
by

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Doctor of Philosophy

University of Witwatersrand, South Africa
Wits School of Governance
DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE

I, Julius Kinyeki hereby declare that this PhD thesis: Reconstruction and Recovery Process of the 2007/2008 Post-Election Violence Victims in Kenya is my original work and has never been previously submitted either as a whole or part in any University or any institution of learning for any kind of award.

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ABSTRACT
This research addresses three questions: how Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) following the post-election violence of 2007/2008 in Kenya are recreating their community resilience capacities; how the Kenyan government and non-state interventions are influencing the victims’ livelihood strategies towards their reconstruction and recovery process and how social support and social capital has accelerated their reconstruction and recovery process. It proposes a post-conflict reconstruction and recovery approach based on the research findings. The research adopted Qualitative research methodology and primary data were collected from the month of January, 2015 continuously and concurrently with data analysis. The key findings were that ownership of land is perceived and identified as a milestone in the process of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, an avenue for community resilience. The main means of livelihood for IDPs are casual labour and other menial jobs. The Kenyan government has made an effort towards resettlement of IDPs although this is ad hoc and ineffective due to lack of experience and a specific framework for any major resettlement. NGOs abandoned the reconstruction and recovery projects as soon as the humanitarian crisis ended. But the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had reconstruction and recovery projects which ended in 2011. In displacement, IDPs lost their original support system, but developed new emergent norms to support each other. Integration of IDPs is a better option in the reconstruction and recovery process compared to the government farm resettlement approach. The key recommendations are that government should evaluate the economic loss of every integrated IDP and those resettled in government procured farms should be provided with legal ownership documents. There should be an urgent re-profiling of IDPs in camps and use of UN Guiding Principles on IDPs to re-integrate them into society. The findings of this research bring to light new knowledge on the theory of social capital: victims of displacement develop new emergent norms, values and culture to support each other, which eventually creates a new society/community. **Key Words: Post-conflict reconstruction and recovery; integrated IDPs; government resettled IDPs; camp-based IDPs; social capital: social support; livelihood strategies.**
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I am indebted to my entire extended family for particularly encouraging me. I pay attention posthumously to my dear wife, Christine who passed away on 19th September, 2015 soon after giving birth to our last born baby, Timothy, and my Mum who had also passed on the same year. I would have wished they witnessed this great finish. Special thanks to my daughter Sally, my son William for prayers and tirelessly encouraging and offering me academic space to complete this thesis.

Most sincerely, I would like to thank the IDPs who shared their stories and experiences through interview guides and focus group discussions. I was not bored listening to you when narrating your experiences as IDPs. A great thank you to all the key experts in the reconstruction and recovery processes who shared their knowledge for this research in the form of key informant interviews and Patrick Githinji who was my research assistant throughout the process of data collection. Prof. Paul Mbatia, you are special in that you gave me encouragement especially at the proposal stage even when I felt it was unachievable.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my late Mother, Salome Wambere Kinyeki (1935 - 7.03.2015), my late wife, Christine Wambui Mwaniki (25.12.1971 – 19.09.2015) and to all camp-based IDPs in Kenya seeking lasting solutions.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE ........................................................................................................ i
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................... iii
DEDICATION ...................................................................................................................................... iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................................... v
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................. x
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................................. xi
LIST OF MAPS ................................................................................................................................. xii
APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................................... xiii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................... xiv

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Background to the Study ................................................................................................................. 1
1.2 Problem Statement ......................................................................................................................... 8
1.3 Research Questions ......................................................................................................................... 11
1.4 Aims and Objectives of the Study ................................................................................................ 11
1.5 Purpose of the Study ....................................................................................................................... 12
1.6 Rationale of this Study ................................................................................................................... 12
1.7 Scope and Limitations of this Study ............................................................................................. 14
1.8 The Research Process and Structure ............................................................................................ 15

CHAPTER TWO: POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND RECOVERY OF VICTIMS IN CONTEXT .......................................................... 18
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 18
2.2 Perspectives of Reconstruction and Recovery ............................................................................. 18
2.3 The Role of Local and External Actors in Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Recovery ............... 27
2.4 African Union Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Recovery ................................... 30
  2.4.1 Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development – PCRD ....................................................... 31
  2.4.2 The New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review
        Mechanism (APRM) ..................................................................................................................... 39
2.4.3 The Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention, 2009) ............................................................. 40

2.5 History of Post-Election Violence and IDPs in Kenya ........................................ 43

2.6 Kenya’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Recovery Approach .......................... 48
  2.6.1 Government Resettled IDPs ........................................................................ 50
  2.6.2 Camp-based IDPs .................................................................................... 51
  2.6.3 Integrated IDPs ......................................................................................... 52

2.7 The United Nations Guiding Principles on IDPs ............................................. 53
  2.7.1 Return to Original Homes ....................................................................... 56
  2.7.2 Integration into Local Communities .......................................................... 59
  2.7.3 Resettlement ............................................................................................ 68

2.8 Livelihood Strategies in Post-Conflict ............................................................... 70

2.9 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 72

CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL APPROACH ......................................................... 73

3.1 Introduction to the theoretical framework ....................................................... 73

3.2 Evolution of Social Capital ............................................................................ 73

3.3 Forms of Social Capital and Community Resilience ..................................... 79
  3.3.1 Bonding Social Capital ........................................................................... 81
  3.3.2 Bridging Social Capital .......................................................................... 82
  3.3.3 Linking Social Capital ............................................................................ 83

3.4 Examples of Roles of Social Capital among IDPs .......................................... 83

3.5 Social Capital Controversies and Measurements ........................................... 87

3.6 The Concept of Social Support ...................................................................... 93

3.7 Community Resilience ................................................................................... 95
  3.7.1 Community Assets .................................................................................. 99
  3.7.2 Community Social Dimension ................................................................100
  3.7.3 Areas of Collective Action ......................................................................100

3.8 General Indicators of Community Resilience ...............................................101
  3.8.1 Economic Development .........................................................................101
  3.8.2 Social Support .......................................................................................102
5.3 Political Interventions under the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) .............................................................. 137
5.4 Government Socio-economic Livelihood Approach ...................... 141
5.5 Non-State Actors' .................................................................... 147
5.6 Land Reforms ........................................................................ 151
5.7 The International Criminal Court (ICC) .................................... 153
5.8 The 2013 General Elections and Devolved Government ............... 158

CHAPTER SIX: COMMUNITY RESILIENCE AND CAPACITIES OF THE 2007/2008 IDPs ........................................................................................................ 163
6.1 Introduction to Community Resilience and Capacities of 2007/2008 IDPs .... 163
6.2 Understanding the IDPs Geographic Community .................................. 163
  6.2.1 Nakuru County ..................................................................... 164
  6.2.2 Nyandarua County ............................................................ 168
6.3 Overview of IDPs in Camps, Integrated and Government Resettled .......... 171
6.4 Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Recovery Capacities of IDPs ............ 173
  6.4.1 Camp-Based IDPs: Adaptation, Absorption and Transformation ........ 173
  6.4.2 Government Resettled IDPs: Adaptation, Absorption and Transformation .......................... 185
  6.4.3 Integrated IDPs: Adaptation, Absorption and Transformation ............... 193
6.5 Social Support Mechanisms for IDPs .............................................. 198
6.6 Summary of post-conflict community resilience and social capital for IDPs ... 202
6.7 Conclusion .............................................................................. 204

CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS- “WHAT WORKS” ..................................... 205
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................. 205
  I. Role of Land in Community Resilience ........................................ 205
  II. Livelihood Capacities .............................................................. 209
  III. The role Kenyan State and non-State actors ................................ 210
  IV. Integrated IDPs ....................................................................... 212
  V. Role of Social Support .............................................................. 214
  VI. The role of ICC ...................................................................... 216
  VII. The role of the African Union .................................................. 216
7.2 The Empirical, Theoretical and Conceptual contribution ........................................ 220

CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................... 225

8.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 225

I Land-based resettlement approach ........................................................................ 226
II Social support in reconstruction and recovery ...................................................... 226
III External actors’ support ...................................................................................... 227
IV African Union mandate ....................................................................................... 228
V Further research ..................................................................................................... 228

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................. 229
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.2: Structure of the Thesis ................................................................. 17
Figure 3.1: Forms and Features of Social Support ........................................ 94
Figure 3.2: Conceptual Framework for Community Resilience ..................... 99
Figure 3.3: Contextual Framework to Measure Community Resilience .......... 108
LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: Countries with IDPs who wish to Integrate Locally .................................. 67
Table 3.1: Social capital and key capacities for achieving community resilience ... 80
Table 5.1: Summary of Presidential Candidates and Political parties contesting the 2007 General Elections.......................................................... 128
Table 5.2: Percentages of voters participating in Kenya 1992-2013 multi-party elections........................................................................................................ 132
Table 5.3: Percentage of Local Media Coverage of political parties by mainstream print media in 2007 ...................................................................... 134
Table 5.4: 2013 Presidential Results.................................................................................. 159
Table 6.1: Community Resilience Capacities and Social capital in post conflict for IDPs ........................................................................................................ 202
LIST OF MAPS

Map 6:1 Location of Nakuru County ................................................................. 167
Map 6:2 Location of Nyandarua County .......................................................... 170
APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: Global Overview 2015: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence ................................................................. 250
APPENDIX 2: Map of Kenya ................................................................................................................................. 251
APPENDIX 3: Interview – Guide for Camp-based IDPs ................................................................. 252
APPENDIX 4: Interview – Guide for Government Resettled IDPs ................................................. 256
APPENDIX 5: Interview – Guide for Integrated IDPs ................................................................. 260
APPENDIX 6: Key Informant Interviews ......................................................................................... 264
## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCRA</td>
<td>Africa Climate Change Resilience Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Africa Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>Africa National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Africa Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAT</td>
<td>Business Advisory Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCPR</td>
<td>Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSED</td>
<td>Business Skills Entrepreneurship Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAQDAS</td>
<td>Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Software</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central Africa Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community Based Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCM</td>
<td>Camp Coordination and Camp Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Concerned Citizen for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Development Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIPEV</td>
<td>Commission Investigating Post-Election Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLO</td>
<td>Coalition Liaison Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORD</td>
<td>Coalition of Reforms and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWGER</td>
<td>Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBSCs</td>
<td>District Business Solutions Centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPCs</td>
<td>District Peace Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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ECD  Early Child Development
ECHO  European Community Humanitarian Office
ECK  Electoral Commission of Kenya
EU  European Union
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FORD  Forum for Reforms and Democracy
FORD-K  Forum for Reforms and Democracy - Kenya
FORD-P  Forum for Reforms and Democracy - People
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
IASC  Inter Agency Steering Committee
ICC  International Criminal Court
ICD  International Crimes Division
ICJ  International Commission of Jurists
ICTJ  International Centre for Transitional Justice
IDMC  Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDPs  Internally Displaced Persons
IEBC  Interim Electoral Boundaries Commission
IGA  Income-Generating Activities
IIBRC  Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission
IIICDRDRC  Interim Independent Institutional Dispute Resolution Court
IIIEC  Interim Independent Electoral Commission
ILO  International Labour Organization
IOM  International Organization for Migration
IREC  Independent Review Committee
KADDU  Kenya African Democratic Development Union
KAM    Kenya Association of Manufacturers
KBC    Kenya Broadcasting Corporation
KENDA  Kenya National Democratic Alliance
KEPSA  Kenya Private Sector Alliance
KICC   Kenyatta International Conference Centre
KMTC   Kenya Medical Training Institute
KNCHR  Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
KNDR   Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation
KPTJ   Kenya for Peace Truth and Justice
KRC    Kenya Red Cross
KRCS   Kenya Red Cross Society
KSHS   Kenya Shillings
LDP    Liberal Development Party
MP     Member of Parliament
NAK    National Alliance of Kenya
NARC   National Rainbow Coalition
NARC-K National Rainbow Coalition-Kenya
NCCCC  National Consultative Coordination Committee
NCIC   National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NDOC   National Disaster Operations Centre
NDP    National Development Party
NEPAD  New Partnership for Africa and Development
NGOs   Non-Governmental Organizations
<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Peace Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODM</td>
<td>Orange Democratic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODM-K</td>
<td>Orange Democratic Movement - Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORPP</td>
<td>Office of Registrar of Political Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTP</td>
<td>Office of the Prosecutor</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCRD</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNU</td>
<td>Party of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPA</td>
<td>Political Parties Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTC</td>
<td>Pre-Trial Chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWGID</td>
<td>Protection Working Group on Internal Displacement</td>
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<tr>
<td>QUIPS</td>
<td>Quick Impact Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECOM</td>
<td>Regional Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>Returning Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAT</td>
<td>Social Capital Assessment Tool</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPSS</td>
<td>Statistical Package for Social Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>STAREC</td>
<td>Stabilization and Reconstruction of War-Affected Areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>TJRC</td>
<td>Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCHR</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDG</td>
<td>United Nations Development Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Education Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPE</td>
<td>Universal Primary Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICDA</td>
<td>Volunteer International Community Development Agency</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Kenya attained Independence in 1963 from Britain and has regularly conducted relatively free, fair and peaceful general elections in accordance with her Constitution. The re-introduction of multi-party politics in 1991 resulted in the flourishing of many ethnic-oriented political parties leading to the first ever post-election violence after the 1992 general elections (Kiliku, 1992). Although the magnitude was small, this pattern repeated itself during the 1997 general elections (Akiwumi, 1999) and after the 2007 general.

The 2007/2008 post-election violence was bigger in scale in comparison with 1992 and 1997 violence (see Kagwanja, 2009; Kanyinga, 2009; Rutten & Owuor, 2007 and Muller, 2011). This violence led to the death of 1,133 people and over 600,000 were displaced (Waki, 2008). The brutality of the violence is clearly demonstrated by an incident where 17 people were burned alive inside a church in Eldoret, 11 died as they were being transported to hospital and 54 were treated and discharged (Waki, 2008). The number of deaths and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) attracted the attention of the international community. Violence ended after the mediation by the African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities. The International Criminal Court (ICC) eventually was called upon to investigate the perpetrators of the violence.

At the onset of the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya, various renowned world leaders attempted peace negotiations, but finally the AU through the Panel of African Eminent Personalities led by the former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan mediated a peace deal. Other members of the panel were retired Tanzanian President, Benjamin Mkapa, and former South African First Lady, Graça Machel. At the height of the post-election violence non-state actors such as Kenya Red Cross and UN OCHA provided humanitarian assistance.
After the signing of the peace agreement by the warring political parties, the Ministry of State for Special Programmes, started resettlement programmes and all other IDPs affairs. The work of this ministry was taken over by the Ministry of Devolution and Planning created after the 2013 General Elections. These ministries have been under the Office of the President demonstrating the need for close supervision by the Head of State.

Despite the 2007/2008 post-election violence receiving global attention, Kenya could be considered a politically stable country compared to many countries in the African region. However it has experienced other challenges which could eventually erode this perception. For example, the country has been host to thousands of illegal immigrants from Somalia and was embroiled in diplomatic disagreements with the global community, especially the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) over its decision to close down the Dadaab refugee camp. This is the world's largest refugee camp and has been in existence since 1996. According to Kenya, these immigrants have been the source of growing internal insecurity and an economic burden.

According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2010), the Kenya population census in 2009 counted 38.6 million people and 42 distinct ethnic groups. World Bank estimates the population by 2015 to be about 44.86 million people. Kenya has also experienced frequent incursions by militant Islamist group (Al-Shabaab) from Somalia killing thousands of Kenyans civilians and soldiers for over a decade. This is an indication of complexities of reconstruction and recovery efforts of Somalia.

The militant Islamist group demands Kenya to withdraw its soldiers from Somalia, who has been part of African Union peacekeeping mission, The African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Other challenges facing Kenya include border disputes with its neighbours, Uganda and Somalia. While the Uganda-Kenya border dispute is being handled diplomatically by both countries, the Somalia-Kenya
maritime boundary dispute proceeded to full trial at The UN International Court of Justice (ICJ) in February 2017.

Additionally, East African neighbours have been constantly dishonouring many East African Community agreements and Memorandums of Understandings to the detriment of Kenya’s economy. For example, in 2016, Uganda reneged on an agreement to route its crude oil for export through Mombasa port in favour of Tanga seaport route in Tanzania. Despite an agreement by East African presidents to vote for a Kenyan candidate for the position of African Union Chairperson in 2017, they failed to honour the agreement. These challenges have been compounded by climate change which has led to constant droughts in a country depending on agriculture and tourism. Income from tourism has been negatively affected by travel advisories from traditional tourist markets leading to low tourists arrivals. These inherent challenges and the 2007/2008 post-election violence demonstrate that Kenya has not been politically and economically stable for a while.

There are many examples in Africa of countries which have experienced post-election violence. These include, Zimbabwe in 2008, Cote d’Ivoire in 2010 and Burundi in 2015 (Collier & Vicente, 2012, Mitchell, 2011, Daily Nation, 2016, May 22: 42-43). Other countries in Africa which have experienced electoral conflicts include Uganda, Chad, Gambia and Zambia (Fischer, 2002). Other example in the world includes Thailand, Yemen, Philippines, Pakistan, Fiji, Seychelles, Belarus, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (Fischer, 2002). From these and the above examples, it is clear that post-election violence problem is not unique to Kenya. The reasons may be many but it could be argued that voters are increasingly becoming aware of their democratic rights, hence are less likely to accept flawed electoral results and are demanding electoral integrity. But what is the essence of democracy and multiparty politics, if results of an electoral process lead to destruction of life and property?
With regards to the 2007/2008 post-election violence, it is recognised that the violence erupted after the official announcement of presidential results on 30th December, 2007 (Waki, 2008). The main opposition, Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) disputed the tally of results alleging rigging in favour of the incumbent, president Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU). Spontaneous as well as planned ethnic violence broke out across the country, resulting to massive displacement of people. The displaced people sought shelter in make-shift camps where non–state actors helped them with basic needs. Displacement meant not only the loss of a home and property, but loss of social networks and other relationships both economic and personal, built over many years. It also caused the dispersal of relatives and loss of memories that constituted one’s being (Waki, 2008).

A new segment of the population referred to as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) was created from this violence. These are people who fled from their homes and communities to live as refugees within their own country (Taylor, Lopas & Solomon, 2011). By the end of the 2007/2008 post-election violence, there were 118 IDPs camps across the country (Waki, 2008). For over the last eight years, there has been concerted effort in Kenya from the IDPs, the Government and other non-state actors to facilitate reconstruction and recovery from the impact of this violence.

These efforts have led to the re-categorization of the IDPs into three distinct groups: the integrated IDPs, the IDPs still in camps and the government-resettled IDPs. Integrated IDPs sought refuge from friends and relatives and have since then been housed by them. Government-resettled IDPs are those the government purchased parcels of land and resettled them. Whatever the category, their lives changed forever after the violence. They lost income, property, community support systems and networks. Families broke up, cultural...
heritage suffered and the sense of belonging to a particular place got lost. They are yet to reconstruct and recover from the impact of the post-election violence.

Recovery in post-election conflict is the long-term effort of restoration to the pre-conflict situation (Kumar, 1997). On the other hand, reconstruction in post-election conflict is the activity in recovery phase including actions undertaken to improve living conditions of affected communities by repairing or replacing damaged physical structures and infrastructure (Krisch & Flint, 2011). Recovery involves projects such as cohesion and integration, re-establishing livelihood businesses, recreating social capital (networks, norms, values etc.). Reconstruction involves short-term activities such as repair and building of houses, hospitals, schools and markets.

On the global scene, there are studies focusing on nation building and reconstruction in failed States such as Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan (Kreimer, 1998). The post-conflict reconstruction and recovery in such countries is spearheaded by external actors and international institutions such as the World Bank and their main focus is on macroeconomics (Orr, 2004). Microeconomic issues such as capacity-building and socio-economic livelihood are not their priority and these states are occupied by a host of international actors such as the United States military. Nakagawa & Shaw (2004) note that post-conflict reconstruction and recovery processes should be considered as opportunities for development, by revitalizing local and community economy, upgrading livelihood and living conditions.

Such aspects of social capital as social support, social network, values, norms, information and others play a significant role in reconstruction and recovery process. A case in point would be the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in Japan, 1995 (popularly known as the Kobe Earthquake) which demonstrated that a community with social capital and community tradition can proactively participate
in a reconstruction and recovery programme to make a quick successful and speedy recovery from disaster (Yuko & Rajib, 2004).

In Africa, post-conflict reconstruction, peace-building and security are a primary responsibility of African Union (AU) (Nkulu, 2005). For example the AU is funding the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in an effort to stabilize Somalia. It is also actively involved in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery agenda in countries such as the Central Africa Republic (CAR) and Burundi. To achieve this goal, it has developed an African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework (PCRDF) through a broad consultative process which included partnership with civil society organizations (Murithi, 2005). The policy emphasizes the nexus between peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building.

Additionally, in October 2009, the African Union (AU) Special Summit of Heads of State and Government met in Uganda and adopted the AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, also known as the Kampala Convention. This instrument is the first internal displacement-specific Convention covering the African continent and sets out goals and responsibilities for state parties, armed groups, the AU and humanitarian agencies in relation to all phases of displacement (Ojoda, 2010).

Kenya’s Parliament enacted the Internally Displaced Persons Bill in June, 2012. This law was envisaged to help in management of IDPs from early warning to reconstruction and recovery in the post-election violence cycle. The obligations of IDPs are significant in reconstruction and recovery as their participation could stimulate their empowerment and self-reliance. This would help achieve the power to influence the decisions that affected their livelihood and social capital.

In Kenya, studies (see Kiliku, 1992; Akiwumi, 1999; and Waki, 2008) have been done to identify the root causes of the post-election violence but issues of
reconstruction and recovery have not been adequately addressed in these studies.

A taskforce report in 2012 revealed that by 2011, the government spent over four billion Kenya shillings on IDP resettlement between 2008 and 2011 (Ministry of State for Special Programmes, 2012). Although this large sum of money was spent, many IDPs are still living in pathetic conditions in the camps and hundreds of thousands have sought shelter and livelihood from friends and relatives across the country. According to the Taskforce Progress Report on Resettlement of IDPs (2012), only 7,498 IDP households had been resettled out of over 663,921 IDPs. Futher more those responsible for the violence and displacement of people were not held to account.

The commission investigating the post-election violence recommended setting up of a local judicial mechanism to try perpetrators of the violence within set timelines. Otherwise the post-election violence cases were to be forwarded to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Waki, 2008). Despite concerted effort by section lawmakers in the Grand Coalition Government to lobby for local judicial system, the Kenya parliament eventually referred the cases to ICC. Although the pre-trial hearing of the cases started immediately, by 2016 all the cases had collapsed due to various reasons given by the prosecutor and the judges.

There have been two governments during the ICC cases: Grand Coalition Government (2007-2013) and current Government (2013-2017), but nobody has been successfully prosecuted either by ICC or the local justice system in regard to post-election violence. The problem of IDPs is yet to be fully settled as the country heads to another general election in August 8, 2017 (Daily Nation 2016, October, 21).
1.2 Problem Statement

Kenya’s post 2007-election violence aroused large-scale violence that led to deaths and displacement of thousands of people. Many actors were involved in the reconstruction and recovery projects to assist the IDPs but the IDP problem remains in place not securely resolved. But displacements during conflicts are a matter of global concern. Indeed, according to Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) global survey, 2016, 40.8 million people around the world have been forced to flee their homes by armed conflict and generalized violence and were living in displacement within the borders of their own country at the end of 2015. This is the largest ever in the last ten years. In 2014, there were 38 million people displaced, 33.3 million in 2013, 28.8 million in 2012, 26.6 million in 2011, 27.5 million in 2010, 27 million in 2009 and 26 million in 2008.

In sub-Saharan Africa, there were 12 million IDPs across 22 countries, with Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) South Sudan, Somalia and Nigeria being the most affected in the region. By end of 2015, Kenya accounted for 309,200 people living in internal displacement. These statistics, and those of previous years, show that internal displacement is a problem which is increasing each year, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.

The history of post-election violence in Kenya dates back to the first multi-party general elections (Kiliku, 1992; Akiwumi, 1999; and Waki, 2008). During the post-election violence, IDPs lost community support structures which members of the community had helped build in their lifetime. Many self-employed community members lost business income and livelihood, while those in gainful employment lost their jobs. Many school children lost links with their former schools, teachers and students. This negatively contributed to their academic performance. Social networks such as family, neighbours, friends, co-workers as well as informal social support mechanisms were destroyed. Although some of the above
community social structures were reconstructed, many others were not, or were entirely abandoned as community members got resettled in new areas.

Social capital, defined as the capacity of individuals to command scarce socio-economic and political resources by virtue of belonging to a social network (Portes, 1998; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004) was disrupted or destroyed. According to Schilderman and Lyons (2011), reducing IDPs socio-economic livelihood vulnerabilities by restoring social support for them to cope is a step towards rebuilding their adaptation, absorption and transformation (community resilience). It helps to build bondage, linkages and bridges in the process of either adapting, absorbing or transforming to reconstruction and recovery. The IDPs primary social networks such as family, close friends, neighbours, co-workers, community and professionals cannot provide foundation for social support, as they were destroyed during the post-election violence.

As many families remained separated, informal support systems such as women credit systems, record keeping and micro finance banking structures were disorganised and damaged, complicating the process of reconstruction and recovery. Research in social psychology has revealed that the primary source of help and social support for IDPs is their own informal social support networks (Hernandez-Plaza et al., 2005).

Although some IDPs have been resettled in new areas by the government, it has been difficult for them to recover their socio-economic livelihood acquired through social capital (social support) because of their unique and quite distinct adaptation, absorption or transformation coping strategies (Alvarez-Castillo et al., 2006). Although the process of reconstruction and recovery spearheaded by the Kenyan government and non-state actors is on-going, it can be argued that many IDPs are yet to bounce back to the pre-conflict situation (community resilience). This means the approach to reconstruction and recovery adopted by the Kenya government would require different strategies. This study argues that
the current reconstruction and recovery process is *ad hoc*, costly and ineffective. It also recognises that the literature on how IDPs on their own help in reconstruction and recovery is scant. The study fills this gap by examining the role of social capital in this regard. It therefore pays attention to efforts among the IDPs themselves; it also concentrates on the lives of IDPs and how they preserve and rebuild social capital in their current reconstruction and recovery situations.

In the meanwhile, the hope that IDPs were to receive either reparation, restorative or retributive justice for them to adapt, absorb or transform (bounce back) was short-lived as the Kenyan parliament referred the post-election violence cases to the ICC. The ICC commenced crime against humanity pre-trial hearings for six Kenyans recommended for prosecution of being most culpable for the violence, but by 2016 all the cases had collapsed. Successful prosecution would have paved way for secondary cases for compensation for the IDPs.

The pre-trial hearings was complicated in 2013 after two of the suspects in the ICC pre-trial were elected president and deputy president which brought to light the question of Kenya’s government full co-operation with the ICC court. By the time of this research Kenya had not established any internationally recognised justice system to try any emerging cases related to the post-election violence and nobody has been successively tried and convicted of such crimes.

The post-election violence cycle such as Kenya’s 2007/2008 case involves: mitigation – preparedness – response - reconstruction and recovery (Kumar, 1997, Krisch & Flint, 2011, Alexander, 2002, Coppola, 2007). In five years (2008-2012), according to Taskforce Report on Resettlement of IDPs (2012), only 7,498 households were resettled out of 663,921 displaced persons (Ministry of Special Programmes 2011). The new Ministry of Devolution and Planning does not have new data on resettlement. This means that the process of resettlement stopped in 2012 (see Daily Nation 2015, March, 27; Daily Nation 2016, October, 21; Daily Nation 10 August, 2015; Standard 2nd June, 2015). This was the period
coinciding with the end of the term of the coalition government and ushering in campaigns for another general election in March 2013. Resettlement is a phase in the post-election violence cycle therefore IDPs are far from either adaptation, absorption or transformation to reconstruction and recovery (Arya, 2003). Indeed during the 2017 general election campaigns, the president promised a Kshs. 358 million as compensation to Integrated IDPs in Kisii, Nyamira (see Daily Nation 2017, June, 6; Daily Nation 2017, March, 20). This demonstrates the IDPs reconstruction and recovery process is yet to be fully completed.

1.3 Research Questions

The primary focus of this study is to explore how the processes of reconstruction and recovery of the victims of the 2007/2008 Kenya post-election violence have been undertaken by the various actors. Accordingly, the specific research questions to guide the proposed study are:

i. How have the 2007/2008 post-election violence IDPs in Kenya recreated their community resilience capacities?

ii. How have the Kenyan government interventions and non-State actor interventions influenced the livelihood strategies among the IDPs in their process of reconstruction and recovery?

iii. How has social support in the social capital context accelerated the reconstruction and recovery process of the IDPs in Kenya?

iv. What are the recommended approaches for reconstruction and recovery strategies of post-election violence victims in a multi-ethnic community?

1.4 Aims and Objectives of the Study

The focus of this study was to examine the process of reconstruction and recovery of 2007/2008 post-election victims in Kenya. Consequently, the specific objectives of the proposed investigation are:
i. To examine the community resilience of the IDPs in their reconstruction and recovery processes;

ii. To examine the Kenyan government and non-State actor livelihood interventions of IDPs in their reconstruction and recovery processes;

iii. To explore and recommend a post-election violence reconstruction and recovery approach of IDPs in a multi-ethnic community.

1.5 Purpose of the Study

The primary purpose of this proposed research was to investigate the process of adaptation, absorption or transformation of socio-economic and political livelihoods of the 2007/2008 post-election victims in Kenya. The secondary purpose was to examine the influence of the Kenyan government and non-state actors in the livelihood interventions of the 2007/2008 post-election violence victims in Kenya and if necessary recommend different reconstruction and recovery approaches.

1.6 Rationale of this Study

There are many studies focusing on post-election violence (see Kiai, 2008; Kiliku, 1992; Waki, 2008). Other studies (see Kagwanja, 2009; Kanyinga, 2009; Muller, 2011) focus on rebuilding of democracies. Many of these studies interrogate the processes of general elections and development of democracies. There also many studies in the field of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery focussing on nation building in countries which have experienced long periods of conflict such as Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan (Kreimer et al., 1998; Orr, 2004). The socio-economic aspects of how IDPs of post-election violence reconstruct and recover their livelihood have not been fully interrogated. The strategies the IDPs take to reconstruct and recover their economic and social livelihood is an important scholarly gap that this proposed study intends to fill.
The value of social capital in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery is important to all categories of victims. Studies have identified that strong IDPs social networks, participation and norms are some aspects which help in reconstruction and recovery (Nakagawa & Shaw 2004). Also, other studies have noted that community social support structures such as family, schools, churches and markets play a significant role the in functioning of a community (Giddens, 1984).

In addition, Schilderman and Lyons (2011), argue that norms, values and behaviours are shaped by the informal networks of these structures, which helps in victims’ resiliency. Social support in the context of social capital plays a crucial role in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. This support extends from the nuclear family to community structures. In these studies, there is limited comparative literature on how rural and urban IDPs have been able to make use of social support to adapt, absorb or transform to community resiliency.

This proposed study is intended to provide development experts and policy-makers with knowledge on how community social support structures help increase feelings of solidarity, strengthen social cohesion, improve communication and provide a learning ground for coordinated activities. This will be possible by comparing the IDPs’ livelihood lifestyles in the camps, those resettled and those living with well-wishers. This will create new knowledge on how different communities of IDPs are able to adapt, adopt and transform to recover community resilience through rebuilding community social support structures.

In post-election violence, just as after any major disaster such as fires, earthquakes, floods and droughts, victims usually decide if they want to return to their destroyed homes with no viable infrastructure or settle in new areas. For example, in the town of Rikuzentakata, Japan, where 10% of the population was killed and 80% of the businesses were washed away by the Tohoku tsunami in
March 2011, only one resident offered to go back and re-start his business (Aldrich, 2012). In Kenya, a number of victims’ households have been resettled by the Government, while others managed to return to their original homes (Ministry of State for Special Programmes, 2011; 2012).

This study will provide new knowledge on the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of approaches adopted by the Kenyan State. The lessons from these approaches will be a reference point for stakeholders dealing with similar post-election violence reconstruction and recovery projects. The conclusions will help stakeholders to revisit their interventions for successful resettlement of the remaining IDPs.

1.7 Scope and Limitations of this Study

The issues related to post-election violence in Kenya date back to 1992 (Akiwumi, 1999). However, this research will be limited to post-conflict reconstruction and recovery process of the 2007/2008 post-election violence victims. It will cover Government resettled IDPs, integrated IDPs and IDPs still in camps. This study looks into livelihood strategies of these IDPs.

There are many actors implementing projects related to post-conflict reconstruction and recovery of the 2007/2008 post-election violence victims in Kenya. This study focuses on the role of the Ministry of State for Special Programmes and later the Ministry of Devolution and Planning. This is because, according to United Nations Guiding Principles, the State has the primary obligation to find lasting solutions for IDPs. There are other non-state actors such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) active in reconstruction and recovery. This study interrogated their roles to compare their input in the IDPs post-conflict reconstruction and recovery.

The researcher, being a Kenyan also recognizes possible unintended biases in language especially in interviews with the IDPs and in the writing of this report.
1.8 The Research Process and Structure

The research process followed by the researcher is: first, the researcher identified the research problem based on available literature and personal observations. Theoretical and conceptual frameworks were determined after a detailed analysis of available literature. Research methodology was developed and data collected from primary respondents, key informants and focus group discussions. Secondary data was also reviewed before data analysis and writing the report. Research findings, conclusions and recommendations were formulated and presented. The research process is graphically presented below:
The research process is divided into the following chapters (Figure 1.2) below.

Source: Researcher’s construction
Figure 1.2: Structure of the Thesis

**Chapter One**: Introduction and Background of the Research (Pages 1-17)

**Chapter Two**: Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Recovery of Victims in Context (Pages 18-72)

**Chapter Three**: Theoretical Approach (Pages 73-110)

**Chapter Four**: Methodology (Pages 111-123)

**Chapter Five**: The 2007 General Elections-Various Reconstruction and Recovery (Pages 124-162)

**Chapter Six**: Community Resilience and Capacities of the 2007/2008 IDPs (Pages 163-204)

**Chapter Seven**: Analysis - "What Works" (Pages 205-224)

**Chapter Eight**: Conclusions and Summary (Pages 225-228)

*Source: Researcher's Construction*
CHAPTER TWO: POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND RECOVERY OF VICTIMS IN CONTEXT

2.1 Introduction

Reconstruction and recovery in post-conflict contexts has a long history dating back to the 18th century. The literature on this subject classifies reconstruction and recovery into macro and micro-levels. While macro-level may involve country-wide reconstruction and recovery projects, micro-level involve parts of a country or even parts of a community reconstruction and recovery projects and activities. In other perspectives, reconstruction and recovery has been discussed through the roles played by actors such as the United Nations, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs). The Kenya’s 2007/2008 post-conflict reconstruction and recovery is at a micro-level but related to post-electoral conflict while other such studies are of mineral, natural resources and community conflicts.

This chapter offers a critical review of contribution of other scholars in the subject of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery process. The discussion focuses on historical development and the macro and micro levels perspectives as well as comparisons and similarities of different approaches at global, continental and local levels. Additionally the chapter reviews the reconstruction and recovery process of victims in context.

2.2 Perspectives of Reconstruction and Recovery

The historical and intellectual studies as well as documentation of the modern meaning of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery can be traced to the American civil war (Williams, 2005). During this war, where 11 southern states intended to secede from the union, over 600,000 Americans died, property worth millions of dollars was destroyed and families disrupted. Consequently, the period 1863-1877 was dedicated as an era of reconstruction and recovery in most
of the affected American states, an attempt to restoring pre-war economic status. Land and industries had suffered massive destruction.

Other historical and intellectual studies on post-conflict reconstruction and recovery at global level are the documentation of the effects and impact of World War I (1914-1918) and World War II (1939-1945). The socio-economic and political systems were severely affected by World War I. Many countries in Europe suffered massive economic destruction. Politically, the Paris Conference created the League of Nations as an approach to maintain world peace. The 1st World War and the 2nd World War the redefined world socio-economic and political order, new super powers emerged, and the United Nations was created.

The magnitude of global socio-economic destruction can be viewed through the post-conflict projects initiated during that period, such as, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration towards Europe and China (1943-1946), the loans of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development to Europe, the European Recovery Programme (Marshall Plan) (Williams, 2005). Over the years particularly in the 21st Century, there has been an increased interest in post-conflict agenda to deal with increasing emerging conflicts. The academic discourse on this matter has helped to bring up issues on post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. Academically, Coyne (2005: 1) notes that most post-conflict reconstruction and recovery research is confined to the disciplines of History, Political Science, and Public Policy.

The above argument has been supported by del Castillo (2008: 20) and in addition Tzifakis (2006) in his essay published online through University of Peloponnese, noted that most post-conflict reconstruction literature is overwhelmingly focused on the security and political dimensions of peace-building operations. This research concurs that post-conflict reconstruction and recovery are political in nature and literature on this discipline should be located
in political sciences and history, regardless of the socio-economic damage that conflicts cause.

Due to increased interest in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery agenda, the donor community has reviewed its policy tools and methods in dealing with post-conflict reconstruction and recovery projects. For instance, in 1995 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised its policy on emergency assistance in order to address the needs of countries in post-conflict situations. In 1997, the World Bank established a post-conflict unit, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) and a post-conflict fund.

In 2001, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) created a bureau for crisis prevention and recovery to work for the restoration of the quality life of people who have been victims of natural disasters or violent conflict. In 2005, the United Nations formed a peace-building commission with a peace-building support office and a peace-building fund) with the aim of bringing together and improving coordination among all relevant actors who get involved in a reconstruction effort (World Bank, 1997; UNDP, 2001). This demonstrates the importance of the reconstruction and recovery agenda in the 21st Century.

Major donor countries, such as the United Kingdom, USA, Japan, among others, have set up development assistance departments, dealing with, among other issues, reconstruction and recovery. For example, United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) have all adopted a more complex approach to reconstruction and recovery by merging efforts towards relief, rehabilitation and development from the beginning of involvement in post-conflict situations.

Unlike during the post-World War I and II approaches, donors now ascribe to more interventionist practices, monitoring and evaluating the projects they fund.
They have also attempted to influence the policies of recipient countries, prescribing reforms to streamline institutions in war-affected countries in accordance with the demands of ‘good governance’. Based on the number of deaths and socio-economic destruction as noted in the introduction, the scale of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery after the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya is on a lower level compared to post-conflict projects in World wars.

Therefore, there is need to understand the levels of projects and programmes dealing with post-conflict reconstruction and recovery such as in the Kenya situation. This study submits that post-conflict reconstruction and recovery can be classified at two major levels: macro and micro. However, Collier, (2000) argues that there are other perspectives of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery projects at micro-level such as reconstruction and recovery from post-election violence, natural resource conflicts such as witnessed in Great Lakes regions in Africa and disasters in Asia.

At the macro-level, socio-economic post-conflict reconstruction and recovery efforts involve a great variety of actors encompassing such institutions as the United Nations and its agencies, the international financial institutions such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund, regional development banks such as the African Development Bank, multilateral and bilateral donors, and a large number of national and international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as Action Aid, Oxfam, World Vision and private companies. International peace-keeping missions are common in such rebuilding. They provide security, while other international actors work out policies towards economic recovery, social stability and structures for good governance (UN DPKO, 2003; Collier, 2000). At extreme levels of conflict, state institutions collapse. Examples where post-conflict reconstruction and recovery have been undertaken in countries and defined as failed states, include Afghanistan and Somalia.
The actors at the macro-level get involved because of the socio-economic and political interests they have beyond the conflicts. Sometimes, these interests help escalate the conflict instead. An example of such political interest was witnessed when external actors facilitated rebellions in Libya and Egypt against long serving presidents. The effect and impact of “liberation” of Libya in March 2011 and Egypt in February 2011 through “sponsored” mass street protests to overthrow elected presidents is still being felt in the region. Civil war in Somalia has been going on for decades despite concerted effort from international community towards reconstruction and recovery. Another example is South Sudan which is relapsing to civil conflict despite elaborate peace agreements and independence on 9 July 2011.

At the micro-levels of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, this study introduces a perspective of post-election violence and argues that the post-conflict reconstruction and recovery after the post-election violence witnessed in countries such as Rwanda, 1994, Kenya, 2007, Zimbabwe, 2008, Burundi, 2015 are at that levels. Other global examples are Bosnia and Herzegovina. The post-conflict reconstruction and recovery after post-election violence is unique as in most of these countries, the conflicts are ethnic based. This requires different approaches because ethnic communities fight each other over political power (Kagwanja, 2009; Kanyinga, 2009). The post-election violence is carried out along ethnic lines and established along ethnic membership. This determines affiliations, loyalty, relationships or other aspects of political, economic and social life such as voting in general elections/business and property ownership. The consequences of these kinds of conflicts, is the breakdown of a society into an ethnically determined closed and hostile unit (Waki, 2008).

Therefore, there is a distinction of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery approaches. For example approaches in communities and countries emerging out of ethnic conflicts, those afflicted by natural disasters and approaches in
countries at the end of the first and second World wars as well as those emerging from protracted internal conflicts. Usually, the communities emerging from ethnic-conflict have weak democratic structures and a fragmented society hence requiring extensive and intensive community re-building to achieve lost community socio-economic capacities. As general elections are conducted at pre-determined periods of time, it is difficult for affected communities to adapt, adopt or transform within this cycle.

