SOUTH AFRICA’S DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: BUILDING CONSENSUS AMONGST DISSENSION.

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a Master of Arts degree

By:
Claire Hurst (607280)

Supervisor:
Dr. Michelle Small

February 2018
Declaration

I declare that I have written the following research report, and have not used sources or means without declaration in the text. Any thoughts from others or literal quotations are clearly marked. This research report has not been previously accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree. Written permission to include research interviews conducted by Mr Christopher Williams whilst co-writing an academic paper for the South African Historical Journal was granted, and accompanies this research report.

Claire Hurst
607280

February 2018
Acknowledgments

Thank you to Ronel Jansen van Vuuren at DIRCO, and Mosanku Maamoe at Fort Hare University’s Liberation Archives for the retrieval of the archival documentation, and to Hung-ting Teng at Wits Language School for translating the memoirs of Loh I-Cheng from Mandarin to English.

Many thanks to Eleanora, on behalf of Mr. Shapiro, for granting permission to include the Zapiro cartoon, and to Mr. Scott and Mr. Mboni at the SABC Media Libraries and SABC News Agency, respectively, for their help in locating footage relating to the switch in recognition.

My sincere thanks to my supervisor, Dr. Michelle Small, for her continuous guidance, support and encouragement not only during the writing of this research report but throughout my time at Wits University.

This research report benefitted enormously from the research conducted with Christopher Williams during the writing of our paper ‘Caught Between Two Chinas: Assessing South Africa’s Switch from Taipei to Beijing’, soon-to-be published by the South African Historical Journal. The interviewees, Iaan Basson, PJ Botha, Pierre Dietrichsen, the late Leo ‘Rusty’ Evans, Nina Karen Human, Pallo Jordan, Aziz Pahad, Max Sisulu, and Zola Skweyiya provided significant insight into this foreign policy decision, and we are extremely appreciative of their time. The access to their interviews, conducted by Chris, has been invaluable, as was the opportunity to sit in on some of the interviews. I am incredibly grateful for the chance to have worked with Chris and for his mentorship over the last two years. Thank you!

Lastly, to my Mum, thank you for everything.
Abstract

The following research report is an analysis of the diplomatic history paradigm of South Africa’s switch in diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China in November 1996. Previously classified documentation from the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, and the African National Congress’ Liberation Archives at Fort Hare University, and with interviews with former ANC/National Executive Committee members and Department of Foreign Affairs officials, along with the inclusion of the memoirs of the former ROC and PRC ambassadors at the time of the switch, provide valuable insight into the timing of the announcement and the factors that prompted the decision. This research aims to aid our understanding of the foreign policy decision making process under the Mandela administration.

Keywords: Archival research, the African National Congress (ANC), chequebook diplomacy, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), diplomatic recognition, dual recognition, foreign policy analysis, the Mandela administration, the National Executive Committee (NEC), One China principle, South African foreign policy decision making.
# Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPM</td>
<td>Bureaucratic Politics Model</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
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<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Department of International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation (formally the DFA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTI</td>
<td>Department of Trade and Industry</td>
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<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
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<td>FPDM</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Decision Making.</td>
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<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFN</td>
<td>Most Favoured Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>Umkhonto we Sizwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>MKMCA</td>
<td>Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans’ Association</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Executive Committee (of the ANC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIEO</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity (now the African Union, or the AU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAIA</td>
<td>Promotion of Access to Information Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China</td>
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<td>SAA</td>
<td>South African Airways</td>
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<td>SABC</td>
<td>South African Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFH</td>
<td>University of Fort Hare</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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Players List

The individuals mentioned in this Research Report and their respective positions at the time of the issue of diplomatic recognition.

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<thead>
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<tr>
<td>Danny Jordaan</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pallo Jordan</td>
<td>Minister of Posts and Telecommunications and a member of the NEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.B. Marks</td>
<td>Chairman of the SACP, and member of the ANC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson Mandela</td>
<td>President of South Africa. Some quotations and interviews refer to him as ‘Madiba’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jerry Matsila</td>
<td>ANC’s representative in East Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thabo Mbeki</td>
<td>Director of the ANC’s DIA, and then Deputy President of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raymond Mhlaba</td>
<td>Commanded the ANC’s armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, and member of both the ANC and the SACP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joe Modise</td>
<td>Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popo Molefe</td>
<td>Premier of the Northwest Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edna Molewa</td>
<td>MP - Chair of the portfolio committee on trade and industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blade Nzimande</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Nzo</td>
<td>Foreign Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essop Pahad</td>
<td>Former head of International Affairs of the SACP, and member of the ANC. After 1994, he served as the Parliamentary Counsellor to Thabo Mbeki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyril Ramaphosa</td>
<td>Secretary General of the ANC, and chairperson of the GNU’s Constitutional Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zola Skweyiya</td>
<td>Minister of Public Service and Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joe Slovo</td>
<td>Head of the SACP, and member of the NEC. Also the Minister of Housing in the GNU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Sisulu</td>
<td>One of the leaders of the ANC Youth League who went on to become Secretary-General and then Deputy President of the ANC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Max Sisulu</td>
<td>MP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Raymond Suttner</td>
<td>MP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oliver Tambo</td>
<td>President of the ANC from 1967 to 1991</td>
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### DFA Officials and Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title and Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PJ Botha</td>
<td>South Africa’s Ambassador to Singapore, also helped set up the South Africa Study Centre in the PRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Dietrichsen</td>
<td>Director of Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nina Human</td>
<td>Researcher on the Asia Desk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les Labuschagne</td>
<td>Head of South Africa’s Mission/Study Centre in Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aziz Pahad</td>
<td>Deputy Head of the DIA and then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leo (Rusty) Evans</td>
<td>Director-General of the DFA</td>
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### ROC Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lien Chan</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frederick Chien</td>
<td>Foreign Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hsu Li-Tech</td>
<td>Vice-Premier</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-Cheng Loh</td>
<td>Ambassador to South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Lee Teng-Hui</td>
<td>President of the ROC</td>
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</table>

### PRC Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title and Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ji Peiding</td>
<td>Director of the PRC’s South African Study Centre in Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qian Qichen</td>
<td>Foreign Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xie Gutong</td>
<td>Director of the Centre for Chinese Studies in Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madame Wu Yi</td>
<td>Head of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Jiang Zemin</td>
<td>President of the PRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xie Zhiheng</td>
<td>Director of the Centre for Chinese Studies in Pretoria (replaced Gutong).</td>
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Introduction

South Africa’s ‘two China’ Dilemma

In 1994, the newly democratic South African government, under the Mandela administration, inherited trade and investment ties with both the ROC and the PRC yet held diplomatic relations with only the ROC.\(^1\) Whilst the ROC respected the PRC’s ardent belief that Taiwan formed part of the PRC, the ROC advocated for two governments, or sovereign authorities. This was juxtaposed against the PRC continued insistence of the One China principle\(^2\) or ‘one China, two systems’, particularly as the international system increasingly accepted the PRC as the ‘legitimate’ China. This presented a dilemma to the new dispensation as they grappled with how to continue their relations with the ROC all the while improving their ties with the PRC. This was coupled with balancing their domestic challenges with the hopes of re-emerging as an international player after years of being regarded as a ‘pariah’ nation given the atrocities of the apartheid government. The PRC had no objection to South Africa continuing non-official relations with the ROC, and likewise had not objected to trade relations between South Africa and the ROC.\(^3\) What the PRC did take exception to was South Africa’s pursuance of establishing diplomatic relations with both the ROC and the PRC, a so-called ‘dual recognition’, and began to place increasing pressure on South Africa, often through a ‘carrot and stick’ approach,\(^4\) to downgrade its official relations with the ROC and recognise the PRC as the exclusive representative of China.

Between 1993 and 1996, policy-makers, scholars, and journalists alike afforded a great deal of attention to the issue of South Africa’s ‘two China dilemma’, debating when South Africa would formally downgrade diplomatic relations with the ROC and enter into full diplomatic relations of the PRC. The uncertainty surrounding the dilemma was fuelled by conflicting high-level delegations to both the ROC and the PRC, and reciprocated visits from Taiwanese and Chinese officials. Furthermore, President Nelson Mandela made multiple contradictory

\(^1\) The specifics of said trade and investment ties are explored in greater detail in the literature review. For
\(^2\) This will be discussed more rigorously in the literature review.
\(^4\) These approaches will become evident as the research report analyses the archival documentation and interviews. In particular, Chapter Four devotes attention to the impact of Chinese diplomacy in this case study.
statements on the recognition dilemma, often reassuring reporters that South Africa would not sever diplomatic ties with the ROC because doing so would be “immoral”.\(^5\) One such reassurance came at the end of August 1996. However, less than three months later, on the 27th November 1996, President Mandela announced that South Africa would be severing its diplomatic ties with the ROC, and would establish official diplomatic relations with the PRC from 1 January 1998.\(^6\)

The switch in recognition, whilst not unexpected, did cause confusion especially in relation to the apparent sudden timing.\(^7\) Until now, the timing and decision making process of the decision have only been speculated. There has been an absence of evidentiary documentation that illuminates the sequence of events, the decision making process, the key actors, especially the role of the NEC,\(^8\) and why the switch was announced, seemingly abruptly, on the 27th November 1996. A major reason for this absence is due to the classification of documentation pertaining to South Africa’s foreign policy recognising the PRC. The year 2016 marked the 20\(^{th}\) anniversary of the announcement of the switch, and under South Africa’s Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA), classified documentation that has passed a twenty-year classification period is made available to the public.\(^9\) Thus, the acquirement of over 400 pages of never-before-seen, utilised or cited documentation from the archives of DIRCO and Fort Hare afford this research report an opportunity to fully analyse and understand how the decision was reached. The ‘switch’ has been deemed one of democratic South Africa’s first substantive foreign policy decisions,\(^10\) and its importance in understanding how decision making occurred under the ANC and Mandela administration cannot be overlooked.

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\(^6\) Department of International Relations and Cooperation Archives (hereafter DIRCO), Folder 1/24/3, Office of the President, Media Release Attention: All Editors. ‘South Africa’s Relations with the Greater China Region’, 27 November 1996.


Aside from the decision’s importance in post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy, China has become South Africa’s largest trading partner, and as such, its position as a critically strategic and economic partner of South Africa cannot be understated or separated from its political significance to our country. In order to understand the dynamics of this relationship we need to understand the origins, and how and why South Africa decided to diplomatically recognise the PRC. This research report thus aims to reveal previously underappreciated or neglected factors that influenced this foreign policy decision, some of which continue to shape the dynamics of the current relationship. Moreover, Nelson Mandela’s role in the foreign policy decision making process during his Presidency has often been relegated to the periphery and very little in-depth analysis of his involvement has occurred. This research report aims to address that and to show that whilst this was ultimately a process of collective decision making, his belief in the possibility of South Africa being able to attain dual recognition of both Chinas directly impacted the timing of the switch.

The research report will commence with Chapter One’s overview of the literature, including the knowledge gaps and potential knowledge gains, the main research question and subsidiary questions, and the research methodology and data collection. Chapter Two will engage with the theories, chiefly foreign policy decision making models, and elite theory, highlighting limitations in adequately applying these models and theories to the diplomatic history and foreign policy decision making of South Africa’s ‘switch’. Chapter Three will serve as the focal point of this research report, that being South Africa’s China Decision. The utilisation of archival documentation and interviews aims to create a narrative that reveals just how consensus was built amongst dissension. Chapter Four will discuss the impact ‘Chinese diplomacy’ had on the decision making process, through the memoirs of Qichen Qian and Loh I-Cheng, and Chinese media articles from the time. The Conclusion provides a summation of the decision, discussed in congruence with the various implications of this research as we celebrate the 20th anniversary of diplomatic relations.

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Given the apartheid government’s ties with the ROC, upon the ANC’s election as the ruling political party in South Africa in 1994 it was anticipated that a diplomatic switch to the PRC would occur momentarily. This did not happen, and as 1996 progressed and South Africa was nearing its third year without an official announcement, there was confusion as to why South Africa had not severed its diplomatic ties with the ROC. This perplexity was exacerbated by the increased awareness that President Mandela was attempting to achieve what no other country had – dual recognition of both Chinas. Literature from the time indicates that whilst it had become apparent that the recognition of the PRC was inevitable, scholars and journalists alike diverged on the viability of the PRC accepting South Africa’s pursuance of dual recognition.

The Viability of Dual Recognition?

Within the literature, there are some who believe that South Africa was capable of pursuing a balancing act between the rivals on either side of the Taiwan Strait. Their arguments for dual recognition centred around accounts of Taiwan’s purported economic importance to South Africa whereby the ROC had contributed to both the monetary and non-monetary sectors of the economy. In particular, Daniel (1995) surmised:

As a developing, capital-importing economy, the PRC cannot match this type and level of involvement in the South African economy…individuals in banking and business circles maintain that South Africa’s short-term economic interests would be damaged by a change in its diplomatic position over China.

However, figures accompanying these claims related solely to the ROC, and not the PRC, limiting comparisons and undermining the validity of their argument.


14 In contrast, Havenga (1995) provided a much more balanced economic perspective that concluded the PRC’s growing economic importance to South Africa, which will be referred to in more detail further on in this
In addition to this economically-based argument, other factors given by those who were adamant that dual recognition was achievable included references to the PRC’s human rights record.\textsuperscript{15} Given the ‘new’ South Africa’s emphasis on human rights in the post-apartheid era, and the Constitution and Bill of Rights that was being drafted at the time, the issue of potentially recognising Beijing included debates regarding “power versus principle” and South Africa’s “national interest”.\textsuperscript{16} Likewise, the ANC’s electoral manifesto had included emphasis on human rights and democracy as the basis of South Africa’s foreign policy going forward.

Another factor was the notion of ‘South African exceptionalism’.\textsuperscript{17} Breytenbach (1994) and Geldenhuys (1995), especially, argued that President Mandela should use his “unique prestige” in the international realm in order to achieve dual recognition.\textsuperscript{18} Mandela was regarded as a leader that acted in benevolent, measured ways. Thus, his initial insistence on achieving a ‘two-China policy’ was not uncharacteristic, in fact, it rather affirmed the type of thinking he was renowned for, later referred to as ‘Madiba Magic’. The belief that if anyone could succeed in acquiring the PRC’s acceptance of dual recognition, it would be Mandela, was further propelled with the knowledge that he favoured dual recognition.\textsuperscript{19}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}

\bibitem{Mills1995} Supposedly, the issue of human rights was placated with reassurances that “these and other issues would have to wait for the establishment of full relations.” See G. Mills, "The case for exclusive recognition." \textit{South Africa and the Two Chinas dilemma}, ed. by SAIIA Research Group (Johannesburg: SAIIA and Foundation for Global Dialogue, 1995), 255.


\bibitem{Lazarus2004} For a more thorough analysis of the notion of ‘South African exceptionalism’ see N. Lazarus, "The South African ideology: The myth of exceptionalism, the idea of renaissance." \textit{The South Atlantic Quarterly} 103, no. 4 (2004), 607-628.


\bibitem{Spence1996} Some scholars concluded that comments made by Mandela indicated his loyalty to the ROC, and thus the need to pursue dual recognition. These comments were vis-à-vis the investments given to the ANC by the ROC for the 1994 election campaign, see J. Spence, "The debate over South Africa's foreign policy." \textit{South African Journal of International Affairs}, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 (1996), 118-125. Other examples of Mandela’s assurances to retain relations with the ROC include Sapa-Reuter, ‘Mandela Reafirms Ties with Taiwan,’ \textit{The Star}, 25 April 1995, Sapa-AFP, ‘Taiwan Connection: Still Firm Friends,’ \textit{The Daily News}, 4 July 1996, and SAPA-AFP, “Taiwan Gratified by SA’s Stance,” \textit{The Citizen}, 28 August 1996.
\end{thebibliography}
This view of South Africa’s supposed “special status” seemed to confuse South Africa’s international standing and popularity at the time with “its relatively insignificant economic and political power in the world”. Some scholars recognised this and cautioned against propelling this “exceptionalism”. This was uncomfortably emphasised during President Nelson Mandela’s visit to England in July 1996, when meetings with the UK business community ultimately demonstrated that South Africa “should no longer rely on reputation alone as a guarantee of international goodwill and investor confidence”. Those that were sceptical, and more realistic about the prospects of dual recognition, regarded the psychology of this argument as the height of hubris. Indeed, whilst dual recognition would have been ideal, the arguments above were fundamentally flawed in how they overestimated South Africa’s clout and simultaneously underestimated the PRC’s unwavering stance on dual recognition.

