relocated in the above-mentioned villages.\footnote{Ibiden} The Portuguese also announced that in the new villages they would establish irrigation schemes to benefit the settlers and the local populations.\footnote{Casimiro, J.F. e A. P. Veloso. 1969. \textit{Reconhecimento pedologico e de utilização de solo do Posto Administrativo de Massingir}. Junta Provincial de Povoamento [Unpublished Report]; Casimiro, Jose Figueiredo and Antonio P. Veloso. 1972. \textit{Levantamento dos solos da margem direita do rio dos Elefantes e sua aptidão para o regadio, zona a montante da confluência com o rio Chinguidzi [Sic]}. Lourenço Marques: Grupo de Trabalho para o Limpopo, [Unpublished Report]; Casimiro, J.F and Veloso, A.P, 1972. \textit{Levantamento dos solos da margem direita do Rio dos Elefantes e sua aptidão para o regadio} (Marrenguele e Banga), Grupo de Trabalho para o Limpopo; Lourenço Marques, [Unpublished Report]; DNA - Província de Moçambique. Grupo de Trabalho para o Limpopo. 1972. \textit{Relatório}, p.11} After the Tâmega Consortium had started the building of the dam, the Portuguese hired a company known as CODAM (Companhia de Aluguer de Máquinas) to clear (deforestation) 2,300 ha for the relocation of the families displaced by the dam.\footnote{DNA - Província de Moçambique. Grupo de Trabalho para o Limpopo. 1972. \textit{Relatório}, p.11}
During planning for the relocation of the riverine communities of the north bank of the Elephants river, the Portuguese warned the local families that in the near future all the people living in inner villages of Coutada 16 would be settled in areas surrounding the irrigated areas or outside of Coutada 16. Before the beginning of the construction of the dam, the colonial authorities commissioned detailed studies on fertility of soils at the confluence of Elephants and Shinguedzi River. The irrigated areas were not aimed at benefiting Portuguese settlers only but were also intended for commercial farming and for the employment of Africans displaced by the construction of the dam. The colonial government advised the families living in the area earmarked for the construction of the Massingir dam reservoir that they would be the first ones to be relocated in such areas. After the completion of their relocation, the Portuguese administration would embark in other programs to relocate communities living in inner village of Coutada 16 to free the area for conservancy and protection of fauna. The Portuguese did not give any options to the communities living along Elephants valley to move to upper lands in Coutada 16.\footnote{Interview with Simeão Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6/6/2012}

Fearing the violent methods (forced labour or whipping) used by the Portuguese administration to discipline those who refused to comply with colonial policies, the affected communities lacked the power to refuse the Portuguese relocation option. The cultivators and their families knew that they would be relocated in the place chosen by the colonial government on their free will or forced by the \textit{cipaios}.\footnote{Interview with Simião Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, July, 6\textsuperscript{th} 2012, see also Interview with Salomão Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014, Interview with Finiasse Sechene Valoi, Massingir Velho, 21/1/ 2014} However, this plan to relocate Africans by force should they be unwilling to do so voluntarily did not materialise as the political changes that occurred in mid-1975 abruptly ended the colonial state’s plan.

In 25\textsuperscript{th} June 1975, Frelimo government came to power and subsequently took over the responsibility to complete the dam and relocate the downriver communities. Frelimo adopted a social, economic and development policy for Mozambique that differed from its colonizers. Whereas, in the colonial state’s scheme of things, Africans would have been the ones cajoled to either relocate or flee their homes, under the new Frelimo government, it was ironically,
Portuguese technicians and government civil servants that did not agree with Frelimo’s policies who were made to flee.\textsuperscript{487} This situation left the Frelimo government without qualified staff to implement the dam project as effectively as the colonial state had intended, albeit at the expense of Africans. As such, several mistakes were committed during the completion of the construction of the dam wall, and there were changes made on the colonial resettlement programme.\textsuperscript{488}

As explained in the ensuing section, my research in the Massingir region suggests that the rupture between the colonial government and Frelimo resulted in changes on the project design due to lack of staff or lack of information on colonial development plan and particularly the colonial resettlement programme. Frelimo did not follow the colonial plan designed to relocate families affected by the construction of the Massingir dam. Instead, the party staff relocated the population in the forest (hunting reserve) to upper lands in Coutada 16. As we shall see below, the Frelimo guerrillas had, prior to independence, already begun consultations about how they would deal with the consequences of the dam construction, especially the ordinary people’s welfare.

**5.3. The independence of Mozambique and its impact on Massingir Dam Project**

The Mozambique liberation struggle commanded by Frelimo guerrilla forces started on 25\textsuperscript{th} September 1964 in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. By the later 1960s, the liberation war had reached the northern and central provinces of Mozambique and was moving southward.\textsuperscript{489} On 25\textsuperscript{th} April 1974, a military coup organised by left-leaning military officers took place in Lisbon–Portugal. The coup deposed the Salazar-Caetano longstanding authoritarian regime and installed a democratic regime in Portugal. The political changes made in Portugal opened a convenient window for the independence of Portugal’s overseas territories. The new government or the National Salvation Junta (\textit{Junta de Salvação Nacional}) had been opposed to the


\textsuperscript{488} [CarmoVaz, Álvaro, Rui Gonzalez, Benjamim Alfredo, Carlos Quadros, Isabel Zucule. 2008. \textit{Comissão de inquérito ao acidente da Barragem de Massingir}]

Portuguese colonial war to defend the so-called overseas territories. Instead, it favoured their independence and Frelimo assumed power on 25th June 1975.490

After independence, the Frelimo government was obliged to continue with the construction of Massingir dam. This also meant that it had to assume the responsibility of relocating the families living along the Elephants River in the area designed for the construction of the dam reservoir. In early 1976, Frelimo officials started meetings with the local population to redesign the relocations of the riverine communities of the Elephants valley. During the first meetings, the community representatives noted that Frelimo government officials had vague knowledge about the colonial resettlement program. According to Amós Matebula, former traditional leader of Mavodze village, soon after independence, Frelimo introduced radical political changes that resulted in the abandonment of the area by colonial government staff, shopkeepers and many technicians involved in several projects. This situation prevented Frelimo officials from learning from the colonial government staff about colonial development projects for the area including the resettlement programme.491

Analysis of data collected during fieldwork suggests that during the planning for the relocation of populations affected by the dam, very few studies were made to understand the polity in Massingir region, social organization and modes of production of the displaced to capture the significant strengths to apply lessons to the new social and development projects. Lack of such relevant information led the Frelimo staff to allow the relocation of the families affected by the construction of the Massingir dam in upper lands above the flood plain on the north bank of the Elephants River.

It also appears that Frelimo did not have a map with the development projects and protected areas of the region and the Frelimo staff working in the resettlement program did not even know

491 Interview with Amós Matebula, Mavodze, 24/1/2014
that north of Elephants River was Coutada 16. Additionally, when Frelimo came into power, the social infrastructure (roads, markets, hospital, schools, water pumps, irrigations schemes, etc.) which was part of the Massingir dam project to benefit Portuguese settler and the resettled communities had not yet been built. Thus, the party had to start the resettlement program from scratch (i.e., choose the area for resettlement, survey it and build the infrastructure). This situation was particularly difficult because the party lacked the financial wherewithal to complete the project and qualified staff to undertake specific studies on suitability of land for agriculture and pasture in the new resettlement areas.

5.3.1. Relocations in Coutada16

Besides the technical and financial components, the resettlement program to relocate families affected by the construction of the Massingir dam was also highly influenced by social and economic factors. As explained in the next sections, social, economic, cultural factors contributed for the decision making of local communities about where to go and when to leave. Similarly, these factors help to explain why the local communities resisted leaving their villages or not cooperating with Frelimo staff working on the resettlement program.

In her PhD thesis, Lunstrum analysed the relocations of families from two villages displaced by the filling up of the Massingir dam reservoir (Canhane in the north bank of the Elephants River and Massingir Velho in the south bank). Lunstrum emphasized that villagers of Canhane and Massingir Velho took a long time to accept the idea that their villages would be filled up by water and because of that they only started to move to the upland regions when they noticed that water was flooding their houses and fields and was advancing up to a 100 m of height leaving their villages submerged. According to Lunstrum, this situation limited the government’s ability to relocate the populations in areas identified by the colonial government. Therefore, it had to move them to upland regions located immediately above the floodplains of their former

492 Interview with Amós Matebula, Mavodze, 24/1/ 2014
493 Interview with Amós Matebula, Mavodze, 24/1/ 2014
494 Lunstrum, E. M. *The making and unmaking of sovereign territory*, p. 112-3
My research on the north bank of the Elephants River has not brought about a different argument, but has provided a more comprehensive picture regarding the relocation process. My analyses are based on 3 factors, namely: (i) the political economy of the region (ii) economic activities and livelihood strategies of the local families and, (iii) the politics in Massingir region.

i) The political economy of the region

Due to lack of investment by the colonial administration in Alto Limpopo, this region remained backward. Consequently, until early 1970s, there were no employment opportunities in the region that could secure wage incomes for the majority of the population. Local communities relied on hunting and labour migration to secure wage incomes that allowed them to pay the hut taxes or pay the bride price known in southern Mozambique as lobola.

With the increase of mine income from 1973, mineworkers were able to buy ploughs and carts used in agriculture to improve productivity. The existence of shopkeepers (cantineiros) in Mavodze where the cultivators sold the surplus of their crops motivated the cultivators to increase their production. The barter system practiced by the shopkeepers in southern Mozambique and particularly at Mavodze village allowed the migrants and their families to buy the basic consumer goods such as tools, clothes, matches, kerosene and alcoholic beverages.

Labour migration to South Africa, which had contributed to the monetization of rural economy in southern Mozambique, resulted in the dependence of the local population on money for their

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497 Labour migration and the division of work in southern Mozambique in the early 20th century increased the preponderance of men in activities such as clearing the land for agriculture, constructions, hunt and the young boys took care of the cattle while women carried on activities such as planting, wadding, harvesting, cooking fetching water and firewood. In the Lower Limpopo region, labour stratification put men in advantaged and women in a disadvantaged situation as men were only engaged in seasonal work and women in daily work. See in Hermele, Keneth, 1988. *Land struggles and social differentiation in southern Mozambique*, p.14


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daily life, and at the same time offered a degree of accumulation to those whose incomes allowed them to save and invest in agriculture.499

Due to political changes in Mozambique, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Portuguese regime and the rise to power of the Frelimo government, which was opposed to the apartheid regime of South Africa, the South African government feared that Frelimo would limit labour recruitment in its territory resulting in shortage of labour to the South African mining sector. The South African authorities resolved the situation by increasing the proportion of domestic labour in the total proportion of mineworkers – a process also known as the internalization of labour force. In summary, the internalization of labour would allow to reduce the dependency that the mining sector had on migrant workers, as the sector would recruit a considerable part of its workers within South African frontiers. This process was also aimed at addressing local unemployment. Moreover, the increase of salaries in the mining industry since 1973 also stimulated many South Africans to search employment in the mining sector.500

The internalization of labour force affected particularly Mozambique because the country was then the major supplier of mineworkers to the South African mining industry.501 Thus, in 1976, WENELA recruited 32 803 mineworkers from southern Mozambique, but in 1977 recruited only 8 825 migrant workers and closed 17 of its 21 camps in Mozambique, including the Pafuri post, mainly used by migrants from the Massingir region. In the following years, many migrants were not able to renew their contracts; they lost their jobs and were forced to return to their home areas to restart their lives.502

After losing their jobs in South Africa, the former mineworkers began to work on their land to continue to generate income and produce food for their families’ survival while livestock keeping, gathering and hunting remained as alternative livelihoods. Nevertheless, while the former mineworkers were trying to rebuild their lives along the Elephants valley, the filling of the Massingir dam reservoir forced them to leave their villages and the fertile alluvial soils to be relocated on poor land in Coutada16. The disillusionment of losing their jobs in South Africa and removal from their lands angered the migrants and many of them refused to cooperate with Frelimo officials working in the resettlement program. William Valoi, a former mineworker and former government representative in Massingir Velho village recalled the moment in the following terms:

“Migrants who lost their jobs in South Africa rushed home to assist their families in agriculture. The migrants who used the bush route from Massingir to South Africa were taken by surprise when they arrived at the border and found that there were companies erecting fences along the boundary line; as a result, they had to walk dozen of miles to find section where the fence had not yet been erected. …When the migrants arrived in Massingir they were told that they had to leave their ancestors’ land and find other place to live… their former villages would be filled by water.”  

According to Valoi, the migrants saw a direct connection between labour retrenchment in the South African mines, which led to their dismissal from their positions, and the construction of the border fence as direct consequences of the Samora Machel’s policy, which was opposed to Apartheid. Many migrants were angry and refused to cooperate with Frelimo officials in the resettlement programs. Lack of cooperation between the people affected by the feeling of Massingir dam and Frelimo officials resulted in the delay of removals of local families from the Elephants valley to the new resettlement areas.

**ii) Chieftaincies and the resettlements**

During my fieldwork in Massingir, I raised questions about why the representatives of the displaced population chose to move from the north bank of the Elephants valley to a non-fertile land in Coutada16 rather than be relocated downstream of the Massingir dam. Salomon

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503Interview with William Number One Valoi, Massingir Velho, 25/8/ 2013
Ngovene, now the traditional leader of the Massingir Velho village explained that Frelimo officials just like those of the colonial government did not make it clear where we should be relocated. There were vague references to the resettlement areas. People were only told that they had to be relocated to Marrenguele, Chinhangane or Chibotana downstream of the Massingir dam. Thus, lack of information about the natural conditions of the area (fertile soils for agriculture and pasture) and the political structures of the new area were some reason that led the local population to refuse to leave their areas.

The interviewees also indicated that along the Elephants valley, the local communities had good land for agriculture, pasture for the cattle and did not want to move to a land where they were not clear about natural conditions. Additionally, Frelimo was in power for only two years and the local population knew little about the party. Based on experiences from the colonial government they suspected and feared to be relocated in an area non-suitable for agriculture and therefore they resisted relocation to such areas.

Ngovene also explained that the land downstream of the Massingir dam did not belong to them. As a result, the former leader of the Massingir Velho village feared that if he accepted the move from his home village and be relocated in new villages downstream of the Massingir dam, he would not have the same authority and influence in his community as he had in his home village. According to the local traditions, only one man in a village has the right to perform traditional ceremonies to evoke spirits to thank them for good harvesting or demand rains. In the new village, their leader would become a common cultivator and lose his right to undertake traditional ceremonies. Accordingly, the situation would put him and the community in a disadvantageous position since the community leader would lose his power to undertake traditional ceremonies. In addition, the whole community would lose protection from ancestral spirits and, consequently, would ask the local headmen to perform traditional ceremonies. This

504 Interview with William Number One Valoi, Massingir Velho, 25/8/ 2013, see also Interview with Simeão Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6/6/2012, see also Interview with Finiasse Sechene Valoi Massingir Velho, 21/1/ 2014
505 William Number One Valoi, Massingir Velho,10/7/2012; 25/8/ 2013.
situation would subject the entire community to the level of subjects of the headmen of the villages where we would be relocated.

“Massingir was the powerful leader in the region. In recognition of his authority in the area, the Portuguese named the whole district south of Shingwedzi River as Massingir. Massingir was one of the first local leader to trade with the Portuguese … our village is Massingir Velho (Old Massingir). The Mavodze (which in the local language means to find …ku hodza) migrated from Nhaneti in Vetcha [probably Venda] to Massingir in the search for fertile land for agriculture and livestock farming … when they arrived here they said He hodzile … (We found the good land) … they were known as ka Mavodze (people who found land in other people land)… We are the owner of the land … This land belongs to us… We did not want to leave our land and be vassals of our vassals”.

The above quotation is a local explanation of the reality in the eyes of a traditional leader. The colonial government in southern Mozambique had given authority and power to the régulos or traditional leaders. For example, they were exempted from undertaking forced labour at the administration just as, simultaneously they could use the same system (forced labour) to recruit non-paid labour to work on their fields or other domestic activities. Apart from the taxes paid by the migrants to the local administration, the traditional leaders demanded additional taxes in money and kind for each migrant returning back from work in South Africa. During the colonial period, the régulos in the Massingir region demanded a share of the hunt from hunters entering their territories and forced migrants to pay 100 escudos (USD 3.5) known as mpondo ya hosí and a South African sliced bread locally known as Nchicua sha yosi.