There are many documented examples of global post-conflict reconstruction and recovery approaches at macro-level of post-reconstruction and recovery. For instance, the World Bank has divided the post-conflict reconstruction and recovery interventions into clusters along the sectors of: structural/institutional, social/human, physical/rural/urban; and macro-economic/financial (World Bank, 1998). The bank referred to this approach as a Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF).

In operationalizing this approach, the bank acknowledges the contribution of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery experts that rebuilding socio-economic frameworks of a war-affected country or community does not necessarily mean restoring or re-establishing the particular conditions that existed before the onset of the conflict (World Bank (1998; 1999). The argument is to improve beyond the pre-existing conditions. This research refers to this possibility as “bouncing back better”. In the Kenyan post-conflict reconstruction and recovery context, achieving livelihood standards and assets as those before the post-election violence would be considered to have bounced back, hence achieved community resilience.

The United Nations has divided the operational post-conflict peace building approach activities into four sectors. These are the security, governance & democratization, humanitarian assistance and recovery, development & sustainable peace (UN DPKO 2003).
The approaches by the Bank and the United Nations could be explained through many schools of thought. These institutions were conceived immediately after the 2nd World War; hence have rich practical experiences in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. Indeed the World Bank has presence in 189 countries while the United Nation is present in 196 countries. However, their approaches are determined by their core objectives and purposes. For example the bank’s interest is financial and economic in nature despite its argument for poverty reduction. Like any other financial institutions their approach is based on return on investment.

Economically rich countries, such as USA and Britain push their agenda through the Bank. Therefore the approaches are designed in ways to favour the interests of these countries, sometimes as experiments. For example, the Bank in the 1990’s pushed through the Structural Adjustment Programmes to many African countries, whose implementation led to negative effects such as massive unemployment.

The United Nation’s mandate especially on rule of law, human rights and security are constantly being questioned by Third World countries in the recent past. For example, while many conflicts are in Third World countries such as in Africa, these countries have no permanent membership on the UN Security Council, which is mandated to maintain international peace and security. The United States, United Kingdom, China, Russia and France are the five permanent members and have exclusive ability to veto resolutions. Ten non-permanent members are elected on a regional basis and serve two-year terms. Without equal representation, the United Nation should concentrate its efforts on humanitarian affairs sector.

In her PhD thesis submitted to University of Bath, Zora, (2009:71-73) argues that post-conflict reconstruction and recovery aim at the consolidation of peace and security and the attainment of sustainable socio-economic development in a
conflict-shattered country. She identified four general clusters of concern in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery approach. She termed this approach as the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Recovery Task Framework. The four clusters of concern in the scholar’s approach are: security, social cohesion, governance and economic performance. These clusters are broken down further on to: physical, human economic, natural, and social capital as the basic community assets actors need to rebuild post-conflict communities to “bounce back better.”

Zora adopted a view that post-conflict reconstruction is circular (UN DPKO, 2003: 183-184). From security to good governance, there are elements of institutional building and property rights. Policy and economic sector assistance drives the post-conflict reconstruction to economic recovery.

Similar to the World Bank and UN approaches, Zora submits that the security pillar is concerned with control of belligerent, territorial security, protection of population and regional security. The justice and reconciliation pillar concerns areas of judicial system, laws, human rights, international courts, tribunals and truth commissions as well as community rebuilding. The socio-economic well-being pillar focuses on refugees and IDPs, employment generation, markets, international trade, investment, banking and finance. The governance and participation pillar’s main areas of concern include executive authority, elections, political parties, civil society, and media, among others (Zora, 2009: 76-78; UN DPKO 2003; AUSA/CSIS 2002).

The African Union’s Post-conflict reconstruction and recovery in many of the African countries are based on contemporary conflict-resolution approaches that have a standard formula of peace negotiations, with a trajectory of ceasefire agreements, transitional governments, demilitarization, constitutional reforms ending with democratic elections (Daley, 2006). In addition to these approaches, the African Union (AU) has raised funds to support Quick Impact Projects
(QUIPS) in countries emerging from conflict, an effort that has allowed the communities to benefit directly at the grassroot level.

The AU has also established functional offices in some African countries emerging from conflict for close interaction in areas of peace, security and post-conflict reconstruction. Other efforts are peacekeeping missions such as Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). These missions help affected countries rebuild their security and defence capacities.

Regardless of the clusters, pillars and approaches, rebuilding economic and livelihood of the affected communities are equally important considerations. This means that post-conflict reconstruction and recovery assistance ranges from socio-economic reconstruction and recovery, physical reconstruction and recovery as well as political reconstruction and recovery. This requires long-term commitment from both local and international actors.

There are also global documented examples of how countries managed post-conflict reconstruction and recovery by building IDPs socio-economic resources (creating resilient communities). For instance, in post-conflict Nepal, the Government established various compensation resettlement funds for victims of the conflict. These funds included: victims of conflict fund, scholarship programmes, damage to private property fund among others (Martinez, 2002).

In addition to the above approaches, this study acknowledges the contribution of civil society in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since the 1990s, the role of civil society has been acknowledged in conflict transformation and peace-building. In these countries, civil society has been instrumental in peace education, dialogue projects (linking social capital). They are also involved in empowerment of women and youth through community-based initiatives in peace building. In 2005, several NGOs from Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia campaigned to set up a Regional Commission for
Truth-Seeking and Truth-Telling about war crimes –RECOM (Fischer, 2007). Socio-political considerations may be one of the factors in reconstruction and recovery strategy in a particular continent or country.

The above approaches provide knowledge in which post-conflict reconstruction and recovery actors could rely on. But, Collier (2000:2) acknowledges that there could hardly be a universal approach devised with a systematic implementation and proposes a need for country and community context approaches.

2.3 The Role of Local and External Actors in Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Recovery

Post-conflict reconstruction and recovery situation has two sets of actors, classified as local and external actors. Each of these actors usually has interests beyond the conflict. Post-conflict reconstruction and recovery embraces major roles in planning, implementation, managing, controlling and co-ordinating of the reconstruction programmes and activities.

External actors are political bodies representing countries, national, regional and international organizations, and have their own hidden interest in the post-conflict reconstruction and recovery outcomes. They are grouped together and commonly referred to as the international community.

According to the World Bank (1998:20), external actors and the international response to conflict situations in general can be considered mainly within two fields of activity that, to a certain extent are projections of the post-conflict phases. The first and main component is the political-diplomatic actors of peace negotiations and conflict resolutions constituting the governments as part of multilateral alliances and forums such as the United Nations and the European Union (World Bank, 1998:20; Zora, 2009). They form active structures within the frameworks of security and peace-keeping operations.
The second component includes those in the field of the provision of necessities during or after a violent conflict. The major contributors are donor states and organizations through actors such as the UNHCR, UNOCHA, Red Cross, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), UNDP, the World Food Programme (WFP), local or international NGOs, among others. In this second area, philanthropists, CBOs and churches can be grouped, although at times their interventions are at micro-level especially if they are community-based.

During the implementation of activities, external actors due to their financial abilities can relegate and reduce local actors to colonized subjects as foreign policies, projects and programmes are imposed on the communities. These external actors are primarily either bilateral/multilateral donors, or perhaps funding international NGOs (World Bank, 1998).

Despite the knowledge that external actors should support and not directly implement post-conflict reconstruction and recovery projects, local actors are rarely treated as partners in the process of reconstruction and recovery, partly because they don’t have any monetary contribution (Kartas 2007, Englebert & Tull 2008, Muggah, 2009). Local participation is limited, although the external actors may not understand that implementation of elitist policies, projects and programmes without community leadership full participation in decision-making usually are bound to be slowed down or, at worst, fail altogether.

At the political-diplomatic of peace negotiations component discussed above, external actors mainly deal with governments (Uvin, 2001). The primary aim is to secure certain socio-economic and political interests beyond the conflict. This is a standard worldwide protocol and may have positive or negative effects and impact on the process of post-conflict reconstruction, especially where competing interests do not converge. This has caused relapse to conflict in many countries despite elaborate peace negotiations and return to peace formulas.
The result of non-involvement of local actors may at times provoke community discontent, hostile attitudes towards the foreign intervention in the internal affairs and resistance to any of the undertakings and outcomes. This research also argues that the understanding of African democracy as well as practice is different from the international community’s view and practice of democracy.

The ideal situation would be to bring together major parties involved in the post-conflict reconstruction for a seamless and successful planning, implementation, managing and co-ordination of post-conflict agenda. However, it is difficult to have a joint and synchronized effort of both local and external actors. This co-operation is still a goal to be achieved in order to combine the reconstruction capacities and experience with the channels and mechanisms for overall implementation (Barakat, 2005:8).

External actors’ involved in implementation of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery projects, are likely to find difficulty in understanding post-conflict dynamics and correctly predicting the impact of their activities (Uvin, 2001). For example, it would be very difficult for a foreigner to deal with Kenya's 2007/2008 post-election violence dynamics, as the country has 42 ethnic groups. Also, when IDPs are resettled in new areas as the Kenyan Government did, they are likely to lose their cultural heritage and sense of belonging, which they have built over a long period of time, therefore the role of civic organizations in times of victims' resettlements in an ethnic-divided environment is crucial (Varshney, 2001).

According to Anderson (2002), donor monies intended for post-conflict reconstruction and recovery projects is sometimes used for other needs by actors in the field. For example, the funds may be used to fan conflicts so that peace projects take longer to resolve. The decisions and actions of how actors interact with conflicts is important. For example, who is accountable for ensuring that aid programmes not only do no harm, but also help reduce inter-group
hostility and reinforce cohesion and integration when each actor has his/her own vision, mission and goals?

While the UN and other International Organizations have a fairly constant flow of money, other local actors such as NGOs and churches must first conduct fundraising campaigns to respond. It is therefore hard to maintain and sustain post-conflict reconstruction and recovery projects, as they are only available for humanitarian activities. While IDPs may accuse external actors of not doing enough in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, donor fatigue may contribute to this reluctance. For example, the Mozambique floods of the year 2000 precipitated a situation where the international community was accused of idly sitting as hundreds of people died (Coppola, 2007).

Although NGO aid is not sustainable, in countries with protracted conflicts such as Sudan and Somalia, international NGOs have been running post-conflict projects and programmes for decades compared to government development programmes. However, this sustainability is related to the end of conflicts such that when these countries attain considerable peace, NGOs leave the government to implement the projects.

2.4 African Union Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Recovery

At the global level, United Nation has a role and mandate in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery to its members. Some of the major programmes and projects are undertaken by UNDP. Other major actors have been the World Bank and IMF. Like the United Nations, African Union has similar roles and mandates. The main reason for an African post-conflict reconstruction and recovery approach was the extended role of external actors at the expense of local actors. There was need for an African solution to an African problem.

This section discusses the role of African Union (AU) and its mandate in the continent regarding post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. The discussion
focuses on the African Union’s approach to post-conflict reconstruction and recovery through its approaches - Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development – PCRD, the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), and The Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention, 2009). Indeed one of the primary responsibilities of the African Union (AU) is peace and security for the member States hence the need to be involved in the processes of reconstruction and recovery after post-conflict.

Through the African Union, a framework Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), was created, as well as a political review mechanism, New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD). Similarly other post-conflict instruments created include the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the Kampala Convention on IDPs. There are other sub-regional organs such as the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Economic Commission for West Africa (ECOWAS), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and East Africa Community (EAC), all dealing with issues of continental and sub-regional post-conflict and reconstruction and recovery issues. This research assessed the role and contribution of PCRD, NEPAD, APRM and Kampala Convention as they have broader mandate compared to the others.

2.4.1 Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development – PCRD

As noted in the introductory chapters, Africa has been experiencing an increased incidence of conflicts, many of them related to post-election violence. Solutions to these conflicts were mainly externally driven and lacked African leadership inputs. To address this problem, the African Union conceived a post-conflict framework, especially to domesticate post-conflict implementation strategies. The main intention of the PCRD was to focus on an approach that was
In definition, PCRD is a comprehensive set of measures that seek to address the needs of African countries emerging from conflicts and the needs of affected population. PCRD also acts to prevent escalation of disputes, avoid relapses into violence, address the root causes of conflict and consolidate sustainable peace (African Union, 2006).

To achieve its mandate the PCRD framework has six indicative key components as a foundation for achieving sustainable PCRD, namely: security; humanitarian and emergency assistance; political governance and transition; socio-economic reconstruction and development; human rights, justice and reconciliation; and women and gender (African Union, 2006).

These key elements are as such similar to clusters and pillars used by World Bank and United Nations approaches to post-conflict reconstruction and recovery strategies. However, the roles of these components are designed to serve local interests in various ways. Firstly in the security component, the framework tasked countries emerging from post-conflict to pursue integrated approaches in repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation of the displaced population, among other objectives. Secondly, the framework understood humanitarian and emergency assistance as a set of integrated and coordinated measures to, among others, support return and reintegration of displaced populations and help resuscitate socio-economic activities (African Union, 2006).

In this regard, the PCRD requires affected countries to create an enabling environment for displaced populations to return in safety and dignity and protect them from attacks. While the returnees should enjoy property rights, the government is expected to design and implement community-based quick impact projects to facilitate reconstruction and recovery as well as train and develop
skills to facilitate reintegration of IDPs. These projects, for example, include unemployed youths and IDPs projects, support of rehabilitation and reconstruction of vital infrastructure and physical facilities such as schools.

Thirdly, in the human rights, justice and reconciliation component, PCRD required countries emerging from post-conflict to make critical decisions about the use of restorative and retributive justice. For example, on reconciliation, PCRD encouraged post-conflict countries to facilitate peace-building from national to community levels as well as promote those institutions which are engaged in reconciliation.

There was justification for a common PCRD framework in order to provide guidelines and translate strategies for post-conflict reconstruction and development into activities. This aimed to build capacity and help empower affected countries and communities to take the primary role in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. Therefore, this framework brought coherence, cooperation and joint co-ordination of all actions between the roles of states and non-actors at local, national, regional and international levels.

As noted above, as PCRD is a creation of AU, the framework requires it to collaborate and form partnerships in order to enhance success. Such partners include the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), like-minded UN agencies, other institutions and NGOs, in an effort to realize and consolidate PCRD in affected countries. Indeed, the Africa Development Bank and Economic Commission for Africa as well as the UN Peace Building Commission are key partners to the African Union. Similarly the AU, like UN, has a Peace and Security Council which is structurally placed with considerable powers in regard to peace and security.

Since the adoption of the PCRD framework in 2006, the African Union Commission (AUC) has taken a number of steps towards its implementation. For
example, identification of joint activities in support of implementation of peace agreements and conducting needs assessment missions, consolidating and scaling up security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration initiatives, sustained collaboration with Regional RECs and civil society organizations (African Union, 2006).

Although one of the primary objectives of this framework was to improve timeliness and effectiveness on co-ordination as well as putting a firm foundation for social justice and sustainable peace, critics find notable shortcomings. For example, a number of countries have relapsed to violence soon after emerging from conflict. Notable examples include Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2012, the Central African Republic (CAR) and most recently South Sudan in 2013. This therefore raises the question: how effective is the PCRD framework? This researcher suggests lack of adequate funds, inadequate peace-building efforts and lack of skills as reasons for these failures and inability of the framework to address the root causes of conflicts.

However, the framework can be credited in such areas as development of PCRD operational guidelines at regional and national levels. For technical interventions, PCRD has updated databases of African experts in different fields of PCRD as well as Panel of the Wise. Countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Liberia, Comoros and Sierra Leone have benefitted from specific peace building efforts. Similarly, the AU recently undertook multidisciplinary missions to the CAR (2006), Liberia and Sierra Leone (2009), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi (2010), and Sudan (2011). These missions assessed and ascertained the PCRD demands of these countries. Additionally, a committee of AU Standing Multi-dimensional Committee on PCRD has also been formed (African Union, 2006).

PCRD is guided by five philosophies: first, implementation and oversight of PCRD should be guided by African leadership and governments; second, the
primary need to align local needs and aspirations to national and local ownership because of the shared vision; third the need to engage and re-engage local populations in governance; fourth the need for PCRD inclusiveness, equality and non-discrimination intended to address the needs of marginalized and vulnerable groups; and lastly, cooperation and coherence, intended to promote partnerships and complement relevant international actors such as United Nations for capacity building for sustainability (African Union, 2006).

An interesting link between this research and the PCRD is the socio-economic indicative element of PCRD. One of the objectives of this research concerns livelihood strategies of IDPs. The PCRD notes that the AUC, 2004-2007 strategic plan, New Partnership for Development (NEPAD), 2001, millennium declaration 2000, socio-economic development, is a multi-dimensional process that contributes to improved living conditions, improved ability to meet basic needs (health, education and food), reduction of poverty and inequality and enhanced capacity of human beings to realize their potential – “jumpstarting” livelihood. Therefore post-conflict actors are required to target micro-level activities which have the greatest regenerative impact, address threats to livelihoods and income generation, re-establish agricultural production for food security and land ownership, re-establish markets and trade at local, regional and international levels of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery.

According to African Union (2006; 2009), there have been various suggestions from experts and stakeholders on how to address problems of funds, particularly unpaid or delayed annual subscriptions from member states. This has proved to be a big setback on PCRD implementation timelines. One of the ideas is the Africa Solidarity Initiative (ASI) whose funding conference was launched at an African Solidarity Conference (ASC), in July 2013 in Addis Ababa, and aims to mobilize both in-kind and funding support for post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts in countries emerging from conflict.
This initiative prioritizes various in-kind contributions from African countries. These include sharing of expertise, best practices, offering training facilities, exchange familiarization schemes and capacity building. In future, this initiative should galvanize the private sector to participate as a shareholder in PCRD, the way the African Union engaged it in the fight against Ebola virus outbreak in Sierra Leone.

The PCRD framework is not complete until such a time when local participation and empowerment of marginalized communities are incorporated in such a way that they are able to integrate in-kind and indigenous knowledge into coherent plans and programmes for sustainable peace. Other emerging initiatives such as the global dialogue on fragility (New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States) and the related G7+ group of developing countries on PCRD issues as well as efforts towards a harmonized conceptual understanding on the transition-recovery development continuum in the African context are still developing on the PCRD agenda in the coming years.

However, the commitment of the AU in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery is demonstrated by action plans passed by a Special Session of the Assembly of the African Union on the consideration and resolution of conflicts in Africa, on August 31, 2009. The Session discussed situations of thirteen countries in Africa. These include: Somalia, Sudan (Darfur), Chad/Sudan, Horn of Africa, Great Lakes regions, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Madagascar, Cote d’Ivore, Liberia, Central African Republic, Comoros and Western Sahara.

By the time of the August 31, 2009 AU Special Session, Kenya was emerging from the 2007/2008 post-election conflict. This researcher therefore interrogated the various resolutions and interventions passed for the thirteen countries to explore if there were any lessons learnt from the Kenya’s context. African Union had mixed interventions: for example, on Somalia the session resolved twelve
action points. Among them, the AU recommended for deployment by the end of 2009, battalions of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

The session also resolved to strengthen the political and humanitarian components of AMISOM, including the enhancement of its political presence on the ground in Mogadishu. Additionally, there were recommendations of facilitating engagement with all stakeholders, the delivery of humanitarian assistance, reconstruction of the local administration and infrastructure and the implementation of community-based demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programmes (African Union, 2009).

There were sixteen action points in regard to Sudan/Darfur, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and Chad/Sudan and on the Horn of Africa. On Darfur, among the recommendations includes: To ensure speedy progress in the search for peace, security, justice and reconciliation in Darfur, building on the improvement of the security situation; urge the international community to move from emergency humanitarian assistance towards development support, in order to facilitate the return and resettlement of refugees and IDPs.

Ten action points emerged from the session regarding the Great Lakes. Among them the AU resolved to mobilize greater support from Member States towards post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi, and request the Commission to organize a pledging conference which would enable African countries to express their solidarity with these two countries, in accordance with the AU Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). Additionally, support the electoral process in Burundi, including through the deployment of an AU mission to observe all stages of the electoral process (African Union, 2009).

According to African Union (2009), the Session passed five action points regarding Guinea Bissau as well as the republic of Guinea. For example, the AU
recommended the Commission and ECOWAS to convene, before the end of 2009, a regional conference on post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization, security sector reforms in Guinea Bissau, and demand that the *de facto* authorities fully comply with their commitments and ensure that the elections are held within the new time-frame agreed, that is, January 2010 for presidential elections and March 2010 for legislative elections.

In Madagascar, conflict parties were expected to double their efforts to resolve the outstanding issues and restore State legality through credible, transparent and fair elections, and in Cote d’Ivoire the session resolved to request the Ivorian parties show the necessary political will in order to create a favourable atmosphere for the holding of the presidential elections. The session further resolved that AU support the on-going efforts at peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction in Liberia as well as in CAR, and to call for increased efforts by Member States and the international community.

In regard to the Comoros, the AU reaffirmed its unity and its territorial integrity. For Western Sahara, the Session resolved to support the UN efforts to overcome the impasses and relevant UN Security Council resolutions, which called for direct negotiations between the two parties without preconditions and in good faith, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

The discussion shows that AU/PCRD does not have a uniform framework for post-conflict reconstruction and recovery but intervenes on a “context basis” depending on complexity and magnitude of the problem. Some countries, such as Somalia, are still in conflict while Kenya and Burundi are vulnerable, especially during electoral periods. With such a weak framework, many other countries will have lesser obligations to honour any enforcement mechanisms. For example it took considerable amount of time for ECOWAS to swear in
Gambia’s president-elect, after the 2016 general election and in a neighbouring country even after the incumbent had conceded defeat.

2.4.2 The New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)

The New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) working under AU has a role to support post-conflict reconstruction and the mobilization of resources for the AU Peace Fund (Nkhulu, 2005). To encourage member states to adhere to democracy and good governance, the AU created a self-monitoring instrument, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), in 2003, which is voluntary for member States.

The primary purpose of the APRM is to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building. Other than periodic reviews, early signs of impending political or economic crisis in a member country would also be sufficient cause for instituting a review.

Before the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya, APRM had recommended some review on electoral structure. At the height of the post-election violence in Kenya, AU, with other donor assistance assigned Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of United Nations, and the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, the mandate to broker peace. But the African Union acknowledges through the policy framework on post-conflict lack of sufficient local ownership and participation in post-conflict reconstruction. Externally driven post-conflict reconstruction processes cannot be sustained if they are not effectively owned by the people that they are targeting (Murithi, 2005).
When the international community, in the form of the UN, bilateral actors and international civil society come into a post-conflict reconstruction process, they immediately distort the economies of the war-affected regions that they are operating in (Murithi, 2005). But the framework also acknowledges that civil society can make a critical contribution to post-conflict reconstruction. It identifies early warning, policy development and research, capacity building through training and education as areas where civil society can contribute to post-conflict reconstruction.

Reconstruction and recovery alone are not effective means of managing post-election conflict, if performed in the absence of a comprehensive regimen of mitigation activities such as peace education (Coppola, 2007). Adapting, adoption and transformation of a society from conflict is not easy, hence the call for concerted effort from international and local actors depending on the magnitude of reconstruction and recovery.

Wars destroy not only buildings and bodies but also trust, hope, identity, family and social ties (Pouligny, 2005). In post-conflict situation, actors must project and portray images of trust, hope and faith to all the victims and; the victims should also respond in trust.

2.4.3 The Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention, 2009).

At the continental level, the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention, 2009) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR, 2006) are the main legal frameworks dealing with IDPs. Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the African Union met at a Special Summit in Kampala, Uganda, on 22-23 October 2009 and adopted the Kampala Convention. Before this Convention, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
(ICGLR) had developed the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region in December 2006.

The ICGLR was signed by 11 member States and contained two Protocols - the Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, and the Protocol on the Property Rights of Returning Populations. The main objective of these protocols was to facilitate member states to adopt, domesticate and implement guiding principles on internal displacement. The Protocols further provides legal guidance about the physical safety and material needs of internally displaced persons in accordance with the guiding principles.

This research pays closer attention to the Kampala Convention due to its wide membership. The main objective of this legal framework was to commit States to seek lasting solutions to the problem of displacement and explicitly recognizes IDPs’ rights. The Convention defines IDPs as:

Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. Kampala Convention, Article 1(k).

In post-conflict reconstruction and recovery process, IDPs have a right to voluntarily return home, integrate locally in areas of displacement or relocate to another part of the country. Governments are responsible for promoting and creating satisfactory conditions for each of these options on a sustainable basis and in circumstances of safety and dignity. It also obliges governments to assist IDPs and facilitate their resettlement after they have been forced to move.

However, the role of the Kenya government in this post-conflict reconstruction and recovery approach, which is beyond the resettlement programmes, is unclear. For example, under the Convention, governments are required to protect
and assist IDPs without any discrimination as well as assist local communities that host IDPs.

Additionally, signatory governments are expected to provide compensation for the harm suffered by IDPs as a result of their displacement. Therefore, it calls for cooperation among Governments, local and external actors to protect IDPs. This demonstrates the awareness of the difficulties IDPs experience and actors being ready to end their suffering. There are a lot of similarities in the general objectives of the PCRD, the Kampala Convention and the ICGLR in activities regarding post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. This reflects a common vision and parallel purposes.

The ICGLR, like the World Bank, the UN and the AU has functions such as, peace and security; democracy and good governance; economic development and regional integration as well as humanitarian and social issues. This demonstrates similarities in post–conflict reconstruction and recovery agendas. However, the ICGLR requires member states to put in place national coordination mechanisms which include youth, women and civil society, to ensure wider participation in decision-making.

With all the global and continental post-conflict reconstruction and recovery mechanisms in place, this research argues for the need to rebuild social capital – the IDPs capacity to command scarce socio-economic and political resources by virtue of belonging to a social network. The focus of this research is community resilience (adaptation, absorption and transformation capacities), where IDPs are able to move from vulnerability to bouncing back to their original livelihood.

The IDPs also have rights to infrastructure such as schools, health centres and churches hence in designing post-conflict reconstruction and recovery legal framework, dynamics of rural and urban IDP communities are a challenge due to their socio-economic livelihood needs. For example, the population density is
very high in urban areas compared to rural areas, hence easy to set out resettlement programmes for rural-based IDPs. In urban areas, majority of residents gain livelihood through gainful employment and unlike in rural areas housing is a significant factor in adaptation, absorption or transformation of IDPs because of high population density. In contrast, rural communities have low population density and low land value, with the community having sentimental value for the land ownership, but strong social support network.

The main source of livelihood for rural populations is agriculture-based. Therefore, rural post-conflict reconstruction and recovery strategies could be comparatively easier to achieve as opposed to urban post-conflict reconstruction and recovery strategies. In the rural setup, familiarity and ways of survival are universal among the rural population, which is predominantly mono-ethnic. In both rural and urban populations, effective post-conflict reconstruction and recovery requires social capital (Colletta et al. 1998; Colletta & Kostner, 1996). These include social support from their network, family, relatives and community members.

2.5 History of Post-Election Violence and IDPs in Kenya

In democratic societies, elections are held after a predetermined period of time (Kiai, 2008). However, democracy is not just holding elections, but includes mechanics and procedures of accountability in between the elections. Elections are a critical hallmark of democratic governance but on their own, they do not make democracy as they are usually an event. To achieve free, fair, accountable and credible general elections other factors such as professional Election Management Bodies (EMBs), constitutional election dates, credible voter registration, accountable voter education, domestic and international election observation, political party funding, independent public media, party primaries and election campaigns are important. When constantly practiced the above
factors entrench democratic electoral practices for acceptance of electoral outcomes.

But while these practices may be in place, other factors such as historical, socio-economic, political and cultural beliefs exist and can negatively affect electoral processes Adeagbo (2011). For example there are many African political contenders who must consult witchdoctors to seek for “blessings”, and there are many voters and contenders who stereotype women candidates as un-electable in certain political offices such as the presidency. In Kenya to ensure equity, the Constitution provides for at least two-third gender equality principle in all political and public office holders appointments. Therefore political institutions such as parliament have been under pressure to ensure they correct the current situation where parliament is dominated by men. Also affected by this provision are the Executive, Judiciary and other public institutions as they are required to evaluate their workforce and comply.

Between 1989 and 2003, out of forty-eight countries in sub-Saharan Africa, forty-four held de jure elections which were contested (Lindberg, 2006). There is need to interrogate the quality of democracy in many of these countries. In 1990 alone, thirty one countries experienced post-election violence. Other countries in Africa with a history of election violence include Uganda, Ethiopia, Chad, Cameroon and Zambia (Atoubi, 2008; Kwatemba, 2008). Contested general election results can also legitimize post-election violence as in the case of the 2007 Sierra Leone general elections (Christensen & Utas, 2008) as voters and candidates contest irregularities in the processes.

General elections should be avenues for lasting peace (Sisk & Reynolds, 1999), but combinations of elements such as ethnicity, historical injustices, unemployment and poverty, roles of media, civil society and international community may take some share of the blame for post-election violence. In Kenya, since the introduction of multi-party system of government, each general
election has been characterized by violence and crisis (Kagwanja, 2009; Akiwumi, 1999; Kiliku, 1992; Waki, 2008). There are knowledge gaps to interrogate how it is that with so many general elections, Kenya and many other countries are yet to achieve lasting peace. There could also be a relationship between post-election violence and a multi-ethnic nation such as Kenya, in every general election.

According to Waki (2008) and Adeagbo (2011), deep-rooted land disputes, economic and political inequality, impunity, role of media and ethnic animosity played a key role in Kenya’s 2007/2008 post-election violence. The causes of post-election violence are documented through research and government commissions in many of the affected countries in Africa. There are strong arguments that democracy in Africa is still weak and proper mechanisms and maturity of democracy is yet to be realized in many of these countries. Kenya managed some initial steps in 2013 by holding general elections since the introduction of multi-party politics in 1992, whose results were contested in the Kenya’s Supreme Court, a sign of democratic maturity.

Although the Court validated the results of the election, the losers queried the casualness of the verdict and described the validation process as lacking rigor and deeper interrogation of facts provided. However IDPs in Kenya have learnt valuable lessons as a consequence of the 2007/2008 post-election violence, and they went on to participate in the 2013 general elections.

The post-election crisis of January 2008 brought Kenya close to collapse. The abrupt proclamation of Mwai Kibaki, the retired president, as victor in a highly contentious presidential election, led to either planned or spontaneous eruptions of ethnic violence (Kagwanja, 2009). There are many root causes of the post-election violence such as poverty and unemployment (Waki, 2008), but ethnic disputes relating to land dating back to colonial times (notably between Kalenjin
and Kikuyu in the Rift Valley) and formation of political parties around Kenya’s 42 ethnic groups was what stoked violence (Kagwanja, 2009).

Towards the election date, ethnic tension was further heightened by the opposition campaign critically shaped by rhetoric of “forty one against one” (the Kikuyu) and Kenya against Kikuyu. The message to the voters was to isolate one tribe (Kikuyu) against the other forty one tribes in Kenya by voting as a tribal bloc. This demonstrated that though multiparty elections in 1992, 1997 and 2002 were also conducted along ethnic lines, ethnic polarization reached fever pitch in the 2007 elections.

Ethnicity has been one of the significant variables under Kenya’s multiparty democracy as competition for state resources has made it hard for politicians to devise alternative bases for political organization such as class (Kwatemba, 2012). Hyden (2006) acknowledges this point when he argues that the influence of “community-centred networks” in African politics has been due to the inability of class-based identity to dislodge kinship ties.

The re-introduction of multiparty politics in Africa in the early 1990s led to a worrying trend of increasing election-related violent conflict that threatens democracy, peace and stability. These threats are manifested through increased electoral violence with an ethnic dimension. For example, according to Kagwanja (2009), the electoral violence in Kenya quickly metamorphosed into a deadly orgy of ‘ethnic’ slaughter, rape and plunder reminiscent of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. To demonstrate the role of ethnicity, Wolff notes:

Ethnicity acquires enormous power to mobilize people when it becomes a predominant identity and means more than just a particular ethnic origin; it comes to define people as speakers of a certain language, belonging to a particular religion, being able to pursue some careers but not others, being able to preserve and express their cultural heritage, having access to positions of power and wealth or not. In short, when ethnicity becomes politically relevant and determines the life prospects of people belonging to distinct ethnic groups, it is possible to mobilize group members to
change a situation of apparently perpetual discrimination and disadvantage or in defence of a valued status quo (Wolff, 2006: 31).

Ethnicity has become more than just an expression of cultural identity and gets connected to social status; it determines people’s fortunes in life and becomes politicized. It makes it possible for those who feel aggrieved as a result of discrimination and those in power who want to protect their privileges, to invoke ethnicity (Kwatemba, 2012). Multiparty elections in a country like Kenya with forty two ethnic groups generate a sense of optimism due to wide participation, but increases cases of electoral violence unlike in single party elections. However, it can be demonstrated that achieving mature democracy is a process. Countries such as France and the United States which gained independence in 1789 and 1776 respectively are a reminder that many of the world's consolidated democracies also experienced violence as part of a maturing process during the centuries-long move towards democracy.

Although the general elections in 2013 were peaceful, this may not be a yardstick of maturity in democracy. Indeed, many African countries have faithfully conducted general elections as provided for in their constitutions and legal frameworks, but the electoral outcomes have not translated into sustainable democracy (Owuor, 2009). The post-election violence in Kenya proved the weaknesses of many electoral institutions since independence (Khadiagala; 2008, Waki, 2008 & Abuya, 2009). This could be either deliberate or by coincidence but facilitated by the government. This begs the question: have the African political systems effectively responded to multiparty aspirations?

Like many countries in Africa, Meredith (2006) argues that during the first elections in Kenya after independence, politicians conducted politics around national identity thus, candidates were voted for regardless of ethnicity. However, throughout the multiparty period in Kenya, ambitious politicians discovered they could win votes by appealing for ethnic support and promises of improved government services and projects in their areas, hence creating ethnic solidarity.
Tribal identity, kinship, clan and ethnic consideration largely determined how people voted especially in 2007 general elections (Waki, 2008).

2.6 Kenya’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Recovery Approach

With the legal instruments and approaches towards post-conflict reconstruction and recovery discussed above, Kenya enacted an IDPs specific law in 2012, five-years into post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. It provided for a rights-based response to internal displacement and imposed an obligation on everyone involved in the protection and assistance to IDPs to act in accordance with the Great Lakes Protocol and Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

This law provided a clear implementation strategy of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery after a 5-year of learning experience. For example, it imposed a Kenya shillings 5 million fine and imprisonment of up to 10 years for anyone pretending to be internally displaced. Similarly, a person who establishes an institution or camp which consists of persons pretending to be internally displaced suffers punishment. Additionally in this law, the Government is required to ensure that it consults with IDPs when creating programmes to assist and protect them through the National Consultative Co-ordination Committee (NCCC) on IDPs and a Fund for protection and assistance of IDPs (Ministry of State for Special Programmes, 2010; 2011; 2012 and Taskforce Progress Report on Resettlement of IDPs 2012).

However, experts have criticized the omission in the law of the provision requiring the Government to address the information needs of existing IDPs. They argue that references to the right to information and participation focus on prevention and lasting solutions, leaving a significant gap in relation to protection and assistance of IDPs during their displacement.
After the 2007/2008 post-election violence, the National Steering Committee (NSC) on peace building and conflict management was created. It brought together different actors at a number of levels to share information, expertise and co-ordinate conflict prevention efforts and enhance effectiveness to all actors. The main focus of NSC is to collate reports from the local level. Below the NSC, the District Peace Committees (DPC) was also formed. This structure has existed since 1993 in Northern Kenya, but after the 2007/2008 post-election violence, it was re-launched in all the districts in Kenya (UNDP, 2012). The main focus is to monitor peace, map-out and analyse information to generate early warning reports and share this information with relevant authorities to act at the district level.

Between 2008 and 2010, through NSC, 760 government officials and police were trained on various aspects of post-conflict and peace building. Organizations such as Peace-Net, a coalition of 530 NGOs have helped mobilize communities to foster both early warning and response and long-term resilience, particularly through faith-based organizations and community-level organizations. These models are expected to enhance community resilience towards future conflicts. In the meantime, there has been concerted effort from the Kenya Government to undertake resettlement programmes (Ministry of State for Special Programmes, 2012) after the post-election violence.

IDPs can be encouraged to build new lives elsewhere without having to give up the possibility of eventual return when conditions warrant (Mundt & Ferris, 2008). During violence and flight, victims lose institutional knowledge, cultural and social identity and economic viability (Coppola, 2007). The framework for the 2007/2008 reconstruction and recovery in Kenya has been modelled through categorization of IDPs into three groups, who have different community resilience adaptive capabilities and social support as discussed below.
2.6.1 Government Resettled IDPs

The reconstruction and recovery process of the 2007/2008 post-election violence started immediately after the humanitarian crisis. The government started an initiative, *Operation Rudi Nyumbani* - (Operation Return Home), where victims were “encouraged” to go back to their original homes and farms with a promise of guaranteed security and transport from the IDP camps. Thereafter, a second initiative was launched where government bought land for resettlement purposes. Individual IDP households were resettled in 2 hectare pieces of land identified and purchased by the government (Ministry of State for Special Programmes, 2011). According to the Taskforce Progress Report on Resettlement of IDPs 2012, the Ministry of State for Special Programmes managed to resettle 7,498 IDP households out of 663,921 victims. The resettlements provide informal social safety nets and allows for collective action for victims to move on with reconstruction and recovery process.

Resettlement of IDPs was done in five particular locations chosen by the government (Taskforce Progress Report on Resettlement of IDPs 2012). Some host communities may reject them based on their cultural values and norms. In the new environment, IDPs found new systems as well as existing structures such as markets, schools, churches, health centres and transport systems. They are expected to abide by the rules, norms and values governing these systems. Government structures such as administration and NGOs and also present in these new environment as they require good working relationships.

By virtue of sharing common challenges and opportunities throughout the cycle as IDPs, they are also likely to form new social support structures. New networks and groups to regulate their actions and behaviour were created. But prices of commodities in the markets, different religions, transport systems, and languages among other political and socio-economic aspects are likely to affect their resilience as a community. This research was built on the knowledge of the
extent to which post-conflict victims influence aspects of social support in the host communities in the process of reconstruction and recovery.

2.6.2 Camp-based IDPs

By the end of the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya, there were 118 IDP camps across the country (Waki, 2008). These IDP camps hosted thousands of victims displaced by the violence. To survive in the camps, victims depended on humanitarian aid. Within the 118 IDP camps, there are IDP structures formed purposely for their survival and coping strategies. For example, the IDP network has leaders who have a link with the Government and other actors (Ministry of State for Special Programmes, 2010). Individual networks, an aspect of social capital, further comes in handy to help in survival and coping strategies. Social support through families, relatives and acquaintances can send remittances in form of cash or kind to the IDP relatives/friends who are still in the camp. These remittances could be sent through trusted sources such as a messenger.

Through social capital – information flow, individual IDPs may be able to secure jobs through friends putting across a good word to the prospective employer giver. This is a resource embedded in social relations and social structures and mobilized when an actor wishes to increase likelihood of success in an action. Access and use of the embedded resource resides with the actor and are set to benefit both the individual and group. The IDPs being a vulnerable group are likely to be engaged in informal jobs, which would require networking to secure. For example, if urban IDPs have freedom to work and access to opportunities, there would be likely fewer dependants on humanitarian aid and better able to overcome sources of tension and conflict among the host communities.

Through social influence, this category of IDPs has remained in the camps while other IDPs have been resettled by the Government. Their action of remaining in the camps is both an opportunity and a constraint. It is a constraint as they continue to live in abysmal conditions in the camps, and opportunity as
international community and media continues to focus on the problem. This focus could lead to government taking concrete actions to resettle them.

2.6.3 Integrated IDPs

This is the section of the IDPs who, because of their social capital, were able to seek refuge within the host communities. They have been accommodated by friends, relatives and acquaintances. IDPs must feel accepted and accommodated into the host communities by friends, acquaintances, relatives and well-wishers. They must feel the social security and sense of belonging to a host community. This may be ontological security, which Giddens (1984), defines as confidence or trust that natural and social worlds are as they appear to be, including the basic existential parameters of self and social identity. Socio-economic, political, psychological and biological security may be seen as dimensions or sub-sets of ontological security.

Depending on social structures, the period of relative reconstruction and recovery may vary. They bring extra dependency burden to their relatives, friends and acquaintances as they need social support on a daily basis. There is limited knowledge on the extent of social support and livelihood burden the 2007/2008 post-election violence victims brought to their hosts.

There are unwritten rules and regulations, which IDPs are expected to respect, obey and practise. Internal contradictions, opposition to structural principles or basic values may lead to system degeneration and collapse, unless corrected by mediation and dispute resolution processes (Richmond, 1988). The feeling of recovery can, therefore, be assumed to be inner cognitive feeling than the physical structures and order in society. IDPs may attend the same markets, churches and clinics with the host communities yet they are still considered as aliens. But because IDPs are newcomers to these areas and also in such systems like markets and churches, they are likely to be labelled and defined as such which may psychologically affect their reconstruction and recovery process.
Activities such as communal rebuilding of schools, health centres and churches which cater for multi-ethnic victims of 2007/2008 post-election violence is an example of a recovering society. But the post-election violence destroyed not only the infrastructure in a community but also values (Pouligny, 2005). Therefore, both external and local actors should also focus on social capital of the IDPs. For example, IDPs in the host communities must be initiated and taught particular rules within that community. These may be market prices of commodities in the markets or simple language systems like greetings. IDPs are easily identified as they have no basic training of the systems and social order.