The Inevitability of Exclusive Recognition of the PRC

The majority of scholars and journalists understood that the PRC would not entertain dual recognition. Beijing viewed, and continues to view itself as the sole legitimate government of all of China, and Taiwan as a renegade province. Grant (1995) elaborated on this, explaining that it came to “the question of national unity and territorial integrity on which China will never compromise at any cost”. This emphasis on adhering to PRC’s refusal to compromise or tolerate a dual recognition policy is explored further in Barber

25 Additionally, by 1995, there was far greater diplomatic recognition and support for the PRC internationally, with 159 states recognising China, in comparison to the 29 that recognised Taiwan.
(2004), where it is explained how Beijing made it quite clear that “there was only one China: the PRC” and that “Taiwan was part of it and would in time be fully re-integrated into it.”27 The PRC’s insistence on its official recognition was further reiterated when it severed ties with Burkina Faso, Nicaragua, Grenada, Gambia, and Senegal when they tried to retain diplomatic relations with both the PRC and the ROC.28 Every state in the international system had to make a choice between recognising the PRC or the ROC. Thus, whilst dual recognition may have been preferred, it was ultimately not an option that the PRC would agree to.

Apart from the PRC’s view on dual recognition, the issue of international pressure was central to arguments in favour of exclusive recognition of the ROC. Prior to the ending of apartheid, South Africa and Taiwan had found common-ground in international isolation, both being labelled as ‘pariah states’. However, with the ending of apartheid and the emergence of a democratic South Africa, South Africa’s foreign policy placed great emphasis on the importance of re-entering the international realm. This emphasis was regarded as South Africa pursuing a foreign policy that “fundamentally cleaves to the neo-liberal international consensus on the structure of the international system”.29 Consequently, the PRC’s ‘veto’ power as one of the permanent five in the UN’s Security Council was argued to have affected South Africa’s decision, given the realisation that South Africa could not afford to not recognise and establish diplomatic ties with the PRC because of South Africa’s hopes of obtaining a seat in the UN Security Council. South Africa thus required the support of the PRC, support that the PRC had made clear was contingent on South Africa abandoning any ideas of a ‘two China policy’.30

Aside from the PRC being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it was recognised by the OAU, the Commonwealth and the NAM. Additionally, in 1995, the PRC

was a member of most international multilateral organisations to which South Africa belonged, including the IAEA and other “specialised agencies”. Consequently, it was seen as contradictory for South Africa to belong to these international bodies without officially recognising the PRC, yet still maintaining ties with the ROC and claiming to be in pursuit of dual recognition, which to the PRC equated to ‘no recognition’. Thus, dual recognition was ultimately not an option that would be in the overall interest of South Africa’s desire to increase its international standing in the post-apartheid era.

In addition to the PRC’s stance on dual recognition and the role of international pressure, the economic prospectus of the PRC was argued by scholars to be an important factor in recognising the PRC. In 1995, the ROC was South Africa’s greater trading partner, as indicated in the table below, accounting for 3.1% of South Africa’s total trade in comparison with the PRC’s 1.3%. However, when the fact that the PRC had a greater population size and an economy larger than the ROC, along with the figures indicating the trade growth between South Africa and the PRC between 1989 and 1994, it was clear that trade with the PRC had grown significantly faster than with the ROC.

| South African Trade with the ROC, PRC, and Hong Kong (1994) |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Imports (Rm) | Exports (Rm) | Total Trade (Rm) | % of Total Imports | % of Total Exports | % of Total Trade |
| ROC | 2,573 | 1,704 | 4,277 | 3.5 | 2.7 | 3.1 |
| PRC | 1,268 | 516 | 1,784 | 1.7 | 0.8 | 1.3 |
| Hong Kong | 1,448 | 1,514 | 2,962 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 2.2 |

Furthermore, when figures were examined in conjunction with trade with Hong Kong, the trading totals exceeded that of the ROC. This was important given Hong Kong’s imminent


33 This table has been compiled using the data presented in Havenga (1995). Havenga’s data was compiled using trade data captured by the SACU between 1989 to 1994. Whilst the combined trade figures of Hong Kong and the PRC did provide an indication of their potential importance to South Africa (over that of the ROC), Havenga did note that in doing so, three important factors are neglected – “First, many people have left Hong Kong over the last few years and many more may still leave, taking with them valuable skills. Secondly, Hong Kong produces various goods such as toys, clothes and electronic equipment that are also made in the PRC. This could lead to strong-inter-firm rivalry after unification. Finally, Hong Kong serves as a conduit for large volumes of trade between the ROC and the PRC. Such re-exports may distort the picture if the PRC and Hong Kong are simply aggregated. The effect of unification is therefore still unclear.”, 46.

34 Rm indicates South African Rands in millions.
return to Chinese sovereignty in July 1997. The PRC had stressed that the status quo would not continue for countries that traded with Hong Kong but did not have full diplomatic recognition with the PRC, incentivising South Africa to establish exclusive diplomatic relations with the PRC “sooner rather than later”. Aside from Hong Kong’s long-standing trade links with South Africa, South African Airways had landing rights in Hong Kong, and had used Hong Kong as a fuelling point during flights to various countries in Asia. Some scholars predicted that if South Africa did not recognise the PRC, the fallout would not only include trade being prohibited with Hong Kong, but could also include striping South African Airways of its landing rights in Hong Kong.35

Additionally, Mills (1995) and Alden (1997) both mention Thabo Mbeki’s imminent succession as President of South Africa as a factor in delaying the switch. Whilst not explored in great detail in the literature, they argued that delaying the “inevitable” switch would make things more difficult for Mbeki, as he would then have to announce the China decision. By settling the China question before 1999, President Mandela “would himself assume responsibility” so that Mbeki “would not be burdened by this difficult problem”.36 Moreover, Cornish (1997) explained that at the time of the debates regarding the issue of recognition, and the accompanying diplomatic ‘tug-of-war’, Mandela had already begun discussions with Mbeki about the handing over of the governance of the country. At the same time, Mbeki had avoided visits to the ROC, whilst also refraining from publicly commenting on the issue of recognition, “indicating that he was not planning to support the diplomatic status quo of the time”.37 Mandela hoped to succeed in obtaining dual recognition whilst Mbeki knew that the PRC would never accept this.

**Knowledge Gaps and Potential Knowledge Gains**

Whilst the above overview of the literature indicates that previous authors have competently examined the switch through the myriad of factors thought to have contributed to the decision, they were predominately based on available secondary sources. There has been very little primary evidence regarding the decision making process and the sequence of events vis-à-vis the key actors who controlled ‘the switch’ decision. In particular, there has been an

absence of knowledge regarding the high-level exchange and communication that occurred in and amongst South Africa’s executive branch, the DFA, the ANC, and in particular the NEC. By analysing the archival documentation acquired from DIRCO and the ANC archives at Fort Hare, and by including excerpts from interviews with former DFA officials and NEC officials, this research report aims to provide a diplomatic history of the switch in recognition, and in doing so, fill these knowledge gaps.

For the most part, the literature has also neglected an incorporation of Chinese and Taiwanese sources. There is very little cited in the way of publications produced in the PRC and the ROC. The acquisition of the memoirs of both PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and ROC Ambassador Loh I-Cheng will aid in greater inclusion of Taiwanese and Chinese perspectives, respectively, especially concerning the nature of ‘Chinese diplomacy’. The addition of Gary Lin’s thesis is an important contribution on the subject of the switch in diplomatic recognition given that Mr. Lin was working at the Taiwan Liaison Office Archives in Pretoria at the time of writing his thesis. By deepening the research through greater understanding of the PRC and ROC perspectives, this can perhaps aids the questions this research reports seeks to answer.

Previous literature on the two Chinas dilemma has also disregarded the importance of the domestic situation between Beijing and Taipei, in particular, the cross-strait relationship at the time of the recognition issue. Following Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui’s controversial visit to the United States in June 1995, China responded to this perceived affirmation of Taiwan’s pursuance of independence by recalling their ambassador in Washington. They also deferred dialogue with Taiwan, and scheduled missile tests off the coast of Taiwan. In an attempt to emphasise the extent of their disapproval, a second round of military exercises, including more missile tests, were conducted near Taiwan in early 1996, before Taiwan’s presidential elections. Thus, the question of South Africa’s position regarding Taiwan, and

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38 G. Lin, ‘The Relations between the Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa’ (PhD thesis, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, May 2001). The Taiwan Liaison Office’s Archive in Pretoria is not open to the public and most of the documents are written in Taiwanese or Mandarin. They can only be accessed by the Taiwanese officials who are working there. Many of the old files have been sent back to Taipei for safe-keeping, and those archives will only be available for the general public after 30 or 35 years when they are declassified in accordance with Taiwanese regulations and laws governing official archives and documents.

increasing pressure to resolve the issue of recognition, coincided with escalating tensions across the Taiwan Strait, a factor not addressed in the literature. This provides a necessary contextualisation and will aid in understanding why the PRC became less patient with South Africa’s delay in switching diplomatic recognition.

**Research Questions**

The main question this research report seeks to answer is:

What caused South Africa to switch diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in November 1996?

Four subsidiary questions compliment the main question:

1. What was the decision-making process and the corresponding sequence of events that guided the switch in diplomatic recognition?
2. Who were the key actors controlling this process?
3. What role did the NEC play?
4. Why was the switch announced when it was?

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**Research Methods and Data Collection**

**Data Collection**

**Archival Documentation**

The nature of this research report’s diplomatic history paradigm of the China decision requires a thorough examination of primary sources. The archival documentation was acquired through the administrative procedures stipulated by PAIA. Over 300 pages were retrieved from DIRCO, and 100 pages from the ANC Liberation Archives at Fort Hare University. This documentation includes official reports, policy statements, press releases, and speech transcripts, records of memoranda, official faxes, and personnel files. These were sorted and grouped in relevance according to date, subject matter, and the officials that had written the documents.
Limitations of Archival Documentation

Whilst every effort was taken to acquire the entirety of the documentation pertaining to this case study, it became evident when interviewing officials that worked in the DFA and former members of the NEC, that certain documents were missing. This is unfortunately one of the limitations of archival research, particularly when access is restricted. Your research is at the mercy of the person granting permission for you to have access to the documentation you requested. By not relying solely on the archival documentation, and by utilising methods of triangulation, this report hopes to circumnavigate this.

Interviews

Access to interviews conducted by Christopher Williams aim to contribute greatly to the analysis of South Africa’s China decision. Interviews were arranged by Mr. Williams, and I was given permission to accompany him on some of the interviews, with the permission of the interviewees. Given that they were all former DFA officials or ANC/NEC members they were not considered ‘vulnerable subjects’.

Limitations of Interviews

The recollections of the interviewees are a product of their lived experiences and can be influenced by their ideals/positions/personal investments in the topic at hand. Also, they can be forgetful or simply remember certain events in a different light. Once again, every effort was taken to cross-check dates, events, names, and facts they may have been mentioned.

Media Files

Access to SABC’s Media Libraries afforded the opportunity to watch archived episodes of television broadcasts and interviews that included remarks made by President Mandela on the topic of the switch in recognition. These provided an opportunity to hear directly from the late president and to ascertain the environment at the time of the announcement i.e. in one clip the reactions from the journalists asking him questions spoke volumes about the many questions they had after his announcement of the switch in recognition.

Christopher Williams is currently a PhD candidate for the Fletcher School at Tufts University, and a visiting lecturer at the University of Witwatersrand. Attached to this research report is a letter of permission from Mr. Williams for use of the interview data.
Limitations of Media Files
Given these recordings are utilising older machinery certain parts were not always audible. By cross-checking articles from the time that quoted from the actual interview, any errors have hopefully been avoided.

News Sources
Newspaper articles and Op-Eds from the time period in question were gathered from Wits’ Database, in particular the SA Media database. These were grouped in accordance to their published date and aid in capturing the way in which the two China dilemma was reported and conveyed to the public. They provide a necessary contrast between the internal documents from DIRCO and Fort Hare, and indicate the discrepancies between what was communicated to the public and what was unknown.

Limitation of News Sources
Like any source, it is important to first question the motive and position of the author in question. For example, some of the Op-Eds were written by Ambassador Loh and thus would propel a certain ‘pro-ROC’ rhetoric when writing about the two China dilemma. Being cognisant of potential biases is crucial when tracing the narrative.

Chinese and Taiwanese Sources
Taiwanese and Chinese news reports from the time also provide an understanding of how South Africa’s decision making was perceived in Taipei and Beijing. Secondary sources including books and journal articles (both online and those found in Wits’ libraries and through inter-library loans) have also been incorporated. Memoirs of the key Chinese protagonists on either side of the Taiwan strait, the Foreign Minister of the PRC - Qian Qichen, and Loh I-Cheng, the ROC’s Ambassador to South Africa, have been used to supplement South African perspectives and inject the recollections of the recognition issue from the perspectives of Taipei and Beijing.

Limitations of Chinese and Taiwanese Sources
Mr. Loh’s memoir is not available in English and thus had to be translated. Mr. Hung-ting Teng at Wits Language School helped tremendously with the translation from
Mandarin to English. Whilst every effort was made to ensure as accurate a translation as possible, mis-translations are unintentional yet possible.

Methodological Application

The incorporation of process-tracing and narrative analysis has taken guidance from the writings of Beach and Pedersen (2013), Bennett (2008), Collier (2011), George and Bennett (2005), and Waldner (2012). The use of process-tracing is particularly helpful in providing explanations for historical events and thus provides an important methodological framework through which to analyse South Africa’s China decision. In particular, Beach and Pedersen outlined three types of process-tracing: theory testing, theory building and explaining-outcome. For this research report, explaining-outcome has been used given that the research question is case-centric rather than theory-centric. The questions this research report aims to answer and the subsequent findings will most likely be relevant only to the case of South Africa’s recognition of the PRC, and does not aim to generalise all historical instances of changes in diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. The vast quantity of sources acquired does not afford this report the opportunity for a comparison study as doing so would be a disservice to the wealth of material that has not been previously consulted. This may be a limitation for those that seek to generate theories regarding the foreign policy decision making of switches in diplomatic recognition, or the foreign policy decision making under the Mandela administration. Whilst hoping to shed light on the latter, this research report aims to be case-centric as opposed to theory-centric. Once this research is complete it will afford the opportunity, perhaps a doctorate dissertation, where less space constraints can prompt an analysis of South Africa’s recognition dilemma with that of another country, or the

opportunity to analyse another South African foreign policy decision and decipher if there are correlations in the decision making process, the key actors controlling the process, etcetera.

Prior engagement with literature regarding historical diplomacy also contributed to the methodological approach. In particular, the writings of Elman and Elman (1997), Levy (1997), and Haber, Kennedy, and Krasner (1997), were utilised to address the historical nature of this case study. In particular, Elman & Elman’s incorporation of narrative-based explanations as opposed to theory-based explanations, has guided the methodology. It is important to acknowledge that whilst these methodologies aim to best serve the case study in question, there are limitations to research that aims to deduce the very complexities inherent within a diplomatic switch in recognition particularly given, as George (1997) explained, “Much depends upon the sensitivity and judgment of the investigator in choosing the explanatory variables for purposes of arriving at an analytical explanation”. A comprehensive triangulation of the sources acquired, and listed above, in addition to engagement and cognisance of their respective limitations, will hopefully prevent unsubstantiated analyses and conclusions.

Chapter Two will engage with theories most suited to analysing a foreign policy decision, ultimately showing that current theories do not assist in explaining the outcome of this particular paradigm of the switch in recognition from the ROC to the PRC

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Chapter Two
Theoretical Engagement

When engaging with theory in relation to a foreign policy decision, like the switch in recognition from the ROC to the PRC, the most apt place to begin would be Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Numerous definitions exist regarding how to best encapsulate the study of foreign policy nonetheless, Sekhri’s (1995) definition continues to provided one of the most encompassing ones. FPA is defined as:

a combination of diverse means and activities, which are dedicated to understanding and explaining foreign policy processes and the behaviour of significant actors in the international system.  

Previous neo-realist discourses that dominated the study of International Relations have been extensively scrutinised, particularly in relation to the prominence they placed in the above-mentioned ‘significant actors’ being equated to states and their behaviour. This state-centric emphasis disregarded the importance of utilising actor-centric theory, that which recognises that human decision-makers serve as the very ground of International Relations. There has been a continued shift away from state-centric approaches towards greater nuanced, actor-centric approaches that realise that the role of humans in decision-making cannot be reduced to simply being unitary rational actors, nor can they be seen as equivalents to ‘the state’.  