The colonial government allowed the régulos to extract from the mineworkers part of their incomes and became wealthier people in their communities. Their authority and wealth resulted in social differentiation in the Massingir region. Consequently, their relocation in other régulos’ territory would limit their autonomy and privileges, as they would become common cultivators under the rule of the regulo of the relocation area. As a result, they preferred to move to upland regions adjacent to their villages where they thought they would continue to have the same

506 Interview with Salomao Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014
507 Interview with Salomão Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014
509 Interview with Winalse Mathe, Mavodzi, 23/1/ 2014

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authority and power in their communities. The villages would continue with the same names, with the same social and political structures.\textsuperscript{510}

\textit{iii) Alternative livelihoods strategies}

If the headmen of the down river-communities cared about their authority in the new villages, the ordinary populations were not quite aware of the resources they would find in the new villages such as land for cropping, livestock farming, pasture, hunting frontiers, etc. The riverine communities of Massingir Velho and Mavodze villages used to climb to the upland regions in Coutada 16 for hunting and gathering. The relocation of this population downstream of the Massingir dam (Marrenguele, Chinhangane or Chibotana) would put them in a disadvantaged situation in terms of proximity to the hunting frontiers. Therefore, they would have to walk for more than 30 km from the new villages to find hunting grounds.\textsuperscript{511}

In addition, the original villages were located a few kilometres from the Mozambican border with South Africa. Some members of these communities had experienced life in South Africa and were conscious about the evolution of conservation policies and practices in the KNP and knew that if they accepted to move to areas located outside Coutada 16, they would not be allowed to go back to their former land for whatever reason even for traditional purposes (to perform traditional ceremonies or to evoke the spirits of their ancestors). The communities also feared that after their relocations fences would be erected to prevent trespassing to the hunting grounds just like what happened in 1969 when the Makuleke, a fellow Shangane community in South Africa was evicted from their land to allow the KNP to extend its territory.\textsuperscript{512}

\subsection*{5.3.2. Deciding when to leave and where to go}

Labour retrenchments in South Africa resulted in the reduction of wage incomes and more dependence of former mineworkers on agriculture. The fear of families to lose their alternative livelihoods (especially hunting), lack of clarity of condition in the new resettlement area (fertile

\textsuperscript{510} Interview with Sime\~ao Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6/6/2012
\textsuperscript{511} Interview with Salom\~ao Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 17/1/2014
soils and social infrastructures) and the fear of the local leaderships of losing their authority and privileges in the new villages affected the way these populations negotiated with Frelimo officials the resettlement program. Many times the meetings between Frelimo officials and community representatives ended without any conclusion. Most often, the population demanded to see real assets such as irrigation infrastructures downstream of the dam and allocation of land in the irrigated areas before they move. Despite holding negotiations for more than 2 years, there was no progress in the resettlement program and people continued to live on the land despite the warning that their land would be filled by water to become a reservoir of the Massingir dam.\footnote{Interview with Manuela Valoi; Mavodze, 26/8/ 2014}

In late 1976, the assembling of the dam floodgates of the Massingir dam signalled the completion of its construction. However, the government had not yet found arguments to convince upriver communities to move to areas located downstream of the Massingir dam. Lack of resettlement options for the families affected by the filling of the reservoir was putting the government under pressure. In the following years, the Massingir dam would start the filling of the reservoir to help regulate floods in the Lower Limpopo and enable the development of agriculture in its irrigated areas. Due to time pressure, and the limited capacity of the Frelimo government to undertake civic work to convince the communities to move to areas located downstream of the Massingir dam, the government had no other option but to ask the representatives of the communities for their own options for relocations.\footnote{Sobrinho, António de Souza. 1981. “As cheias de Fevereiro de 1977 no Rio dos Elefantes em Massingir e sua repercursão no Baixo Limpopo” Finisterra, 31 (16): 95-122.}

The representatives of the communities of the north bank of the Elephants valley used this opportunity to suggest to Frelimo officials their relocation to upland regions above the floodplains in Coutada 16 rather than to move to downstream of the dam.\footnote{Interview with Amós Matebula, Mavodze, 24/1/ 2014} Without carrying out a critical analysis of this resettlement option, the Frelimo government agreed to move the population from the north bank of the Elephants valley to the uplands in Coutada 16, despite the
consequence that the measure represented to people’s lives (wildlife conflict) and livelihoods (agriculture and cattle keeping), local ecosystems and wildlife conservation.516

5.4. The illusion of socialization of the countryside in Coutada 16
In the late 1976, Frelimo government officials came to an agreement with the local families living along the Elephants valley for their relocation in Coutada 16. After this agreement, the government rushed to mobilize machinery (bulldozers and tractors) to clear the areas for the establishment new villages and open the paths used by trucks for the transport of goods and people to the new villages. Coincidently, the planning for the relocation of families displaced by the construction of the dam took place soon after the 8th Session of Frelimo Central Committee had debated in February 1976, the social and economic policy to be followed for the development of the countryside in Mozambique.517

Frelimo members present at this meeting agreed that the country had to go through a process of socialization of the countryside to allow the development of the remote rural areas. This policy entailed radical transformations in the economic mode of production, and the socio-political and territorial organization of the countryside. The cornerstone of the policy was based on the development of communal villages or aldeias comunais. Frelimo government expected to use communal villages to bring the dispersed rural population into modern rural villages where it would build social and economic infrastructure and the population was encouraged to work on peoples’ farms, state agro-industrial enterprises and cooperatives.518

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516Colonial documents on assessments of the soils made during the planning phase for the construction of the Massingir dam and the development of irrigation schemes had clearly indicated, for example, that soils north of Elephants River (Coutada 16) were not suitable for agriculture. The reports strongly advised the relocation of the populations from the north bank of the Elephants River in land located downstream of the Massingir dam where the soils are fertile and appropriate for the development of agriculture by ordinary people and for the development of irrigation schemes.


In the Massingir region, Frelimo officials working in the resettlement of families displaced by the dam, despite not yet having the guidelines for the establishment of communal villages, used the opportunity to test this policy and thus establish communal villages or *aldeias comunais* in Coutada 16. In late 1976, they cleared the land for the new villages and urged the displaced families to build their houses in blocks known as *quarteirões*. These comprised units of 10 houses headed by a chief (*chefe de 10 casas*). A unit of several blocks constituted a *bairro* or neighbourhood and a unit of several *bairros* formed a communal village.\(^{519}\)

The first families that went to build new homesteads in the new communal villages were given 10 to 15 zinc sheets for the roofs of their houses depending on the sizes of their households. For that reason and according to Lunstrum, it is true to say that people moved to the new area when their villages were flooded by water. However, when the rainy season started in late 1976, some families with help from the government had already started to build their houses in the new resettlement area.\(^{520}\) Until the early 1977, Frelimo government officials had managed to create four communal villages; two on the north bank of the Elephants River (Massingir Velho and Mavodze villages) and the other two were communal villages in the south bank (Canhane and Cubo) to relocate communities removed from the Elephants river due to the filling of its reservoir.

According to Araujo, after the Marrupa meeting (seminar for planning of agricultural development that took place in the northern province of Niassa in Marrupa district) of 1975 and the 8th Session of Frelimo Central Committee (February 1976), some Frelimo members hastened to create communal villages without the guidelines on the structure and purposes of the communal villages. Moreover, most of the Frelimo government officials at local level lacked training in territorial and development planning. This fact led the officials to ignore elementary principles to be taken into consideration during the planning of communal villages (this include natural conditions, water, fertile soils, social infrastructure (roads, markets, schools, hospitals)).\(^{521}\)

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\(^{519}\) AHM. CNAC. Cx. AC 71. *Informação sobre o distrito de Massingir – Gaza*. CNAC, 1980-1982

\(^{520}\) Interview with Celeste Mathe, Massingir Velho, 23/01/2014

\(^{521}\) Araújo, M. G. M. *O sistema das aldeias comunais em Moçambique*, p. 86
As explained in the next pages, socialization of the countryside was adopted as state policy during Frelimo’s 3rd Congress held in Maputo on February 1977 and the guidelines for the establishment of communal villages were made public after this Congress.522

After the 3rd Congress, the party at all levels organized meetings with its staff to harmonize the process of the establishment of communal villages in Mozambique. In Gaza province, the first such seminar took place in May 1977 and only in August 1979 did the provincial government of Gaza organize a similar meeting to harmonize the procedures to be followed for the establishment of such villages in Massingir district. These seminars took place after the government of Massingir district had established a number of communal villages in Coutada 16.523 This meant that the villages of Massingir Velho and Mavodze were established before the diffusion of policy guidelines and orientation for the establishment of communal villages in rural areas in Mozambique. This problem resulted in poor planning of almost all the communal villages in Coutada 16.

5.4.1. Moving to new communal villages in Coutada 16

In early 1977, the southern Mozambican region witnessed the passage of the cyclone Emilie that caused atmospheric changes and above-normal rainfall and floods. It is a fact that Massingir dam is small when compared to the infrastructure and complexity of the Cahora Bassa dam, whose construction involved the relocation of about 45,000 people compared to the 3,000 displaced by the Massingir dam. Because of its small size the Massingir dam reservoir was amongst the fastest to fill up. But for the Cahora Bassa dam, the Portuguese needed four months to fill the reservoir and Kariba took 4 years to fill its reservoir.524 The heavy rains in the Massingir region from 1st to

11th February 1977 resulted in quick filling of the reservoir. The heavy rains filled the dam in only 11 days and washed away all the villages located upstream of the Massingir dam.

The beginning of the filling up of the dam was a surprise to many families who were still beginning to build their houses in the new villages. The water quickly sprawled in the riverine villages leaving them totally inundated. The populations quickly left the riverine areas and escaped to the upland regions; furthermore, even the households that had already built their houses in the new communal villages in Coutada 16, had not yet moved to their new homes.

During the removal of the population affected by the flooding, the Tâmega Consortium allowed the local government to use its trucks for transportation of the affected population, their goods and livestock excluding cattle. Households owning cattle had to drive them from the old villages along the Elephants Valley to the new villages in Coutada 16 (approximately 30 km). A part of the family took the transport with the family goods to the new communal villages and some members had to stay behind to drive the cattle from the old villages to the new communal villages in Coutada 16.

Voices of the local cultivators indicate during the filling up of the reservoir many wildlife and flora disappeared. The subsequent removal of the population from the Elephants valley to the new communal villages in Coutada 16 occurred whilst most of the families were yet to start the harvesting of maize from their fields. Due to the rapid filling up of the reservoir, the affected families hastened to move to the new villages without having finished the harvest of their maize. In the new villages, they depended on foodstuffs distributed by the government, which, quite often, were not enough for their survival.

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526 Ibiden
528 Interview with Alina Jossias Simango, Mavodze, 26/8/ 2014
529 Interview with Manuela Valoi Valoi, Mavodzi, 26/8/ 2014
Food insecurity and hunger were some of the consequences of the displacement process. People’s accounts in this regard indicate that in most households of the new villages bush meat was the alternative food for survival. The area also lacked physical infrastructure needed for the population’s daily life such as roads, schools, hospitals, markets, etc. The main rivers of the region run far from the communal villages. The families relied on water distributed by a government tanker truck that most often was not enough for their consumption, bathing and cooking. The resettled families had to rely on water puddles near their villages formed during the rainy season and most often, the families claimed suffering constantly from diarrhoea and other stomach diseases.\(^\text{530}\)

The establishment of the poorly planned communal villages with little or no consultation with the people who were meant to be the beneficiaries of these new postcolonial policies rather than improving the living conditions of the local communities, tended to create conditions that deepened people’s levels of poverty. People interviewed in the Massingir region recorded that soon after their relocation in communal villages in Coutada 16, life was much harder if compared to colonial period. They argued that their removal from Elephants valley made them lose the fertile alluvial soils from where they grazed their cattle, developed agriculture and produced enough crops to eat all year round and even sell part of their production to get money to pay for the colonial hut taxes and buy goods for their families. However, such natural conditions did not exist in the new communal villages what made agricultural pursuits a daunting exercise.\(^\text{531}\)

5.4.2. Development of agriculture and fisheries in the new communal villages

Coutada 16 has a semi-arid climate and savanna-like environment. The soils are poor and not suitable for cropping.\(^\text{532}\) In general, rains in the area occurred from November to February and

\(^{530}\text{AHM, CNAC. Cx. AC 71. Informação sobre o distrito de Massingir – Gaza. CNAC, 1980-1982; see also AHM: CNAC. Cx. AC 223. “Linhas orientadoras para o desenvolvimento das aldeias comunais” Pasta – Planificação física das Aldeias Comunais; CNAC: Maputo 1980}

\(^{531}\text{Interview with Simião Peninicela Ngove, Massingir Velho, 6/7/ 2012, see also Interview with Finiasse Sechene Valoi, Massingir Velho, 21/1/ 2014, see also Interview with William Number One, Massingir Velho, 10/7/2012}

\(^{532}\text{COBA- Profibril: Desenvolvimento das aldeias comunais de Cubo, Paulo Samuel Kankomba, Massingir-Velho e Mavoze: Levantamento uso de terra: Lisboa Portugal, 1983, p.6, 31}
the average of rainfall in the region is about 400 mm a year. Far from the main rivers, Shingwedzi and the Elephants, agriculture is risky. Droughts occur regularly, often with devastating consequences to crops and pastures. 533

According to Almina, after their arrival in the new villages in Coutada 16, it was relatively easy for cultivators of Massingir Velho to find some land near their homesteads and up to a distance of 5 km to open new fields than the cultivators of the Mavodze village. She argues that in Mavodze, most of the households did not succeed in finding good soils around their village and had to go to the nearest village of Mbingo (a village located along the Shingwedzi River and 9 km from Mavodze village) to clear new fields to plant. 534

The preparation of new fields in the forest was a hard and painful job. The texture of the soils of Coutada 16, i.e., the heavy clay and the sandy and rocky soils made it too difficult to cultivate by hand. Additionally, the cultivators had to cut down the trees and clear the grass to plant. This situation was particularly difficult because the government did not give any support (agricultural inputs and machinery clear new fields) to these families after their relocations in Coutada16. The families had to rely on members of their households to clear new fields. With regards to the soil conditions of the village of Massingir Velho, Mrs. Celeste, the wife of the community leader of Massingir Velho left the following account.