As observed, IDPs in the host community are a new population and cause community support structures to change. This may cause relative disorder in the society. Under these situations, the IDPs may be perceived as threatening to the stability of the social order. This may continually lead to tension between the IDPs and the host communities, which may ultimately lead to lack of integration as a function of society.

2.7 The United Nations Guiding Principles on IDPs

The preceding sections of this study have provided the continental and Kenyan legal framework on the IDPs processes of reconstruction and recovery. Section 2.6 above has provided Kenya’s approaches (return to original homes, re-integration and resettlements) of IDPs after the post-election violence. This section compares the above approaches against the UN guiding principles. Literature on specific case studies borrowed from Brookings Institution research has been widely quoted to demonstrate similarity or divergence from global practices.

The United Nations developed 30 guiding principles towards reconstruction and recovery process of IDPs in the late 1990s. These guiding principles aimed to highlight the rights and guarantees to protection and assistance of IDPs during displacement, resettlement, re-integration or return to original homes. According
to the UNOCHA 2004; 2010, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, argues:

Competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country. Such authorities shall endeavour to facilitate the reintegration of returned or resettled internally displaced persons.

The guiding principles on internal displacement are international in nature and a standard to governments, international organizations and all actors providing assistance and protection to IDPs. They are based upon international humanitarian and human rights law and analogous refugee law, to which many countries are signatories.

There has been an attempt to determine at what point the actors dealing with IDPs consider their interventions to have reached a lasting solution and declare displaced population as no longer to be referred to as IDPs (UNOCHA, 2010; Brookings Institution 2010). In 2007, through the participation of stakeholders such as governments, donors, international agencies and NGOs, civil society and IDP organisations, conferences were held and a pilot version of the framework on durable solutions was released at Georgetown University.

There have been revisions and field testing of this first version by agencies such as Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the member organizations of the Global Cluster Working Groups on Early Recovery and Protection and with the UNDG-ECHA Working Group on Transition (UNOCHA, 2010). The final version, released in 2009, clarified the concept of durable solutions and international actors and local actors dealing with IDPs can use the present framework. The 2010 IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons states that:
A durable solution is achieved when IDPs no longer have assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement. A durable solution can be achieved through: sustainable reintegration at the place of origin; sustainable local integration in areas where internally displaced persons take refuge (local integration); or sustainable integration in another part of the country (settlement elsewhere in the country).

Accordingly, through the assistance of actors, IDPs should be fully engaged in planning, controlling, co-coordinating and management of their durable solutions. They should have access to humanitarian and development actors and also have access to effective monitoring mechanisms of the resettlement activities and projects. There should also be full participation of IDPs during peace processes and peace building, in case of displacement caused by conflict or violence (Brookings Institution, 2010; UNOCHA, 2010). This has been equally addressed as mentioned under PCRD in this research. Indeed, African Union, article 11(2) of the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, acknowledges freedom of choice. UNOCHA (2010) states:

States Parties shall enable internally displaced persons to make a free and informed choice on whether to return, integrate locally or relocate, by consulting them on these and other options and ensuring their participation in finding sustainable solutions.

The guiding principles are divided into 30 parts, referred to as principles, with each focusing on specific areas. The main focus on reconstruction and recovery are on Principles 28-30. Achieving durable solutions is a gradual, often long-term, process.

Some of the indicators of achieving durable solutions may include: general peace and security, affordable quality standard of living, access to means of livelihood, ability to acquire housing, land and property, access to documentation such as land titles, identification and voters cards, family reunification, participation in
public affairs such as voting, and access to effective remedies and justice are some of the broad indicators of reconstruction and recovery (UNOCHA, 2010).

To interrogate the various options available for IDPs: local integration, return or resettlement, in relation to the Guiding Principles 28-30, this research divided this literature into specific sections discussed below:

2.7.1 Return to Original Homes

In post-conflicts, IDPs are disconnected with their social life and return to original home is one of the best options in search of durable solutions. According to the Brookings Institution (2010), IDPs who have physically returned to their place of origin may find that they are unable to rebuild destroyed houses or reclaim their land, because their former land and the houses have been occupied by others. In Kenya for example, a significant number of IDPs were unable to return home as their land and houses were already taken by others, raising a safety and security concern. Land is particularly important in Kenya because it is a natural capital which is scarce: either inherited or purchased.

Many reports regarding post-election violence in Kenya since the introduction of multi-party politics isolate land as a primary cause of conflict, and general elections as a trigger to the conflicts (Kiliki, 1992; Akiwumi, 1999; Waki, 2008). The UN guiding principle 29(2), additionally concurs:

Competent authorities have the duty and responsibility to assist returned and/or resettled internally displaced persons to recover, to the extent possible, their property and possessions which they left behind or were dispossessed upon their displacement. When recovery of such property or possessions is not possible, competent authorities shall provide or assist these persons in obtaining appropriate compensation or another form of just reparation.

Most rural Kenyan people earn their livelihood through land-farming. It is a tedious exercise, particularly in Kenya, to acquire land, hence losing it becomes a real setback to bouncing back to regular livelihood. Therefore, local
communities and individuals in Kenya consider themselves resilient based on assets such as land. The larger the ownership, the more resilient a community is viewed to be. This is not isolated to rural communities alone, as urban communities also purchase small parcels of land where they put up their homes. High demand for land and its unavailability has made the land issue very emotive and a campaign agenda in every subsequent general election.

When IDPs return, they should be able to rebuild their houses, infrastructure, access livelihood, education, schools and healthcare. Therefore the guiding principles require engagement of IDPs by national authorities regarding the process of return. IDPs further require up-to-date and practical information of what items they can take with them, available transport, arrangements for those with special needs, information regarding degrees of destruction, and access to housing, land, livelihood when they return (UNOCHA, 2010). Lack of this information is likely to place IDPs under more vulnerability especially when they have limited choices of livelihood.

Therefore, the operational status of schools, churches, health centres, electricity and water systems must be evaluated and monitored by national government and IDPs before returning. It may be necessary to open a school in a return area despite there not being the minimum number of students as prescribed by the law. This would help the IDPs to re-engage in their previous lifestyles leading to early adaptation. This information can be disseminated to all categories of IDPs including women, children and disabled through different approaches.

Lessons from the Kenyan approach indicate that there was insignificant engagement between the National government and IDPs. The “Operation Rudi Nyumbani” project (Operation Return Home) was driven by politicians in campaign rallies, sometimes with intimidation of individuals and groups unwilling to return home (Waki, 2008). The project was a government driven initiative intended to intimidate rural based IDPs to return to their farms regardless of the
security situation. Politicians were the architects’ of the aggressive campaign which if it succeeded would have demonstrated that they ended the displacement.

There was no prior proper evaluation of the areas of return to ensure basic security and safety of returnees. IDPs were ferried in lorries and vans, and left them in proximity to their original homes. If for example, the infrastructural development of schools, churches, hospitals and clinics burned down are operational before return, including those belonging to minority groups, it would have created confidence in the returnees, which was missing in the Kenyan situation.

IDPs who return should have access to employment and other means of earning livelihoods, which should allow them to meet their primary socio-economic needs. This researcher notes the likelihood of business people who return to find many opportunities already taken or missing. They may be disoriented upon return because new ideas, technologies, approaches were developed in their absence. Often they also lack start-up capital as their businesses were either burnt down or looted by gangs. Therefore, there is need to consider compensation or restitution for the returnees, which the PCRD 2006 framework concurs with. According to the UN guiding principles, they should not be discriminated in gainful employment either.

In Kenya, despite the huge socio-economic losses mentioned in the introduction of this research, the affected population has never been compensated and the cases at the International Criminal Court (ICC) collapsed (Waki, 2008). There was hope of compensation among victims who lost of property, when ICC began the pre-trial of six Kenyans the ICC prosecutor had identified to be accountable and responsible for the 2007/2008 post-election violence.
However, all the cases collapsed when the judges terminated the last case involving the current deputy president in 2016. In all the cases the judges blamed the collapse on the Kenyan government non-cooperation. In addition, nobody has ever been charged and convicted locally in relation to the 2007/2008 post-election violence.

2.7.2 Integration into Local Communities

Despite the continued focus on IDPs return to original homes, many governments have recently changed their stance. For example, Georgia, 2007 State Strategy for IDPs, Turkey national strategy framework document issued in 2005. Iraq, 2011, Nepal, Burundi, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Russian Federation and Serbia have all made some efforts to facilitate the local integration of IDPs. But According to Ferris, cited in Brookings Institution 2011,

Local integration, while generally accepted as one of three settlement options for achieving durable solutions to internal displacement, has received much less attention from almost all actors involved in internal displacement issues than return. Very little is currently known about the actual process of local integration for internally displaced persons choosing to remain in the locations to which they have been displaced.

Many national governments are unlikely to keep records of integration trends among IDPs due to poor data-capturing systems. Depending on the IDPs social network, they often leave IDP camps and get shelter from relatives, former neighbours and work colleagues. This social support is a reciprocity gesture based on previous assistance.

But often the IDPs have their own network to cater for socio-economic needs, which keeps track of individual well-being. For example, in the Kenyan situation, the IDP network is recognized by the Government and helps to update the database (bridging and linking social capital). The network acts as a link between the national government and IDPs issues. While the national government seems
to have a good database of government resettled IDPs and those in the camps, the IDP network captures socio-economic data.

Rural-based IDPs, who have no prospect of returning to their original farms in the foreseeable future due to security and safety fears often choose to integrate locally as they wait for guaranteed peace and security to return. In their new socio-economic setup they transform, adapt or adopt new livelihood systems. According to Brookings Institution (2010), a sudden en masse arrival and integration of IDPs places a considerable burden on existing community services and resources because of the added population which could create new conflicts. To minimize this, a community-based approach that addresses the needs of IDPs and the host community may mitigate risks of tensions between the two populations, and support a more effective integration or re-integration of IDPs, especially where the conflict was ethnic-based. There are likelihoods of resentment, labelling, stereotyping and identity issues between the IDPs and the host community which may result in further conflicts.

It is however important to have more reflection on the concept of local integration as a transitional measure pending the possibility for return or resettlement elsewhere. For example, in Kenya, many IDPs moved into multiple transit IDP-camps before eventually returning to their original homes. Some IDPs consciously decided to integrate locally, influenced by factors which include security, social networks, jobs, services and property ownership at their current residence.

In recent years, an increased number of governments have acknowledged local integration as a valid settlement option of IDPs. Local integration presents different challenges in rural and urban areas. Arguably, inadequate housing and lack of income-generating opportunities appear to be obstacles to local integration in both rural and urban set-ups. Local integration is mentioned as a settlement option for IDPs in many regional and country-level documents, though
UN documents mention this option inconsistently. Development actors need to be further engaged in the support of local integration and the achievement of sustainable solutions for IDPs in protracted displacement.

The factors that could affect successful integration of IDPs according to Ferris, (cited in Brookings Institution 2011) include attitudes of host communities (community views of IDPs as temporary or long-term. It is possible that the longer the IDPs intend to stay in a community before return to their home, the more they antagonize the host community. Alternatively, the longer they stay in a particular area/region, the more they relate to the host community. Other factors authorities and IDPs consider in integration are ethnic and religious, attitudes of displaced populations, cultural similarities between IDPs and host community, history of relations between IDPs and host communities. The closer the similarities the more seamless the integration is likely to be among the two populations.

Political causes of displacement (e.g. IDPs as innocent victims or as somehow responsible for the conflict) are a factor likely to call for re-alignment of loyalty and support among the IDPs, host community and the political leadership. For example in Kenya, some political leaders were against re-integration of IDPs into their areas as they were likely to distort the voting pattern (Waki, 2008). Socio-economic policy makers are also likely to consider demographics of displaced populations (IDP vulnerability, ability to contribute to the economy, similarity in urban/rural background to host community), availability of land or underemployment in host communities, governmental policies and international assistance, particularly the provision of social services.

In a multi-ethnic post-conflict reconstruction and recovery environment such as Kenya, where IDPs integrate into local communities, peace building is crucial as a long-term solution. IDPs are likely to compete for scarce socio-economic resources with the host communities. Sometimes, there could be cases of IDPs
not finding a job or a dwelling to rent because of discrimination by the resident population, which is against the UN guiding principles. But even as IDPs decide to integrate into the local communities, they should be guided by possibilities of sustainable livelihood such as employment and business opportunities.

Other factors such as environmental sustainability, security, infrastructure or public services should also be monitored first. In most circumstances, for example, IDPs may opt to integrate because national authorities have neglected IDP camps hence, for whatever opportunity, life out of the camps is considered better. But before making a decision to move out of the IDP camps, social capital of the individual IDP plays a significant role in this decision. For example, social networks and social support will help the IDP to adapt, adopt or transform, hence bouncing back better.

In devolved governance systems such as in Kenya, counties are encouraged to integrate IDPs into their communities through incentives and grants. This approach is likely to ensure these counties design socio-economic programmes for IDPs within their population. But the role of county governments in regard to IDP agenda has been very limited. Even where the national government has not allocated special fund or grants to county governments, such activities like tracing of IDP primary network members and re-uniting them for purposes of social support would assist in gradual reconstruction and recovery of integrated IDPs.

The above possibility was adopted in Serbia in 1990’s post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. The country designed and adopted action plans to provide municipalities (counties) with grants for IDPs. The Commissioner for Refugees encouraged municipalities with larger numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees to initiate participatory consultation with the displaced and the host communities and draw a local action plan to support the integration of displaced people (Brookings Institution, 2011). Each municipality that adopted an action
plan received a grant from the Commissioner for Refugees, which matched the funds the municipality provided from its own budget to the action plan.

In her study, securing the right to stay: local integration of IDPs in Burundi: Zeender, (cited in Brooking Institution, 2011) observed that although there was no significant difference in the socio-economic situation of integrated IDPs in comparison to the host communities, there were some substantial differences, with IDPs tending to live in more concentrated settlements with houses closer together, probably because of limited land resources. The host community homes and land were scattered across the hilly countryside. Due to the location, IDPs had a harder time cultivating their land, and their settlements were often built on territories that are subject to various State or private claims. Security of tenure of the land on which IDPs settlements were built were also key issues to consider in local integration. The above situation is similar to the Kenyan situation where IDPs are located in land which is yet to be adjudicated or belongs to state agencies.

Research by Fagen (cited in Brooking Institution, 2011) on local integration option in Colombia noted that IDPs themselves largely shared the view that their vision should be a return to the land they lost or, at least, a return to their rural lives as small farmers. Housing and land were considered important resilient capacities for the IDP community and was stated as important for post-reconstruction and recovery reconstruction. To address the housing and land concerns, the government offered housing subsidy to IDPs. In Kenya government re-constructed houses although not of the original quality or offered some cash for that purpose for IDPs who returned to their rural areas.

In addition to address the problem of education, donors contributed to improving existing schools and to creating new schools within IDP community and offered food. This was due to observations that traditional community schools were few and inadequate to IDP special needs. Literacy and educational levels among IDP
families were lower than the national average, hence could not fit well in the established education system in the host communities. There was need for education programmes with adult education components and flexible schedules because other than literacy levels, IDP children were often old for their grade levels as their families had to sufficiently settle to register children in school. The implication was that IDPs could not fit in the same classes with their age-mates. Similar to the above, some donors in Kenya constructed some schools in some areas where IDPs resettled.

According to this case study, some of the factors IDPs considered before local integration included the possibility to recover property and the former means of livelihood, possibility to adapt to new forms of livelihood and ability to transform to socio-economic and physical stability approximate to their previous lifestyles. Others included adoption to local and state services on the same basis as Colombian citizens in the same locality, and to all citizenry rights and possibility for compensation in any way for stolen land and property, and especially for human losses.

Williams (cited in Brooking Institution, 2011) research on protracted internal displacement and integration in Serbia, concluded that obstacles to the integration of IDPs in Serbia were divided into two categories. The first category involved documentation, access to health, education and labour markets while the secondary category involved humanitarian, shelter and adequate housing. Housing for IDPs was seen as the key to sustainable integration.

Sluga (cited in Brooking Institution, 2011), in the same report, studied local integration of IDPs in Yei, Southern Sudan, and noted an uneasy relationship between IDPs and the host community. There was contestation over land and property, which were an impediment to IDPs integration. The antagonism involved on one side, Dinka IDPs and SPLA soldiers (most of them also Dinkas) who remained in the area during the war and acquired land, the other side
involved indigenous inhabitants, most of them who left during the war and only returned after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). IDPs faced challenges of adjustment to the loss of their traditional livelihoods and lack of other alternatives in their places of origin. This hindered return to their original homes, preferring local integration. This meant IDPs lacked capacity of bouncing back if they returned to their original homes.

Reviewing Uganda’s case study, Berg (cited in Brooking Institution, 2011) observed that local integration based on economic viability tended to be hybrid in form. The intention for IDPs was to remain in the area even though in almost all cases a foothold was kept in the places of origin monitoring and evaluating the situation with a vision to return. When opportunities dwindle then option of returning home becomes a priority as the research noted that culturally, land was very important to the Acholi people, and the ties to ancestral land are very strong. This resonates with the Kikuyu ethnic community in Kenya which is perceived to have strong attachment to land.

On social capital, Walicki (cited in Brooking Institution, 2011) found that although it was not a criterion in durable solutions framework, social networks were a contributing factor to IDPs’ integration decisions. For example, in its local integration strategy in 2007, the Georgian government acknowledged that IDPs current social capital did not facilitate their integration; this resulted in their isolation and lower participation in areas of civil society. Therefore, there were disappointments and desperation and lack of initiative. Hence the IDPs over dependence on assistance resulted in obstacles to their social integration as well as their future return to their permanent places of residence.

Although all these case studies were conducted in different country contexts, community assets such as housing, land, livelihood, education and health were considered major factors in the options for local integration.
A study by IDMC, 2011 on durable solutions revealed that most IDPs prefer to return to their original homes, but at least in 20 countries IDPs or some groups of IDPs prefer to integrate locally. These included Burundi, Indonesia, Nepal and Southern Sudan, among others. In other countries, some IDPs prefer local integration but they also remain interested in returning home, such as IDPs from Kosovo in Serbia, among others.

The longer the IDPs stay in a certain area, the more they become compliant with the host communities socio-economic livelihood. They form new social networks which offer social support (emergent norms, culture, values) and re-establish socio-economic livelihoods systems (adaptation). They are therefore not primarily focussed on returning to their original homes. The table below illustrates these findings.
### Table 2.1: Countries with IDPs who wish to Integrate Locally

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Years of Displacement</th>
<th>Mention of local integration in peace agreements</th>
<th>IDPS who wish to integrate locally</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>No peace agreements</td>
<td>About 15 per cent of IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Local Integration, return and resettlement provided in the peace agreements</td>
<td>Most remaining IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa Republic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Local integration not mentioned</td>
<td>Some IDPs in Urban areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>No peace agreement</td>
<td>About 80 per cent of IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Local integration not mentioned</td>
<td>IDPs who have use of land in areas of displacement; Some internally displaced families with children enrolled in schools in areas of displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>No peace agreement</td>
<td>Turkish Cypriot IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Between 4&amp;10</td>
<td>Local integration not mentioned</td>
<td>Unknown though Government and International organization have made efforts to encourage local integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Local integration not mentioned</td>
<td>Ethnic Javanese expelled from Aceh during 1999-2002 and who sought refuge in North Sumatra Province; East Timorese who have been living in West Timor since 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>20-25</td>
<td>Local integration not mentioned</td>
<td>37 per cent of IDPs displaced after 2003 expressed wish to return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Local integration not mentioned</td>
<td>IDPs who represent the ethnic majority at their current locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Local Integration, return and resettlement provided in the peace agreements</td>
<td>Some IDPs prefer to integrate locally in areas of former camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Local Integration, return and resettlement provided in the peace agreements</td>
<td>Most remaining IDPs would prefer to integrate locally but they don’t receive assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>No peace agreement</td>
<td>Mostly Hausa-Fulani IDPs Plateau State having found refuge in Bauchi State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Local integration not mentioned</td>
<td>Some IDPs in Urban areas such as Cotabato city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Up to 8</td>
<td>No peace agreement</td>
<td>Non-Chechen IDPs outside North Caucasus and some IDPs in Ingushetia and Dagestan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>No peace agreement</td>
<td>IDPs from Kosovo mostly ethnic Serbs but also ROMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Up to 20</td>
<td>No peace agreement</td>
<td>Among Muslim IDPs who have been living in Puttalam for 20 years, about half of those surveyed preferred local integration (across all ages)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Peace agreements specifies right of IDPs to return and other resettlement options</td>
<td>IDPs in the North, South and Darfur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Brookings Institution – University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement (2011)
2.7.3 Resettlement

For IDPs who have not been able to return to their original homes or integrate into the local communities, they are resettled usually through national government programmes. Resettlement may be within the country borders or in other countries, based on post-conflict circumstances. However, like other options, sustainable livelihood and employment opportunities, environmental sustainability, security, infrastructure and public services are other considerations before resettlement. As a good practice and guiding principle, arrangements should be made for IDPs and their representatives to visit and assess conditions for resettlement whether in the country or elsewhere outside the country.

The resettlement should be a programme issue under a framework as opposed to haphazard and ad hoc procedures. Data and demographic studies should be available before resettlement. For example, like Kenya’s post-election violence, Turkey in 1990’s experienced significant problems as a result of post-conflict displacement. Turkey thereafter adopted a framework on resettlement. The Turkish Government requested the Institute of Population Studies of Hacettepe University to assess the future plans of IDPs against their current circumstances then. The findings of the first survey provided detailed information gained through a mix of qualitative and quantitative techniques. This information was crucial in determining resettlement options.

In 2010, the findings of a second survey on the needs and perceptions of IDPs, based on more than 4000 interviews in 13 provinces, were released. This essentially provided national and local authorities with a sound empirical basis for the development of action plans to assist and protect internally displaced persons. Before the 2007/2008 post-election violence, Kenya did not have any post-election violence framework on IDPs, the resettlement projects are modelled on resettlement schemes, where all IDPs, regardless of their orientation, were provided with cheap housing in a settlement scheme without any empirical
studies. IDPs were provided with small pieces of land to farm and free community services such as common water, common rural roads and playing field. This research argues that there are no global ideal frameworks to cater for all resettled IDPs and the likelihood is to use contextual models when resettling IDPs. For example, small groups or individuals based on specific needs resettlements models. Others are programmes to resettle IDPs out of their countries of origin, when they are facing imminent threats from the government.

On the basis of the studies mentioned above and CDF Task Framework, the PCRD and UN guiding principles the views of this research in regards to approaches on post-conflict reconstruction and recovery is that the first task in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery is to rebuild damaged structures which allows for implementation of established post-conflict practices. For example, rebuilding community schools, houses, churches, businesses, road systems, water systems, markets, among others, provides basis for other post-conflict activities.

The second task would be dealing with cohesion and integration. Population in post-conflict still have their own identities and their ethnic, cultural or any other affiliations. Integrating these group identities are contributory to the establishment of a formal social contract that respects diversity and prevents their transformation into grounds for discrimination and exclusion.

There are other long-term activities such as formation of new social contract and the recognition of its principles by all members of the political unit emerging from a conflict. This is possible only if there are conditions creating a cohesive and integrative environment, enabling the post-conflict reconstruction of social cohesion and capital. Scholars agree that one of the most important preconditions in this respect is the termination of any identity politics based on exclusion or on different rules from those agreed (Crawford 1998b). Similarly, de-politicization of ethnic identities can occur if there are conditions that motivate
and support the identity transformation. In addition creation of strong State institutions promoting inclusive national affiliation and universal citizenship laws are important for diminishing the political relevance of any ethnic background (Crawford, 1998b).

2.8 Livelihood Strategies in Post-Conflict

War and conflict have long been known to destroy livelihood, either directly through looting, or indirectly by limiting freedom of movement and so restricting livelihood strategies to wider networks (Young, 2006). Livelihood refers to the means used to sustain life. “Means” denotes the resources, including household assets, capital, social institutions, and networks (kin, village, authority structures), and the strategies available to people through their local and transnational communities (Jacobsen, 2002).

According to DFID, (1999a); Chambers and Conway, (1992), livelihood is the capability of having assets (including both material and social resources) for a means of living. It is likely that during the conflicts, victims salvage the most important items to carry along into the IDP camps. This could be money or material properties, which could help them re-establish their means livelihood. The assets (social, economic, cultural or political) post-conflict victims carry as they flee violence can provide a resource base in the bouncing back resilience pathways.

While livelihood would entail long-term plans, the vulnerability of IDPs may not allow for this but for short-term arrangements, hence survival and coping strategies. Humanitarian aid from actors is a source of dependency for the displaced, but as soon as the situation stabilizes, they may move on to tackle emergencies elsewhere leaving the displaced to cope with the reconstruction and recovery situation. This leaves the displaced population to rely on new forms of social organization and formation of new social networks as well as re-establishing old social networks.
Gender issues are also an important dimension in livelihood. In an African family setup, women compared to men ordinarily can experience discrimination in the allocation of economic and social resources such as credit, relief commodities, seeds, tools, or access to productive land. Therefore, for women, their efforts to survive mean that they engage in businesses and other economic activities that give them more control, autonomy, and status at both the household and community level (Jacobsen, 2002). However, there is limited knowledge on the kind of social and economic livelihoods the various segments of the Kenyan 2007/2008 post-election IDPs engage as an effort to adapting, absorption and transforming in order to achieve control and autonomy of their livelihood.

For men, displacement and the resulting loss of livelihood place them at increased risk of being recruited into illegal gangs, either forced or voluntary. Future scholars may need to investigate if there are increased insecurity issues in the host communities related to male IDPs. Children, on the other hand, must often manage as heads of households, while being at risk for forced labour, sexual abuse, and abduction.

Income-Generating Activities (IGAs) can also be a base for reconstruction and recovery of post-conflict victims, usually through grants or soft loans by NGOs. This is “seed money” to help them start small businesses. Humanitarian actors also create indirect opportunities, for example, needs for services such as like trucking and delivery, construction, administration and translation (Jacobsen, 2002). IDPs are often also willing to engage in activities such as volunteer work.

Dependency on remittances from relatives and friends as well as social capital through communities not affected by violence could be another survival strategy of IDPs. Friends and relatives send money regularly, and important information regarding available socio-economic opportunities. Money and information are usually transferred through mutual trust, established ground rules, and the word of recognized messengers. Other than money, remittances in kind (Young, 2006)
such as basic needs: clothing, utensils, food items among others to supplement humanitarian aid are also sent to victims. While money has economic purchasing power for goods, it is not clear if there is any quality information passed on to IDPs as a group or individually, which have accelerated their reconstruction and recovery process.

2.9 Conclusion

The literature reviewed above has shown the different levels and perspectives of reconstruction and recovery. The historical origins of the reconstruction and recovery have also been discussed and it is demonstrated that it has origins in the efforts to reconstruct lives after the American civil war. The period after the two world wars also witnessed increased efforts in reconstruction and recovery. The discussion has noted that governments and other actors such as the United Nations, and the African Union play an important role in reconstruction and recovery. UN guiding principles in particular offers case examples of how communities recreate resilience. The AU/PCRD provides examples of their interventions and also legal mechanisms.

Kenya has adopted a context specific approach of resettlement of IDPs and enacted a law on IDPs five years into the process of resettlement. The new legal framework provides for a clear strategy on implementation of resettlement efforts but also provides for punishment of those who pretend to be IDPs in order to get assistance from the government and other external actors. Although enacted late, the enactment of the law is a demonstration that the State is aware of possible future re-currence of post-election violence and the need for post-conflict reconstruction and recovery.
CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL APPROACH

3.1 Introduction to the theoretical framework

The preceding discussion has noted the increasing global problem of internal displacement over the years. The literature shows that one of the factors leading to this problem is the outcome of electoral disputes. The literature has shown the different levels, perspectives, similarities and comparisons of communities emerging from internal displacement and the process to reconstruction and recovery of these victims.

The roles of social support systems and different actors have been identified as important in achieving community resilience among the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The purpose of this chapter is to iteratively connect the literature to theoretical and conceptual frameworks in examining the research problem. The discussion seeks to anchor the research to a theoretical framework and also to a conceptual framework which helps in data collection and analysis.

3.2 Evolution of Social Capital

The evolving nature of social capital theory has led to as many definitions complementing as well as opposing it’s theoretical definitions in trying to capture and explain it (see Bourdieu 1986; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000; Granovetter, 1973, 1985; Burt 1992, 2005; Lin 2001; Portes, 1998). But these major proponents are in agreement, that the main issues in social capital are the roles of social structures, networks, social relations, actors as well as the position of values and norms in a community, which is important for this research as this agreement forms the primary basis of discussing this theory.

This study has noted that a lot of research on social capital is the final product of the 20th Century socio-political thought, whose first documentation of the concept appeared in 1916 in the Lyda Judson Hanifan’s work on the rural school community centres in USA (Woolcock, 1998). Hanifan emphasized the need for
community involvement for such schools to succeed. Hanifan (cited in Woolcock, 1998; Putnam, 1993) defines social capital as the intangible assets that count most in life. Examples of these intangible assets include goodwill, fellowship, sympathy and family as a social unit.

However, it was not until the 1990s when the social capital concept came into widespread usage probably due to expansion of social science research. It is at this period when social capital became a focal point of research and policy discussions. While the primary argument then was that social norms are needed to guide economic activity, which can be traced back to the political economy theorists of the Scottish enlightenment, the secondary argument was that markets and means of transactions cannot function without civilized norms and moral principles (Woolcock, 1998). This meant that civilized business and economy operates in an orderly manner or where social order existed. Therefore destruction of economic activities during post-election violence means lack of social order, hence absence of social capital.

The increased research discussions on social capital led to a number of journal articles listing the concept as a key word rising in the next 10 years from 109 (1991-1995) to 1003 in March 1999 (Baum 2000 quoted in UKONS 2001:6; Winter (2000b). This demonstrated the popularity of the concept across disciplines. This popularity and subsequent application of the theory in a range of social issues dissolved its empirical specificity into a fashionable word meaning all things to all people (UKONS 2001:6, Woodcock 2001). Today, many government agencies are conducting research on social capital. Due to this universal usage, Dasgupta (2000) warned that social capital should not be used to peg all informal engagements. To minimize ambiguous usage and application a number of scholars study specific aspects of social capital. Such scholars as Bourdieu, Putnam and Coleman attempted a scientific study of social capital.
For example, Coleman studied the relationship between social capital, human capital and school attendance in USA (Coleman, 1988) and later Putnam studied social capital and democratic institutions in Italy (Putnam, 1993). Other perspectives focused social capital as a set of norms, networks and organizations through which members of a community access power and resources (Dasgupta and Serageldin 2000). They further acknowledge that it is easier to give examples of social capital than define it.

To understand this concept better, this research sampled some definitions from organizations and scholars. According to World Health Organization (1998), social capital is the degree of social cohesion and integration which exists in communities and the way of life in a community which establishes networks, norms and social trust, and facilitates co-ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit. Bourdieu (1983:249) defined it as the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition; Coleman, (1994:302) defined by its function – it is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities, having two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspects of a social structure and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure.

Similar to the World Health Organization definition, the World Bank refers to social capital as the institutions, relationships and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions (World Bank, 1998). The bank also argues that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable. Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society – it is the glue that holds them together.

This implies the need for institutionalized structures to achieve quality and quantity social interactions. This perspective of social capital is at macro-level as it is more aligned to institutional structures. This research argues that the
dimension of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery of the 2007/2008 post-election violence victims is at micro-level as it concentrates in rebuilding socio-economic and livelihood aspects of a community. This means there are larger contributions of individuals and communities than formal institutions.

Similarly, Coleman, (1988; 1990) argues that social capital is a structural relationship between actors and among actors. This implies, structures are important for smooth relationship, but some relationships are informal devoid of any structure, especially in IDP situation located in the remotest parts of a country. IDPs lack the socio-economic capacity to live where there are “adequate” structures.

According to Porte’s, (1998:7) perspective, social capital is defined as - the capacity of individuals to command scarce socio-economic and political resources by virtue of belonging to a social network, hence:

Whereas economic capital is in people’s bank accounts and human capital is inside their heads, social capital inheres in the structure of their relationships. To possess social capital, a person must be related to others, and it is those others, not himself, who are the actual source of his or her advantage.

Porte’s focus is at micro-level, making a meaning and implications to individuals, thus provides individuals with access to resources such as social support, which may in turn promote post-conflict reconstruction and recovery process. The relations and dependency to the “others” and the emphasis that it is those “others” who are the sources of help means social support is an important aspect in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery.

The primary network of an individual or community determines the process of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. In Porte’s (1998) words...”it is those others who are the primary source of advantage...” meaning, the bigger the primary network, the greater the chances of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. Similarly Nakagawa and Shaw (2004), argue that social capital is a
function of mutual trust, social network of both individuals and groups, social norms such as obligations and willingness towards mutually beneficial collective action.

With the above perspectives in mind, this study concludes that the contributions of Portes (1998) fit well in the study of the process of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery as the scholar also acknowledges that horizontal and vertical depths of individuals and community social network define his/her social capital, which plays a central role in the process of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. The IDP community is expected to command scarce socio-economic and political resources through social support within individual network.

Family, friends and relationships are the backbone of primary social support especially in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. Social support is derived from social networking, which is an aspect in social capital. The implication of Porte’s (1998) argument is that the more family members, close friends, neighbours, co-workers, community members and professional colleagues as a social network the community of IDPs have, the more they are likely to reconstruct and recover faster from the impact of the post-election violence. In the social support pyramid, the composition of primary social network is assumed to provide social support and build the scarce socio-economic, livelihood and political resources.

This study argues that in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, the role of social support goes beyond the traditional system of nuclear family being at the forefront in offering physical, socio-economic, human and social capital to host communities involved in the system. This is because the effect and impact of displacement goes beyond immediate family (bonding social capital) to those outside the family (bridging and linking social capital). Therefore, linkages (networks) are crucial in that an individual must be related to others, and it is
those others (alters), not the individual (egos), who are the actual source of victim’s post-conflict reconstruction and recovery advantage (Portes, 1998).

But while the contribution of others is important in the process of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, the individual vision, mission, attitude, behaviour and purpose, plays an important role in terms of after how long individual and community emerge from IDPs situation. This implies, there is social capital at individual and at group level. The effect and impact of displacement is more visible as a community, although each IDP is affected at different levels. The focus of this study is at a community level (group level), but acknowledging the sum of individual post-conflict reconstruction and recovery efforts makes up a community.

At the individual level, access and use of resources embedded in social networks to gain return are the primary focus. For example, finding an opportunity to earn a livelihood in post-election violence, locating relatives separated during conflict, among others, amounts to social support from significant others after conflict. Aggregation of individual returns also benefits the collective community, therefore, how individuals invest in social relations and how they capture the embedded resources in the relations to generate return are all important in the subject of community post-conflict reconstruction and recovery process.

At the group level, communities develop and maintain social capital as a community asset comprising bonding, linking and bridging social capital. The community collective asset enhances group member survival chances, as well as community social dimensions and areas of collective action (Frankenberger et al., 2012). For example, groups can organize social support funds, credit schemes and security among members. In post-conflict, community resilience (adaptation, absorption and transformation capacities) is important and related to group social capital as community members need to develop these capacities together.
To anchor and understand the role of social capital theory in process of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, this study discusses the various forms of social capital to clearly position community resilience framework in the research.

### 3.3 Forms of Social Capital and Community Resilience

There are various forms of social capital, which have a linkage to community resilience. This has been proved by Putnam (1998); Narayan (1999); and Woolcock (1998) who have distinguished the specific forms of social capital (bonding, bridging and linking), in relation to absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity, and transformative capacity of community resilience. According to Frankenberger et al., (2012), absorptive capacity is the ability to minimize exposure to shocks and stresses *(ex onte)* where possible and to recover quickly when exposed *(ex post)*.

Adaptive capacity involves making proactive and informed choices about alternative livelihood strategies based on changing conditions. Transformative capacity relates to governance mechanisms, policies/regulations, infrastructure, community networks, and formal social protection mechanisms that are part of the wider system in which communities are embedded. Studies by Aldrich (2012); Narayan (1999); and Woolcock (1998) argue that communities with higher levels of bonding, bridging and linking social capital are more resilient than those with none or only one type. The specific forms of social capital and the three community resilience capacities are demonstrated in the table below:
### Table 3.1: Social capital and key capacities for achieving community resilience

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<td><strong>Absorptive Capacity</strong></td>
<td>Evident in informal social protection: Community-based gathering and dissemination of critical information (e.g., plans/available resources in the face of imminent post-election violence). Community-based risk sharing (e.g., savings and credit groups, funeral associations) Sharing resources (food, cash/loans, labour, child care, tools, transportation) Bonding Social Capital works well when only one or a few households are potentially affected: they can turn to unaffected households</td>
<td>Evident in community-to-community support during disasters: Unaffected communities share resources with post-conflict affected ones (e.g., remittances). Unaffected communities share knowledge, expertise, and networks based on their own experiences of similar conflicts. Inter-community communication/sharing of technologies, innovations. Bridging social capital works well where: unaffected communities can support communities that have experience or are vulnerable to a conflict.</td>
<td>Community-based organizations formed in response to post-election violence can provide community members with voice and leverage in decision-making in externally-supported rebuilding efforts. Linking social capital facilitates a feedback loop between grassroots and policy/formal governance in information gathering and dissemination.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Adaptive Capacity</strong></td>
<td>Bonding social capital is more limited in applications to adaptive capacity. However, close relationships between community members facilitate adoption of proven practices for income generation, health etc. IDPs-led savings and loan associations can promote their empowerment and greater livelihood diversification.</td>
<td>Bridging social capital facilitates dissemination and multiplier effects of proven good practices. Formal and/or informal ties between communities in different affected areas can contribute to livelihood diversification and protection from effects/impact of post-conflict. Exposure to models and experiences in other communities can inform and broaden aspirations and thereby encourage trying new practices for reconstruction and recovery.</td>
<td>Adaptive capacities strengthened through collective action can compel formalization or strengthening of structures that can have an impact at higher levels, e.g., people resettled into new areas as a reconstruction and recovery process form new networks and institutions (farmers' unions, women's associations) beyond the immediate community.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transformative Capacity</strong></td>
<td>Relationships forged to realize a community function can be applied to other functions: e.g. Increased exposure to other groups in markets (formal or informal, can help to mitigate conflict as different groups become more familiar with each other over common interests. School-based programmes, church functions etc. that engage ethnic communities from otherwise warring factions can improve their interrelationships and reduce antagonism.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strong vertical linkages are essential to realizing transformative capacities. These are evidenced in a variety of areas: infrastructure investment, land reform, pro-IDP policies.</td>
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*Source: Adapted from Community Resilience: Conceptual Framework and Measurement, Feed the Future Learning Agenda (2013).*
3.3.1 Bonding Social Capital

This involves principles and norms such as trust, reciprocity and cooperation. Putnam (2000) and Woolcock (2000) note that bonding social capital is often based on social connection and often links individuals already very similar to each other in terms of race, ethnicity or religion. Therefore, it describes close connections between people. For example, relationships among family members or close friends are characterized by a strong bond; it is good for “getting by” in life. Family is the smallest social unit in a community and members of a family are bonded to provide social support to each other during times of challenges.

Since the 2007/2008 post-election violence, there are IDPs in the camps, who have family members in positions of economic well-being. It would be interesting to explore how much more should immediate family relations provide social support after conflict. The 2007/2008 post-election violence victims in Kenya have been in IDP camps for over the eight years that this research was concerned with.

Bonding is good for reciprocity, mobilization and solidarity. It is a kind of super-glue among the members (Woolcock, 2000). Strong social networks in ethnic groups provide crucial social and psychological support for displaced members in terms of livelihood strategies. However, it also brings negative effect on the larger community by creating strong in-group loyalty, which may create strong out-group antagonism that is, labelling and identifying with certain groups. The post-election violence in Kenya was fought along ethnic lines (Waki, 2008) and post-election violence victims are likely to work closely to help each other to cope and recover. However, there are knowledge gaps to establish which kind of social support in a pyramid post-conflict reconstruction and recovery victims value most.
3.3.2 Bridging Social Capital

It connects members of one community or group to other communities/groups. It often crosses the ethnic lines, language groups and geographical boundaries. Bridging social capital (Putnam, 2000) helps connect individuals. It is better for accessing external assets and for information flow. For example in formal organizations individuals from different neighbourhoods and ethnicities work together (Schuller, Baron & Field, 2000). This can also be the case where post-election violence brought individuals from different ethnicities together in IDP camps.

The IDPs, especially those resettled by Government live within communities, though they don’t share languages/dialects. Many of these resettlements are funded by local and international actors, creating a bridge between the post-conflict victims with members outside their immediate networks (family, neighbours, co-workers etc.). This bridge helps to enhance socio-economic capacity of victims in the process of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery (Portes, 1998).