Correspondingly, Hudson (2013) surmised “that ‘the state’ is a metaphysical abstraction that is useful as a shorthand for IR’s ground, but cannot be a realistic conceptualisation of it.” Thus, FPA can be seen as an ‘investigative process’, one that studies the behaviour and actions of human decision-makers that act alone or in groups in order to respond to their external environment on behalf of their respective states. Similarly, through this investigative

47 V. M. Hudson, "Foreign policy analysis: actor-specific theory and the ground of international relations." Foreign policy analysis 1, no. 1 (2005), 1-30.
48 A notable exception includes Bell, Hindmoor, & Mols’ (2010) argument that “a state-centric relational account can help us to better understand important facets of persuasion as a mode of governance”, in S. Bell, A. Hindmoor, and F. Mols, "Persuasion as governance: A state-centric relational perspective." Public Administration 88, no. 3 (2010), 851-870.
process of FPA, we are able to provide greater insight into how humans in governmental positions shape foreign policy decisions. Moreover, how this shaping influences the decisions they make on behalf on their states remains central in understanding that which happens in the international realm, further supporting Hudson’s (2013) argument that “The engine of theoretical integration in IR, then, is the definition of the situation created by the human decision-makers.”

Analysis of these situations created by human decision makers includes a variety of perspectives, theories, models and approaches, usually in relation to several actors such as the state, non-state and sub-state entities. Additionally, given the above-mentioned move away from state-centric notions, the individual level, the state level and the macro or systemic level are further analysis proxies. Sekhri (2009) provided a comprehensive and yet extremely well-encapsulated inclusion of the diverse methods of FPA:


In particular, when researching FPA models, Graham Allison’s ‘Essence of Decision’ (1971) remains one of the most widely cited on the subject. His proposed three models for interpreting and explaining American foreign policy, and in particular, the Cuban Missile Crisis have continued to be utilised. These models categorised decision-making into three distinct spheres: the Rational Actor Model; the Organisational Model; and the Bureaucratic Politics Model. These models ultimately explained foreign policy decisions as being the products of a process and not the outcome of values or ideology. Whilst the models have been used extensively in explaining foreign policy decision making, they have not been immune to criticisms. Specifically, the models place great emphasis on bureaucracies and organisations, and do not allow for the agency of individuals in the decision making process,

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51 For greater explanation of the three levels of analysis, see Waltz (1959), Singer (1961), and Carlsnaes (1992).
nor for the impact of culture and national identity. These voids, especially the need for greater ‘actor specificity’, coined by Alexander George (1993), are addressed by Valerie Hudson (2013), who argued that:

The single most important contribution of FPA to IR theory is to identify the point of theoretical intersection between the most important determinants of state behaviour: material and ideational factors. The point of intersection is not the state, it is human decision-makers.  

Hudson’s emphasis on human decision-makers allows for an understanding that recognises the actors involved in the decision process as not being equivalent to the state. Ergo, the state itself is not an agent when analysing foreign policy decisions and “cannot be a realistic conceptualisation of it.”

Whilst an in-depth analysis of all the aforementioned perspectives, theories, models and approaches is beyond the scope of this research report, the reason for its inclusion is to highlight the multitude of options that exist and are available in FPA. The following section of this chapter will explore one of FPA’s models, that of Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM).

**Foreign Policy Decision-Making (FPDM)** “refers to the choices individuals, groups, and coalitions make that affect a nation’s actions on the international stage”. According to Renshon & Renshon (2008), these choices are usually the result of decisions that “are typically characterized by high stakes, enormous uncertainty, and substantial risk”. Although the importance of an actor-centric approach, discussed above, emphasised that decisions states make are shaped by individuals, in particular, leaders and members of executive branches, Mintz & DeRouen argued that it is crucial to view their role in conjunction with other contributing factors in the decision-making process. Mintz & DeRouen utilise four key determinants of foreign policy decisions: the Decision Environment (e.g. time and information constraints, dynamic and interactive settings), Psychological Factors (e.g. belief systems, leaders’ personality, and leadership style), International Factors (e.g. geopolitical location, deterrence and arms races, and alliances), and Domestic Factors

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55 Ibid, 5.
(e.g. military and economic capabilities and interests, type of government, and role of public opinion).

**The Limitations of FPDM and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM)**

However, after initially analysing FPDM in relation to the archival documentation, the interviews, the news articles, the Op-Eds, the Taiwanese and Chinese memoirs, and the secondary literature gathered in the literature review, this research report concluded that FPDM’s applicability to the diplomatic recognition issue has its shortcomings. Specifically, FPDM is unable to adequately explain the intricacies of the switch in recognition, as it calls for four distinct categorisations (the decision environment, psychological factors, international factors, and domestic factors) thus reducing thorough analysis and neglecting the reality that many aspects of the decision making process are not easily categorised, and regularly overlap. For instance, the issue of Hong Kong’s return to the sovereignty of the PRC could fall under the first, third and fourth factors (the decision environment, the international factors, and the domestic factors). Furthermore, analysis of the archival documentation and interviews, as will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Three, indicates that there were key individuals who were at the forefront of the decision making, individuals within the NEC.

This model does not account for the role of the NEC. From this insight it is clear that the FPDM model is unable to fully explain the political elite phenomenon in South Africa. Political elites play a very important role in the decision making process, a factor that is only accounted for in the BPM. This report questions why, as part of FPDM, does the BPM not allow for the exploration and analysis of political elites, such as the NEC? The above limitations of the FPDM model warranted research into other theories that could be utilised and that would perhaps best enable thorough theoretical engagement on the switch in diplomatic recognition.

**Political Elite Behaviour**

There are a number of conceptual lenses for understanding elite behaviour in the IR literature, including elite theory and the notion of “Big Men” Politics.
Elite Theory

Elite theory, as defined by López (2013), “is based on the assumption that elite behavior has a causal relationship with general patterns of state–society relations”.58 The theory has predominately been applied to studies of American politics.59 The main arguments put forth from this research concerns the substantial impact that economic elites - individuals deemed to have substantial economic resources, and organised groups representing specific business interests have on U.S. politics and policy making, with average citizens and interest groups having comparatively little influence. However, the nature of the decision making process for the China recognition case study, as illuminated by the archival documentation and the interviews, indicates that the decision to recognise the PRC was ultimately the result of the inner-working, elite decision making of the NEC, thus those within the highest political organ of the NEC, and not necessarily individuals with substantial economic means. Upon examination, the applicability of elite theory to the case of the PRC’s recognition is faulty. The theory does not allow for an understanding of the power structures inherent within a collective like the NEC, and the influence its members had on the recognition issue.

The work of Farazmand (1999) will also be drawn upon, given his critique of “the deficiencies of the traditional theories of organization premised on instrumental rationality and void of normative dimensions of politics and power structure”.60 Given his encouragement for more normative dimensions, an exploration of Azeez and Ibukunoluwa (2015) is important. They provide an application of elite theory to the paradigm of Nigerian political elites. In particular, they explore how:

the active participation of elites in a typical democratic system would be detrimental to the democratic process because the interest of the few would be taken care of thereby neglecting the interests and opinion of the general masses who are then seen as the “average citizen”.61

Azeez and Ibukunoluwa explore the characteristics of these political elites explaining how they “have been seen to be sentimental, uncontrollably dependent, greedy or materialistic,

and in most cases non-nationalistic” factors which they argue have contributed to the underdevelopment of Nigeria, issues of political instability, and unfavourable changes in the country’s growth.\(^{62}\) They go on to explain that there are mediums within Nigerian politics which “foster or aids elite circulation” and identify these mediums as ‘godfatherism’, ‘political parties’, and ‘economic contributors’.\(^{63}\) Unfortunately, much of what is spoken in their paper mirrors South Africa’s reality,\(^{64}\) yet the extent to which their analysis correlates with the recognition of the PRC is questionable. Given that the issue of recognition was a foreign policy decision, it was not a decision that was intended to be injected with the opinions of the wider citizenry. Even so, the research gathered has shown, from the new articles, Op-Eds, and academic conferences, that the role of public opinion featured in diplomatic exchanges pertaining to this foreign policy decision.\(^{65}\) FPDM does not accommodate for the role of the public’s opinion. Furthermore, whilst Azeez and Ibukunoluwa’s paradigm of elite theory is important in the context of Nigeria, when we apply the same theory to the China decision, it does not necessarily offer an explanation for the NEC’s decision. The archival documentation and the interviews show that when the NEC finally reached consensus on recognition the PRC, it was due to South Africa’s best national interests. There is no evidence to suggest that certain individuals in the NEC would gain from the switch, in fact, as will become evident in Chapter Four, some individuals might have personally gained from rather retaining recognition of the ROC, given the ‘chequebook diplomacy’ openly utilised by the ROC.

\(^{62}\) Ibid, 155.
\(^{63}\) Ibid.


\(^{65}\) Diplomatic exchanges, or ‘chatter’, and its contribution to the decision making is particularly emphasised with the reaction that a September 1996 Xinhua Agency news article garnered. The report condemned President Mandela’s August 1996 reference to Taiwan as a country, see ‘Dual Recognition’ Unacceptable says People’s Daily’, Xinhua News Agency, 5 September 1996. The PRC’s anger to Mandela’s reference was included in a documented compiled by C. Basson at the DFA. This indicates the way in which public opinion did indeed reach the DFA, DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, C. Basson, ‘PRC Reaction to President Mandela’s Recent Statement on Continued Diplomatic Relations with the Republic of China’, 18 September 1996.
“Big-Men” Politics

When utilising process-tracing and data analysis in relation to the archival documentation and the interviews, it is evident that there were key individuals who impacted the timing of the switch in diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. This is where theory focused on “Big Men” politics, or elite individuals in Africa, may be able to shed some light.

As Daloz (2003) identified, the trend of “Big Men”, or elites in Africa, has received little attention:

> Or more precisely, it has been a question of fitting the study of elites into very reductive schematic moulds, even if this has meant twisting the realities a little for general coherent explanation” … and that “reflections on the elites still appear only at the margin of wider theoretical syntheses”.67

Whilst Sahlins’ “Big Man” model was initially intended to explain the conversion of resources (e.g. money) for another resource (e.g. political support), Daloz (2003) referred to “Big Men” as those “controlling as many fields of activities and networks as possible”, and a model that “applies to all types of elites including other important categories in sub-Saharan Africa, like “traditional rulers,” some religious and even top military leaders”.68 One of the critiques offered by Daloz is of particular importance to this research report. When analysing the neo-Marxist approach in dependency theories, he argued that “we seldom find an empirically grounded reflection on cleavages and intra-struggles within the elite”.69 This acknowledgement that “Big Men” do not operate as one homogenous group resounds with what has been discovered amongst the archival documentation and during the interviews. The theory of the “Big Man” offers a departure from elite theory in that it “seems the more relevant for acknowledging, on the one hand, the close relationship between communities or factions and elites representing them and, on the other hand, the weak differentiation of the elites”.70 These social-political overlaps, along with the acknowledgement of intra-party contestations is evident through the intra-party dissension within the ANC’s NEC, in relation

66 The “Big Men” theory or “Big Man” model was originally an anthropological model introduced by Marshall Sahlins. See his work M. D. Sahlins, “Poor man, rich man, big-man, chief: political types in Melanesia and Polynesia.” Comparative studies in society and history 5, no. 3 (1963), 285-303.

67 J-P. Daloz,”“ Big men” in sub-Saharan Africa: how elites accumulate positions and resources.” Comparative sociology 2, no. 1 (2003), 271, 272, and 277.

68 Ibid, 271. Daloz further identified how the notion of elites or “Big Men” in Africa has been addressed through other theories and approaches namely, the development and modernisation theories of the 1960s, the neo-Marxist dependency approaches of the 1970s and the ‘so-called’ “third wave” of African studies from the 1980s.

69 Ibid, 274.

70 Ibid, 277.
to the ‘Two China’ issue. The ideological pasts and opinions of some of the individuals highlight the socio-political linkages inherent in political elite circles. FPDM does not accommodate for intra-party dissension and is thus limited in understanding the lack of initial dissension on the ‘Two China’ issue.

The Limitations of Elite Theory and “Big Men” Politics

Yet, whilst the archival documentation and interviews with former officials indicates the vital role of certain individuals, as will be explored in the following Chapter Three and Chapter Four, when applying the “Big Men” politics theory to the foreign policy decision case study of South Africa’s China decision, there is little resonance with the current literature. Thus, even in combination these theories do not adequately explain what is observed through the archival documentation and the interviews, which is political elite interaction at the domestic level and at the diplomatic level. There is a gap in explaining the decision making process that the current models do not account for; how the decision was actually reached through a process from dissension to consensus.

Current elite behaviour theories focus on elite formation, colonial legacies, patronage, kleptocracy, and domestic politics. These do not explain the interaction this research report develops– in particular, the overlap between domestic and foreign politics. Whilst this research report is not attempting to theory build, it is attempting to explain an outcome that the current theory is unable to assist with. It is hoped that future theory building concerning South Africa’s political elite interactions across the diplomatic circle could perhaps benefit from this paradigm of South Africa’s China decision. Chapter Three will substantiate theses

71 The influence of ideology within the NEC is particularly evident through P. Jordan’s interview where he explained how those that had been in exile in the USSR, and those that had been in exile in the PRC, had, at times, divergent views on the China issue. Those that had been in China were more vocal about the need to recognise the PRC given that they understood more about the national integrity intertwined with the ‘One China’ policy. P. Jordan, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 14 March 2017.
theoretical limitations that have been discussed by detailing how South Africa’s China decision was made.
Chapter Three
South Africa’s China Decision: Building Consensus Amongst Dissension

This chapter serves as the focal analysis of this research report’s topic of South Africa’s China decision. It does so by bringing together the vast archival documentation, interviews, news articles and Op-Eds from the time of the decision, so as to piece together the narrative of how the decision played out. In utilising these sources, this exploration aims to answer the main question that this research report set out to answer; ‘What caused South Africa to switch diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in November 1996?’, and the four subsidiary questions; ‘What was the decision-making process and the corresponding sequence of events that guided the switch in diplomatic recognition?’, ‘Who were the key actors controlling this process?’, ‘What role did the NEC play?’, and ‘Why was the switch announced when it was?’. This is done in the hopes of not only understanding the diplomatic history paradigm of the China decision but to aid future theoretical constructions concerning foreign policy analysis of foreign policy decision making under the Mandela administration.

The Evolution of Sino-African Relations: Bandung Conference, and the Non-Aligned Movement

The PRC has had a long history of supporting Africa, and its most ardent engagement with African states can be traced to the Bandung Conference, and the formation of the NAM. These progressions amongst Africa and Asia showed growing consensus amongst ‘developing’ countries that the Western hegemonic world order did not place great concern on the development of Africa and Asia, and thus there was an urgent need for greater ‘South-South’ cooperation.77

The conference produced a Peace Declaration of 10 points that reiterated some of the principles from the UN Charter.

1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations

2. **Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations**
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small
4. **Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country**
5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations
6. (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve any particular interests of the big powers
   (b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries
7. **Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country**
8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties own choice, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations
9. Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation
10. **Respect for justice and international obligations**

The Bandung Conference, along with the creation of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) and the New International Economic Order (NIEO) arguably signified a historic moment of divergence in global politics. The ‘banding together’ of the ‘developing’ drew scepticism from Western states that were concerned with the power of this grouping. Furthermore, these shifts in the global arena indicated the expansion of China’s regional power – an unsettling reality for Western hegemony with their views impelling the necessity for the containment of communism, but a welcomed opportunity for China’s engagement with other developing countries. In particular, South Africa would come to benefit greatly from China’s expansion during the liberation struggle.

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78 The bolded points highlight those that would become contentious during the China dilemma, in particular those relating to matters of territorial integrity, and respect of international obligations. Whilst none of the archival documents, secondary literature or interviewees made specific references to these exact principles, it is arguable that this thinking of ‘South-South’ cooperation, and the need to honour international obligations guided the China decision. Specifically, this was emphasised during Mandela’s 27th November announcement when he stated that “In its international relations, South Africa has become an active participant within the ambit of the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement as well as within the UN system. A permanent continuation of diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China, or Taiwan, is inconsistent with South Africa’s role in international affairs.” Quoted in M. Makhanya, ‘Shock as SA Dumps Taiwan for China’, The Star, 28 November 1996.
The PRC’s Support of the Anti-Apartheid Struggle

China’s expansion into Africa altered the notion that only the PRC could benefit from Africa, and not the other way around. However, South Africa had already known this given the support its liberation movement had received. Ties with the ANC had existed as early as the 1950s when Walter Sisulu had travelled to the PRC to request military support for the struggle against the apartheid regime. Although Sisulu was unable to obtain weapons for the ANC, he was well received. A decade later, Yusuf Dadoo and Vella Pillay visited China on behalf of the SACP and garnered great support from the PRC. The following year, in 1961, Raymond Mhlaba and a group of Umkhonto we Sizwe recruits received secret military training in China. Furthermore, between 1962 and 1963, many ANC and SACP officials were welcomed in China, including J.B. Marks, Joe Slovo, and Oliver Tambo.