“The land of this village is not good for the production of maize and vegetables. We produced vegetables in down-river area (ncoveni). Here it is not possible to produce vegetables. Here we grow only maize, but not in the same quantities that we did in ncoveni…. In ncoveni it was possible to produce maize twice a year. Here we plant maize once a year”. 535

533 Data collected and analysed by COBA indicate that in every month of the year, the potential evapotranspiration exceeds the precipitation. Given the Thornthwaite method to estimate potential evapotranspiration in tropical regions, the water deficit for the practice of agriculture deteriorates even more. Excluding alluvial soils of the floodplains of Shingwedzi, it can be concluded that the climate of the region is a serious limiting factor for the practice of the rain fed agriculture regardless of other factors as soil topographic conditions); see COBA-Profibril: Desenvolvimento das aldeias comunais de Cubo, Paulo Samuel Kankomba, Massingir-Velho e Mavoze: Levantamento uso de terra: Lisboa Portugal, 1983, p.51
534 Interview with Almina Jossias Simango, Mavodze , 26/8/ 2014
535 Interview with Celeste Mathe, Massingir Velho, 23/01/2014
African agricultural practices based on the slash and burn mode have several implications for the fertility of the soils, and after a period of use of the plots they have to be left unplanted for a period not less than 5 years for the regeneration of the soils fertility. This practice presumed that each household had to have some plots of land in use and another set of plots as fallow grounds. As the interviewees recognised, the moisture rich and fertile soils of the Elephants valley were easier to cultivate and they did not need to leave plots unplanted.536

The proximity of the area to the river meant that during the rainy season and small-scale floods, the river deposited silt in the clay soils, rejuvenating the fertility of the valley and improving agricultural yields. The structure of the clay soils allowed the land to retain water for long periods making it easier to work these fields compared to those of upland regions.537 These natural conditions allowed the cultivators in their former villages (Ncoveni) to plant twice a year and secure enough food for their families, as they could use the same plots for many years while at the same time reducing the burden of having many fields to work.538

Given the low and irregular rainfall in the new upland villages, access to the river-fed soils was critical to ensure household food security. Some household members went back to the reservoir shore to establish gardens to exploit the fertility of the dark alluvial soils remaining accessible. While in the upland regions of Coutada16 they could plant maize and sorghum once a year, the soils of the dam shore allowed them to plant the second season maize and vegetables. Cultivating vegetables in maize fields ensured food security as vegetables took only a few weeks to grow and were ready for consumption while waiting for the maize to ripen and be ready for harvest.539

536 Interview with Winalse Mathe, Mavodzi, 23/1/ 2014
538 Interview with Winalse Mathe, Mavodzi, 23/1/2014
539 Interview with Abel Elias Ngovene, Mavodze, 23/1/2014
The distances from the new villages to the reservoir shore is approximately 8km to 17 km depending on the location of the homesteads in the new villages. The paths to the fields located along the reservoir shores are made through thick bushes, hills and very rough terrain. In order to reach their fields the cultivators had to walk about three to four hours one way. This distance and the topographic condition of the land along the path to the reservoir shore made it impossible for the cultivators to commute to their fields and return home every-day. Moreover, given the need to protect their crops from attacks by hippos and other herbivores, the cultivators had to build huts near the shores of the reservoir to live there until the crops were ripe and collected to their homes. The need to protect crops was not only restricted to the fields located along the dam shore. It also affected fields near the new communal villages. Most often, wild stock came to these fields and destroyed crops creating shortages of foodstuffs for some of the households. The families were encouraged to build hedges to protect their fields. The situation increased the burden of work for the local families especially for women who, despite their involvement in agriculture, had to take care of the children and walk long distances to fetch water for bathing and cooking.\textsuperscript{540} This coping strategy resulted in the division of the family members for quite long periods. While some members remained in upland regions in Coutada 16, other members had to live along the Massingir dam shore to protect the crops until they were harvested, collected and transported to their homes.\textsuperscript{541}

\textsuperscript{540} Interview with Rosina Sitoe, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014
\textsuperscript{541} Interview with Alicina Zitha, Massingir Velho, 23/1/ 2014
Photo 1: Maize field along the Massingir dam reservoir.\footnote{Photo taken by the author during fieldwork in 2013}

Photo 2: Resident of the LNP (former Coutada 16) who live near the reservoir keep fires lit to keep the hippopotamus from eating the maize planted along the dam shore in the dry season.\footnote{Photo taken by the author during fieldwork in 2013}
Until recently, no research was undertaken to analyse the impact on the environment resulting from the development of agriculture along the shores of the reservoir. A look at the fields where cultivators are still active shows that soil erosion caused by the cultivators when opening farms on hills along the reservoir shore began to occur. In general, the cultivators who had fields along the reservoir shores used their extra time for fishing. They sent their families the fish they caught from the reservoir for consumption or sold it to obtain additional income. During the course of the war, 1976-1992, the government staff responsible for fisheries abandoned the area leaving the activity without control. Moreover, during the course of the war, the population that remained in their villages relied on food aid and hunting rather than fishing. Thus, the overexploitation of natural resources south of the Elephants River was intense within the inner Coutada 16 forests rather than in Massingir Lake.

5.4.3. Developing peoples’ farms inside a conservation area (Coutada16)

The development of peoples’ farms was at the centre of Frelimo’s policy for the socialization of the countryside. Beside their use as areas for agricultural development, the peoples’ farms were “territories” where local people would have space and time to meet, discuss and find solutions to the problems of their villages. The peoples’ farms together with state farms were designed to replace most of the traditional peasants’ cultivation models, deemed by Frelimo to be inefficient and backward. The communal farms were seen also as space for the people to learn new agricultural techniques that would be provided through Frelimo’s governmental institutions. The peoples’ farms would produce food to feed not only the local villagers, but also the population living in the Mozambican cities and towns. Therefore, it was intended that the sale of production from the communal farms would generate income for the villagers to buy commodities and goods not produced locally.545

543 Milgroom, Jessica. 2012. Elephants of democracy, p.6
544 Interview with William Number One Valoi, Massingir Velho, 25/8/ 2013
545 AHM: CNAC. Cx. AC 223. “Linhas orientadoras para o desenvolvimento das aldeias comunais” Pasta – Planificação física das aldeias Comunais; CNAC: Maputo 1980
Unlike the Chókwè region where the peoples’ farms and state farms (e.g. farms owned by the Agro Industrial Company of Limpopo or CAIL) were established after the floods of February 1977 in the areas abandoned by the Portuguese settlers, Coutada 16 lacked fertile soils, irrigation schemes and other infrastructure for such developments. Indeed, despite this fact, the Frelimo staff urged each household to allocate one of its members for a day of work in the collective farms.546

According to information gleaned from interviews, the communal farms increased the burden of work for the local families especially women who had to work on their field and on communal fields, they entailed additional work of clearing field in the bush to plant. Questioned about the levels of productivity in the collective farms, the interviewees mentioned that it was very low when compared to families’ plots. The development of peoples’ farms in Coutada 16 was abandoned in the early 1980s because of drought and the intensification of the armed conflict.547 During my fieldwork in the Massingir region, I noticed that due to the work done that led to deforestation of some areas, local populations are using such areas as grazing fields for the cattle.

5.4.4. Livestock keeping inside communal villages in Coutada16

The development of animal husbandry requires the existence of good pastures and water for livestock. Soon after the establishment of the new villages in Coutada 16, local communities faced several difficulties in feeding the cattle. In Massingir Velho village, the cattle had to be driven for a distance of 8 km to Bonzuene (a tributary of the Elephants River) to drink water and in Mavodze village cattle were driven to Shingwedzi River, located 9 km from the village. The development of cattle in such conditions meant that the boys engaged in cattle herding had to spend the whole day taking care of the cattle and thus had little time to help their families and even to go to school. Pertaining to the changing patterns of cattle keeping in Massingir Velho village, Manuela Valoi complained:

546 Roesch, Renamo and peasantry in southern Mozambique, pp.3-4; see also Bowen, Merle. 2000. The state against the peasantry, p.129
547 Interview with Manuela Valoi, Mavodze, 26/8/ 2014
“When we were living along the Elephants valley, it was possible for kids to drive the cattle to the grazing areas and leave them there grazing and come back to help the family in domestic activities including agricultural activities. Here in upland in Coutada 16, the situation is completely different…. young people could not abandon the cattle. They have to go to the grazing field in groups of about 3 to 5 young men from three to five families respectively. Going to graze in groups give them a sense of security and they can help each other if a predators come to attack the cattle.”

Before February 1977, the former Massingir Velho and Mavodze villages were located along the flood plain areas of Elephants valley. Before this period, predators also inhabited the upper lands of Coutada 16 and crossed their villages when going down to the river to drink water. Semeão also explained that even when the wild beast walked down to the river they used their own paths that were not usually used by local villagers to avoid human and wildlife conflicts. The resettlement of the relocated families in communal villages located in the forest in Coutada 16 exacerbated conflicts between wildlife and resettled families. Frequently predators invaded local communities’ kraals, killing goats and chickens, while lions attacked cattle. From early 1977 to the mid-1980s, many families of the communal villages of Massingir Velho and Mavodze lost their livestock due to predators.

The relocation of the riverine communities in Coutada 16 also resulted in changes in cattle keeping practices. Along the Elephants valley, households that had no kids to take care of the cattle used to take the cattle to the grazing areas in the evening and leave them grazing overnight and collect the cattle on the following day. This practice allowed the households to work in their fields during the day and take care of the cattle after returning from their fields. In the new villages, this practice was abandoned due to attacks on cattle by predators. It was not secure to leave the cattle grazing overnight in the bush. Simeão Penicela Ngovene, a herdsman and cultivator in the Massingir village explained the changing patterns of the cattle keeping in the following words:

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548 Interview with Manuela Valoi, Mavodze, 26/8/ 2014
549 Interview with Simeão Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6/6/2012
550 In Gaza province cattle is normally taken care by young herders aged 8 to 14 years old. Interview with Simeão Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6/6/2012
“When we arrived here, there were many predators. Wild dogs (Hyenas) eat goats and chickens and lions attacked the cattle. In the lower land (Ncoveni), we did not take the cattle back to kraals every day. Some days we used to leave the cattle grazing overnight. After we have arrived in this place we noticed that some cattle disappeared overnight eaten by lions and other predators. We abandoned leaving the cattle grazing overnight.”

The data on wild stock population before the establishment of communal villages in Coutada 16 is scarce. The existing files refer only to elephant population surveys done by the KNP board from 1972 to 1976 to analyse elephant’s movements between the KNP and Mozambique. Relying on interviewed cultivators, I can ascertain that the relocation of communities from the Elephants valley in Coutada 16 contributed to human and wildlife conflicts. While predators (hyenas and lions) are reported to have contributed to the reduction of the livestock, herbivores (gazelles, impales) are constantly mentioned as species that destroyed local families’ and households’ crops. The grazing areas had gone from the open fields along the Elephants valley to areas with shrubs and trees in Coutada16. Due to the attacks on the cattle in the grazing areas, it became mandatory for the young herders to take with them hunting dogs to the grazing fields. The dogs were often used to scent predators when approaching the grazing areas. The warning of the dogs (barking) allowed the young herders to call their colleagues to help them to chase the predators away.

After the relocations, the cattle bells became very important instruments for the security of the cattle. The cattle bells helped the young herders to detect the location of their cattle and in the event that some cattle had gone astray, the young herders could quickly follow the bells to bring back the cattle. Although the cowbells helped to locate the cattle, they also warned the predators about the existence of cattle in the bush. In such a situation, the predators could follow the noise of the bell to track and kill the cattle. Consequently, the herders were urged to keep all the cattle close to each other to avoid being caught by predators.

551 Interview with Simeão Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6/6/2012
553 Interview with Simeão Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6/6/2012
554 Interview with William Number One Valoi, Massingir Velho, 25/8/ 2013
Establishing communal villages in the central part of Coutada 16

In 1978, Frelimo government officials from the district of Massingir worked to set up new communal villages in the central part of Coutada 16 where some communities along the Shingwedzi catchment were still living in scattered households. In this area, Frelimo government officials organized weekly meetings with the local population where they explained the objectives of the communal villages and urged the scattered households to move to the communal villages. If compared to the south end villages, the villages of the central part of Coutada 16 were better located because they were established near the source of water (Shingwedzi River) for the population and cattle. Moreover, the best arable lands in the region were located along the Shingwedzi valley and the population had to walk a few kilometres to their fields.

Despite the fact that many heads of the local families attended the meetings with Frelimo officials, not all families in the central part of Coutada 16 moved from their former homesteads to the areas designed for the establishment of the communal villages. Living scattered in the bush had great advantages to this population rather than living in communal villages. Living in the bush allowed them to continue to hunt in the local forests without interference from the Frelimo local staff or secretários. The replacement of traditional leaders by Frelimo staff broke communication between Frelimo officials and the local population who continued to be loyal to their traditional leaders. Consequently, despite several appeals made by Frelimo officials concerning the need for scattered households to move to the new communal villages, some families continued living apart in the bush until the early 1980s when the civil war forced them to join other villagers in the new communal villages.

By late 1979, Frelimo officials had managed to establish three villages in the central part of Coutada 16. The villages lacked social infrastructure and access facilities especially roads and bridges over the main rivers of the area. This situation made travel from the Massingir

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555 Group Interview with, Rosina Mbombe, Elina Malhaule, Naquirosa Valoi, Mbingo, 24/2/ 2014
556 Ibiden
557 Entrevista com Simion Number One Ngoveni, Mukatine, 26/04/2016
558 Ibiden.
administration (Tihovene) to these areas very difficult. In the rainy season, no vehicles could reach these villages. After the establishment of these villages, Frelimo officials named it after the names of the party’s heroes, former Frelimo bases (barracks) and slogans used by Frelimo during the liberation war. Archival documents are silent in this regard. It is known, however, that soon after independence Frelimo used names of its heroes, bases and slogans to popularize the party its programs and its social and economic policy. Thus, Frelimo party officials used the names to remember its heroism during the war to overthrow the colonial government and thus persuade the population to affiliate the party and follow its social and economic programmes.

Table 3: Communal villages established by Frelimo in Coutada nº16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Name of the village</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>N de hab.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massingir Velho</td>
<td>Aldeia Comunal Venceremos</td>
<td>South region</td>
<td>1309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mavodze</td>
<td>Aldeia Comunal Cahora Bassa</td>
<td>South region</td>
<td>1414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbingo</td>
<td>Aldeia Comunal Gorongosa</td>
<td>Central region</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machamba</td>
<td>Aldeia Comunal Nachingueia</td>
<td>Central region</td>
<td>606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimangue</td>
<td>Aldeia Comunal 500 anos</td>
<td>Central region</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are no official statistics of the number of families that joined communal villages in 1981/2. From the interviews, I knew that from this period until 1984/5 almost all families of the inner villages of Coutada 16 lived in communal villages to benefit from the protection of the national army due to the occurrence of the armed conflict. In 1984-5, the civil war reached these villages and local families left their village and sought refuge in other Mozambican villages and towns while some households migrated to South Africa.

5.4.5. Frelimo dispute traditional leaders in Coutada 16

In 1977, at the party 3rd Congress, Frelimo proclaimed itself as a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party of the worker-peasants alliance. During the congress, the Frelimo government adopted the

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559 Group interview with, Rosina Mboro, Elina Malhaule, Naquiosa Valoi Mbingo, 24/2/2014
socialization of the countryside as the state strategy for the development of rural villages. In the period following the congress, the party launched campaigns to broaden its base, incorporating new militants at every level. The party advocated that all the government staff at all levels had to be in alignment with Frelimo’s development policies to allow the mobilization of the population to embrace its central planning strategy and the implementation of the policy for the socialization of the countryside in remote rural areas.

Frelimo’s strategy to bring into the administration members who were only loyal to the party resulted in the replacement of former heads of rural villages or régulos by new chiefs known as secretaries or secretários. In most rural villages, the former heads of the villages were removed from office not only because of their loyalty to the colonial regime, but also because they represented the traditional practices (power of the ancestors), which was in conflict with Frelimo’s nation making project, and of the creation of the homem novo literally, the new man.

In rural villages and towns, the secretários and the mass-based groups composed of Frelimo’s sympathizers formed the grupos dinamizadores (“dynamazing” groups) whose functions were carrying out administrative, economic and political tasks. Bowen argues that after 1977, in some rural villages in southern Mozambique, the one-party state merged into the same person or the secretário, the political and administrative functions. The secretários and grupos

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561 FRELIMO (1977b), Documentos de base da FRELIMO (3º Congresso, 3 à 7 de Fevereiro de 1977). Maputo: Departamento do Trabalho Ideológico da FRELIMO
563 Interview with Simiao Sitoi, Massingir Velho, 21/1/ 2014
564 FRELIMO used media and community meeting to pass its messages and slogans (palavras de ordem) to the population and those deemed to perpetrate the colonial, capitalist and backward practices as tribalism and racism were labelled as Xiconhocas (greedy, lazy, corrupt, ugly personality) and were denied access to higher position in the community. Meneses, Maria Paula 2015. “Xiconhoca, o inimigo: Narrativas de violência sobre a construção da nação em Moçambique” Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais 106 (2015) Memórias de violências: Que futuro para o passado?
565 Anton, Johnston. The Mozambican state and education in Education and Social Transition in the Third World, p, 286
dinamizadores played a fundamental role in the sensitization of their communities so as to embrace Frelimo’s policies.\textsuperscript{566}

The disruption of the colonial state apparatus at the grassroots level, i.e. the removal of the former local and traditional leaders from the office and the lack of supervision of local forests by government staff in Coutada 16 resulted in anarchy in the management of the local forests resources. The replacement of former local leaders also sharpened disparities concerning access to and management of natural resources (land forest and wildlife).\textsuperscript{567} Despite their removal from office, the traditional leaders continued to be recognized in their communities as legitimate authorities. The secretários and the grupos dinamizadores did not have the same legitimacy that the traditional leaders had.\textsuperscript{568}

While the government reserved its institutions and staff, the management of natural resources including the supervision of local hunting, the loyalty that the population retained for their traditional leaders allowed them to continue to be in control of natural resources such as allocation of land in their villages and surroundings. However, they abandoned their duties as guardians of the local forest and supervisors of hunting activities. The secretários and the grupos dinamizadores lacked authority in their villages. Consequently, it was difficult for them to arrest illegal hunters and take them to proper institutions to be judged or pay penalties. In some


\textsuperscript{567}During the colonial period, the traditional authority in southern Mozambique was encompassed in the figure of the village leader – the Régulo. The regulos’ authority and power was associated with the Portuguese colonialism. They represented the colonial authorities in their villages and also were the entities that connected the new generation with their ancestors; they command ceremonies linked to ancestors which were believed to demand rains, thanks the spirits of the ancestors for a good agricultural season, a good hunt etc. see Alexander, Jocelyn. 1997. “The local state in post war Mozambique: political practice and ideas about authority” *Africa*, 67 (1): 1-26

\textsuperscript{568}During the colonial period, the local population in most rural areas in Mozambique maintained loyalty to the traditional leaders not only because they were the representative of the Portuguese colonial government but due to the divine power that they had in their communities. During the *Estado Novo* the traditional authorities, the regulos had a considerable authorities in their villages as they represented the colonial authorities at the local level. Moreover, the regulos worked closely with the colonial systems in the implementation of the colonial rule. Because they acted as assistants of the colonial government at local levels, they were exempted for forced work at administration. In the late 1930s when the production of cotton was intensified in southern Mozambique, regulos used the cípaio (coloni al police in rural areas) to recruit people to work on their fields; see Isaacman, A. 1992. “Peasants, 1992. Work and the labour process: forced cotton cultivation in colonial Mozambique,1938-1961” *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 25 (4): 815-855
circumstances, the roles played by the secretários in Coutada 16 were controversial. They represented their villages at the administration but at local levels they continued to be under the rule of the traditional leaders.\textsuperscript{569} The headman of Mbingo village recalled the political transformations in his villages soon after independence and the state of management of natural resources, land and fauna, this way:

“The Portuguese empowered the régulos us as managers of the local resources. We had the right to allocate land to the population and supervised hunting in the area. After Mozambique gained independence, people continued to come to us to ask for permission to clear new plots in the villages or its surroundings. They never went to the secretários. They did not recognise their authority... they had authority only at the administration but locally they obey us. They had no right to perform local ceremonies.

