CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

Public works infrastructure programmes and projects have been seen as a major development tool that could transform the lives of people throughout the developing world. But this is not true for all developing countries. The character of development, its direction and pace and the way people share in its benefits are largely determined by how a country manages its development projects and programmes. In South Africa, the levels of unemployment and poverty are extremely high and make these arguably South Africa’s most pressing problems. At the same time, there is a great need for physical infrastructure in both urban and rural areas. The levels of unemployment have been rising steadily over the years. The unemployment rate is an indicator of economic and social health. The level of unemployment was 9.18% in 1972; 7% in 1980; 10% in 1985; 15% in 1990; 22% in 1995 (Human Development Report, 2004); 30.2% in 2002; 27.4% in 2003; 25.6% in 2004; 26.5% in 2005 and 23% in 2007 and 21.9% in 2008 (Statistics South Africa, 2008). The unemployment rate rose rapidly over the 1990s, then fell in 2003 and 2004 and rose again in 2005. This is due to the drastic fall in the demand for unskilled labour in the formal sector caused by structural changes in the economy as a result of a decline in the importance of the primary sector. The high unemployment rate is also a direct contributing factor to inequality and poverty in South Africa (Statistics South Africa, 2008).

From a theoretical perspective supported by experiences elsewhere in Africa, there are reasons for considering that properly formulated employment creation programmes, based on the use of labour-intensive methods, could be established
to construct and maintain the required physical infrastructure, thus creating employment, skills and institutional capacities (McCutcheon et al, 2005). Investment in labour-intensive infrastructure projects and programmes could provide new employment opportunities in developing countries for the unemployed and underemployed who have little hope of finding stable wage employment in the near future. The term labour-intensive will be used throughout the thesis as it is legislated. The Framework Agreement which was signed on 22 June 1993 by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO) and the National Committee for Labour Intensive Construction (NCLIC) legislated the use of the term in the civil engineering industry in South Africa. The Framework Agreement in which the civil engineering industry committed itself to maximise the use of labour-intensive methods of construction within public works programmes was discussed between 1992 and 1994. The following were the main features of the Framework Agreement:

- The employment of people rather than machines.
- Community involvement in planning a project and its implementation.
- Improvement of services to the community.
- Training including managerial and administrative training, as well as general education like literacy and numeracy; and

Large scale development programmes and projects in South Africa prior to 1994 did not solve the unemployment problem in many depressed areas across the country (Thwala, 2001). Between 1980 and 1994, the former government spent millions of Rands on large-scale projects and programmes with the stated objectives of creating employment, alleviating poverty and providing physical infrastructure. However, given that a major objective of the large scale programmes and projects undertaken by the previous regime was “political” stability, it could be argued that insufficient attention was paid to the factors which
require most attention for a national development programme to take place. Analysis of these projects carried out by Thwala (2001) revealed shortcomings in planning, setting up and implementing large scale programmes. Furthermore a summary of research into large-scale South African public works projects conducted by McCutcheon (2001) revealed that very little sustainable employment was created; the assets constructed were not cost-effective, were of doubtful value, and were poorly maintained.

By contrast, research conducted by researchers such as McCutcheon et al, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and International Labour Organisation, (1987); Urban Foundation, (1994b) indicate that experience elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa has demonstrated that infrastructure properly constructed and well maintained by labour-intensive methods can generate employment and alleviate poverty. Therefore, properly planned long-term development projects and programmes can be used as a tool to alleviate poverty. Unemployment remains a major problem in South Africa and a major contributor to poverty. Job creation is a high government priority. The main problem which underpins the study is to explore: what is the root causes of the failure or apparent failure of large-scale development projects and programmes in South Africa to achieve the intended objectives of employment creation and poverty alleviation?

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Since the early 1980s many large scale programmes and projects related to infrastructure development for employment creation have been carried out. However, these projects and programmes were poorly documented and evaluated. Where documentation exists, severe shortcomings have been identified. This thesis will ascertain whether the lessons learnt before had been taken into consideration in the post 1994 period. The thesis has proposed a Programme Management Framework for large-scale development programmes
and projects. The framework will be used in the planning and implementation of development programmes. The following are the objectives of the research:

- To evaluate, through ex-post research, the large-scale development programmes and projects in South Africa: what were the stated objectives and their validity, how adequate was the planning, how was the money spent, what was achieved in relation to the stated objectives.

- To discover what lessons could be drawn from the pre-1994 programmes.

- To determine whether the projects and programmes since 1994 have been better documented and evaluated.

- To ascertain whether the pre-1994 lessons have been learnt and applied in the post-1994 programmes and projects.

- To discover what lessons can be learnt from past experiences, both international and South African, to improve future programmes and projects.

- To develop a framework for the formulation of policy for development programmes/projects and an institutional, organisational and managerial framework for their implementation.

- To make general recommendations for future programmes and projects.

As mentioned above since the early 1980s and early 1994 many large-scale projects and programmes related to infrastructure development for employment creation have been carried out. However, these projects and programmes have been poorly documented and evaluated. Where documentation does exist, severe shortcomings have been identified. The thesis critically evaluated the different programmes and projects since 1980. Have the projects and programmes since 1994 been better documented and evaluated? What are the lessons that can be learned from past experience, both international and South African, to improve such future projects and programmes. In order to make
recommendations for these future projects and programmes, the thesis described and critically evaluated different large-scale development projects and programmes. By doing so, the thesis had proposed a Programme Management Framework to be used when planning and implementing development projects and programmes. The following large-scale programmes and projects have been chosen based on the scale of the money that was committed to each project, which amounted to millions of Rands. The main objectives of the projects and programmes listed below were to address unemployment and poverty. Based on the scale of expenditure and the objectives of job creation and poverty alleviation the author had to select them.

Pre-1994 Projects and Programmes

- The Greater Soweto Upgrading Project
- The Republic of South Africa KwaZulu Development Project
- The Strategic Oil Reserve Fund
- The Special Employment Creation Programme

Post-1994 Projects and Programmes

- Community Based Public Works Programme
- The Clean and Green Programme
- Poverty Relief Programme: Emergency Food Relief Programme
- 2002 Gauteng Zivuseni projects
- An Evaluation of the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme in Kgalagadi District Municipality

The use of employment-intensive public works programmes is not new in Africa. In the 1960s, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria experimented with such programmes. Although started as emergency relief works programmes, especially in rural areas, they gradually came to acquire a development orientation (Jara, 1971).
Despite their valuable contribution to rural employment-generation, many of these earlier experiments in employment-intensive public works in African countries had their own shortcomings. During the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, several labour-intensive programmes were implemented in Kenya, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi and Ghana. To date, development projects and programmes have not been properly planned for and implemented to reduce unemployment and poverty. However, they have contributed to the understanding of the methodology, and could therefore be regarded as a learning curve in the road to improvement.

1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is significant because it contributed to an understanding of the failure of development programmes and projects to achieve their intended objectives of employment creation and poverty alleviation. The research will enable policy makers and decision makers to plan for long-term programme management approach in order to improve project delivery. The study has proposed a Programme Management Framework for large-scale development programmes and projects in order to improve planning and implementation phases. The research is designed to engage in the debate on policy and to put forth alternative policy options. Long-term development programmes and projects can deliver major benefits in economic growth, poverty alleviation, and environmental sustainability, but only when these projects and programmes provide services that respond to effective demand and do so efficiently. Such development programmes and projects have the potential to redress this problem of disproportionately high unemployment in South Africa and also to correct the skill deficits in disadvantaged communities. The following is the major contribution of the thesis to knowledge:

- Understanding the failure of development programmes to achieve their intended objectives of employment creation and poverty alleviation through provision of public works.

• Developing a framework for the formulation of policy for development programmes and projects and an institutional, organisation and managerial framework for their implementation.

• By doing the above, the thesis will assist the public sector in the search for improved and alternative strategies and approaches for large-scale development programmes and projects in South Africa, in particular the second phase of the current Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP).

1.4 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Scriven (1991) define evaluation as a process of determining the merit, worth, or value of something. The evaluation process involves identifying relevant values or standards that apply to what is being evaluated, performing empirical investigation using techniques from the social sciences, and then integrating conclusions with the standards into an overall evaluation or set of evaluation. Caro (1977) proposed that evaluation must fulfill two purposes – information and judgement. On the other hand Stern (2005) proposed five purposes for evaluation that give a view of how evaluation can have an impact on political decisions for planning, learning, developing and termination of a programme:

• Planning / efficiency – ensuring that there is a justification for a policy / programme and that resources are efficiently developed.

• Accountability – demonstrating how far a programme has achieved its objectives and how well it has used its resources.

• Implementation – improving the performance of programmes and the effectiveness of how they are delivered and managed.

• Knowledge production – increasing the understanding of what works in what circumstances and how different measures and interventions can be made more effective.
• Institutional and community strengthening – improving and developing capacity among programme participants and their networks and institutions (Stern, 1005: xxviii).

Monitoring and evaluation can provide unique information about the performance of government policies, programmes and projects. It can identify what works, what does not work, and the reasons why. Monitoring and evaluation provides information about the performance of a government, of individual ministries and of development agencies, managers and their staff. The value of monitoring and evaluation is on the usage of it to help improve government performance.

The following are the different ways in which monitoring and evaluation information can be useful to governments and other stakeholders:

• To enhance results-based management: this support government in managing public policies and programmes, including government service delivery and the management of staff.

• To enhance transparency and support accountability relationships: monitoring and evaluation enhance the accountability of government to the parliament or congress, to civil society, and to the donors. In addition monitoring and evaluation supports the accountability relationships within government. Monitoring and evaluation provide a vehicle to magnify the voice of civil society and to put additional pressure on government to achieve higher levels of performance.

• To support evidence-based policy making: particularly in the context of the national budget cycle and of national planning. Monitoring and evaluation information can support government’s deliberations by providing evidence about the most cost-effective types of government policies (Segone, 2008).

1.5 INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT

Infrastructure can deliver major benefits to economic growth, poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability, but it can only do this when it provides services that respond to effective demand and does so efficiently (World Bank, 1994).
Until the end of the 1980s, infrastructure was neglected as one of the factors in economic growth. Since then, the effect of public infrastructure on the long-run performance of an economy has been debated in academic literature and public policy circles. Scholars such as Hulten and Schwab (1993) argue not only that infrastructure influences growth, but that other factors such as economic growth are correlated as well. Although correlation does not imply causality, it is significant that economic development and infrastructure are closely associated (Queiroz and Gautam, 1992). While there is no consensus on the exact nature of the impact of infrastructure on growth, studies conducted by the Development Bank of South Africa (1998) concluded that the role of infrastructure in growth is substantial, significant, and frequently greater than that of investment in other forms of capital. A shortage of infrastructure services puts pressure on the public sector for more infrastructure. A capable and willing public sector is essential to decide when and where infrastructure is to be expanded. A strategy where infrastructure leads to growth also requires policy makers to make spatial choices about which areas and regions are to receive additional infrastructure. When infrastructure follows growth, the choices are more sector than spatially orientated. Political choices under such conditions are more likely to involve economic sector interest groups than spatially orientated ones (DBSA, 1998a).

1.6 MULTIPLIER EFFECT

The multiplier effect is an important economic effect that occurs specifically from the flows of expenditure on investment in infrastructure. The construction of a road, for example, involves a number of transactions that will affect the economy in various ways. Labour and professional services are hired, plants and machinery are purchased, local material is utilised and so on. These transactions involve the generation of income streams and it is the subsequent impact on the wider economy, which produces the economic benefits. According to Simon (1996), the effectiveness of the multiplier effect depends on a number of factors:
• The initial increase in Government spending does not ‘crowd out’ spending the private sector. This can occur by bidding up the cost of labour and inputs (Kessides, 1993);

• A large share of the investment is obtained from domestic firms;

• There is a labour force readily available with the necessary skills to undertake the project.

Public spending on infrastructure construction and maintenance can be a valuable policy tool to provide economic stimulus during recessions. As long as quality and cost-effectiveness are not compromised, labour-intensive approaches to infrastructure development can also be an important instrument for economic growth (World Bank, 1994). When public spending on infrastructure is not wisely deployed, it can crowd out more productive investment in other sectors.

1.7 THE NEED FOR LARGE-SCALE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES IN SOUTH AFRICA

As mentioned above, public works infrastructure programmes and projects are a major development tool that could transform the lives of people throughout the developing world. The character of development, its direction and pace and the way people share in its benefits are largely determined by how a country manages its development projects and programmes. Despite the strong performance of the economy the chronic socio-political problems of South Africa have resulted in a deteriorating labour absorption capacity in the formal economy and expanding informal economy and rapidly rising unemployment and poverty (Statistics South Africa, 2005). The collapse of commodity prices and the prolonged droughts of the 1980s and 1990s compounded the already poor economic performance and have changed the poverty cycle experienced by the unemployed and underemployed. The severity of these problems as well as existing structural rigidities in the South African economy signifies the need for an active policy to redress past developments. In an effort to raise living standards, sustainable economic growth and structural reform are necessary to empower
deprived communities and to bring them into the mainstream of the economic process. Unfortunately, there is no single policy that can attain these goals overnight. The required solution is invariably multifaceted and must be directed at the very roots of poverty and unemployment. A mere treatment of the symptoms will not achieve sustainable results.

A major component of the Public Works Policy aimed at breaking the cycle of poverty should be large-scale and well-coordinated long-term development programmes and projects. This must be implemented in conjunction with other supportive policies, it has the ability to absorb large numbers of involuntarily unemployed persons and arrest the process of impoverishment. Not only does it act as a net to catch social tensions that culminate in crime and violence during the economic-political transition phase, but it also facilitate the restructuring of ownership which in turn could enhance the revival of economic growth and development.

The past decades have brought about greater demand for the utilisation of project management in the execution of development projects; especially in the public sector. This has culminated from a realisation that project management is focused on maximising efficient and effective use of available resources. This is vital in developing countries where resources are often scarce and therefore their maximal and efficient utilisation becomes crucial. Project management aims at providing ways of structuring management and adapting special techniques to obtain better control and use of available resources.

The changes in technology, management issues, and market forces have brought about a need to have dynamic and flexible management forms. Such forms should be able to adapt and respond timeously enough to the changing environments. Project management is one mechanism that could be used in this regard. It involves many aspects, including an assessment and structuring of project definition, project life cycles, project environments, project cost and control. The challenge for development planners and engineers in developing
areas is to explore and apply these variables to ensure the success of development projects.

According to the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) (DBSA, 1993) a project in a developing area should include objectives that go beyond the provision of a physical facility. The intention of the development impact approach is to encourage the participation of local communities throughout the project sequence, from identification to operation and maintenance, so that maximum benefits accrue to the community as a result of the process.

- The objectives of the development impact approach are:
- To provide the opportunities, and to enable and empower people to assume the responsibility, for improving the quality of their lives.
- To facilitate the upgrading of the social and physical environment.
- To increase employment.
- To reduce poverty.
- To stimulate economic growth.
- To reduce imbalances in access to opportunities (DBSA, 1993).

The development impact approach is designed to achieve the multiple development objectives mentioned above through the active involvement of the local community and utilising local resources as much as possible.

Rondinelli (1983a) argues that projects have become the acceptable way in which development efforts can be brought to the ground level due to the following advantages:

- Projects are identifiable, defined and organised sets of development activities.
- They can be an effective means of translating development plans and policies into specific courses of action.
- They are vehicles for mobilising and allocating resources to development efforts.
- They can be analysed and appraised before funds are committed.
- Projects are temporary activities that can lead incrementally to achieving larger development goals.
- They can be used to undertake unique, innovative or non-routine development activities.
- Projects can be used to channel development resources to specific groups of beneficiaries and to particular locations.
- Projects can be formulated as manageable units of activity guided by well-defined planning and administrative procedures.
- They can be organised in a variety of ways and undertaken by a wide range of organisations.

1.8 THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research methodology is a system of methods and rules to facilitate the collection and analysis of data. It provides the starting point for choosing an approach made up of theories, ideas, concepts and definitions of the topic. Therefore, the basis of a critical activity consists of making choices about the nature and character of the social world (assumptions). One of the most important outcomes of the search and review is the identification of methodological traditions which, in turn, helped to identify data-collection techniques that can be considered for use in the work. The thesis draws simultaneously from several different methods of investigation. In this thesis four types of research that have been mainly used including descriptive, historical, comparative, and evaluation research. Below is the elaborate discussion of the four types.
1.8.1 Descriptive Research

Descriptive or case-study research is research in which a specific situation is studied either to see if it gives rise to any general theories, or to see if existing general theories are borne out by the specific situation (Leedy, 2005). Depending on the type of information sought, people can be interviewed, questionnaires distributed, visual records made or sounds and smells recorded. The important point is that the observations are written down or recorded in a structured way, in order that they can be subsequently analysed. It is important that the data collected is organised and presented in a clear and systematic way so that the analysis can result in valid and accurate conclusions. The scale of the research is influenced by two major factors: the level of complexity of the survey and the scope of the survey. For example, seeking relationships between specific events inevitably requires a more complex survey technique than aiming merely to describe the nature of the existing conditions. Descriptive research had been used because the objectives of the research are very complex. The researcher had to undertake an in-depth case study of a selected number of programmes and projects implemented in the pre- and post-1994 era across South Africa and then compare them to see if any general trends emerged which should differ from those which had been identified by Thwala (2001) in his Master in Science Engineering thesis.