The close relationship between the PRC and the ANC was explained by Max Sisulu who indicated how there were two main reasons for this:

One was that they supported our struggle and also we were inspired by the struggle of other peoples in other countries who won their freedom, and China’s one of those very big countries, huge population, and who were able to do two things first liberate themselves but also empower their own people.

The ANC was not only inspired by the political achievements of the PRC but saw how their developmental trajectory could perhaps be emulated to uplift the majority of the South African population that had experienced years of oppression:

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80 Historically, literature concerning the relationship between China and South Africa was framed in terms of “imperialism”, “resource extraction” and “globalisation”, propelling variations of George Yu’s “the dragon in the bush” metaphor whereby “the dragon is imposing but the bush is dense” G. T. Yu, "Dragon in the bush: Peking's presence in Africa." Asian Survey 8, no. 12 (1968), 1026. See also D. Large, "Beyond ‘dragon in the bush’: the study of China–Africa relations." African Affairs 107, no. 426 (2008), 45-61 or, similarly, the “dance between the elephant and the dragon” in P. T. Zeleza, "Dancing with the dragon: Africa's courtship with China." The Global South 2, no. 2 (2008), 171. These inferences did little to dispel notions that Sino-South African relations were mutually beneficial, and instead propagated the idea that China’s role in Africa had benefitted China at the expense of African interests.


85 M. Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017.
In China everybody was in the ‘Mao suits’ and standard of living wasn’t that high. When I went back, what, five year later, first time everybody was on a bicycle, they love bicycles, I went back five years later and there were no bicycles only cars. It says a lot actually about the quality of life of the people. So, we were always being inspired by the achievements of, you know, China had a huge population in a historically short space of time. But also, we benefited from the support we got from the People’s Republic of China. My father was there and spoke to us about China when we were kids, and so we liked the idea that, basically, a peasant population could, in a historically short space of time, could do what the Chinese were able to do. And I think what impressed us most was the education system. Educating millions of people. So that was really outstanding for us. And every time you go to China you see the qualitative improvement in the lives of the people…the quality might not be the same as say America or anywhere else in Europe, but at least people have a roof over their head, and they have food.  

The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Split

Whilst the ties had initially been strong, the Sino-Soviet split saw the SACP siding with the Soviet Bloc, and relations between the SACP and the CCP deteriorated. Given the SACP’s alliance with the ANC, and the USSR’s support of the ANC, the ANC distanced itself from the CCP, and the PRC responded by transferring its support to the PAC in the late 1960s and early into the 1970s. South Africa’s liberation movements appeared to have to choose, and as Zola Skweyiya, who at the time was a member of MK and staying in one of the camps in Moscow, recalled, ‘The main tendency was that you must support what Moscow is saying.’ Sisulu too, when asked if the split forced the ANC to choose between the PRC and USSR, responded:

Yes, and no, the split had an effect on not just the ANC but the international implication obviously, we got a lot of support also from Russia, that Soviet Bloc…but we continued to receive a lot of support from China even though there was this tension we, from time to time we got material support from China and obviously the political support was always there. It was not in question because it was a moral issue, it was a political issue, so we continued to receive political support from China.

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86 M. Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017.
88 A. Pahad, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 7 March 2017.
89 M. Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017.
Yet, Sisulu was quick to point out that the split was viewed differently, although within the ANC there was an understanding of maintaining ties with both the PRC and USSR:

Well, there would be different views, depending on who you talk to. When there was a split, a big split between the Soviet Union and China, and of course that influenced a lot of people, we as the ANC were very close to the Soviet Union and they continued to support us, I studied there myself, so clearly we have bias depending on who you talk to. But the support we got from the Soviet Union was much greater than the support which we got from China, materials scholarships, and that kind of thing. And also, the Soviet Union was a big country, politically a superpower, but we always, as the ANC, wanted to make sure that we didn’t lose a friendship because of others. The Chinese Revolution was also a source of inspiration for us because it was the peasants of the country, and the speed in which China changed itself was amazing so we used to encourage people to go to China and learn from the Chinese because there’s always something to learn from everybody, and the Chinese Revolution peasants were, at the time, a source of inspiration.

Even with the Sino-Soviet split, China did remain loyal to the anti-apartheid struggle and backed the UN’s call for sanctions against the apartheid government. This was further evident between December 1963 and February 1964, when then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited 10 African countries and emphasised Chinese support for the liberation movements. During the visit he gave five guiding principles for China's relations with Africa.

'The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence':

1. China supports the African and Arab peoples in their struggle to oppose imperialism and old and new colonialism and to win and safeguard national independence
2. It supports the pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment by the governments of African and Arab countries
3. It supports the desire of the African and Arab peoples to achieve unity and solidarity in the way they themselves choose
4. It supports African and Arab countries in their efforts to settle their disputes through peaceful consultations.
5. It holds that the sovereignty of African and Arab countries should be respected by all other countries and encroachment and interference from any quarter should be opposed

90 M. Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017.
Whilst South Africa was not one of the 10 African countries that Premier Zhou Enlai visited, these principles are indicative of the moral imperative felt by the Chinese towards Africa. The reason South Africa had not been included as a stop in Premier Zhou’s visit to Africa was due to the fact that, at the time, South Africa did not have diplomatic relations with the PRC.

The 1980s saw improvements between China and the USSR, which also improved the ties between the PRC and the ANC. The ANC sent high-level delegations to the PRC, where they were welcomed and given financial support for their cause. Pallo Jordan recounted how during one of the delegations, him and Aziz Pahad “came away with a briefcase full of US dollars”, which the two then took to the ANC’s headquarters in Lusaka. This support from the PRC continued into the 1990s, especially after the apartheid government unbanned the liberation movements.

The PRC and ROC’s ties with the apartheid government

Even though the PRC increased its support of the anti-apartheid liberation movements, there is now substantial evidence that the PRC had connections with the apartheid government. In particular, the ties were centred around trade of food staples, metal, iron ore and even military equipment. It appears that the ANC was aware of how the PRC was ironically aiding the ability of the apartheid government to fight the liberation movements because in 1994, their Department of International Affairs (DIA) released a press statement that condemned the PRC for violating the UN’s arms embargo against the apartheid government.


93 P. Jordan, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 14 March 2017.


The ROC’s ties to the apartheid government, whilst no less defensible, were certainly more transparent. As discussed during the literature review, given the international isolation they both experienced, trade relations between the ROC and South Africa were strong and covered an array of fields. By 1994, the ROC was South Africa’s seventh largest trading partner, accounting for 3.1% of its total trade. The ROC continued to support the apartheid government, even after the unbanning of the ANC. Their thoughts on the ANC were made clear in May 1990 when Jerry Matjila, the ANC’s representative in East Asia, applied for a visa to travel to Taiwan to lobby for election support (See Appendix 1 and 2). The ROC initially issued him a visa but later withdrew it, justifying their decision because of the ANC being a supposed “terrorist” organisation. (Ironically, less than two years later the ROC would send Aziz Pahad a letter intended for Mandela which stated “The Peoples republic [sic] of China will always support the ANC in its struggle for a democratic South Africa”. (See Appendix 3).

The ROC’s U-turn

Less than a year after the unfortunate reference to the ANC as a “terrorist” organisation, the ROC clearly realised the necessity of being in the good graces of the ANC, and in January 1992, the ROC Ambassador to South Africa, Loh I-Cheng sent Mandela a letter confirming that the ROC would be granting 500 000 USD to the Albert Luthuli Memorial Trust, R1 000 000 to the Phemelo Foundation, and sponsorship of training for ANC members that covered a range of fields. Loh also included his intention in “further cementing the good relations with your organisation and yourself.” Mandela was being exposed to the first of many instances of the ROC’s utilisation of ‘cheque book’ diplomacy, a tactic which will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Four.

Just a few months later, in July 1992, the ROC’s Foreign Minister, Frederick Chien, extended an invitation to Mandela to visit Taiwan. The letter was laden with compliments to Mandela, with Minister Chien exclaiming;

100 UFH, NAHECS, Secretary General’s Office, Box 22, Folder 186, Letter from I-C. Loh to N. Mandela, 30 January 1992.
For many years, we have watched with admiration your selfless sacrifice toward the goals of a free and democratic South Africa. Your release in February 1990 was a source of joy for us also. Even though the road toward a new constitution may not be all smooth, we are confident that the African National Congress under your astute leadership will succeed in the end. Mandela thanked Minister Chien and confirmed that plans would be made for him to travel to the ROC in 1993.

**Mandela’s First Trip to the PRC in October 1992**

Whilst plans were underway for Mandela’s ROC trip, a visit to the PRC had already been scheduled for October 1992. When asked by reporters in Beijing if the purpose of his visit was fundraising for the upcoming elections, Mandela did not respond directly but did surmise that “his mission had been successful in all respects.” An ANC report from the trip to the PRC confirms Mandela’s summation, explaining how, after a private meeting with the PRC Premier, Li Peng, Thomas Nkobi and Pallo Jordan, “At the end of that private consultation Madiba came back to us and told us that he was pleased with the response of the Chinese Premier.” The response was indeed pleasing – The PRC had granted the ANC two million USD, three million for the ANC cadres in Tanzania, and five million credit to purchase goods from the PRC.

During his PRC trip, Mandela informed the PRC officials of his invitation to visit the ROC, and explained to Minister Qian that he would keep him informed about how the ANC would tackle the invitation. Qian also recalled this trip as an example of the conflict between the PRC and the ROC, detailing how Mandela’s trip created great anxiety for the Taiwanese. This is confirmed in Loh’s memoir, where he believed that the trip signalled that “the PRC has gained the leading position in the race.” This was, of course, not entirely inaccurate. ANC officials on the trip had made it clear that South Africa’s China decision would only

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102 UFH, NAHECS, NMP, Box 294, Folder 21, Letter from N. Mandela to F. Chien, n.d.
104 UFH, NAHECS, Walter Sisulu Papers (WSP), Box, 13, Folder 55, ‘Report: Visit of the President of the ANC, Comrade Nelson R Mandela to Pakistan and China’, nd.
occur after the 1994 elections. Yet, Qian noted that Mandela had given PRC officials private reassurances that South Africa would definitely be recognising the PRC.

The Establishment of Reciprocal ‘Study Centres’ in 1992

Also in 1992, the PRC and South Africa, still under the governance of the apartheid government, established reciprocal ‘Study Centres’ in their respective capitals. This worried the ANC, who had believed that the PRC would wait for their election as the ruling party, before establishing diplomatic relations. The PRC’s eagerness to establish diplomatic ties was evident through Qian’s recollection that South Africa “attached more importance to economic and trade relations and personnel exchanges with China than to political relations.” These sentiments were observed by Ambassador Loh who claimed that the PRC would have established diplomatic relations even prior to the first democratic elections.

Xie Zhiheng, the Director of the PRC’s Study Centre in Pretoria sent Thabo Mbeki a letter in December 1992, regarding Mandela’s upcoming visit to the ROC. The letter, a total of seven pages, emphasised the extent to which the PRC was concerned about the influence of the Taiwanese, and the future of their relations with South Africa. Not wanting to worry the PRC, in May 1993, another mission to the PRC was organised, with the sole intention of reassuring the PRC officials about Mandela’s trip to the ROC. Mbeki led the delegation, and minutes from the discussions indicate that he justified Mandela’s ROC trip as a decision made by the ANC’s NEC in order for Mandela to acquire the financial support that had been promised by the ROC. Mbeki reiterated that the Taiwan trip did not change the ANC’s stance regarding the One China policy. Qian’s memoir supports this internal memo, further relaying what Mbeki had said:

The ANC recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of the whole of China, and will never betray its old friend. The ANC will make great efforts to

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114 UFH, NAHECS, NMP, Box 246, Folder 6, ANC Office of the Secretary General Internal Memorandum from M. Sparg to C. Ramaphosa, 4 June 1993, 5.
establish diplomatic relations between China and South Africa. We believe that this goal will be achieved in the near future.\textsuperscript{115} Mbeki’s reassurances appeared to have calmed the PRC officials, who showed an understanding for why Mandela needed to visit Taiwan.\textsuperscript{116} Mbeki’s comments were at odds with Mandela’s reassurances to the ROC. Here we are able to see how the thinking of the NEC was not always aligned with the mentality of Mandela.

**Mandela’s First Trip to the ROC in July 1993**

Mandela’s trip to the ROC in July 1993 secured great financial support for the ANC, with 10 million USD being given to Mandela during his first encounter with President Lee Teng-Hui.\textsuperscript{117} However, the trip was not without inferences to the issues of recognition. When the delegation arrived in Taiwan, ROC reporters began asking Mandela about the ANC’s future stance on the two China issue. Pallo Jordan remembered how the Taiwanese were anxious as to what would be Mandela’s reply.\textsuperscript{118} Whilst Mandela was politely measured, he said, ‘South Africa will remain a member of the United Nations, of many international organisations. We will thus be bound to the policies and decisions of these organisations.’\textsuperscript{119} This was a clear confirmation that the ANC would be recognising the PRC, given that the PRC was recognised as the legitimate China in the international arena. This was obviously not the response the ROC would have wanted to hear however, over the duration of his stay, Mandela repeated reassured the ROC that there would simply be a ‘new chapter’ in the relationship between the ROC and South Africa.\textsuperscript{120} As to be expected, the trip concluded with more financial contributions, including a request from Mandela for a similar vocational training centre to what he saw in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{121}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Q. Qian, *Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy* (New York City, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2005), 211.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} J. Matjila, ‘ANC Official Delegation to People’s Republic of China: May 16-20, 1993’.
  \item \textsuperscript{117} UFH, NAHECS, NMP, Box 294, Folder 21, n.a. ‘Programme for the Visit of President Nelson R. Mandela to the Republic of China, July 30-August 2’, n.d, and UFH, NAHECS, NMP, Box 294, Folder 22, Facsimile transmission from T. Ditshego to B. Masekela ‘President’s Visit to R.O.C. on Taiwan’, 28 July 1993.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} P. Jordan, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 14 March 2017.
  \item \textsuperscript{119} I. Lagardien, ‘Mandela on the Spot in Taiwan’, *Sowetan*, 2 August 1993.
  \item \textsuperscript{121} E. Waugh, ‘Taiwan to Fund Centre in SA’, *The Star*, 2 August 1998; Sapa, ‘More than R50-m in loans and aid given to SA’, *The Citizen*, 17 August 1998; UFH, NAHECS, NMP, Box 11, Folder 135, Letter from A. C. Van Den Broek, to N. Mandela, 3 August 1993; and Letter from N. Mandela to A. C. Van Den Broek, n.d.
\end{itemize}
Following Mandela’s ROC trip, an article ran in the PRC’s state-owned Xinhua News Agency which reported on a recent trip that Joe Slovo had taken to the PRC where, according to the article, Mandela had asked Slovo to ‘convey a message of reassurance to the PRC’ following his visit to the ROC. This message appeared to also include a reassurance that South Africa will recognise the PRC after its election, keeping in line with its One China policy.\(^\text{122}\) Given that the ANC had just acquired great financial assistance from the ROC, these supposed ‘messages’ needed urgent clarification. The ANC released a statement explaining, “While the ANC stands ready to build a new relationship with the Government of Taiwan, whatever our past differences, it will not abandon its longstanding friends [including the PRC].”\(^\text{123}\) The ANC claimed that the message that had been sent was merely Mandela’s request that his speeches made during his trip to Taiwan be made available to the PRC officials. Li Liqing, the former Director-General of the Africa Bureau of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and the official who had hosted Slovo whilst he was in China, backed Xinhua’s reporting, confirming that the message did include reassurances with regards to the sole recognition of the PRC.\(^\text{124}\)

It was evident that the ANC was trying to placate both Chinas. Minister Qian understood this and worried that these trips and conflicting statements indicated that, “The ANC's idea was neither to abandon Taiwan nor ignore China's international status and influence.” He pondered whether, ‘… they wanted to resort to “dual recognition”.’\(^\text{125}\) As the 1994 elections drew closer, South Africa’s diplomatic relations with the ROC was a political reality that became increasingly contested by the international and domestic community. Given that the apartheid government had had diplomatic ties with the ROC, it was widely anticipated that once the ANC was the ruling party, a diplomatic switch would occur simultaneously. Yet this did not happen quite as seamlessly as proponents had hoped.