During the colonial period when hunters killed an animal, they brought a part of it to us. It was said that the belly of the animal belongs to the king. When the hunters had killed a big animal such as an elephant or rhino, they had to bring one of the tusks to the king ... it was said that the horn on the side that the animal lays down after being shot belongs to the king. We did the control of hunting. Those who did not obey our rules were taken to the administration to pay penalties (forced work or be whipped by a special whippier known as xipacani). In the mid-1950s, the Portuguese introduced forest scouts locally known as or mbocotanas to supervise hunting in the area.

After independence the scouts disappeared ... then there were people who came here saying that they were from the Department of Agriculture in Massingir... they did not know anything about hunting. When they heard the first gunshots of Mapswanga (local name for RENAMO’s army) they disappeared. Due to draught and hunger in the region, people increased hunting.... There was no one to take the control of the game. We were excluded from Frelimo’s administration. Frelimo created a big problem in the management of forest resources in the area. Who were the secretários? Who knew them? Who listened to them?\textsuperscript{570}

The above quotation demonstrates the dissolution of former traditional leaders in Massingir region. As I have pointed out in previous chapters, the participation of the traditional leaders in the management of local resources and supervision of hunting was direct consequence of the benefits that they had from the colonial administration (exception of hut taxes, use of local labour in their field, etc.). The colonial administration in southern Mozambique allowed Shangan traditional leaders to share the products of hunting and thus incentivise their participation in the

\textsuperscript{569}While in the colonial period traditional leaders’ work was more concerned about the enforcement of colonial rules in the villages; after independence, the secretários in rural areas were more committed with territorial organization of space of their villages, political functions and modes of production.
supervision on hunting. Because Frelimo replaced the former villages’s headmen (régulos) by new chiefs or secretários the régulos resigned their duties as guardians of the local resources and refused to cooperate in the supervision of hunting and management of the wildlife (flora and fauna).

The mismanagement of ecosystems and fauna north of the Elephants River was worsened because from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, Frelimo officials in the Massingir district seemed to completely ignore that the area between the confluence of Limpopo and the Elephants River in the north to the Mozambique and South Africa border in the east was a hunting concession. The local government of Massingir district and its staff was only concerned with the socialization of the countryside and nothing was made to improve the management of the natural resources. During the period from 1977 to 1983, the state of natural resource conservation in Coutada 16 was appalling as the area witnessed a massive depletion of the forest resources and wildlife.

5.6. Improving the living conditions of the local populations in Coutada 16

In 1979, the GoM realized that the relocation of the families displaced by the construction of the Massingir dam in communal villages in Coutada 16 was a disaster and that it had condemned the population to misery. In contrast to the communities of the central and northern parts of Coutada that depended on Shingwedzi alluvial soils for cropping, the poor soils of the Massingir Velho and Mavodze villages were not suitable for agriculture. In addition, cyclical periods of drought had condemned the populations to hunger and poverty. Additionally, human and livestock diseases reduced cattle herds and deteriorated significantly the living standards of the local populations. The situation resulted in mass abandonment of the area, especially by youths who migrated to South Africa in search of new opportunities in life.\(^{571}\)

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\(^{571}\)COBA, Consultores. 1983. *Desenvolvimento das Aldeias Comunais de Paulo Samuel Kankomba, Massingir Velho e Mavodze: Carta de Potencial Agrícola, Carta de pastagens, Carta de Potencial Florestal.* Maputo: SERLI
The deterioration of the living conditions of the population in the new communal villages in Coutada 16 due to adverse factors listed above led the government in later 1979 to commission studies on the conditions of life in the relocated communities and land suitability to base land development programs to increase agricultural yields in the communal villages of Coutada 16. The evaluation reports concluded that a part of Coutada 16, especially the area where the government had established the communal villages of Mavodze and Massingir Velho was not suitable for the development of agriculture and cattle keeping. The reports also emphasised the fact that if the government wanted to improve the living conditions of the local populations, it had to develop irrigation schemes along the Shingwedzi valley and introduce new cattle species resistant to drought and that could feed on existing pastures.\textsuperscript{572}

The report also indicated that between the confluence of the Shingwedzi and Elephants River, there were about 5.830 ha of arable land of which 78\% could be used for the development of irrigation schemes and the 22\% could be used for rain fed agriculture. Part of the land could be cleared and given to local households and other land could be used for the establishment of state farms.\textsuperscript{573} In the late 1970s, Frelimo government staff began to convince the population from the villages of Massingir Velho and Mavodze to resettle along the irrigated area just a few kilometres from the foot of the dam wall. Again, lack of clarity about the new relocation program led the population to remain in the upland region of Coutada 16.\textsuperscript{574}

In the 1980s, the government started to develop small-scale irrigation schemes downstream of the Massingir dam (15 km downstream from the foot of the dam wall to 20 km to the confluence between the Elephants and the Shingwedzi rivers). With this project, the government expected to

\textsuperscript{572} COBA- Profabl: Desenvolvimento das aldeias comunais de Cabo, Paulo Samuel Kankomba, Massingir-Velho e Mavoze: Levantamento uso de terra: Lisboa Portugal, 1983

\textsuperscript{573} RPM. 1984. Projecto do Rio dos Elefantes, margem esquerda [Estudo de Viabilidade]. This study was commissioned by the GoM and conducted by MacDonald and Partner Limited. Principal Report. The report has 7 huge annexes or books (1- Solos, 2-Agricultura, 3-Irigação, 4-Infraestruturas, 5-Organização Administrativa, 6-Estimativas de Custos, 7-Economia). The Library of the Instituto de Investigação Agronómica de Moçambique-Maputo (HAM) has a series of unpublished reports done by the Portuguese authorities and the post independent state regarding research done on soils fertility for the development of irrigation schemes downstream Massingir dam. The documents on feasibility studies on water component can be found at the Library of the National Directorate of Water or Direcção Nacional de Aguas (DNA).

\textsuperscript{574} Lunstrum, E. M. The making and unmaking of sovereign territory, p. 112
attract the families from the upland regions region of Coutada 16 to migrate and settle in the area to take advantage of job opportunities existing on the state farms and develop agriculture in the fertile lands. In 1983, the government began planning for the development of irrigation infrastructure downstream of the Massingir dam. The assessment reports in this regard recommended that the government should include the already planned Massingir irrigation schemes and its state farms as part of the big governmental project for accelerated development of agriculture along the Incomati and Limpopo valleys. The Project was under tutelage of SERLI or State Secretariat for the Accelerated Development of the Incomati and Limpopo Region (Secretaria do Estado para o Desenvolvimento Acelerado da Região do Limpopo e Incomati).575

Combined factors such as drought (1982-3) and the intensification of the armed conflict (1982-1992) drove a considerable part of the population to seek refuge in South Africa and Mozambican villages and towns. Due to the increasing criticism about the negative impact of the policy for the socialization of the countryside in most of rural villages, in 1984 during the 4th Congress of Frelimo party, the government officially abandoned the policy and SERLI was dismantled before making any investment to establish state farms in Massingir region.576

The failure of this project meant that once again the project of relocation of communities living in the core conservation area of Coutada 16 in new villages located outside the Coutda was postponed to an unknown future. As I have demonstrated in the next chapter, the implementation of effective strategies to protect fauna in Coutada 16 would wait for another 11 years (1985-1996), when finally in 1996 the government with active support from the World Bank designed a project to rehabilitate ecosystems destroyed by war and enhance community development in the area.

5.7. Conclusion

The political independence of Mozambique celebrated on 25\textsuperscript{th} June 1975 implied considerable changes in the country’s development policies. After independence, the abandonment of the country by technicians involved in several projects did not allow Frelimo officials to learn from them about the potentialities of the region or even locate important files concerning development projects started during colonial period. This fact resulted in many mistakes during the building of the dam wall and the planning for resettlement of communities affected by the filling of the dam reservoir.

The building of the Massingir dam caused displacement of the communities living along the Elephants valley and their relocation to upland regions above the flood plains. The building of the dam implied also great transformation of land, ecosystems at the dam site and reservoir, structural changes in the new villages built to host government staff, the workers employed in the construction of the dam and in the new villages established to host the families displaced by the construction of the dam. The filling up of the dam resulted in the Massingir Lake and consequent destruction of the natural ecosystem and wildlife along the reservoir.

The relocation of riverine communities to poor soils in Coutada16 resulted in the decrease of the local families’ agricultural yields. Thus, hunting for food became a means for survival for many of the households. The opening up of family and communal farms in Coutada 16 increased the destruction of local ecosystems. Moreover, the conflict between Frelimo and traditional authorities and their replacement by new chiefs (chefes and secretaries) loyal to the party left a vacuum in the field of natural resources management. The removal from office of traditional leaders who were the effective managers of local natural resources and lack of government staff to take control of the natural resources resulted in a disorder in the management of local natural resources. As a result, the area witnessed the destruction of wildlife and fauna.
Chapter 6 examines the consequences of the armed conflict on already fragile ecosystems. Indeed, the armed conflict (1976-1992) forced a considerable part of the inhabitants of Coutada 16 to seek refuge in other Mozambican villages and towns and in South Africa. Far from the control of governmental institutions, the armies fed on local fauna and the increase of illegal hunters contributed to exterminate the fauna in Coutada 16.
CHAPTER VI: COMMUNITIES IN TRANSITION: WAR AND CONSERVATION IN THE SOUTH WESTERN MOZAMBIQUE BORDERLAND, 1976-2002

6.1. Introduction

Chapter 5 examined how rural transformation in Massingir and particularly in Coutada 16 resulted in the relocation of the families that lived along the Elephants and their restelment in upper lands in Coutada 16. In the new village in Coutada 16, some families did not succeed to find fertile soils for cropping. Thus, hunting for food became a mean for survival of the local populations. In the new communal villages, the replacement of traditional leaders by Frelimo staff broke communication between Frelimo officials and the local population who continued to be loyal to their traditional leaders. This situation resulted in anarchy in the management of the local forests resources including fauna.

From 1976 to 1992, much of the countryside was severely affected by armed conflict that destroyed social and economic infrastructure built during the colonial period and soon after independence. In most rural areas, the government staff left their positions and sought refuge in the cities and towns. In Massingir district, the government armies were present to protect the town of Massingir and the dam. From 1984, RENAMO’s armies took control over inner villages in Coutada 16, burning homes and granaries, stealing cattle, mutilating people and exterminating the fauna forcing local populations to leave their villages and and seek refuge in safer places in towns, and some people migrated to South Africa.

The end of the armed conflict in October 1992 brought hope to the hundreds of thousands of displaced who rushed to return to their home villages. The political stability allowed the GoM to implement programmes aimed at pushing the country’s economy forward and rehabilitate ecosystems and wildlife destroyed by the war. In 1996, the GoM received funding from the World Bank to rehabilitate the ecosystems in border zones in Maputo, Gaza and Manica. The
funding allowed the government to set the framework for further integration of these areas into the Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCA) Projects.

The rationale behind TFCA lay in the fact that colonial borders, administrative rules, colonial and post-colonial conservation policies resulted in fragmentation of natural ecosystems and blocked wildlife migrations patterns. These areas had their natural equilibrium, specific animal and human carry capacity rather than governed by state legislation. The TFCA were seen as solutions to heal the wounds of the pre and post-independence wars in border regions in southern Africa, which resulted in fragmentation of African ecosystems, displacements and separation of African communities. Thus, TFCA encouraged regional integration while fostering peaceful cooperation between countries that in the past may be engaged in conflict with one another. The TFCA concept also laid hope that they would reduce political and cultural tensions related to disputed borderlands and competition for shared resources and encourage use of resources in borderlands. The use of this conservation approach would also allow the member states to bring down fences along the border regions and allow migratory species to move freely from one area to another within the same conservation unit.577

This chapter examines the armed conflict in the Massingir region and its impact on the lives of the local communities and the environment. It documents experiences undergone by the local communities in Coutada 16 to escape the war and the routes followed to find refuge within and across national borders; it also analyses the return of these communities from exile and the process of rebuilding lives in Coutada 16. The chapter seeks to answer the following questions. What was the state of environmental conservation in Coutada 16 after the resettlements caused by the construction of the Massingir Dam? What was the impact of the war to the local communities and environment? What strategies were put by the GoM to rehabilitate the local ecosystem soon after the end of the civil conflict?

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This chapter argues that the integration of former Coutada 16 in the regional TFCA initiative or GLTP forced the GoM in 2001 to transform Coutada 16 into LNP. This transformation was followed by the adoption of the KNP’s conservation model where communities are not allowed in protected areas. However, lack of funding by the GoM is limiting the effectiveness of the resettlement programs for people living in the core conservation area of the LNP and environmental related business initiatives in buffer zones. During my last field work in Massingir region in April 2016, there were communities still living in the LNP.

The chapter is structured into four sections. The second section examines the political environment in the region that led to armed conflict in Mozambique and particularly the Massingir region. The section describes the severity of the armed conflict, its impact on the environment and strategies adopted by local populations in Coutada 16 to escape the warfare. The third section examines the economic and political transformations in Mozambique and the end of armed conflict; it analyses the return of the local population from exile and the process of rebuilding life in their home villages in Coutada 16. The fourth section reviews the establishment of TFCA initiatives in the region and the road to the GLTP. The last section examines the processes of transformation of Coutada 16 into LNP and implications for the lives of the communities affected by the relocations.