Bridging social capital describes more distant connections between people and is characterized by weaker, but more cross-cutting ties. For example, business associates, acquaintances, friends of friends or those of a different ethnic groups or social class; it is good for “getting ahead” in life. It helps connect one network to another regardless of ethnic group, religion, or socio-economic and political barriers. The government and host of both local and international actors continue to respond to IDP issues such as livelihood needs. However, scholarly knowledge on what social support projects these actors have provided to the IDP communities in their process of reconstruction and recovery is missing.
3.3.3 Linking Social Capital

It is seen in trusted social networks between individuals and groups interacting across explicit, institutionalized, and formal boundaries in society. Linking social capital brings together citizens with decision-makers and leaders who hold positions of authority and can distribute often scarce resources (Woolcock, 2000; Portes, 1998). Power, authority and institution are aspects of linking social capital in a community, describing connections with people in positions of power, and is characterized by relations between those within a hierarchy where there are different levels of power.

Therefore, the more powerful actors and institutions of power a community relates to, the less vulnerable in adversity they are likely to be as they can access support from those formal institutions. There are many state and non-state actors implementing post-conflict reconstruction and recovery programmes. They are good examples of institutions in linking social capital.

This study argues that post-conflict victims who have higher levels of social capital (bonding, bridging and linking) are able to reconstruct and recover (bounce back better, adapt, absorb and transform) faster compared to those who have lower levels of social capital.

3.4 Examples of Roles of Social Capital among IDPs

To demonstrate that adaptation, absorption and transformation (community resilience) and social capital are theoretically and conceptually studied and tested, this research reviewed global and regional practical project successes modelled on social capital and community resilience. Thus, according to World Bank (2011) report on building assets and promoting self-reliance among IDPs in Azerbaijan, one of the first Republics of the former Soviet Union that faced the problem of internally displaced persons from Nagorno-Karabakh and its
administrative units, social relations within the IDP population appeared to be resilient and provided the much-utilized safety nets. There were 603,251 IDPs in Azerbaijan in March 2009. Social life proved a source of hope for IDPs and a powerful resource for well-being and overcoming vulnerability. However, IDPs felt that their social capital in the wider society is undermined by their social marginalization and stigmatization compared to non-IDP groups.

Community-based mediation and negotiations to end conflicts in the southwestern highlands of Uganda over scarce natural resources, demonstrated that synergy between social capital and public policy can be strengthened to end conflicts. A combination of voluntary associations (ranging from credit and saving groups and farming groups, to church-based groups) and the development of by-laws, collectively contributed to managing conflicts in a variable measure (Gerenge, 2014).

This is because a significant proportion of members of a particular group belonged to several other groups, many such that groups with diverse experiences had the advantage of facilitating mediation and negotiation – a voluntary process in which conflict parties meet to reach mutually acceptable decisions, and to seek to create a win-win outcome (Gerenge, 2014). Multiplicities in membership which transcend ethnic borders create a dense network of shared interests among individuals – which, in effect, generate informal norms of cooperation based on embedded trust. From this example, it demonstrates that social capital has the capacity to restructure relationships to transcend ethnic groups and trigger cooperation to post-conflict reconstruction and recovery.

Experience in Liberia, during its civil war in the 1990s, demonstrated social capital as being useful for the survival of individuals in situations of total governance failure, and further forms an important building block in the reconstruction of post-conflict governance (Sawyer, 2005). The effect and impact
of the seven years of violence and bloodshed was that an estimated 200,000 people were killed out of a population of 2.8 million people in Liberia. More than half of the population was forced to flee their homes and of those displaced, approximately 1.2 million persons were internally displaced persons, while 700,000 refugees fled out of Liberia as refugees.

Liberian communities forged cooperative engagements with each other as a “coping” mechanism against State-sponsored violence. Consequently, in the ensuing post-conflict reconstruction and recovery period, these forged informal relationships among communities became critical in the mobilization of joint efforts for community development such as building schools and other community structures (Sawyer, 2005). The role of these informal relationships demonstrated the power of social capital in reconstruction and recovery process.

In Kenya, 2007/2008 post-election conflict and South Sudan, December in 2013 political crisis, there was a breakdown of trust, a component of social capital, and violence contributed to social fragmentation by polarizing communities, forcing individuals to take political sides in the conflict (Waki, 2008; Gerenge, 2014). In South Sudan, the mobilization of people along ethnic i.e. Dinka-Nuer ethnic divisions, demonstrates scarcity of the dense network of overlapping associational memberships of informal groups with embedded-ness of trust transcending ethnic confinements (Gerenge, 2014). This rendered communities vulnerable to each other.

The underlying structural relationships between these communities were weak and susceptible to manipulation by political leaders. In light of social and economic needs in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery in South Sudan, little investment has been directed to generate informal norms of cooperation among communities. This can be achieved by formation of informal voluntary associations such as saving and credit self-help groups, farming groups etc. that target collective action for socio-economic gains.
An academic example on IDPs in Colombia indicates the positive role of social networks, social support and relations for displaced population and provides similarities to the objectives of this research. In her research on displaced women in Bogotá, Duplat describes networks and relations as an adequate coping strategy towards reconstruction and recovery. Perecman (2005: 13) summarizes Duplat’s findings as the follows:

In the face of obstacles like a shortage of formal opportunities, discriminatory practices, and inadequate public policies, displaced women in Colombia use social networks that include other displaced people, e.g. family members, the historically poor, the religious community, and friends, as an effective and efficient coping strategy. Through these networks they find a place to live, a first job, and help in building a home.

The above observation means that IDPs do not entirely depend on state and non-state actors for social support, but rather they also make use of social network amongst themselves and their extended social networks outside the camps towards their post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. Social networks represent a less formal social structure in that there is less or no formality in delineating position and rules or authority, hence ability to adapt, absorb or transform as the situation demands (Perecman, 2005).

IDPs prefer fluidity which characterizes the occupants, positions, resources, rules and procedures as opposed to laid-down rules and order. Mutual agreements through persuasion rather than authority or coercion dictate actors’ participation and interaction. A social network may evolve naturally or be socially constructed for a particular shared focus or interest such as search for a casual labour, information or emotional support, which tend to improve member’s vulnerability through that network.

Embedded resources in social networks enhance outcomes for action. For example, information flow is facilitated – social ties located in advantageous/strategic or hierarchical positions, hence often better informed,
may share useful information about available opportunities and choices. Likewise, these ties may recommend organizations/institutions or communities about availability and interest of an otherwise unrecognized individual.

Access and use of the embedded resource resides with the actor and are set to benefit both the individual and group. Flap (1991 and 1994) also included mobilized resources emphasizing that what is important in the social network is the number of persons within one’s social network who are prepared or obliged to help you when called upon to do so. Other factors would be the strength of the relationship indicating readiness to help and the physical, social and economic resources of these persons.

Although the above examples provide positive contributions of social capital in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, there are scholarly controversies regarding social capital theory, and especially on a uniform measure of the concept. This research brings to light these controversies, but also acknowledges that it is unlikely to locate any one theory without controversies or limitations in academic research at this level. The research has, however, offered ways of overcoming the identified limitation which ensures the highest standards of data collection and analysis.

3.5 Social Capital Controversies and Measurements

There are a few controversies in answering the question whether social capital is a collective good or individual good (Portes, 1998). Most scholars agree that it is both collective and individual good by arguing that institutionalized social relations with embedded resources are expected to be beneficial to both the collective and the individual. At a community level, social capital represents some aggregations of valued resources (such as economic, political, cultural, or social, as in social connections) of members’ interactive networks (Portes, 1998).
Scholars (see Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993, 1995) have also focused on the collective aspect of social capital by assuming or expecting that there is closure or density in social relations and social networks. From a class perspective, Bourdieu views society or community as divided into classes; as such social capital as the investment of the members in the dominant class. For example, a group or social network will engage in mutual recognition and acknowledgment so as to maintain and reproduce group solidarity and preserve the group's dominant position in a community.

To belong to such a group or social network, a clear demarcation on criteria such as nobility, title and family become the basis of admission, hence exclude outsiders. In this perspective there is closure and density within the group, which ensures non-infiltration of unqualified population. Although Coleman does not assume such a class vision of society as Bourdieu, he views social network closure as a distinctive advantage of social capital. To him it is closure that maintains and enhances trust, norms, authority, sanctions, etc. in a community. These solidifying forces may ensure that it is possible to mobilize social network's socio-economic and livelihood resources. There is also the controversy in understanding social capital as any "social-structural resource" that generates return for an individual in a specific action (Coleman, 1990).

There are inherent difficulties in operationalizing and measuring social capital, particularly due to imprecise definition and application, as already highlighted. But according to Lin, (1982), embedded resources are the valid measures of social capital. This implies that the location/position of an individual or community in a social network determines the measure of social capital. For example, how close or far an individual or community is from a strategic location. As an asset in social networks, indicators to measure embedded resources include: the range of socio-economic and livelihood resources as well as individual/community processes.
Social capital is rooted in social networks and social relation and therefore can be measured in relation to the two. In addition, empirical studies have used a wide range of variables as a measure or indicator of social capital. However, researchers can be guided by three key issues in determining how to measure social capital: availability of data, objectives of the study and the particular way the researcher has conceptualized social capital. Social capital can only be measured by its indicators.

For example, in a study on post-conflict lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala and Somalia, different indicators for measuring social capital were used. Some of them were community’s channels and mechanisms for information exchange, availability of functioning infrastructure, social protection and welfare, intermarriages, existence of associations and cooperation, such as sharing basic necessities (water, firewood etc.). In particular, Cambodia’s study focused on community events, informal networks, associations. For Rwanda, the focus was on integration within the community, while for Guatemala and Somalia, the focus was on integration and linkages (Colleta & Cullen, 2000). This means that each of the countries had different variables and indicators to measure social capital.

In analysing data, the Cambodian study used quantitative methodology to establish demographic background information on the communities, and participatory qualitative methodology to examine more substantive social capital issues. Rwanda study used qualitative survey and strove to integrate participant perspectives on the concepts, definitions and indicators of social capital and conflict. Guatemala and Somalia yielded a large amount of quantifiable data but sparse qualitative information (Colleta & Cullen, 2000).

In another example, Narayan and Princhett (1997), constructed a measure of social capital from a survey of eighty seven villages in rural Tanzania which examined social capital and village level outcomes. This research focused on
individual membership in groups, characteristics of those groups, individual values, attitudes and perception of social cohesion. Other documented methods used by researchers to measure social capital is the study by Onyx and Bullen, (1997) who sought to measure social capital in five locations in New South Wales using a 68-question survey. The research identified 8 broad elements related to social capital, e.g. participation in local community, neighbourhood connections, family/friend connections, work connections and feeling of trust and safety among many others.

To gain a practical understanding on how social capital can be measured, this research reviewed how major players such as World Bank (WB), the Organization for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD) and the Office of National Statistics in United Kingdom (UKONS) who have projects in the field of post-conflict reconstruction have operationalized and measured social capital.

In its theoretical and practical work, the World Bank’s views social capital at three levels as a combination of cognitive (micro), structural (meso) and institutional (macro) elements. Due to its presence in many post-conflict countries, it can be argued that the World Bank is one of the most active post-conflict reconstruction and recovery agencies in this field. The Bank explores the ways social capital operates in specific development situations through a number of small-scale case studies. Therefore, given the variety of political, organizational, cultural and other contexts in the countries of intervention, the World Bank preferred approach for addressing social capital has been based in the importance of the contextual variables as a determining factor for collective action (Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2001). As is evident different approaches are used in different countries.

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) uses social capital as a marker of wellbeing, measured in turn through four major indicators: social participation, social support, social networks, and civic
participation (Franke, 2005). According to the OECD, social capital refers to social networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups (Cote & Healy, 2001:47). This therefore presupposes that social capital can manifest differently depending on the context and the issues involved.

The Office of National Statistics in United Kingdom (UKONS) while emphasizing on the practical aspects of research initiatives in three countries of United Kingdom, Canada and Australia have also focused their efforts on studying the concept of social capital (Franke, 2005). The office adopted a pragmatic macro-approach to social capital, based on its social integration values in community participation, social engagement, commitment, control, self-efficacy, perception of the community, social interaction, social networks, social support, trust, reciprocity and social cohesion.

In these three countries, for example, the Australian initiative approached the concept of social capital based on social networks, distinguishing between the concept itself and its effects. This approach aimed at making the concept operational and thus more useful for public policy by building upon the four interrelated types of capital: natural, economic, human, and social capital. The analysis from UKONS demonstrates that while social capital is widely documented, it is understood as an end-result rather than as an explanatory variable for socio-economic outcomes.

Since this study noted that the above controversies and limitations identified in social capital theory can be overcome, scholars have researched and achieved a standard methodological clarity and produced an approach of social capital that encompasses its different dimensions and manifestations. In this regard, the Social Capital Assessment Tool–SCAT - was developed without losing the contextual meaning and after studying a number of existing methodological approaches drawing upon empirical studies (Krishna & Shrader, 1999). The tool
acknowledges that social capital is either structural or cognitive. The main idea is to identify some broad but constant categories of indicators for establishing the general framework. The precise selection of sub-categories would be context-specific on the issue under research. Krishna & Shrader (1999:6) emphasise that what constitutes social capital in one context, might be otherwise in another context.

SCAT was developed from qualitative and quantitative data and research instruments derived from twenty six studies in fifteen countries globally. The use of qualitative and quantitative data in this approach helped to determine certain baseline levels of social capital and observe the progress of project implementation as well as analyse the relationship between development indicators and social capital accumulation. The tool assesses social capital at three levels; community profiling, household survey and organizational profile. But not all studies of social capital are empirically driven; therefore, the tools differ substantially though intended to measure the same concept (Putnam, 1993). Different measurement concepts are guided by contextual diversity with issues such as social network types, country and culture being a consideration.

Acknowledging this risk and the inherent difficulties in operationalizing and measuring social capital entirely, this research anchored one aspect - social support in the social capital theory, as the theoretical framework of the research. This provided clarity and specificity in operationalization and measurement of social support and community resilience, as discussed further below. With this specificity, the researcher was able to develop research instruments such as interview-guides and focus group discussions to measure the reconstruction and recovery processes of the IDPs. This further allowed the research to position forms of IDPs social capital (bonding, bridging and linking) in relation to IDPs community resilience capacities (absorptive, adaptive and transformative).
The socio-economic and livelihood role of state and non-state actors were examined through the social support they provided to the IDPs in their process of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. The pyramid of social support below discusses these dimensions.

3.6 The Concept of Social Support

Social support refers to social interactions that provide individuals with actual assistance and embed them into a web of social relationship perceived to be loving, caring and readily available in times of need (Barrera, 1986). Strong social support is vital for community resilience following crises (Goodman et al., 1998, Ganor & Ben-Lavy, 2003). This research adopts the argument, the more the IDP community have access to social support from their social networks, the more and faster they adapt, adopt and transform (community resilience).

The overall pattern of social support resembles a pyramid with its foundations being family, followed by other primary support groups such as friends, neighbours and co-workers; followed by formal agencies and other persons outside the recipients’ immediate circle (Kaniasty & Norris, 2000; Tardy, 1985). In post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, social support is derived from the family, victim’s community, Government and other actors. However, the community of IDPs is likely to have different levels of social support as it comprises camp, Government resettled and integrated IDPs. Their interests are diverse hence they are likely to be resilient or vulnerable in different ways. The diagram below illustrates the forms and features of social support:
According to Tardy (1985), social support is level-based. The basic level originates from social network, here defined according to its composition (i.e. family, close friends, neighbors, co-workers, community and/or professionals). The next level of describing social support is according to its content or type - (emotional, instrumental, informational and appraisal). Emotional support entails the supply of love, trust and empathy (listening to personal problems and providing affection); instrumental support entails the provision of tangible aid and services that directly assist a person in need (e.g. Loan of money or food, taking care of children). Informational support involves giving advice, suggestions and
information (e.g. information regarding work opportunities, suggestions and advice on all kinds of issues). Appraisal support refers to provision of information that is useful for self-evaluation purposes – in other words, constructive feedback and affirmation (e.g. providing feedback and appraisal of achievements).

The third level of social support is description and evaluation (Tardy, 1985). This entails both the mere description of the social support provided and received, as well as an evaluation of the individual satisfaction with that social support. At this level, it is crucial to know if the person was actually in need of this specific form of support, or whether other forms of support would have been suitable. Disposition is the fourth level of social support. This is perceived as well as actual. There is a difference between the support people think they can rely on and the one they actually receive. To understand perceived support, it has been defined as:

“... a prominent concept that characterizes social support as the cognitive appraisal of being reliably connected to others”, which can be measured by capturing the individuals’ confidence that adequate support would be available if needed (Barrera, 1986: 416-417).

Contrary to perceived support, actual support comprises the actions individuals actually receive or provide (Barrera, 1986). Tardy’s last level of social support is directional, meaning there is a provider and a receiver. In this research, IDPs are mostly the receivers of social support from the external world, but are also providers of social support amongst themselves. Due to IDPs common challenges they support each other in all areas to build community capacities for collective action.

3.7 Community Resilience

There are various perspectives to define resilience from scholars and agencies undertaking community resilience projects. For example, USAID (2012) defines resilience as the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and
systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth. Frankenberger et al., (2007) define it as the collective capacity to respond to adversity and change, and maintain function. A resilient community can respond to crisis in ways that strengthen community bonds, resources, and the community’s capacity to cope.

Walker et al., (2010) define it as the general capacity of a community to absorb change, to seize opportunity to improve living standards, and to transform livelihood systems while sustaining the natural resource base. It is determined by community capacity for collective action as well as its ability for problem-solving and consensus building to negotiate coordinated response. This research adopts community resilience as a process of regaining functionality after a crisis by adapting, absorbing or transforming to the original or better community.

Breakdown of socio-economic livelihood capacities of IDPs in the post-election violence left them vulnerable and for over the eight years that this research was concerned with, were yet in the process of adaptation, adopting or transforming their socio-economic capacities. A resilient community is one that takes intentional action to enhance the personal and collective capacity of its members and institutions to respond to and influence the course of social and economic change (Coles, 2004).

This study argues that all communities have within them characteristics that can either enable or constrain their ability to adapt, absorb or transform. A practical example is utilizing IDPs social support systems from their social network which enable them to re-build their livelihood capacities to bounce back. However, greater emphasis should be on what IDP communities can do for themselves and how they can strengthen their capacities, rather than concentrating on their vulnerabilities (Twigg, 2009). This is because community resilience is not created
but is developed over time; it occurs when resources are sufficiently strong to buffer or counter adversity to reconstruct and recover (Ganor & Lavy, 2003).

These resources could be social capital, economic capital, physical capital or natural capital. As noted in the introduction and problem statement of this research, the 2007/2008 post-election violence undermined the community resilience by breaking down social support systems, social cohesion, destroying factors of production, local infrastructure, separating families, among many others. The main argument is that communities have the potential to function effectively and either adapt, absorb or transform successfully in the aftermath of adversity (Norris, Steven, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2007; Frankenberger et al., 2012).

This study further observes that the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya was both idiosyncratic (affecting only certain individuals or households) and covariate (affecting an entire population or geographic area). But whether idiosyncratic or covariate, socio-economic capacities of such a community enable it to navigate through and react to the disturbance and restore/recreate community resilience by bouncing back better or collapse.

To fully understand the process and potential of community resilience, it is critical to understand that each of its individual components entail dynamic attributes, transactional linkages and relationships that must complement and work in conjunction with each other to achieve a resilient community (Norris et al., 2008). Communities that are able to combine their assets, social dimensions, and collective actions to manage the shocks or stresses such as post-election violence, and incrementally reduce their vulnerability are less sensitive and are on resilience pathway and vice versa (Frankenberger et al., 2012).
Figure 3.2: Conceptual Framework for Community Resilience

The conceptual framework for community resilience below illustrates the trajectory of a community from pre-conflict to post-conflict reconstruction and recovery position.

**Context**: Political, Social, Economic, Historical, Demographic

**Disturbance**: Shocks, Stresses

**Community Assets**
- Human Capital
- Financial Capital
- Natural Capital
- Physical Capital
- Political Capital

**Community Social Dimension**
- Bonding Social Capital
- Bridging Social Capital
- Linking Social Capital

**Areas of Collective Action**
- Preparedness
- Responsiveness
- Learning and Innovation
- Self-Organization
- Diversity
- Inclusion
- Aspirations

**Reaction to Disturbance**
- Conflict Reduction
- Conflict Management
- Social Protection
- Natural Resource Mngt
- Management of Public Good

**Livelihood Outcomes**
- Bounce Back Better
- Bounce Back
- Recover yet worse than before
- Collapse

Source: Frankenberger et al. (2012), DFID (2011a), TANGO (2008), and CARE (2002)
The components responsible for community resilience in the conceptual framework above are discussed below:

**3.7.1 Community Assets**

These are tangible and intangible assets that allow a community to meet their basic needs. All categories of IDPs in Kenya have diverse and different pools of assets. Some of these assets include: social, human, financial, natural, physical and political capital. The greater the diversity of these assets, the less vulnerable the community is and vice versa. Human capital consists of skills, knowledge, availability of labour, etc. that are important in pursuit of livelihood strategies. Acquisition and maintenance of human capital at community level is important for managing collective response to conflict.

Financial capital is the resources households and communities use to achieve their economic and social objectives: for example money, savings, credit, remittances, pension etc. (Tango, 2006). The accessibility, reliability and inclusiveness of formal and community-based savings and credit institutions are one indication of community resilience capacity. For instance, memberships to cooperative societies and women social groups are a key asset for credit among women in Kenya. Natural capital includes resources derived from the environment such as land and water.

Land issues in Kenya are very emotive and are acquired through purchase, or community inheritance. Therefore, loss of this resource is a setback and acquisition of this resource is a resilience attribute. Productivity of this asset is also a consideration because the more productive land is, the more it offers different opportunities to overcome vulnerability. Physical capital is the infrastructure such as electricity, roads, shelter, health systems, markets and means of communication. They enable people to maintain relative levels of wellbeing. Focus on housing (shelter) is a primary concern in this research as
resettlement basics involves housing of the displaced. Many IDPs are still tented in camps across the country. Political capital is the power relationship and access to and influence to the political system. The level of political capital in a community determines the policies and regulations the community is able to generate. Since 2007/2008 post-election violence, IDPs have been under two different governments, with different policies and programmes for IDPs resettlement.

3.7.2 Community Social Dimension

These are the dynamic qualities within a community which enable it to manage community assets in an equitable and sustainable way. They are evident in perceptions, attitudes and quality of relationships between and among the post-election victims. They include: preparedness for shocks and stresses, responsiveness, connectivity, learning, self-organization, diversity, inclusion, social cohesion and aspirations.

For example, the implication of label and identity issue of the IDP community in resettlement or integrated areas in relation to IDPs vision, purpose, attitude, perceptions and behavior among others. The sources of livelihood are attributes of how prepared they are to cope with stress and shock of displacement. This research argues that IDPs social bonds amongst themselves and with their primary social networks facilitate their post-conflict reconstruction and recovery process.

3.7.3 Areas of Collective Action

These are areas in which the community social network collaborates and partners in a strategic way to advance community resilience. Efficient, equitable use of community assets and optimization of community social dimension plays a key role in the collective action. The most important are the activities and tasks that are to be performed to restore the essential community institutions such as
clinics, schools, markets etc. These areas may include: disaster risk reduction (conflict reduction), conflict management, social protection, management of natural resources, management of public goods and services.

The role of the IDP social network is critical in facilitating their process of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. The social support of the social network is important in rebuilding their resilience. The community of friends within the camps, integrated and resettled IDPs provides social support to individual colleagues when needed.

3.8 General Indicators of Community Resilience

The focus of this study is the role of social support and livelihood among IDPs on their pathway to post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. As such the indicators of adaptation, absorption and transformation (community resilience) are critical for this research, which identifies economic development, social support capacities, information/communication, and community competence as the primary indicators of pathway to community resilience. They are discussed below:

3.8.1 Economic Development

All communities are governed largely by social and economic factors. Therefore social and economic resilience are important community survival factors. Key parameters for observing social resilience, which include economic growth, stability of livelihoods, and equitable distribution of income and assets within populations, land and raw materials, physical capital, accessible housing, health services, schools, and employment opportunities (Adger, 2000; Godschalk, 2003; Pfefferbaum et al., 2005).

There is a multiplier and reciprocal effect on economic resilience, as it depends not only on the capacities of individual business incomes but on the capacities of
all the entities that depend on them and on which they depend (Rose 2004, 2005). For example, related to post-election violence, the case for a link and a relationship between economic resources and post-disaster recovery is evident in research on social class as a buffer of disaster stress.

Participants of lower socio-economic status (SES) often experience more adverse psychological consequences than do participants of higher SES (Norris et al., 2002a). IDPs in lower socio-economic classes will experience more difficulties in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery regardless of social support. The volumes of economic resources and their diversity are also factors in building community resilience. For example, multiple effect of post-election violence displacement reduces the volume and diversity of resources available.

3.8.2 Social Support

The basic idea of social capital is that individuals invest, access, and use resources embedded in social networks and social support to gain returns (Lin 2001). Comfort, (2005: 347), notes that uncertainty often leads to efforts that broaden the “scope of actors, agents, and knowledge that can be marshalled” to a level of community resilience.

The type of support dimension differentiates between emotional, informational and tangible social support. Received social support typically shows a mobilization pattern by actors. Vulnerability of post-conflict victims places them in constant need of emotional, informational, and tangible social support until they adapt, absorb or transform enough to be socially and economically independent. This research argues that in a post-conflict reconstruction and recovery process, victims look to similar others to help them make decisions about appropriate decisions in regard to their activities.

This behaviour is referred as social influence (Fritz & Williams, 1957). Therefore, IDPs with stronger ties are more likely to receive information influencing certain
recommendations in regards to post-conflict reconstruction and recovery options. Victims of post-election violence with stronger social support and social influence are likely to resettle faster compared to those with weaker social support systems.

3.8.3 Information / Communication

In post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, the context in which information is conveyed provides the primary resource in technical and organizational system that enables adaptive performance (Comfort, 2005). As such, clear communication is important as a creation of common meanings and understandings and the provision of opportunities for members to articulate needs, views, and attitudes. Pfefferbaum et al., (2005), Goodman et al., (1998), and Ganor and Ben-Lavy (2003) have all argued that good communication is essential for community resilience. Therefore, the quality of information and communication between the state and non-state actors and the IDPs is important.

According to UN guiding principles, IDPs require quality information and communication about options for durable solutions. In this research, for example, the information IDPs Network receive from the State and non-State actors is important for the adaptation, absorption or transformation process. Furthermore, the information the community of IDPs pass to the IDP network regarding their preferences for durable solutions is important for programme purposes.

For IDPs returning to their original homes, accurate and instant information about the danger, risks and consequences and behaviour of receiving is crucial (Reissman et al., 2005). For example, exposing returning IDPs to more conflict at their places of origin would be counter-productive to resettlement programmes.

On the basis of her review, Longstaff (2005:55) argues that information increases survival only if it is “correct and correctly transmitted”. Therefore the type and
source of information support is important because of the volatile nature and anxiety for long-term solutions. Because there is little time to cross-check accuracy of information, the sender of the information should be trusted to influence decisions made by the victims. Information from closer and local sources such as family members as demonstrated in the pyramid of social support are more likely to be relied upon than unfamiliar, distant sources (Tardy, 1985).

This study posits that a trusted source of information is an important community resilience asset that any individual or group can have during post-conflict reconstruction and recovery process. Similarly, the Working Group on Governance Dilemmas (WGGD) (2004) concludes that trusted communication treats the public as a capable ally, invests in public outreach, and reflects the values and priorities of local populations. Landau and Saul (2004) argue that community post-conflict reconstruction and recovery depends partly on collectively telling the story of the community’s experience and response, hence generating ideas.

3.8.4 Community Competence

On collective action and decision-making, Cottrell (1976:197) describes a competent community as one in which there is active participation of all members. The various segments of the community are able to collaborate effectively in identifying the problems and needs of the community. Among other programmes, they can achieve a working consensus on goals, objectives and priorities of the community because they share the same mission and vision. Therefore, implementing projects and programmes becomes seamless as members can collaborate effectively in the required actions.

It can be argued that members of a community are resilient if they are able to act and recover from what they define as negative physical or social events.
Additionally they should be able to either through adapting, absorbing or transforming their physical and social environments are able to mitigate against such events in the future. Brown and Kulig (1996/97) note that community resilience is not simply a passive “bouncing back” because people can imagine how things might be and do things to bring those conditions about, but a practical approach.

Goodman et al., (1998) identified several skills and essential elements of community competence such as abilities to engage constructively in group process, resolve conflicts, collect and analyse information, and resist opposing or undesirable social influence. Indeed scholars such as (Bruneau et al., 2003; Goodman et al., 1998; Klein et al., 2003; Pfefferbaum et al., 2005) agree that critical reflection and problem-solving are fundamental capacities for community competence and community resilience. In the same regard, Ganor and Ben-Lavy (2003) emphasize the importance of the community’s ability to take action, which they call “coping”.

3.9 Examples of Measuring Community Resilience

In order to operationalize the measurement of adaptation, absorption or transformation from IDPs vulnerability, this research examined practical examples of measuring community resilience. The research has noted that emphasis on appraisal, monitoring and evaluation of community projects for demonstrating effects and impact while ensuring accountability has pushed donors and policy-makers to support research towards developing community resilience measurements. This is despite the nascent state of community resilience measurement and the numerous challenges encountered in developing robust, accurate, and contextually appropriate measures of community and household resilience.
To date, NGOs have proposed a number of approaches for measuring community resilience (Frankenberger & Nelson 2013). A good example is the many NGOs working with vulnerable populations in predominantly agricultural or pastoral communities. Many of their measurement approaches focus on shocks and stress that directly affect food and nutrition systems. At the same time, efforts are being made to expand the scope of community resilience measurement to account for different contexts and sort out any underlying measurement challenges.

To improve on accuracy of the measure, Oxfam has developed methods for measuring community resilience regardless of the nature of the shock or disturbance by specifying particular characteristics of a system (such as a household or community) that are assumed to be associated with coping or adaptation success. Similarly, ACCRA promotes an approach to community resilience measurement that is consistent with its Local Adaptive Capacity Framework (LACF), which identifies specific elements related to adaptive, absorptive or transformative capacities. Unlike Oxfam and ACCRA, emphasis of specific characteristics and elements, Kimetrica is measuring community resilience as a function of income and expenditure outcomes in a USAID funded project in Northern Kenya focusing on community resilience and economic growth in arid lands.

Other community resilience measurement examples are derived from Save the Children and Mercy Corps projects. Save the Children uses household economy analysis and compares costs of different response scenarios in pastoral areas of Ethiopia and Kenya. The latter (Mercy Corps) supports an approach to community resilience measurement in the Horn of Africa that accounts for the impact of conflict on vulnerable communities and the role of improved market access and value chain participation in promoting community resilience.
Recognising the difficulties in determining the universal threshold of resilience, which can be used to measure absolute and comparable levels of resilience across different contexts, this research adopted a contextual specific indicators approach (see figure 3.3) below. This was because community resilience is a process and it is not possible mark-up to determine the exact point of resiliency. Community capacities for collective action play a critical role in resilience pathway or vulnerability pathways. These capacities are determined by community assets, community social dimension and areas of collective action.

This study noted in the problem statement, that IDPs lost livelihood (e.g. food security, jobs etc.), social capital (bonding, bridging, linking), economic assets (e.g. land, businesses, household property etc.). Therefore to achieve community resilience, an integrated approach in the figure below on absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities of the IDP community has been determined based on IDP economic, physical, natural, social resources before the post-election violence. Data collection instruments were designed to capture community capacities before the post-election violence and after.

This study used interview-guides to qualitatively interrogate the community capacities the IDPs initially had accumulated and qualitatively measure it using indicators such as change in livelihood (e.g. food security, jobs etc.), social capital (bonding, bridging, linking), economic assets (e.g. land, businesses, household property etc.). The other tools used included, key-informant interviews, focus group discussions and review of data. The outcome determined if IDPs had absorbed, adapted or transformed, hence resilient. The figure below (3.3) illustrates the contextual framework adopted by this research to measure community resilience.
Figure 3.3: Contextual Framework to Measure Community Resilience

Source: Adapted from Frankenberger, T. R., & Nelson, S. (2013b); Constas & Barret (2013)
3.10 Conclusion

The discussion around the theoretical and conceptual framework to measure community resilience is applicable to the analysis of resettlement of IDPs following the Kenya post-election violence. Notable here is that the political context of post-election violence creates environment of shock and stress to the community. This distorts the baseline livelihood of the community. The well-being and basic conditions are also exposed to vulnerability. The nature of shock and stress leads to loss of livelihood, social network, social support, deaths and damage of property among others.

The capacity of a community to overcome post-election violence is damaged and becomes vulnerable. Preparedness, responsiveness, innovation, self-organisation, diversity, inclusion, aspiration are some of the community social dimensions in livelihood and resilience. When they are under attack, the community uses their absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities to bounce back to resilience.

This pathway to community resilience is determined by areas of collective action such as conflict reduction and management, levels of social protection, natural resources and management of public good. If a community is able to rebuild their livelihood, recreate social capital and maintain their economic assets, then it is on the pathway to community resilience and bounce back to pre-conflict situation otherwise it slides to vulnerability pathways and collapses beyond the pre-conflict situation.

In post-conflict contexts, victims and communities become vulnerable after losing their livelihood and social support systems. To achieve their original status (community resilience), they go through pathways of bouncing back or collapse. To transit from vulnerability to resilience, social capital is an important variable to such communities; it is the bases upon which they hold on together counting on each other for support. The community resilience framework and the theory of
social capital therefore are useful in explaining the reconstruction and construction of lives of the IDPs following the post-2007 election violence in Kenya. These discussions in the next chapters pay particular attention to these efforts.
CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an account of the methodological framework that guides this study to answer the research questions. It is the research design, a plan according to which the researcher chooses the research participants and collected information from them directly (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 2005). The aim is to define the research journey in answering the research questions and research problem. The Chapter is a blue print and focuses on: research tools used, population, unit of analysis, sampling methods, sampling unit, sampling frame and data analysis.

4.2 Research Design

There are two broad research methodologies: quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative research involves assigning of numbers to the units being measured and performing statistical analysis on the numbers (Miller, 2007), emphasis being on representation and generalization. Struwig and Stead, (2001) agree that quantitative methodology makes use of large samples and highly structured data-collection procedures to ensure generalization. An essential feature of quantitative research is that it produces numerical data, which are amenable to statistical analysis.

At any rate, quantitative data must consist of frequencies in terms of well-defined and mutually exclusive categories. Higher levels of measurement require those categories to be structured as a scale, either ordinal or cardinal, and this allows more powerful statistical techniques to be used. Quantitative research uses small samples; hence are not appropriate for such levels of measurements. Some of the main methods in quantitative research include: experimentation, quasi-experimentation, survey, tests, among others.
With this in mind, the researcher chose the qualitative research methodology as the ultimate aim in qualitative research is to generate ideas or concepts that offer to cast new light on the issues being investigated. For instance, the process of reconstruction and recovery of IDPs is a concept dealt with in this research. Data collection and analysis were flexible and context-sensitive. The researcher had to be in close proximity with the participants in their social context in order to understand people’s outlook and experiences and to look at the world from their viewpoints, visit them in various situations and in various moods, appreciate the inconsistencies, ambiguities, contradictions and their behaviour, and explore the nature and extent of their interests, understand their relationship among themselves and other groups.

To understand the process of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery of IDPs, the researcher is required to examine their experiences in detail using set instruments like: interview guide, focus group discussions, observations and content analysis (Bailey, 2011). Intensity, holistic description and analysis of the post-election violence victims were the primary concern in this qualitative research. Flexibility and spontaneity with the participants by use of open-ended questions, where they were to respond in their own words elaborately and in great detail is an advantage over the quantitative approach. This research used qualitative research methodology because of the above primary advantages, which helped to answer the objectives and the research questions being examined, more clearly.

There are other secondary advantages which led to the choice of qualitative research methodology in this study. They include: the victims of 2007/2008 post-election violence know the effects and impact of that violence better than any other person. They are therefore, the only ones who could articulate the experiences and conceptualize the concepts and terms of that violence. The
victims are the lens through which the rest of the world could experience part of the terror and horror of the 2007/2008 post-election violence.

By use of the qualitative methodology, the researcher was able to capture the violence victims' experience better because the approach involved was an inductive process, moving from unknown to known aspects. Employing this methodology, the researcher had no pre-conceived ideas and information about the process of reconstruction and recovery of the 2007/2008 post-election violence victims before the start of this research.

Qualitative methodology describes and explains social phenomena “from inside” in a number of different ways – analyse experiences of individuals or groups knowledge, accounts, stories; analyse interactions and communications in the making by observing or recording practices; analyse documents such as texts, images, films or music (Gibbs, 2007). The intention was to unpack how the 2007/2008 post-election violence victims in Kenya reconstructed the world around them, what they are doing now or what is happening to them in terms that are meaningful and that offer rich insights.

4.3 Study Locale

In qualitative research, the researcher develops vicarious experiences for the reader. To achieve this, the study locale is well described in this study including maps. This description of the counties (geographic areas) together with maps on which the study is based is clearly covered in chapter six. Interviews for camp-based IDPs for this study were limited to Kamara IDPs camp in Kuresoi North District in Nakuru County, and Mumoi IDPs camp in Subukia District, in Nakuru County. These two camps were picked precisely as they are the oldest hence they have rich history of IDPs issues and also hold the largest number of IDPs.

Interviews for Government-resettled IDPs for this study were limited to five areas: Muhu Farm in Mirangini District, Nyandarua County; Ngiwa Farm in Rongai
District, Nakuru County; Kabia/Asanyo Farm, in Kuresoi North District, Nakuru County; Gakonya Farm in Molo District, Nakuru County; Haji Farm in Subukia District, Nakuru County. Five out of the current eighteen farms were picked deliberately because they account for the largest Government-resettled IDPs and are the oldest; hence have rich history of IDPs issues.

Interviews for integrated-IDPs were conducted in Ndunduri in Mirangini District, Nyandarua County, Bahati Centre in Nakuru District, Nakuru County, and in Nakuru Township in Nakuru District, Nakuru County. These are the areas with the largest number of integrated IDPs country-wide.

4.4 Study Population

Population is a large pool of subjects from which the researcher picks the target group to study (Neuman, 2011). This has been reinforced by Welman (2005), who notes that population represents the total collection of all units of analysis. It is not possible to study the entire population of post-election violence victims in Kenya. In the 1992 and 1997 general elections, there were incidences of post-election violence and thousands of people became IDPs. Guided by the research problem, time and resources, the study population for this research comprised 663,921 IDPs of 2007/2008 post-election violence (Ministry of Special Programmes, 2010).

4.5 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis refers to what or who is being studied and can also be unit of observation, meaning, the things the researcher examines in order to create summary description (Babbie, 2012). The community of internally displaced persons within each of the three categories (camp-based, integrated and government resettled) were the units of analysis for this study. According to the Ministry of Special Programmes (2010), the population of 2007/2008 post-election violence IDPs is as follows:
663,921 persons were displaced by the 2007/2008 post-election violence;
313,921 are IDPs integrated into the society and live with well-wishers, friends and relatives; (they are still classified as IDPs);
350,000 are IDPs living in 118 internally displaced camps scattered in different parts of the country.

4.6 Sampling Procedures and Sample Size

Sampling is the selection of participants for a particular study (Miller, 2007). The primary purpose of sampling process is to get a sample that is representative, or as indicative as possible, of the target population. The logic of qualitative research is concerned with in-depth understanding, usually working with small samples. The aim is to look at the “process” or the “meaning” individuals attribute to their given social situation (Hesse-Biber, 2011). “Representativeness” or “indicative-ness” is the underlying epistemic criterion of a valid sample for this study. The major aim of sampling in qualitative research is to identify participants who are likely to give rich and in-depth information on the issue being studied so that we may learn the most about it.

Sampling methods can be through probability or non-probability. A random sample is defined by Huysamen (1994) as a drawing process in which each member of the population has equal chance of being part of the sample and each sample of any size has the same chance of being chosen. The sampling process and sample size for this research is discussed in sections 4.6.1, 4.6.2 and 4.6.3 below:

4.6.1 Sample Size for IDPs in Camps

The researcher collected data in early 2015. According to the Ministry of State for Special Programmes (2010), 350,000 IDPs were living in 118 internally displaced camps scattered in different parts of the country. Out of this number, according to Taskforce March 2012, progress report on resettlement of IDPs, 7,498 IDP
households have so far been resettled on parcels of land bought by the government. (This research assumes that a household consists of five members (Father, mother and three children). This means 7,498 households are 37,490 resettled IDPs out of 350,000 IDPs in camps. This leaves approximately 312,510 IDPs in the camps. The Ministry of State for Special Programmes has lists of all the 2007/2008 post-election violence IDPs. The comprehensive list of camp-based IDPs constituted the sampling frame for this category.