**A New Government and a New Approach: Dual Recognition**

After the 1994 elections, the DFA decided to participate in a trade show in Beijing. Nina Human, who had been placed on the Asia Directorate in 1993 and was tasked with writing documentation in preparation for South Africa’s return to the international community,


\(^{123}\) Sapa-Reuter, ‘Mandela’s Alleged Promise on ROC is ‘Corrected’’, *The Citizen*, 19 August 1993.


recalled how the lack of diplomatic relations with the PRC meant that the DFA “had to participate under the auspices of the DTI (the Department of Trade and Industry).”\textsuperscript{126}

Interestingly, all that the department had prepared for the exhibition never arrived and they wondered if the host government had perhaps prevented the importation of the materials. The group managed to “do some last minute interior decorating at the stall”, and the rest of the trip was a success. Human recalls one particular day when her colleague, Christiaan (Iaan) Basson, a South African diplomat that had been sent to Beijing to help establish the South African Study Centre, or the South African Centre for Chinese Studies, took her to a Chinese think tank. Human said to one of the people working there that “the China-Taiwan quarrel was a funny quarrel”, to which the man replied, “in one family only the older brother could be the boss.”\textsuperscript{127}

Whilst some viewed the two Chinas issue as a ‘family issue’, that which should be resolved amongst themselves, others believed a more proactive approach was necessary. At the first cabinet meeting after the new government came into power, Joe Slovo requested a document on the recognition of China. Human was the person who then drafted this first cabinet memorandum, the contents of which she explained stipulated that South Africa should recognise the PRC justifying how “Kissinger once said if something is inevitable, you might as well do it immediately.”\textsuperscript{128}

Human’s memo was not well received by all within the DFA. Rusty Evans, Director General of the DFA, phoned Human “furious about the contents of the cabinet memorandum that they dare bring into question South Africa’s well-established ties with Taiwan, the so-called ‘free China’.”\textsuperscript{129} Human said she later learnt that Evans had “endeavoured to sideshow the cabinet memorandum for several months in his safe.”\textsuperscript{130} Human reasoned that Evans efforts appeared to have been due to his belief that President Mandela “had the moral authority to carry off a two China policy.”\textsuperscript{131}

When asked about this, Evans responded that:

\begin{quote}
It was a matter of when, for sure. And how, I had a sense also that this was also a domestic political standoff between Beijing and Taiwan, and why should we be the kicking ball between them? That’s a problem they had among themselves and they should sort it out, in
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{126} N. K. Human, interview by C. Williams and C. Hurst, Pretoria, 5 December 2016.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
the meantime we were happy to just stand back and carry on our relationship and build all the aspects of a diplomatic relationship with Beijing, which we’d inevitably grow into a full relationship, that was our approach.  

Evans did admit that he initially believed that dual recognition may have been feasible saying, “In the early days we thought it was quite a feasible approach to the issue but as time went by it became obvious that it wasn’t going to be a sustainable.”  

Although, he believed claims that he was anti-Chinese were unsubstantiated, and that his position was that we would, of course, recognise China but the question was at what point, and that what was necessary was the building of a substantive relationship with China before the switch in diplomatic recognition.

When questioned about the belief by some in the department that the flow of information from the Asia Directorate to the President was being prohibited, Evans replied:

No, that’s not true. I would categorically say that there was no intent on blocking a different view from the Asia division. I think I have been pretty frank and open about Les, and he was a very good official and he did his job very well. Nor, did we have a sense at that time that Les is persuaded on their side but we’re on a different side. We were just, ‘we’, ‘Rusty Evans’, were just a bit slower in terms of... we were being a little more nuanced, in terms of.... He wanted us to go quicker than we were, in terms of the diplomatic, the political relationship, not all the other. Diplomatic relations, you know what diplomatic relations are, they are not just at the political level you know you build a relationship on the basis of substantive matters and he was encouraged to do that, and did it to a large extent. And the Taiwanese reacted to that, I mean there was an explosion of interaction in that period since they opened the Mission to when this blew up to this point. In fact, I allude to it in this, that they are going to hold back on a number of things, but these are things that had already been established in that relatively short period. So, we were actually being successful in terms of building a diplomatic relationship.

Yet, Human was not the only one worried about where documents were going, and if the correct information was getting to President Mandela. Minutes from a briefing session on 11th October 1995, end with an observation by Mr. G. Pretorius, a deputy-director at the DFA, who had worked on Japan, China and Korea. Pretorius noted his concerns saying:

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133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
It is the considered opinion of the Directorate Asia, that all the facts of the China - Taiwan matter are not known to the President - that the information is not being made available to him.\textsuperscript{135}

**Dissension**

**Dissension within the DFA**

Whilst it may not have been clear just where the notes and memos were going, it was clear that there were some within the DFA that disagreed about switching diplomatic recognition to the PRC. In 1995, this was highlighted at the DFA’s Heads of Mission meeting, the first since the amalgamation of the departments in the post-democratic era. The meeting occurred at Espada Ranch, outside of Pretoria. Nina Human was appointed rapporteur for the Asia group and during her report back session to the plenary she recalled that there were “some fireworks, largely because the majority in the Asia group had drafted a resolution calling for the early recognition of Beijing.”\textsuperscript{136} One of Human’s former colleagues questioned her on the issue of China’s human rights record in Tibet. Human found this ironic because this colleague had served in Taiwan and she explained that Taiwan did not recognise the independence of Tibet either. From here “a real bun fight started as various members of the audience raised their opinions on the issue of the China-Taiwan debate.”\textsuperscript{137} Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad, who was on the podium beside her, said to Human that he would deal with the matter which she concluded that he did “very professionally.”\textsuperscript{138}

Botha too recalled the tensions that arose during this Heads of Mission meeting, further explaining how:

… yes, there was a total split on that. And, I wonder if I can remember what we, we were very unhappy and it was basically left in the air… Many of us spoke in favour of the switch, and there were those who were against… It got quite acrimonious. And as I recall, there was a split in the ANC too, but it was mainly the old South African department that was arguing the case, as I recall.\textsuperscript{139}

\textsuperscript{136} N. K. Human, interview by C. Williams and C. Hurst, Pretoria, 5 December 2016.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{139} P. J. Botha, interview by C. Williams, Cape Town, 17 February 2017.
At the same time as the Heads of Mission meeting, there was a department called the ‘Guest Programme’, and the head of the mission in Beijing, Les Labuschagne, sent the president of the Chinese Institute of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Liu Shuqing to South Africa. Dr. Liu Shuqing’s institute, as explained by Human, “dealt a lot with countries that had not yet established relations with China”.\textsuperscript{140} Human, Dr. Liu Shuiqing, Aziz Pahad, and Ji Peiding flew to Cape Town where they met Thabo Mbeki, Alfred Nzo, and F.W. de Klerk. The intention of Dr. Lui Shuqing’s trip was to persuade South Africa to change relations. What Dr. Lui was most likely not aware of was the dissension within the Mandela administration, the DFA and the NEC. The discrepancies in viewpoints and statements was alarming. Nina Human referenced this in one of the departmental minutes in October 1995, saying that:

> A problem we face is the fact that President Mandela has made contradictory statements on the nature of our relations with the Chinese i.e. that South Africa would follow international diplomatic practice and, on our relations with Taiwan, that South Africa would not break diplomatic relations.\textsuperscript{141}

As time passed, those within the DFA did not completely understand Mandela’s reluctance to announce what was, to them, an inevitable decision. PJ Botha remembered how the PRC’s Ji Peiding was equally confused and would visit him in the hopes of establishing where Mandela stood with regards to the China decision. Botha eventually explained to Ji that the switch would be decided in the ANC:

> You’re not going to get this thing switched in DFA...you need to work within the ANC, because that is where the decision will be made. And it’s within the ANC that they can put sufficient pressure on Mandela to see the benefits, and to make him face up to what the reality is in the international community, in terms of China.\textsuperscript{142}

Here we see how those within the DFA were attentive to the reality that the ANC would be making the decision in their collective capacity as the ruling party. This further confirms the notion of party elites within the ANC controlling the decision, and thus the limitations of FPDM in explaining the role of party elites. However, this is not to say that the DFA did not affect the decision. Letters that were drafted by the DFA’s East Asia Directorate and sent from Nzo to President Mandela were able to influence his understanding of the need and increasing urgency to recognise the PRC. Like Mbeki, officials in the directorate including

\textsuperscript{140} N. K. Human, interview by C. Williams and C. Hurst, Pretoria, 5 December 2016.
\textsuperscript{142} P. J. Botha, interview by C. Williams, Cape Town, 17 February 2017.
Basson, Human and Labuschagne understood that Beijing would never accept dual recognition and that it was becoming crucial to convince Mandela of this or risk angering the PRC.

**Dissension within the ANC**

Mbeki was not the only member of the ruling party who understood the PRC’s resolute stance on the One China policy. Four prominent ANC MPs, Raymond Suttner, Blade Nzimande, Max Sisulu, and Danny Jordaan accompanied Nzo on the delegation to the PRC in 1995. Suttner’s own writing has shown that he supported the switch in recognition to the PRC, and Nzimande had also made it known that he also saw the necessity for recognition of the PRC. The composition of the delegation, and the individuals supporting the switch in recognition, did not mean, at the time, that there was consensus within the ANC. In fact, a lack of consensus on the ‘Two China’ issue in and amongst the ANC was evident when Joe Modise, Defence Minister explained in May 1996 that they wanted relations with the PRC but did not want to hinder their relations with the ROC. Contrastingly, ANC MP and chair of the portfolio committee on trade and industry, Edna Molewa, was quoted a few days later saying that the ANC would establish relations with the PRC even if it meant severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

Similarly, the Minister of Public Service and Administration, Zola Skweyiya, met with Qian Qichen in August 1996 where he informed the Foreign Minister that the NEC had decided that South Africa would recognise the PRC. However, Skweyiya did also mention that there had been a debate within the ANC regarding the ‘Two China’ issue. Skweyiya also conveyed Mandela’s hesitancy and desire for dual recognition however Qian made it quite clear that the PRC would not entertain that idea.

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147 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, L. Labuschagne to T. Mazibuko, ‘Notes: Meeting Between Foreign Minister Skweyiya and Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian, Diaoyutai State Guest House, Beijing, 22 August 1996’, 23 August 1996.
Popo Molefe, the Premier of the Northwest Province, was one of the key ANC officials leveraged by the PRC to gain support. In August 1996 he was invited to the Beijing to discuss the PRC’s proposed infrastructural investment in South Africa, deemed ‘Dragon City’. News reports from the time indicate that the investment was between $12 and $18 billion USD. It was understood that this investment was contingent on the diplomatic recognition of the PRC.148

The inclusion of these individuals in this section of the report is necessary for confirming an earlier critique in the theory chapter – that of elite theory often viewing elites as one homogenous group. What is evident from the above recollections of the ANC and NEC members is that whilst the NEC would eventually find consensus on the ‘Two China’ issue, seemingly in August of 1996, as Minister Skweyiya relayed to Foreign Minister Qian,149 the political elites were not immune from dissension. **Future elite theory frameworks** would do well to provide leeway for potential divergences amongst elites.

**Public Diplomacy**

Later in 1995, the DFA arranged a conference with the *South African Institute of International Affairs* (SAIIA) and the *Foundation for Global Dialogue* entitled ‘South Africa and the two Chinas Dilemma’. Much of the discussions that emanated from this conference provided the base literature from which this research report formed, and remains an important secondary source contribution that highlight the debates and position of academics and policy-makers at the time of the China dilemma.150 Correspondingly, and rather comically, an antithetical conference was convened by the Consulate-General of the ROC after the SAIIA Conference occurred, entitled ‘The Taiwan Experience: Implications for South Africa’.151

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149 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, L. Labuschagne to T. Mazibuko, ‘Notes: Meeting Between Foreign Minister Skweyiya and Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian, Diaoyutai State Guest House, Beijing, 22 August 1996’, 23 August 1996.
151 The *Taiwan Experience* conference, as is implied in the title, produced articles advocating for the ROC’s maintenance of diplomatic ties with South Africa, and thus showed more support for the notion of dual recognition than the SAIIA conference. See J. Daniel, ‘One China or two? South Africa’s Foreign Policy
Whilst Mandela did not attend either conference, one of the papers was found amongst the archival documentation with his personal papers. The paper in question was Deon Geldenhuys’ *South Africa and the China question: A case for dual recognition*. Vol. 6. East Asia Project (EAP), (Dept. of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, 1995). Given knowledge that Mandela had high hopes for the pursuance of dual recognition, it is interesting that this paper had made its way into his collection of papers. FPDM does not consider the role of non-state actors, such as think-tanks, research institutes, and study centres, in influencing the decision making that occurs. These two conferences, and the way in which their research infiltrated even the presidential office, is evidence enough that their inclusion in theories of foreign policy decision making is of great importance.

1996 UNCTAD Conference

Despite the President’s desire for dual recognition, his respect for the democratic process was evident when Madame Wu Yi, the Head of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, visited South Africa in April 1996 for the UNCTAD Conference. She was informed by Mandela that there was growing consensus within the NEC to recognise the PRC. Yet, in continuing his modus operandi, Mandela stressed the need for a measured way forward and his desire to first justify and explain to the Taiwanese about the switch. The President appears to have been sincere about this, as he tried to secure a meeting with President Jiang Zemin shortly after Wu’s trip. Zemin had been travelling throughout the continent however, the meeting did not take place. It is not clear if this was because of schedule conflicts or if Mandela had been discouraged from meeting Zemin on the basis of the possible Chinese wrath if the meeting went ahead.

The fact that Mandela mentioned the NEC in his talk with Madame Wu reaffirms his adherence to the collective decision making capacity of the NEC. It would appear that an announcement by Mandela was imminent given the consensus in the NEC. Yet, Mandela was still hopeful that dual recognition might be feasible, especially if the ROC and the PRC were to resolve their dispute. This hope was often interpreted as South Africa ‘fence-sitting’, as


153 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, A. Nzo letter to N. Mandela, 7 May 1996.
depicted in the below 1996 Zapiro cartoon. South Africa was in its third year as a diplomatic country and yet it had still not achieved consensus regarding the China decision. Nzo, as foreign minister, was constantly having to reassure either the Taiwanese or Chinese about which China South Africa was going to choose.

![Cartoon by Zapiro, Sowetan © 1996. All rights reserved - For more Zapiro cartoons visit www.zapiro.com](https://example.com/cartoon)

**Objective of Minister Nzo’s 1996 Mission**

An additional round of trips to both Taiwan and Beijing in 1996 served the purpose of ascertaining where South Africa stood with the respective Chinas and afforded the delegations opportunities to compile reports, only after which was the decision then made in the NEC. This appears to have been a matter of principle:

… it would not have been fair to have a major decision like that without having visited both Chinas. And that was part of the plan to visit both, and then report on both, as well as our own recommendations… Individuals might have decided on their own “look man, there’s no point even going to Taiwan”, quite possible, but for the purpose of objectivity, and whatnot, we had to give a report on both countries. Or visit both of them.¹⁵⁴

Sisulu recalled how there was more than one purpose of the mission:

First one was to establish formally… in the past we had a relationship as the ANC, not in government, now we’re in government, it was to formalise that relationship. Government to government. Party to party relationship. That’s why we went to China, and it also was to, in a

¹⁵⁴ M, Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017.
sense, thank the Chinese for the contribution that they made to the struggle. They didn’t contribute as much as the Russians did but it was a contribution. But also it was to make a point that our policy, foreign policy, would be determined by ourselves. We can’t expect somebody, not Russia, not China, not anybody, not America. We’re very proud about our independence, and therefore we made sure that in any relationship it would not be at the expense of our own policies. Maybe when we still freedom fighters, the situation was a bit different but now that we are an independent country we exercise our independence. Also in terms of who we want to have relations with and the nature of the relationship, or the extent of the relationship. So, we accept that yes, we are good friends with Mainland China, always been, but we accept that we also have relations with other countries.\textsuperscript{155}

Whilst the Mission was referred to as a ‘fact-finding’ mission, it does not appear that there were many facts to find, in relation to the China decision and the notion of dual recognition. Those that were on the trip knew that dual recognition was not an option the PRC would accept, and knew that South Africa’s recognition of the PRC was imminent:

Well, it was clear to us even before we went to China. We were not going to China to persuade China to have a special relationship with us. It was a fact-finding mission, and we had honest, frank discussions with China, and the Chinese told us, basically, what we already knew. It wasn’t like it was a shock, we knew this.\textsuperscript{156}

It would appear to be strange that such a high-level delegation was convened if it was already understood that the China decision had already been made within the NEC however, the mission was at the special request of President Mandela. Sisulu explained that the trip came from “the insistence of Mandela that there should be a high-level delegation to China, led by Nzo, not anybody else.”\textsuperscript{157} Sending Nzo was a clear message that South Africa was serious about its ties with the PRC. Also, Sisulu clarified that although it had been clear to the ANC for some time that recognition of the PRC was crucial, the decision was only officially made after the mission returned and the report had been drafted. Additionally, he suggested that this may have been one last attempt by President Mandela to ascertain just how unachievable dual recognition was:

And we also had to come back and talk to Mandela, who might not have been on the same wavelength as everybody, and so we had to go and comeback and give a report, and after that report a decision was then taken. It could not have been taken before. So this was an important mission, and it took a bit long, but because it’s the nature of the thing. You’re

\textsuperscript{155} M, Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017.