6.2. Roots of armed conflict in Mozambique and Massingir region

The political independence of Mozambique was declared by Frelimo in Maputo on 25th June 1975. After independence, the political and economic policy adopted by Frelimo differed from the capitalist development approach of its neighbours and particularly of South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Moreover, after the party had taken the reins of power, it supported

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578In 1964, Frelimo guerrilla forces started in the northern province of Cabo Delgado an armed struggle to overthrow the Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique. In April 1974, the collapse of the Salazar-Caetano longstanding regime in Portugal and the decision of the new government in Lisbon to end Portuguese defence of colonial rule in Africa opened the way for the independence of Mozambique. On 7th September 1974, Frelimo signed an agreement with Portugal that as from 25th September 1974 to 24th June 1975 the country would be ruled by a transitional government (composed of Portuguese staff and Frelimo nominees) to prepare power transfer from the Portugal’s Oversees Ministry to a Frelimo government; the political independence of the country was celebrated on 25th June 1975. This agreement is known in the History of Mozambique as Lusaka Accords as it was signed in
the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in its armed struggle for Zimbabwean independence and the African National Congress (ANC) in its long struggle against racial discrimination in South Africa. In March 1976, the GoM closed transport links to the land-locked Rhodesia in support of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle.579

This support resulted in rivalry between the GoM, the Rhodesian government and the Apartheid regime. The apparent regional polarisation became worse on July 1976 when the Frelimo government nationalized land, natural resources and leasing buildings affecting the owners of big companies and settlers that had left the country immediately after independence. From 1977, the Rhodesian government supported a group of rebels unhappy with the country’s economic and political orientation. By mid-1977, the Rhodesian security forces through the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) had managed to recruit some Africans (among them black Mozambicans Diaspora in South Africa and Lisbon) and formed the rebel movement which became known as the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR) otherwise known in Mozambique as Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO). André Matsangaissa, a former Frelimo member, led the movement. Matsangaissa was accused of robbery and sent to prison on charges of theft. Matsangaissa managed to escape from jail and joined the MNR thereafter RENAMO.580

The Rhodesian security forces supported the formation of RENAMO with the objective of counteracting the support that Mozambique was giving to ZANU-PF. Thus, supporting insurgency in Mozambique, the CIO expected that the Mozambique government would redirect its resources to fight insurgency within the country rather than supporting Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZNLA). While Smith’s troops acted at a national level, the Matsanga (name given by local populations to RENAMO’s men in reference to the movement’s chief commander, André Matsangaissa) acted in rural areas to destabilize Frelimo’s governance.581

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Between 1978 and 1979, Rhodesian forces attacked strategic economic infrastructures in Mozambique such as bridges, roads, military positions, schools, hospitals and fuel deposits. In May 1976, Smith’s forces tried to limit the movement of people, vehicles trains in the northern Gaza province by lying landmines, derailing trains and ambushing both military and civil vehicles. From May to October 1976, several villages located north of Coutada 16, namely Chigamane, Machailia, Jorge de Limpopo and Massangena were attacked.582

In 1977, Smith’s paratroopers landed in Chimangue village, about 80 km from the town of Massingir and unloaded several containers. Information about what was in the containers is scarce. It is believed however that it was military equipment to support RENAMO in its attacks in southern Mozambique. When the government troops approached the site they were ambushed and 2 were killed. The Mozambican forces retreated to Massingir to gather more support and when they returned to the site, the equipment and troops were no longer there.583

The opening of the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference held in London in September 1979 brought hope to millions of Zimbabweans for peace and independence. Conscious that the future government of Zimbabwe would not support insurgent forces of the region, in late 1979, the CIO negotiated with the South Africa authorities to host and continue to support RENAMO. This request was particularly favoured by internal changes within South Africa.584 In 1978, due to “Muldergate” information scandal, the South African Prime Minister, John Vorster, who was considered a moderate in foreign policy and favoured detente was removed from the cabinet and replaced by P.W. Botha, the then Minister of Defence.585

Botha had great support from the military, which offered an armed approach to solve political problems with the neighbouring states. Botha accused particularly Mozambique of fomenting

582At the time ZNLA had established its base in the central province of Manica which it used for training of its troops; see Robinson, David Alexander. 2006. *Curse on the land: a history of the Mozambican civil war*, [PhD Thesis]; University of Western Australia; p. 99-101
583AHM. CNAC; Cx 71 “RPM – Relatorio da 1ª fase da missão a província de Gaza - 1980-82
revolution in the region and threatening stability in South Africa itself. Botha argued that South Africa was facing a ‘Total Onslaught’. Under its Total National Strategy (TNS) Botha found alliances within the SADF to support insurgency and attacks to ANC members in Mozambique.

Up to the early 1980s, the Apartheid regime had channelled support to RENAMO via CIO. Documents collected by Mozambican Armed Forces soon after the attack to Garagua Base in Manica demonstrate support provided by SADF to RENAMO. As the independence of Zimbabwe was approaching the British forced CIO to close down its support to RENAMO and offered the rebels a choice of be integrated into civilian life or continue sabotage to Mozambique under the support of South Africa. After independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980 and the ZANU-PF victory, the rebels operating under the umbrella of CIO preferred to be transferred to South Africa and rely on South African support to continue sabotage to Mozambique.

From early 1980, the RENAMO leaders moved from Zimbabwe to northern Transvaal where its troops received logistical support and military training. The existence of an extensive forest on the south western Mozambique border with South Africa without effective control of the government armies allowed the rebels to take control over the area and set up bases to manage military support from the SADF. Accordingly, the Apartheid regime also used its bases in Phalaborwa to channel support to RENAMO in Mozambique. Unspecified military equipment passed through KNP to RENAMO in Mozambique. RENAMO used the support from South Africa to prepare its forces for further interventions in Mozambique.

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587Geldenhuys, Deon. 1981. “Some foreign policy implications of South Africa’s Total National Strategy”, with particular reference to the "12-pointplan". The South African Institute of International Affairs - Special Study; pp1-63; see also David, Alexander. curse on the land: a history of the Mozambican civil, p.113
From later 1978 to 1983, the movement increased the number of its fighters from less than 300 to 8,000 in 1982.591 From 1983 to the end of the armed conflict in 1992, RENAMO intensified attacks in southern and central Mozambique using two main routes. From the KNP near Phalaborwa, RENAMO infiltrated its troops to Mapulanguene and then to southern Mozambique and from KNP troops were driven to Chicualacu and then infiltrated in central Mozambique.592 In 1985, RENAMO had managed to establish a base in Coutada 16 near Machamba village (along the Shingwezi River). The difficult access to the area by road made incursions by the government troops by land very difficult. RENAMO used its bases in Coutada 16 to conduct sporadic attacks in Gaza province, particularly in the districts of Massingir, Mabalane, and Guijá. Until 1989, RENAMO controlled the region north of the Shingwedzi basin and conducted sporadic attacks to villages located south of Coutada 16.593

The horrors of RENAMO military strategy in Coutada 16 included mutilating civilians by cutting off their limbs, ears or breasts, and public killings and destruction of social infrastructure such as schools, clinics, shops and mills, power lines, roads and bridges making it almost impossible to link by road the major cities and towns. The brutal attacks of RENAMO also involved burning down homes, granaries, leaving families without food. Due to hunger and war, local populations abandoned their villages and sought refuge in relatively safe places where humanitarian agencies distributed foodstuffs.594

6.2.1. Escaping the warfare
Relying on oral sources, it was difficult to produce an accurate chronology of war in the Massingir region and particularly in Coutada 16 as most of the interviewees did not remember the date that some events (attacks by RENAMO) took place. However, soon after the civil war, a British anthropologist, William Norman, who conducted his PhD research in Coutada 16,

593 Norman, William Oliver. 2004. Living on the frontline;
produced a chronology, which I have used in this work. By 1989, the war had reached the central and northern regions of Coutada 16 and forced the local population to abandon their homes and migrate to the village of Mavodze where the presence of the government army protecting the dam made the village safer.595

During this period, RENAMO intensified its attacks to civilians in the inner villages of Coutada 16 and even the village of Mavodze was subjected to RENAMO’s ambushes. According to Simão Sitoi, the secretary of Massingir Velho village, due to insecurity in Mavodze, people with relatives in the Mozambican towns escaped to Tihovene, Xai-Xai, Maputo, etc. Owing to the proximity of the area to the border and familial ties that some families in Coutada 16 had with relatives in South Africa many people preferred to cross the border to find refuge in South Africa.596

The population that stayed at Mavodze village was composed of militias, old people, the disabled and individuals who, due to their government appointments or physical condition, did not leave for the nearest villages in South Africa. Even those who stayed behind did not live in their houses. They opened shelters in the bush to hide from RENAMO. In such a situation, cropping was practically impossible and the population depended on humanitarian aid to survive. Local peoples’ memories also reflect that hunting was also difficult because people feared that during hunting parties they could meet RENAMO’s men who would probably kill or arrest them. Those who were arrested by RENAMO’s men were forced to carry their heavy bags of products stolen locally and walk through the bush until their bases, which were located far away from their villages.597

People who escaped to South Africa used the bush routes to make their way to the nearest villages. The bush route from Coutada 16 to the border was made through thick forests, plateaus,

594 Lunstrum, E. M. 2007. The making and unmaking of sovereign territory; see also Norman, William Oliver. 2004. Living on the frontline, p.149
595 Norman, William Oliver. 2004. Living on the frontline;
596 Interview with Simiao Sitoi, Massingir Velho, 21/1/ 2014
597 Interview with Simiao Sitoi, Massingir Velho, 21/1/ 2014
ravines and swamps, having wild beasts and predators. The area is also inhabited by mosquitoes responsible for malaria transmission. The situation represented a threat to the lives of the refugees; there are cases reported that lions in the KNP killed people in their way to South Africa.598 Most often community members who fled to South Africa migrated in small groups and relied on the assistance of others who knew the track. Nowadays, people in Coutada 16 still remember the horrors of the armed conflict and the despairing moments that they experienced on their way to South Africa. The rebels killed many people and others got lost in the bush and starved to death. A young woman now living in Massingir Velho village who engaged in the risky adventure to travel through the bush from Magude to South Africa recalled the journey this way:

“When the war began I was still a teenager and I was living in Magude. My friend and I decided to escape to South Africa. … We did not know the way and did not ask for help. We decided to go to South Africa and left our village. I took my younger brother with me. We walked… walked… walked in the forest and got lost…we stayed in the bush for more than two weeks. We were thirsty, hungry and my younger brother got a fever. Suddenly we saw a group of troops …there were about 20 men. We shouted and they came in our direction ….we were lucky because they were not RENAMO men; they were government troops leaving border patrols and they were on their way to Tihovene. They took my brother on their shoulders and walked to Massingir… they gave medicine to my brother… we stayed in Massingir then we had assistance of someone who knew the way to South Africa and we followed him until Lulekani Refugees´ Camp in South Africa.”599

People interviewed in the Massingir region noted that in the mid-1980s they crossed the border in sections where fences were not electrified or had been damaged due to elephant crossings or natural factors. In some areas, non-permanent rivers opened channels under fences and wild pigs had dug deeper under such areas allowing animals to move from one side to another. The local population travelling in both directions also used such places to cross the fence. Oral accounts indicate that even after crossing the border travellers were not safe. They could be arrested and repatriated via official border gates.600

598 Interview with Fátima Chaúque, Massingir Velho, 11/7/ 2012
599 Interview with Fátima Chaúque, Massingir Velho, July, 11th 2012
600 Interview with Felisberto Penicela Matebula, Machamba, 26/2/ 2014
The Apartheid regime was not a signatory of conventions and protocols on refugee rights. It denied Mozambican migrants seeking asylum in South Africa a refugee’ status and did not provide protection or assistance to them as required under International Law on War and Displaced (ILWD). As a result, the role played by the South African authorities in assisting refugees along the border was controversial as it depended on the will of the KNP guards or SADF troops. Accordingly, some park employees assisted Mozambican refugees entering South Africa, giving them food, water and transport to the Mozambican refugees’ camps in Phalaborwa and Tzaninee, while other KNP guards arrested the migrants and sent them to prison where, after a long period (1 week to 3 months), they were deported to Mozambique via the border gates of Pafuri and Mapulanguene.

According to Joubert, this apparent conflicting situation arose from the fact that some groups of KNP guards were composed mainly of Africans who were keen to help Mozambican refugees while the white counterparts of the SADF had no such attitude. I will not examine in this thesis the daily life of Mozambican refugees in South Africa as this has been explored by a number of scholars in South Africa and Mozambique. In the following sections, I examine the impact of the armed conflict on environment, the process of repatriation of Mozambican refugees from South Africa and their relocation in inner villages of Coutada 16 as well as the impact of this relocation to the local ecosystems.

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602 Golooaba-Mutebi Frederick, 2004 “Confronting uncertainty and responding to adversity” p.7
6.2.3. Armed conflict and the environment

The Ember’s analysis of conservation in America and Africa during warfare have found that war has negative impacts on ecosystems. During wars, belligerent armies ignore limitations imposed by conservation laws (hunting, setting of fires, etc.), thus destroying natural ecosystems and exterminating fauna.\textsuperscript{605} In Coutada 16, the armed conflict did not only affect the lives of people but also contributed to a change in landscapes and to depletion of fauna. Owing to the intensity of war, the government recruited local villagers, trained them and supplied them with machine guns (AK-47s) to defend their villages. Oral accounts in the Massingir region and Coutada 16 indicate that the militias used their AK-47s to hunt for food, instead of using the AK-47s for self-defence and to protect the local communities, their villages and belongings and other social and economic infrastructures in the Massingir region.\textsuperscript{606}

Armed conflict negated much effort undertaken by the Frelimo government in the years following independence. It forced rural families to abandon their land, their belongings and cattle to seek refuge inside and outside the national boundaries. By 1989, the government's presence had been consolidated in the major cities and towns but rural areas remained mostly defenceless and the population left to their own fate. RENAMO guerrilla forces blocked the main roads impeding road links from one district to another and from one province to another. Even the aid supply convoys were subjected to ambushes by RENAMO guerrilla forces.\textsuperscript{607}

Apart from armed conflict, from 1981 to 1983 the country was hit by drought, which reduced the ability of the cultivators to produce enough crops to sustain their families. From 1982, there were many reported cases of famine throughout the country. The government and humanitarian agencies put in place emergency plans to save the lives of people affected by the war and drought and minor actions were taken to improve the management of the environment and


\textsuperscript{606} Interview with Salomão Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014

\textsuperscript{607} Ibiden
fauna. A considerable number of wild stock especially elephants and rhinos were exterminated during the course of the armed conflict.

Lack of data prevents me from fully comparing the state of wildlife conservation in Coutada 16 before and after armed conflict. Aerial surveys conducted by the KNP from 1970 to 1972 to monitor elephant movements between KNP and Coutada 16 indicated the existence of approximately 789 elephants in Coutada 16, but soon after armed conflict elephants could be hardly seen in the area. Parallel analyses of wildlife management from other conservation areas in Mozambique have also pointed out the extermination of fauna during the armed conflict. According to Ellis, during the armed conflict in Mozambique, RENAMO allies in South Africa demanded payments in commodities such as hardwood, rhino horns and elephant tasks.

Mozambican surveys on the environment indicated less destruction of ecosystems (deforestation) but massive depletion of fauna. For example, in Gorongosa National Park where RENAMO had the most important base in central Mozambique, the number of elephants prior to the armed conflict was about 3000 whilst in 1994 only 108 elephants were recorded during an aerial survey. Massive declines were also recorded for buffalo (14,000 in 1979 to 0 in 1994), hippos (4800 in 1979 and 0 in 1994), wildebeest (5500 in 1968 and 0 in 1994) and waterbuck (3500 in 1988 to 129 in 1994). Similar trends were observed in Mozambican forests and conservation areas where plundering of forest resources, especially rhino horns and ivory were done not only by RENAMO but also by the national troops and their allies.

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614 Hatton, John; Mia Couto and Judy Oglethorpe, 2001. Mozambique: biodiversity and war”; p. 58, 68
6.3. Economic and political reforms and the end of armed conflict in Mozambique

As referred to earlier in this chapter, in the early 1980s, the armed conflict and drought reduced cultivators’ ability to produce for their survival and in many rural villages, people relied on foreign aid for survival. Most of the government rural development enterprises had collapsed and some other rural developed plans cancelled due to drought, war or lack of technical and human capacity. In the Massingir region, the Government cancelled the development of the Massingir Irrigation Scheme.

In 1983 at its 4th congress the party abandoned the policy of the development of the countryside. In 1984, the Government started dialogue with the South African authorities aimed at cutting off SADF support to RENAMO and thus minimise the movements operation in Mozambique. On 16th March 1984 a Non-aggression Pact and Good Neighbourliness was signed by the Mozambique president Samora Machel and the president of South Africa P.W Botha. The Accord was signed in an arranged place on the banks of Nkomati River, which is at the border between Mozambique and South Africa. The pact became known as the Inkomati Accord.615

The GoM was sure that ending South African support to RENAMO would reduce its power and consequently reduce its incursions into civilian areas and the destruction of economic infrastructure. In turn, the situation would allow the government to bring about measure for economic recovery.616 From June to October 1984, the South African authorities mediated negotiations towards a ceasefire between RENAMO and the Mozambique government. However, no results were achieved.617 It seems, that despite the fact that Mozambique and South Africa had signed in March 1984 a Non-aggression and Good Neighbourliness Pact and Mozambique closed ANC offices in Maputo, some sectors of the SADF did not cease their support for RENAMO.