Through random sampling, 10 camp-based IDPs were picked from the lists. Of the 10 respondents, 5 were picked from either of the Kamara IDPs camp in Kuresoi North District in Nakuru County, and Mumoi IDPs camp in Subukia District in Nakuru County. The first five adult IDPs were picked from the Ministry of State for Special Programmes list from the two camps. From government records, these are the oldest camps and have rich history on the process of reconstruction and recovery. By the time of this research, there were 46 IDP camps.

**4.6.2 Sample Size for Integrated IDPs**

According to the Ministry of State for Special Programmes (2010), 313,921 are the 2007/2008 post-election violence IDPs integrated back to the society to live with well-wishers, friends and relatives. The IDPs Network also maintains a database of all integrated IDPs. The IDPs Network is a formally recognized structure by Government, purposely used for communication between IDPs-Government and other actors as well as those coordinating IDPs welfare.

This research used the IDPs network database and picked 9 respondents through random sampling from the main areas of: Bahati, Ndunduri and Nakuru Town. This was systematically done by picking every fifth person in the database from the respective areas. Where the next fifth person was the same gender (male/female) following each other, the next person was picked gender wise.
Also, where a minor was the next fifth person, he/she was left out and the next person picked as long as he/she was not of the same gender (male/female). This was done until the 9th respondent was picked. Five male and 4 female formed the sample for this category. Records from the IDP network leadership indicated the above areas as hosting the largest number of integrated IDPs.

4.6.3 Sample Size for Government Resettled IDPs

According to Taskforce Report on Resettlement of IDPs (2012), the Government has resettled 7,498 IDP households in five different locations/farms. This research assumed that a household consists of five members (father, mother and three children). This meant 7,498 households were 37,490 resettled IDPs out of 350,000 IDPs in camps.

This researcher picked 15 respondents through lists maintained by the Ministry of State for Special Programmes. There were 5 distinct locations/farms of resettlement: (Muhu Farm, Ngiwa Farm, Kabia/Asanyo Farm, Gakonya Farm and Haji Farm). Three respondents were picked randomly from the lists each of the 5 resettled locations/farms to ensure the sample is representative. This was done by picking every fifth person in the list. By the time of this research, there were 18 fully functional government resettled IDPs farms out of about 28 government-procured farms. The geographic distribution and their distinct organisation and management of the farms were considered in picking the 5 farms.

4.7 Data Collection Instruments

These are instruments or techniques the researcher used to collect data. The primary research tools which this research relied on were interview-guides. To increase “trustworthiness” of the research findings, this research made use of key informant interviews, focus group discussions and review of data. The data collection tools used in this research were considered because of their material merits presented below:
4.7.1 Why Use Interview-Guides

Interviews are intended to get to what a person who is a participant in research thinks, the attitudes of that person, and/or to explore a person’s reasons for thinking in a certain way or for carrying particular perceptions or attitudes. Interviews are one of the most important sources of data in qualitative research. This research made use of interview-guides, a technique where the researcher used semi-structured interviews and asked standard questions from each respondent and noted the answers given.

Some of the reasons why this technique was considered important for this research included: it allowed deeper exploration of responses by participants – probing and exploring emerging dimensions that may not have been previously considered pertinent aspects of the study; it allowed for flexibility and pursuance of interesting leads; it enabled the researcher to develop a relationship with the participants and also conduct the interview as a conversation rather than formalized “question – answer” sessions.

Further, many rural-based IDPs were assumed not to be conversant with the English language. The researcher used Kiswahili, the Kenyan national language in order to meet the literacy level of each respondent. Questions were asked in the same way and also in the same order; the researcher was able to ask for clarity of meaning wherever an answer was not clear; the researcher was also able to read non-verbal answers from the respondents to compare the answers noted with body expressions. The researcher transcribed the notes in English.

4.7.2 Why Use Key-Informant Interviews

This is a technique where the researcher interviews a selected number of people because of their positions and roles they play within the other respondents. In this research, these key-informants included: The programme co-coordinator, IDPs resettlement in the Ministry of State for Special Programmes; the
programme co-coordinator, IDPs affairs in the Integration and Cohesion Commission; 2007/2008 post-election violence IDP Network Leader; programme co-coordinator, Kenya Red Cross Society, IDPs reconstruction and recovery programme; one local chief each within the two main IDP camps (Total 2); member of country representative from each of the two main IDP camps (Total 2).

This technique was adopted because these few people have a wide pool of knowledge in policy and practice in their areas of work, they were few, hence easy to manage, and the researcher was able to cross-check information from other sources through them, and was also able to get important aspects of information missed out through other techniques. However, the researcher was aware that poorly constructed key-informant interviews lead to poor responses.

4.7.3 Why Use Focus Group Discussions

Focus group discussion is a form of group interview where a researcher or a moderator facilitates a discussion with a small group of people on a specific topic. It combines both elements of individual interviews and participant observation. The first really visible use of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) for conducting Social Science research emerged in the 1940s when it was used to assess media effects on attitudes towards America’s involvement in World War II.

This is a technique where a few participants are brought together for a group discussion on issue. The researcher moderated the sessions and analysed the given the data. This research used this technique to cross-check information received from the other techniques. Six IDPs were considered for the focus group discussion in each of the three categories of IDPs. Individuals for the focus group discussions were picked through purposive sampling based on their perceived knowledge of themes under discussion.
Three focus group discussions were conducted with: Two men, two women, two youths picked from Ministry of State for Special Programme camp-based IDPs list; two men, two women, two youths picked from the Ministry of State for Special Programme list of Integrated IDPs; two men, two women, two youths picked from the Ministry of State for Special Programme government-resettled IDPs list.

The discussions were scheduled for about forty-five to sixty minutes. The advantages of this technique included: The informal group situation and the largely unstructured nature of the questions encouraged the participants to disclose behaviour and attitudes they might not have disclosed during individual interviews. This happens because participants tend to feel more comfortable and secure in the company of people who share similar views and behaviour than in the company of the individual interviewer; participants had an opportunity to highlight issues the researcher had not anticipated; everyone in the focus group had an opportunity to speak out; and the participants had adequate knowledge so as to elucidate discussion. The researcher used personal and professional attributes to create a conducive environment for optimum gains on topics under discussion, for example, balance on gender and age considerations.

**4.7.4 Why Review of Data**

This is a technique the researcher employed to scrutinize important documents. This research intended to review: School admission/enrolment registers for the two main schools of IDPs resettlement; programme budgets from local NGOs implementing post-election violence projects; progress reports from Kenya Red Cross Society; progress reports from the Ministry of State for Special Programmes and progress reports from the Cohesion and Integration Commission.
The advantages of this technique included; the researcher was in a position to cross-check for details already given in other techniques, records don’t change unlike events where emotions are involved.

4.8 Validity and Reliability of Instruments

Brynard and Hanekom (2006) define validity as the potential of an instrument to achieve or measure what it is supposed to measure. It is concerned with the “what” of data collection procedures and measures. Validity should be viewed as best approximation of truth. To check on validity and reliability of data from the primary respondents, this research conducted key informant interviews, focused group discussions and review of data.

4.9 Data Presentation: Processing and Analysis

In qualitative research, data analysis occurs simultaneously with data collection. This is because of the inductive nature of the research. Data analysis is the process of making sense out of the data (Merriam, 2003). This involves consolidating, reducing phenomenon from several pages of field notes and deducing meaningful information. Data was broken down into bits of information and these bits were assigned categories or classes which brought these bits together. Thematic coding and categorization were done by defining what data the researcher was analysing. It involved identifying and recording one or more passages of text or other data items such as parts of pictures that in some sense exemplified the same theoretical or descriptive idea.

The research on the process of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery process of 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya was able to infer from the empirical details of social life; passing judgments or reasoning and to reach conclusions based on evidence at the stage of data analysis. Data were organized into categories, themes or concepts to develop new conceptual meanings or
definitions and examine the relationships and links to each other. The themes or categories were expanded as qualitative research is often inductive.

To ensure credibility of conclusions and recommendations, the researcher ensured the amount of data collected reached saturation. Data was accessible to others and recording of data was systematic and well documented. The presentation and analysis have been arranged into sections and sub-sections through which information developed the answers to the research questions and objectives of this study. Primary data were collected from the month of January, 2015 continuously and concurrently with data analysis. Data analysis started with transcribing field notes, re-familiarization with data, first coding, second coding and third coding.

While primary data were from interview-guides, focus group discussions, key informant interviews and review of documents from institutions were conducted and analysed during this period as a secondary approach to cross-check data already provided.

The proposal to conduct interviews with the Wiyumiririe government-resettled IDPs farms were cancelled due to security concerns. These concerns were brought to attention by the research assistant and corroborated with officials from Ministry of Planning and Devolution. The three samples from this farm were substituted with three others from Haji farm, located 50 kilometres from Nakuru town.

4.10 Research Ethical Issues

Before conducting the interviews, the researcher was provided with a letter confirming his enrolment at the University of Witwatersrand. This letter was shown to officials from national governments and county governments. The researcher first explained to each respondent(s) the purpose of the research, namely; that it is for academic purposes only.
The researcher sought permission from each to conduct the interviews. He read out the instructions of the interview-guides to the respondents and made it clear that the researcher was not representing any government, NGO or any other entity; therefore, by the in participation, they would not get any monetary reward or improve their welfare directly. Interviews were conducted at the preferred locations of the respondent(s) and the researcher maintained anonymity of the respondents by using gender and locations and not their names in writing the research report.

In recognising the possibility of the vulnerable nature of displaced persons, the researcher intentionally decided not to include children in the research samples. The researcher also was confident that as data collection was being undertaken eight years after the post-election violence, majority of the IDPs had passed the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) stages in crisis/conflicts management, hence could not be negatively affected by participating in the research. This view was collaborated by the Research Assistant, who had had interacted with the IDPs for over the last eight years. Additionally the IDPs samples in this qualitative research were quite few, a key principle in this methodology.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE 2007 GENERAL ELECTION: THE VARIOUS RECONSTRUCTION AND RECOVERY INTERVENTIONS

5.1 Introduction

The preceding discussion has noted that a dispute over the 2007 presidential election resulted in unprecedented violence and mass displacement of people especially in the Rift Valley region of the country. The opposition disputed the vote tally. Immediately after announcement of the results, spontaneous as well as planned violence erupted especially in the strongholds of the opposition. The violence later took ethnic dimension with members of the President’s ethnic community, the Kikuyu, being targeted by groups of opposition. As noted in the Waki 2008 report, the violence rapidly took ethnic dimensions.

This chapter analyses the context in which the post-2007 election violence happened, the mediation efforts to end the violence, and the measures that the government and other players took to address the humanitarian crisis arising from the violence. Three categories of IDPs emerged from this crisis: camp-based, integrated, and government resettled IDPs. The three were faced with differing challenges.

The chapter examines the various efforts by different players to assist in the reconstruction and recovery of these various groups. The issue of the justice for the victims through the intervention of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the contradictions of this intervention, are also discussed. Finally, the discussion examines why IDPs are still not eager to return to original homes and why ethnic tension is acute since re-introduction of multi-party system of government.

5.2 The 2007 Election: triggers of violence

The credibility, accountability of general elections in Kenya has been in question since the return of multiparty democracy in 1991. Although the 1992 and 1997 general elections were held as prescribed in the constitution, the administration
and management of the elections were questionable and did not qualify as free, fair, credible and accountable. The results were contested in the courts, which also was hostage of the presidency. The presidential petitions in 1992 and 1997 were defeated on technicalities. Aware of lack of independence of the courts in hearing presidential petitions, in the 2007 general elections, the opposition, ODM, led by Raila Odinga refused to take his petition to the courts.

The presidential results indicated a narrow loss to the incumbent, but the management of announcement of the results by the electoral body and eventual swearing in of the president-elect by the chief justice was problematic in itself giving credence to election fraud. For example live media coverage of result tallies was banned on the last day, electoral commission head announced his frustrations in receiving results from returning officers in the constituencies, the president-elect was sworn in at dusk in a hurried ceremony in State house. The eruption of post-election violence was spontaneous but could also been systematically planned in the lead up to the election days. This study unpacks the management of 2007 general election in chapter five.

The literature review highlighted the position of ethnicity in Kenya. The Kikuyu community is in no doubt relatively large but also occupies vantage socio-economic, political position in Kenya’s development agenda. This was first by coincidence at independence, but successive regimes failed to correct this inequality. Therefore by 2007, the campaigns against the Kikuyu community resonated very well with the voters.

Although all other communities combined occupy large geographic spaces in Kenya territory, the Kikuyu community votes as a block to-date as compared to many other ethnic communities. Therefore a Kikuyu presidential candidate has numeric advantage. The 2010 constitution attempted to de-ethnicitise the presidency by creating 47 devolved county governments with governors as heads of these counties. The electoral results of the 2013 and 2017 elections
and developments afterwards demonstrates that Kenyans still strongly holds the presidency in an ethnic angle as literature in chapter 5.11 reveals. The feeling of ontological confidence is still strong in ownership of presidency among ethnic communities. Indeed at times the presidential candidates hype electorates in campaign on that platform.

The post-election violence was primarily fought on the platform of other ethnic communities against the Kikuyus. The results therefore led to many Kikuyu ethnic members being IDPs as they were displaced from areas they were not dominant. But other communities including the Kisii, Luo, and Luhya were also IDPs but the majority of the IDPs were Kikuyu given their population size in the conflict area of the Rift Valley.

Successive governments have attempted to resettle IDPs to their originals home to a certain successes and failures due to politics. For example, the coalition government was held hostage by competing party politics and the 2013 government held back by the ICC cases for the better part of its term. The dynamics of rural and urban IDPs has also constrained reconstruction and recovery strategies given their different needs and challenges.

5.2.1 Ethnic-Oriented Politics

The 2007 general elections were fiercely contested by two main ethnic political parties, Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and Party of National Unity (PNU). Because political parties were formed based on ethnic-regional support, their candidates for various seats also were picked on the same basis. This affirmed the perception that certain ethnic candidates had zero chance of being elected after party primaries.

According to IRC, (2007), ODM had the highest number of parliamentary candidates at 190 out of 210 parliamentary constituencies; Kenya National Democratic Alliance (KENDA) 170, Party of National Unity (PNU) 135, Orange
Democratic Movement Kenya (ODM-K) 133, Kenya African Democratic Development Union (KADU) 97, Kenya African National Union (KANU) 91, Safina 88, National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) 73, Democratic party (DP) 86 and National Rainbow Coalition Kenya (NARC-K) 59. The table below illustrates the nomination and clearance of presidential candidates by ECK, their political parties, as well as votes garnered by each candidate.
Table 5.1: Summary of Presidential Candidates and Political parties contesting the 2007 General Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential candidate</th>
<th>Nominating Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mwai Kibaki</td>
<td>PNU</td>
<td>4,578,034</td>
<td>46.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raila Odinga</td>
<td>ODM</td>
<td>4,352,860</td>
<td>44.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalonzo Musyoka</td>
<td>ODM-K</td>
<td>879,899</td>
<td>8.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Karani</td>
<td>Kenya Patriotic Trust Party</td>
<td>21,168</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pius Muiru</td>
<td>Kenya People’s Party</td>
<td>9,665</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazlin Umar</td>
<td>Workers Congress Party of Kenya</td>
<td>8,624</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth Matiba</td>
<td>Saba Saba Asili</td>
<td>8,049</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Waweru Ngethe</td>
<td>Chama Cha Uma</td>
<td>5,976</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon Kukubo</td>
<td>Republican Party of Kenya</td>
<td>5,926</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researcher’s Construction

Although there were nine political parties fielding presidential candidates, only three (PNU, ODM and ODM-Kenya) had considerable following. The presidential candidates in these parties belonged to the Kenya “big” tribes, Kikuyu, Luo and Kamba respectively. As the presidential results above reveal, Mwai Kibaki (Kikuyu) emerged the winner with 4,578,034 votes, representing 46.38 per cent, followed by Raila Odinga (Luo) with 4,352,860 votes representing 44.10 per cent of the votes and Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka with 879,899 (Kamba) votes representing 8.91 per cent of the votes. Therefore, as noted in the literature review, campaign promises were not issue-based but an ethnic competition.

The ethnic political party system in Kenya can be described in two periods: the single party system and the multi-party system. At independence, Kenya was a multi-party state but had only two parties, KANU and KADU. These two parties were, however, tribal in nature. KANU was dominated by Kikuyu ethnic tribe while KADU was dominated by Luo ethnic tribe. But because the country at that period still had adequate levels of economic resources, perception of ethnicity was not evident. In 1990’s the economy had deteriorated and introduction of
multi-party system of governance enhanced perception of ethnic favourism and to some extent the cause of increased post-election violence (see Kagwanja, 2009; Kanyinga, 2009; Waki, 2008; Akiwumi, 1999; Kiliku, 1992; Kiai, 2008).

Additionally, the ruling elite managed to introduce politics of ethnic solidarity and kinship. Because of uneven socio-economic development in the country, the electorate perceived development by voting for an ethnic kinsman. For example, in 1992, Forum for Reforms and Democracy Kenya (FORD-Kenya’s) presidential candidate was a Luo and the main support blocks were people of Luo ethnic tribe.

The DP presidential candidate was a Kikuyu and so were the main supporters. To date the country’s democracy is still growing, emerging from situations where individuals formed political parties and “sold” them to candidates. This primarily meant that political parties belonged to individuals and some unscrupulous party leaders, ensuring everyone else was a party sycophant.

5.2.2 Management of the December 2007 General Elections

Management of free, fair and credible general elections starts way before the voting day, at the voter registration and public education stages Kagwanja, (2009); Kanyinga, (2009). But a large number of countries in Africa have not been able to manage accountable, free, fair and credible general elections, particularly after the introduction of multi-party systems of governance.

For example the first incidences of post-election violence in Kenya were in 1992 which built up to the 2007 general elections. These elections were widely discredited by International Republican Institute Election Observation Mission and the Kriegler Commission established to examine the 2007 elections. The elections - presidential, parliamentary and civic elections were conducted on December 27 and the final declaration of the presidential winner announced on 31st December 2007.
The management of the elections was the responsibility of the then Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), through the appointed commissioners. In the 1997 general elections, political parties had an input in appointment of commissioners, through a consultative process – Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG). Pointers of distrust and lack of credibility emerged with appointment of new commissioners by the president without reference to IPPG (Kriegler 2009). Out of 22 commissioners, 20 of them were new. As ethnicity plays a significant role in Kenya, in his appointment, the president seemed to have considered an ethnic balance, but nevertheless, the commissioners were viewed as government sympathizers.

The electoral commission accredited 24,063 election observers, 15,000 of them being local observers under the Kenya Domestic Observation Forum (KEDOF). The domestic teams were funded under the 2007 Election Assistance Programme managed by UNDP-Kenya, who eventually became a major actor in reconstruction and recovery process of the post-election violence. The law on presidential election in Kenya, before multi-party elections, was designed such that a winning candidate was the person with the highest votes (first-past-the-post). But in the first multi-party elections, a new provision in the law required the winner in the presidential candidate to not only obtain but also win a minimum of 25 per cent of the presidential votes cast in at least five of the eight provinces (Kriegler 2009; IRI, 2007).

This aimed to ensure the winner was popular across the country and among the majority of the ethnic communities. The presidential win margin in 2007 elections was less than 250,000 votes with Kibaki, 4,578,034 against Odinga, 4,352,860. This demonstrated that each had a near-equal support base, which could easily be mobilised to support or reject the electoral commission’s results. Alternatively, the candidates and the electoral commission engaged in fraud at vote counting tallying and announcements.
The Kriegler (2009) report noted that a key issue in all complaints was the surprising high voter turnout in 2007 general election. The report also noted examples of discrepancies between presidential and parliamentary elections in the constituencies when final tallying was announced and concluded there were widespread irregularities in voting, tabulation and tallying of votes.

9,886,650 million Kenyans voted representing 69 per cent of the national voter turnout. This was the highest turnout ever experienced in Kenya since 1992. There were nine presidential candidates, 2,547 parliamentary candidates, and 15,331 civic candidates who participated in this election. In comparison, the previous general election in 1992, the voter turnout was 67.5%, 64.2% in 1997 and 57.2% in 2002. The 2005 referendum witnessed the lowest turnout, at 54%. The table below summarizes these findings.
Table 5.2: Percentages of voters participating in Kenya 1992-2013 multi-party elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Registered Voters</th>
<th>Voter Turn out</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>7,956,328</td>
<td>5,437,769</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>8,967,569</td>
<td>6,173,171</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>10,451,150</td>
<td>5,969,181</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>14,296,180</td>
<td>9,886,650</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>14,388,781</td>
<td>12,330,028</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author construction from ECK various literature

This research concludes that in 1992, voters were enthusiastic about multi-party democracy and were determined to vote out the independent party and government out of office. This enthusiasm continued to the 1997 general elections, but there was voter apathy in 2002 as the independent party offered a new candidate and opposition parties formed a national alliance.

The Africa Union through African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in 2006 signalled some underlying problems related to the preparation of the 2007 general election, but neither the government nor the stakeholders attempted to address the issues. This affirms the weaknesses of post-conflict approaches AU practiced over the years. For example, AU waits until declaration of elections results and outbreak of post-election violence before taking practical steps towards solving the crisis. Gabon 2016, Burundi, 2015, Cote d’Ivoire, 2008 and Zimbabwe, 2008 post-election violence are examples of this weakness.

The 2005 referendum supervised by ECK, was also a pointer to a post-election violence. In the referendum, the pro-government lost leading to reconstitution of the government by sacking all government ministers who campaigned against
the referendum. The sacked ministers were able to mobilise their ethnic support base on reasons of their sacking, eventually forming a movement which culminated in a political party. The movement was able to maintain same political base into the 2007 general elections.

The conclusions of the analysis in this section are that rules of political participation and allocation of resources underlie any demographic and economic stability, as well as the power-balance, resulting in the end of discrimination, marginalization and exclusion of communities (Carroll, 2001). For example, in Kenya, the political campaigns before the 2007 General Elections were that one tribe had dominated the socio-economic and political space for a considerable longer period of time, isolating forty-one other tribes. Hence, Colleta, & Cullen, (2000); Colletta, & Kostner, (1996) notes that strong state institutions can prevent any possible efforts by political entrepreneurs to use ethnic origin as a resource for developing forms of exclusive nationalism and for inciting community conflicts, by promising rewards in exchange for supporters’ ‘loyalty’.

5.2.3 Role of Media in 2007 Campaigns and Elections

The role of public media in relation to general elections campaigns has been controversial in many African countries. Indeed, Kadima (2009), cited in van Nieuwkerk & Moat (2015) concurs that access to state-owned media especially electronic media has been controversial in South African Development Corporation (SADC) countries. The quality and timing of broadcast reveals unfair practices that favour incumbent presidents. Kadima’s observation resonates with the public media in 2007 general elections in Kenya.

According to Kriegler (2009) Kenya media together with civil society played a significant role in the outcome of the 2007 general elections. Candidates contesting make use of the press, radio and television to broadcast their manifestos and propaganda. Kenya had a State owned radio and television station, Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) and numerous private-owned
stations. There were less than five mainstream daily newspapers and as global practice, international and regional media houses also covered the 2007 general election.

To achieve free and fair elections, media houses were required to ensure a balanced coverage. But according to media monitoring reports after the 2007 general election, the political campaigns of PNU were the most covered by the mainstream media compared to all other political parties. The table below illustrates the specific percentages the three major political parties received from three mainstream newspapers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Daily Nation</th>
<th>Kenya Times</th>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNU</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODM</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODM-K</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Researcher’s construction from data obtained from Media Council of Kenya*

The above tabulations reveal a close contest in investment in media coverage, which demonstrated Kenya media was an influential political tool. Media owners had vested interests in presidential outcome and would go to great lengths to ensure a preferred candidate win. There were also general perceptions on political-ethnic lineage of particular newspapers and radio. For example, Kenya Times was viewed to favour KANU a dominant party in Rift Valley, while the Daily Nation was perceived to favour politics of the Central Province of Kenya associated with PNU.

There were ten vernacular radio stations which were on air between 2000 and 2007. These stations broadcasting in Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luo dialects participated in covering the 2002 general elections as well as the 2005
referendum without incidences of post-election violence. According to Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNHRC, 2008), while the mainstream newspapers and radio stations were mainly in English and Kiswahili languages, and required some level of literacy, there was a tremendous rise in establishment of vernacular radio stations prior to 2007 general elections.

The radio stations broadcasted in local dialects and targeted audience of that particular ethnic tribe. The vernacular radio stations played a significant role in political balkanization of the country towards the 2007 general elections. To work as presenter in those radio stations, the main requirement was fluency in the dialect the radio was broadcasting, therefore professional qualifications and ethical standards were secondary. The listenership of these stations was popular in rural areas where local dialect was the means of communication especially among the older population.

Media supported civic education, voter education in 2007 and scrutinized the actions of politicians to ensure free and fair elections. But also it provided the platform for misinformation and propaganda. The Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNHRC, 2008) noted:

The media, and particularly local language media, influenced or facilitated the influencing of communities to hate or to be violent against other communities. Radio stations broadcasting in Kalenjin languages as well as in the Kikuyu language were culpable in this respect. Live phone-in programmes were particularly notorious for disseminating negative ethnic stereotypes, cultural chauvinism and the peddling of sheer untruths about the political situation or individual politicians.

The commission singled out the vernacular FM stations especially for disseminating dangerous propaganda and hate-speech through their live talk-shows and call-in programmes. In concurrence with the KNHRC report on vernacular broadcasting, Waki, (2008) also noted:

Many recalled with horror, fear, and disgust the negative and inflammatory role of vernacular radio stations in their testimony and statements to the
Commission. In particular, they singled out KASS FM as having contributed to a climate of hate, negative ethnicity, and having incited violence in the Rift Valley.

A radio presenter from KASS FM which broadcasts in Kalenjin dialect and was the main presenter in the 2007 general election period was an accused person in the International Criminal Court (ICC), Kenya case two. He was alleged to have used the station to promote post-election violence. The current deputy president was a co-accused in the same case. This demonstrated the negative role the vernacular FM radio station played in the run up to the 2007 general elections. According to Kriegler (2009):

[H]ate speech ... characterized the 2007 ... elections on party rallies; text messages, emails, posters and leaflets were other vehicles of incitement’. And when travelling around the country, the Commission observed that most radio stations lacked professional journalists able to control an audience or regulate talks ... Words and phrases such as ‘settlers’, ‘let’s claim our land’, ‘people of the milk to cut grass’, ‘mongoose has come and stolen our chicken’, ‘madoadoa’ and ‘get rid of weeds’ aired by radio FM stations ... and songs such as ‘talking very badly about beasts from the west’... also aired on FM radio stations were received with mixed feelings by Kenyans.

5.2.4 Role of Civil Society in 2007 Elections

According to Kanyinga (2014), “civil society” in Kenya broadly refers to the autonomous and voluntary non-state associations. They are formed to complement or supplement government efforts in service delivery. They comprise of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), religious or Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs), trade unions, professional associations, self-help and numerous other voluntary organizations.

As in practice, civil society in Kenya was heterogeneous in composition and interests. A big number of civil society groups in Kenya implements their projects from funding by European countries. Civil society was a key ally in management of the 2007 general elections in voter education exercises Kriegler (2009).
Since the introduction of multi-party in Kenya, governance and electoral democracy sectors attracted a large number of civil society organizations, which were neutral and independent. But after the 2005 constitutional review referendum, civil society was polarized along ethnic lines. This polarization was carried over to the 2007 general elections, affecting voter education where political campaigns degenerated from issue-based to ethnic stereotyping and identity attacks to opponents.

The mainstream churches, Anglican and Catholics campaigned in favour of PNU and the incumbent president. Although Kenya was a secular state entrenched in the constitution, Raila Odinga, of ODM and main challenger to the incumbent signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Muslim leaders supposedly to promote Islamic religion above other religions.

By taking sides in the political contest, the role of civil society in 2007 was not neutral hence aggravated post-election violence chances Kriegler (2009). At the end of the campaign period, all segments of the country were highly divided on ethnic lines, with a rider from ODM – “forty one against one”, meaning all ethnic communities in Kenya against a supposedly one dominant ethnic community, the Kikuyu.

5.3 Political Interventions under the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR)

The question why warring parties accept external intervention is demonstrated by Khadiagala’s (2008; 2009), argument that structural factors in a civil conflict compel outsiders to become participants in conflict resolution by probing the stalemate, forcing parties to accept outside mediation. The conflict parties find themselves locked in zero-sum position without any idea how to solve out the problem hence opening doors to external mediators.
From this perspective, effective mediators are often driven by the desire to redress almost impossible situations in which combatants are incapable of finding solutions on their own. Therefore, mediators seek to break the stalemate and to move the parties from unilateral to multilateral solutions.

The post-election violence was based on ethnic affiliations (Waki, 2008), hence brokering of peace was initially shaped in the same thinking. According to the International Crisis Group (2008), before the involvement of international actors for a political settlement, the first attempt to a peace deal involved negotiations between ODM and PNU by influential members of the Kikuyu-ethnic business community, facilitated by the World Bank resident representative, Colin Bruce. This affirmed how ethnicity was entrenched in the country.

The peace negotiation at these initial stages was an economic investment concern because the elite group feared the massive economic damage the crisis could cause and its long lasting implications to their investments. This group was generally supportive of Kibaki’s policies and funded his campaign, but it was not the prime beneficiary of his patronage (International Crisis Group, 2008).

The political crisis settlement was intended to operate between the parties through trusted intermediaries and by-pass the close confidants who guarded access to the president and benefited most from his patronage. The go-betweens, chosen for their ability to interact one-on-one with Kibaki, emphasized the need for power sharing with Odinga, an idea the close confidants could not entertain.

The African Union constituted the Panel of Eminent Personalities who in turn established the mediation framework under the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR). These mediation efforts managed to end the post-election violence, when they facilitated signing of a peace agreement and formation of government of national unity (Grand Coalition Government).
signing of peace agreement after 41 days of mediation marked the end of the post-election violence and the beginning of the resettlement of IDPs.

The agreement (the National Accord), provided a four-point undertaking by the conflict parties to take immediate action to stop the post-election violence and restore fundamental rights and liberties, resolve the humanitarian crisis, promote reconciliation, healing, and restore calm, overcome the political crisis, and address long-term issues and the root causes of the violence, including by means of constitutional, legal and institutional reforms. Issues mentioned under the humanitarian crisis included the resettlement of IDPs and specifically facilitating their return to their original homes.

Notable international personalities who attempted to broker peace included, the AU Peace and Security Commissioner, Ambassador Said Djinnit, Ghana’s Ambassador to Addis Ababa; the then Nigerian President, Umar Musa Yar-Adua, Britain’s Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, South Africa’s Nobel Peace Laureate, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Jendayi Frazer, US Assistant Secretary of State and African former African Heads of States Benjamin Mkapa (Tanzania), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), Ketumile Masire (Botswana) and Joachim Chissano (Mozambique). None of these interventions initially succeeded (see Waki, 2008; Akiwumi, 1999; Kiliku, 1992).

According to Khadiagala (2008; 2009), the invocation of African solutions to African problems partly had precedence from the use of former Heads of States and other prominent personalities to mediate in cases of civil conflict. African Union relied on the experiences of former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, retired president of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa, and former South African First Lady, Graça Machel to broker a peace agreement.

Since the 1990s, the practice of using elder statesmen as mediators has been the practice in Africa. For example the involvement of Nelson Mandela and Julius
Nyerere in Burundi in 1995 and 1999 respectively, Joaquim Chissano in Northern Uganda in 2006, and Olusegun Obasanjo and Benjamin Mkapa in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2008 in mediations or peace negotiations. Kenya’s case was the first where the African Union involved collective power of three eminent persons together.

One of the problems identified as the cause of post-election violence was a lack of integration and cohesion in Kenyan society. To address this problem, the National Cohesion and Integration Bill, was enacted into law in December 2008, eventually establishing the National Cohesion and Integration Commission. This law sought to encourage cohesion by outlawing discrimination on ethnic grounds. Also the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission Bill, was enacted in 2008 eventually establishing the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission. This law aimed to address historical injustices.

According to the Kenya National Dialogue (2008), the idea of power sharing was anathema to ODM and PNU negotiating teams. But by the end of the negotiation the two sides agreed to constitutional amendment to allow for formation of the Grand Coalition Government. The president (PNU) retained executive powers while a position of non-executive prime minister was created as well as two deputy prime ministers. At the end, the government comprised forty cabinet ministers and fifty-two deputy ministers from different political parties to satisfy the ethnic interests of the voters.

Resettlement of IDPs process was placed under the Ministry of State for Special Programmes headed by a PNU affiliate minister. The ministry was in charge of all types of IDPs including, but not limited to, those from the post-election violence, integrated IDPs, displacements as a result of natural disasters, inter communal conflicts, cattle rustling and historical IDPs. But in a report of the select committee on the resettlement of internally displaced persons, April 17, 2012, tabled in Parliament, the committee accused the ministry of a reluctance to
resolve the problem of IDPs and a lack of commitment to address the IDP crisis, thus perpetuating a culture of impunity.

During the public hearings, the committee heard that: The IDPs lived under deplorable conditions lacking basic needs such as shelter, food, water, and social amenities; IDPs pooled their ex-gratia resources together for purchase of land; the resettlement exercise was skewed and characterized by inequities and those who lost property and livelihoods had not been compensated. They also made an observation that integrated IDPs had largely been neglected.

This ministry was under the Office of the President hence its functions and performance were under the close scrutiny of the Presidency. The term of the grand coalition government ended after the swearing in of the new government elected in 2013. The affairs of the IDPs resettlement were placed under the Ministry of Devolution and Planning.

5.4 Government Socio-economic Livelihood Approach

By the time of research, there were many policy documents on IDPs. Key informant interview (Macharia, April 9, 2015) as well as policies identified earlier established the existence of other approaches that govern Kenya disaster management and are relevant to the post-conflict reconstruction and recovery process of the IDPs. For example the draft national disaster management policy 2009, the national disaster response plan, the Vision 2030 development strategy for northern Kenya and other arid areas, the national climate change response strategy 2010, the draft national policy on peace-building and conflict management, the national land policy, the evictions and resettlement procedures Act and community lands Act.

The prevention, protection and assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Affected Communities Act 2012 were gazetted on 4 January, 2013 through the Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 220 (Act No. 56) and became effective in
January 2013. The enactment of the Act, led to operationalization of the following; the chairman of the National Consultative Coordination Committee (NCCC) was appointed by the President on 19th February, 2014 and gazetted on 28 February, 2014; the NCCC was gazetted on 3 October, 2014 by the cabinet secretary; the secretariat was constituted and offices secured.

Socio-economic interventions started as soon as the post-election violence fizzled out. For example, the government formed the National Humanitarian Fund for Mitigation and Resettlement of Victims under legal notice No. 11 of 30 January, 2008. Provision of resettlement out of the IDPs camps formed a key component of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery efforts of the government, humanitarian and development partners (Key informant interview, April 9, 2015). There were campaigns to encourage IDPs to return to their former homes and this fund provided cash grants to post-election victims/returnees to support their rehabilitation efforts.

To entice IDPs, every returning household was entitled to a cash payment of Kshs. 25,000 for reconstruction of houses and an additional Kshs. 10,000 as livelihood start-up capital. The government indicated that 38,145 households received this direct payment. However, contrary to intended actions, some households redirected their funds to other basic needs of the family (e.g. education or starting up livelihoods) and never rebuilt their homes. Out of a total 43, 792 houses only, 26,589 houses were constructed. By 30 July, 2010, the fund had a budget deficit of Kshs. 1,161,390,000 having disbursed Kshs. 2,380,170,000.

According to (Key informant interview, April 9, 2015), this post-conflict reconstruction and recovery approach had some international support and pledges. For instance, the government of China donated 105,000 iron sheets worth Kshs.200 million, the government of Morocco donated US$ 1 million and ADB provided Kshs.1.5 billion for restoration of farm infrastructure and
livelihoods. But by November 2008, the government had run out of funds. Thus reporting to Parliament on November 13, 2008 the Special Programmes Minister said the Ministry had run out of resettlement funds, and of Kshs. 30 billion estimated cost, only Kshs.1.96 billion was raised, of which Kshs.1.38 billion has been used to resettle 255,094 IDPs on their land.

Without adequate funds, the reconstruction and recovery agenda diminished in significance and the problem was no longer an issue of priority. The level of service provision and donor attention declined. For instance, UNHCR decision in 2013 to stop funding IDP-related activities also affected activities of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) and activities of the national Protection Working Group on Internal Displacement (PWGID).

The introductory chapters of this research highlighted the *ad hoc* nature of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery of the IDPs. Over the years government organs including the Presidency pronounced the closure of all IDP camps. These quasi-formal pronouncements de-accelerated post-conflict the reconstruction and recovery process. For instance in September 2013, the president announced that the government was to compensate all IDPs in camps and close them, and in October, 2013, announced closure of all the IDP camps.

These announcements have been challenged by human rights groups. However, in his second State on the Nation address in parliament on 26 March 2015, the President ordered the establishment of a Kshs. 10 billion fund to assist victims of the 2007/2008 post-election violence. This fund was to be established in the next three years and help victims resettle, reconcile and re-build their socio-economic lives (Daily Nation 2015, March, 27). During the post-election violence some IDPs fled to Uganda as refugees, and when they returned in 2016, they demanded payment of Kshs. 40,000 and camped outside the Kenyan parliament as a sign of protest. However, the government refused to pay any money to this group (Daily Nation 2016, October, 21).
The President also acknowledged it was difficult to successfully prosecute the perpetrators of the violence, the challenges being: inadequate evidence, inability to identify the culprits, witnesses’ fear of reprisals and the general lack of technical and forensic capacity.

According to global approaches developed under UN guiding principles, the search for long-term solutions for IDPs is categorized in three options: return to original home; reintegration into host communities and resettlement. Kenya seems to have followed all three options. To implement these options was the responsibility of the Ministry of Special Programmes and later the Ministry of Devolution and Planning. This Ministry established the department for mitigation and resettlement to accelerate the resettlement of those displaced and sub-directorates like counselling services; resettlement; and operations. After the 2013 general elections, the IDP department under the Ministry of Devolution and Planning has been implementing the three options in relation to UN guiding principles approach (Key informant interview, April 9, 2015).

According to Key informant interview, April 9, 2015, the return to original homes approach project had an intention to encourage IDPs return to their original farms. The government was to rebuild burnt houses as opposed to earlier initiative where IDPs were given cash to rebuild houses on their own. Government also provided security to the returnees. Each household returning was given Kshs. 10,000(US$ 111.1) as start-up capital – the returnees used this money to replace household furniture, till their land and plant for the new season. About 70 households returned to their original farms out of this initiative and government directly reconstructed for them houses. The project also gave Kshs. 25,000(US$278) to 38,145 IDPs who wanted to reconstruct their own houses in their original land without government direct involvement.

There were IDPs who wanted to be provided with capital and resettle themselves in new places without government involvement. This approach led to about 817
individual IDPs being given Kshs. 400,000 (US$4,000) to purchase alternative land on their own for resettlement purposes and an additional Kshs. 10,000 (US$100) as start-up capital. Government constructed 167 primary/secondary schools. They also initiated inter-community peace projects and provided farm inputs and relief food until stabilization.

Immediately calm returned, there were heightened political campaigns asking IDPs to return to their homes. This initiative fell short of the UN Guiding Principles on IDPs as highlighted in the Literature Review - the IDPs were not fully consulted. Although the physical resettlement seems to have worked for some rural-based IDPs, there was fear and uncertainty. Most of the returnees were not keen to make huge or permanent investments in their farms or homes as they had no guarantee that future general election would not result in renewed violence.

This approach was criticized by the Kenya UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator on 15 October 2010. The coordinator emphasized that displacement does not end with returning home, but only when particular needs and vulnerabilities linked to the displacement are resolved. An analysis revealed that the government’s intention was to close down all the IDP camps to avoid international embarrassment, hence entice or coerce the IDPs with money for them to agree to the approach.

Resettlement of IDPs on government-procured farms was another approach. Project reports indicated that resettlement entailed purchase of farms by the government and resettling IDPs on these parcels of land. Each household received a 2¼ hectares. The government constructed a standard one-roomed iron sheet roofed house with mud walls, bare floor, wooden door and wooden windows. They also provided seeds and fertilizer for the first planting season. The ¼ hectare was used for construction of a standard house, while the 2 hectares were for farming purposes.
Government constructed the houses for each household and ferried them from a particular IDP camp and commissioned the new settlement. In the settlement there were rural roads, a water point, a primary and secondary school and a cemetery. The settlements were not fenced, but some capable individual households have taken the initiative to put fences around their houses. Since then, no other government initiative has been occasioned in these settlements.

There were 18 fully functional government IDP farms spread across the country by the time of this research. The largest and oldest farms are: Muhu, Gakonya, Kabia/Asanyo, Ngiwa, Baraka Summit, Wiyumiririe, Managua, San Mario, Nyandarua/Kiambaga, Rwangondu, Nakuru/Kejokety, Maranet and Wangondu farms.

This approach ended up separating IDPs from mainstream society, hampering an effective post-conflict reconstruction and recovery process. By living in secluded IDP-only settlements, they were clearly labeled as IDP farms by host community. Their livelihood, actions and interactions were closely monitored to ensure they did not import alien norms, values and culture. Some of the IDPs resettled under this project argue that current farms have different weather from their original homes. They were also not consulted about the farm buying projects.