1.8.2 Historical Research

Historical research can be defined as the systematic and objective location, evaluation and synthesis of evidence in order to establish facts and draw conclusions about past events (Walliman, 2001). It involves exploring the meaning and relationship of events by using primary historical data in the form of historic artifacts, records and writings. It attempts to find out what happened in the past and to reveal reasons for why and how things happened. The value of historical research has been categorised by Walliman (2001) in the following:
• It enables solutions to contemporary problems to be sought in the past.
• It throws light on present and future trends.
• It stresses the relative importance and the effects of the interactions that are found within all cultures.
• It allows the revaluation of data supporting selected hypotheses, theories and generalisations that are held about the past.

Historical evidence, consisting of primary historical data, must be scrutinised from two points of view. The first is to ascertain whether the artifact or document to be studied is genuine. There have been many mistakes made in the past, either through lack of analytical rigour by over-enthusiastic researchers, or through fraud. The second is to examine, in written evidence in the form of historical documents, the authenticity of the contents. What is the meaning of what is written, and how accurate is it?

In this thesis, historical research was often geared towards using past programmes and projects to examine a current situation and predict future situations. Data was gathered from primary sources (records used during the life cycle of the different programmes and projects) and secondary sources (records made after the implementation). The thesis is a study of what has been done in the past, and so the principles of historical research can be seen to be of direct relevance to this part of the research.

1.8.3 Comparative Research

Comparative research is often used together with historical research (Leedy, 2005). Researchers compare people's experience of different societies, either between times in the past or in parallel situations in the present. It is often easier to understand phenomena when they are compared with similar phenomena from another time or place. The study and comparison of differences help to reveal the origins and development of social phenomena. This locates them in a certain time
and place thus overcoming claims that they are universal and temporal. Comparative research also opens the doors by making comparisons with the past and experiences elsewhere. Comparative research was used to compare pre and post 1994 programmes and projects planning and implementation in this thesis.

1.8.4 Evaluation Research

A common purpose of evaluation research is to examine programmes or the working of projects from the point of view of levels of awareness, costs and benefits, cost-effectiveness, attainment of objectives and quality assurance. The results are generally used to prescribe changes to improve and develop the situation, but in some cases might be limited to descriptions giving a better understanding of the programme (Robson, 1993). This is done in order to make improvements in a specific programme, policy or set of activities at a specific time and place, and with a specific group. The aim is to focus the research by using case-study methods and qualitative evidence. Questions are often focused and specific. In social policy the question might be: “How can this agency be more effective in meeting the needs of its clients?” and in management, “How can we maximise the benefits of this computer system for our research team?”

There are a range of different approaches or evaluation models. According to Leedy (2005) two of them are systems analysis and responsive evaluation. Systems analysis is a holistic type of research, which reverses the three-stage order of thinking which is typical of scientific enquiry. That is, system analysis breaks the problem or phenomena to be investigated down into researchable parts, evaluates the parts separately, and then aggregates these evaluations into an explanation of the whole. In systems analysis there are also three stages, but they start from appraising the whole:

- Identifying an encompassing whole (system) of which the phenomenon or problem is a part.
- Evaluating the behaviour or properties of the encompassing whole.
• Explaining the behaviour or properties of the phenomenon or problem in terms of its roles or functions within the encompassing whole (Leedy, 2005).

Systems analysis lends itself to creating understanding in complicated situations, particularly those involving people and organisations. Such problems are often referred to as ‘messes’ because of their indeterminate nature and large number of interconnected variables. Modeling and diagramming are two of the principal techniques used to describe systems.

• In the responsive evaluation model, a series of investigative steps are undertaken in order to evaluate how responsive a programme is to all those taking part in it. This model includes:
  • Data collection: identifying issues from the people directly involved in the programme; identifying further issues from the programme documents; observing how the programme is actually working.
  • Evaluation: the design of an evaluation based on the data collected and reporting findings.
  • Suggesting changes: informing the participants of the findings in ways specifically designed for each type of audience.

**Literature Survey**

An extensive study of international and South African literature on development projects and programmes was carried out. The literature focuses mainly on the public sector development projects. This involved comparing projects and programmes implemented internationally with the South African ones. Archival studies were also used in the literature review. This involved the selection of documents (both published and unpublished) on the topic, which contain information, ideas, data and evidence written from a particular standpoint to fulfill certain aims or express certain views on the nature of the topic and how it was investigated and the effective evaluation of these documents in relation to the research done.
According to Hart (2003), a literature review serves the following purposes in research: distinguishing what has been done from what needs to be done; discovering important variables relevant to the topic; synthesising and gaining a new perspective; identifying relationships between ideas and practice; establishing the context of the topic or problem; rationalising the significance of the problem; enhancing and acquiring the subject vocabulary; understanding the structure of the subject; relating ideas and theory to applications; identifying the main methodologies and research techniques that have been used; and placing the research in a historical context to show familiarity with state-of-the-art developments.

**Interviews**

Discussions and interviews were conducted with the following groups of people:

- Experts in government departments, especially the Public Works Department.
- Project Officers, Programme Managers, Project Managers, Development Planners, Social Facilitators and Training Managers at the Independent Development Trust.
- Independent experts who work with rural communities.
- Non-Governmental Organisations and development agencies.
- Development Practitioners.
- National Public Works Project Managers.

The interviewing method was used, in the data collection. There were two main methods used namely; face-to-face and telephone interviews. Face-to-face interviews can be carried out in a variety of situations – in the home, at work, outdoors, on the move and can be used for members of the general public, experts, leaders or specific segments of society (for example, elderly or disabled people, ethnic minorities). Respondents can be interviewed individually or in
groups. Interviews can be used for general or specific subjects and, with the correct preparation, for very sensitive topics. They can be once-off or, for longitudinal studies, repeated several times over a period to track developments. The interviewer is in a good position to be able to judge the quality of the responses of the subjects, to notice if a question has not been properly understood, and to reassure and encourage the respondent to elaborate. Visual signs such as nods and smiles are valuable tools in promoting complete responses.

Telephone interviews avoid the necessity of traveling to the respondents, and much of the time and problems associated with contacting people personally. Because many people own phones, it is often possible to contact a suitable sample of the target population by this method. However, visual aids cannot be used to explain questions. Also, important visual clues between interviewer and interviewee, for example, eye contact, smiling and puzzled looks, are absent. Non-response tends to be 5 to 10% higher on telephone surveys than with equivalent face-to-face surveys (Morton-Williams, 1993:156).

1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

1.9.1 Chapter 1

This chapter contains the introduction to the report and sets out the methodology adopted in the study.

1.9.2 Chapter 2

This chapter focuses on the community development approach to development projects and programmes in South Africa.
1.9.3 Chapter 3

This chapter focused on both a Sub-Saharan and South African literature survey with regard to development programmes and public works projects using labour-intensive construction methods for the provision of physical infrastructure.

1.9.4 Chapter 4

This chapter summarises four major programmes and projects implemented prior to 1994 which were dealt with in detail in the MSc Engineering dissertation and it summarises the major reasons for their failure (Thwala, 2001).

1.9.5 Chapter 5

This chapter focuses on post-1994 large-scale programmes and projects. This chapter deals with the Community Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP). The National Department of Public Works manages the Community Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP), one of the government’s key anti-poverty programmes. Since its launch in 1994/1995, the CBPWP has evolved into a major national programme with a complex set of deliverables developed to try and provide a multifaceted response to poverty. To achieve its objectives, the programme draws together a wide range of players from all tiers of government, civil society and the private sector.

Mthombeni (1997) dealt only with the period 1994 to 1996. The material in this chapter not only summarises that earlier period but provides a description and analysis of the whole programme from 1994/1995 to 2001/2002.

1.9.6 Chapter 6

This chapter deals with the National Food Emergency Programme which is a part of the Integrated Food Security and Nutrition Programme. The Integrated Food Security and Nutrition Programme was planned to put into operation the policy thrust enunciated by the Minister of Finance in his mid-term budget review
speech to Parliament on 30 October 2002. In this speech, the Minister of Finance announced that they would allocate about R400 million to the Social Cluster to reduce the effects caused by increased food prices. This was intended to help vulnerable groups by providing food relief to the vulnerable families in the short term and, in the longer term, increases their food production capacities and capabilities.

1.9.7 Chapter 7

The chapter examines the Poverty Relief Programme and the Emergency Food Relief Programme. The National Department of Social Development appointed the Independent Development Trust in February 2003 as the Programme Implementing Agency for the 2002/2003 National Food Emergency Programme. Among other responsibilities, the IDT was tasked with identifying and appointing service providers whose responsibility was to procure, package and deliver food parcels to delivery points located close to beneficiary households.

1.9.8 Chapter 8

In April 2002 the Gauteng Department of Public Transport, Roads and Works initiated a workfare programme managed by the IDT as a programme implementing agency. The programme called Zivuseni was given an initial budgetary allocation of R420 million derived from the provincial Medium Term Expenditure Framework allocations. The strategic purpose of the programme was to contribute towards the upliftment and empowerment of disadvantaged communities in Gauteng, through the implementation of spatially and demographically targeted workfare programmes. The programme was specifically intended to contribute to short-term poverty relief and a reduction of direct dependence on the state welfare system through the repair of community infrastructure.
1.9.9 Chapter 9

This chapter focuses on the Evaluation of the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme which was implemented in the Kgalagadi District Municipality.

1.9.10 Chapter 10

Chapter 10 focuses on the findings, recommendations and conclusion of the thesis. The chapter formulates the guidelines for the implementation of developmental programmes and projects for sustainability. Suggestions for further research are also listed.

1.10 CONCLUSIONS

In order to improve the success of future investment in development programmes by government/public sector or Non Government Organisations, this thesis has documented and critically analysed most of the large-scale development projects that have been initiated and implemented in South Africa in the pre- and post-1994 period. There was a need for an in-depth research into the potential for employment generation in development projects and programmes in South Africa through the use of labour-intensive methods. There are reasons for considering that properly formulated programmes and projects based on the use of labour-intensive methods could be established to construct and maintain the required physical infrastructure, thus creating employment, skills and institutional capacities. The conclusions will draw together the various elements through the description, review and evaluation of the large-scale projects and programmes. It also proposes a detailed Programme Management Framework for the potential planning, financing and management of such a project or programme.
CHAPTER 2
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT APPROACH FOR
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will focus on the different community development approaches for
development projects in South Africa. Stewart (1997) defines development as
positive social, economic and political change in a country or community. The
main concern for development arises in response to the gross inequalities and
also the absolute poverty which are generated by the world economy.

Community development practitioners face the daunting task of helping a
community to help itself or initiating community-based development. The people
they work with are usually poor. According to Swanepoel (1997), many
community development practitioners have a good idea of their basic objectives
but fewer know how to tackle the myriad overwhelming problems and obstacles in
their way. Apart from the set of skills needed for the job, community development
workers also need to know and understand the basic principles underlying their
work. When they know and understand these principles, their work finds meaning.
In their daily confrontation of choices, they are guided towards opting for those
that benefit the community.

It is necessary for government or development agencies to be guided by a vision.
It is vital that the frame of reference given to government and development
agencies has, as its point of departure, a philosophy of community development.
The belief system, in turn, must be informed and supported by principles acting
as guiding lights on the difficult road to development. These principles,
representing ideals community development workers must strive towards, should be non-negotiable. Although realising the ideals will be a process, those involved in development must accept the principles as given.

According to Sell (1991) economic development of a society and the prosperity of its members depend on the success of various investment programmes. He further allude that the different economic successes of various countries is most probably a result of different degrees of efficiency in the planning and selection of projects. In most instances this is due to the fact that those responsible for making decisions are in possession of insufficient knowledge regarding decisive management techniques (Sell, 1991:3). According to Turok (1993) South Africa’s separate development paradigm became encrusted in a variety of institutions inevitably linked to the Bantustan system. On the other hand urban townships were also viewed in the light of development handed down by the apartheid state. As a result Regional Services Councils, Provincial Administrators and Development Bank structures were all institutional expressions of “development” for disadvantaged subordinates. Turok (1993) further alluded that the government policy utterances were filled with declarations of good intentions for the poor and deprived, but they were devoid of serious commitment in the shape of resources for redressing the wrongs wrought by apartheid.

2.2 THE PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN ORIENTATION

The ‘basic needs approach’ grew out of an awareness of people’s poor living conditions and lack of resources. Millions of people in South Africa are caught in the deprivation trap that is with unfulfilled, basic physical needs; also have needs that are not physical. According to Swanepoel (1997), people’s physical and abstract needs go hand in hand and present simultaneously. The most important abstract human need is dignity (Swanepoel, 1997).

People may not be ignored, bypassed, forced into or made dependent on development projects that address their physical needs. What are considered by
some to be physical improvements in an area can have negative effects on people. Any effort to address people’s physical needs must simultaneously strive to fulfill the need for dignity. According to Swanepoel (1997), dignity is promoted by giving people recognition, by recognising them as capable of making their own decisions and accepting responsibility for their decisions. Dignity is enhanced when people become self-reliant and self-sufficient and therefore become capable of organising themselves and engendering and maintaining benevolent and farsighted leadership. According to Gran (1983), dignity grows as people fulfil their potential. People must progress in realising their inner potential while working to fulfill their physical needs.

This implies that development must be humanistic. No physical development can be divorced from the person and no human development can be divorced from the physical. Development must also be holistic. Human beings cannot be separated from their health needs or, for that matter, from their housing needs. According to Ickis (1983), a holistic approach requires a social intervention capability and capacity that supports its goals.

Streeten (1981:xi-xii) posited the following argument in explaining the basic needs approach (BNA):

“The objective of a basic human needs approach to development is to ensure that all human beings should have the opportunity to live full lives. To this end, the approach focuses on receiving access to minimum levels of consumption of certain basic goods and services. The basic needs approach attaches fundamental importance to poverty eradication within a short period as one of the main objectives of development. It defines poverty not in terms of income, poverty lines and deciles of the income distribution, but as the inability to meet certain basic human needs on the part of identifiable groups of human beings. Poverty is characterised by malnutrition, by ill health, by lack of education, of safe water, of sanitation, of decent shelter. An important aspect of the elimination of poverty, thus, consists in securing access to these goods and services by the poor”.

25
2.3 THE PRINCIPLE OF PARTICIPATION – PARTICIPATION DEFINED

Gran (1983:327) defines participatory development as a self-sustaining process to engage free men and women in activities that meet their basic needs and, beyond that realise individually defined human potential within socially defined limits. Edwards and Jones (1976:12) define a community as a grouping of people who reside in a specific locality and who exercise some degree of local autonomy in organising their social life in such a way that they can, from that locality base, satisfy the full range of their daily needs. On the other hand Zentner (1964:420-423) define a community as a group structure integrated around goals associated with the problems arising out of the collective occupation and utilisation of habitation space. The community has certain measures of local autonomy and a degree of local responsibility. According to Rowlands (1995:102) people’s participation in development implies empowerment and *vice versa*. Genuine community participation means that people must have the power to influence the decisions that affect their lives. It is important to note that without empowerment participation becomes ineffective. Thus community development must promote human development.

By enabling participation, a solid local knowledge base may be used for development. Local people, who have lived in deprivation and survived the hardships of poverty, have something that outsiders do not. According to Swanepoel (1997), their ‘common sense’ knowledge of the political, social, economic, cultural and natural environment dynamics, can be of immense value to development efforts. People who do not participate in their own development have no affinity for developmental efforts and their results. The huge problem of sustaining development and maintaining facilities instituted by development is resolved if the affected people participate, knowing that they have a stake in the effort and the results.

According to Gran (1983), a radical view sees participation as a way of ensuring equity. Usually, the poorest of the poor do not get their fair share of the fruits of development. Therefore, participation must include the people. It must be
emphasised that it is imperative that the poorest of the poor participate in the full sense of the word. The second radical view sees participation as a democratic right. In any community, every adult, regardless of class, has a right to be part of the decision-making mechanism affecting his or her development. If development practitioners want to uphold and implement the radical view, they must ensure that the poorest of the poor are present when developmental decisions are made. Their presence is one thing, but their active participation is another. It is necessary to facilitate their full participation by enabling them to determine their own development. This means, first, supplying them with information so that they can make informed decisions. It also means guarding against elites or change agents subtly undermining the efforts of the poor and using their participation so that they can co-opt them. It must be noted that much of the local development decision-making will be governed by perceptions of power and that those perceptions can be changed (Gran, 1983). The development practitioner must, with wisdom, safeguard the poor's position and retain the elite's support of the development effort.