I will not discuss in this chapter the evolution of the armed conflict and the whole negotiation process to ceasefire in Mozambique. This topic is well developed by several academic works and is not the main subject of my thesis. However, it is important to underline that from 1984, RENAMO increased actions toward destabilization of the economy in Mozambique and the armed conflict reached almost all rural villages. RENAMO’s attacks targetted civilians, aid workers, power lines, railways, roads, bridges, and factories in order to paralyse the progress of the national economy.\(^{618}\)

Desperate to improve national economic performance, from 1984-1986 the GoM began a process of internal reforms to rebuild the country’s economy; the government relied on the assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) to change its economic development approach, moving from a socialist oriented to a market based economy. In 1987, the government introduced the Economic Recovery Programme (PRE) aimed at liberalizing the economy and stimulating private sector investment.\(^{619}\) The reforms were successfully implemented only in the major Mozambican cities and towns that remained protected by government armies. In most rural areas the local population still lived in refugee camps within and across national borders.\(^{620}\)

In the early 1980s, the dire situation in which many Mozambicans were living forced the GoM, the Mozambican Christian Council (MCC), the Catholic Church and other non-governmental institutions to search for lasting solutions to end the conflict. In 1984, the MCC created the Peace and Reconciliation Commission. In the late 1989, the MCC and the Catholic Church re-approached RENAMO leaders in Nairobi to established a platform for negotiations between the


The details of the negotiations between the Frelimo government and RENAMO are not a subject of analysis of this thesis. It is known, however, that in its 5th Congress held in Maputo in July 1989, the party abandoned officially its centralized socialist development model in favour of a market based economy and started working toward changes in the country’s political orientation from a one party state to a multiparty system. These changes were further incorporated into the new constitution passed by Parliament in 1990. The 1990 constitution helped the conciliatory approach between the belligerents and created a political environment conducive to the formal end of armed conflict on 4th October 1992 and to the first multiparty election held in October 1994. The end of the armed conflict also allowed the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans who had left the country in search of safer places within and across national borders.

6.3.1. Returning from exile and rebuilding life in Coutada 16

The peace agreement signed between the GoM and RENAMO in the Italian capital Rome on 4th October 1992 brought hope to hundreds of thousands of displaced persons living in refugee camps within and outside the country. After the peace agreement, the media and humanitarian institutions within national borders and in neighbouring countries began to disseminate information about the end of the armed conflict in Mozambique. Salomão Ngovene, a traditional leader of Massingir Velho who at the time was living in a refugee camp in South Africa, recalls how these messages were spread by the leaders of the area where he was living.

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“In early October 1992, the heads of our village in South Africa came and gathered us for a meeting… they told us that there was peace in Mozambique. Frelimo and RENAMO had finally come to an agreement and a peace agreement was signed on 4th October; the soldiers had lowered their weapons… then we could go back home in peace.... all individuals who wanted to return home could do so with support from the South African Government and UNHCR. Every person was allowed to take their belongings to their home village. There were free shuttles to carry people and their belongings home.... These messages were later spread by the local radio stations in South Africa.”

While in exile, some families had managed to integrate themselves into local social and economic life. These people preferred to continue their lives in exile rather than returning home. People interviewed in Coutada 16 told me that a part of the population from their villages did not return to Massingir. Some of these people succeeded in starting businesses. Others had found employment or had their children enrolled in schools in the areas where they went to seek refuge. Moreover, people recalled that before they left Coutada 16 and went to South Africa there were no schools in inner villages of Coutada 16. Such people preferred to continue living in South Africa rather than return to Massingir. However, the vast majority of the population who depended on agriculture for survival, land was the only asset that they had in their home villages to produce crops to feed their families. After the armed conflict, these populations preferred to return to their home villages to rebuild their lives through agriculture and rising livestock.

Literally the so called “voluntary repatriation” started only in March 1994 after all necessary logistical arrangement were made by the institutions involved in the process, namely the government of South Africa, the GoM, United Nation High Council for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Organization of Migrations (IOM). The UNCHR contracted the Medicines Sans Frontieres-France (MSF-F) to administer the five transit camps in South Africa where the returnees received medical check-ups before being transported by IOM trucks to another transit

625 Interview with Salomão Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014
626 Polzer, Tara. 2004 “Adapting to changing legal frameworks”; see also Rodgers, Graeme. 2002. When refugees don’t go home
centres in Mozambique. It should be remembered that the Mozambican refugees in South Africa did not only escape from the Massingir region but from other districts of the province of Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo. However, the statistics indicate that the Massingir district had the most significant number of Mozambican refugees in South Africa (4956 out of 25000).

The IOM provided transport to Mozambican refugees in South Africa to the transit centres in Mozambique where from there they were transported by the Núcleo de Apoio aos Refugiados - NAR (Mozambique government department responsible for refugees) vehicles to their final destinations. I did not access documents on the repatriation process for the Massingir returnees. People interviewed during my fieldwork in Massingir, mentioned that they got transport from their refugees’ camps in South Africa to the transit centres located near the border. From there they got another transport to Tihovene (the headquarter of Massingir district). Owing the lack of roads in rural Massingir the vehicles that transported the returnees did not reach the local villages in Coutada 16; the populations had to make it on foot. In order to avoid land mine explosions, the GoM sent specialized teams in advance to inner villages in Coutada 16 to undertake careful checks along the main paths that gave access to local villages.

Whiteside analysed the condition of the displaced in Mozambique and noticed that almost all people who sought refuge out of their home villages after their return, in most cases found that infrastructure left behind had been destroyed, making the returnees strongly dependent on food supply agencies to survive because they needed to cultivate, plant crops and wait until the first harvest. Humanitarian agents were also placed in Tihovene to assist the people on their arrival. Foodstuffs, seeds, hoes and other agricultural inputs were distributed to these populations before they moved to their home villages. Salomon Ngovene vividly recalled the process:

“The South African authorities opened many entry points along the border to allow the returning of the Mozambican refugee from South Africa. Communities living in the former Gazankulu

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631 Interview with Salomon Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014
632 Whiteside, Martin. “Realistic rehabilitation: linking relief and development in Mozambique”, p. 124
homeland were transported to Letaba and from there they were taken to Mapulanguene… there were other routes…. I was living in Phalaborwa; from Phalaborwa we were directed to Mongoe; from Mongoe, we used a bush path to walk to Cubo and from there we walked to Massingir Velho.”

6.3.2. Rebuilding lives in Coutada 16

The return of the refugees to their home village ensured that they would rebuild their houses in the same places where their homesteads had been located before leaving the area. There were rare cases where people preferred to go to other villages. This change had other implications for access to land and plots for agriculture. Moreover, given the local conditions (villages located in bush areas) the construction of houses in new areas implied additional work to clear the bush to set up new homesteads and farms. Lack of data does not allow me to undertake a careful analysis of population trends before and after armed conflict. Moreover, the data produced by the Mozambique National Statistics Institute (INE) regarding the population census in Massingir before and civil war does not offer desegregated numbers of the population in villages of Coutada 16. Relying on interviews it is easy to understand that many people who left the area and sought refuge in different places in Mozambique and across national borders did not return to their home villages.

During my fieldwork in Massingir Velho and Chimangue, I noticed that many former homesteads of the local families remained unoccupied. Interviewees confirmed that after the armed conflict only Mavodze village had increased the number of its inhabitants. The existence of social infrastructure such as roads, schools and clinics and its proximity to the town of Massingir (28 km) had attracted people from the inner villages of Coutada 16 to build houses in this village so that their children could attend schools and live near the social infrastructure. Many of these families continued with their fields in their home villages.

633 Interview with Salomon Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014
Table: Inhabitants of the Villages of Massingir

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mavodze</td>
<td>1414</td>
<td>2686</td>
<td>2205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massingir Velho</td>
<td>1309</td>
<td>1105</td>
<td>1233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machamba</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimangue</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbingo</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As pointed out earlier, cattle in south western Mozambique is an important asset for the local communities. It is an asset that functions as “banks” because in time of bad harvest they sell their cattle to get some cash to buy food. Additionally, cattle in these communities are also used as currency to pay the *lobola* or bride price, which can range from 8 to 15 head of cattle. During the armed conflict, the cultivators-herdsmen lost a considerable part of their cattle. I did not find data about the evolution of cattle keeping for Massingir before and after the war. The Magude district that border Massingir district in the south, is the richest cattle-breeding district nationwide and had about 20000 head of cattle between the commercial farmers and the family sector but only 2000 survived the conflict.

In the post-armed conflict period, some regions of Mozambique benefited from livestock restocking programs. However, Coutada 16 villagers did not benefit from such programs because when livestock restocking programmes were being implemented (1996-8), the government had just begun the implementation of the TFCA initiative in Coutada 16, and it was unfeasible to restock in a protected area. Despite such limitations, local households borrowed and purchased cattle and small livestock for restocking from each other. According to Ngovene during the war some individuals who did not migrate still had some cattle and gave or lent some to their families to restart livestock farming.

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634 Limpopo National Park. 2012. LNP villages and communities [Unpublished]
636 Interview with Salomão Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014
6.4. The rise of the Transfrontier Conservation Areas initiatives in southern Africa

In the later 19th century, colonial borders separated African lineages, “natural ecosystems” or “bioregions” into different colonial states. Accordingly, natural resources management laws and regulation differed from one state to another. Such differences limited the establishment of coordinated efforts for the preservation of ecosystems and fauna along the border zones.637

The increase of illegal hunting along the Transvaal-Mozambique border and lack of control of hunting by the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique, led the South African authorities in 1938 to start unilaterally erecting fences along the Transvaal and Mozambique border. In the 1960s and 1970s, the South African authorities erected fence in two parallel lines (the first being the border between Mozambique and South Africa and the second the KNP fence). The fences were aimed at protecting the wildlife in the KNP, trespassers. Up to 1976, the South African authorities had fenced the full length (a perimeter of about 350 km) of the Transvaal and Mozambique border.638

Indeed, from the later 1970s to the early 1990s fences were not used to deter fauna movements only but to avoid intrusion of insurgent forces into South African territory.639 During the armed conflict in Mozambique, the South African authorities electrified some sections of the fence to prevent intrusion by insurgent nationalists or ANC into South African territory. Alongside the fences, the South African authorities placed units of SADF for surveillance.640

637 For more details on this account see chapter III and IV.
Analysis of fencing and fauna conservation in the KNP has demonstrated that fences have a catastrophic impact on wildlife. Fences allowed the protection of fauna in the KNP but they separated natural ecosystems along the border. Whyte argues that many migratory species such as zebra from the eastern part of the Kruger and western Mozambique would have died of hunger, thirst or of being trapped by the fence where they could spend hours expecting that other zebras on the other side could cross the fence and join the herd.\footnote{Whyte, I.J. and S. C. Joubert, 2010. “Impacts of fencing on the migration of large mammals in the Kruger”, p.139} Despite the existence of fences, people escaping war in Mozambique systematically violated them and crossed the border to South Africa.\footnote{Interview with Felisberto Penicela Matebula, Machamba, 26/2/ 2014}

In the mid-1980s, it became evident that fencing was no longer socially or politically acceptable; nor, was it a sustainable way to manage and protect wildlife. National park managers argued that fencing protected areas was not only expensive (deploying personnel and equipment) but that it was also counterproductive; they did not stop the unlicensed hunting and poaching and further encroachment on wildlife areas. From then on, wildlife managers and policy makers started to advocate an approach that emphasized that communities had to become actively involved in wildlife management.\footnote{Spierenburg, Marja Harry Wels, 2006. “Securing space”, p. 297} However, the advance of the decolonization process in the region with Mozambique favouring the liberation of South Africa from Apartheid became an impediment to establish coordinated efforts to protect fauna and natural ecosystems along the common border between Transvaal and South Africa.\footnote{Spierenburg, Marja & Harry Wels, “Transfrontier conservation in southern Africa: Taking down the fences or returning to the barriers?” see also Keet, D., Bengis, R. & de Klerk-Lorist, L-M K Ferguson “Fencing along the Kruger National Park boundary”. Ferguson, K. & J Hanks (Eds.). Fencing impacts: A review of the environmental, social and economic impacts of game and veterinary fencing in Africa with particular reference to the Great Limpopo and Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Areas. Pretoria: Mammal Research Institute, 2010, p. 67}

The end of civil war in Mozambique in 1992 and consequent relocation of the refugees within Coutada 16 posed another serious threat to conservation not only in Mozambique but also in the KNP. Wolmer argues that the KNP authorities became concerned about resettlement of Mozambican refugees in border region of Coutada 16, who in times of crop failure relied on
bush meat for food and could enter KNP territory for poaching. Therefore, interstate conservation initiatives were seen as a solution to prevent unlicensed hunting and poaching along the border and to provide measures to deter the increase of human settlement in Coutada 16. On the South African side, the establishment of the Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) were justified by the need to appease international criticism against South African elephant culling methods implemented in the 1980s to reduce elephant negative impact on the environment. Therefore, bringing down fences would allow dislocation of some elephants to neighbouring parks especially to Coutada 16 in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{645}

In the early 1990s, the shift of South Africa from Apartheid to democracy and its admission as a member of the SADC opened up opportunities for greater cooperation between regional states on social and economic development projects including environmental related ones. In order to address the concern around the establishment of a transnational park across South Africa and Mozambique the two government created a joint commission also known as Working Group to examine specific issues and needs for the establishment of transnational parks.\textsuperscript{646}

Accordingly, a South African philanthropist, Anton Rupert, visited Mozambique and met Joaquin Chissano the then president of Mozambique (1986-2004) to discuss the establishment of TFCA along Mozambique and South Africa. The meeting opened windows for greater cooperation between the two countries in wildlife management.\textsuperscript{647} In the later 1990s and early 2000s, the Peace Park Foundation (PPF) assisted the SADC members’ states to establish TFCA or “peace parks” in the region while lobbying the international donor agencies (World Bank, the USAID, and the German Development Bank or KFW) for funding social, economic and environmental appraisals to base new management models for the proposed TFCA. The PPF also


\textsuperscript{646}The working group was co-chaired by Mr. Abdul Adamo from the National Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife in Mozambique and by Dr. Solomon C. Joubert, warden of the KNP see Joubert, S. 2007. \textit{The Kruger National Park: A History}. Volume II, High Branching, Johannesburg, p. 320

worked in close relationship with IUCN and WWF on programs toward the materialization of the TFCA initiatives in the region.\textsuperscript{648}

The involvement of the SADC secretariat in the TFCA initiatives allowed the member states to promote common conservation platforms and wildlife policies that allowed the establishment of the idea of “peace parks” in the region. In 1997 in the Malawian city of Blantyre, the SADC heads of states signed the protocol on SADC Wildlife Policy. Indeed, the policy aimed among other things, to enhance inter-state cooperation in the management and sustainable use of ecosystems, which transcend national boundaries. Accordingly, in August 1999 in Maputo - Mozambique, the heads of states of SADC signed a protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement, which opened the window for regional cooperation in the development of natural resources, and enforcement of the laws governing their sustainable use across southern Africa borders.\textsuperscript{649} In practice, the SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement provided the framework for TFCA development and management.\textsuperscript{650} John Hanks the then director of TFCA initiatives in southern Africa emphasized that this protocol was also a demonstration that the heads of states of SADC had finally accepted the concept of TFCA and that it was seen also as priority.\textsuperscript{651}

\textbf{6.5. From Coutada 16 to LNP and the establishment of the GLTP}

In the early 1990s, the World Bank in southern Africa and particularly in Mozambique advocated for a close relationship of community development projects and conservation pursuits. Indeed, lack of resources to develop poverty alleviation programs forced the GoM to rely on resources from bilateral aid agencies. In 1994, the GoM conducted social appraisals in border regions to base projects on poverty alleviation and rehabilitation of ecosystems devastated by


\textsuperscript{650}Spenceley, Anna. 2006 “Tourism in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park” \textit{Development Southern Africa}, 23(5) 649-667; p. 651

armed conflict. The appraisal indicated 3 border regions (Maputo, Gaza and Manica) as having the necessary natural conditions for the establishment of conservation related initiatives and community development projects.652

In 1996, the GoM signed an agreement with the World Bank that founded the Mozambique Transfrontier Conservation Areas and Institutional Strengthening Project. Apart from the rehabilitation of ecosystems destroyed by the armed conflict, the Project set a framework for integration of the same areas into the regional trans-frontier conservation areas initiatives.653 During the early 1990s, the KNP offered great impetus to the project by allowing the GoM to use its facilities for training of its staff and service for research and survey in the areas disengaged for the Mozambique and South Africa TFCA.654

In 1999, a ministerial meeting was held in Maputo with the purpose of introducing to the representatives of Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe the TFCA concept and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to that effect was signed. The MoU showed the road map that would lead to the establishment of TFCA between the 3 countries. With the ministerial committee leadership, the countries undertook long negotiations that resulted in the signing of the Gaza/ Kruger/ Gonarezhou Park (GKGP) agreement by the ministers of the three countries on 10th November 2000 at Skukuza, South Africa.655 The GKGP covered an area of about 100,000 square kilometres of which 66,000 in Mozambique, 22,000 in South Africa and 12,000 in Zimbabwe.656

Apparently, Mozambique had the biggest share of the GKG Park because the GoM included 3 parks conservation areas in Mozambique (Coutada 16, the Zinave and Banhine national parks) and all the areas surroundings these conservation areas. The GoM expected to secure funds from

the initiative to founding small-scale projects within buffer zones and areas surrounding these parks. In practice, until late 2002, very few community development initiatives were funded within or in adjacent areas of these parks. It is known, however, that in the Massingir region in an area adjacent to LNP the Swiss NGO Helvetas secured 70,000 USD to build the Covane Community Lodge owned by the Canhane community on the southern bank of the Elephants River.