*Here the weather is very harsh ….in the morning it is fog….one old man died here because of the weather – (Female, Muhu farm).*

*In this place we only grow maize and beans….this season has been very bad. No harvest was realized as rains are very insufficient – (Female, Ngiwa Farm).*

By the time of this research, Ngiwa farm had 444 households, Muhu farm, 174, Kabia/Asanyo farm, 97, Gakonya farm, 100 and Haji farm, 567 households. Since the 2007/2008 post-election violence, these IDPs have been moving from one location to another as camp-based IDPs before finally being resettled in the respective farms. Pressure exerted on IDPs to move out of the camps raised
concern about the voluntary nature of the process. IDPs substantive participation in planning and implementation was missing. IDPs did not have the opportunity to see the farms in advance in order to assess their viability.

The Kenya government was involved in the initial stages of the Integrated IDPs approach. The government gave 170,000 individual integrated IDPs Kshs. 10,000 (US$100) as start-up capital under the Integrated IDPs project. They also received psychosocial counselling. Four business solution centres for training on different ventures were established. There were 75,000 individuals who were profiled as integrated IDPs, but the project, by time of this research could not trace them (Githinji, personal interview, Integrated IDPs leadership, 26 March, 2015).

During the post-election violence, 6,500 IDPs fled to Uganda as refugees. For over 8 years they have been refugees settled at Kiryandogo refugee settlement in Masindi District, Uganda. They have been returning to Kenya in groups of 1,350 with the last group being received at the Malaba IDP camp on 4th May 2015 by UNHCR, who gave each of them US$50 to help them settle (Daily Nation, May 5, 2015).

5.5 Non-State Actors’

This research aimed to explore how the non-state actors’ influenced livelihood strategies for IDPs. The non-state actors’ intervention to the initial response of the post-election crisis was built in the form of a triangle. The government, through the Ministry of Special Programmes in the Office of the President, convened regular meetings with the UN resident coordinator and the Kenya Red Cross (KRC).

A National Disaster Operations Centre (NDOC) was established to organize and coordinate the relief efforts with the KRC. This had been created through an Act of Parliament in 1965 to, *inter alia*, “provide relief to victims of catastrophe or
disasters” and offered the government a good opportunity to deploy in the worst affected areas whilst handling the problems of acceptability and legitimacy that government officials were facing.

The KRC was mainly responsible to run the relief operation on behalf of the government especially focusing on the management and coordination of the camps. On the side of the UN agencies and the IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee) Humanitarian Country Team, the cluster approach was activated on 9 January, 2008 and provided the framework for coordination for the international community’s relief efforts. UNHCR assumed the leadership of the protection and emergency shelter/Non Food Items (NFI) clusters. The office also provided technical support and advice to KRC for it to discharge key CCCM (Camp Coordination and Camp Management) responsibilities. Formally however, UNHCR was cluster lead for CCCM as per the Emergency Coordinator’s letter dated 8 January, 2008.

At the end of the crisis, and among the UN and NGOs, it was only UNDP Kenya which had a sustainable three year livelihood recovery project specific for the IDPs. The project was implemented from May 2009. The UN agency started its livelihood recovery project with the overall objective of contributing to the post-election violence recovery and reintegration process through the restoration of livelihoods in affected areas. The project was supported by the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) within the overall global UNDP structure.

The intention was to build capacity and empowerment to reduce the livelihood impact of the post-election violence victims. While, the post-election affected both rural and urban IDPs the main focus of the project was on urban-based IDPs but still accommodated rural-based IDPs and youths in areas of economics, agriculture, transport and financial services, manufacturing, construction and the micro and small enterprises. To achieve positive results in restoration of livelihood, the projects targeted both agricultural and non-agricultural livelihoods.
According to the UNDP (2009), the project’s non-agricultural activities included: Re-equipping lost livelihoods assets for men, women and youth; skill development particularly among unemployed youth; establishment and promotion of micro-enterprise opportunities for youth and women; facilitation of access to credit and entrepreneurial opportunities through establishment of business solution centres in the major hubs; access to women development funds and youth business funds; restoring and improving access to markets especially for women; rehabilitation of small-scale public works through intensive labour and mainstreaming of livelihoods recovery in the national economic agenda.

The outcome of these activities was the establishment of District Business Solution Centres (DBSCs); Business Skills and Entrepreneurship Development (BSED) training programs for the youth; business advisory services and short trainings and business advisory trainings. DBSCs provided support directly or indirectly through identified linkages with experts and relevant institutions. The project also considered the re-establishment of livelihood tools and equipment in masonry, carpentry kits, and sewing machines and in extreme cases livestock purchases were made through an arrangement that was developed with the beneficiary groups, making sure that it was not based on a “handout” approach.

According to the UNDP Kenya progress report on Post-Elections Violence Livelihoods Recovery Project, reporting period of January to December 2010, the budget for the project was US$1,666,700. The established District Business Solution centres had trained half of the unemployed youths in the affected areas in entrepreneurial skills by the first year of the project and half of rural IDPs were supported with farm inputs within the first three months. At least 30% of youths who had received entrepreneurial skills had access to credit by end of 2009 and at least 40% of youths in the affected areas had access to informal employment opportunities. Additionally, 60% of youth training polytechnics were supported.
during the second year of the project and were able to graduate 1,000 skilled youths per year in the project period. At the end of the project, 50,000 youths had received vocational training.

The only active NGOs by the time of this research were those interested in justice and their work revolved around advocacy and documentation. These were such NGOs as the ICJ and the UN human rights commission. Indeed, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2012, status report, Elusive Justice: A status Report on the Victims of 2007-2008 Post-Election Violence in Kenya (2012) highlighted the ad hoc, ineffective nature of the IDPs resettlements programmes.

The activities of different non-state actors have been shaped by their core mandates and their donor’s primary interests. Therefore, they were not co-ordinated most of the time duplicating functions especially feeding and provision of essentials. By the time of this research, NGOs had spent Kshs. 16 billion collectively on IDP issues from crisis to reconstruction and recovery.

There were no partnerships or collaboration with the Government. Each NGO operated their projects and programmes. They fundraised separately and implemented their projects based on their donor needs. For example IOM, international humanitarian organisation (GOAL) and DRC constructed 359 houses in 2008. Many other NGOs offered humanitarian assistance but never got involved in long-term projects with IDPs.

The last time NGOs provided material support was in 2009, but a few churches continued to provide un-programmed support to IDPs in the camps. For instance, the Catholic Church in Mumoi was on record as providing clothes, blankets and foodstuff to IDPs in Mumoi on a “surprise” basis. This support was limited and was considered a humanitarian gesture.
5.6 Land Reforms

One of the key perceived indicators of community resilience identified in chapter seven of this research through interview guides, key informants and focus group discussions is possession of land. The main approach identified in this research as undertaken by Government to solve the IDPs reconstruction and recovery is inclined to providing parcels of land to IDPs as resettlement plans.

Land forms the basis for livelihoods for most Kenyans, especially those in rural areas; during colonisation most Kenyans were displaced by white settlers who were large scale farmers. At independence, Africans were supposed to get back their land, but it never happened as perceived by many Africans. When the white settlers decided to leave Kenya, the government did not recognize customary land use in law or practice but instead sold the land it acquired under the principle of ‘willing seller, willing buyer.’

Most of this land thus ended up in the hands of members of the Kikuyu ethnic group rather than with the communities from which it had been taken. This was possibly due to the President’s recommendations as a Kikuyu. The President further used the land for patronage purposes and to build alliances, a pattern that continued and increased under the next president, who was from a Kalenjin ethnic tribe. This entrenched a culture for competition for land acquisition among different ethnic groups.

According to various reports on land clashes reviewed in chapter one (see Akiwumi, 1999; Kiliku, 1992; Waki, 2008) in 1990, politically instigated land clashes broke out mostly in the Rift Valley. Other parts, e.g. Western, Nyanza and later Coast Provinces were also affected because they were perceived not to support the ruling political elite and their party at the time. The clashes led to the displacement of many people from their lands. This underlined the role of land in politics in Kenya and suggested that the potential for civil war was real. In the Rift Valley, those displaced were mainly people who had acquired land through
resettlements schemes or outright purchase (Kikuyu). They had been long viewed as “foreigners” by the original inhabitants of the area (Kalenjins).

Land reform was identified by the National Accord as a priority, noting that land and discontent over its distribution and ownership was much cited as a driving factor behind the 2007/2008 violence. According to the National Lands Commission formed in 2009 after the post-election violence, land issues in Kenya range from out-dated land laws to long and tedious processes of planning, surveying, adjudication, settlement and registration of land.

Irregular allocation of land by the executive to political cronies, squatters and landless were weak policy points. Other issues identified included unsustainable land utilisation, lack of access to land by some members of the society, such as women and youth, and utilisation of arable land for housing and non-agricultural activities, to mention but a few. The National Lands Commission has classified land in Kenya into private, public and community land.

The irregular illegal allocation of public land intensified with the introduction of multi-party politics. Government was required to reward and even “buy” influential politicians to remain in power. This demonstrated that land has been used for political mobilisation by successive governments, with promises and rewards to friends and supporters. The government commissioned an independent inquiry to investigate the extent of land grabbing in Kenya in 2002 an effort to address the problem.

The Commission made some major findings, which sum up the major problems bedevilling the land sector in the country since 1963. For example, it established that some 200,000 illegal titles were created between 1962 and 2002 and close to 98 per cent of these were issued between 1986 and 2002. The main beneficiaries of grabbed land included ministers, senior civil servants, politicians, politically connected businessmen, and even churches and mosques.
The most affected of these allocations were forests, settlement schemes established for the poor, national parks and game reserves, government civil service houses, government offices, roads and road reserves, wetlands, research farms, state corporation lands and trust lands (see Akiwumi, 1999; Kiliku, 1992; Waki, 2008). The 2010 Constitution established the National Lands Commission (NLC) which has led to a series of land reform developments.

For IDPs and other landless Kenyans to enjoy land as an asset, the National Assembly is mandated to enact such bills based on the 2010 constitution. The time line provided for such enactment was five years, which the Kenyan parliament extended to August 2016. Such bills include the Community Land Bill 2014, the Eviction and Resettlement Bill 2014 and minimum and maximum land Holding Acreage Bill 2015. Enactment of these bills among other reforms intended to provide legal ownership will contribute to livelihood and resilience capacities for the landless and the IDPs. By the time of this research none of these bills had been enacted.

5.7 The International Criminal Court (ICC)

For IDPs to adapt, absorb or transform (community resilience), they need restitution, reparation and restorative justice. As stated above the lack of faith in the Kenya’s justice system contributed to post-election violence. For the victims to get compensation, thus absorb the impact of the loss, they required reform of the justice system. The commission investigating the post-election violence eventually recommended the ICC justice system. Kenya became a party to ICC’s Rome Statute on 15 March 2005. According to (ICC 2015), it exercises its jurisdiction when:

A State becomes a party to the Rome Statute, it agrees to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to the crimes enumerated in the Statute. The Court may exercise its jurisdiction in situations where the alleged perpetrator is a national of a State Party or where the crime was committed in the territory of a State Party. Also, a State not party to the
Statute may decide to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC. These conditions do not apply when the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, refers a situation to the Office of the Prosecutor.

Kenya followed systematic steps to eventual engagement with the Court. According to Waki (2008), the Commission found that the post-election violence evolved into well-organized and coordinated attacks, which the State security agencies failed institutionally to anticipate, prepare for, and contain. One of the recommendations was setting up of a special tribunal to prosecute the crimes committed. Political intrigues ensured the special tribunal was not established, with the Kenya’s parliament rejecting this recommendation on several attempts. Eventually the names of the alleged perpetrators were sent to Panel of Eminent persons, under the former UN secretary general, who forwarded the names to the ICC prosecutor.

After investigations, the prosecutor identified six individuals as bearing the biggest responsibility for the post-election violence. These were classified into two: case 1 confirmation of charges hearings for William Ruto, Henry Kosgey and Joshua Sang took place from September 1 to 8, 2011, while Frnis Muthaura, Uhuru Kenyatta, and Major-General Hussein Ali from September 21 to October 5, 2011. William Ruto, was then ODM deputy party leader and Minister for Agriculture and now Deputy President of Kenya; Henry Kosgey, was ODM chair and Minister for Industrialization; and Joshua Sang, a radio broadcaster with Kass FM, a private radio station. In case 2 Major-General Ali, a former police commissioner was then postmaster general by time of this research; Uhuru Kenyatta (PNU), former Deputy Prime minister and Minister for Finance and now President of Kenya; and Francis Muthaura, former Head of the Civil Service.

By time of this research, no individual had been successfully prosecuted by the Kenya courts in relation to the post-election violence. This means the chances for compensation of livelihood and assets lost by the IDPs failed. On January 23,
2012, the ICC dropped the Kosgey and Ali cases citing weak evidence provided. Again, on March 11, 2013, the prosecutor dropped charges against Muthaura citing insufficient evidence to sustain prosecution. The Office of the Prosecutor announced the withdrawal of all charges against Kenyatta on 5th December 2014. This followed a decision by the trial chamber order rejecting a request to postpone the trial. Hope for justice through the two remaining cases (Ruto and Sang) was short-lived as ICC dropped the cases on April 5, 2016.

By then a section of the IDPs had started agitating for dropping of these two cases. Fatigue, political persuasion, lack of hope could be some of the reasons the IDPs wanted the cases dropped. For example, Daily Nation of 10th August, 2015 online edition published a headline on IDPs accusing ICC court of incompetence. The IDP network National Organizing Secretary and Kisumu Coordinator asked the ICC to consider relocating its offices situated in Nairobi. The IDPs lawyer in the same report complained of the prosecution’s failure to take appropriate measures to ensure effective investigations and prosecution of case 2. The IDP network Organizing Secretary (according to Daily Nation 10 August, 2015):

The office of the ICC should leave us alone. We had a lot of expectations and the ICC has over time crashed them with every step they take.....We want the ICC to leave President Uhuru Kenyatta to give us the Sh10 billion he promised us. We no longer expect justice from them and we just want them to go....even the Nairobi office they have set up for us should just be moved out of our country. We now think we are okay alone if the government just compensates us. We have suffered a lot already.

The network acknowledges that the IDPs were losing their lives to diseases as the cases at the court dragged on. “We no longer want to die, neither do we want to wait until we are dead for the compensation. The case in the ICC is blocking our compensation”. The IDP lawyer was of the opinion that the prosecution had failed to protect the victims when it discontinued the Uhuru case and requested the chamber to review the case.
While the IDPs and the lawyer agree for the need of reconstruction and recovery of the victims, they are not in agreement on justice for the victims. IDPs want the closure of all the cases as an avenue for compensation, hence building their community resilience, but the lawyer argues for transparency towards successful prosecution of the alleged perpetrators probably pushing for compensation for property and lives lost, hence as well as building resilience and bouncing back for the victims.

There has been a concerted effort for the IDP leadership to lobby and advocate for termination of the cases. This was probably a strategy by the Kenya Government to involve the victims in fighting for collapse of the ICC cases. According to the Standard 2nd June, 2015, the paper headlined a news story on IDPs requesting for termination of ICC cases as way for reconciliation. The IDP group had written several letters to ICC prosecutor on Kenya cases requesting for closure as a way forward. But the IDPs also noted the need for government to speedily resettle them. The Standard (2 June, 2015), reported:

The Government should come out strongly and ensure the IDPs are resettled because not all affected individuals were supported to get out of the camps. Authorities have clear records and should focus on addressing IDPs plight.

In the Daily Nation article, the County Commissioner presented a report to the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) with arguments that pending ICC cases were an impediment to reconciliation and cohesion in his region affecting adaptation, absorption and transformation of IDPs. Although the success of the ICC cases would have created a framework towards IDP community resilience, as they would have received compensation, both the government and the victims joined hands to fight off any success of the cases. The collapse of ICC cases marked the end of international actors’ approach to IDP community resilience.
The analysis of section brings to conclusion that the way Kenya parliament referred the cases to ICC was an indication they would frustrate the system and the cases would eventually collapse. Although the pre-trial of the cases started immediately, by 2016 all the cases had collapsed due to various reasons given by the prosecutor and the judges, such as interference with the witnesses by the Kenyan Government systems. There have been two governments during the ICC cases: the Grand Coalition Government (2007-2013) and the current Government (2013-2016). Nobody has been successfully prosecuted either by ICC or the local justice system in regards to post-election violence.

The IDPs’ expectations of restorative, reparation or retributive justice collapsed when ICC terminated all the Kenya cases. While the international community - expected that two of the suspects in the ICC could not be elected as political leaders, the current President and his Deputy were elected as President and Deputy President respectively.

This re-shaped the IDP post-conflict reconstruction and recovery agenda as the President and the Deputy President were expected to implement IDP policies, while being accused by the IDPs as the causes of their plight. Because of lack of faith in the Kenya justice system as noted by losers of the 2007 General Election who refused to contest the loss in the courts as indicated in the Literature Review, the ICC seemed to be the last resort for justice to the affected population.

The termination of cases by ICC meant IDPs' hope for compensation is uncertain because they had hoped that if the ICC convicted the perpetrators of the post-election violence, international community would push the government to offer compensation to the victims. As well external actors would have valid justification to compensate victims. Additionally, victims would file secondary cases for compensation based on the convictions.
5.8 The 2013 General Elections and Devolved Government

The implementation of the IDPs reconstruction and recovery was initiated by the 2008-2013) negotiated government. One of the peace agreement recommendations was enactment of a new constitution. The 4th March, 2013 elections were Kenya’s first general elections under a new constitution and the outcome of this election was important to IDPs as new programmes for IDP resettlement were a possibility. Reforms under the new constitution included the judicial and police reforms, creation of independent commissions such as the National Cohesion and Integration Commission, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, among others.

An interesting observation was the political campaigns leading to the general elections were primarily shaped around those against the alleged perpetrators of the post-election violence and those in support. Although there were eight presidential candidates on the ballot, representing eight coalition/alliances and political parties, Uhuru Kenyatta of Jubilee Alliance and Raila Odinga of Cord Coalition were the top contesters. Table 5.4 analyses the 2013 presidential results:
Table 5.4: 2013 Presidential Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James Kiyiapi</td>
<td>40,998</td>
<td>0.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martha Karua</td>
<td>43,881</td>
<td>0.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Dida</td>
<td>52,848</td>
<td>0.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musalia Mudavadi</td>
<td>483,981</td>
<td>3.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Muite</td>
<td>12,580</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Kenneth</td>
<td>72,786</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raila Odinga</td>
<td>5,340,546</td>
<td>43.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uhuru Kenyatta</td>
<td>6,173,433</td>
<td>50.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Valid Votes Cast</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,221,053</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Rejected Votes</strong></td>
<td><strong>108,975</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.88%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Votes Cast</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,330,028</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Registered Voters</strong></td>
<td><strong>14, 352,533</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% Turnout</strong></td>
<td><strong>86%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Authors Construction from IEBC various sources*

Uhuru Kenyatta and his running mate William Ruto of Jubilee Alliance were alleged perpetrators of the 2007/2008 post-election violence but had since been acquitted by ICC. On the other hand, Raila Odinga of Cord Coalition was the immediate Prime Minister in the out-going government and was a fierce competitor to the retiring president in the 2007 General Elections. His running
mate was Kalonzo Musyoka, immediate Vice President in the out-going government and was ranked third in the disputed 2007 general election.

Therefore, the main agenda point in the 2013 General Election was the ICC. There were various court cases to determine if accused candidates were eligible to contest, with the courts finally clearing the Uhuru and Ruto candidature. There were also campaign issues regarding the issue of cooperation of inductees with the ICC in case they were to win the general elections.

According to International Crisis Group, (2013), the 2013 general elections were relatively peaceful, but the country was still deeply divided and ethnically polarized. Many of the conflict drivers that fuelled violence in 2007 were yet to be adequately addressed, among them incomplete resettling of IDPs and land grievances. Ethnic-based political campaigns as in other previous general elections remained a characteristic in the 2013 elections.

In this election, Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic communities formed a political alliance between United Republican Party (URP), a dominant party in Rift Valley region of Kenya and historical home for the Kalenjin ethnic community and the National Alliance Party (TNA), a dominant party in central region of Kenya and home to the Kikuyu ethnic community. A Majority of the IDP displaced from their land in Rift valley were of the Kikuyu ethnic community. Although IDPs received as much information and promises as in other general elections, their primary concern were resettlement and much of the information they received was that they would be resettled once the general elections were over. Therefore, the question of returning to their land informed their voting behaviour. Politicians promised IDPs resettlement within 100 days of the new government.

The euphoria of the political Union in the Jubilee Alliance was that with the Kikuyu-Kalenjin political alliance, land ownership fights would be sorted out permanently. The Kikuyu IDPs were of the opinion that with a Uhuru presidency,
they would be able to return to their original home. The Kalenjins believed that Ruto as the Deputy President would be able to renegotiate their land from the newcomers – Kikuyu’s with Uhuru hence regaining their lost land.

After the Jubilee Alliance won the general elections, According to Daily Nation, 2016, page 5, the government released Kshs. 1 billion to conclude resettlement of the IDPs. This money was given to 5,261 households still living in camps. Primary interviews for this research were from Nakuru and Nyandarua counties, whose county governments are a majority from Jubilee Alliance. Although they enjoy this majority, the IDPs reconstruction and recovery agenda has not yet been part of the many pieces of legislation generated by these county governments.

Therefore, the process of bouncing back through community resilience has been slow and not yet achieved by the current Government despite promises in the campaign period. Kenya is expected to hold another general election on 8th August, 2017.

This chapter notes the primary initiative to promote adaptation, absorption or transformation agenda for IDPs is the primary responsibility of the government. The government has shown little commitment; hence all other non-state actors have also abandoned the IDPs projects. Even at the initial stages, when government was committed to resettlement programmes, corruption was evident in the slow, ad hoc and ineffective projects initiated.

The new constitution born out of the recommendations after the post-election violence established several independent Commissions such as NCIC, TJRC and NLC. The implementation of land reforms under the National Lands Commission has not been very successful. Ownership of land remains contested as those individuals and communities with large parcels are against any management and reforms in this sector. As the literature review has noted,
without available land, resettlement of IDPs was done on un-adjudicated parcels of and government land usually located in hilly, dry or swampy areas in which even the corrupt government administrators have little interest.

The ICC cases to an extent had made the government stay focussed on the IDP resettlement to prove remorse to the court and demonstrate to the international community adherence to such agreements and protocols as the UN guiding principles and the Kampala convention. The collapse of the cases diminished the commitment and obligations to IDPs by the government. Indeed while the campaigns agenda to the run up to the 2013 general elections was IDPs focussed, there are no mentions of IDPs by the political class in the 2017 campaigns. This demonstrates closure of IDPs agenda.
CHAPTER SIX: COMMUNITY RESILIENCE AND CAPACITIES OF THE 2007/2008 IDPs

6.1 Introduction to Community Resilience and Capacities of 2007/2008 IDPs

The various efforts by the Kenyan State and other external actors in facilitating IDPs reconstruction and recovery have been discussed in the above chapter. The discussion has noted that after the elections, the Kenyan State played a key role in restoration of peace and resettlement of IDPs. Many other actors also supported the reconstruction and recovery efforts. The discussion has also noted that these efforts had mixed results; they did not register adequate success. The issue of land, the ICC and the 2013 general elections combined to limit the success of reconstruction and recovery.

This chapter discusses the IDP’s own initiatives in recreating their community resilience. IDPs have community assets as identified in the conceptual framework which forms the basis of bouncing back to resilience. Also social capital has been identified in the literature review as an element which plays a crucial role in recreating community resilience by vulnerable communities. Different categories of IDPs had their own distinct reconstruction and recovery capacities. How these were utilized, and the result of these efforts, are the focus of this study.

6.2 Understanding the IDPs Geographic Community

The collection of primary data through interview-guides and focus group discussions were conducted in Nakuru and Nyandarua Counties in Kenya. This section seeks to first equip the readers of this research with a descriptive literature of the two Counties to help them understand the location of this study, in which the unit of analysis lives.

In Nakuru County, interviews were conducted in Mumoi and Kamara IDP camps, Nakuru Township and Bahati centres and also in Ngiwa, Gakonya, Kabia/Asanyo
farms. In Nyandarua county interviews were conducted in Muhu, Ndunduri and Haji farms.

6.2.1 Nakuru County

The county is divided into nine administrative sub-counties, namely; Naivasha, Gilgil, Nakuru, Rongai, Nakuru North, Subukia, Njoro, Molo, and Kuresoi. Njoro and Kuresoi were hived off from Molo Sub-County, Gilgil from Naivasha, Rongai from Nakuru Town, and Subukia from Nakuru North. These administrative counties are important as they monitor and evaluate the reconstruction and recovery processes of IDPs and formulate policies and procedures which assist the national government in long-term planning.

The total population of Nakuru County stood at 1,756,950 in 2012, comprising 881,674 males and 875,276 females as per the projections of Kenya National Population and Housing Census of 2009. The population was projected to increase to 1,925,296, comprising 966,154 males and 959,142 females in 2015 and to 2,046,395 in 2017 comprising 1,026,924 males and 1,019,471 females. This remarkable growth in the population implies that the county will have to invest in more social amenities and physical infrastructure to match the needs of the high populations.

The County is cosmopolitan comprising a populace of diverse ethnicity and nationality which include Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luo, Kamba, Luhya, and Kisii among others. The settlement patterns are influenced by availability of natural resources, soil fertility and rainfall, pasture, infrastructure, economic opportunities, proximity to urban setups, and security. Although a large population is in the rural areas, the urban centres have the highest population density due to rural-urban migration as a result of well-developed infrastructures, employment opportunities, and security. The rural population is estimated to be 62 per cent, with the remaining 38 per cent living in towns.
The education sector has performed well but some sections of the County are also hardship areas hence have hampered sustained existence of education institutions. The displacement of students, teachers and parents as well as the destruction of schools during post-election violence in 2008 has also been a major setback for growth in this sector.

Land is the main source of livelihood for many people in the County. All socio-economic activities depend largely on land. Thus, rights of land ownership and land use are critical in influencing growth. The County has few large scale land owners holding approximately 263 Hectares (Ha) of land on average. On the other hand, the County is dotted with many small scale land owners with mean landholding size of 0.77 Ha.

The bulk of the land holdings in the County are small-scale and are found mainly in the high potential agricultural areas. The medium and large scale farms account for a small per cent of the holdings, but cover the largest area under farming. On the other hand the mean holding size for land ownership in urban areas is 0.05 ha on average. This being the case though, some larger parcels of land adjacent to major town like Nakuru and Naivasha remain undivided, thus, reducing growth of these urban areas.

Slightly less than 20 per cent of the households in the County are considered to be landless. Some of these landless persons are post-election victims settled in camps for internally displaced persons, while others are slum dwellers and immigrants either on employment or engaged in business. There are also incidences of landlessness affecting those who were evicted from the Mau forest.

The main food crops produced in the county include maize, beans, Irish potatoes and wheat. The types of fruits and vegetables grown are apples, cabbages, kales, strawberries, asparagus, leeks, tomatoes, peas, carrots, onions, French beans, citrus fruits and peaches. Most of these are grown in Molo, Rongai,
Olenguruone, Nakuru Municipality, Bahati, Njoro, Gilgil and Mbogo-ini divisions.
The map below illustrates the location of Nakuru County in Kenya.
Map 6:1 Location of Nakuru County

Source: Nakuru County Website
6.2.2 Nyandarua County

The County is located in the central part of Kenya. The county has an area of 3245.2km². The county borders; Laikipia to the North, Nyeri to the East, Kiambu to the South, Murang’a to the South East and Nakuru to the West.

Population in the County stood at 596,268 as at the last national population census of 2009. This comprised 292,155 males and 304,113 females. The 2013 population projection for the County was 656,348 persons. The population which grows at 2.4 % annually comprises 321,593 male and 334,755 female. The population was expected to grow to 688,618 and 722,498 persons in 2015 and 2017 respectively with 43 % of the population being below 15 years while over 69% of the population is below 30 years. There is no significant difference between the male and female population as there are 104 females for every 100 males.

The county is divided into five sub counties (constituencies) namely Kinangop, Kipipiri, Ol’kalou, Ol’joroOrok and Ndaragwa. Kinangop is the biggest sub-county with 6 divisions and 16 locations, Kipipiri has 3 divisions and 12 locations, Ol’kalou has 8 divisions and 21 locations, Ol’joroOrok has 4 divisions and 8 locations and Ndaragwa has 4 divisions and 13 locations.

There are 313 trading centres and 4 urban centres namely Mairo-inya, Ol’kalou, Njambini and Engineer. Except for Mairo-Inya, the other urban centres grew out of formally designated and planned parcels of land while Mairo-inya developed organically out of subdivision of agricultural land. Mairo-inya lacks urban form due to lack of unanticipated development.

The main crops grown are potatoes, wheat, maize and vegetables. The County has a large proportion of its farming area dedicated to food crops which include potatoes, cabbages, peas, carrots, among others. These crops are not
exclusively meant for subsistence as they also account for significant income for most of the households.

There are incidences of landlessness in the County that date back to the colonial era. Farm workers who were employed by the white settlers have continued to stay in the former labour camps or squatted in vacant plots within trading centres spread out in the county such as in Magumu, Heni, Koinange, Mukeu, Njabini, Gitwe, Murungaru, Nduyu Njeru, Githioro, Kiriko, Wanjoji, Sofia, Ol'kalou, Passenga, Rurii, Gathanjie, Mirangine, Boiman, Kaheho, Kanyagia and Ndaragwa.

Internally displaced persons who flocked into the county following post-election violence in 2008 increased the number of people without land. This situation from 2009 to date has been dealt with by the government, with most families being settled within and outside the County on purchased parcels of land. Within the county, they have been settled in Kaimbaga, Mawingo, Salient, Ol'joroOrok, Mbuyu, Muhu, Kianjogu and Uruku settlement schemes as well as in Laikipia and Nakuru counties. Land uses in the County can be categorized into national park, forestry, roads, townships, arable, watercourses and water bodies. The map overleaf illustrates the location of Nyandarua in Kenya.
Map 6:1 Location of Nyandarua County

Source: Nyandarua County Website
6.3 Overview of IDPs in Camps, Integrated and Government Resettled

Most of the IDP camps are in the remotest part of particular geographic areas. Most of them are located several kilometres off main roads, requiring four wheel vehicles to access them due to the state of the road. These areas have no basic facilities water, roads or electricity. Motorized transport to these areas is usually through bicycles or motorcycles. There are no shops or foodstuff markets nearby. There are no structured employment opportunities and the non-IDP community lives in large farms. The IDP camp community lacks financial, natural, physical and political capital. This undermines their adaptive, absorptive and transformative capacities for livelihood.

This research conducted interviews in two IDP camps: Mumoi and Kamara. Mumoi is located in Subukia District in Nakuru County, about 80km from Nakuru town. The camp is currently occupied by 689 IDP households. On average each household comprises 5 family members. Kamara is located in Kuresoi North District, 50km from Nakuru town, and has 56 households.

The living conditions in the two camps are deplorable: worn-out tents, of which most have been patched up several times. Each tent is shared by an individual family mostly comprising father, mother and a number of children. All interviewed had no less than three children. There are no basic facilities like water, electricity or toilets.

In Mumoi IDP camp, the host community donated the land where the camp is situated, measuring about 4500 hectares in anticipation that the government will purchase it to resettle the IDPs. Mumoi camp IDPs moved frequently since 2008 from their pre-conflict locations to Narok, Nakuru, Gilgil, and Ngeteti and finally trekked the 50km to Mumoi IDP camps. Majority of those interviewed lived in either Kuresoi or Narok before the 2007/2008 post-election violence.
Kamara IDPs camp is located adjacent to a road junction outside a police post and chief’s camp. This is the place they have camped in since February, immediately after the 2007/2008 post-election violence. All of those interviewed from this camp lived at the Total Junction, a business centre with a T-Junction road to Kericho and Eldoret before the post-election violence. In 2010, government pronounced closure of all IDP camps, but by the time of this research, there were 46 IDP camps across the country as a result of the 2007/2008 post-election violence, as unrecognized camps.

According to government records, there are about 28 Government procured farms to settle 2007/2008 post-election violence IDPs. They are scattered in all parts of the country. Several of these farms have political and legal issues hence are not surveyed. In a majority of the lands with disputes, IDPs live inside the farm, but with the same camp-condition lifestyle. For the purpose of this research, five farms were picked for interviews and focus group discussions. These are: Muhu Farm in Mirangini District, Nyandarua County, Ngiwa Farm in Rongai District, Nakuru County, Kabia/Asanyo Farm, Kuresoi North District in Nakuru County, Gakonya Farm in Molo District, Nakuru County and Haji Farm in Subukia District, Nakuru County.

Integrated IDPs are scattered in different parts of the Country. According to the IDP Network database, there are about 313,000 integrated IDPs in Kenya. For purpose of this research, three locations hosting large numbers of integrated IDPs were picked: Ndunduri in Mirangini District, Nyandarua County, Bahati Centre in Nakuru District, Nakuru County and in Nakuru Township in Nakuru District, Nakuru County. Many of the Integrated IDPs live in urban centres while others live in peri-urban centres.
6.4 Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Recovery Capacities of IDPs

The three different categories of IDPs have undergone different pathways of reconstruction and recovery. This is mainly based on economic and social capacities they lost during the post-election violence and the capacities they have been able to reconstruct and recover as IDPs. Each IDP category has developed unique resilient capacities to adapt, absorb and transform the vulnerabilities caused by the post-election violence to the status before the violence. These findings are discussed in specific categories below:

6.4.1 Camp-Based IDPs: Adaptation, Absorption and Transformation

The 2007/2008 IDPs originated from different parts of the country. In search of final resettlement, they have moved camps several times as a group. This decision has been motivated mostly by politicians who come with promises of final resettlement. While for many their primary livelihood was farm based – growing maize and beans at subsistence levels others supplemented this farming with small businesses based in rural areas or satellite towns in rural areas.

Other than growing maize and beans for a household they reared animals such as cows, goats and poultry as a norm and not for commercial purpose. A “complete” household was considered complete when this combination was visible. They depended on rain, and family workforce to achieve sufficient harvest and animal output. However, in other areas they also grew other crops such as potatoes and peas based on climate and weather. Their livelihood seemed similar to a majority of respondents. This was evident when the researcher asked respondents to account how they earned their livelihood before the post-election violence:

*I was farming maize, beans in my farm…..in fact most of us here were farmers, but some had small businesses at the junction. I also had poultry, some goats and a cow. I fed my family from output of these. I Myself was a full time farmer. – (Male, Kamara, IDP camp).*
...growing of maize and beans from one season to the next. My family depended on this and we would have enough to pay school fees, household needs and save the rest to feed on until the next season and also to plant when the rains came. – (Female, Mumoi IDP camp).

My family depended on farm produce and we also had two cows. We sold extra milk in the Kuresoi Township...about two litres, each litre was like kshs. 30 (about US$ 0.3). When maize harvest was good we could also have extra to sell. – (Female,Mumoi IDP camp).

The only crops doing well were maize, beans, potato, peas. As a family we grew each mixing them in the same farm. Farm work was our daily routine....when not planting, you are weeding or harvesting or drying the produce. Throughout the year the circle was the same.- (Female, Mumoi IDP camp).

They solely depended on farm produce for their livelihood. For those who complemented farming with businesses, they owned part-time small shops selling general commodities such as sugar, salt, matchboxes etc. This was illustrative when a respondent was probed further about livelihood:

…..I eat from the farm....but when I have planted and waiting for harvest, I opened my small shop to sell salt and sugar to the community. I also opened in the evenings and mornings when these items are required – (Female, Kamara IDP camp).

Most of us here were small business people at the Total Junction. But we also owned pieces of land to farm potatoes and maize. When the crop is growing we concentrate on business. At harvest time, the produce earned more than the business so we closed down the first and concentrate on harvesting. – (Female, Kamara IDP camp).

In their current camp situation, both groups co-exist and depend mostly on casual labour and well-wishers. There are no observable differences between those who owned businesses and farmers-only IDPs. In the Mumoi camp, IDPs sub-divided part of the 4,500 hectares donated by the host community for maize and beans farming. Each IDP household was allocated about 2 hectares. This was virgin land and initially with good rains had plentiful of harvest. However, this
land is not enough for all the IDPs and moreover, with 5 years of cultivation, since 2011 and dependence on rains, the harvests are diminishing every season.

When not in the farms, their day-to-day livelihood is on casual labour. The yield from the small plots is primarily for household consumption and is barely enough to last between seasons. They walk long distances in search of this casual labour everyday sometimes returning to the camp at the end of the day without finding work. The standard day casual work earns Kshs 200 (US$.2). This was a standard response, when respondents were asked to account for their livelihood in the IDP camp:

...yes we farm...but is not enough to live on. We all rely on casual work...in the farms, fields, houses.... a day’s work is Kshs. 200. It is not always available. There are no other activities here – (Female, Mumoi IDP camp).

Casual labour...could be farming in the host community farms, domestic work in their houses, fetching water, washing clothes....any “kibarua” (casual labour) available. When you have nothing you cannot choose. It is also not available all the time. For example, I have been out of any “kibarua” for the last two weeks. If I am lucky I can be on kibarua for a month, and also can be without for as long.- (Female, Kamara IDP camp).

When planting is over and as we wait for harvest, everyone is looking for casual labour. If you are lucky you get as you wait for harvesting to find at least something to feed on for some time. I am holding on here for a watchman who has an emergency at home. When he returns the job is finished – (Male, Kamara IDP camp).

...just ideal around in the camp. There is nothing to do. We just sit talk whole day, waiting if one can get some casual labour in the field. Can wait for weeks or months.- (Male, Kamara IDP camp)

Asked to estimate the economic loss as a result of the 2007/2008 post-election violence, they gave figures ranging from Kshs. 250,000 (US$2,500) to Kshs. 2million (US$20,000). Majority of them lost about Kshs. 750,000 (US$7,500). They lost farms, houses, furniture, farm produce and animals, such as cows, goats and sheep.
I lost 10 sheep, 74 chickens, house, household property, water tank, foodstuff for two harvest seasons… I lost about Kshs 800,000 (US$8,000) in value – (Female, Mumoi IDP camp).

I had bought land at about Kshs 300,000 (US$3,000), farm produce and my animals – cows and goats, the figure maybe Kshs 700,000 (US$ 7,000) – (Female, Mumoi, IDP camp).

I lost my house and farm produce in the farm. Don’t know the value….but maybe Ksh.300,000(US$3,000), assuming house was worth Kshs. 250,000 (US$2,500) and farm produce Kshs. 50,000 (US$500). I also lost furniture and clothes…which I don’t know the value of– (Male, Kamara IDP camp).

They have not been able to replace or recover these assets. In Mumoi IDP camp in the initial years of settlement, they burned charcoal but have depleted all the trees. According to respondents, it is also a health risk due to carbons emitted and requires a lot of muscle.

….even the trees we used to burn charcoal from are all finished….it requires good meals, which we don’t even have…furthermore it’s a health risk due to smoke…..women cannot do this job – (Male, Mumoi IDP camp).

When we came here, the whole of this place was full of trees. We have since cut all of them for burning charcoal. It was very profitable. We sold a sack for Kshs 1200 (US$12). In a week, I used to have about 2 or 3 sacks. It was good, but now as you can see, there is no tree left.- (Male, Mumoi IDP camp).

Women could not burn charcoal. It required chopping big trunks, burying these trunks with soil waiting for the trunks to burn and eventually packing burned charcoals into full sacks. This is men work, just like they baby sit on casual basis…that’s women work – (Male, Mumoi IDP camp).