2.4 THE PRINCIPLE OF EMPOWERMENT

2.4.1 What is empowerment?

There are developmental organisations, agencies and government departments that regard local people as a good source of information. These organisations may limit people's participation to an advisory role. If this does happen, that is if the local people act only as advisors to the development practitioners and decision-makers, practitioners cannot talk of adequate participation. According to El Sherbini (1986), power must accompany participation. Arnstein (1969) declared that participation without power “is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless”. Swanepoel (1997) argued that many bad things can happen under the banner of participation. For example, the rhetoric of participation can enable the people to be used for cheap labour. Decision-making and planning are regarded as outside the ambit of ordinary people because participation is seen as
interfering with the effective provision of basic needs (Spalding, 1990). The principle of empowerment stipulates that people participate because it is their democratic right to do so (Wignaraja et al, 1991). Empowerment entails that the participation of people will give power to the people (Tacconi and Tisdell, 1993). According to this principle, participation is the natural result of empowerment. It is not a means to an end, but is the objective of development.

Yet, empowerment entails more than having the power to make decisions. It demands the knowledge and understanding to make the correct decisions. The development practitioner has a special task in this regard. People cannot be expected to make wise decisions if they do not have the necessary information. The development practitioner must be a source of information or must be a channel to sources of information. Ultimately, people must make informed decisions.

According to Kilian (1988), empowerment can be misused or become a radical cloak hung around conservative ideas. Empowerment does not mean giving people facilities that were previously denied or unavailable to them. Moreover, it does not mean giving them the skills that they lacked. In its purest form, empowerment means the acquisition of power and the ability to give it effect. Such power is not amorphous or an entity that is not able to be defined. According to Kent (1981), it manifests in groups of people working together.

The World Development report on Development and Environment (1992) argued that self-empowerment requires the following:

- Community-based control of natural resources.
- Access to funds, technologies and education.
- Creation of units of economic management working in the market place and governance.
- Priority aid for women and their empowerment.
Community access to produce or gain access to necessary goods and services.

2.5 THE PRINCIPLE OF OWNERSHIP

The most important thing about the principle of ownership is that it seeks to entrench the ownership of development where it belongs, with the community. Community development programmes and projects do not belong to the initiating development agency or government departments. They act as facilitators for the people who run their own projects. If the principle of ownership is to be adhered to, it must be established at the outset who will have authority. There should be no question as to where the authority lies. Gran (1983:169) alluded

“it should be clear by now that ... development cannot and should not be externally managed. More properly, development should be but lightly guided.”

According to Swanepoel (1997), the developing organisation and its workers should have no authority over a project. This can pose real threats to established interests, be they government institutions with an authoritative style or elites with vested economic interests that may be threatened by the mass ownership of development (Wisner, 1988).

2.6 THE PRINCIPLE OF RELEASE

The main goal of development is to eradicate poverty. Development is intended to free people from the deprivation trap. The extent of the poverty crisis is not always realised, especially when the “not-so-poor” or the “enterprising part of the community” are targeted for development.

Welfare oriented projects targeting a specific area of relief may see only one dimension of poverty and, by focusing on a particular manifestation, may miss the global picture (Swanepoel, 1997). The humanistic and holistic approach to development forces development practitioners to look at more than only relief,
emergency or improvement. If the whole person is to be the target of development, and if development aims to meet his or her abstract needs of self-reliance and dignity, then it must be more than a relief operation. Development becomes an effort at total transformation (Obaidullah, 1980) in order to release the whole person from the jaws of poverty. By their nature, development efforts quite often tend to maintain the status quo. Their recognition of the status quo forces them to restrict themselves to bringing short-term or repetitive relief to a situation without addressing its causes. It is imperative to realise that such efforts conform instead of transforming the status quo. According to Chambers (1983), conforming efforts try to bring relief to trapped people without freeing them from the trap. It must be emphasised that transforming efforts go beyond bringing relief. Rather, they attempt to release people from the trap so that they can become free and self-reliant and gradually improve their own situation. Transformative Development usually frees and then improves. If it improves first, it seldom frees. Efforts at relief do not have the ability to ‘reverse the accelerating spiral of poverty’ (Wisner, 1988). According to Gran (1983), development should be a ‘self-sustaining’ process to engage free men and women in activities that meet their basic human needs. It must be emphasised that transforming and releasing approach and policy must also be carried out by transforming and releasing actions. At the end of the day, appropriate actions are just as important as appropriate policies and approaches.

2.7 THE PRINCIPLE OF LEARNING

When people continuously strive to fulfill their needs, they learn to realise their objectives more easily. This underpins the principle of learning. All people who are involved in development must learn. The responsibility for learning is distributed between the people and the development organisations and its workers. No one person teaches another. Rather, all are students of the situation and all learn from the realities of the situation. Soedjatmoko (1986:20) calls this is “a collective process by which neighbourhoods, villages, communities, and
ultimately the nation state prepare themselves not only to adjust to change, but also to direct change.”

Learning cannot be curtailed by non-negotiable or established frameworks. This implies an empty agenda at the start. Development organisations or community development workers come into the community with a clean slate (Korten, 1980). The community development workers have nothing to offer than themselves and their willingness to become involved in the people’s efforts to break out of the deprivation trap. A process that Korten (1991a) calls “bottom-up learning” evolves from the “coming together” of the community worker and the community.

### 2.8 OBSTACLES TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

There are several obstacles to the success of development projects. People’s poverty and their lack of self-sufficiency and self-reliance make it extremely difficult to get them to participate in development efforts. According to Swanepoel (1997), the following are some of the obstacles:

- **Illiteracy causes inferiority complexes.** People are afraid to participate, thinking that they cannot make worthwhile contributions. Community development specifically wants to involve the ordinary person. Yet, many believe that innovations must come from educated people or from the rich. Illiteracy also hampers organisational functions such as keeping the minutes of meetings, doing surveys, and bookkeeping.

- **Customs and traditions can be obstacles because people feel obliged to follow them even if they work against development.** Submission to traditional leaders and the inferior position of women are examples of this. But, customs and tradition are not obstacles *per se*. On the contrary, they tend to adapt themselves to suit the times. However, where people keep them static for some reason, they can hinder development.

- **Dependency can become entrenched.** People may have become so used to being dependent on the government and other agencies, that
receiving handouts is accepted as the norm. People are therefore loath to do things for the common good, and often expect to be paid for their efforts.

- Apathy becomes something to fall back on. People are so used to being poor and suffering the consequences of poverty that they have no real desire to do anything but survive. They accommodate their poverty and misery by accepting it as their way of life. They are also fearful of innovation because, for them, it carries tremendous risk.

These obstacles cannot be ignored. Community development’s aim is to overcome them. Every community development project must take note of them, address them and, to a certain extent, accommodate them. In short, these obstacles are real and ignoring or breaking them down by force will obstruct community development further.

### 2.9 SUMMARY

From the review, one of the outstanding lessons in this chapter is that community development is not a method to be applied by experts, although they have a role to play. It is not meant for the government or development agencies, although they also have a role to play. It is not meant for the elite, although it is clear that in most cases they also have a role to play. It is not a method whereby the elites, government officials or experts keep communities busy by involving them in a worthwhile action. Community development is primarily a process in which the ordinary people will play a leading part while the government, experts, and elites play a facilitating role. The primary focus on ordinary people makes community development unique.

Swanepoel (1997) argues that when more people are involved in a project, especially from outside the community, the less the community members will feel involved and responsible for the outcome. It is for this reason that one could say that community development leads to community building. Not only do people
gain in self-sufficiency, self-reliance, and dignity, but they also learn how to
organise more effectively and to develop their leadership structures.

One could conclude by saying that, if the project is properly planned and carefully
implemented, the project will play an important role in alleviating poverty,
providing assets and building capacity and skills for the community to develop
themselves. However, if public works projects and programmes are not properly
planned and carefully implemented, they will generally go disastrously wrong.
From the above discussion it may be seen that proper community development is
crucial for the long-term health of a development programme. The effectiveness
of the community development component will be one of the criteria by which the
South African large-scale development programmes will be evaluated.
CHAPTER 3
OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYMENT CREATION THROUGH PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an overview of the Sub-Saharan and South African experience in regard to development programmes and public works projects. History has shown that labour-intensive methods of work have long been used in creating remarkable infrastructure works. Labour-intensive programmes generate more direct and indirect local employment opportunities and income by using locally available inputs (materials, simple tools and local labour) and thus creating a greater demand for local products and services than do high-technology programmes that rely on imported technology and equipment. Over the past 25 years, several projects have been initiated in South Africa to counter unemployment and poverty (McCutcheon et al, 2007). It is envisaged that there will be others in the future. From a theoretical perspective supported by experience elsewhere in Africa, there are reasons for considering that properly formulated employment creation programmes based on the use of labour-intensive methods could be established to construct and maintain the required physical infrastructure, thus creating employment, skills and institutional capacities.

This chapter examines the past African experiences in implementing development programmes and projects, in which labour-intensive methods played an important role, with regard to their successes and problems. The chapter then critically looks at the experiences and problems encountered in the
implementation of labour-intensive public works programmes and projects in South Africa. The chapter closes with some recommendations for the future.

3.2 POVERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA

The new estimates of poverty by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) shows that the proportion of people living in poverty in South Africa has not changed significantly between 1996 and 2001. The households living in poverty have sunk deeper into poverty and the gap between rich and poor has widened. Eastern Cape is leading followed by Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal respectively. The Gauteng’s poverty gap has grown faster between 1996 and 2001 than all other provinces. This is probably a result of its population growth rapidly exceeding economic growth. The poverty gap has grown faster than the economy indicating that poor households have not shared in the benefits of economic growth. In 1996, the total poverty gap was equivalent to 6.7% of gross domestic product (GDP) and by 2001 it had risen to 8.3%. South Africa like most developing nations has a high proportion of its population falling into the category of “youth”.

The levels of unemployment and poverty are high in South Africa among the youth population which is between 18 and 35 years. By 2008, the youth make up 67.4% of the unemployed (Statistics South Africa, 2008) and mostly they have never worked. The level of unemployment was 9.18% in 1972; 7% in 1980; 10% in 1985; 15% in 1990; 22% in 1995 (Human Development Report, 2004); 30.2% in 2002; 27.4% in 2003; 25.6% in 2004; 26.5% in 2005 and 23% in 2007 and 21.9% in 2008 (Statistics South Africa, 2008). The high rate of unemployment and poverty requires the establishment of a large-scale public works programme which will employ the large number of unemployed and unskilled South Africans. The large-scale public works programme must be implemented through the use of labour-intensive construction methods. Table 3.1 shows the poverty indicators by province. Table 3.1 shows that the population of KwaZulu-Natal has the biggest poverty gap (R18.3 billion).
Table 3.1: Poverty indicators by province in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of poor persons (million)</th>
<th>Population in poverty (%)</th>
<th>Poverty gap (R billion)</th>
<th>Share of poverty gap (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ngoma, A.N. 2005

3.3 YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

Table 3.2 shows the employment status of the youth category which is defined as people between the ages of 18 to 35 years. It uses data from the Labour Force Surveys of 2001 and 2004.
Table 3.2: Employment status (official definition of employment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment status</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not economically active</td>
<td>5 301 206</td>
<td>5 419 493</td>
<td>5 734 023</td>
<td>6 338 939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>5 370 419</td>
<td>5 121 588</td>
<td>5 103 594</td>
<td>5 259 895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>3 119 080</td>
<td>3 437 903</td>
<td>3 778 716</td>
<td>3 380 434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13 790 706</td>
<td>13 978 984</td>
<td>14 616 333</td>
<td>14 979 268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ngoma, A.N. 2005

The provincial distribution of youth employment shows that the highest rate of employment was in Gauteng (29.2%); followed by KwaZulu-Natal (18.9%) and the Western Cape (17.0%). The Northern Cape has the lowest employment rate (1.8%); followed by the Free State (6.0%) and Limpopo (5.9%). The highest rate of employment is amongst the 26 to 35 year old age cohorts. The statistics below shows that employment rates have decreased among both age cohorts. Similarly, there has been a decrease in the employment rate of young women. In 2001, 45.9% of young women were employed compared to 54.1% of young men. A comparison between 2001 and 2004 shows that youth male employment increased by 2.5% and decreased 7.4% among young women. In addition, the decrease in the total employment for all youth was (-) 2.1%.
Table 3.3: Employment age cohorts that are 18 to 25 years and 26 to 35 years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age category (Years)</th>
<th>2001 %</th>
<th>2002 %</th>
<th>2003 %</th>
<th>2004 %</th>
<th>% change 2001 to 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 to 25 years</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 to 35 years</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>2001 %</th>
<th>2002 %</th>
<th>2003 %</th>
<th>2004 %</th>
<th>% change 2001 to 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ngoma, A.N. 2005

3.4 UNEMPLOYMENT AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

The low education and skills levels among the youth in South Africa resulted in a rise in unemployment. The employment opportunities in high skills occupation categories in South Africa have increased, but there is a decrease in employment opportunities for semi-skilled and unskilled workers. The labour market is increasingly demanding highly skilled labour, while the demand for semi-skilled and unskilled labour is decreasing. This had been necessitated by the shift from a labour-intensive to capital-intensive mode of production and the consequent decreased employment opportunities for semi-skilled and unskilled workers.

According to Matas (1996) the Bantu Education Act, Act No. 47 of 1953 established a Black Education Department in the Department of Native Affairs which would compile a curriculum that suited the nature and requirements of black people. The aim was to prevent Africans receiving an education that would lead them to aspire to positions they wouldn’t be allowed to hold in society. Africans were to receive an education designed to provide them with skills to
serve their own people in the homelands or work in labouring jobs under whites. On the other hand the job reservation of 1951 applied to Blacks, Coloureds and Indians. The notion behind job reservation was the best, the most highly skilled jobs, should be reserved for whites. The 1951 Native Building Workers Act provided that no Black might be employed as skilled building workers outside of a Bantu area (Matas, 1996). The above discussed Acts created a skills shortage among the Africans to compete in the labour market. A large number of people are without any skills and therefore a need to generate employment opportunities which requires low level of skills and this form the basic foundation for advocating labour-intensive construction methods to be utilised in the implementation of large-scale public works programmes.

Higher educational attainment among the youth is very low. There are only 37 113 youths that have either a masters or doctoral degree, and only 61 356 youth have an honours degree. As a percentage of the youth population, tertiary education attainment is below 0.3% for either qualification and total tertiary achievement is well below 10% (Youth Development Journal, 2004). In 2001, there were about 1 158 031 youth with no schooling and 1 011 098 with Grade 8 [previously standard 6 or form 1].

Historically, the construction industry has relied largely on a core of highly skilled staff (generally white and often expatriate) to supervise a largely semi-skilled and unskilled workforce (generally black). The decline in demand for construction products over the past decades, and associated uncertainty, has seen a reduction in skills training since the 1980s, and the closing down of industry training institutions in the 1990s. Before the current (2008) boom it was reported that only about 70% of the available training capacity is currently being utilised (CIDB, 2004). Skills enhancement in the construction industry faces a very particular challenge since the construction sector employs the fourth highest number of persons having no formal education – after agriculture, households and mining. Industry has expressed a view that the skills supplied to the market through the Further Education and Training (FET) system were in many cases not
appropriate to their needs, resulting in a skills gap. While industry-based training is seen as better aligned with company-specific requirements, the South African Qualification Authority (SAQA) does not accredit some trainers, and some do not issue certificates for training and employment. This tendency limits mobility and career path prospects (CIDB, 2004).

Table 3.4 below shows the skills category, additional skills requirements and experience requirements for non-residential building in South Africa.

Table 3.4:  **Case study: non-residential building**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skills category</th>
<th>Additional skills requirements (number of people)</th>
<th>Experience requirements (years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contract directors</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10 to 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracts managers</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>2 to 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site agents</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>2 to 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site engineers</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>2 to 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foremen</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>2 to 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior foremen</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>2 to 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shutter hands</td>
<td>1 200</td>
<td>0.25 to 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebar hands</td>
<td>1 200</td>
<td>0.25 to 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB), 2007*

3.5 **PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES AND EMPLOYMENT CREATION**

Large-scale public works programmes have a long history in the industrialised countries as an economic-policy tool, both as a fiscal measure to expand or contract public spending in periods of unbalanced domestic demand, as well as a short-term measure to alleviate unemployment. In order to alleviate poverty and generate employment during the construction and maintenance of infrastructure projects, attempts must be made to encourage the use of labour-intensive
methods. In Chapter 1 the author provided the reasons for using the term “labour-intensive” thought; to repeat: it is in the legislation on The Framework Agreement which was signed on 22 June 1993 by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) and the National Committee for Labour Intensive Construction (NCLIC) (SA Labour Bulletin, 1994). The Framework Agreement in which the civil engineering industry committed itself to maximise the use of labour-intensive methods of construction within public works programmes was discussed between 1992 and 1994. The following were the main features of the Framework Agreement:

- The employment of people rather than machines.
- Community involvement in planning a project and its implementation.
- Improvement of services to the community.
- Training including managerial and administrative training, as well as general education like literacy and numeracy; and
- Task-based remuneration.