**Map 6: Regional context of the Gaza-Krueger- Gonarezhou Transfrontier Park**

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Without exception, all the Mozambican protected areas have communities living inside them. The active involvement of PPF in the establishment of TFCAs in southern Africa and particular in Mozambique resulted in the adoption of the KNP conservation model where no communities are allowed inside protected areas. Therefore, the GoM was forced to look to resettlement of the communities living in Coutada 16 as a must. Katerere et al have criticised the move away from Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) where international donors have generously supported natural resource management initiatives and involved local communities in management of their resources and sheared benefits to TFCAs projects.\cite{660}

According to Katerere et al, the imperatives of donor agencies to develop natural resource management at the larger trans-border scale in the region forced African governments to throw away lessons learned in CBNRM. As a result, the adoption of a single management plan across TFCA has neglected traditional forms of natural resource management and has resulted in social disruption and displacement of people. Katerere et al also doubted fair compensation and benefits arising from the expansion of TFCA in the region.\cite{661}

Since Mozambique had no parks bordering the South African KNP and the Zimbabwean Gonarezhou Park, in early 2000, the government started working toward the transformation of Wildlife Utilization Zone or Coutada 16 into a national park. Such transformation “legally” allowed the government to demarcate the limits of the park and to limit social and economic activities within it (see Mozambique Land Law 19/97 and Forest and Wildlife Law 10/99).\cite{662} To legitimate the transformation of Coutada 16 into a national park, in 2001, the World Conservation Union (IUCN), academic institutions (Eduardo Mondlane University and University of the Witwatersrand) and private organizations (Sani/Create) undertook community hearings to capture the local communities´ perceptions and plans after the transformation of the area into a national park. The hearings awakened issues of the old resettlement programs where the local communities especially in Mavodze and Massingir Velho villages refused to move from

\cite{660} Katerere, Y., R. Hill, and S. Moyo. 2001. A critique of transboundary natural resource management
\cite{661} Katerere, Y., R. Hill, and S. Moyo. 2001. A critique of transboundary natural resource management
\cite{662} Milgroom, Jessica and Marja Spierenburg, 2008. “Induced volition”
the Elephants valley to areas located downstream of Massingir dam and chose to stay in Coutada 16 (see chapter V for more details).663

The hearings brought confusion within the local communities because the university researchers and private consultants came to discuss with the local communities their resettlement in areas outside the limits of Coutada 16 before the central and local governments had spoken about such possible resettlement. Therefore, all the possibilities announced by the researchers and consultants seemed unfounded, as the government had autonomy and authority over the resettlement process. The contradictions that existed during the consultation process for the transformation of Coutada 16 into the LNP can be blamed on lack of communication between the different actors involved in the consultation process with the communities.

i. There was no official information regarding the transformation of the area into a national park; the very few people in the park (former Coutada 16) that had such information had heard it on radios in South Africa or were informed by neighbours and not from the centres of local government;664

ii. Lack of education of the majority of representatives of communities in Coutada 16 hindered their ability to differentiate the mandates of the diverse institutions working in the resettlement program. For the local communities there was no difference between the IUCN, SUNI / CREATE, WWF, GIZ, Peace Park Foundation, the Government, Park staff managers and NGOs operating within the area.665

iii. Moreover, even after the community workshops held by the government in May 2001, June 2001, and November 2001 and attended by village administrators with the intention to “provide information to the community representatives regarding the GLTP” it seems the information did not filter down to the household level.666

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663 Interview with Germano Dimande, Maputo, 28/8/2013; see also The SANI-create hearing was commissioned by the PPF to base the LNP Management Plan – quoted by Refugee Research Programme (RRP). 2002. “A park for the people”


Despite the contradictions, which existed during the consultation process, the hearings produced useful information about the area, its people, its local resources and local management practices and possible threats to wildlife management in the future park. They also produced very important recommendation for the development of the LNP management plan which was realised in 2004. From a close analysis of the models proposed by the consultation teams it seems, however, that they were very influenced by the KNP management models and consequently little attention was given to local community options.

Due to time pressure to release the elephants from KNP, the Park authorities in Mozambique constructed a wildlife sanctuary of 35 000 hectare near Massingir Velho village to host elephants and other animals moved from the KNP to Coutada 16. In October 2001, 25 elephants were released from KNP into Mozambican territory. The construction of the 35 000-hectare wildlife sanctuary near the Massingir Velho village led the communities to believe that the park would be confined only to such an area and that they would continue in their villages.

During my fieldwork in Massingir region in 2014, I participated in one of the meetings on the arrangements for relocation of people of Machamba village to new villages on the south bank of the Elephants River. Those present at the meeting raised issues of their participation in the management of the park. It seems that focus on CBRM led the population to believe that they would not be removed from the area or at least that they would be moved to the buffer zones to have opportunities to develop small-scale business that would follow the establishment of the KNP. As I understood, the hearings conducted by IUCN staff opened the window for community participation in the natural resource management as if the park would allow them to continue to live inside it. One of the community members addressed the GIZ officer in the following terms:

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667 Interview with Germano Dimande, Maputo, 28/8/2013
669 Notes from community meeting with park staff on the arrangement for relocation in Machamba village; 25/2/2014
“When we started working in the resettlement process …prior to establishment of LNP, Massango (a former IUCN consultant, now part of LNP staff) told us about three possibilities: 1st the communities could continue in the park and contribute to the management of biodiversity; 2nd the park would erect a fence to limit the biodiversity conservation area and communities would live out of these fences; 3rd removal of communities to be resettled in other locations outside the park. At that time we told Massango that we did not want to leave and we could continue to live with the animals… we have been living with the animals since we were born…. Massango agreed with us and then he disappeared … we know that he works for you (Reference that he works for the park)... in 2002 we saw fences in Massingir Velho… we thought the problem was then solved….. No one came after such fence … now you come again to say things that we have settled in 2002.”

The relocation of 25 elephants in Coutada 16 was one of the steps toward the accomplishment of a big project, which culminated, with the establishment of the GLTP. In October 2001, a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was indicated to develop further steps to establish the park bases on regional models. Following the KNP model, the LNP was divided into three major zones: the tourism zone, the wilderness zone and support zone. The establishment of the park would lead to relocation of about 7000 people who live in the 8 villages along the Shingwedzi catchment and Elephants valley; 20000 in the buffer zone would be affected in a minor sense; these people would not leave their villages and would continue with their livelihoods in the area demarcated as resource zone.

Hearings conducted in early 2002 by the Rural Research Program of the University of the Witwatersrand found that local people did not want to leave their land and preferred to live with the animals because of their attachment to the villages where they were born, to the land of their ancestors and to sacred trees and other icons. As I explained in chapter V their continuation in the area ensured that they would continue to have access to land, water and fauna and their leaders would continue to have authority over their populations. Moreover, due to past relocation

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673 Notes from community meeting with park staff on the arrangement for relocation in Machamba village 25/2/2014
programs, local communities doubted that the promises of better services as water pumps, houses and proper compensation would be effective in the relocation areas.

The villagers were also aware that due to the lack of education of youth in the area, the job opportunities that would be created by the Park would benefit youths from other areas and not of Coutada 16. Therefore, when the Wits RRP asked the local communities “where would they go if they were forced to move,” the respondents replied that they would go to South Africa, rather than to any other place in Mozambique. Local communities preferred to return to South Africa where they have family ties and social networks that would allow them to restart their lives rather than moving to land lacking good soils for agriculture. The experiences undergone by the first 18 families moved from the Village of Nanguene and Macaveni to Banga in 2014 was specially documented and analysed by Milgroon in her PhD thesis.676

On 27th November 2001, the GoM transformed Coutada 16 into the LNP; however, there was no clarity of the future of the people who lived in former Coutada 16, now LNP.677 The transformation of the area into the LNP was also followed by measures to protect the elephants and other species. Hunting was controlled and local populations could no longer kill wild species even when these came to their villages and destroyed crops.678 The whole consultation made several recommendations about scenarios (relocation; fencing the core conservation area and living with animals). Relocation did not happen immediately after the establishment of the park because the GoM lacked resources to undertake induced resettlements and the KWF, the World Bank had not secured yet funds for the resettlement of the population of Coutada 16. While the LNP management plan was still underway, the heads of state of Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe on 9th December 2002 in Xai- Xai Mozambique signed a formal treaty establishing the GLTP. The government committed itself to continue working on the management plan which was completed only in 2004.679

676 Milgroom, Jessica. 2012. Elephants of democracy
677 Mozambique. Republic of. Decree 36/2001; 27th November. This governmental decree officially created the Limpopo National Park
With the establishment of the GLTP wildlife protection measures were enforced and there was no compensation for cattle killed by wild animals. Local communities were not initially forced to leave. However, since 2002 human and wildlife conflicts began to be a serious problem in the area and local communities were and are not allowed to kill the wild animals in any circumstance. Due to the increase of human and wildlife conflicts, it became clear that in near future all communities from the core conservation area had to be relocated in villages outside the LNP.

Following the transformation of Coutada 16 into the LNP, the park began a census to estimate population numbers and their belongings. From then onward local communities were forbidden to extend their farms or build new houses. Local people recognised that their families and sons that were still in South Africa but wished to return to Coutada 16 encountered difficulties because they could no longer (officially) clear new farms for cropping. Therefore, some youths preferred to stay definitively in South Africa. Feniasse Ngovene, an old man living in the village of Massingir Velho disappointed with successive relocations argued in the following terms:

We are people on the move … we will die while the relocations have not ended … we are originally from Ritave [Lethaba mountains] our grandparents migrated from Ritave to this area [Massingir] because they wanted fertile lands along the Elephants valley and the game…. After our arrival the Mavodzes came also… they settled near our village; we welcomed them… then the Amaveshuas [Sotho] came to steal our cattle. Our grandparents fought them and they left the area and went away….then the Portuguese came…. our fathers came to an agreement with the Portuguese that we could live in this land but obey their rules…. then Frelimo came… Frelimo said that fought the Portuguese because they were oppressors… Frelimo said then that we were independent.

Soon afterwards, Frelimo came, took our land, and fill it with water to build their bridge [probably because of the road over the dam]. Frelimo moved us to here [Coutada 16] …then came the Mapsanga [RENAMO] and its war….We ran to South Africa and some went to Tihovene and Xai-xai … the war came to an end in 1992 and we came back to our villages and continued cultivating the land …. Now Frelimo is returning with another strategy. Frelimo sold our land to south Africans to keep their animals…the Park speaks on behalf of the South Africans… it says we must leave this area to an area that we refused to go long ago [1977]… we are people on the move… others will go but I will die in this land… I don’t have the strength to build a hut or open a new farm… I am too old to be relocated again.680

680 Interview with Finiasse Sechene Valoi, Massingir Velho, 21/1/ 2014
The integration of LNP into the GLTP resulted in deep transformation of the wildlife management in southwestern Mozambique borderland and had considerable impact on the lives of the local populations. The planned business opportunities did not follow the establishment of the LNP, however; the local communities are facing restriction on the access to land and local resources. Apparently, such restrictions will continue for years because the government lack funds for relocation of the population from the core conservation area of the LNP to the new promised villages. This problem is making the process very slow and the promised investment in buffer zones is not taking place.

In April 2016, I met Finiasse Valoi in his new home in Mukatine (45 km south of the Elephant River). I interviewed Feliciano in 2012 and 2014 in the former village of Massingir Velho (45 km north of Elephants River and within the core conservation area of the LNP). Feliciano and other villagers from Massingir Velho were moved from their villages in August 2015 to Mukatine where the Park built a new village for the community of Massingir Velho. Unfortunately, some people whom I interviewed in 2012 to 2014 passed away; among them is the community leader of the Massingir Velho Village Mr. William Valoi and our guide Mr. Rafael Mbumbi. Feliciano was very depressed and unable to speak. However, regardless his opinion regarding resettlement due to the establishment of the LNP he was moved. Probably this could be his last move, but I do not think that this could be applicable to his sons and grandsons. Feliciano managed to survive the long process of resettlements, which started with his removal from the Elephants valley to upper lands in Coutada 16: then he joined the army, rebuilt his house after the conflict, and in August 2015 was moved to Mukatine.

I did not analyse in this thesis the reason why the World Bank and KFB abandoned their commitment to finance the resettlement process in the LNP. However, it is clear that during the establishment of the GLTP the key players did not take into account the differences of conservation approaches undergone since the end of the colonial period until the formal end of the Cold War. Such differences posed serious threats to the development of a common conservation model for the GLTP. On the Mozambican side, while communities are still living in the park conservation would continue to be threatened as local people would continue hunting.
for survival. Moreover, the restriction on farming practices as the opening of new plots in the LNP seems to contribute to impoverishment of the communities still living in the park.

6. Conclusion

The armed conflict in Mozambique (1976-1992) forced many people in rural areas to leave their villages and seek refuge in safer villages within the country and across national borders. During the armed conflict there was a complete shutdown of conservancy in Mozambique; the government and humanitarian agencies were active in supporting people affected by the war and drought, rather than helping local communities living within conservation areas to establish small-scale business or environmental related business.

By the mid-1990s, the GoM worked to push the economy forward and rehabilitate ecosystems destroyed by war. In 1996, the GoM with support of World Bank and other donor agencies designed a Project aimed at rehabilitating endemic ecosystems destroyed by the armed conflict as well as set a framework for the integration of Mozambique’s conservations areas located along the border into the regional TFCA initiatives. This Project became known as Mozambique Transfrontier Conservation Areas and Institutional Strengthening Project. Accordingly, in November 2000, a tri-party agreement was signed in Skukuza, South Africa, which formally created the KGK Park covering the KNP in South Africa, Coutada 16 in Mozambique and Gonarezhou Park in Zimbabwe.

In the later 2000s, South Africa and Zimbabwe were regarded as the most advanced countries in southern Africa in terms of wildlife management; KNP had no communities living inside it and had capable technical team in the field, operating with sufficient funds to enforce its regulations. The Gonarezhou Park in Zimbabwe had less capacity and fewer resources if compared to the KNP but had a highly successful Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) functioning in buffer zones and national forests. In the mid-1970s Zimbabwe had also experienced private game reserves an activities that in the post-Apartheid South Africa had great support of white rural farmers and even the government.
The implementation of the TFCA initiative in southern Africa implied countries involved in the initiative to adopt a similar platform for park management. Indeed, it seems that the model that sees inclusion of people in protected areas as harmful to conservation became dominate for the southern Africa TFCA. Until November 2000 when the first agreement was signed to establish the Gonarezou-Kruger Park, Mozambique had no parks bordering the South African KNP and the Zimbabwean Gonarezhou Park; the country had only a non-operational wildlife utilization zone known as Coutada 16.