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
talking about the future, long-term relationships; it’s not just, you know, Lesotho… That’s why it took a couple of months because it was also debated internally in the NEC of the ANC, the Executive Committee of the ANC.  

He clarified that this different wavelength was President Mandela’s desire for dual recognition:

Part of the visit was to just gauge if it was possible, so clearly after that visit it was not possible to have the same kind of relations between the two. The Chinese made it abundantly clear to us. They would NOT accept that.  

Whilst the ANC was well aware of President Mandela’s desire to achieve dual recognition, it was equally clear that the China decision would be a collective one within the structures of the NEC.

Yes Mandela, who had his views but the views of an individual in the ANC cannot overwrite the collective decision making process. Once the report was out there, people in the ANC went “this is it”. You can’t change Chinese position. And China’s an important player and so we had to recognise that. And also, a lot of us didn’t feel particularly sympathetic to Taiwan because they never supported us in the struggle, China did. So it was not a difficult decision to make. It was realistic, it was in line with what’s happening globally, and it also didn’t feel particularly pained by it…

Following the presidential delegations to the ROC and PRC in 1996, a memorandum was drawn-up and deduced that whilst the ‘Two China’ issue would be best resolved amongst the PRC and the ROC, it did not seem like a likely outcome. The memo also made mention to Mandela’s attempts to act as a mediator in the dispute countering with the reality that the PRC would not accept foreign involvement or mediation. The report concluded that, given the upcoming transfer of Hong Kong back to PRC sovereignty:

Our view is that it is in line with our interests as a country to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC as a matter of urgency…Regrettably, it is our view that there is no alternative way of establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, other than transforming relations with Taiwan into unofficial relations. We believe that this must be managed in a manner that is as sensitive as possible. But the choice is unavoidable. We believe that is essential to now move swiftly.

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158 M, Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017.
159 Ibid.
160 UFH, NAHECS, NMP, Box 186, Folder 354, Report and Recommendations of the ANC Component of the Presidential Delegation to People’s Republic of China and Taiwan’, n.d.
Yet, the ‘seesaw’ nature continued in spite of the memo’s concerns. In July, whilst Nzo was in Taiwan many believed he was there to prepare the ROC for the switch in recognition, yet back in South Africa Mandela told journalists that:

Taiwan supported us during the later phase of the struggle against apartheid...as did the People’s Republic of China. It is not easy for me to be assisted by a country, and once I come to power say ‘I have no relations with you.’ I haven’t got that type of immorality and I will not do that.  

Additionally, in August 1996, Mandela referenced Taiwan as a country whilst an ROC delegation was visiting South Africa. His statements, justifiably, exasperated the PRC who believed South Africa was close to formally recognising them.

By August 1996, the ANC’s NEC had decided that formal diplomatic relations with the PRC needed to be established. Mbeki realised that President Mandela was still convinced of a dual recognition approach. Mbeki held a meeting to discuss the ‘China issue’ with Rusty Evans, Aziz Pahad, and Alfred Nzo in what appeared to be an attempt to place pressure on Mandela to make the switch. When Mbeki questioned the group about any objections to announcing diplomatic recognition of the PRC, Evans presented Mandela’s belief that South Africa should try a dual recognition approach. Evans further justified Mandela’s stance as being the result of his relationship with Ambassador Loh and the debt he felt he owed the Taiwanese. This did not sit well with Mbeki. He informed Evans that South Africa had to recognise China, and that they would begin a process to switch recognition. The implication that ‘they’ would begin the process shows the separation between the NEC and the President at the time. The NEC were not willing to wait to see if dual recognition could be achieved. They understood the impossibility of the PRC accepting dual recognition. Likewise, the NEC was aware of Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty and what this meant for South Africa.

It is interesting that Mbeki invited three senior DFA individuals, Evans, Pahad and Nzo and did not speak directly to Mandela about the NEC’s decision. Perhaps there are other explanations for this, schedule conflicts for one, yet, it could be perceived as an indication that Mbeki believed that it would be better if the three officials would convince Mandela to make the announcement, as opposed to Mbeki convincing Mandela. It is also interesting how,

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162 A. Pahad, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 7 March 2017.
163 L. Evans, interview by C. Williams, Pretoria, 23 February 2015.
if the NEC had already made the decision, why it would take a further three months until Mandela announced the decision in November? Perhaps the channels in the decision making schema of the NEC are not as clear as believed. Given that the archival evidence does not provide explanations for this, nor did the interviewees, we are unable to clarify this. When analysing other foreign policy decisions it would be beneficial to remember the agency of the President. Whilst Mandela may not have had the autonomy to continue to pursue dual recognition when the NEC had decided, he perhaps had agency in deciding when and how he would announce the decision.

On 26 November, one day prior to Mandela’s announcement, he informed Loh I-Cheng of the switch in diplomatic recognition at a meeting which Rusty Evans was present at. Mandela explained to Loh how it was an ANC decision “… it’s out of my hands. It’s the organisation, you know.” Aside from Evans’ recollection of Mandela’s meeting with Loh, at which he was present, Evans surmised that he did not believe that the decision was a ‘Nelson Mandela’ decision, and that “I think it was an ANC decision taken within the coherent structures of the ANC, at that time.” Max Sisulu agreed, and clarified that, as a member of the ANC’s NEC, ‘We had made our decision collectively, so the ANC had decided that this is the best way to go…The recommendations coming from Nzo’s mission. And so, Madiba had to live with it. That’s the nature of a democracy.’ Sisulu concluded how this showed Mandela’s adherence to the collective decisions of the NEC. This further confirms the role of elites in South Africa’s China decision, and in particular, the role of the NEC in South Africa’s foreign policy decision making, a reality that current FPDM models do not explain.

Previous commentators on the ‘Two China’ issue believed the decision was entirely in the hands of President Mandela. The archival documentation and interviews have proven this to be untrue, and have indicated that there was a very intricate relationship between Mandela and the ANC. Mandela did not make the decision but rather accepted the decision that had been made within the structures of the NEC.

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164 L. Evans, interview by C. Williams and C. Hurst, Pretoria, 2 March 2017.
165 Ibid.
166 M, Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017.
167 In particular, see D. Geldenhuys, ‘The Politics of South Africa’s ‘China Switch,’” Issues and Studies, 33, 7 (July 1997), 93-131.
Consensus

On the 4th November 1996, Nzo’s final letter on the subject of the ‘Two China’ issue was sent to Mandela (See Appendix 5). This emphasised the unequivocal view that South Africa had to recognise the PRC as Nzo stressed how the PRC could close the Consul-General in Hong Kong, revoke the MFN status, and cause other economic challenges for South Africa in relation to the trade with Hong Kong. The severity of the potential backlash for South Africa appears to have been conveyed aptly, and after almost thirty months of trying to achieve dual recognition, President Mandela finally accepted the collective decision of the NEC and announced the severance of diplomatic ties with Taiwan and the entrance into formal diplomatic relations with the PRC.168 Sisulu recalled:

Mandela’s a person of strong views to try and persuade, but also he’s a democrat when decisions are made, collective decisions. He’ll stick by those, he won’t seek to change them alone. He would want to persuade people but if that doesn’t work, and there’s a collective view on a matter, he’ll stick with it and pursue it. So he’s not like a godfather, “you must do as I tell you”. He’s got strong views and he articulates them, he doesn’t shy away from articulating his views, but once a collective decision has been made, he abides by it.169

Although it has been shown that there were many factors influencing the decision, during the announcement, and as indicated in the simultaneous press release (See Appendix 6), Mandela provided just one reason for the switch in diplomatic recognition:

In its international relations, South Africa has become an active participant within the ambit of the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as within the UN system. A permanent continuation of diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China on [sic] Taiwan is inconsistent with South Africa’s role in International affairs.170

Yet, when Mandela was interviewed by journalist Tim Modise in February 1997, he made no reference to the ‘international relations’ factor but did confirm the dual recognition negotiations, concluding how this was not feasible and that a choice had to be made:

We negotiated with them (Beijing and Taipei), over these last two and a half years, to say we are prepared to retain our diplomatic relations with Taiwan and at the same

168 Given the date of this letter, and the subsequent announcement by President Mandela less than 30 days later, it would appear that this letter, and those before it, influenced the decision making and also the timing.
169 M, Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017.
170 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, Office of the President, Media Release Attention: All Editors. ‘South Africa’s Relations with the Greater China Region’, 27 November 1996.
time establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China…but we couldn’t resolve the position in that way. We had to choose between the two…\textsuperscript{171}

Mandela’s use of ‘we’ in the above quotations echo the eventual collective decision making that occurred. This chapter has analysed the narrative that played out, as supported through the archival documentation and the interviews, ultimately showing that whilst there were initially internal disagreements within the ANC’s NEC and the DFA’s Asia Directorate about the prospects of dual recognition, the majority of its respective MPs and officials realised that the establishment of diplomatic relations with only the PRC was the only way forward. The NEC was therefore at the helm of this decision making process, followed by the DFA’s role in ensuring that their research and information pertaining to the recognition issue reached the President’s Office.\textsuperscript{172} These two ‘bodies’ were able to turn dissension into consensus in order to convince and pressure Mandela to make the announcement that would be in South Africa’s best interest.

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\textsuperscript{171} N. Mandela interviewed by T. Modise on the SABC programme, \textit{Focus}. SABC Media Libraries, Johannesburg, 10 February 1997.

\textsuperscript{172} DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, A. Nzo to N. Mandela, ‘Greater China Region: Important Political Developments’, 4 November 1996. Nzo’s letters were usually drafted by the DFA’s Asia Directorate, and thus further substantiate the important role played by the DFA.
Chapter Four
Chinese Diplomacy

“To be honest, although there was competition, we and the mainland, in the fight for diplomatic relations, never engaged in ‘auction bidding’.” – Ambassador Loh, in his memoir Valiant but Fruitless Endeavors.

The above translation taken from Loh’s memoir is rather amusing. It is in reference to when he was asked by President Lee in November 1992 how much money the ROC should donate to South Africa, and Loh replied with the amount of $10 million. He explained that perhaps he was “sub-consciously” thinking of the PRC’s donation in October 1992, coincidentally also $10 million. Not only does Loh’s own words do little to dispel notions of ‘auction bidding”, the archival evidence and interviews have shown that there were definite elements of ‘chequebook’ diplomacy, from both Taiwan and Beijing, in their attempts to secure sole diplomatic representation. The following chapter explores these attempts through the recollections of the key Chinese protagonists on either of the Taiwan strait, Qian Qichen, the PRC Foreign Minister, and Loh I-Cheng, the ROC’s Ambassador to South Africa. Additionally, an incorporation of Taiwanese and Chinese news reports from the time will be discussed to provide an understanding of how South Africa’s decision making was perceived by the two Chinas. Existing literature on the switch has given little attention to these recollections that provide necessary perceptions to the interjections of South African perspectives.

As 1995 progressed, it became clear that South Africa’s China decision had still not been made, or rather, President Mandela’s dual recognition approach was still being embraced. This uncertainty fuelled anxiety amongst the Taiwanese and the Chinese. In February 1995, Ji Peiding met Thabo Mbeki to emphasise that the PRC sought to normalise relations between themselves and South Africa; for South Africa to withdraw recognition of the ROC and enter into diplomatic relations with the PRC. Mbeki, unlike Mandela, knew that the possibility of achieving dual recognition was not strong and thus saw ‘the switch’ as imminent. The deputy-president agreed with Ji’s desire to formalise relations, and promised

to speak with Minister Nzo. Mbeki’s pro-PRC stance was not welcomed by Ambassador Loh whose friendship with Mandela was a stark contrast to his interactions with Mbeki.

**The ROC’s Efforts**

**Mandela and Loh**

Throughout Loh’s memoir he emphasised the supposed close friendship he had with President Mandela, reiterating how his “personal relationship with Mandela, after he became president, developed further”. He also included references to times Mandela called him at his residence, even spending time speaking to Loh’s wife, Jane. These sentiments are confirmed by some of the interviewees. Sisulu explained how “Mandela had good personal relations with the Ambassador from Taiwan, he was a very good guy, he invited us to his house, with my dad, gave us very good food. But that didn’t change our minds about China, Mainland China.” Whilst Sisulu appears to recall Loh fondly, others were more sceptical of his character and the strength of this ‘friendship’:

> I heard a lot about this relationship, and Ambassador Loh I Cheng was not shy to boast about his relationship with President Mandela and also other politicians. He was always name dropping, and who he saw, what they discussed, but at the same time did it help him? He saw a lot of people in the political parties, ANC, IFP, but how close his relationship was, I cannot say, but he claimed he was close. But I always took it with a pinch of salt.

Basson’s view of Loh was shared by Ambassador Botha who also questioned the materialisation of the ROC’s promised, particularly regarding investments they promised:

> ... I know Ambassador Loh was, and I could never figure it out, from Taiwan, was very connected. I think it was his third posting in South Africa. But he was not a pleasant person to deal with, he was quite aggressive, quite, I don’t think he gives Taiwanese a good shake. I know that he got very angry with Nina and me, and wrote about us in his books, because we were “obstructionist” and “pro-Beijing”, which was never the case, but I think he was the one who drove all of it, when he was here. And I think when the switch was made, I think what they did, their strategy was to hang these carrots out there and to drag them out as long as

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possible. And I think he was very impressed that it took up to 1998, before officially. So he actually gave Taiwan another four years which nobody expected, so there was always going to be these carrots and these projects, and it was incremental, but so slow, that they could drag them on. Again, I might do them a great injustice but that was just my assessment of the dissidence.\textsuperscript{177}

Although Loh did not mention Botha in his memoir, he did specifically mention Nina Human when stating that South African diplomats experienced pressure from Beijing, saying that “although she was not a Communist, she saw me as the trouble maker and gave me a hard time. I believe she was influenced by CCP’s strategy.”\textsuperscript{178} Human was well aware of how Loh had depicted her saying, “…in his memoirs he referred to me as giving him a very hard time, and I was a fellow traveller of the South African Communist Party!” Human denied this, insisting she is “a capitalist to the core of my bones”. Whilst her depiction of Loh was not entirely favourable either, Human did concede that “Look, I think he was a very good diplomatic [sic] for his country, he tried very hard to keep relations.”\textsuperscript{179}

The methods and means of his efforts, although undoubtedly tenacious, appear to have had a dubious undercurrent. Human learnt that in May 1994, ‘Pik’ Botha, then the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs, had given Loh “the word-for-word briefing on the discussion in Cabinet surrounding the issue of recognising Beijing and cutting ties with Taipei”. Although Loh does not disclose his source, it appears that Human was correct as he specifically mentions the Cabinet meeting in question. This meeting saw Joe Slovo, the Minister of Housing in the GNU, propose that South Africa should establish ties with the PRC and cut ties with Taiwan. Loh said that the SACP were placing increasing pressure on Cabinet to switch recognition. Yet, somehow, Loh knows that tensions arose because Slovo did not have the support of the entire Cabinet. According to Loh, about half of the ministers were ‘pro-ROC’, including F.W. de Klerk, ‘Pik’ Both, and Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who apparently raised their opposition during the meeting.\textsuperscript{180}

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\textsuperscript{177} P. J. Botha, interview by C. Williams, Cape Town, 17 February 2017.
\textsuperscript{179} N. K. Human, interview by C. Williams and C. Hurst, Pretoria, 5 December 2016.
\end{flushleft}
Gary Lin’s thesis further confirms that the Taiwanese had access to notes from the Cabinet. Lin, utilising the Taiwanese embassy’s archives, cites the same meeting although, he included Joe Modise and the Director-General of Foreign Affairs, Leo ‘Rusty’ Evans, as being ‘pro-ROC’.\(^{181}\) Whilst Evans denied being ‘pro-ROC’, during his interview he explained why it was perceived that he was ‘pro-ROC’. In particular, he spoke about a meeting convened in August 1996, by Thabo Mbeki at his home in Pretoria. Those attending included Alfred Nzo, Aziz Pahad, and Evans. According to Evans, Mbeki asked “Is there anyone here who is not persuaded that we have to recognise China?” Evans, guided by Mandela’s stance of dual recognition, told Mbeki that:

> And I said, Mr. [Vice] President, you know, “in a nutshell, our approach to this issue is and our understanding of the governmental position on the Chinas is that we should conduct a two China policy and string this out at this stage. Because of the personal relationship between the President and the Taiwanese, and the understandings that he has given to the Taiwanese, and against the background of the fact that it is obviously inevitable that we are going to recognise Beijing, that’s our understanding of it.”\(^{182}\)

Mbeki was not satisfied with Evans’ viewpoint and tasked the assembled people with setting a process in motion to recognise the PRC. It is evident that Loh did not share the same ‘friendship’ with Mbeki, something which Loh had been aware of. Loh explained that he was always trying to figure out what Mbeki’s next step was or what was in Mbeki’s mind regarding his diplomatic intentions. Loh deems Mbeki as “incomparable” to any other politician he had ever met or engaged with before. Loh concluded that he did his best to establish a relationship with Mbeki but found him distant. Loh described in his memoir how even though he had known Mbeki for quite some time, Mbeki was not someone who let you know what he was thinking, and he recalled their interactions in the same vein as playing chess, or a “diplomatic minuet”. An example Loh gave was when he wanted Mandela to visit the ROC in 1992 but Mbeki wanted to send Walter Sisulu because Sisulu was older and about to retire, and would therefore not be seen as being as influential as Mandela. Loh believed that Mbeki wanted to send Sisulu because it was less likely to bring great attention.\(^{183}\)

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\(^{182}\) L. Evans, interview by C. Williams, Pretoria, 23 February 2015.