Based on the above Framework Agreement the author will use labour-intensive method throughout the thesis. McCutcheon (2008) defined labour-intensive construction as the economically efficient employment of as great a proportion of labour as is technically feasible, ideally throughout the construction process including the production of materials, to produce as high a standard of construction as demanded by the specification and allowed by the funding available; labour-intensive construction results in the generation of a significant increase in employment opportunities per unit of expenditure by comparison with conventional capital-intensive methods. Labour-intensive construction results in the generation of a substantial increase in employment opportunities per unit of expenditure by comparison with conventional capital-intensive methods. By “substantial”, it is meant that there are 300% to 600% increases in employment generated per unit of expenditure (McCutcheon, 2003).
On the other hand Bentall et al (1999:219) defined the “labour-intensive approach” as an approach where labour is the dominant resource for carrying out works and where the share of the total project cost spent on labour is high (typically 25 to 60%). The term “labour-intensive approach” indicates that optimal use is made of labour as the predominant resource in infrastructure projects, while ensuring cost-effectiveness and safeguarding quality. This involves a judicious combination of labour and appropriate equipment, which is generally light equipment. It also means ensuring that labour-intensive projects do not degenerate into “make-work” projects, in which cost and quality aspects are ignored.

3.6 OVERVIEW OF AFRICAN EXPERIENCES THROUGH THE USE OF THE LABOUR-INTENSIVE APPROACH IN PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES

The use of employment-intensive public works programmes is not new to Africa. In the 1960s, three countries in North Africa, namely Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, experimented with such programmes. Although started initially as emergency relief work programmes, especially in rural areas, it gradually came to acquire a development orientation. The Moroccan experiment, known as National Promotion, was launched in June 1961. This large-scale programme aimed at enhancing opportunities for the rural unemployed in productive works. It also attempts to slow down the rural exodus and problems associated with rural populations in the development process. According to one estimate, the programme provided employment for 85 000 workers per month during the peak season and increased GNP by 3.6% (Jara, 1971).

During the period between 1959 and 1960, a large Tunisian works programme, known as Worksites to Combat Underdevelopment, was carried out with 80% of the cost being borne by Tunisian authorities and the remaining 20% in the form of food aid from the United States. The employment created was equivalent to an annual average of 20.7 days per head of Tunisia’s labour force (Jara, 1971).
Algeria, the publicly-sponsored works programme, known as Worksites for Full Employment (Chantiers de Plein Emploi), began operating in 1962 as a relief operation. It soon acquired a strong development orientation to maximise employment in a project of economic interest, namely reforestation work to fight the severe erosion problem (Jara, 1971). In 1965, the People’s Worksites Reforestation (Chantiers Populaires de Reboisement) was created as a statutory body attached to the Forestry Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. Since then, the World Food Programme has provided assistance and the scope of projects have been increased to include land reclamation and other infrastructural works (Jara, 1971).

A few countries have tried to create, through employment-intensive infrastructural works, relatively small “functional economic areas” in the countryside in an attempt to stem rural-urban migration and retain more people on the land. An example is the Djoliba pilot project in Mali (Jara, 1971). It converted a swollen rural village into an agro-urban community, which calls for several layers of investment in infrastructure. This project has tested the feasibility of the establishment of some 150 rural centres that would service Mali’s more than 10,000 villages. The Volta River Settlement Programme of Ghana, involving the creation of network of rural towns and access roads, is another example of rural spatial planning. Three times as many workers were employed in these resettlement preparations than were involved in building the Volta dam, showing the employment-generating potential of employment-intensive infrastructural investment.

In Kenya, over 12,000 km of rural access roads have been constructed and over 80,000 man-years of employment have been created (McCutcheon, 1993). The Kenyan Rural Access Roads Programme is the overall responsibility of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, but operates within the national District Focus policy which gives great autonomy to the local level. According to McCutcheon (1993), the methods have been considered so successful that they have been introduced in the secondary roads network (the Minor Roads
Programme). In Botswana, a national programme of labour-intensive road construction units has been set up within District Councils, which are semi-autonomous bodies under the overall responsibility of the Ministry of Local Governments and Lands. This programme has resulted in the creation of over 3,000 jobs (total employment within the public sector is only 20,000) and the construction and upgrading of nearly 2,000 km of road (McCutcheon, 1995).

Thus, within different institutional and organisational frameworks, a wide range of techniques of labour-intensive road construction has been extensively tried and tested since 1984. Despite their valuable contribution to employment-generation, many of the earlier experiments in employment-intensive public works in Africa suffered from one or more of the following short-comings (Barker, 1986; Abedian and Standish, 1986; UNDP and ILO, 1987; Ligthelm and van Niekerk, 1986; McCutcheon, 1990, 1994, 2001; McCutcheon and Taylor-Parkins, 2003): the ad hoc nature of schemes, lacking spatial focus and often without any links to national rural development and infrastructural planning systems; makeshift administrative arrangements and failure to inject sufficient managerial and engineering skills and technical competence into project selection and execution, as well as choice of technology, resulting in poor project planning, programming and manpower management; lack of balance between centralisation and effective involvement of local administrations and popular bodies in crucial programme decisions, planning and implementation; failure to adjust programme operation and intensity to seasonal labour demand for agricultural operations; lack of precision about target groups and programming on the basis of inadequate information about beneficiary groups; lack of adequate and sustained political commitment and allocation of public funds for the programmes; inadequate post-project maintenance arrangements; and inadequate emphasis on, and arrangements for, reporting cost-benefit studies and general performance evaluation. Many pilot projects had been implemented in countries such as Kenya, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi and Ghana.
3.7 INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT

Infrastructure can deliver major benefits in economic growth, poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability – but it can only do this when it provides services that respond to effective demand and does so efficiently (World Bank, 1994). Until the end of the 1980s, infrastructure was neglected as one of the factors in economic growth. Since then, the effect of public infrastructure on the long-run performance of an economy has been debated in the academic literature and public policy circles. According to Aschauer (1988) and Munnell (1992) additional infrastructure investment has a significant positive effect on aggregate and regional economic activity. Other scholars such as Hulten and Schwab (1993) argue not only that infrastructure influences growth, but that other factors are correlated as well. Although correlation does not imply causality, it is significant that economic development and infrastructure are closely associated (Queiroz and Gautam, 1992). While there is no consensus on the exact nature of the impact of infrastructure on growth, many studies on the topic have concluded that the role of infrastructure in growth is substantial, significant, and frequently greater than that of investment in other forms of capital. A shortage of infrastructure services puts pressure on the public sector for more infrastructures. A capable and willing public sector that decides when and where infrastructure is expanded is essential. A strategy where infrastructure leads to growth also requires policy makers to make spatial choices about which areas and regions are to receive additional infrastructure. When infrastructure follows growth, the choices are more sector than spatially orientated. Political choices under such conditions are more likely to involve economic sector interest groups rather than spatially orientated ones (DBSA, 1998a).

3.8 The Need for Public Works Programmes in South Africa

As mentioned above public works infrastructure programmes and projects have been seen as a major development tool for transforming the lives of people throughout the developing world. The chronic socio-political problems of South Africa, augmented by the continuing weak performance of the economy,
have resulted in a deteriorating labour absorption capacity of the formal economy, an expanding informal economy and rapidly rising unemployment and poverty. The collapse of commodity prices and the prolonged droughts of the 1980s and 1990s compounded the already poor economic performance and have entrenched the poverty cycle experienced by the unemployed and underemployed. The severity of these problems as well as existing structural rigidities in the South African economy signifies the need for an active policy to redress past developments. In an effort to raise living standards, sustainable economic growth and structural reform are necessary to empower deprived communities and to bring them into the mainstream of the economic process.

A major component of a policy aimed at breaking the cycle of poverty should be a large scale, well co-ordinated public works programme. Implemented in conjunction with other supportive policies (in particular, fundamental restructuring of ownership within the economy), it has the ability to absorb large numbers of involuntarily unemployed persons and arrest the process of impoverishment. Not only does it act as a net to catch social tensions that culminate in crime and violence during the economic-political transition phase, but also facilitates the restructuring of ownership which in turn enhances the revival of economic growth and development.

3.9 IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS THROUGH LABOUR-INTENSIVE METHODS IN SOUTH AFRICA: SUMMARY OF EXPERIENCES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The Government of National Unity initiated the National Public Works Programme (NPWP) after the first democratic elections in 1994. In essence the NPWP consisted of a process of labour-intensification and increased training and capacity building in the provision of infrastructure. The NPWP was a key component of the Government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (McCutcheon, 1995). The NPWP shifted towards a Community Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP), which placed more emphasis upon smaller
companies and regulatory bodies than a national programme. Prior to the NPWP another initiative was the set up of the Framework Agreement. This was later incorporated into NPWP. The Framework Agreement was a social compact between Government, labour, the construction industry and the civics (McCutcheon, 1999). The main item in the Agreement is first, where industry commits itself, to maximise the use of labour-intensive systems of construction within public works programmes, with due regard to economics. In turn COSATU agreed to the linking of performance tasks to payment (output based remuneration).

The seminar was very useful in the sense that it provided a good background to the subject. Based on Abedian and Standish’s (1986) report for the Human Sciences Research Council, the Trade Union Research Project reported that the most prevalent causes of failure of public works programmes were: seldom scaled to the magnitude of national manpower needs; often introduced in a fragmented and unsystematic way; implemented using inappropriate technology; introduced on an ad hoc basis and were not linked to an overall development policy; lacking administrative back-up; lacking adequate post project maintenance; and almost entirely dependent upon the government’s commitment to the programme.

If there were a lack of commitment this would have been reflected in a lack of funding. The Public Works Programmes led to the creation of direct short-term employment during the construction phase as well as long-term and more durable employment from the productive utilisation and regular maintenance of the created assets. The net employment generated through the PWPs must also take into account indirect employment stemming from project activity (for instance, purchase and transport of locally produced material inputs) and secondary employment resulting from the PWP workers’ increased consumption. Apart from their significant impact on employment and income levels of the poorest groups, the development assets created under the PWPs are expected to increase agricultural production, reduce environmental degradation, open up
communication in hitherto inaccessible areas, and provide basic amenities for the beneficiary communities.

In South Africa, large-scale programmes and projects with similar objectives have not been as effective as elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa and Tunisia. Since 1994, billions of Rands have been spent on projects and so-called programmes with stated objectives of both creating employment and providing physical infrastructure such as roads, water supply and sanitation (Thwala, 2001). To these objectives, community participation and entrepreneurial development have been added. One of the projects that were implemented was the Greater Soweto Upgrading Project. The Greater Soweto Upgrading Project was introduced to eliminate the enormous backlog in the civil engineering services that prevailed in the Greater Soweto area in 1980 using labour-intensive methods of construction. The project represents a lost opportunity to use labour-based technology. The construction that was to be completed under phase 1 was to comprise of roads, streets, storm water, water supply reticulation and sewerage at a total value of R300 million. 70% roads; 60% streets; 75% storm water, 67% water supply reticulation and 76% sewerage were completed under phase 1 (Thwala, 2001). The R300 million was supposed to complete the whole of phase 1, but unfortunately it did not. The main reasons were that there was a lack of proper planning and the project was managed as an emergency project. There were no employment figures which were kept for the whole project. These large-scale programmes and projects implemented before 1994 were dealt with in great detail by Thwala (2001) and will be summarised below in Chapter 4.

- It is unfortunate that labour-intensive construction was not applied because if implemented correctly was ideal for the programme. Not only would unemployment figures have dropped, but entrepreneurial skills would have been developed. This would leave locals in a position to market themselves and secure employment. What was intended to be a labour-intensive project became a capital-intensive one. The contractors which were employed to construct the infrastructure employed more people from outside the project area. About 10% of
the total budget was used on labour as compared to labour-intensive projects where the money spent on labour can be between 30 to 40% of the total budget (McCutcheon, 2005). It seems that the construction industry in South Africa generally still believes that the labour-intensive approach is not an appropriate method of construction. There is a strong belief that labour-intensive construction methods are too slow (time), too expensive (cost), and that the quality is not at an acceptable level (quality) (McCutcheon, 2003). These constitute the main constraints seen by the industry to accept the use of labour-intensive methods of construction. The first Quarterly Report for the fourth year of the Expanded Public Works Programme (2007/2008) identified the following challenges in the implementation of the EPWP:

- Limited numbers of accredited training service providers mainly in rural areas.
- Lack of human resources at provincial and municipal level.
- Limited use of the EPWP tender and design guidelines.
- Limited hard skills training for the workers on EPWP projects.
- Some project level data is not of quality

The large-scale public works programme in South Africa should change as the policy environment changes from relief, emergency and “special” public works programme to a long-term structured employment-generation programme. The approach should link economic growth, employment and investment policies. The public works programme must aim to ensure that infrastructure is planned around local needs rather than vice-versa. As will be seen, the project was a total failure if seen as a development initiative. The community was not involved in any decision making. Communities were not encouraged to become sufficiently organised to have input into the project and the community was not left with any new skills after project completion. The GSP was a learning experience and engineers and planners must learn from the mistakes that were made, so that similar projects can be successful in the future. Based on both the international and local experiences, the problems of public works development projects can be
attributed to the following factors, which must be avoided in order for large-scale projects to be successful in South Africa. There has been a lack of clear objectives linking the short and long-term visions of the programme and there were no pilot projects with extensive training programmes or lead-in time to allow for proper planning at a national scale.

3.10 SUMMARY

In the early phases, the emphasis was upon the creation of employment opportunities for unskilled labour. Over the past decade, it has become clear that in order to use labour productively it is necessary to train a skilled supervisor who is technically and organisationally competent and thus able to direct and motivate the workers under his or her control. In Kenya the ratio of site-supervisors to labourers is about 1 to 70; in Botswana it is about 1 to 20) (McCutcheon and Marshall, 1998). Equally, for a successful national programme, it is necessary to educate engineers about employment creation and train them in the specific skills required in planning, control and evaluation of large labour-intensive programmes (to date the ratio is about one engineer per 300 labourers) (McCutcheon and Marshall, 1998). In time, an experienced technician or technologist should be able to do this level of work releasing the engineer for engineering and planning.

McCutcheon (1994) considered the following points as the main reasons for the success of the programmes in Kenya and Botswana: good preliminary analytical work and thorough attention to technical aspects throughout the work; pilot projects which tested all aspects (technical, administrative, organisational, institutional, wage rates and conditions of employment, training, planning, socio-economic \ community) and acted as the embryonic training programme for future work; strong institutions with good management systems: yet flexible; extensive training; long-term political support; and long-term financial support. Development programmes and projects in South Africa should change as the policy environment changes, from relief, emergency to a long-term structured employment-generation programme. The approach should link economic growth,
employment and investment policies. Development projects must aim to ensure that infrastructure is planned around local needs rather than vice-versa. The Government needs to establish a long term programme on employment intensive construction. This cannot be established overnight, and will take some years to grow into a national programme.

From the above, it may be seen that proper planning and implementation of labour-intensive programme is crucial for large-scale development programme that had been implemented in different countries in Africa. The extent to which labour-intensive methods have been used in the South African large-scale development programmes will be one of the criteria by which the programmes will be evaluated.

In the next chapter we will deal with the evaluation of the projects and programmes that were implemented before 1994. Chapter 4 is followed by several chapters which describe and evaluate large-scale programmes and projects implemented after 1994.
CHAPTER 4
PRE–1994 LARGE-SCALE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES
AND PROJECTS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The pre-1994 Government had initiated several development programmes and projects to alleviate unemployment and poverty in almost all areas that were occupied by Black South Africans. The focus of this chapter is to highlight the objectives and outcomes of the pre-1994 development programmes and projects. This chapter will further look at the lessons that were learnt from the implementation of such projects and programme to inform future projects and programmes that were implemented in the post-1994 period. The projects and programmes were supposed to be developmental in nature. This means the projects were supposed to improve the welfare of the people after being implemented. These projects were important because development is one of the important challenges facing the human race and more pronounced in developing countries such as South Africa. Todaro (1997) defines development as a process of improving the quality of all human lives. Thus the projects and programmes that were implemented were supposed to empower the local people.

Of the projects and programmes that were implemented in the period prior to the first democratic elections in 1994, the author focused upon the following in his MSc Engineering dissertation (Thwala, 2001).

- The Greater Soweto Upgrading Project;
- The Republic of South Africa KwaZulu/Natal Development Programme;
• Strategic Oil Reserve Fund; and
• The Special Employment Creation Programme.

As earlier stated the focus of this chapter will be on the above mentioned projects and programmes. Below the author will examine the conclusion reached in his dissertation in order to be able to compare and contrast with the results of major large-scale projects and programmes implemented after the advent of democracy in 1994. It must be noted that other smaller projects that were implemented but the above were chosen based on the size and budget which ran into billions of Rands.