Women are not able to burn charcoal and men doing this job required proper energy meals which are not available. Other means of livelihood has been temporary work as watchmen and domestic workers to the host community. As a survival strategy, many families skip breakfast and lunch and share supper which
is often not guaranteed. This was evident during focus group discussions at the Mumoi IDP camp:

\[\text{Most of us cannot afford all the meals all the time...most of the time, you only eat in the evenings} \quad \text{(Female, Mumoi IDP, camp).}\]

\[\text{When we were not IDPs, food was plenty in the farms, sometimes you even give neighbours. At the camp here what can you eat when you have planted nothing? You eat when food is available...sometimes after a day or so...if you don't have and your neighbour also don't have then you miss supper.} \quad \text{(Female, Mumoi, IDP camp).}\]

\[\text{Children, elderly and sick people are the ones who are in big problems here. I can miss lunch and supper even for two days and live only drinking water...but what about this young baby and those unwell. It is a difficult life here.} \quad \text{(Male, Mumoi IDP camp).}\]

Asked, how best they can describe their reconstruction and recovery process from the 2007/2008 post-election violence, the respondents in interviews and also in focus group discussions, answered that they have not recovered. Probed further, they quipped:

\[\text{How can you say you have recovered while still living in this deplorable condition here?... we lost everything} \quad \text{(Female, Mumoi IDP camp).}\]

\[\text{I told you I had bought land at about Kshs 300,000 (US$3,000), farm produce and my animals - cows and goats, the figure maybe Kshs 700,000 (US$ 7,000), we can start talking of recovering if those things were paid back. But government abandoned us and there is no other way of getting back your land without government involvement-} \quad \text{(Female, Kamara IDP camp).}\]

\[\text{We have hope that one day we get paid what we lost. But for now we are at zero. I came here with nothing having lost everything. When government gives us land and build houses for us like it has done to some other IDPs, is when we can look forward for a new beginning.} \quad \text{(Male, Kamara IDP camp).}\]

As a safety net, they moved with whatever they could carry along, for example poultry, clothes and a few utensils. But as they transited from one camp to the
other, they also lost the little items they had secured. For the last seven years they have been on the move based on promises from politicians. In the IDP camps, there are no opportunities for white collar jobs, but a youth is employed as a semi-skilled teacher in a near-by secondary school in Mumoi IDP camp. He earns Kshs. 200(US$2) per day. In the focus group interview, he stated that that was hardly enough:

*I am paid Kshs 200 every day,... from this I am supposed to buy lunch provided in the school...how much will remain? I need to educate myself and also look after my small siblings by making sure I facilitate them to attend school. Even if they say it is free, you have to buy books, uniform, pay activity fees etc. This is same amount paid in casual labour, but me I am a teacher and should earn more...but because they know I am IDP they are sure I don't have any other alternative. (Youth, Mumoi IDP camp).*

*There is an intention to purchase a one hectare plot, which we can all co-own and put our tents there. For those with nothing, we debit them....but this piece of land is up there....it more accessible and we can live there without fear of eviction until the time government will resettle us. We came together and can't leave others out because they don't have any shilling. – (IDP leader, Mumoi IDP camp).*

Focus group discussions and interviews with the respondents revealed that their social support systems are strong. They are able to offer a helping hand among themselves in times of emergencies, illnesses in the camps. They share meals with those with no means or those who in a particular day, week or month have not secured any income from casual labour. This is what they depend on: reconstruction and recovery. This was clearly stated in focus group discussions:

*My neighbours here have come in to help me with supper on those days I am unlucky not to get some casual labour......and vice versa......when she does not, I also share my supper... – (Female, Kamara IDP camp).*

*...amongst ourselves we help each other to buy small medicines here and there....you cannot plan for emergencies, and when you are unwell... as you know, this place is very cold and when rains come you*
cannot escape from ailments….if you are able you help your neighbour to raise a few coins to buy medicine – (Female, Kamara, IDP camp).

….you can see how small and worn-out our tents are, how do you sleep here with your teenage daughters?…we make sleeping arrangements, the girls sleep with our neighbour in that tent (pointing), while us women sleep together in this (pointing) tent. ..you cannot live alone without interacting and knowing your neighbour’s problems. We have moved together from one camp to another. To come here we trekked very long distances together. This has made us be very much together and help each other – (Female, Mumoi, IDP camp).

Social norms and values such as obligations were evident as the IDPs have developed networks amongst themselves based on their vulnerability. They are eager to help each other in such issues like sleeping patterns and information on availability of casual and temporary labour. This is an emergent norm and values which maybe were dormant before the post-election violence as the victims were not as vulnerable. In a focus group discussion, the researcher probed what kind of practices and norms on sleeping arrangement they have as a community; some of the responses were:

Even if we don’t have perfect bed, we agree on sleeping arrangements with our neighbours, especially where family is large. The youth sleep in one tent, mothers in another neighbour’s tent, fathers in another one. This is new because before this post-election violence, everyone had his own house and accommodated the whole family, even visitors….regardless of how large it was. – (Female, Kamara IDP camp).

It is un-African for grown up girls to sleep in the same room with their fathers. Also it is un-African for grown up boys to sleep in the same room together with their mothers. Though this displacement problem is big, we care for those families requesting some temporary sleeping arrangements. Boys sleep in one tent, girls in another. We understand each other as we have different secondary problems. (Male, Mumoi, IDP camp).

In all the camps, they have formed a leadership group with the chairman and secretary being the head and below them are the committee members. They contribute small coins each when the chairman/secretary has to travel for
representation purposes in national or county offices. This leadership represents the aspirations and problems of the IDPs to the authorities.

_We each contribute a coin here and there for the chairman’s motorbike transport when he have to attend a meeting in town_ (Female, Mumoi IDP camp).

_Even where we came from, we had village leaders, so it is here. The leaders take our problems to Nairobi or Nakuru. We have moved together with him from the showground, Mirangini and now here. If there is no one to talk to Government on our behalf, we get forgotten. When he comes back he shares with us the outcome of the meetings. For travelling we give him bus fare, each one of us contribute whatever small monies we have because he cannot travel without paying bus fare...motorbike._ – (Male, Mumoi, IDP camp).

_The leaders call us for informal meetings on need to know basis to report about where, when, how the Government is planning on resettlement. We also discuss issues affecting the camp....this is when it is necessary_ – (Female, Mumoi IDP camp).

The researcher also enquired about the quality of the camp leaders. Most of the leaders clearly understand the IDP community problems and are passionate about representing the IDPs in any forum. In a focus group discussion, the quality of a camp leader was described:

_Someone who is an IDP himself and has suffered this long. Someone who understands issues faster and is articulate in pointing out our problems. Must be passionate about durable solutions and not shut down by Government views. Must be energetic....not getting tired quickly on issues. Must be knowledgeable....a bit of schooling is important. Must be ready to work long hours, for example travel overnight to Nairobi._- (Female, Kamara IDP camp).

Because the IDPs camps are temporary, they are unable to foster long-term relationship with non-IDP community. Their children attend same schools with those from non-IDP community and they are also casual labourers in the non-IDP community. The host community has been very generous to them and receptive to their needs. They empathize with the IDP situation.
When we came here, they (host community) allowed us to cultivate this forest and farm. But we supplement this through casual and temporary jobs in the community – (Male, Mumoi IDP camp).

They are very good people. When our children are late from school, they sometimes sleep there...even a whole weekend. Also when we go for casual labour and it is late, you are accommodated there even for days. They have no problem with us. But they still remember we are IDPs thus,– people from the tent. Otherwise they are generous and kind people. (Female, Mumoi, IDP camp).

The host community refers to IDPs as the “tent people”, a clear identity issue which could affect the reconstruction and recovery process of the IDPs. This label has psychological impact which could impair innovation and vision for future among the IDPs. Camp-based IDPs are entirely dependent on the Government will to transform them as they have no transformative capacity on their own. They have a vision that the national or county governments will enact progressive policies for them to be resettled. They aspire to own a piece of land one day in future, courtesy of the Government. They are very optimistic with faith that government is working out a resettlement plan for them.

We were brought here by Mututho (former Member of Parliament, Naivasha) because in Nakuru when it rained the camp became a swamp. The same way he found out this solution, is the same way the current government will find a durable solution. Other IDPs have been give land and built a house....our time is also near. Maybe even before end of this year we shall be in our own farms. This is our prayer. – (Optimistic Female, Mumoi IDP camp).

When we came here Murugi (former Minister, Special Programmes) dis-owned us. She told Mututho she does not know us. But that was politics. Now we have a new Government and I believe they are aware of us. Our leader attends meetings in their offices....this means something is being done. –( Male, Kamara IDP camp).

... every day we are moving....even last week we were told they (government) were coming, but up to now we have not seen them. If they say tomorrow we are moving, us we are ready – (Male, Mumoi IDP camp).
Social support is derived from social network (family, friends, neighbours, co-workers, professionals (Tardy, 1985). The researcher wanted to find out if these networks have supported them in reconstruction and recovery. It emerged that they do not have the financial means to help them out of the IDP camps.

That the overall pattern of social support resembles a pyramid with its foundations being the nuclear family followed by other primary support groups such as friends, neighbours and co-workers. Formal agencies and other persons outside of the recipients’ immediate circle are at the third level of social support (Tardy, 1985). When asked what kind of support they have received from their network, they always started with their families thus:

*My brothers and sisters are struggling like me…they have their own families. It will even be a bother to ask for help from them. Our neighbors are also IDPs. Its only government which can help us by giving us some land* – (Female, Mumoi IDP camp).

*….even if they wanted (family), maybe they send airtime. They cannot afford any other help. They are as needy as I am…..* – (Female, Mumoi IDP camp).

*I am sure they (brothers and sisters) would want to help, but they have different problems. They have their families first. If my sister-in-law hears that I am all the time asking for help from my brother….she cannot be happy…because they also have their needs to take care of first. Some of my brothers were also affected by the violence, but are a bit lucky as they are not in the camps like me.* – (Male, Kamara IDP camp).

None of the respondents ever sold any asset to cushion them from effects of the post-election violence as they don’t have any material assets to sell! This lack of assets puts them in a vulnerable position, where they are unable to cope with any violence in future. When the researcher asked, - Have you ever sold any asset to help you reconstruct/recover i.e. move on with life? Most of the respondents were surprised, and asked, - which asset do you see here? Others responded:
We own only what you can see here, nothing else, even the tent was a donation from Kenya Red Cross and UNHCR. My utensils are a cup, a plate; a spoon......other asset is this trouser and T-shirt. There is nothing to sell. – (Male, Mumoi, IDP camp).

Through their camp leaders, they are able to identify their problems and priorities. This is done through irregular informal meetings as need arises. The camp leaders present IDP issues to the IDP Network and to the national government. In a focus group, where a leader was present, he narrated the kind of issues he presents to the government:

The government wants to know, how many we are, the women, the children, elderly, sick…. the daily issues like food, tents. Sometimes we discuss options of giving us money or buying land for us. Sometimes they say they don’t recognize the number given, other times they acknowledge this figure.....at the meeting I am also with other leaders from other camps....so it becomes a whole day meeting. – (Male, Mumoi, IDP camp -Leader).

Most of the respondents had trust and have faith that Government will eventually resettle them. This vision was captured when respondents in a focus group were asked where they see themselves in the next five years:

....even this year cannot end....everyday they (government) say they are coming for us. Sometimes we pack our little things.....but they have not yet come.... by Grace and Will of God we are going to be resettled soon – (Female, Mumoi IDP camp).

I cannot say when, but I am certain Government cannot leave us like this for long. They came here to ask for votes in 2013. They promised all these things (resettlement) so I am hopeful time is coming. When it is very bad (Moi) the county senator distributes foodstuff to us. This means at the end we shall get “haki yetu” (justice) like those others who are already resettled. – (Male, Kamara IDP camp).

When the question of resettlement was put across to the area chief, during a key informant interview, the chief, though sure resettlement will be done, noted that decisions are made by the national government, thus:
My work is to maintain peace and security here. Other decisions are made in Nairobi without my direct involvement. Issues about when, where, how (resettlement) are very far from me. Sometimes, I can be asked to organize the IDPs for relief food and it ends there. – (Chief, Mumoi).

I have no idea because it is the responsibility of national government. I only maintain order. When government is ready, I am sure I will be informed accordingly (Chief, Kamara).

Before the 2007/2008 post-election violence the victim’s children attended government primary and secondary schools. This was mainly because primary schools are free of charge while Government secondary schools are highly subsidized. An analysis in the current situation reviews the host community nearby schools have accommodated the IDP pupils. There are no xenophobic issues among the new children. But the free primary education schooling has some indirect costs of parents buying books, uniform and sometime activity/development school levies. Parents have somehow managed to maintain the IDP children in schools, especially those at primary level.

In Mumoi IDP camp, Kiriko Primary School has 1,200 pupils with 70 of them being IDPs pupils in different classes. Other major schools near the Mumoi IDP camp are Gitundaga, 800 pupils with 35 IDP pupils, Mwiteithie 600 pupils with 5 pupils being IDPs. When the researcher enquired in a key informant interview about the performance of IDP pupils, Kiriko headteacher answered:

They perform as well as non-IDP pupils …in fact, while here the teachers never refer to them as IDPs. Also we encourage other pupils never to call them IDPs. Missing classes can be an issue sometimes because of food, school levies, books etc. The general behavior and character is good. – (Headteacher, Kiriko Primary School).

In Kamara IDP camps, Peles Primary School has 800 pupils with 10 students being IDPs; Koige Primary School has 500 pupils with only 8 being IDP pupils. In all these schools, teachers have not noticed any unique relationship issues in regard to behaviour and character of IDP pupils when compared to non-IDP
pupils, but notes that this category could perform better if offered conducive home environment to study and don’t miss school as often, thus:

_They are bright pupils, but you know problems in the tent hinder their full potential. I cannot imagine how they do their homework and if they have better environment, they can score above 400 marks in exam._ – (Head teacher, Pele’s primary school).

### 6.4.2 Government Resettled IDPs: Adaptation, Absorption and Transformation

This category of IDPs has spent many years in IDPs camps before being finally resettled by the Government. Like those in the camps, they have been transit for several years. For example, the Ngiwa farm IDPs moved from their various original farms to Nakuru showground IDP camps, then to Mawingu IDP camp before the final resettlement in 2012 at the Ngiwa farm.

Muhu farm settlers moved from their original lands to Ndunduri, IDP camps then Mirangini IDP camps and final resettlement at the Muhu farm in 2012. By the time of this research, there were 18 fully functional government resettled IDPs farms out of about 28 farms. Originally, most of the IDPs resettled by Government were either famers or small businessmen and women. Government allocated a standard 2¼ hectares of land to each household. The ¼ hectare is used as a homestead while the 2 hectares are used for crop cultivation. This was collaborated by all the respondents at Ngiwa farm:

_Each one of us was allocated 2¼ hectares, each house is built on a ¼ hectare while each household farms the remaining 2 hectares._

(Female, Ngiwa farm).

An observation by the researcher was that the entire farm was surveyed and divided into a settlement scheme model. One part of the farm was reserved for housing, while the other part was surveyed for farming. The houses were constructed by the Government, hence uniformity in structural designs. For instance, all the houses had blue iron sheets. However, after the Government –
assisted construction was over, each household was at liberty to improve on their structures. Some households, for instance, have attached a kitchenette onto the main structure; built other separate structures like toilets, planted hedges fences etc.

Before the post-election violence, the majority of the respondents were subsistence farmers. They grew maize, beans, peas and also reared cows, goats and poultry. The outputs from their farms were primarily for household consumption. There were also some respondents who were business men and women. This category was not commercial business people but conducted business on a small scale. Some of their businesses included: shop keeping, selling second-hand clothes, transport business, garages etc. When the researcher asked if they were content with the farming arrangements, many responded that even though the situation was very much better than camp life, the means of livelihood were very limited, thus:

We owned big chunks of land back at home, here we were allocated 2 hectares each….how much food can one grow in that piece? It cannot even feed the entire family. One must look for other means of sustaining the family, hence casual labour to the host community. – (Male, Ngiwa farm).

Definitely it is better than the camps, because you have a house, you don’t care about the rains. But means of livelihood are still a struggle. I have three children, there is no way we can live on farming of 2 hectares alone. Most of the time I am looking for menial jobs to earn some extra money to buy commodities and food. – (Female, Ngiwa farm).

We mainly farm maize and beans, but other people have cultivated peas and potatoes mixed with the maize and beans to maximize on the 2 hectares. But the harvest is barely enough. Only one person had a record 25 sacks of maize last season. This record has never been reached before and I don’t think it will be achieved again….last season the rains were exemplary, good. - (Male, Ngiwa farm).

In their current farms, they cultivate maize and beans, but as the farms are too small for any commercial farming, they supplement their income with casual
labour and other menial jobs in these farms. Those who are able rear such domestic animals like: a goat, a cow and some poultry. For women, they are engaged as temporary domestic workers. Some IDPs have leased out part of their farming land to the host community. Men are also employed as temporary watchmen and courier service to transport bulky stuff for others.

As a survival strategy some of us have leased out one hectare to host community. They pay Kshs. 600 (US$ 6) per season. This sometimes is equivalent to one season maize harvest. So you do other things with the money. Also not all of us are interested with farming but there are limited business opportunities here...shopping centre is far so trekking there every day for some business like hawking, building construction etc. is also a big challenge. – (Male Ngiwa Farm.)

When the researcher asked them if they consider themselves recovered from the post-election violence, they were negative: they have not recovered. Majority of them listed assets on average of Kshs. 750,000 (US$ 7,500) as the estimated value of economic development they lost and are yet to reconstruct and recover. They have never been able to get back or replace their farms, houses and properties lost during the post-election violence. This has negatively affected their reconstruction and recovery process.

We can say we have given up on our original shambas –(farms). Those people who burnt our houses still live there. There are no avenues of getting these farms back. – (Male, Ngiwa farm).

There are initiatives from a donor, but unique only in Ngiwa farm where a dairy cow and a dairy goat are donated to a group of 8 on a rotation basis. The cow or goat is donated to the first person on agreement that the first calf is given to the second and so forth till the 8 people have a cow or a goat each. However, this initiative was not replicated to many other groups of 8; only the first few benefited.

Many of these farms are located far off main roads. They are large and subdivided into 2¼ hectares per household. There are relatively limited basic
facilities in these farms such as rural roads and a water point. In Muhu farm, each IDP household is allocated 2¼ hectares for farming but they still live in the camp-like situation as the Government is yet to move in and build houses for them in individual parcels due to political and legal issues involving the farm:

*When we came here, government started building these houses, but the owners of this land went to court regarding payment by the government. This dispute has never been sorted out to date. I hear the case is still in the courts. The land was therefore not surveyed. For some of us, the houses were not completely built and we had to complete the structures on our own. This is why you don’t see uniformity in structural designs. As it is now we live here just like the camp, but fortunately in semi-permanent houses, not tents. We don’t worry about rain that much….but you can see the sanitation is very poor….it is a slum. We have continued to farm on the bigger farm, though not surveyed. We allocated ourselves equivalent of 2 hectares.* – (IDP leader, Muhu farm).

As a reconstruction and recovery strategy, Government allocated them land. Therefore, each household “owns” 2¼ hectares of land and practise maize and beans subsistence farming. They are also pools of casual labour to the host community within. They rear poultry on the individual household spaces they occupy and also rear other domestic animals such as cows, sheep, goats etc.

The respondents also listed friendships and other relationships as some of the most significant non-financial assets they consider unrecoverable. Displacement of family relatives and neighbours was considered as a big loss:

*My husband was killed in the post-election violence. I have now to take care of the children, who are all in school with no meaningful income* – (Female, Gakonya, IDP camp).

*There is a sick old man here….when he has to attend clinics we assist him with motorbike fare, about Kshs 200 (US$ 2) because the clinic is far. He does not have any relative here. He goes in the morning and will only be able to return sunset. If he had family members living with him, they would take better care of him…because sometimes we are also busy planting or*
harvesting….we cannot be there for him every day. – (Male, Muhu farm)

In the focus group discussion, the participant further narrated how a sick man died a few days ago:

_This man had been sick ...I think diabetes for some time, weather here is not friendly especially for the aged....it is foggy from morning to midday....so this old man eventually died....he did not have any relative here...we did not know where to bury him. So we contributed some money and transported him to a cemetery about 10km away. This is where we buried him. We don't know if he had relatives and if they got information that he is dead._ – (Male, Muhu, farm).

Each farm has formed leadership structures to check on their social and security needs. These members especially the chairperson is the link between the farms and the Government. The members consist of a chairman, secretary and several committee members. Information and decisions are supposed to be communicated through this structure. There are _ad hoc_ meetings when there are issues to be discussed either from the leadership to the IDPs, or vice versa. There are unwritten rules and norms in every farm to ensure co-ordination and smooth operation of the farms.

Not all IDPs resettled under the Government resettled model were farmers. They are transforming themselves into subsistence farmers. They have cordial relationship with the host community and their children attend the same public primary and secondary schools built under this model. There are also other public schools outside the Government farms. When the researcher asked whether the children attend school, the response was positive:

_Yes, they attend the schools near here.....they study in the schools we found here.....they are mixed with other children and there are no problems at all. Teachers are the same._ – (Female, Muhu, farm).
Because they are resettled, Government does not consider them as IDPs any more, however, they continue to perceive themselves as such and they reach out to non-IDP community in churches and markets and forge healthy relationship despite wealth gaps between them. The host communities continue to identify them as IDPs, a label which has created a culture of dependency and vulnerability. This acquired belief constitutes a negative pathway to reconstruction and recovery as they continue to approach opportunities from a beggar’s point of view.

The respondents feel the Government should have done more other than the current effort of donating 2¼ hectare land. Unlike before, they had legal documents for their land and property. The current programme does not allow them the right of either owning the land or the house. Thus, when asked if government or NGOs have helped them to reconstruct and recover from the post-election violence, a majority stated:

*To an extent government has done something because they built these houses for us...but after handing over the houses we have never seen them (government) again. They gave us land...but where is the title? How much can you farm in 2 hectares?.....it is not equivalent with our original land....they built for us a house, but where is the proof that it belongs to us... -* (Female, Ngiwa IDP farm).

*NGOs have never visited us....only in the early days in the camp. I hear UN had projects but not in this farm, only (UNHCR and Kenya Red Cross) provided us with tents and food and also left –* (Female, Ngiwa farm).

*When Government gave us these farms, they also gave us fertilizer and seeds to plant for the first season. The only Government we see here is the chief. If they could be coming they would understand our problems first hand.....but now we only hear about IDP programmes on a grapevine....you cannot tell whether it is true or not –* (Female Ngiwa farm).

Like the IDPs in the camps, the resettled IDPs have no external social support systems outside the farms. They stated that their significant family members and
networks were equally poor and unable to rely on them for any support. However, they have formed close-knit support systems to help them with day-to-day issues such as referrals for casual or temporary jobs, borrowing of basic household goods and services, for instance, borrowing of salt, sugar, maize etc. The network is largely for emotional and informational support.

As a community, the only asset they can count on in case of a shock or stress is the donated piece of land and house. But they are equally not sure if they can rely on them, as they don’t have any legal documents to lay any claim. Therefore, when the researcher enquired what safety net they can rely on at a focus group discussion, majority mentioned land and the house but with a caution, thus:

**We are told the land is ours, the house is ours….but we don’t have the title. We are not 100% sure of tomorrow in case of violence. But at least we have something. If it was possible we would borrow money with these (land and house) as sureity, but no bank or co-surety would agree an arrangement without legal documents -**

(Male, Kabia/Asanyo farm).

**If we have the title then we can say we have something….. at the moment we have and also don’t have –** (Female, Kabia/Asanyo farm).

**The option of getting a loan or credit to improve our livelihood is not there. If it was available many people here would be engaged with a lot of businesses. Because we don’t have any titles we have to live like this until the government find it necessary to issue these titles to us. No bank can accept a letter of allotment….this can even be copied! Therefore we don’t have any safety net….we can talk about.** (IDP leader, Kabia/Asanyo farm).

Except for poultry which is available in some households, a majority of the households have no asset at all. This has put them at a vulnerable situation in case of a similar post-election violence. The poultry are also not of high quality as they roam round the settlement feeding on their own and on average for those households owning them they have only two or three birds. This is barely enough as an asset.
The IDPs are optimistic that new opportunities will come their way in future and help them to grow their assets. They believe that in the next five years, God with them, they will not be in the same state of vulnerability. When probed further about where the new economic resource will come from, most said:

>You never know God’s plans….we trust in the next five years we shall be economically able people – (Female, Gakonya farm).

>Just like the way we moved from crisis to the camps and finally here in the farms, new opportunities will come by. I don’t know which or how….but I trust and believe in the next five years we shall be better off than now. – (Female, Gakonya Farm).

>A good Samaritan, NGO or even Government will help improve our livelihood. We can’t live like this forever…it is a trust, just like the way Government moved us from the camps….something will also happen to improve the way we live. – (Male, Gakonya Farm).

In Ngiwa farm, Volunteer International Community Development Africa (VICDA) partnered with World teachers and constructed Shalom primary school at a cost of US$110,000 in 2011. The school enrolled 567 pupils, all of them IDPs. At Haji farm, Safina Haji primary school was constructed in February, 2015 by donors. This is a big step towards reconstruction and recovery, but the names for these two primary schools has deep Christian meanings and is symbolically given to these schools as part of IDPs history.

This could affect current and future parents and pupils in these schools in their process of reconstruction and recovery in terms of socio-pyscho livelihood. This was evident when the researcher in focus group discussion enquired about the feeling about the just constructed school:

>It is good that our children don’t have to walk long distances to school every day any more, although they now have to learn as IDPs only pupils. The community may start now referring the school as the – IDPs primary school….they already call us the people from the tents – (Male, Haji farm).
We have learnt to live with the “tent people” identity. When in the camp this is the name they identified us with….not consciously but because we were alien. ...it was not by bad intention....it came naturally to them. Even us we refer to them as “matajiri” – (the rich) unconsciously. While in the camps we called the host community “wenye mashaba” – (land owners). What I don’t know is if this identity reference will last forever (IDP leader, Haji farm).

These sentiments were repeated in other farms, where IDPs acknowledged cordial relationship with the host communities, but with a clear identity label between them and the communities where they live.

6.4.3 Integrated IDPs: Adaptation, Absorption and Transformation

In the combined areas of Bahati, Ndunduri and Nakuru Township, where this study was undertaken, there are 8,250 Integrated IDPs. Integrated IDPs are those who opted out of the IDP camps after sometime and went back to the community. Some of them went back to townships where they had rented houses. For instance, most of the Integrated IDPs in Nakuru Township who were originally tenants in the outskirts of Nakuru town before the post-election violence went back to these outskirts. However, others moved to new areas and settled there. For example, many of the integrated IDPs interviewed in Ndunduri originated from Miragini area prior to the post-election violence, thus:

When violence broke, we ran to the show ground (Nakuru), then after sometime we moved again to Miragini in the camps. We stayed there and life was unbearable….we decided to come back here. Although we had lost all our assets when they burnt the houses, we somehow were able to rent new accommodation here. - (Female, Ndunduri, Integrated IDP).

Their main livelihood is based on small businesses - hawking wares in bus-stops and downtown streets as well as cultivating small pieces of land in the backyards of their rented houses. These pieces of land are rented from their landlords. Except for those in small businesses, all others stated that they live on casual labour- farming and domestic work within the host community. The men push handcarts, wash cars, operate as courier men and touts in bus stops.
This is mainly the same livelihood they lived on before the post-election violence, but sometimes in different locations within the same towns. Their network of business colleagues is largely the same. Hence when asked how they earned their livelihood before the post-election violence, many stated:

We were in this market and town doing any available job…touting, hawking sweets, washing cars….. We just moved to this location recently…we are our brother’s keeper – (Male, Nakuru Township IDP).

I was a hawker even before the violence… my colleagues here were also hawkers. But when violence came, we lost the small earnings for livelihood we had saved. We lost all household goods. So when we came back to the streets we had to start from zero. It has been a big step back. We attend to the same customers like before and hope things will improve. – (Male, Nakuru Township, Integrated IDP).

…this is where we worked before the violence…we don’t have business structures as such. I operate from a makeshift stall, many others move around selling sweets, fruits, wait for cars to break down and we step in as road-side mechanics. It was easy for me to reconstruct the stall when violence ended. Like my colleagues here I was able to settle back, though with nothing to start off - (Male, Nakuru Township Integrated IDP).

While the main occupation identified in this research for integrated IDPs was hawking, other occupations included: temporary employment in food stalls, hair barbers, hair stylists, shop attendants, road side mechanics and as touts in bus-stops. The hawkers sell small items like sweets, necklaces, watches, fruits to name a few. Their daily net earnings range from Kshs. 100 (US$1) to Kshs. 300 (US$3). They work long hours to maximize on profits. They rarely eat lunch and walk to their work stations every day. This was a common response from Nakuru Township Integrated IDPs:

….we sell sweets, fruits, sodas, women beauty items…..to passengers in these vehicles. Sometimes you can get temporary employment as a waiter in these food kiosks….on a good day you earn between Kshs. 200 – Kshs. 300…(US$ 2-3)….we don’t choose
any job for us is ok. What is important is to save as much as possible...you cannot afford eating lunches and coffees – (Male, Nakuru Township IDP).

This town is not big. As a hawker, I don't have a permanent stall or place to operate from. I go where customers are....so in a day I walk to all bus stops...everywhere...my 6th sense tells me where there are potential customers. Sometimes I walk from one bar or hotel to the other to petrol stations to the park...then at the end of the day I walk home...about 2km away. If you board a bus you pay all the monies you've been working for! (Female, Nakuru Township Integrated IDP).

Many of those living in the outskirts of townships are casual labourers in the farms. They supplement this by cultivating small farms donated by landlords or rented from the community. They grow maize and beans on these plots. Harvests depend on seasonal rains. Where possible, they also rear poultry. The average rent in these townships is Kshs. 600 (US$ 6) per month. The average monthly net income for these Integrated IDPs ranges from Kshs. 2500 (US$25) to Kshs. 7500 (US$ 75). When the researcher asked how they earn their livelihood as IDPs, the common answer was casual labour to those living away from town, thus:

I work in the houses here as temporary domestic worker. I get paid per day and check if there is a new job the following day. Sometimes during planting seasons, I work in the farms, also during weeding and harvesting. I move from one house to the other checking if they need some “Kibarua” – (casual work). But many times my colleague will send a word about where casuals are required at a particular time or week. (Female, Ndunduri Integrated IDP).

Before the violence, I was still a casual worker, but had some permanency...now I cannot be sure if tomorrow we are not chased away again. I say permanency because I lived with my husband....he was killed in the violence, We were able then to combine our income and bring up the children. Now the income is less but the expenses remain high. – (Female, Ndunduri Integrated IDP).
Unlike IDPs in the camps, many integrated IDPs were able to go back to their small businesses though on a smaller scale as they lost investment capital. They were able to diversify their businesses and move on. They largely maintain the same business associates and operate from same business settings: in bus stops and back streets. When asked to estimate the assets they lost, they listed businesses on average of Kshs. 500,000 (US$ 5,000) to over Kshs.1Million. They have not been able to recover this loss.

_I am 38 years old....have been a hawker for the last 12 years. I was only able to come back here 5 years ago. I have done enough savings before the violence....about Kshs. 700,000 (US$ 7,000). Remember, with this income I was paying rent and other expenses in the house and for my family. I was getting ready to get a more permanent business. Since I came back, I can't say I have saved any monies. Life is more difficult these days than earlier days when I started hawking._ - (Male, Nakuru Township, Integrated IDP).

_If you count house furniture plus my stock...I can put the figure of about Kshs. 800,000 – Kshs 1million (max US$ 10,000) – (Male, Nakuru Township Integrated IDP)._ 

In any particular area, for instance Nakuru Township, Ndunduri and Bahati, the Integrated IDPs have formed and maintained network. This network has informal structures such as chairperson and members. These networks cascade downward to particular areas such as hawking areas, bus stop areas. Through this network, they are able to stay informed and maintain a social network to cushion members from social emergencies such as emergency bills. The leadership links them to policy-makers.

_We have a chairman and his team. We meet and discuss our issues and he passes them to the Government. We must keep engaging the Government to find durable solutions. They inform us about the plans Government has for compensating us or buying us land._ – (Female, Bahati Integrated IDP).
In a key informant interview, one Integrated IDP leader confirmed that government was not enthusiastic about resettlement or compensating Integrated IDPs:

Unlike IDPs in the camps, Integrated IDPs are not situated at one place, they are scattered. It is our leadership who give the government the numbers, my feeling is that Government assumed that because they are not in the camps, they are ok. The priority is those in the camps and if we keep quiet, then we are forgotten.- (Integrated IDP leader, Bahati).

During the post-election violence, they lost friends and business colleagues as they got dispersed. However, some were able to link up with them and reconnected and re-started new or same businesses. Currently, their network is largely for emotional, informational support.

Government does not have a database of integrated IDPs. According to the respondents, they have not been assisted by Government, NGOs or any entity in their reconstruction and recovery processes. They have relied on personal and teamwork effort to recover from the post-election violence. In a focus group discussion with Nakuru Township, IDPs, they stated:

We help each other especially in emergencies, also sometimes on business. For instance if a colleague is arrested by town council for whatever reason, we come together and bail him/her out. He/she will pay us back when he/she sells stock. Other times we pass information for safety purposes, for example impending round up of hawkers or site of licensing officers making round…then we run to safety. – Female, Nakuru Township Integrated IDP).

We have lived this long on our own…small saving here and there. Neither of them (Government & NGOs) has helped in any way so we keep helping each other to survive – (Male, Nakuru Township Integrated IDP).

Many consider their business as their safety net. They consider the business stock of sweets, fruits, etc. as their saving in case of stress or shock in future. For those cultivating maize and beans in the backyards of their rented houses, the
harvest is their saving for a shock or stressful period. However, whether in business or farming, they still believe they cannot be able to cope with any new violence, as narrated below:

My stock is all what I own, plus my clothes. This cannot last you for a month in case of a crisis. We live from hand to mouth, each day at a time. There are no savings. But our experience and knowledge in hawking is our business advantage (Male, Nakuru Township Integrated IDP).

6.5 Social Support Mechanisms for IDPs

IDPs share similar problems and have the same aspirations. Their vulnerability has made them establish social bonds. Due to this common bond, the IDPs have throughout the years supported each other in many ways. When asked if they have ever relied on other people for financial and in-kind support, the common response was:

….yes all the time we refer each other to where casual labour is available at any one time. You know is easier than trekking for long distances knocking each household…Women mostly do house chores and men do outside jobs like trimming fences and grass. So one is bound to overhear about the need for one kind of casual work or you are asked if you could recommend someone – (Female, Mumoi IDP camp).

When one is recommended, the chances of being rejected are usually slim. We know who can do what job. So we recommend each other. Sometimes we even probe employers if they would want this or that kind of casual or temporary employee. We can even negotiate the pay on behalf of potential casuals as we know each other. This is the only way we can help and survive together. – (Female, Mumoi, IDP camp).

They live in solidarity based on common interest and identity. Therefore, to earn livelihood they refer each other for opportunities in casual labour. This is both informational and instrumental social support. The primary source of social support among the IDPs has been through friends and neighbours within their tents, who are IDPs. Most of this support has been content-based as evident
when probed further on who in particular they relied on for financial and in-kind support:

All IDPs interviewed had a common answer that social support originates only amongst themselves, whether within the camps, Government resettled farms or integrated IDPs. When the researcher introduced the topic of, if government or non-state actors financially or otherwise assisted them, in a focus group discussion the responses indicated none of them helped them:

We help each other with the little money we have especially for emergencies, if an aged or sick person has to buy medicine even if you have nothing for supper, you have that obligation as an African to help him or her. God will bless you by your acts. If a breastfeeding mother has nothing to eat, you share the little you have. We cannot remember when government assisted us. The NGOs - Kenya Red Cross and UNHCR - gave us tents….but you can see they are all now patched up…..with the coming rains, it will be unbearable here. You can even see a snake can enter from the floor….. (Female, Mumoi, IDP camp).

Which Government?…which NGO?...They only provided blankets, tents and foodstuff sometimes in early 2009. From then on we have never seen any of them here….In 2013, the politicians were here asking for votes but after voting they disappeared! – (Female, Mumoi IDP camp).

Mututho (former Member of Parliament for Nakuru) brought us here, we trekked here with a promise of allocation of farms…..but when we arrived…Murugi (former Minister of State for Special Programmes) dis-owned us – (Male, Mumoi IDP camp).

We moved here in 2012….they built these houses for us and also gave us planting seeds and fertilizer…..since then, we have never seen them… to some extent they assisted –(Female IDP, Ngiwa farm).

The researcher probed further, why they cannot go back to their farms as part of reconstruction and recovery, especially under the government project of “Operation Rudi Nyumbani”, they stated the issue of fear, security and perpetrators, they quipped:
Why go to a place you are constantly living in fear?. Nobody has ever been arrested because of the violence. Those people (perpetrators) are still living there waiting for us (victims) to forget, then they start off again. It is not recommended for one to go back. – (Male, Haji farm).

...because of fear, those people who burned our houses still live there...if it was you, can you live there? – (Male, Mumoi IDP camp).

All the respondents were in unison that they have not been able to replace any of the assets - farms, houses, animals - etc. lost during the post-election violence. On the significant social relations lost during the violence, many lost their social network (family, close friends, neighbours, co-workers, community and professionals):

I worshipped at the SDA (Seventh Day Adventist) church in Kuresoi.....although I also attend the same here, it is new.....I lost all the congregation including the church leaders. The church liturgy is the same but the feeling is not the same as the church in Kuresoi – (Female, Mumoi, IDP camp).

My wife was killed by the youth....she could not run as fast....my two children were burnt in the house. I have since re-married and have two children. It is easy to lose money and house and furniture because at one point in life you can earn more and buy even better ones....but when you lose your whole family, it is not replace-able. I am starting all over again, by now my children would have finished school – (Male IDP, Haji farm).

....I hear my former friends live in Narok....everybody runs to wherever, he knew. Here is a new beginning... I have not seen those friends since then, even telephone call...we don't communicate – (Male, Ngiwa Farm).

My wife and children returned to the farm. I still have that phobia....so now we live separate lives. When Government finally surveys this farm and allocates us our portions, I will ask them to come back– (Male IDP, Muhu farm).

Asked about what kind of social support the IDPs received from the primary network such as friends, family, neighbours and co-workers, they responded that
this group is also vulnerable and cannot help financially. However, they are active in emotional and informational support.

….we can only pray for each other….my brothers and sisters wherever they live are equally not financially able….they also have their own families to take care of….unless it’s a big emergency, they are not able to help…even then they can only send a small contribution – (Female, Muhu farm).

I receive messages of good will and Christmas wishes whenever someone meets with my former neighbours, brothers and sisters. I also send greetings. We wish each other God’s blessings…..other than that, they have no financial ability to help me and I understand their situation. – (Male, Gakonya farm).

The IDPs have leadership structures based on ability. There is no one clear system in which the leadership in any camp was constituted. For instance in Mumoi camp, the leaders have moved with them from one camp to the other. In all the categories of IDPs, the leadership comprised chairman, secretary and members. The leadership has no clearly defined roles but the primary mandate is to keep the IDPs informed in development on resettlement issues. Therefore, to some extent they are the link between the camps, resettled farms and the external world, especially the county and national governments.

The table below provides a summary of resilience and livelihood capacities of different categories of IDPs as well as the social capital as a means towards reconstruction and recovery. This summary is derived from primary interview and focus group discussions with the IDPs during the data collection.
### 6.6 Summary of post-conflict community resilience and social capital for IDPs

#### Table 6.1: Community Resilience Capacities and Social capital in post conflict for IDPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacities and Social Capital before Post-Election Violence</th>
<th>Absorptive, Adaptive and Transformative Capacities and Social Capital in Post-Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Camp-Based IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal owner of land with titles</td>
<td>Lost their land. No compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal owner of a house (home)</td>
<td>Lost their homes. Lives in torn tents in the last 7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal owner of household properties</td>
<td>Lost all household property. No compensation yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owned animals such as cows, sheep, goats, pigs, donkeys etc.</td>
<td>Lost all animals such as cows, sheep, goats, pigs, donkeys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivated foodstuff such as maize, beans, peas for family consumption and sold surplus on their legal farms</td>
<td>Have no legal farms to grow maize, beans, peas for family consumption or sell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pool of assets (animals, money saved, land, foodstuff, home structures etc.) acted as safety net for emergencies</td>
<td>Lost all safety net assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afforded credit for emergencies from friends and structured financial institutions</strong></td>
<td>Have no power for any credit facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lived in a family set-up (wife/husband and children)</strong></td>
<td>Lost family members through death and displacement. Lives alone or in dysfunctional family in tents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lived in community (neighbours, friends, co-workers)</strong></td>
<td>Lost community – friends, neighbours, co-workers etc. through deaths and displacement. Rebuilding new friendship, neighbours and co-workers in the camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lived in community (neighbours, friends, co-workers)</strong></td>
<td>Lost functional community systems (markets, schools, shops, clinics, transport system etc.). No such systems exist in the camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Climate and weather was conducive for farming and business</strong></td>
<td>Extreme climate and weather in the camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sources of Information for decision making was wide (radio, TV, newspapers, friends, neighbours etc.)</strong></td>
<td>Sources of information limited to leadership in the camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Optimistic about future (had a vision and mission)</strong></td>
<td>Optimistic about future (if Government resettles them)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.7 Conclusion

The findings above shows that different categories of IDPs adapted to vulnerability, absorbed or transformed differently. The camp based IDPs were weak in recreating resilience as they entirely dependent on each other’s support. Integrated and government IDPs had relatively stronger capacities in recreating resilience as they had better social support mechanisms. The resettlement approach by the Kenya government assumed building housing structures and providing a small piece of land for farming was an end in reconstruction and recovery process. The social-economic status of government resettled IDPs as revealed in the interviews above shows they are far from recovery.

In conclusion the above empirical ethnographic research findings in this chapter were that the general expectation that IDPs were socio-economic vagrants due to the losses suffered has been negated by the analysis. The IDPs have been making proactive and informed choices about alternative sources of livelihood, based on the changing conditions (adaptive capacities).

The analysis finds reliance of casual labour and other menial jobs as the primary source of livelihood among IDPs. The IDPs were determined to overcome adversity and bounce back better. IDPs also have been able to minimise shock and stresses (ex post) through emergent social support mechanisms amongst themselves (absorptive capacity). This has been an asset towards community resilience.