Contrastingly, Loh responded well to Mandela’s charisma, as did Mandela to Loh’s appeasing nature. This symbiotic dynamic was not shared with Mandela and the PRC. Evans described how:

Where he had this warm relationship with I-Cheng Loh, I don’t think he had… I don’t think the PRC had made any effort to develop a personal relationship with him or with the ANC for that matter, in that way. You know, so I don’t think there was a sense of, if you’re talking about the personality now, that Mandela had any reason to have a sense of warmth towards the PRC, I’m not saying that he was cold towards them, I’m just saying that I-Cheng Loh succeeded in, you know, being a good diplomat and establishing a personal relationship with the President, with Nelson Mandela of South Africa, and that that counted a lot towards his thinking, and in the sense of, the person that he is, him being committed to something, to an issue. I-Cheng Loh must get the credit for that.  

Evans went on to clarify that it was not a personal friendship, although he had insinuated such when he spoke up to Mbeki, but that Mandela had a high regard for Loh, as an Ambassador and that this had contributed to the delay in the announcement of the switch:

I think that change was possibly delayed by, let’s say six months, just because he felt so bad about how I-Cheng Loh was going to feel when he had to eventually tell him it was all over. And that eventually happened, of course… And Mandela, I think he had given I-Cheng Loh the understanding that as long he is president, we would try and maintain a dual policy, a double recognition type thing. But Beijing had different ideas, and they saw their opportunity.

Whilst the above recollections display different perspectives of the exact nature of Mandela and Loh’s friendship, it is clear that Mandela’s loyalty to those that had helped his party, and had given promises to aid the country, was an important factor in the pursuance of dual recognition. Ironically, the very friendship between the South African President and the ROC Ambassador appears to have catalysed the timing of the announcement. Loh had informed the DFA that the ROC was planning to send its Foreign Minister and President to South Africa early in 1997. A visit of this type would have highlighted the close ties between South Africa and the ROC, in turn creating a diplomatic disaster for South Africa by triggering the wrath of the PRC. The DFA, through Nzo, informed Mandela that the ROC delegation could

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185 L, Evans, interview by C. Williams, Pretoria, 23 February 2015.
186 The ROC had promised to support South Africa’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).
not be accepted, contributing to Mandela’s announcement that South Africa would be establishing formal diplomatic relations with the PRC, derecognising the ROC.

‘Chequebook’ Diplomacy: ‘Gifts of Guilt’?
Aside from the role of Mandela and Loh’s friendship, Chinese diplomacy was evident through the use of ‘chequebook diplomacy’. Sisulu noted the strength of the Taiwanese lobbying, “one thing about the Taiwanese, they are very good at lobbying, like I said we went to the Ambassador’s house, and they were very good at lobbying.”\textsuperscript{187} Sisulu too recalled the warm reception in Taiwan yet he saw these efforts as tokens for making up for having been supportive of the apartheid government saying:

> The Taiwanese, they also give you lots of gifts, and we couldn’t say “no, we don’t want gifts from you”. It was interesting, it was more like making-up for something…We never got support from them but we’re now a free country and we have a liberation movement. Mainly China gave us guns but Taiwan didn’t give us anything, they support our old regime so there was a bit of that, you know, guilt and that kind of thing. But also, we were there to tell them we know where you come from but what we want to see you doing is now supporting a new, democratic dispensation. In a sense, more investments from you. We, as Mandela said, we can forgive you, we won’t forget you supported apartheid… forgive you, but what we want is you to continue to support the new democratic dispensation.\textsuperscript{188}

The new government’s approach placed South Africa’s future ahead of past alliances, even those as inexcusable as links to the apartheid government. They welcomed Taiwan’s support and, as Sisulu observed, this forgiveness was not limited to Taiwan:

> Well, Taiwan had to make those donations because Taiwan was supporting the old order so it was important for them to begin to say “look, we now recognise there’s a new dispensation, a new democratic dispensation, and we want to contribute, we want to be part of the world, we’ll support the new democracy”. And Taiwan was one of those countries that was part of those, the change. Taiwan was not the only one, we got support from the United States who were supporting apartheid, Germany, so there was a change, to say look, “there’s a change in South Africa”, and we were not going to say that “because you supported Apartheid, we don’t want your investments, we don’t want you sending skills or anything”.\textsuperscript{189} 

Nina Human also attested to the strength of the Taiwanese use of ‘dollar’ diplomacy:

\textsuperscript{187} M. Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017.
\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{189} \textit{Ibid.}
Because, at that time what we also said that the Taiwanese were doing here is ‘chequebook diplomacy’. For example they gave a lot of money to Nelson Mandela’s Children’s Fund. And they also wanted to open a vocation training centre for MK soldiers.\textsuperscript{190}

The PRC’s Efforts

‘Losing Face’

The notion of ‘losing face’, or being internationally shamed, featured in the decision making given how the longer South Africa delayed making a decision on the two China issue, the greater the embarrassment for the PRC. Botha explained that ‘By not recognising China [South Africa was] embarrassing and humiliating China, internationally.’\textsuperscript{191} The One China policy was respected almost universally but South Africa was trying to establish dual recognition thus completely undermining the territorial integrity of the PRC. The PRC was concerned that if they accepted South Africa’s dual recognition approach, that other states would follow similarly. Botha explained how the department were anxious about how the PRC may retaliate if South Africa continued to the delay the switch in recognition.

Botha recalled how Ji Peiding would ask him if he was aware of what was happening with regards to the recognition issue. Botha explained that he told Ji:

\begin{quote}
You’re not going to get this thing switched in DFA…you need to work within the ANC, because that is where the decision will be made. And it’s within the ANC that they can put sufficient pressure on Mandela to see the benefits, and to make him face up to what the reality is in the international community, in terms of China.\textsuperscript{192}
\end{quote}

Botha’s advice to Ji was sound, as evidenced through the archival documentation and interviews included in Chapter Three of this research report, the NEC would ultimately make the decision in August 1996, but prior to then, confusion would continue to frustrate the PRC.

Prior to his elections, President Mandela had made statements about how South Africa would adhere to the international arena on the matter of the two Chinas dilemma, technically signalling their imminent recognition of the PRC therefore, the PRC were not impressed that the still did not have official diplomatic relations by 1995. In April of 1995, Mandela further confused the situation when he was quoted saying that:

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{190}]N. K. Human, interview by C. Williams and C. Hurst, Pretoria, 5 December 2016.
\item[\textsuperscript{191}]P. J. Botha, interview by C. Williams, Cape Town, 17 February 2017.
\item[\textsuperscript{192}]\textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}}
We are part of the United Nations, and follow the policy of the United Nations. But nevertheless, we are an independent and sovereign country, and our relations with countries is [sic] determined first and foremost by our own interest. Now, it is in our interest to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.\textsuperscript{193}

This statement by President Mandela was welcomed by Ambassador Loh, who increased the number of South Africa’s being sent on trips to the ROC, as Botha recalled how Loh:

Invited almost every Member of Parliament to Taiwan, and I believe when you got off the plane you got $5000 USD? as a spending allowance. $5000, at that stage, was big money, 1994/95, for South Africans, it was serious, especially for a lot of MPs who had been living very harshly in exile. So they literally bought the whole parliament.\textsuperscript{194}

Not everyone saw this as positive for South Africa’s international image. Greg Mills concluded that, ‘It is extremely embarrassing that the Taiwanese seem to be buying our foreign policy.'\textsuperscript{195} Yet, Loh was on top form. In November 1995 he wrote an Op-Ed in the \textit{Business Day} where he advertised the training programmes of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) that the ROC had aided South Africa with.\textsuperscript{196} The close financial ties between the ROC and South Africa were further confirmed in December 1995 when Mandela confirmed that the ROC had given a “substantial” donation to the ANC for the 1994 elections, something that had always been suspected. Mandela also confirmed another suspicion, that South Africa would not be recognising the ROC, given their friendship.\textsuperscript{197} Mandela deemed an agreement to construct the training facility ‘an expression of just how far those relations [between the RSA and ROC] have been expanded.’\textsuperscript{198}

The Asia Directorate were not happy with the ROC’s utilisation of ‘chequebook diplomacy’ because part of their initial assessments under the new administration was going through all projects that the ROC had promised to see if they had kept their word. Botha confirmed that the ROC ‘didn’t put their money where their mouth is […] we did an assessment of the impact and investment, and it actually was a bit of a paper tiger, it wasn’t there.’\textsuperscript{199}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{194} P. J. Botha, interview by C. Williams, Cape Town, 17 February 2017, and P. Jordan, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 14 March 2017.
\textsuperscript{196} I-C. Loh, ‘Small-scale Agriculture needs to be developed’, \textit{Business Day}, 1 November 1995.
\textsuperscript{197} G. Davis, ‘For Sale SA’s Diplomatic Relations’, \textit{Mail & Guardian}, 8 December 1995.
\textsuperscript{198} SABC Television News Broadcast, 7 December 1995, SABC Media Libraries, Johannesburg.
\end{flushright}
Foreign Minister Qian confirmed in his memoirs that he too was suspicious of the intentions of the ROC’s pledges. When he met Mbeki in 1993, and was informed of Mandela’s trip to accept Taiwan’s donation to the ANC, he told Mbeki:

The ANC should be alert to this kind of activity on Taiwan’s part. It is understandable that you accept the aid, but you should by no means accept any attached political conditions.²⁰⁰

Yet, the ROC’s financial contributions could not match the political clout of the PRC.

Means of Coercion

The PRC appeared to favour methods of tactic ‘coercion’, as opposed to ‘chequebook’ diplomacy. In March 1995, Ji Peiding informed Les Labuschagne ‘that should South Africa wish to enter diplomatic relations in the not near future then it could be that China at that stage would in all likelihood not be interested or amenable.’ Ji also reminded Labuschagne that the status quo would not continue for South Africa once Hong Kong had reverted back to Chinese sovereignty. Labuschagne’s warned the department that ‘It would seem as if the velvet glove covering the iron fist is wearing thin and I interpret the oblique message as an indirect indication that China is not prepared to lose face over the South African issue.’²⁰¹

In November 1995, when Mandela requested backing from the PRC in order to condemn Nigeria’s Sani Abacha’s regime’s hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa,²⁰² in the UN Security Council, his letter to President Jiang Zemin was not as helpful as he had hoped. In the letter, the PRC president reminded Mandela of his 1992 visit to China and the statement which he made about how the new democratic South Africa would tackle the China decision in accordance with the international arena. Zemin stressed that the issue of Taiwan ‘bears on China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and involves the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation and the feelings of the 1.2 billion Chinese people. China can never accept the so-called ‘dual recognition’.²⁰³ Zemin was making it clear that South Africa needed to recognise the PRC as the sole China.

²⁰² DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, Letter from President N. Mandela to President Z. Jiang, 18 November 1995.
²⁰³ DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, Letter from President Z. Jiang to President N. Mandela, 30 November 1995.
The notion of making things ‘clearer’ was mirrored by Qian’s recollection. He recounted a conversation with Nzo in late 1996 where he indicated:

*I made it clear to Nzo that China would not oppose South Africa’s having economic and trade relations with Taiwan after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Africa. On the contrary, China would be glad to see the development of economic and trade relations between South Africa and Taiwan as long as the relations were nongovernmental.*

Qian ended his conversation with Nzo with another instance of the PRC’s subtle coercive reminders:

*I pointed out that Hong Kong, which had wide economic cooperation with South Africa, would return to China in July 1997, and we hoped that Sino-South African relations could see substantial development conducive to maintaining mutual economic interests between South Africa and Hong Kong. Nzo said that he had obtained a clearer understanding of these issues, and would report to President Mandela and urge him to make a decision as quickly as possible.*

Nzo’s 4 November 1996 letter to Mandela confirms that he did report these issues to the president, reiterating the direct role that Chinese diplomacy played in the decision making process.

Whilst South Africa was dealing with the two Chinas questions, the UN was in the process of appointing its next Secretary-General. The U.S. had made it clear that it would block the reappointment of Boutrous Boutrous Ghali yet the majority of the rest of the world, including China and the OAU, supported Ghali’s re-election. DFA officials were concerned that South Africa would be singled out if China decided to veto Ghali or any other candidate put forward by the OAU due to South Africa’s delay in recognising the PRC as the sole China. The memoirs of Ambassador Loh confirmed that this contestation was a factor in South Africa’s recognition of China, and also mentioned that other African states had begun to place pressure on South Africa to recognise the PRC in order for their continued support of the OAU’s Secretary-General nominee. South Africa had also hoped that should the UN undergo reforms, they might obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council, something

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which would not be accepted if South Africa maintained its recognition of the ROC. These two factors provide further examples of the way in which PRC coercion influenced the timing of the announcement. Whilst the decision to recognise the PRC was decided within the collective structures of the ANC’s NEC, this chapter has depicted the importance of the efforts of both the ROC and the PRC, and the significant impact these efforts had in firstly influencing why Mandela wanted to achieve dual recognition (the ROC’s electoral support, and his friendship with Ambassador Loh), and secondly, the timing of the decision (the PRC’s ‘reminders’ about Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty and the adverse impact this would have on South Africa if diplomatic relations were not intact).

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Conclusion
The 20\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary of Diplomatic Recognition

The 1 January 2018 marked 20 years since South Africa officially established formal diplomatic relations with the PRC. This research report’s engagement with newly declassified archival documentation, interviews with former South African political elites and officials, and the inclusion of Ambassador Loh and Foreign Minister Qian’s memoirs, has indicated the many facets of the decision making process and that key players who were controlling those processes, ultimately indicating that the decision was made within the collective structures of the ANC’s NEC.

The switch had been expected for a number of reasons. Economically, China’s substantial growth and the potential this offered for South Africa was at the forefront of why the country needed to recognise the PRC over the ROC. In 1995, whilst the ROC was South Africa’s greater trading partner, accounting for 3.1% of South Africa’s total trade in comparison with the PRC’s 1.3%, when the fact that the PRC had a greater population size and an economy larger than the ROC, along with the figures indicating the trade growth between South Africa and the PRC between 1989 and 1994, it was clear that trade with the PRC had grown significantly faster than with the ROC. Furthermore, when figures were examined in conjunction with South Africa’s trade with Hong Kong, the trading totals exceeded that of the ROC. This was important given Hong Kong’s imminent return to Chinese sovereignty in July 1997. The PRC had stressed that the status quo would not continue for countries that traded with Hong Kong but did not have full diplomatic recognition with the PRC, incentivising South Africa to establish exclusive diplomatic relations with the PRC before the return.

Politically, the realities of the PRC’s power, especially as one of the permanent five in the UN Security Council, was of great concern to South Africa as it re-entered the international arena after its first democratic elections. At the time, there was far greater diplomatic recognition and support for the PRC internationally, with 159 states recognising China, in comparison to the 29 that recognised Taiwan, emphasising how the recognition of China had become a global norm. Yet, whilst these above reasons were known, the reasoning behind the timing of the decision had merely been speculated. When the decision to switch diplomatic relations to the PRC was finally announced, almost 30 months later on the 27\textsuperscript{th} November 1996, Mandela referred only to the inconsistency South Africa’s relationship with Taiwan.
presented in relation to South Africa’s role in the international arena, specifically mentioning its participation in the OAU, the NAM, and the UN. These organisations recognised the PRC as the sole China, and thus Mandela was justifying how his country could not belong to these international organisations and continue to have diplomatic ties with Taiwan. However, from analysis of the DIRCO and Fort Hare archives, and interviews with political elites and officials who witnessed this decision making process, it is evident that there were other factors that contributed to the delay.