4.2 THE GREATER SOWETO UPGRADING PROJECT

The Greater Soweto Upgrading Project was initiated in the early 1980s to eliminate the enormous infrastructure backlog that existed in the civil engineering services that prevailed in the Greater Soweto area (Thwala, 2001). This backlog was so pronounced in the late 1970s and drastic measures had to be taken to alleviate such a situation by the Nationalist Government. This led to the planning and implementation of the programme in the early 1980s. The programme was supposed to be implemented through the use of labour-intensive method to construct the civil engineering services.

Labour-intensive is defined by McCutcheon (2003) as the economically efficient employment of as great a proportion of labour as is technically feasible to produce as high a standard of construction as demanded by the specification. The dominant resource for carrying out works, and where the share of the total project cost spent on labour is high (typically 25 to 60%). On the other hand the International Labour Organisation (1979) defines the extensive use of labour in construction projects as the labour-intensive approach. When small equipment is used to realize a certain level of quality or progress when not feasible solely by labour, the approach is called labour-based or equipment supported (McCutcheon and Taylor-Parkins, 2003). However, the author of the research has used the term labour-intensive and this is the term used throughout this thesis.
The Research Centre for Employment Creation and Development at the University of the Witwatersrand prefer to use employment-intensive as a way of identifying this approach due to the negative connotations of the phrase labour-intensive. The main objective of the use of maximum employment in construction and maintenance can be divided into a long-term development objective and numerous short-term objectives.

4.3 PROGRAMME ACHIEVEMENT

According to the research conducted by Thwala (2001) the construction that was to be completed under Phase 1 comprised roads, streets, stormwater drainage, water reticulation and sewerage at a total cost (in 1981 terms) of R115 million (US$150 million). Furthermore, the research showed that the programme achieved about 33% of the stated programme objectives. The main objective was the elimination of the civil engineering infrastructure backlog in the Greater Soweto area. Table 4.1 clearly indicates what was planned and what was achieved by the programme.
Table 4.1: Total infrastructure backlog roads, streets and stormwater drainage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Size / distance planned</th>
<th>What was achieved?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stormwater drainage</td>
<td>385 km</td>
<td>115 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountable kerbing (300 mm)</td>
<td>427 km</td>
<td>140 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four lane arterial roads (14.8 m wide)</td>
<td>9 km</td>
<td>3.0 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arterial roads (7.4 m wide)</td>
<td>5 km</td>
<td>1.4 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebuilding of existing surfaced roads</td>
<td>34 km</td>
<td>11 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resurfacing of existing roads</td>
<td>173 km</td>
<td>54 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of heavy duty pavement</td>
<td>220 000 m²</td>
<td>74 800 m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intersections upgrading</td>
<td>50 000 m²</td>
<td>17 000 m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of 6 m wide roads</td>
<td>14 km</td>
<td>6 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of 5.5 m wide roads</td>
<td>130 km</td>
<td>43.2 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of 4.5 m wide roads</td>
<td>380 km</td>
<td>127.2 km</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Viljoen, 1987
### Table 4.2: Sewerage services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>What was achieved?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading the existing reticulation where necessary</td>
<td>Some reticulation was upgraded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extensions to the Bushkoppie Sewerage Purification Works Phase 1</td>
<td>The extensions to Bushkoppie Sewerage were not completed (completed after 1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of the Bushkoppie Outfall Sewer Phase 1</td>
<td>It was completed after 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of the Relief Sewer of the Olifantsvlei-Dube Outfall Sewer</td>
<td>It was completed after 1987</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Viljoen, 1987

### Table 4.3: Water supply and reticulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Location of scope of work</th>
<th>What was achieved?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building reservoirs</td>
<td>Dobsonville Chiawelo Diepkloof Meadowlands</td>
<td>Completed Not completed Not completed Not completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augmentation of the primary distribution system</td>
<td>Dobsonville Chiawelo Diepkloof Meadowlands</td>
<td>Not completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading secondary reticulation: replace all 50 mm pipes by either 75 mm or 100 mm pipes</td>
<td>Dobsonville Chiawelo Diepkloof Meadowlands</td>
<td>25% of the upgrading was done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installation of water meters</td>
<td>Dobsonville Chiawelo Diepkloof Meadowlands</td>
<td>20% of the water meters were installed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair all leaking taps and fittings</td>
<td>Dobsonville Chiawelo Diepkloof Meadowlands</td>
<td>This was not done</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Viljoen, 1987
4.4 LESSONS LEARNT

There are several lessons that can be learnt from the Greater Soweto Upgrading Programme. The programme was not well planned as a developmental programme. According to the DBSA (1993) a project in a developing area should include objectives that go beyond the provision of a physical facility. The intention of the development impact approach is to encourage the participation of local communities through the project sequence, from identification to operation and maintenance, so that maximum benefits accrue to the community as a result of the process. The GSUP was implemented as an emergency relief project. The GSUP was supposed to be a labour-intensive programme but it became a capital-intensive one due to lack of planning and the rush for implementation. One of the major shortcomings was the lack of labour-intensive expertise at the design stage to design for labour-intensive implementation. According to Thwala (2001) about 10% of the total budget was used on labour as compared to labour-intensive projects where the money spent on labour can range between 30 to 40% of the total budget (McCutcheon, 2003). The project failed to eliminate the civil engineering infrastructure backlog for the people of Soweto. The GSUP was a total failure when measured as a development project. The programme objectives were too broad and were not clearly defined. The Greater Soweto Upgrading Project was a good learning experience for project consultants, politicians, engineers, town planners, development planners and the community to learn from mistakes that were made to avoid them in future projects.

4.5 THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA KWAZULU-NATAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

The aim of the development programme was to improve the quality of life of the Black people living in KwaZulu-Natal through infrastructure provision and this was to be done through the generation of employment through the use of labour-intensive methods. The original budget for the project was R2.4 billion. According to the findings in Thwala’s (2001) MSc Engineering dissertation, the following were the objectives of the programme:
• To investigate and submit recommendations to the KwaZulu-Natal government and the Republic of South Africa on ways and means of improving the quality of lives for Blacks in KwaZulu-Natal with their full participation;

• To develop a range of options for the provision of engineering services along with a spectrum of low to high standards and costs;

• To compile a comprehensive planning report with implementation proposals, costs and the programme for the upgrading and development of infrastructure in the Durban metropolitan area and its surrounding;

• To formalise the existing shacks in terms of planning and engineering standards;

• To plan shacks according to the needs and preferences of shack dwellers;

• To involve blacks in development projects as employers and not as employees;

• To help Black shack dwellers to help themselves;

• To provide 16 000 serviced sites with standpipes and ventilated improved pit latrines (VIPs) each year;

• To promote self-sustaining economic development through the creation of viable urban communities;

• To ensure local communities acquire their rightful share in the economy;

• To ensure that money spent on capital works can be channelled, as far as possible, into the pockets of the local communities; and,

• To ensure that the recommended options are not be affordable.

4.5.1 Development programme achievement

Table 4.4 shows the achievement of the RSA KwaZulu-Natal Development Programme and the money spent on each project.

What was achieved?

760 Projects: R681.2 million
Table 4.4: Project achievements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Number of contracts</th>
<th>Cost of projects (R million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schools projects</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>52.9 (7.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and general projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Planning projects</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Survey projects</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Town planning projects</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Environmental projects</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and general projects</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>95.7 (14.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal services projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sites</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>190.1 (27.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sites</td>
<td>32 480</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulk services projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Road projects</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>280.8 (41.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Refuse sites</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Electrification</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sanitation projects</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Water projects</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulk services projects</td>
<td>263</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Community facilities</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>61.7 (9.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Administration facilities</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Library facilities</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Clinics</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cemeteries</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sports facilities</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Minor works projects</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other projects</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other projects</td>
<td>237</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Thwala, 2001
4.5.2 Lessons learnt

The Planning Council was able to prepare plans for each community and detailed report which entails the proposal for the upgrading and development of specific areas in KwaZulu-Natal. It is important to note that the KwaZulu-Natal Planning Council was able to prioritise the projects for approval and implementation. According to Thwala (2001) the objectives were difficult to achieve based on the following problems identified:

- The government initiated, implemented and financed the development projects without private sector involvement;
- Planning and acquiring tribal land was a lengthy procedure. Approval procedure was also a long and expensive process.
- The selling price of sites as stipulated by Proclamation R293 was uneconomical for the government and/or private sector.
- A development plan approved by the local Joint Committee which involved the community and the KwaZulu-Natal government could be rejected by the Department of Aid in Pretoria.
- The position of the Tribal Authority was threatened since it had no role to play in the administration, financing and implementation strategies. For the private sector involved, the above problems had to be eliminated.

Another problem was that this project had too many objectives which contributed to its failure. All that the Planning Council managed to do was to establish the status quo which was something that Urban Foundation had already considered before. The qualitative objectives needed to be defined and be measurable in terms of time, cost, quality and performance. There are no figures available to show how many people were trained and how much was spent on the training.

Secondly, unlike the Kenyan Rural Access Road Programme (KRARP) where one aspect (the constructing of rural access roads) was taken at a time, the RSA KwaZulu-Natal Programme took so many aspects at one time to achieve its aim.
This then contributed to its failure because the geographic area was too big to be covered by so many objectives at one time. The question of training was also overlooked in the RSA KwaZulu-Natal Programme. This was exemplified in their Vulindlela example, where the Working Groups realised after the tendering process that many Black Entrepreneurs needed training in contracting procedures. On the contrary, during the implementing of the KRARP, which is one of the most successful projects ever made in developing areas, authorities realised that the question of training was important. They made provisions for training in regard to how and when it will be done, at what cost and so on (McCutcheon, 2001).

Another issue that was overlooked by the RSA KwaZulu-Natal programme was to conduct a pilot study first. In KRARP, piloting was well planned and well implemented. It was emphasised that for a project to be a success, scope and output should be increased gradually. At the same time, whilst piloting on the one hand, training should also be in progress. Officers in charge of KRARP’s field units were trained for 6 weeks, site overseers for 13 weeks, and those to be responsible for road maintenance were to be trained for 3 weeks (McCutcheon, 1993).

The options that the RSA KwaZulu-Natal generated were too general. They did not stipulate that findings from settlement A, for example, indicated that so many percent would prefer such an option. This then made it difficult for the Planning Council to implement those options. The other problem is that one of the objectives of the RSA KwaZulu-Natal Programme was to plan shacks for the Black people with their full participation. Although in a way, the working group tried to achieve planning decisions were taken in a utopian fashion. No involvement of the affected communities was obtained in deriving the options that the working committees generated. Instead, options were derived from the office.
The following were the lessons learnt for future programme success (Thwala, 2001):

- There was commitment by the RSA and KwaZulu-Natal government to fund the programme.
- The institutional system was created.
- Planning of the programme lacked the involvement of the affected communities.
- Development in rural land posed a challenge to the planner and engineer. This was further complicated by guidelines presented by the Council.
- Lack of data related to the implementation of 70 approved projects to the value of R107.78 million makes it difficult to access the level of success of the programme.
- Since the projects selected were to be labour intensive, information on the implementation of the approved projects would provide a measure necessary to access:
  - The quality of the product.
  - The efficiency of the construction methods.
  - The breakdown of project cost, showing the percentage of total costs which would go to labour.
  - The RSA KwaZulu-Natal programme lack of documentation on implemented projects made it difficult to evaluate it.

4.6 STRATEGIC OIL RESERVES FUND PROGRAMMES

The Strategic Reserve Fund Programme was funded through the sale of oil reserves. According to Greyling (1995) the main aim of the programme was to provide short-term solutions in order to address social instability and the programme was funded to the value of R1 billion. The emphasis in the Strategic Oil Reserve project was the use of labour-intensive construction methods in all
projects being planned and implemented. The focus of this report is on the R250 million which was allocated to 14 road authorities for the provision and maintenance of road infrastructure. The money was to be spent over a period of 30 months.

According to Greyling (1995) the funds were to be spent according to the following guidelines:

- Preference would be given to requests for grants for projects with a once-off character due to the once-off nature of the funds;
- The project should result in alleviation of economic and stability problems within a fairly short period of time;
- Existing financial allocations, manpower resources, and physical facilities should be optimally utilised;
- The greatest possible degree of community involvement should occur in the identification of projects, the carrying out of the projects, and the responsible use of the assets that are created;
- Where possible, communities should contribute labour.

According to Greyling (1995) and correspondence from Central Economic Advisory Services (1991) only project which fulfill or contribute to the following criteria would be fully considered:

- Alleviation of unemployment with special reference to labour intensive construction methods;
- The increase of social and political stability;
- The degree of community involvement in all aspects of the project including:
  - project identification
  - determination of priorities
  - project implementation
• responsibility for work carried out
• Reduction of backlogs – particularly in rural road infrastructure;
• Utilisation of available resources;
• Retention of existing job opportunities;
• The use of the most “cost-effective” utilisation of funds while reconciling community needs and stability;
• Projects were to be of a special “once-off” nature.

4.6.1 Achievement of project objectives

According to Greyling (1994) the following were the achievements of the projects based on its stated objectives:

• Unemployment was alleviated,
• Community road backlogs were reduced; and
• Existing job opportunities were retained.

With regard to the retention of existing job opportunities, it is not applicable to new areas of operation but it was the focus of the majority of Provincial Road activities.

The impact of the above constraints and problems was that the programme did not significantly achieve the following;

• Employment
  • 57% done using conventional methods;
  • 36% was done using labour extensively;
  • Only 7% work done using labour intensive;
• Socio-economic stability
4.6.2 Achievement of plans and lessons learnt

According to Thwala (2001) the following were the shortcomings of the Strategic Oil Reserves project:

- The organisational structure used by the DoT to co-ordinate the programme was ineffective, as there was no support from the functional directorates within the department. The directorates of Design, Construction, Financial Administration and Strategic Planning should all have formed part of the structure.

- The autonomous nature of all the authorities participating in the programme did not allow the DoT to effectively intervene (when necessary) with the standards and construction techniques used by each.

- Regional offices of the DoT did not provide sufficient support regarding the inspection of works and the overall administration of the programme.

- The strong control by the DoT over expenditure ensured that 95% of the funds were spent by March 1994, the planned completion date of the programme. Isolated incidents of over-expenditure were effectively handled by reducing the length of road constructed (at a disadvantage to the community concerned).

- The quality of information obtained for monitoring purposes, was highly variable. Information provided by departmental units was generally inferior to that provided by consultants. Works departments kept few records of any relevance.
• Although the line of communication between the DoT and the participating authorities was satisfactory, unnecessary delays in receiving information were experienced because of the number of departments involved and the “protocol” which had to be adhered to.

• The lack of sufficient support in the DoT resulted in an emphasis placed solely on expenditure rather thancoupling it with physical progress. The DoT was too reliant on the honesty of project managers, contractors and departmental representatives. Without effective monitoring and evaluation, the DoT could not improve methods of construction, productivity.

• Departmental teams and contractors generally only attempted traditionally labour-intensive activities (that is, labour-intensive for only a small proportion of overall expenditure). With the exception of QwaQwa and Transkei:

• The majority of projects were run by project managers. As the nature of the work was simple to plan, design and construct, consultants believed that little contracting background was necessary.

• The community-run projects were the least effective, as inadequate preparation (particularly training) took place beforehand.

• Road authorities which carried out conventional road construction (for example, CPA and PAO), were able to implement their projects successfully in the short time provided for planning. The same applied to projects involving simple, easily organised tasks such as grass cutting or the removal of silt from culverts (traditional maintenance).

• Where additional time was granted for ‘planning’, projects contributing to job creation were generally more successful than others.

• The variation in the figures for actual and planned employment generation is a direct result of the lack of previous experience in estimating the resources required (for labour-intensive construction projects), as well as the failure to consult experts.
4.7 THE SPECIAL EMPLOYMENT CREATION PROGRAMME

This section will focus on the Special Employment Creation Programme (SECP) which will be the last programme to be evaluated that was implemented between 1980 and 1994. According to Mthombeni, 1996 Black people in South Africa were hit hard in the 1980s by high unemployment rate, with poor education, inadequate social and physical services. Due to the above reasons the Special Employment Creation Programme (SECP) was initiated by the Nationalist Government to address the unbearable situation which may have led to political instability in most Black areas.