In order to follow the regional conservation approaches for the GLTP, in later 2001, the GoM transformed Coutada 16 into LNP and thus allowing its further integration in the GLTP. Such transformation took place few years after the local population had returned from the exile and restart life in Coutada 16. Fifteen years before, the same government had agreed to move the same population from Elephants valley to upper lands just above the flood plains in Coutada 16. For these populations it is practically inacceptable that the government should now come in the name of regional agreements to force them to leave their ancestral land and move to a land that they refused to go to in 1976-77. Moreover, up to 2000 the local populations and especially the elders had undergone several voluntary and involuntary relocations processes. This and other factors explained in chapters 5 and 6 and are compromisiing the way the local communities are discussing their resettlement in villages located outside the Park. They are demanding the construction of houses and roads and social facilities (schools and hospitals) before they leave their home to the new villages.

Research work done soon after the establishment of the TFCAs in southern Africa pointed out that there is a big gap between TFCA conservation objectives and community development initiatives. It seems that TFCAs are focusing on the preservation of the fauna and linking broken natural ecosystems rather than funding community development programs. Consequently, 15 years after the inception of the GLTP, few developments had been achieved in the Mozambican where some communities are still living inside the LNP.
CONCLUSION

In the 18th century, Europeans travelled from the main ports of the Mozambique coast especially from Lourenço Marques and Inhambane to the southern Africa hinterland and established trade networks between the Indian Ocean ports and the southern Mozambique interland. Historical accounts indicate that during the 18th and 19th centuries, Africans traders supplied European traders with iron, copper, gold, tin, civet, animal skins, ostrich, marabou, crane fathers and oil seed from the eastern Transvaal in exchange for hoes, beads, rifles, gunpowder and cloth. It appears however, that ivory, rhino horns and slaves were the main commodities exchanged by Africans for European and Asian commodities.

The 18th and 19th century the ivory trade in southern Africa led to an increase of power and prestige of African elites as they were able to accumulate European commodities, rifles and ammunition. The high demand for animal products led to the professionalization of a caste of African hunters (*maphissa*) who were responsible for the killing of elephants and selling ivory to the Europeans; these professional hunters abandoned agricultural activities and were more dependent on the product of hunting to sell to European traders or exchange for grains with African cultivators.

Although oral accounts indicate that before the establishment of the Portuguese administration in the southern Mozambique hinterland (late 19th century) there were semi-nomadic communities that used hunting as a means for survival, the majority of African cultivators settled along the main rivers of the area such as the Elephants, Shingwedzi and Limpopo were sedentary and were engaged in hunting to fill the food deficit during periods of drought and crop failure. In the later 19th century the decrease of game and the ivory trade in southern Mozambique pushed the professional hunters to move to areas where game could still to be found; existing sources (both written and oral) acknowledge that some of these hunters settled in the south western Mozambique borderland and some settled in the Transvaal.
In 1895-6, the Portuguese came to dominate the southern Mozambique hinterland and established administrative structures to take control over the people and local resources. Owing to the fact that the colonial districts of Guijá and Alto Limpopo are arid they received little investment for development for white settlement and agro-industrial projects; the Portuguese relegated the areas to hunting frontiers and local communities remained in their villages. In 1903, the Lourenço Marques district administration introduced hunting regulations and obliged hunters to pay fees to hunt in forests located near the city of Lourenço Marques and surroundings. In the same year, they established the Lourenço Marques Game Board, which had the responsibility of issuing hunting licences and supervising hunting activities. In the following year (1904) the district government of Inhambane also issued hunting regulations. In practice, the Lourenço Marques and Inhambane hunting regulations were aimed at banning African hunting techniques (nets and fires) and restricting Africans access to big game and establish control of hunting by Europeans.

In 1906, the Portuguese unified the hunting regulations of Inhambane and Lourenço Marques districts and issued a hunting regulation for the Sul de Save Province. In 1909, they created the Mozambique Game Board (Comissão de Caça de Moçambique) to supervise hunting nationwide and issue advice to the institutions working on fauna protection for the establishment of game reserves; they also supervised the opening of hunting seasons and proposed changes to improve game regulations and hunting practices. However, since the CCM was concerned with sports and commercial hunting rather than pure conservation objectives, it put little effort into the preservation of fauna but facilitated hunting by its members in the Mozambican forests. The CCM also influenced the Portuguese administration in Mozambique to look to hunting regulations as a way to protect fauna. Consequently, during the colonial period the government relied on game regulations (1910, 1932, 1936, 1941, 1944, 1951 and 1956) to regulate hunting. However, almost all hunting regulations issued by the colonial administration did not meet the specific needs for better management of wildlife in the Sul de Save Province. Moreover, the government lacked staff for the supervision of hunting activities.
Although one of the responsibilities of the CCM was to map areas for the establishment of hunting reserves, until late 1910 no hunting reserves were established in southern Mozambique. Since game could be found near the major coastal towns of Lourenço Marques and Inhambane, the game board put much emphasis on issuing hunting regulations that allowed its members to continue hunting and to enable the government to collect revenues to pay its activities and staff rather than initiate work on projects to establish parks and hunting reserves for the protection of fauna.

In 1926, the South African authorities created the KNP along the east Transvaal and Mozambique border. Since then, the South African authorities and the KNP board became concerned with best management practices for the preservation of wildlife along the South Africa and Mozambique border. They demanded that the Portuguese establish a national park in Mozambique contiguous to the KNP. The requests were repeatedly denied by the Portuguese who claimed the existence on the Mozambican side of a high number of African settlements with cultivators devoted to agriculture and cattle keeping.

In the later 1910s, game started to become scarce in forests located near the town of Lourenço Marques. As a result, the CCM started working on the identification of areas to establish hunting reserves. In the early 1920s, it requested the Governor of Gaza district to establish two hunting reserves; the first would be located on the north bank of the Shingwedzi River and the second in the Massingir region on the south bank of the Elephants River. Due to the existence of a considerable numbers of African villages on the south bank of the Elephants River, the government did not establish a hunting reserve in that area, but in April 1930 it transformed the state reserve located north of the Elephants River into the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve (known in some of the literature as Guijá or Pafuri Game Reserve).

Despite the establishment of the reserve, no measures were undertaken to relocate the local populations in areas located outside the reserve. The local population continued living in the reserve despite all threats that hunting represented to their lives and to the preservation of ecosystems and fauna; Africans continued relying on rain fed agriculture, cattle keeping and
during periods of drought and lack of foodstuffs, they continued to rely on bush meat. Existing archival information has pointed out that the presence of local communities within the hunting reserves of southern Mozambique made the control of hunting very difficult because local communities could remain hunting in the local forests even without licences.

In the 1930s, there were political changes in Portugal, which prompted other changes in the economy and society in Mozambique. António de Oliveira Salazar, a Portuguese economist who became the Prime Minister of Portugal in 1931, introduced radical changes in Portugal’s economic policies and in its overseas territories. Salazar was against high investment in the Portuguese colonies but rather envisioned a highly disciplined labour regime requiring little capital investment. In southern Mozambique, he used three strategies to exploit the local resources and the populations: i) collection of hut taxes; ii) export of labour force to the South African mining industry; iii) production of raw materials, specifically cotton, to feed the emerging Portuguese textile sector.

The Salazar administration in Mozambique also increased the hut tax from about 200 escudos in 1942 to 250 escudos in 1949; this increase in Guijá and Alto Limpopo pushed Africans to look for alternative sources of income to pay the taxes. As demonstrated in the dissertation, labour migration to Skukuza and other place in South Africa became the main strategy used by Africans to earn some cash. Labour migration in the colonial districts of Guijá and Alto Limpopo had an impact on the local economy, society and hunting. Besides the money that migrants brought to pay the hut taxes and bride price, and to buy useful commodities for their families, migrants were responsible for the introduction of ploughs, which contributed to the increase of farming areas and productivity; the migrants also brought from South Africa gunpowder and iron traps used for hunting.

From 1930s to later 1950s, Portugal increased publicity on the existence of fauna in Mozambique. The publicity resulted in the increase of number of people (nationals and foreigners) who applied for hunting permits to hunt in the Mozambican forests and hunting reserves. Lack of staff to control hunting and hunting regulations, which did not fit into the local
contexts, resulted in extermination of much of the fauna. In the later 1930s, Mozambican ecologists, wildlife organizations, and South Africans institutions systematically denounced the extermination of fauna in Mozambique and particularly along the South African-Mozambique border and requested that the Portuguese government improve measures to protect the fauna. Existing archival information indicates that the South African government through the KNP board allowed the colonial government in Mozambique to send veterinarian staff to the KNP to learn about their conservation practices to further their use in the management of fauna in Mozambique. Despite such help, it seems however, that the Portuguese authorities expended very little efforts to improve wildlife management in southern Mozambique.

During the 1940s to the late 1960s, the obstacles to protection of fauna in the Mozambican hunting reserves and particularly in the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve remained the lack of qualified staff to undertake the supervision of the reserve and lack of inter-institutional communication mechanisms. Thus, lack of supervision allowed “illegal hunters” to take control of the hunting reserves and hunt outside limits imposed by the regulations. Most often, European hunters hired Africans to assist them or hunt on their behalf; as compensation, they offered to Africans money, alcohol, rifles and ammunition. During this period, the existence of rural shops known in Portuguese literature as cantinas at Mavodze village, within the reserve, where Africans could sell the products of hunting was one of the motivations for hunting by Africans in the area.

Apart from the problems examined above, in the 1930s and 1950s, the Sul de Save Province was also affected by animal diseases with a disastrous impact on cattle and fauna. In 1938, the outbreak of foot and mouth disease resulted in restrictions in the trade of wood and animal products between South Africa and Mozambique. It is also known that in the later 1930s the South African authorities restricted the use of waterholes in the KNP by cattle belonging to herdsmen of border villages in Mozambique. The restriction was made to avoid contamination of water sources and infection of fauna in KNP by cattle from Mozambique. Although the origins of the disease is an issue that needs further investigation, it is known that soon after the outbreak
of the disease the South African authorities started the construction of fences in some sections of the South Africa and Mozambique border.

In the later 1950s, wild stock in southern Mozambique region was again devastated by *G. Morsitans* with disastrous consequences for cattle. The Portuguese authorities of the Sul de Save Province tried to control the advance of the tsetse from central to southern Mozambique by introducing mass killing of fauna along the Limpopo River and Save River corridor. However, lack of human and financial resources hindered the control of the disease. In the mid-1950s, some villages along the Limpopo-Maxila-Massagena corridor north of Limpopo River were devastated by the tsetse fly with considerable cattle loss.

Despite the fact that the game sweeps program did not achieve its objectives (control of tsetse), it resulted in mass killing of fauna north of the Limpopo River to the south bank of Save River. In the later 1950s and early 1960s, conservationists, professional hunters and wildlife organizations condemned the use of game sweeps to combat the tsetse fly; they argued that Portugal had to work more seriously on the protection of fauna and create parks and game reserves into which wild stock would be driven to avoid its contact with cattle. Thus, it would be in such protected areas that the government would put its effort into the control of fauna, and eventually eliminate fauna outside the reserve so as to clear the land for agriculture and cattle keeping.

To appease the criticisms of mismanagement of fauna in the hunting reserves, in 1961, the Portuguese rushed to transform the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve into a Safari Game Reserve known in Portuguese as Coutada 16. This change was made to allow safari companies to apply for the management of the area and introduce effective measures to protect the game; however, very few improvements were made in Coutada 16 and the problems remained the high number of people living in the hunting reserve, lack of touristic infrastructure and lack of staff to enforce the hunting regulations.
From interviews conducted with local communities in Massingir region, in the late 1960s, the Portuguese administration in the colonial district of Guijá hired some scouts locally known as *mbocotanas* to supervise the area. The *mbocotanas* travelled from one village to another looking for signs of hunting; villagers found with bush meat and animal skins were taken to the administration where they were beaten or imprisoned and subjected to hard labour for the administration.

In 1972, the colonial government started building the Massingir dam to control the flow of water along the Elephants River and thus enhance development of irrigation schemes in Massingir and Lower Limpopo regions. Accordingly, the colonial government planned to use the construction of the dam to resettle families living along the Elephants valley (the area designated for the reservoir) in areas located at the confluence of Shingwedzi and Elephants River. After independence, the Frelimo government relocated the population from the Elephants valley to poor lands in Coutada 16. This relocation resulted in the decrease of the local families’ agricultural yields; thus, hunting for food became a means of survival of many households. Moreover, the opening of family and communal farms in Coutada 16 increased destruction of local ecosystems.

The already fragile situation of local ecosystems and wildlife was worsened by the government’s replacement of traditional authorities by *chefes* and *secretários* loyal to Frelimo party. The removal of traditional leaders who were the effective managers of local natural resources left a vacuum resulting in anarchy in the management of local natural resources, and the area witnessed further destruction of wildlife and fauna. This situation became worse from 1984 to 1992 when armed conflict forced the inhabitants of Coutada 16 to seek refuge in safer villages within and across national borders, leaving the natural resources to their own fate. Far from the control of governmental institutions, the armies fed on local fauna and illegal hunters exterminated the fauna.
The end of armed conflict in 1992 allowed hundreds of thousands of those displaced to return to their home villages to rebuild their lives. The resettlement of the Mozambican refugees in Coutada 16 became a concern of the KNP board which feared that in times of crop failure the populations would enter KNP territory for hunting. The establishment of a transnational park across the two countries would allow the South African authorities to monitor preservation of fauna along the common border. Moreover, it would allow the South African authorities to relocate in Coutada 16 the excess elephant population of the KNP, which were considered to contribute to the degrading of the environment.

From 1990, the two governments worked together to design programs to improve wildlife management along the common border. The efforts included training of the Mozambican staff in the KNP facilities and surveys conducted by KNP staff to examine the potentialities of some conservation areas in southern Mozambique (research in Coutada 16, Banhine and Zinave). In 1996, these areas were included in the World Bank funded project known as Mozambique Trans-frontier Conservation Area and Strengthening Project. Besides allowing for capacity building within the Mozambican National Directorate of Forest and Wildlife, the Project set the basis for the establishment in 2000 of the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou Park, which in 2002 was transformed into GLTP.

Initially, the TFCA initiatives were aimed at creating synergies between poverty alleviation programs, community development and wildlife conservation. However due to regional agreements, Mozambique followed conservation approaches practised in South Africa and Zimbabwe where communities are not allowed in conservation areas. In later 2001, the GoM transformed Coutada 16 into LNP and in 2002, the area became part of the GLTP.

The transformation of Coutada 16 into LNP and its further integration into GLTP turned into reality the Hertzog’s 1927 ambition of creating a cross-border park across South Africa and Mozambique; the integration of the LNP into the GLTP meant that the GoM had to restrict social and economic activities within the park and relocate the local communities in areas outside it. Now the concern of the inhabitants of Coutada 16 is the availability of land in the resettlement
areas for development of agriculture and pasture for their cattle. In 1977-8, the GoM failed to secure infrastructure in the resettlement areas (Chibotana and Marrenguele) and thus local population preferred to move from Elephants valley to Coutada 16. Due to their experiences, people fear that some of the government promises will never be accomplished.
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APPENDIXES
De harmonia com os preceitos determinados por S. Ex, o Governador-Geral, que são objecto da Circular da Repartição de Gabinete n.º 1.718/A-18-B), de 29 de Agosto de 1951, faz-se público que até ao dia 17 do corrente se recebem requerimentos, para admissão de um fiscal de caça substituto assalariado, para prestar serviço pelo prazo de 5 meses, na Região do Alto Limpopo, com o vencimento-base de 2.500$, acrescido das melhorias legais.

São condições necessárias para admissão:
1.º Conhecer bem a região do Alto Limpopo;
2.º Ter carta de ligeiros e pesados com mais de 4 anos;
3.º Ter mais de 25 anos de idade e menos de 35.
4.º Os concorrentes deverão indicar no requerimento os encargos de família e outros.

Document 2: Application for hunting license

[Image of the document]
Document 3: Receipt of application for hunting license
Document 4: Hunting license books (1st and 2nd Classes)
Document 5: Pages of the hunter’s license book used to list the slaughtered animals Mozambique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Día</th>
<th>Mes</th>
<th>Localidade</th>
<th>Cabeça</th>
<th>Pés</th>
<th>Tronco</th>
<th>Rodas</th>
<th>Coluna</th>
<th>Etc.</th>
<th>Larga</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Registro de coisas mortas durante o ano de 19...
Document 6: License for carrying and use of firearms (hunting purposes)
Document 7: License for carrying and use of firearms (self-defence purposes)