The ad hoc and ineffective nature of government involvement in the IDPs resettlement programmes reduced the IDPs transformative capacities. For example, structured governance mechanisms, policies/regulations and infrastructure in regard IDPs resettlement have been missing for over the eight years this research was concerned with. All projects and programmes spear headed by government and non-state actors have collapsed leaving IDPs at vulnerable pathways in the processes of reconstruction and recovery.
CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS- “WHAT WORKS”

7.1 Introduction

Both chapter five and six have discussed the efforts towards reconstruction and recovery of IDPs. Chapter five specifically discussed efforts by government and other players and noted some of these efforts were not very successful in promoting reconstruction and recovery. For instance, government provided land as an effort towards reconstruction and recovery, but the pieces of land were located in remote areas, were small in size and unproductive. UNDP had a livelihood project, but could not cover all the IDPs. Other actors dealing with human rights and justice agenda as an aspect of reconstruction and recovery stopped their projects as soon as the humanitarian crisis ended.

Chapter six has discussed the role of IDPs social capital in promoting community resilience. The discussions have shown IDPs were supporting each other in various ways. Integrated IDPs appeared to have recovered most because of the nature of their social support systems.

The aim of this chapter is to discuss how the various interventions assisted or limited community resilience of IDPs. Among issues under discussion in this chapter are: the role of land in community resilience, livelihood capacities, role of social support, role of ICC and the role of Kenyan State and other actors. The purpose is to reveal “what works and what does not work”. The study finally unpacks empirical, theoretical and conceptual contribution of new knowledge to post-conflict reconstruction and recovery discourse.

I. Role of Land in Community Resilience

Legal ownership of land is perceived and identified by IDPs as a socio-economic asset to post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, making it the backbone of community resilience. Ownership of land was throughout linked as the avenue of bouncing back better. Indeed Table 6.1: community resilience capacities and
social capital in post-conflict for IDPs, provides views of IDPs on land ownership. Government made an effort towards resettlement of IDPs on parcels of land but never provided legal titles for these parcels hence the parcels cannot be a safety net (absorptive capacities), and IDPs cannot actively engage in changes in land policies (transformative capacities). Lack of legal land ownership denies IDPs an asset and a means of long-term recovery. They lack adaptive capacities identified in community resilience.

Lack of any legal documents for the donated pieces of land means IDPs have no capacity for credit systems and cannot make alternative investment options, such as selling the land or building rental structures. Hence the IDPs miss the economic growth, stable means of livelihood and equitable distribution of income and assets within populations. As demonstrated in community resilience section in this thesis, land, raw materials, physical capital and accessible housing create the essential resource base of a resilient community.

The Kenyan government resettlement approach was *ad hoc* and ineffective. Even for IDPs who never originally owned any land looked forward to own a piece of land through the government resettlement programme demonstrating that land plays a significant role in absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities of post-conflict victims.

This thesis therefore affirmed that rebuilding community assets has a relationship to reconstruction and recovery in post-election violence. The socio-economic assets of a community form the basis of bouncing back from vulnerability. In this chapter land has been identified as a major asset which enables victims to adapt, absorb or transform when faced with adversity.

Ownership of land helps the victims to rebuild their socio-economic lives by building up income and assets as demonstrated in section 3.8. Land as community asset helps in creating diverse socio-economic livelihood for legal
owners. Table 6.1 summarizes the socio-economic activities IDPs had before the post-election violence and the losses they suffered. Most of them had a relationship with land ownership. For example, they lost all their economic assets such as land and houses. They lost their fertile land with resources such as water and accessible infrastructure. They lost houses they had constructed and lived in for many years. Reports related to post-election, such as Waki, 2008, Akiwumi, 1999 and Kiliku, 1992 cited in the introduction, problem statement and in the Literature Review identify ownership of land as one of the causes of post-election violence in Kenya.

Additionally, in her PhD thesis, Zora developed a task framework, which confirms the role of socio-economic assets in community resilience. Literature Review also acknowledged examples of activities undertaken by NGOs in Bosnia, Nepal and Serbia who tried to improved socio-economic livelihood of displaced populations in an effort to rebuilding community resilience. The UN guiding principles 28-30 in the literature review has also under scored the need for durable solutions through rebuilding socio-economic assets of internally displaced persons.

The Government allocated 2¼ hectares of land to each resettled IDP. The government also provided an approach such that a ¼ of the allocated piece of land was to be used for building a house, while the 2 hectares were supposed to be used for farming. This was a noble idea towards reconstruction and recovery of IDPs. The Government also provided seeds and fertilizer for the first planting season.

This thesis argues that the piece of land - 2¼ hectares allocated is barely equivalent to the land individual IDPs lost, there is no clear understanding of how the government came up with this size. The space is not adequate for profitable farming. The resettled depend on seasonal rain for maize and beans cultivation. This is unpredictable in volumes and patterns. The harvests continue to be poor with every season as the IDPs have no capacity to invest in modern farming.
technologies or budget for fertilizer or manure. Without enough food, IDPs cannot be resilient.

Since the implementation of resettlement projects, there is no clear data on how many IDPs have been allocated farms. After allocations, the government discontinued any socio-economic or political support. The argument has been that once resettled, victims cease being IDPs. However, the resettled continue to perceive themselves as IDPs and are identified as such by the host communities. This has hindered reconstruction and recovery as they continue to look forward for economic and social support from government and NGOs. In fact, they lament on how the government has not been visiting them in the resettlement. A key finding on the camp-based category of IDPs is that due to long stay in the camps, IDPs have developed a “beggar culture”, which has continued to limit their view of opportunities. But in reality this thesis argues these IDPs do not fit the definition of beggars.

There were no adequate consultations between the IDPs and Government before resettlement. This was not only against the UN guiding principles on resettlement as highlighted in the review of literature. Government presumed that all IDPs were farmers or could be farmers even where they were business people before. This is manifested in the farms where the idea of farming is abandoned and IDPs rent out part of or all the 2 hectares provided by the Government. They used the money for other socio-economic business ideas which they think may bring about resiliency. This has been confirmed through interviews with IDPs as indicated in Chapter Six of this research.

An interesting finding has been the claims that weather and climate in these farms is too extreme for any profitable livelihood. This has affected IDPs reconstruction and recovery as they spend a lot of time hoping for alternatives which are unlikely to come. Land allocated to IDPs are in isolated locations and in harsh climatic and environmental areas.
Despite the *ad hoc* nature of allocation of land to IDPs, interviews with IDPs as recorded in Chapter Six of this research argues that all IDPs in camps perceive direct allocation of land by government or provision of cash to buy land on their own as a pathway to adaptation, absorption or transformation.

**II. Livelihood Capacities**

IDPs are faced with limited opportunities and options for any economic livelihood for IDPs, which are unsustainable: for instance, casual labour. The main means of livelihood is through casual labour as established from interviews with IDPs on Chapter Six. The social support system of IDPs is among themselves, hence is economically weak. This is an emergent norm, similar to Colombian IDPs. They relied on each for other social support as well as the equally economically weak. Without external livelihood assistance, it means IDPs remain vulnerable for a long period of time, eventually affecting pathways to post-conflict reconstruction and recovery.

In the Literature Review, DFID referred livelihood as capacity for assets both material and social. As identified in Chapter Six, before the post-election violence IDPs’ capacities included: they owned animals such as cows, sheep, goats, pigs, donkeys etc.; they cultivated foodstuff such as maize, beans, peas for family consumption and sold the surplus, they also had small businesses in townships. The pool of assets (animals, money saved, land, foodstuff, home structures etc.) acted as safety net for emergencies. They were able to afford credit for emergencies from friends and structured financial institutions. They lived in a family set-up (wife/husband and children) and in community (neighbours, friends, co-workers). Post-election violence damaged these livelihood systems.

The easily available means of livelihood for the IDPs - as chapter six observed - is casual labour. Through this livelihood options they aim to absorb, adapt and transform to post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. The conceptual framework
identified adaptive capacities – alternative livelihood strategies and absorptive capacity – ability to minimize shocks and stress. To build up these capacities social support is necessary as Portes (1998) has noted in the theoretical framework that dependency and reliance on other people is an advantage, hence the emergent norm of referral for opportunities among social network of IDPs.

Other than the State, other actors have attempted to restore livelihood for the IDPs. For example in the literature review, civil society helped build capacity and empowerment to women and youth. In the Kenyan situation UNDP established a livelihood project, which was implemented from 2009 to 2011. The aim of this project as noted in section six of this research was to re-equip lost livelihoods assets; skills development; establishment and promotion of micro-enterprise opportunities; facilitation of access to credit and entrepreneurial opportunities through establishment of business solution centres in the major hubs; access to women development fund and youth business funds; restore and improve access to markets; rehabilitation of small-scale public works through intensive labour and mainstreaming of livelihoods recovery in the national economic agenda.

The UNDP project was not able to reach out to all IDPs, hence the current situation of IDPs still in camps, integrated and resettled by government. Other non-State actors such as Kenya Red Cross, only offered humanitarian assistance, and their projects ended after the humanitarian crisis. Active civil society to-date is interested in advocacy and human right issues.

III. The role Kenyan State and non-State actors

The amount of money spent by the Government and NGOs for over eight years that this research was concerned with is huge enough to make a positive livelihood impact for IDPs, if it were well-co-ordinated, projects and programmes well-planned. The government did not have any post-conflict reconstruction and recovery approach for the post-election violence victims. If government adhered
to UN guiding principles on IDP resettlement, the process would have been a success. The current process was ad hoc, ineffective, infiltrated by imposters and fraudsters among the victims and in Government bureaucracy.

By the time of this research, the Government announced a new initiative to resettle IDPs through a Kshs. 10 billion fund. This is a good way forward but coming too late, though an acknowledgement that the process is incomplete. The introduction of this research had established that by 2012 government had spent Kshs. 4 billion with NGOs spending 16 billion on post-conflict reconstruction and recovery of the 2007/2008 IDPs.

At the initial stages of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, there were 118 IDP camps. Through government initiatives, 7,498 IDP households were resettled out of 663,921 IDPs. Section 6.2 of this research observes that by the time of this research there were 46 IDP camps, 28 government procured farms – of which only 18 were fully operational. The government was not able to provide the accurate number of integrated IDPs. However, 170,000 integrated IDPs were given Kshs. 10,000 as start-up capital. In the combined area of this research covering integrated IDPs (Bahati, Ndunduri and Nakuru towns) there were 8,250 IDPs by the time of this research.

This research establishes that, in response to the post-election violence crisis, the Kenyan Government paid Kshs. 25,000 to every returning IDP to reconstruct their houses and another Kshs. 10,000 as start-up capital. In this intervention, 38,145 IDP households received payment. The target was to construct 43,792 houses but managed to construct only 26,589 houses. There were 817 individual IDPs who received Kshs. 400,000 to reconstruct their own houses without government logistical support and Kshs. 10,000 as start-up capital. Kenya Government also constructed 617 primary schools in the affected areas.
In addition to direct Kenya Government support, there were resource and monetary support from external actors, for examples the Government of China donated 105,000 iron sheets worth Kshs. 200 million, the government of Morocco donated US$1million and Africa Development Bank (ADB) donated Kshs. 1.5 billion for farm infrastructure. When IDPs who fled to Uganda returned in 2015, UNHCR paid each IDP US$50. This was an indication of recognition of these IDPs. However, as indicated above, Kenya Government has refused to make any further payment. Between 2009 and 2011 UNDP implemented a livelihood project worth US$1,666,700.

The problem statement of this research has noted that NGOs spent Kshs. 16 billion on IDPs programmes. Although it is the Kenya Government’s primary responsibility of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery according to the UN guiding principles in the literature review, when the Government announced closure of all IDP camps, NGOs also closed down the IDPs projects. This thesis argues this is because there was no more donor appeal. Currently NGOs are active on research, human rights and advocacy. This thesis further argues the large amount of money spent is not reflective on the IDPs livelihood post-conflict reconstruction and recovery.

**IV. Integrated IDPs**

The integrated category of IDPs is able to reconstruct and recover from the effects of post-election violence much faster compared to the other categories of IDPs. Section 6 of this research established that they are able to adapt, absorb and transform their IDP status and return to their businesses hence becoming resilient when compared to camp and government resettled IDPs. They are able to go back to the host community or relocate to other parts of the country and re-start new lifestyles.
This thesis therefore argues the host communities are generally receptive and cordial to post-conflict victims. There are strong social support systems within this integration of IDPs and also with the host communities as compared to the other IDPs, which has played a key role in their post-conflict reconstruction and recovery process.

Reflecting on the theoretical definition of Portes (1998), regarding community resilience and social capital, a person must be related to others, and it is those others, not himself, who are the actual source of his or her advantage. The integrated IDPs were able to re-establish their old social network. Tardy (1985) in the theoretical framework established the pyramid of social support. In the context of Kenya’s post-election violence, IDPs social networks are an asset to their post-conflict reconstruction and recovery process. Literature review also acknowledged that the primary source of help and social support for IDPs are their own informal social groups.

This thesis affirms the above Kenyan context as literature review provided similar examples - victims of the Kobe earthquake in Japan, IDPs in Azerbaijan, IDPs in South-Western highlands of Uganda, IDPs in Liberia, the displaced in the 2013 Southern Sudan ethnic violence and findings of a study on displaced women in Bogota, Colombia by Duplat in her PhD. This demonstrates that social support provides an informal buffer to IDPs community adaptation, absorption and transformation pathways (community resilience).

Additionally, this thesis argues that integrated IDPs’ adaptive, absorptive and transformative capacities are strong because other than their IDP-based social support system, they have managed to integrate with the host community hence, building on this wide social network to reconstruct and recover. For example as demonstrated in Chapter Six, they have cordial relationships established with the landlords, who allowed them delayed rent based payments on circumstances.
They have cohesively been able to integrate and conduct businesses with those who were not affected by the post-election violence as well as re-establish social networking with former business clients. The integrated nature of where they have resettled means they attend the same the markets, churches, clinics, and children attend the same public schools with host communities, which this research concludes is an asset in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery.

The integrated IDPs have formed integrated networks based on where they live and have leadership structures. The structures comprise chairman, secretary and members. This social network helps them access information and also links them to the National Government. This demonstrates that they have bonding, linking and bridging social capital, which is positively helping them accelerate their post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. This empowers them for collective decision-making.

V. Role of Social Support

The problem statement of this research noted that in post-election violence, IDPs lost their social support system from family, friends, neighbours, co-workers, professionals, norms, culture, values, institutions etc. Through interviews in Chapter Six, this research established IDPs have been able to re-create new social support (emergent norms, cultures and values).

This thesis argues that, by time of this research, these new social support systems have not helped to accelerate their post-conflict reconstruction and recovery processes, especially among camp-based IDPs as they are based and created through their common interest of vulnerability. They are mainly for emotional and informational purposes. They lack financial ability to propel the social network members to adapt, absorb or transform (community resilience).
Tardy’s (1985) pyramid of social support, places family, neighbours and colleagues at the core of social support. The theoretical framework also noted that support is either received (enacted) or perceived (expected). To affirm this finding, this research analysed data on Chapter Six and particularly on social support mechanisms on chapter 6.4 and made a conclusion that through the various forms of social capital (bonding, bridging and linking), IDPs in the post-election violence have weak social capital based on common vulnerability. To overcome this vulnerability they have developed a strong emergent norm, value and culture of assisting each other.

For example, securing casual labour through referrals, sharing common meals and sleeping in one tent as need arises. This is regardless of ethnic affiliation or gender, although population may ethnically vote as a block as the literature review established, when confounded with common problems they forget their ethnic affiliations, hence draw strength in their diversity. This demonstrated how close-knit they live as a community, hence the argument that the more vulnerable a post-conflict a community is, the closer knit it becomes on social support as a survival strategy.

Chapter six has identified that relationship with the host community has been very cordial and receptive to IDPs needs – bridging social capital. This means that host communities have been supportive of IDPs socio-economic needs. But because camp-based IDPs and Government resettled IDPs live in secluded IDPs-only areas, they have lesser contact with host communities compared to integrated IDPs who live together with host communities.

All IDPs have access to National Government leadership but through their elected leaders, such as Members of Parliament, members of County Assemblies and Local Administration such as Chief – (linking social capital). Additionally they have formed IDP leadership structures.
VI. The role of ICC

Kenya is part of international community and a signatory of ICC Rome Statutes. The process of referring Kenya to the International Court is documented in chapter 6 of this research. However, the previous Government and current Government have been very pre-occupied fighting off the ICC to the detriment of building adaptive, absorptive and transformative capacities (community resilience) for IDP post-conflict reconstruction and recovery process. This thesis argues Government’s failure to establish a local tribunal in Kenya, and opted for the Hague-based ICC demonstrated its unwillingness to engage in a process towards a permanent judicial solution for the victims. However, the acquittal of the President’s and the Deputy President’s ICC cases in 2014 and 2016 respectively re-programmed the vision and mission of the post-conflict reconstruction and recovery agenda by the Government.

While the introductory chapters of this research defines the genesis of the post-election violence in Kenya and the effects and impact, Chapter 6 provided the post-conflict reconstruction and recovery based on a political approach and also highlights the role of ICC in Kenya.

Through the political approach, IDPs expected justice from the perpetrators of the post-election violence. The perpetrators were expected to be held accountable for, as the contextual literature established, IDPs lost property, while others lost relatives and friends as a result of post-election violence. Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) in the literature review expect victims to achieve restorative, reparation and retributive justice but Kenya’s judicial system was unwilling and incapable.

VII. The role of the African Union

Through the African Union, Kenya was able to regain peace after almost two months of post-election violence. The Literature Review noted that African Union
has the primary responsibility for peace and security. But it failed to anticipate the magnitude of the post-election violence in Kenya, thus arrived on the ground late. This thesis notes that if Kofi Annan, the panel of eminent persons’ Chairman had arrived earlier, the number of deaths, destruction and displacement would surely have been less and the post-conflict reconstruction and recovery process would have been manageable, enhancing the adaptive, absorptive and transformative capacities of IDPs. Chapter 5 of this research established that the peace process was driven by the Western countries such as the USA, Germany, UK, France, and Switzerland among others, hence neither African-based nor Kenyan-based (local-based) despite the panel of eminent persons being African.

This research observed the role of the Africa Union in the introduction and also highlighted examples where African Union has set up active post-conflict reconstruction and recovery offices. Section 2.4.1 of the Literature Review has reviewed the role of Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) as well as NEPAD and Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). In addressing the post-election violence, Africa Union relied on the traditional approach of peace negotiations, ceasefire, transitional government, demilitarization, constitutional reforms and democratic elections.

There are other approaches reviewed in the literature, such as World Bank, United Nations and Zora’s PhD. approaches. The peace negotiations spearheaded by AU approach were short-term as it helped to end crisis, and recommended long-term post-conflict reconstruction and recovery agenda, but lacked enforcement mechanisms. The agenda points developed by Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) body remained as such and at the mercy of political leadership to implement.

As reviewed in Chapter 5, the Grand Coalition government 2007-2013 did not achieve much progress in post-reconstruction and recovery agenda. The
Government, for purposes of inclusivity was the largest since independence and had two centres of power, each faction answerable to its principal. This research, however, takes note of an achievement of Kenya promulgating a new constitution in 2010 and conducted peaceful 2013 elections which were contested at the Supreme Court. The country is due for 2\textsuperscript{nd} elections in August 8, 2017, but this thesis points out the political tones from opposition parties and violent demonstrations against electoral body indicate the AU objective of demilitarization was not fully achieved.

While APRM had raised concerns regarding free, fair and accountable elections as early as in 2006 during the peer review mechanism, AU did not have any practical solutions and had to wait until post-election happened the following year.

Section 2.4.1 revealed action plans passed by a Special Session of the Assembly of the AU on the consideration and resolution of conflicts in Africa, on August 31, 2009. Kenya had just emerged from the 2007/2008 post-election violence, but was not among the thirteen countries in the action plans. This thesis submits, African Union should have set up country offices such as in Quick Impact Projects (QUIPS) approach as well as provide funds to implement post-conflict reconstruction and recovery of socio-economic capacities of IDPs. Therefore the thesis argues that lack of decisive approach by the African Union in Kenya’s post-election violence led to emergence of similar post-election violence in Cote d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe and currently in Gabon, Gambia and Burundi.

From the above conclusions, this thesis has recommended an IDP post-election reconstruction and recovery approach. The approach offers five coordinated steps:
First, the thesis argues that where democracy is mature, there unlikely to be incidences of post-election violence. However, in case of post-election violence, the community experiences a crisis, people are displaced killed and property destroyed. The displaced seek shelter into camps, becoming IDPs.

Secondly, the government department in charge of internal affairs appoints a lead non-state actor such as UNDP. The appointment is on merit of experience and capacity to coordinate humanitarian affairs of displaced population. This lead agency coordinates all other non-State actors in the management of various IDP camps. Humanitarian resources should be distributed to the IDPs through the various non-State agencies as role-assigned by the lead appointed non-state actor. Therefore core competencies and functions of these agencies are established before assignment. Among the main activities by these non-actors include, supply of resources and essentials such as – food, clothes, tents, transport, counselling, medicines, tracing etc.

Third, the Government should take the responsibility of profiling the IDPs in terms of socio-economic losses and capacities. This profiling should ultimately lead to comprehensive databases and databanks of genuine IDPs. The information on the databases can be verified with the Department of Immigration/registration of persons/identity issuance sections etc. Government security agencies should also collect crucial information from IDPs regarding alleged perpetrators of the post-election violence. This information should collaborate with information collected outside the camps.

The Government should be guided by the UN guiding principles for purposes of classification of IDPs based on returning home, re-integration or resettlement options. Therefore, social support abilities of IDPs are identified through interviews with IDPs to establish their primary social network, IDPs adaptation, absorption and transformation capacities as established by assessment of their
skills, assets, information and communication, vision and mission of each IDP household.

Fourth, when peace is re-established through PCRD, the Government start implementation of the various legal frameworks such as the UN-guiding principles, Kampala Convention, Great Lakes Convention and Kenya IDP Bill to return IDPs to their original homes, resettle them elsewhere or help them re-integrate within the communities. The most viable option would be to return IDPs to their original homes and where this is impossible; re-integrate them in the host communities.

The last step is to ensure that perpetrators of the post-election violence face the justice system. IDPs receive compensation in forms of either: reparation, retribution or restitution. A trusted judicial system is able to hold the perpetrators of the post-election violence to account and make them pay for properties destroyed and deaths caused.

7.2 The Empirical, Theoretical and Conceptual contribution

This thesis is a thought-provoking exploration, which contributes to new knowledge on the empirical, theory and conceptual approaches, particularly on IDPs adaptation, absorption and transformation processes after a post-electoral conflict.

The thesis has made a contribution in revealing how the concept of social support and community resilience has informed the post-conflict reconstruction and recovery discourse, particularly in multi-ethnic communities. Although the social capital theory submits that primary social networks such as family, friends, neighbours and co-workers are the first call for social support during and after crisis, this thesis concluded that in displacement IDPs have disregarded this philosophy. The thesis reveals that IDPs have been able to create IDP-based social support structures and systems to overcome adversity. The emergence of
new IDP-based social support structures and institutions were intentional and based on common adversity.

The iterative nature of this thesis reveals that post-election violence victims lose economic (livelihood), physical (land), natural (heritage, culture), social (friendship, neighbours) during the violence in the problem statement and in the literature review.

The general expectation that IDPs are socio-economic vagrants due to the losses suffered has been negated by the findings of this research. Indeed this is a perception as the victims have been making proactive and informed choices about alternative sources of livelihood, based on the changing conditions (adaptive capacities). The research finds reliance of casual labour and other menial jobs as the primary source of livelihood among IDPs. The IDPs are determined to overcome adversity.

However, IDPs have no control of transformative and absorptive capacities as they are external and activities of others shape this form of social capital. This affirms the theory that communities rich in different aspects of social capital are able to regain functionality (bounce back) faster. This thesis argue, they provide a baseline for future researchers interrogating how such post-conflict victims communities could snow-ball their experiences to other displaced communities located in many parts of the world.

This thesis affirms the conceptual framework argument that a resilient community must combine community assets (human, social, financial, political and natural), community social dimensions (vision, missions, goals and objectives) and areas of collective action (partnership and collaboration). As the conclusions noted, this thesis concurs that rebuilding the socio-economic livelihoods of the displaced communities are key indicators bouncing back batter to pre-conflict. This thesis underscores the importance of such livelihood assets like land, food, security,
jobs, and businesses, household properties, as a measure that enable the community to transform, adapt or absorb new ways of life.

Additionally, the capacity to bounce back better or worse is determined by the characteristics of the community in enabling or constraining victims to adapt, absorb or transform during and after crisis. For example how close or far is an IDP community in ownership of livelihood resource (land) and what social support systems are advancing this vision, mission, goals and objectives of becoming resilient. Therefore, this thesis finds an important contribution to knowledge in that the bigger the pool livelihood assets and the faster re-acquisition of lost assets or acquisition of new assets the faster the post-conflict victims stands on the pathway to community resiliency hence bouncing back to functionality.

There is a strong argument in the Literature Review regarding the relationship between post-election violence and ethnicity. The summary of this argument is that post-election violence breaks down the community into ethnically determined closed hostile units. This thesis has created new knowledge in that IDPs develop strong emergent norms, values, culture (bonding social capital) dominant among themselves and not determined by ethnic affiliation.

This thesis argues that by virtues of sharing common problems in displacement, IDPs disregarded ethnic affiliations and enhanced unique forms of bonding social capital among themselves. The process of bouncing back better is determined by solidarity, mobilization and reciprocity supports. This creates strong in-group loyalty and comradeship and out-group antagonism. There is closure and density within the displaced population which ensures censorship to infiltration by host communities.

Through this argument, this thesis finds the possibility of IDPs mobilizing new social networks based on their socio-economic and livelihood resources among
themselves. This eventually creates a new society (community) complete with new traditions, culture, systems and structures. This new knowledge deduces the philosophy that the foundation of social support originates from victims social network such as family and neighbours is not accurate. Indeed, the primary sources of social support among the displaced are the victims themselves. They share the pains of displacement, they share common characteristics, attitudes and behaviour; they develop new values, norms among themselves based on their displaced world view. This new culture creates a new community distinct of host communities and different from the previous communities.

The new society/community emerging from displacement develops new forms of social capital. These communities/societies have different socio-economic and political attributes and characteristics from their pre-conflict communities. Experiences in displacement shape their rules, values, norms, behaviour, attitudes and world view. I therefore submit that new community created out of displacement is more resilient, more connected in social support systems and structures to deal with future post-electoral conflicts.

This emergent culture has unique community capacities – adaptive, absorptive and transformative based on previous experiences. In concurrence to conceptual framework, this community develop areas of collective action independent of the host communities, such as conflict and risk reduction and management, community protection (food, money services etc.), resource management (water, land etc.) as well as management of community goods and services (schools, health etc.).These capacities evolve to create to become dominant in the geographic areas the IDP community occupy.

Additionally, this community/society has the capacity to influence host communities to adopt their new culture, values order, social systems, social structures and social networks. This thesis refers to this possibility as creating new social capital. Therefore, the longer IDPs occupy certain geographic areas
the greater the likelihood for them to influence change of culture, social network, social values and interactions of the host community. The new community/society is devoid of ethnicity. Indeed, in the Kenyan context new worship systems, new agricultural practices, new market systems and micro finance systems are taking shape in areas dominated by IDP resettlement. This concept is similar to structure, system, cultural influence the immigrants’ Muslim/Asian community creates whenever they re-settle in a new area. They develop strong loyalty, solidarity and comradeship bonds among themselves. They influence the language and economic systems of that geographic area. They are able in time to dominate existing social systems, structures and institutions.
CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

8.1 Introduction

The focus of this study is to explore how the process of reconstruction and recovery of the victims of Kenya’s 2007/2008 election violence was undertaken. The study has examined the community resilience and the roles of the government and other actors in this process. Therefore the analysis above on “what works” provides a lens for this thesis to offer four critical conclusions for policy makers in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. The four centres on land-based resettlement approach, social support in reconstruction and recovery, external actors’ support and the role played by African Union in mediation in conflict situations.

The thesis finds that the 2007/2008 post-election violence was certain because the ingredients required in the management of a free, fair, credible and accountable general election were missing in the preparations. These failures were aggravated by the negative ethnic-based campaign propaganda which media and civil society as non-state actors also participated. Other actors, such as African Union did not offer concrete enforcement proposals to help the country despite an early warnings conclusion as part of the findings in the 2006 APRM peer review. The media and civil society were divided along ethnic lines hence unable to professionally discharge their duties.

The above findings have been discussed in various chapters. For instance, the discussions in chapter five conclude that the various interventions by the state and non-state actors were fully successful. Chapter six discussed the role of social capital and community resilience. The successes and limitations of social capital to the various categories of IDPs were discussed. Chapter seven has demonstrated that social capital is an important element in reconstruction and recovery process because it is self-based as well as provided through external actors.
On the basis of the findings of this study, the following conclusions and recommendations are highlighted:

I Land-based resettlement approach

Land-based post-conflict reconstruction and recovery approaches are not a sustainable solution to IDP community resiliency. IDPs require guaranteed socio-economic livelihood. Post-electoral conflict victims should be integrated back into communities and offered some socio-economic livelihood they can rely on. To facilitate this approach, a multi-sectorial and multi-agency team should determine each individual victim’s economic loss in the electoral crisis and carry out an evaluation for purposes of compensation (restitution, retribution or restoration). However, Governments, NGOs and other stakeholders need to initiate peace, cohesion and integration projects in the host communities. This approach ensures community resilience and a faster reconstruction and reconstruction process for the victims.

In situations where the Government has resettled IDPs in farms, there should be an accelerated plan to re-engage and provide them with capacity and empowerment for sustainable livelihood. This may include providing them with tools, credit and new options of crops cultivation, poultry rearing and marketing. In the long run, they should provide them with legal documents for ownership of the houses and pieces of land allocated. Cohesion and integration agenda should be rolled out to ensure host communities do not identify or label the resettled as IDPs.

II Social support in reconstruction and recovery

Social support is an important aspect in IDPs’ adaptation, absorption and transformation processes. In absence of external support from host communities or government, IDPs form their own support system. Where IDPs make a
decision to integrate with the host communities, they are able to adapt, absorb or transform much quickly. The pyramid of social support theorizes many forms of social support such as through direction, disposition, description, content and network. The foundation of social support is the social network, comprising immediate family, close friends, neighbours, co-workers, community and professionals.

In displacement, IDPs are able to create new social support mechanisms among themselves for purpose of livelihood. These social support structures are closely knit as they have a clear understanding of each other. They have common values, mission and vision, eventually they create new norms.

III External actors’ support

Non-State actors are stakeholders in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. At the micro-level reconstruction and recovery processes such as the Kenya’s context, they should actively involve communities in design and implementation of the projects. UNDP Kenya had a well programmed post-conflict reconstruction and recovery project (2009-2011). The activities within this project were aimed to improve livelihood capacities and empower the IDPs. To achieve progress, donors should consider more proposals from NGOs similar to the approach of the UNDP Kenya. The projects should run for a longer period of about five years or more to achieve impact.

The peace process was driven by AU with constant dictation from western countries such as US, UK, Germany and France among others. Because these countries were instrumental in peace negotiations, they should appraise, evaluate and monitor the impact of the displacement and resettlement projects and, if necessary, fund the process to ensure accelerated search of durable solutions for the IDPs.
IV  African Union mandate

African Union, PCRD should continue with its current mandate, but put in place enforcement mechanisms to prevent post-election violence. The Literature Review identified the AU as a key stakeholder in Africa peace and conflict prevention. Although a mechanism for peer-review is in place, there has been no tangible impact on how the system has managed to prevent post-election violence.

This research concluded that AU acted late by anticipating the post-election violence but failed to enforce systems to prevent it. Therefore the AU should consider expert missions probably - two years to general elections - to study and make recommendations to countries going to elections. This would help in monitoring and evaluating electoral systems and structures in the country and advise as well as enforce systems accordingly way ahead of general elections. This would avoid a one–day event of monitoring general elections as AU observers, as currently is the case.

V  Further research

The empirical, theoretical and conceptual as well as the conclusions above provide scholars with new horizons of knowledge as this researcher confirms that Social capital and community resilience are a factor in IDPs reconstruction and recovery processes.

Based on the above conclusions, scholars need to investigate further the relationships between IDPs and refugees reconstruction and recovery processes. Additionally, future scholars should examine case studies of IDPs in non-war situations.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

The Global Overview 2014:
People internally displaced by conflict and violence

APPENDIX 3

Interview – Guide for Camp-based IDPs

Dear Respondent,

This interview-guide is used as a means to help the researcher collect primary data relevant to the problem under investigation (Reconstruction and Recovery Process of the 2007/2008 Post-Election Violence Victims in Kenya). The data will be used for this academic research only. All information will be treated in confidence. I therefore request you to feel free to answer all the questions and add any additional information you see fit. I will also ask additional questions.

1. Which of the following statements best describe how you have been able to reconstruct and recover from the 2007/2008 post-election violence?
   a). Have not recovered
   b). Recovered somehow, but worse off than before the 2007/2008 post-election violence
   c). Recovered to same level as before the 2007/2008 post-election violence
   d). Recovered and better off than before the 2007/2008 post-election violence

2. Please give an account of how you earned your livelihood before the post-election violence

3. Please give an account of how you earn your livelihood as an IDP
4. What economic developments or assets and their estimated value did you have before the post-election violence? Please elaborate

5. Which of the following statements best describe the extent to which you have been able to replace or get back property/assets lost during the 2007/2008 post-election violence?
   a). Unable to get them back or replace them
   b). Able to get some of them back
   c). Able to get everything back

6. In your opinion, what are some of the most significant social relations and non-economic assets you lost? Please explain

7. During the process of reconstruction and recovery from the 2007/2008 post-election violence, have you relied on other people for financial or in-kind support?
   a). Yes
   b). No

8. If yes, who have you been relying on most of the times?
   a). Nuclear and extended family members
   b). Non family members
   c). Friends/ colleagues/co-workers/well-wishers
   d). Non-state organizations such as NGOs and churches
   e). Government
   f). Others, Please specify

9. In what ways have the government assisted you to reconstruct and recover both economic assets and social relations? Please explain
10. In what ways have the non-state organizations such as NGO and churches assisted you to reconstruct and recover both economic assets and social relations? Please explain.

11. What kind of social support have you received from your family, friends, co-workers, and neighbours etc. to help you in reconstruction and recovery process?

12. What are the main sources of information in the IDP camps, and how have the information received or communicated influenced your decisions in reconstruction and recovery?

13. As a community of IDPs, what are some of the safety nets you have put in place to assist you in reconstruction and recovery?

14. Over the last 5 years, have your family sold assets to meet family needs due to shocks/stress of the 2007/2008 post-election violence?
   a). Yes
   b). No
15. Which of the following statements best describe your ability to cope and manage post-election violence or future periods of needs/stress?
   a). Unable to cope
   b). Able to cope with changed income and food sources
   c). Able to cope without difficulty

16. How have you been involved in identifying the IDPs community problems, goals and priorities? Please elaborate………………………………………………………………………………
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17. What is your vision? Where do you see yourself in the next five years?
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APPENDIX 4

Interview–Guide for Government Resettled IDPs

Dear Respondent,

This interview-guide is used as a means to help the researcher collect primary data relevant to the problem under investigation (Reconstruction and Recovery Process of the 2007/2008 Post-Election Violence Victims in Kenya). The data will be used for this academic research only. All information will be treated in confidence. I therefore request you to feel free to answer all the questions and add any additional information you see fit. I will also ask additional questions.

1. Which of the following statements best describe how you have been able to reconstruct and recover from the 2007/2008 post-election violence?
   a). Have not recovered
   b). Recovered somehow, but worse off than before the 2007/2008 post-election violence
   c). Recovered to same level as before the 2007/2008 post-election violence
   d). Recovered and better off than before the 2007/2008 post-election violence

2. Please give an account of how you earned your livelihood before the post-election violence……………………………………………………………………………………
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3. Please give an account of how you earn your livelihood as an IDP……………………………………………………………………………………
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4. What economic developments or assets and their estimated value did you have before the post-election violence? Please elaborate.

5. Which of the following statements best describe the extent to which you have been able to replace or get back property/assets lost during the 2007/2008 post-election violence?
   a). Unable to get them back or replace them
   b). Able to get some of them back
   c). Able to get everything back

6. In your opinion, what are some of the most significant social relations and non-economic assets you lost? Please explain.

7. During the process of reconstruction and recovery from the 2007/2008 post-election violence, have you relied on other people for financial or in-kind support?
   a). Yes       b). No.

8. If yes, who have you been relying on most of the times?
   a). Nuclear and extended family members
   b). Non family members
   c). Friends/colleagues/co-workers/well-wishers
   d). Non-state organizations such as NGOs and churches
   e). Government
   f). Others, Please specify
9. In what ways have the government assisted you to reconstruct and recover both economic assets and social relations? Please explain

10. In what ways have the non-state organizations such as NGO and churches assisted you to reconstruct and recover both economic assets and social relations? Please explain

11. What kind of social support have you received from your family, friends, co-workers, and neighbours etc. to help you in reconstruction and recovery process?

12. What are the main sources of information in the IDP camps, and how have the information received or communicated influences your decisions in reconstruction and recovery?

13. As a community of IDPs, what are some of the safety nets you have put in place to assist you in reconstruction and recovery?

14. Over the last 5 years, have your family sold assets to meet family needs due to shocks/stress of the 2007/2008 post-election violence?
   a). Yes    b). No
15. Which of the following statements best describe your ability to cope and manage post-election violence or future periods of needs/stress?
   a). Unable to cope
   b). Able to cope with changed income and food sources
   c). Able to cope without difficulty

16. How have you been involved in identifying the IDPs community problems, goals and priorities? Please elaborate…………………………………………………………………………………………
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17. What is your vision? Where do you see yourself in the next five years?
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Interview –Guide for Integrated IDPs

Dear Respondent,

This interview guide is used as a means to help the researcher collect primary data relevant to the problem under investigation (Reconstruction and Recovery Process of the 2007/2008 Post-Election Violence Victims in Kenya). The data will be used for this academic research only. All information will be treated in confidence. I therefore request you to feel free to answer all the questions and add any additional information you see fit. I will also ask additional questions.

1. Which of the following statements best describe how you have been able to reconstruct and recover from the 2007/2008 post-election violence?
   a). Have not recovered
   b). Recovered somehow, but worse off than before the 2007/2008 post-election violence
   c). Recovered to same level as before the 2007/2008 post-election violence
   d). Recovered and better off than before the 2007/2008 post-election violence

2. Please give an account of how you earned your livelihood before the post-election 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4. What economic developments or assets and their estimated value did you have before the post-election violence? Please elaborate.

5. Which of the following statements best describe the extent to which you have been able to replace or get back property/assets lost during the 2007/2008 post-election violence?
   a). Unable to get them back or replace them
   b). Able to get some of them back
   c). Able to get everything back

6. In your opinion, what are some of the most significant social relations and non-economic assets you lost? Please explain.

7. During the process of reconstruction and recovery from the 2007/2008 post-election violence, have you relied on other people for financial or in-kind support?
   a). Yes
   b). No.

8. If yes, who have you been relying on most of the times?
   a). Nuclear and extended family members
   b). Non family members
   c). Friends/colleagues/co-workers/well-wishers
   d). Non-state organizations such as NGOs and churches
   e). Government
   f). Others, Please specify
9. In what ways have the government assisted you to reconstruct and recover both economic assets and social relations? Please explain…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
10. In what ways have the non-state organizations such as NGO and churches assisted you to reconstruct and recover both economic assets and social relations? Please explain…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
11. What kind of social support have you received from your family, friends, co-workers, and neighbours etc. to help you in reconstruction and recovery process? ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
12. What are the main sources of information in the IDP camps, and how have the information received or communicated influences your decisions in reconstruction and recovery? ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
13. As a community of IDPs, what are some of the safety nets you have put in place to assist you in reconstruction and recovery? ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
14. Over the last 5 years, have your family sold assets to meet family needs due to shocks/stress of the 2007/2008 post-election violence?
   a). Yes  
   b). No
15. Which of the following statements best describe your ability to cope and manage post-election violence or future periods of needs/stress?
   a). Unable to cope
   b). Able to cope with changed income and food sources
   c). Able to cope without difficulty

16. How have you been involved in identifying the IDPs community problems, goals and priorities? Please elaborate…………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………

17. What is your vision? Where do you see yourself in the next five years?
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
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APPENDIX 6

**Key Informant Interviews**

Dear Respondent,

This interview-guide is used as a means to help the researcher collect primary data relevant to the problem under investigation (Reconstruction and Recovery Process of the 2007/2008 Post-Election Violence Victims in Kenya). The data will be used for this academic research only. All information will be treated in confidence. I therefore request you to feel free to answer all the questions and add any additional information you see fit. I may also ask additional questions.

1. In which ways did your projects/programmes help create livelihood strategies to help the 2007/2008 post-election violence in reconstruction and recovery? Please elaborate.
2. In which ways did your projects/programmes facilitate social support to the victims? Please explain.
3. How much budgets were allocated to these projects /programmes?
4. What are the successes/failures of these projects/programmes? Please elaborate.
5. In your opinion, are the victims resilient enough to overcome similar conflicts in future? Please explain.
6. How have you engaged the victims to participate in their reconstruction and recovery process?
7. What are the reasons for the slow pace of the IDP resettlement projects? Please elaborate.
8. In your opinion, are there alternative models of post-conflict reconstruction you think would have worked better/faster to accelerate a reconstruction and recovery process? Please elaborate.