The main aim of the programme was to address the rising trend of cyclical unemployment in South Africa due to the oil crises experienced in the 1970s. The programme’s objective was to provide temporary relief to the unemployed but to refrain from giving them handouts, and to deploy them as productively as possible (Mthombeni, 1996). Furthermore the objectives emphasised the use of labour-intensive methods and were to be in line with the following principles:

- Reduce unemployment in the short-term by using labour-intensive methods;
- Ease the unrest situation (political unrest) at least temporarily;
- Stimulate business activity;
- Due regard should be taken of the distribution of unemployment among the various geographical regions;
- The training of unemployed persons in order to improve their employment potential.
- Provide at least a meal a day for each destitute family;
- Demonstrate that the government is concerned, that is, “one that cares”; and;
- Not conflict with long-term objectives of the government and would therefore have a neutral, although preferably supportive, effect on other objectives.
In addition, according to McCutcheon (2003) the White Paper on Employment Creation stated that the special government expenditure programme had to satisfy some conditions when providing jobs to the poor. The following were the conditions that were to be fulfilled:

- Special attention should be given to the start-up time of the projects.
- Possibilities should be made for rescheduling priorities in favour of labour-intensive projects within the budgetary limits set by stabilisation considerations.
- Special measures should be taken to avoid undertaking projects on the ground of employment creation in the short-term that do not have long-term support from the government.
- Projects implemented should be in line with the interests and needs of the local communities.
- Available funds, administrative and managerial capabilities and other resources for the projects must be used for the successful completion of the project.
- Existing institutional structures should be effectively utilised for the implementation process of the project.
- New job seekers who are directly or indirectly being subsidised by the state should not in any way displace the existing workforce.
- Provision must be made for the thorough widening down and the termination of the project.
4.7.1 Achievements of objectives

The following were the achievements of the programme according to McCutcheon (2003):

The SECP was initiated as an emergency programme and was planned at short notice. The programme was initiated with the socio-psycho-political considerations in mind. One can argue that it was a government tool used to capture the trust of the disadvantaged communities rather than development.

Firstly, the government was concerned about political stability and thus wanted to address it through employment creation. The SECP therefore did not form part of any predetermined, clearly spelt-out plan.

Secondly, the programme was designed to reach a maximum number of persons in as many places as possible. By enlisting the co-operation of various government departments, provincial administrations, development institution and, the private sector and welfare organisations, the efficiency of the SECP in the above cannot be doubted. Some organisations were, however, better equipped to participate in the programme and to adhere to its guidelines.

Thirdly, it is argued that the participants and their organisations, particularly the target groups in the vast majority of instances, have shown some satisfaction and appreciation of the project. Furthermore, in this instance, the Department of Manpower has been helpful and co-operative to the extent that approximately 95% of participating organisations had positive comments generally about the launching of the programme.

Fourthly, even though the SECP was not intended to accommodate the seasonally unemployed persons, it was clear that in areas of seasonal [un]employment, the programme has provided jobs to these workers.
Fifthly, red-tape and bureaucracy were said to be minimal. Some of the government departments had simplified the procedures and forms to accommodate as far as possible with the minimum constraints.

Sixthly, the scheme made possible the substitution of capital for labour (labour-intensive). In several instances, employers had indicated that they had enjoyed working with labour and some had made use of the available labour from the programme as opposed to the use of machines such as bulldozers.

4.7.2 Weaknesses

The SECP, like any other programmes, has its own disadvantages if thoroughly assessed and evaluated. The weaknesses of this programme will be substantiated with evidence from its initial stage to prove its ineffectiveness and inefficiency.

Firstly, the SECP was established to alleviate poverty and reduce unemployment in South Africa. In regions like Bophuthatswana, the Bophuthatswana’s Action Committee felt that the SECP had been hurriedly launched with little time for in-depth planning. According to the DBSA (1987) in McCutcheon (1991), the SECP in South Africa, through its R600 million programme, was not quite a futile exercise. Many people were employed but the overall product was of doubtful value.

This was evident in regions or self-governing territories such as Natal, Transvaal, KwaNdebele, KaNgwane and others. There was a lack of co-ordination and the project tended to confuse the unemployed black people. This is because the SECP had involved many government departments in its implementation process. People had thought that the Joint Management Committee system would be used, to a greater extent, to determine the needs and priorities of the communities.
Secondly, in some instances the supervision and administration of the project proved to be difficult. This gave rise to low productivity, poor supervision and poor project management. People thought that the Joint Management System could have been used as a mechanism to determine the needs and priorities of the communities, particularly in job creation and provision. This is where supervision of projects in some instances presented a problem. It became apparent that in places like Bophuthatswana, the SECP was controlled by the human relief working groups rather than being established as an employment creation programme which attempts to alleviate unemployment problems as accentuated by some of the objectives mentioned.

Thirdly, with respect to the guidelines of the SECP there was considerable latitude in interpretation. While some participants were allowed to continue with the scheme past the 31 March 1986, some were not and this caused considerable inconvenience. This can be proved by the fact that in certain areas, the wage gap was apparent in some instances. Workers in the rural areas were paid approximately R3.00 per day whilst labourers in the urban areas were given R4.00 per day.

Fourthly, in some certain localised instances, the wage rate was seen as inappropriate, being either inadequate or excessive. For example, in areas such as the Transvaal, local authorities in rural areas tended to pay their SECP workers R4.00 per day as against R3.00 per day as it was done by the SECP employers in the other areas. This goes against the fact that when workers were recruited to work with the programme, they were promised to be paid R3.00 per day. Also, some private sector employers of the SECP had reported that workers were not even prepared to work at the wage rate indicated in the programme guidelines. Furthermore, in other areas, million of rands were provided for the project but it was spent ineffectively due to its short-term nature.

Fifthly, the criticism of the SECP in relation to its objectives is its assumption to be a labour-intensive project. This is because the SECP concentrated more on the labour-intensive projects, such as water conservation, soil conservation, weed
eradication and the maintenance of infrastructure. But the question that may be asked is: does the programme that has been implemented resemble the one that was intended? If not, what has happened?

The following were the assessment of the programme based on DBSA evaluation (Viljoen et al., 1987).

- It was reported that up to March 1986, 297 867 people had been employed in temporary jobs.
- The SECP was too short in duration and the amount of money too small to make any significant impact;
- In some cases, supervision and administration was difficult which led to poor productivity;
- Project identification was haphazard; and
- There were time lags in cash payments to institutions.

According to Abedian and Standish (1986) the following were drawbacks of the programme:

- The funds allocated were insufficient.
- The programme was ill-conceived.
- The allocation of funds was too fragmented.
- The programme was too politicised.
- The implementation apparatus was inappropriate.
- The budget allocation was arbitrary.
- The programme was an *ad hoc* attempt.
4.8 PROJECTS AND PROGRAMME FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

One of the common denominators that characterised the pre-1994 development projects and programmes was their focus on alleviating unemployment and poverty among Black South Africans. All the projects and programmes spent millions of Rands to achieve the individual stated objectives. It can be concluded from the evaluation of the projects and programmes that were implemented between 1980 and 1994 that they were unable to achieve their stated objectives. The projects and programmes assumed the character of emergency relief projects where money was spent without focusing on the development goal and impact. Table 4.5 below shows the pre-1994 programmes and projects planned and actual budget.

Table 4.5: Pre-1994 projects and programmes planned and actual budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project name: Project and Programmes</th>
<th>Planned (R billion)</th>
<th>Actual (R billion)</th>
<th>Planned 2008 prices (R billion)</th>
<th>Actual 1994 prices (R billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Soweto Ugrading Project</td>
<td>0.180 (1980)</td>
<td>0.180 (1980)</td>
<td>1.552</td>
<td>1.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Oil Reserve Fund</td>
<td>0.250 (1991)</td>
<td>0.250 (1991)</td>
<td>0.925</td>
<td>0.925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Special Employment Creation Programme</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>1. (1983 to 1992)</td>
<td>4.109</td>
<td>6.848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.430</td>
<td>2.111</td>
<td>17.772</td>
<td>12.500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Currency conversions made by the researcher using rates of exchange and inflation indices obtained from South African Reserve Bank
The main findings of the pre-1994 projects and programmes evaluated are the following:

- Most of the projects and programmes were not thoroughly designed and implemented so that resources were fully utilised.
- No proper planning.
- Labour-intensive methods not used effectively.
- Lack of co-ordination.
- The approach was a short-term emergency relief programme.
- The programmes and projects lacked political commitment from the side of the politicians.
- There was lack of community involvement and participation in planning and preparation of the programme will further facilitate its execution and will strengthen local capacity for development planning generally. (DBSA, 1998; McCutcheon, 2003).

### 4.9 SUMMARY

Developmental programmes need an appropriate developmental strategy including policy and institutional changes made with a conscious understanding of development. Major policy decision-makers must understand the concepts and principles of labour-intensive methods, and the principles of the long-term programmes. Community participation is a very crucial element in regard to labour-intensive methods. This is because it deals with the conceptual development of the community, particularly on issues pertaining to legitimacy, affordability, institutional capacity and user convenience. At the institutional level, what is questioned in this regard is the openness of the decision-making process, a degree of technical complexity, and a degree of community homogeneity.

In conclusion, programmes and projects should follow the principles of the labour-intensive construction and maintenance programmes in order to be able to alleviate the high unemployment programme. The programmes and projects that
were implemented in the pre-1994 period failed because they lacked required conditions for success and because of the difficult political circumstances at that time. The National Party government lacked political commitment to the programme and knowledge about how to implement labour-intensive construction and maintenance methods. The following Chapters will focus on the programmes that were implemented in the post-1994 period.
CHAPTER 5
COMMUNITY BASED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The National Public Works Programme (NPWP) was a long-term programme that aimed at countering the effects of the very high levels of unemployment by creating productive job opportunities that will alleviate the lack of skills and capacity in the country. The main objectives of the National Public Works Programme were to:

- Reduce unemployment through the creation of productive labour-absorbing jobs and opportunities for local contractors, through labour-intensive approaches.
- Educate and train those on the programme as a means of economic empowerment.
- Create, rehabilitate and maintain physical assets – clinics, schools, crèches and roads which serve to meet the basic needs of poor communities and promote broader economic activity.
- Build the capacity of communities to manage their own affairs, strengthen the local government and other institutions and generate sustainable economic development.

The National Public Works Programme (NPWP) covers all the public expenditure on infrastructure for which it was economically viable and practically feasible to use labour-intensive construction techniques. It was realised that the process of labour intensification will take place over a number of years (NPWP, 1995). The eventual goal was the widespread use of labour, rather than machines, where technically and economically feasible. The length of the period required to reach
this goal for a particular type of infrastructure depended on the extent of technical
development work and training required to develop the capacity to use productive
labour-intensive techniques to produce cost-effective and good quality products.
The NPWP covered all public expenditures on infrastructure for which it was
feasible to use labour-intensive construction techniques; the NPWP was only
concerned with certain aspects of the expenditure. These aspects included:

- the labour intensity of the techniques used to provide infrastructure;
- monitoring the efficiency and quality of labour-intensive techniques;
- monitoring the training and capacity building resulting from the
  provision of infrastructure; and
- monitoring other aspects such as the conditions of employment.

A fund of R250 million was made available from the Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RDP) Fund to implement the National Public Works
Programme (NPWP). It was decided by the Department of Public Works to spend
the R250 million to implement the second component of the NPWP, i.e. the
Community Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP). The CBPWP was to be
implemented in two ways, namely by the Provincial Departments of Public Works
and by the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), especially those with a
proven capacity to distribute funds, according to the criteria of the CBPWP
(Mthombeni, 1996). Agreements were reached between the National Department
of Public Works and four NGOs to implement the NPWP.

The CBPWP was a short-term programme within the ambit of the NPWP and
aims at:

- Providing short-term delivery for the Government of National Unity;
- Targeting the most needy;
- Kick-starting the NPWP and demonstrate to government departments
  and the private sector of how sustainable infrastructure could be
delivered with the active involvement of communities, without large-scale use of machinery and without sacrificing standards.

The CBPWP aimed at meeting the needs of the poorest communities in the country, such as: access roads, sanitation, water supply, community facilities such as community halls, clinics, schools and also environmental projects (NPWP, 1995). The main thrust of the CBPWP, especially in its first year was to develop the capacity of the provinces to implement development projects.

In order to receive CBPWP funds projects were supposed to meet the following criteria:

- Labour-intensive methods must be used.
- There must be strong community participation in all aspects of the project, from conception to design, implementation and monitoring.
- Provision must be made for the maintenance and management of the asset once it is completed.
- Assets created must be needed by communities to improve their welfare.
- Training and capacity building must be provided to participants.
- The applicant must demonstrate the capacity to implement the project at the quality specified.

McCutcheon (2007) has done an evaluation of the NPWP and have found out that the NPWP failed to achieve its major objectives on the scale envisaged. In short, the National Public Works Programme made no perceptible impact based upon the nature of public expenditure on public infrastructure, national employment statistics, individual skills development, poverty alleviation or institutional capacity building.

5.2 POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE

The policy /institutional reasons for failure were.
• Responsibility for the National Public Works Programme had been allocated to the Department of Public Works. Despite its name, the Department was essentially the “State’s landlord” and dealt with buildings not infrastructure. Once this had been realised the department concentrated its efforts upon community based relief and small contractor development. Thus, during actual implementation, the focus of attention quickly swung from employment generation through the major industry to “empowerment” i.e. small contractor development. The major construction industry was not involved. The effect of the National Public Works Programme was not perceptible in the major economy.

Equally, implementation relied upon the Community Based Public Works Programme, which generally failed to achieve even the modest objective of serving as a precursor for a larger programme. Furthermore, over time, as the renamed Re-aligned Community Based Public Works Programme, its main emphasis shifted away from infrastructure and employment generation using labour-intensive methods to more social objectives.

• The second set of reasons for the relative failure of the NPWP was related to project implementation and may be summarised as follows:

• Faulty project selection;

• And the lack of the following:
  • training at all levels;
  • planning;
  • institutional capacity at the local level;
  • coherence regarding wage rates and conditions of employment;
  • coherence regarding use of labour-intensive methods;
  • monitoring and evaluation.
These shortcomings were exacerbated by the demands for visible results within a short space of time. However, in the long run, one of the positive elements to emerge from the National Public Works Programme was that the labour legislation necessary for a successful Public Works Programme finally became law in January 2002. After much negotiation and discussion between 1994 and 2002, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 1997, was amended. The source of the concepts and wording for this legislation was the 1993 Framework Agreement, which had been negotiated between the construction industry and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).

The National Department of Public Works managed the Community Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP), one of the government’s key anti-poverty programmes. Since its launch in 1994/1995, the CBPWP has evolved into a major national programme with a complex set of deliverables developed to try and provide a multifaceted response to poverty. To achieve its objectives, the programme draws together a wide range of players from all tiers of government, civil society and the private sector (Mthombeni, 1996).

This chapter focuses on a component of the Community Based Public Works Programme which was implemented between the 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 financial years. The national government allocated R377 million to the Community Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP) of the National Department of Public Works (NDPW) for poverty alleviation and infrastructure development in 1999/2000, and a further R374 million for 2000/2001. The majority of the budget across the two (2) years was allocated to six (6) provinces: KwaZulu-Natal, Northern Province, Eastern Cape, Free State, Mpumalanga and North West.

- CBPWP projects focus, among other things, on poor areas, human development, capacity building and job creation and seek to benefit ‘the poorest of the poor’ including single parent households. The sustainability and financial viability of projects are key considerations, reflecting the overall thrust of the NDPW. The objectives of the programme are recorded as the:
• The creation of useful productive public assets;
• The creation of ongoing job opportunities
• The creation of job opportunities during the construction of the assets;
• The targeting the poorest of the poor primarily in rural areas.


The central thrust of the CBPWP is the provision of appropriate infrastructure in poor communities, creating large-scale temporary employment as well as more limited sustainable employment through the provision of infrastructure that can trigger or enhance (as appropriate) local economic activity. The main focus is the provision of economically sustainable assets that enhance local economic activity. However, the programme also provides assets that have improved social cohesion and/or human resource development as their primary goal. The programme is premised on a participative approach that aims to empower local communities as well as enhance the on-going operation, maintenance and overall sustainability of the assets. To achieve this, the programme seeks to build and develop local leadership through full participation in the programme as well as skills training and other capacity building measures.

The Programme Management System (PMS) is a step-by-step guide to every aspect of the CBPWP. It describes the CBPWP as “a specific job creation and poverty alleviation programme, targeted primarily at the rural poor” and records the CBPWP’s objectives as follows:

• The creation of useful productive public assets;
• The creation of ongoing job opportunities;
• The creation of job opportunities during construction of the assets
• The targeting the poorest of the poor primarily in rural areas.
It is against these objectives that the 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 CBPWP is evaluated in this chapter. However, it is important that the nature and orientation of each programme is understood at the outset. The two (2) years differ considerably from each other, and the evaluation has had to account for these differences, despite evaluating against a common set of objectives.

5.4 THE NATURE OF THE COMMUNITY BASED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME

The CBPWP is made up of two main components: the District Council Programme and Special Projects. In the District Council Programme, local government structures (on the whole) comprise the Programme Implementing Agents (PIAs). The focus is on the neediest District Councils in predominantly rural areas. Those Councils, working within their local integrated development process, target poverty pockets and match them with appropriate assets drawn from the categories described below.