Firstly, it is clear that Mandela’s belief that South Africa could be the first country to achieve dual recognition played a pivotal role in the delayed announcement. Most of the ‘fact-finding’ missions to the PRC were ways for Mandela to ascertain whether a dual recognition approach may be accepted by the PRC. After Nzo’s final visit to the PRC, in August 1996, before the announcement, his delegation’s report reiterated the need for a decision to be made with regards to the two Chinas. By extension, this was a request for President Mandela to accept that dual recognition would never be accepted by the PRC. According to the officials interviewed, Thabo Mbeki, then Deputy President, had long believed that China would not accept a ‘two China’ policy and he played an important role in the consensus that was reached within the NEC. President Mandela accepted the NEC’s decision and went on to make the announcement, a good indicator of his respect for collective decision structures within the NEC. FPDM does not provide explanations for the divergence between party elites and their leaders, nor the ultimate adherence by the leaders to their parties’ decisions. Future FPDM frameworks would benefit from deconstructing the dynamics between the ruling party and its leader in decision making capacities, and the constraints inherent within the party’s structures.

Secondly, the DFA, and in particular, the role of Basson, Botha, Human, and Labuschagne contributed to the decision. These individuals from the Asia Directorate gathered and relayed the necessary information regarding the PRC and the ROC, as evident in many of the documentation where notes drawn up concerning the two China matter often mirrored the letters that Nzo sent to President Mandela.

Thirdly, increasing pressure from the PRC became a factor in the timing of the decision. The pressure was most visible in Nzo’s 4th November 1996 letter to President Mandela where the possible punitive measures the PRC may take were listed. This included Hong Kong’s
reversion to PRC sovereignty, and how this may have altered the connections that South Africa had with Hong Kong, if the PRC was not recognised as the sole China and diplomatic relations with the ROC were downgraded. This pressure had intensified after Mandela’s comments in August 1996 when he accidentally referred to Taiwan as a state.\textsuperscript{207} South Africa was condemned in the Chinese state controlled media, as evidenced in documentation received by the DFA from Xinhua Agency. Not only was Hong Kong an issue, South Africa’s MFN status with the PRC was also a potential benefit that could be withdrawn if the switch in recognition did not occur.

As detailed in Chapter Four, Mandela’s friendship with Ambassador Loh also contributed to the delay. Whilst those interviewed offered differing perspectives of the strength of the friendship, all agreed that President Mandela felt a sense of loyalty to the Taiwanese given their financial support during South Africa’s first democratic elections. Aside from the election money, the ROC had made assurances to aid South Africa’s in a range of fields, including the RDP and the Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans’ Association (MKMCA). Ironically, this very friendship catalysed the timing of the announcement. Loh had informed the DFA that the ROC was planning to send its Foreign Minister and President to South Africa early in 1997. A visit of this type would have highlighted the close ties between South Africa and the ROC, in turn creating a diplomatic disaster for South Africa by triggering the wrath of the PRC. The DFA, through Nzo, informed Mandela that the ROC delegation could not be accepted contributing to Mandela’s announcement.

The fifth factor is echoed in Mandela’s explanation during the announcement on the 27\textsuperscript{th} November, that South Africa’s non-recognition of the PRC was “inconsistent” with South Africa’s role in the international arena.\textsuperscript{208} The UN was in the process of its appointment of its next Secretary-General, with the U.S. having stated it would block the reappointment of Boutrous Boutrous Ghali yet the majority of the rest of the world, including China and the OAU, supported Ghali’s re-election. DFA officials were concerned that South Africa would be singled out if China decided to veto Ghali or any other candidate put forward by the OAU due to South Africa’s delay in recognising the PRC as the sole China. The memoirs of

\textsuperscript{207} DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, Nzo to N. Mandela, ‘Reaction by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to Continued diplomatic Relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan’, 16 October 1996. For the departmental reaction see Appendix 4.
\textsuperscript{208} DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, Office of the President, Media Release Attention: All Editors. ‘South Africa’s Relations with the Greater China Region’, 27 November 1996. For the full media release see Appendix 6.
Ambassador Loh confirmed that this contestation was a factor in South Africa’s recognition of China, and also mentioned that other African states had begun to place pressure on South Africa to recognise the PRC in order for their continued support of the OAU’s Secretary-General nominee. South Africa had also hoped that should the UN undergo reforms, that they might obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council, something which would have been impeded if South Africa maintained its recognition of the ROC.

These factors explain why the decision took as long as it did and why it was announced when it was, they also show the role the NEC’s collective decision making structures had in making the decision and ultimately ending President Mandela’s futile attempts at achieving dual recognition which, whilst ideal, would never have been entertained by the PRC. South Africa had to choose, and the choice had to be the PRC. The way in which the PRC subtly exerted power is indicative of the power differentials that were at play, power differentials that the PRC continues to leverage 20 years later.

Since 2009, China has been South Africa’s largest trading partner yet the sustainability of the relationship continues to be undermined by these power differentials. An unfavourable trade imbalance, along with a trade composition that is harmful to South Africa’s natural resources, is impeding the potential for a truly mutually beneficial partnership, and the power leveraged by the PRC during the diplomatic recognition deliberations in the 1990s continues to underlie the bilateral ties. Whilst this research report is not focussed on providing formal recommendations or delving specifically into the current power dynamics, it is hoped that the implications of the revelations found within the archival documentation and the interaction with those former political elites and governmental officials involved in the decision making process, will aid in understanding the foundation upon which the relationship between South Africa and China was established in the post-apartheid era.

Finally, this case study provides clarity and insight into how foreign policy decisions were made in the immediate post-apartheid South Africa. In particular, within the collective capacity and structures of the NEC, with input from the DFA, and not at the sole discretion of Nelson Mandela. In January 1997, an article in the Sowetan titled SA’s struggle with foreign policy: Unpredictability seems to be one of the salient characteristics of SA policy” criticised the way in which South Africa’s foreign policy was developing in the post-apartheid era. Specifically, the article deemed its diplomacy to be running on “two separate tracks”: the first
being the DFA “where events are weighed in the cold light of history and African National Congress policy experts are consulted and options are passed upward through Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki”. 209 The second track, according to the writer, Donald McNeil Jnr, “is whatever President Nelson Mandela decides to announce”. McNeil Jnr went on to provide the then recent announcement of South Africa’s switch in recognition from the ROC to the PRC as a paradigm purportedly supporting his argument, saying “he (Mandela) sometimes pulls abrupt switches, as he did on November 27, when he announced that South Africa would drop diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in favour of China”.

Whilst McNeil’s analogy to a ‘two track’ foreign policy decision making process is not without merit, the very intricacies of South Africa’s foreign policy decision making process cannot be reduced. The archival documentation and interview data have clarified that the ‘tracks’ were more akin to a ‘jointed-track’ system: the decision to recognise Beijing was not one reached at abruptly, nor at the sole discretion of President Mandela. Instead, the announcement was the culmination of almost 30 months of deliberation within the President’s Office, the ANC’s NEC, and the DFA; a process of building consensus amongst the dissension. The importance placed on building consensus amongst dissension is crucial in comprehending South Africa’s diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China.

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**Online Resources**


**Thesis**

Indices

Archival Documentation

Appendix 1 – Page one of the press release from the ANC’s Tokyo Office in May 1990 describing how Mr. Matsila’s visa was withdrawn.210

ANC-Tokyo Office Press Release

TAIWAN WITHDRAWS VISA FOR ANC CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE TO JAPAN

On the 23rd of May, 1990, Mr. Chung, the Taiwanese Deputy Representative at the Association of East Asian Relations-Tokyo office, called and informed the ANC Chief Representative Office that Taipei had instructed him to cancel the visa issued to Jerry Matsila, ANC Chief Representative to Japan and East Asia, for Taiwan. The visa was issued in May 1990 and was good for two weeks.

Taiwan was on the itinerary of his four nation visit to South East Asia to meet with government officials and brief them about the current developments in South Africa, to solicit support for ANC and to urge them to strengthen sanctions against the F.W.de Klerk government.

The visit was also intended to coincide with the visit, at the invitation of the governments of Singapore and Malaysia, of AMANDLA, the 30 member ANC Cultural Musical and Dancing performers. The ANC Group will be taking part at the Singapore Festival of Arts May 20-June 8 and will visit Malaysia June 6-12 to take part in Malaysia Year activities.

The ANC Representative planned to visit Taipei from June 6-8 to meet with government representatives, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party and the Labour Party, including Churches and Human Rights groups. The ANC Chief Representative, Jerry Matsila informed the Taiwanese representative that he wanted to:

(a) persuade the Taiwanese government to reconsider its diplomatic ties with Pretoria. Taiwan is the only Asian country with full diplomatic ties with the racist republic.
(b) urge Taipei to cut off trade relations and impose sanctions on South Africa, like its major trading partners did.
(c) that Taiwan should not undermine the sacrifices of other countries that have imposed sanctions on Pretoria by taking over "closed markets”
(d) that Taiwan should not use its territory for sanction based activities.

Appendix 2 - Page two of the press release includes the ‘reasoning’ for the withdrawal of Mr. Matsila’s visa – that of the ANC supposedly being a “terrorist” organisation.

The Chief Representative also intended to get the Taiwanese view on reports that:

(a) Taiwan has a nuclear collaboration with Pretoria
(b) Taiwan is used as a promotion and trading point by the South African State Owned Arms Industry (Armsco) in violation of United Nations Security Council Arms Embargo against Pretoria because of its racist policies/apartheid.

In 1987-88, Taiwan trade with South Africa increased by 110 percent and increased further dramatically in 1989. Additionally, Taiwan has over 100 companies in the Bantustands, Pretoria created enclaves called Bantustands where 15 millions Black people are forced to live. 90% of wages paid to the worker in these Bantustand companies is subsidised by Pretoria and company owners pays the remaining 10%. Trade unions are not allowed in these Bantustand companies, the biggest chop-stick factory in the world is Taiwanese owned and is in the homeland of Censkei.

Taiwan also has trade promotion offices in these Bantustands. Taipei and Bantustand leaders often frequent the province.

The reasons for canceling the visa given to ANC Representative, Jerry Matsila by Mr. Chung was that Taipei regards the ANC as a “terrorist” organisation. Taiwan, which has achieved full democracy, does not want to get involved in the affairs of South Africa.

The reasons and explanation given indicates that Pretoria intervened and urged Taipei to block the entry of the ANC’s representative for fear that such visits, like similar ones held earlier in other East Asian countries will result in the increase of Anti-Apartheid activities, the isolation of Pretoria and failure by Pretoria to woo investors and technicians from the region to South Africa.

The cancellation also shows that Taipei sincerely regards the apartheid regime as an important ally, for both suffer from international isolation. However the visa cancellation might have created a base for the future severance of “diplomatic” ties between Taipei and democratic South Africa. The ANC Representative expressed great regret and indicated possible repercussions.

The Chief Representative also informed Mr. Chung that the ANC and the majority of people in South Africa and the world will be shocked by its government labeling it a “terrorist” organisation.

TOKYO
90.05.28
Appendix 4 – A letter from Mr. A. Pahad to President Mandela, from the ROC President. The letter stipulates “The Peoples republic [sic] of China will always support the ANC in its struggle for a democratic South Africa”. Ironically, the appendix above, appendix 3, was sent less than two years prior and deemed the ANC a “terrorist” organisation.

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African National Congress

51 Plein Street
Johannesburg 2001
P.O. Box 61884
Marshalltown 2077

To: President Mandela

From: A. Ziz Pahad
Department of International Affairs

Date: 5/01/1993

MESSAGE FROM THE STATE PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC TO PRESIDENT MANDELA.

The State President received President Mandela’s letter dated 17 December 1992 for which he is thankful.

The State President conveys seasonal greetings.

He was happy to receive briefings on the current political situation. He welcomes the positive results in the bilateral talks with the government and other political organisations.

He sincerely hopes that CODESA multi-party negotiations resume as soon as possible and that positive results emerge from this.

The visit of President Mandela to the Peoples Republic of China was very successful and has strengthened the traditional relations between the Peoples Republic of China and the ANC. Personally, the State President was happy to have met President Mandela and this meeting has built a personal and brotherly relationship.

The Peoples republic of China will always support the ANC in its struggle for a democratic South Africa.

The People Shall Govern!

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211 UFH, NAHECS, NMP, Box 246, Folder 6, Letter from A. Pahad to N. Mandela, ‘Message from the State President of the People’s Republic to President Mandela,’ 5 January 1993.
Appendix 4 – A letter from Mr. Nzo to President Mandela in October 1996 stressing the PRC’s anger after Mandela had met with the ROC Vice-Premier and accidentally referred to Taiwan as a country.\footnote{DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, Nzo to N. Mandela, ‘Reaction by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to Continued diplomatic Relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan’, 16 October 1996.}
Appendix 5 – The front page of a five page letter sent from Mr. Nzo to President Mandela in November 1996 where Nzo stressed the “attitude of the PRC has indeed hardened towards South Africa to the degree where they are contemplating various punitive measures against South Africa”. This letter was sent less than three weeks prior to Mandela’s announcement.\textsuperscript{213}

\textsuperscript{213} DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, A. Nzo to N. Mandela, ‘Greater China Region: Important Political Developments’, 4 November 1996.
Appendix 6 – The media release from the Office of the President announcing the switch in the diplomatic recognition. President Mandela stressed the “enormous appreciation” South Africa had for the ROC, and paid “special tribute” to Ambassador Loh. Only a single reasoning is given; that of diplomatic recognition of the ROC being “inconsistent with South Africa’s role in international affairs”.  

DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, Office of the President, Media Release Attention: All Editors. ‘South Africa’s Relations with the Greater China Region’, 27 November 1996.
May 26, 2017

Dear Faculty of Humanities:

My name is Christopher Williams and I am PhD Candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Boston. Since July 2014 I have been based in the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand as a visiting lecturer and researcher.

Late in 2016, I began work with Claire Hurst on a research project that explores the origins of South Africa’s diplomatic relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In particular, we are examining how the Nelson Mandela Administration decided to switch recognition from the Republic of China on Taiwan to the PRC. As part of this research effort, Claire and I have accessed archival documents from the Department of International Relations and Cooperation and the ANC Archives at Fort Hare. To supplement this archival material, we have conducted several research interviews with former South African officials involved in the policy making process. As the senior researcher, I have conducted these interviews. Claire has assisted with drafting research questions, and on some occasions has sat in on the discussions to observe the interview process.

Claire has contributed substantially to the research effort and I grant her full permission to utilize these interviews as she sees fit for her own research purposes.

To be authorized to conduct these interviews I have completed several modules of the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) program on research ethics, and my work has been exempted from the Institutional Review Board because the interview subjects are appointed or elected officials. The CITI module was completed on April 18, 2013, and I was provided with reference number 10195111 upon completion.

Sincerely,

Christopher Williams

PhD, International Relations | Candidate
The Fletcher School | Tufts University
073-674-0410
christopher.williams@tufts.edu
Chapter 3: References to Mandela’s actions prior to his inauguration in 1994 have been changed to exclude the title ‘President’.

Chapter 4: Information on the PRC’s coercion, that was previously only mentioned in the conclusion, has been included on pages 68 & 69.

**Typographical errors:**

p.17, paragraph 2, line 5: comma after ‘PRC’ has been deleted.
p.17, paragraph 3, line 2: comma after ‘PRC’ has been deleted.
p.25, paragraph 1, line 5: semi-colon has been replaced with a colon.
p.30, paragraph 1, line 11: missing full-stop has been added.
p.35, point 6, line 2: the margin has been aligned to the left.
p.36, paragraph 2: semi-colon has been replaced by a colon before both indented quotes.
p.37, paragraph 2: semi-colon has been replaced by a colon before both indented quotes.
p.39, line 1: apostrophe and ‘s’ have been added.
p.44, paragraph 1, line 7: ‘these’ has been added.
p.44, paragraph 2, line 1: ‘were’ has been changed to ‘was’.
p.44, paragraph 2, line 1: changed “were” to “was”.
p.49, paragraph 2, line 2: changed “Blaze” to “Blade”.
p.70, paragraph 1, line 1: changed 1st to 1.