The second component of the CBPWP comprises a range of different projects, collectively called Special Projects. These usually differ from year to year, reflecting particular priorities or directives from Cabinet or the Department of Public Works itself. With their varied emphases, coupled with the fact that the Special Projects often fall beyond the geographic areas targeted by the District Council Programme, the PIAs for these projects vary and include provincial government departments, private sector companies or civil society organisations. Nonetheless, these projects are also largely implemented according to the guidelines and procedures set out in the PMS and, by implication, therefore can be evaluated against the stated objectives of the CBPWP. We now turn to the specific composition of the two (2) years of the CBPWP under evaluation here.
5.5 MANAGING THE COMMUNITY BASED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME

The CBPWP is managed by the National Department of Public Works (NDPW) and largely implemented by District Municipalities in the six (6) provinces (KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Free State, Limpopo/Northern Province, Mpumalanga and North West) identified as containing households described as the poorest of the poor in the six (6) of the nine (9) provinces.

The NDPW has overall financial accountability for the programme, sets policy guidelines, sets employment targets, enters into contracts with Programme Implementing Agents (PIAs) for the implementation of the programme in each District Municipality, and monitors overall progress and performance of the programme. Financial allocation and targets are decided upon by the NDPW based on the annual poverty alleviation budget as approved by the Treasury. Through its internal processes, NDPW allocates budget according to a poverty expenditure model that allocates funds equitably.

The Projects Approval Committee (PAC), comprising an independent committee established by the NDPW, acts to review and approve projects submitted by the PIA. As shown below, the same function of the PAC at the District Municipality level is performed by the Provincial Co-ordinating Committee (PCC). However, where there are particular conditions and circumstances specific to provincial challenges and needs, specific PACs are often constituted to approve special projects falling outside of the District Council Programme.

5.5.1 Provincial Department of Public Works

The PDPW, through the relevant officials, is responsible, among other things, for the following key activities:

- providing a secretariat function to the PCC;
- provincial inter-departmental co-ordination to ensure co-ordination of funding within the province;
- reporting of progress provincially to the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) and PCC; and
- monitoring of performance of the PIAs from an independent perspective.

**Secretariat function**

The role of the Secretariat to the PCC is vital to ensure co-ordinated and timely approval of projects within the province. This structure also ensures that ultimate political accountability for all projects rests with the MEC. The Secretariat provides some of the critical support functions (including the setting of agendas, co-ordination of meeting dates, timely issue of documentation, compilation of project approval submissions, updating of project approval schedules, documentation of resolutions of the PCC, taking minutes at meetings, and notifying PIAs of the PCC’s decision).

**Co-ordination and reporting**

There is need for closer interaction and information sharing regarding key strategic issues when it comes to budget allocations, targets, and programme focus concerning certain poverty stricken areas in the provinces. The assets are created by the CBPWP are part of the provincial public works programmes and, ultimately, part of the national CBPWP. This is because provincial departments are accountable to the NDPW.

**External monitoring by provinces**

One of the main activities that provinces are expected to perform is that of external monitoring. At the beginning of each implementation phase, the NDPW enters into contractual arrangements with the PDPWs. There have been numerous complaints by provinces that the function of monitoring is unimportant,
and that they wanted to be more involved in the implementation of the programme. This reflects a common misperception and one that the Department needs to actively counter. It is vital that the function of monitoring is seen as an important strategic function for provinces.

At the provincial level, there are two important monitoring functions. The first function involves more physical monitoring, and the PPM and PIAs perform this. This involves day-to-day monitoring of projects to check whether the progress is on par and that they are in accordance with the programme objectives, performance of contractors and appropriate payment procedures are being followed. Secondly, there is the function of “monitoring the monitors” by provinces as an independent function. Provinces are meant to check the overall monitoring of the programme objectives done by both PIAs and PPMs. Some of the responsibilities involve checking whether social facilitators are visiting projects and assessing the relationship between the Social Facilitator and the Cluster Manager. All these are done as an attempt to strengthen the programme and are vital activities.

**Provincial Co-ordinating Committee**

The PCC is responsible for the review of proposed allocations of budget by PIAs to targeted poverty pockets, project approval of all projects submitted by PIAs, review of the progress and performance of the programme at a provincial level, and referral of any policy issues that emerge to the NDPW.

**Composition of the Provincial Co-ordinating Committee**

The composition of the PCC takes account of the social-political and economic dynamics of the province. This involves ensuring that there is representation from the Provincial and the National Department of Public Works that technical/developmental expertise is present, and that other relevant departments are represented. These departments were identified by the National Department and the Provincial Heads of Department.
The PCC was chaired by a senior official of the Provincial Department of Public Works (designated by the Head of Department) in order to ensure political accountability for project approval. In most instances, this responsibility is left with the Director for the provincial CBPWP. The National Department of Public Works is represented on the PCC to ensure financial accountability for projects approved and in line with the overall national CBPWP objectives, and that there is constant interaction between national and provincial CBPWP implementation strategies. Also, technical and development expertise is required on the PCC in order to ensure that projects approved are technically sound, as well as appropriate from a developmental perspective.

5.6 THE 1999/2000 COMMUNITY BASED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME

The national government allocated R377 million to the 1999/2000 CBPWP. In addition to the District Council Programme, the 1999/2000 CBPWP concentrated on a number of major Special Projects, including:

- SDI roads – a series of major roads were constructed to facilitate increased access to and movement within the government’s key Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs).
- Youth for Environmental Awareness – a joint project with the National Youth Commission, the project recruited and trained youth to make public facilities more accessible to people with disabilities.
- Clean and Green – a joint project with South African Breweries. This is a refuse collection and recycling project operating mainly in urban areas.

For the most part, these Special Projects were being implemented for the first time. Business Plans had to be developed and the necessary structures and mechanisms for implementation designed and put in place. As a result – and
because Special Projects absorbed a high proportion of the budget – there were initial delays in the disbursement of the 1999/2000 funds.

5.7 THE 2000/2001 COMMUNITY BASED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME

The national government allocated R374 million to the 2000/2001 Programme. The initially slow rate of expenditure experienced by the 1999/2000 Programme (described above) resulted in R25 million of the 2000/2001 Programme budget being withheld by the Department of Finance. As a result, the budget for 2000/2001 was R349 million. In order to counteract the slow expenditure of the 1999/2000 Programme, it was decided that the 2000/2001 Programme would include a major Fast Track component that would run in parallel with the District Council Programme. This Fast Track programme (better known as rapid delivery) was implemented by District Councils along the same lines as the District Council Programme. However, the rapid delivery programme focused on smaller, stand-alone projects that could be implemented in a short space of time and with less consultation and planning than what usually precedes implementation of a cluster of CBPWP projects.

Special Projects implemented under the 2000/2001 Programme included:

- Clean and Green Project
- Community Production Centres (CPCs) – strategic interventions that aim to create sustainable rural economic activity in the agriculture sector.

5.8 BUDGET ALLOCATION

The initial step in the budget allocation process for both years involved allocations to Special Projects. The size of this allocation was decided at ministerial or executive level and passed on to the CBPWP. The next step that followed was allocations to the District Council Programme and to Programme Management
and Institutional Capacity Support. Allocations made to the District Council Programme were made using an updated version of the targeting formula first developed for the CBPWP’s Pre-Implementation Task Team in 1998. The targeting formula was based on poverty levels and population figures within each District Council.

The 1998/99 CBPWP allocated funds to the eight (8) most needy rural District Councils. For the 1999/2000 Programme, these eight (8) District Councils were not eligible for funding. Funds were allocated to the next nine (9) poorest District Councils on the targeting matrix. This resulted in the CBPWP broadening its locus of delivery from the three (3) poorest provinces of KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape and Northern Province to include Free State, Mpumalanga and North West.

For the 2000/2001 Programme, the process of allocating budgets to District Councils was slightly different. Because of the need to boost spending by the CBPWP, allocations to the Fast Track Programme preceded those to the District Council Programme, and were guided by the implementation capacity of District Councils. The targeting formula was applied to the total available budget for both the Fast Track and District Council Programmes. The 20 most needy rural District Councils were eligible for allocation. If the allocation to a District Council for the Fast Track Programme did not exceed the allocation emanating from the targeting formula, the balance was allocated to that District Council for the District Council Programme. Finally, allocations to Programme Management & Institutional Capacity Support were a set percentage of the allocation for the Fast Track and District Council Programmes.

5.8.1 The results

For the 1999/2000 CBPWP, the District Council Programme was allocated just 26% of the budget. The bulk of the budget went to Special Projects (32%) and SDI Roads (27%). Management and Support accounted for 11% of the total budget.
Two-thirds (66%) of the 2000/2001 budget was allocated to District Councils to implement the Fast Track Programme (45%) and the District Council Programme (21%). Special Projects accounted for 23% of the allocation, while Management and Support was again allocated 11% of the budget. In other words, the two years of the CBPWP have substantive differences in content (what they were delivering) and methodology (how they approached delivery – primarily because of fast tracking). These differences are clear when comparing the overall budget allocation for the two programmes, summarised in Table 5.1.

### Table 5.1: Budget allocation 1999/2000 to 2000/2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999/2000 Year</th>
<th></th>
<th>2000/2001 Year</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount (R million)</td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>Amount (R million)</td>
<td>% of total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Council Programme</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Track Programme</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>156.6</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special projects</td>
<td>121.2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDI roads</td>
<td>103.0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management and support</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>377.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>349.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDT, 2003

As indicated above, the 1999/2000 allocation to Special Projects (including SDI Roads) was very high. This delayed expenditure and led to the rapid delivery component of the 2000/2001 programme. Of greater concern for the evaluation is the fact that the very high Special Project allocation also limited the extent to which the CBPWP could meet all its stated objectives. Only a quarter of the budget went towards the District Council Programme and was used strictly
according to the principles and guidelines of the CBPWP. Although Special Projects largely reflect the ethos of the CBPWP, each has a particular difference. The location of Special Projects is not governed by the targeting formula. For example, while Clean & Green is urban based, both of these factors impact negatively on the CBPWP objective of targeting the poorest of the poor primarily in rural areas.

The Special Project component of the CBPWP has grown substantially in recent years. It is imperative to note that the traditional focus of the CBPWP becomes obscured or lost as the programme tries to provide too many services in different parts of the country using different approaches. Given the positive impact of the CBPWP over time as well as the steady improvements made to the programme, it would be a great set back if these gains were lost through lack of focus.

It is imperative that senior management in the Department carefully consider this issue. If Special Projects are to remain an integral part of the CBPWP, senior managers must ensure that all Special Projects fit into the overall CBPWP policy framework and implementation methodology, and contribute towards realising the same objectives.

5.9 WHAT ASSETS WERE DELIVERED BY THE CBPWP?

The CBPWP provides assets drawn from the following categories:

- **Directly productive** – offers economic opportunities such as irrigation schemes, planting of trees and establishment of animal dips.

- **Environmental improvement** – includes infrastructure such as stormwater drainage schemes and improved sanitation systems to improve health conditions and prevent flood damage.

- **Improved access** – closer market integration through, for example, new roads, improved local markets and storage facilities.
• **Labour saving** – This type of infrastructure saves both time and energy in routine domestic tasks and includes water projects, planting of fuel wood and planting of fodder for animals.

• **Social cohesion** – this includes infrastructure such as community halls and sports facilities aimed at boosting the morale of disadvantaged communities in order to improve social cohesion.

For the 2000/2001 Programme, a further category was added:

• **Multi-purpose centres (MPCs)** – centres that house a number of national government departments, allowing them to provide services to poor rural areas that were previously denied access to information and services.

The distribution of projects across the different categories for each programme is shown in Table 5.2.

**Table 5.2: Distribution of projects across the project categories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1999/2000 Year</th>
<th></th>
<th>2000/2001 Year</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>% of total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved access</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly productive</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour saving</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental protection</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Purpose Centres</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1 042</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: IDT, 2003*

The CBPWP went through a process of ‘realignment’ in 1997/1998. In part, this was in response to the 1997 CBPWP evaluation which found that the programme was dominated by assets from the social cohesion category and argued that in the future, the CBPWP should focus on directly productive and improved access assets given that these created more temporary employment during construction and could provide sustainable employment opportunities over time. One of the
key goals of the realigned CBPWP was to trigger or enhance local economic activity in order to create sustainable employment. The assets provided by the CBPWP were categorised as above. The directly productive and improved access categories were at least implicitly at the apex, given the economic goals of the programme. However, the Department has not thus far explicitly addressed the issue of prioritising project categories, and has neither set targets nor produced guidelines as to whether projects drawn from any particularly category should be more or less widespread than others.

The evaluation of the 1998/1999 CBPWP found that directly productive assets comprised 32% and improved access by 27% of all assets delivered. The 1999/2000 CBPWP saw a drop in the proportion of directly productive assets (22%), with improved access forming the largest category of assets provided (37%), followed by social cohesion (26%). As one would expect given the orientation of the 2000/2001 Programme, social cohesion assets formed almost half (46%) of all assets provided followed by improved access (20%) and labour saving (15%). Directly productive assets comprised only 7% of all assets provided.

Analysed over time (focusing on the post-realignment phase of the CBPWP), it is difficult to detect a strategic approach to planning. For directly productive assets, the general trend is downward, while for improved access the reverse is true. The social cohesion category dominates fast-track phases of the CBPWP (RAP-85 and 2000/2001), as expected; but remains a major component of the programme in the absence of fast tracking. Labour saving and environmental projects comprise a small proportion of successive years of the CBPWP.

It is imperative that senior managers in the National Department of Public Works review the status and salience of project categories, as well as the appropriateness of setting targets for categories according to the contribution they make to realising the objectives of the programme.
This would entail NDPW officials playing an active role in the design and planning stages, where each programme year could (and arguably should) be given a specific character (that is, content) reflecting its contribution to meeting government’s anti-poverty objectives. This in turn would be reflected in the targets attached to each project category. This would not replace the process of local consultation and project selection. Rather, these processes would be informed by what the Department wants the CBPWP to achieve.

It was noted earlier that directly productive assets seem to be on the decline, despite their importance in combating poverty through providing sustainable economic opportunities. It is of considerable concern that no directly productive assets were implemented in the Northern Province or Free State during the 1999/2000 or 2000/2001 years of the CBPWP. It is unclear how the provincial management teams in these provinces allowed such a situation to occur for two successive years nor how the monitoring system failed to detect the issue and allow national programme managers to intervene. It is recommended that in the future, national programme managers should regularly assess the composition of the CBPWP (by project category and type) in order to ensure an appropriate distribution of assets.

5.10  THE COST OF DELIVERY

In section 5.1, it was noted that the proportion of the total budget for each programme year was allocated to the different components within that programme. An important indicator of a programme’s efficiency is the proportion of the total budget used to manage and administer the programme – the management cost of a programme. Greater management-level efficiencies lead to lower overheads and thus maximise the resources available for implementation.

This was the result of two factors. Firstly, MMIS did not capture appropriate data that would allow evaluators (and managers) to calculate the cost of creating a day
of employment, for example. Secondly, at a more conceptual level, the status of social facilitation, training and related services is not fixed, and their related costs can be categorised as part of the programme management or implementation. We return to this below.

Providing an accurate figure for the management costs of each programme year is again complicated and an iterative process is needed to ‘unpack’ the figures. Firstly, the programme figures for each year are uneven. Each year included projects for which no professional fees or training costs were reflected on the MMIS, mainly because such projects were implemented by agencies that absorbed these costs (such as the Independent Development Trust).

Secondly, the version of MMIS made available to the author was out of date, which meant that the author has not undertaken a comprehensive analysis of expenditure for each programme. As a result, the following analysis is based on various sources of data and may have slight inaccuracies or inconsistencies. The overall trends, however, should be accurately reflective of the CBPWP.

5.11 CALCULATING THE MANAGEMENT COST OF THE CBPWP

In terms of actual expenditure for each of the years, the Analysis of Final Payments to PIAs is detailed in Table 5.3. For both years, the proportion of budget consumed by the management of the programme seems to be remarkably low by international standards. At 8% and 7% respectively, these figures are roughly half the 13% to 15% range considered acceptable internationally. Closer interrogation of the data is clearly required.
Table 5.3: Actual expenditure as per analysis of final payments to project implementing agency by year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (R million)</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Amount (R million)</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project implementing agency allocations</td>
<td>339.4</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>336.4</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management/support</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>368.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>360.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDT, 2003

The PIA allocations (92% and 93% respectively) in fact include funds for management and support at PIA level. In other words, management costs appear in both rows of Table 5.3, reflecting their different location within the programme (national/provincial versus PIA/local). If PIA management and support costs are taken into account, the cost of management and support for the CBPWP increases to 10% for 1999/2000 and 8% for 2000/2001. The Table below shows Actual Expenditure taking into account management/support at PIA level by year.

Table 5.4: Actual expenditure taking into account management/support at project implementing agency level by year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (R million)</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Amount (R million)</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project implementing agency allocations</td>
<td>330.9</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>330.1</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management/support</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>368.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>360.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDT, 2003

Even when the management costs within PIA allocations are accounted for, the overall management cost for both years of the CBPWP remains very low. This is a very positive finding for the NDPW. However, to accurately calculate the
management cost of the CBPWP required further analysis, including scrutinising the content and budget of what MMIS records as 'Professional fees'. In doing this analysis, the author re-visited the debate regarding the appropriate categorisation of different services either as management or implementation costs.

The 'Professional fees' covers the costs of service providers including cluster managers, cluster social facilitators, and technical consultants. However, social facilitation can be regarded as a project implementation cost required by the participative methodology of the CBPWP, rather than a management cost. This is a matter of perspective: there are sound arguments for both approaches to accounting for facilitation costs. While this may be a matter of perspective, it also has a significant impact on the total management costs of the CBPWP. Bearing in mind the cautionary remarks made earlier about the reliability of the data, it seems the management cost of the CBPWP for 1999/2000 was within accepted international norms. If the costs of social facilitation are included among management costs, the CBPWP (at 17%) is at the higher end of acceptable management costs. If social facilitation is excluded, the management cost (at 15%) is well within international norms, a very positive result for the National Department of Public Works as shown in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: CBPWP management cost (including/excluding social facilitation by year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme year</th>
<th>Management cost including social facilitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999/2000</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/2001</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management cost excluding social facilitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999/2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/2001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDT, 2003

However, when we turn to the 2000/2001 year, the results are less positive. The 2000/2001 the CBPWP included a large rapid delivery component, which aimed to increase expenditure by selecting assets that required less ‘process’ (that is, consultation and pre-implementation participation) thus speeding up implementation and cutting down on the costs of social facilitators. The goal was worthy: maximise throughput and impact, albeit at the expense of consultation and participation. The result was, however, somewhat different. The management cost of the rapid delivery year stood at 21% including social facilitation or 18% excluding the costs of facilitation. In other words, fast tracking the CBPWP increases rather than decreases management costs.

In subsequent sections, the author identified many of the trade-offs required by rapid delivery or fast track mode including consultation, participation, issues pertaining to gender equality and other social goals of the programme. Taken in conjunction with the fact that rapid delivery increases management costs and decreases project expenses (see below for more detail), the author strongly recommend that senior management in the Department engage with their counterparts in the Ministry and carefully re-consider the whole issue of fast track/rapid delivery as it relates to the CBPWP. This should include the appropriateness of trying to apply a fast track methodology to a participative and
community based programme, as well as scaling down the objectives and targets of the CBPWP in fast track mode. The CBPWP, in standard mode, seems to be efficiently managed, enjoying a relatively low management cost. In rapid delivery mode, however, the management costs of the CBPWP increases significantly.

5.12 EXPENDITURE

Having looked at the breakdown of the overall expenditure for each programme, this section focuses on the actual expenditure at project level. The total cost of a project is made up of three (3) components: project expenses, professional fees, and training costs. Training expenses should constitute a maximum of 5% of project expenses. Professional fees should constitute a maximum of 18.5% of project expenses, broken down as follows:

- cluster manager (2%);
- cluster social facilitator (4%);
- technical designer (8.5%);
- technical disbursements (2.5%); and,
- site supervision (1.5%).

Adding these components together results in the following breakdown of total project costs: project expenses (81%), professional fees (15%) and training expenses (4%). Firstly, for both programme years, the proportion of expenditure on project expenses exceeded the expected 81%. While this may be a good thing, it depends on which other components of the budget were sacrificed as shown in Appendix 2. Both programmes failed to spend more than 1% on training (instead of the 4% target). The 1999/2000 year increased project expenses at the expense of training and professional fees, where expenditure stood at 11% (this is below the 15% target). Expenditure for the 2000/2001 year, however, was very different. Project expenses amounted to 83% – higher than the 81% target but considerably lower than the previous year. Expenditure on training remained low.
but professional fees rose to 16% (this is higher than the target of 15% and also considerably higher than the previous year, possibly caused by the greater number of smaller projects).

The logic behind rapid delivery mode is to maximise project expenditure and increase the speed of implementation, mainly by selecting smaller projects (for example, adding classrooms rather than building community halls) from categories that require less consultation and facilitation. However, the result seems to be the opposite: project expenditure drops while the management costs of the CBPWP increased significantly. This underscores the recommendation made earlier regarding the need to review the status and value of rapid delivery/fast track mode.

5.13 THE PROVISION OF TRAINING

As mentioned above, the provision of training to workers is an important aspect of the CBPWP. For the 1999/2000 CBPWP, the training budget was R6.2 million, 3% of the total project budget. However, MMIS reflects that only R2.9 million of this was actually spent – less than half (46%) the budgeted amount and, just 1% of total project expenditure. In all 2 924 workers received training, less than 1 in 5 (18%) of the total workforce.

The training budget for the 2000/2001 CBPWP was R8.7 million, 2% of the total project budget. As with the 1999/2000 programme, less than half (48%) of the budget was actually spent on training, again comprising 1% of total project expenditure. MMIS reports that 2 824 workers received training, less than 1 in 10 (9%) of the total workforce. The provision of training has been an on-going weakness of the CBPWP. The overall trend is for fewer and fewer workers to receive training on successive years of the CBPWP. It is imperative to recommend that a review of the status and purpose of training is initiated within the NDPW. The programme cannot train all workers, given the rotation of the workforce and other factors. The programme has thus far struggled to provide
training to one in four workers. In fast track mode, these drop to one in ten. There was no policy that identifies who should receive training, in what areas, for how long, to what standard and so on. Nor are there targets for the provision of training. The NDPW should develop a training strategy that sets realistic targets for training provision, type, quality, duration and so on. The Department should also ensure that training provision is a management responsibility, and that MMIS can monitor provision against targets as the programme unfolds.

5.14 CREATING EMPLOYMENT

Job creation is an important aspect of the CBPWP. As stated in the PMS, job creation entails two different components:

- Creating short-term employment opportunities for community members by means of construction of public assets.
- Creating sustainable employment opportunities by facilitating micro business opportunities associated with the community assets created.

MMIS reflects the total number of people who were employed during the construction of assets. It also records the number of sustainable jobs created by these assets.

5.14.1 Sustainable employment

If one looks at the two categories in reverse order, it is immediately apparent that ‘sustainable’ employment by definition can only be measured over time, something MMIS is not in a position to do. This is not a criticism of what MMIS tries to do. In order to generate data regarding ‘sustainable’ employment, MMIS records data from the ‘Project Handover Report’ completed by the Cluster Manager when a project is officially handed over to the relevant Local Authority.

MMIS should be commended for trying to track this key category; but verification is clearly vital in this regard. Using MMIS data, it was found that for the 1999/2000 CBPWP, 16 395 workers were employed across 265 projects – an average of
62 workers per project. The MMIS states that 618 sustainable jobs resulted from these 265 projects – an average of two (2) jobs per project. In contrast, the 2000/2001 CBPWP employed 30 776 workers across 1 042 projects at an average of 30 workers per project. The programme is reported to have created 1 553 sustainable jobs – an average of one (1) job per project.

There were significant differences across the provinces within each Programme, as shown below. On the issue of ‘sustainable’ employment, 491 of the 618 jobs created (79%) were in KwaZulu-Natal. In contrast, the Northern Province CBPWP did not result in any sustainable jobs being created, presumably resulting in part from the absence of any directly productive assets being provided. Table 5.6 shows the job opportunities created.

Table 5.6: Short and long-term job opportunities created by year and province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total number of workers</th>
<th>Average workers per project</th>
<th>Total sustainable jobs</th>
<th>Average jobs per project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999/2000</td>
<td>16 395</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Eastern Cape</td>
<td>8 134</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>5 766</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Northern Province</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• North West</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mpumalanga</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Free State</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/2001</td>
<td>30 776</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1 553</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Eastern Cape</td>
<td>16 915</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>9 541</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1 483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Northern Province</td>
<td>2 688</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• North West</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mpumalanga</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Free State</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field work carried out by the researcher in 2004
Given that the creation of sustainable employment is an overall objective of the CBPWP, it is strongly recommended that appropriate mechanisms are put in place for accurately measuring it over time.

### 5.14.2 Temporary employment

The average number of workers per project on the 1999/2000 CBPWP was 62. This was considerably higher in the Eastern Cape (103) and KwaZulu-Natal (89). In all other provinces, the average number of workers per project was less than 25. This may partially reflect more effective rotation of workers in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, but this does not account for the very large differences between the provinces. This may be an area the Department should look into.

The average number of workers per project on the 2000/2001 CBPWP was less than half that of the 1999/2000 year. This is to be expected given the nature and orientation of the 2000/2001 CBPWP. Nonetheless, the worker/project averages for Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal were again the highest across the provinces. These figures strongly suggest that there are different implementation practises being used across the provinces.

Finally, the evaluation of the 1998/1999 CBPWP noted that the MMIS did not provide figures for the total person days of temporary work created. This made it impossible to calculate the cost of creating a day of employment on the CBPWP for the programme as a whole or for project categories.

MMIS does now include a field for capturing this information, for which the NDPW should be commended. However, the data captured is far from complete. For 1999/2000, data was only available for 79 of the 265 projects (30%), while for 2000/2001 only 334 of the 1 024 projects (33%) had any data captured. As a result, we remain unable to calculate the cost of creating a day of labour on the CBPWP, a basic indicator used world-wide to measure efficiency and effectiveness. Having ensured that MMIS has the capacity to record data needed
in this regard, the NDPW must now ensure that data are regularly collected and verified for accuracy.

### 5.14.3 Meeting the CBPWP employment targets

The CBPWP has the following employment targets:

- At least 50% of the workforce should be women.
- At least 15% of the workforce should be youth.
- At least 1.5% of the workforce should be disabled.

According to MMIS, the 1999/2000 CBPWP failed to meet the employment target set for women, with only 46% of the workforce being women. The target for youth was exceeded by some margin. Youth comprised 47% of the workforce. The target for disabled workers was also exceeded, with 2% of the workforce falling into this category. The 2000/2001 programme also failed to meet the target for women, who dropped from the 1999/2000 level to comprise just 43% of the total workforce. The youth target was again exceeded – 44% of the workforce were youth – as was the target for disabled people, who comprised 2% of the workforce. Only in Mpumalanga was the target for employing women met during 1999/2000. In the Northern Province, women constituted just 38% of the workforce. The target for female employment during 2000/2001 was met only in the North West, with KwaZulu-Natal (37%) and Free State (34%) lagging far behind.

The evaluation of the 1998/99 CBPWP found that women constituted just 38% of the entire workforce compared with 47% in 1999/2000 and 43% the following year. There has been a significant improvement in the employment of women. However, the Department must strengthen its commitment to meeting this target. In particular, it must work with all provinces to ensure that barriers to the employment of women are identified and combated. Some of these barriers may result from different recruitment and implementation procedures used in different
provinces. There were differences across the provinces in meeting these targets as shown in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7: Performance in meeting in the employment targets by year and province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Women (%)</th>
<th>Youth (%)</th>
<th>Disabled (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999/2000</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Province</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 2000/2001     | 43%       | 44%       | 2%           |
| Eastern Cape  | 46%       | 43%       | 2%           |
| KwaZulu-Natal | 37%       | 44%       | 2%           |
| Northern Province | 48%   | 52%       | 1%           |
| North West    | 54%       | 55%       | 2%           |
| Mpumalanga    | 43%       | 46%       | 5%           |
| Free State    | 34%       | 41%       | 2%           |

*Source: Field work carried out by the researcher in 2004*

The target for youth employment is easily being met – and exceeded – by successive phases of the CBPWP. Finally, it should be noted that rapid delivery or fast track mode negatively impacts on the ability of the CBPWP to meet its employment targets and thus achieve its social goals. The proportions of both women and youth were lower during the 2000/2001 CBPWP than in the previous year. Interestingly, the proportion of disabled workers remained constant. As it have noted elsewhere, rapid delivery mode requires trade-offs in return for faster expenditure and output. These trade-offs currently occur in areas linked to the
transformational social goals of the CBPWP, such as the employment of women (others are identified in later chapters). As part of its review of rapid delivery/fast track, the Department must define the location and limits of these trade-offs, if they are to continue.

5.15 SUMMARY

According to MMIS data, the 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 years of the CBPWP differed markedly, had different strengths and weaknesses, and cannot be assessed as a single entity. However, both years are evaluated against the same criteria, namely the objectives set out in the PMS. The 1999/2000 CBPWP included the District Council Programme as well as a series of Special Projects. Expenditure was slow, in large part as a result of the need to develop systems and procedures for the Special Projects. The 2000/2001 year included a large fast track component that complemented the District Council Programme, in order to counteract the slow expenditure of the preceding year.

The District Council Programme was allocated just 26% of the CBPWP budget for 1999/2000. In the following year, this figure was 23%, with a further 66% allocated to the fast track programme. There is a danger that the flagship of the CBPWP – the District Council Programme – will be submerged under a welter of ever-changing Special Projects. Special Projects, in turn, limit the ability of the CBPWP to meet its objectives. They are not identified by the targeting formula; rather, some are urban rather than rural, and so on. It is recommended that senior management in the Department carefully consider this issue. If Special Projects are to remain an integral part of the CBPWP, senior managers must ensure that all Special Projects fit into the overall CBPWP policy framework and implementation methodology, and contribute towards realising the same objectives.

The 1999/2000 CBPWP was dominated by improved access (37%) and social cohesion projects (26%), while directly productive assets comprised a fifth of the
programme. The 2000/2001 year looked very different, reflecting its fast track nature. Social cohesion assets made up almost half the programme (46%), followed by improved access (20%) while directly productive assets comprised less than a tenth of the programme (7%). It is strongly recommended project categories be reviewed and appropriate targets be set for the different categories according to the contribution they make to realising the objectives of the programme. This would entail playing an active role in the design and planning stages, where each programme year could (and arguably should) be given a specific character (i.e. content) reflecting its contribution to meeting government’s anti-poverty objectives. This, in turn, would be reflected in the targets attached to each project category. This would not in any way replace the process of local consultation and project selection. Rather, these processes would be informed by what the Department wants the CBPWP to achieve in any given year.

The management cost of the 1999/2000 CBPWP was 17% if social facilitation costs are included, or 15% if social facilitation costs are excluded. This is a positive finding, within international norms, suggesting that the programme design included appropriate efficiencies. The 2000/2001 year had less positive results, with management costs of 21% including social facilitation and 18% excluding facilitation costs. The *raison d’etre* of a fast-track approach is to expedite implementation by selecting projects requiring limited consultation and facilitation, allowing savings on process-related matters and maximising implementation and impact. However, exactly the reverse occurred. Management costs for the 2000/2001 CBPWP increased rather than decreased. The quality of product need to be improved.

This is confirmed when project expenditure figures are analysed. Professional fees at the project level stood at 11% for 1999/2000, rising to 16% the following year (also exceeding the 15% target). Rapid delivery costs more than standard implementation. It also requires a series of trade-offs, such as limiting consultation and participation. We strongly recommend that senior management in the Department engage with their counterparts in the Ministry and carefully
consider the whole issue of fast track/rapid delivery as it relates to the CBPWP. This should include the appropriateness of trying to apply a fast-track methodology to a participative and community based programme, as well as scaling down the objectives and targets of the CBPWP in fast-track mode.

Programmes in both 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 failed to spend more than 1% of the 4% set aside for training. This is a significant failing for both programme years. The provision of training has been an on-going weakness of the CBPWP over time, and the overall trend is on the decline. The programme cannot train all workers, given the rotation of the workforce and other factors. The programme has thus far struggled to provide training to one in four workers. In fast-track mode, this drops to one in ten.

The 1999/2000 CBPWP employed 16 395 people on 265 projects, at an average of 62 workers per project. The following year saw 30 776 people employed across 1 042 projects, an average of 30 workers per project. Within both years, there was a significant provincial difference that required more detailed investigation by the NDPW. In response to the evaluation of the 1998/1999 CBPWP, MMIS does now include a field for recording the total person days of temporary work created. However, the data captured is far from complete. Having ensured that MMIS has the capacity to record data needed in this regard, the NDPW must now ensure that data are regularly collected and verified for accuracy.

Without accurate data, it was impossible to calculate the cost of creating a day of employment on the CBPWP for either programme year. MMIS does attempt to measure the creation of sustainable employment, but has limited resources and possibly inappropriate tools for doing so. Given that the creation of sustainable employment is an overall objective of the CBPWP, it is recommended that appropriate mechanisms are put in place for accurately measuring it over time.

The CBPWP, in both 1999/2000 and 2000/2001, failed to meet its 50% employment target for women, reaching 46% in 1999/2000 and 43% the following year. On a positive note, both years of the programme exceeded the 15% target
for youth (47% in 1999/2000 and 44% in 2000/2001) and the 1.5% target for people with disabilities (2% in both years). The NDPW must intervene decisively if the CBPWP is to reach the employment target for women. This must include close liaison with provinces, where very different employment procedures are in use.
CHAPTER 6
THE NATIONAL FOOD EMERGENCY PROGRAMME

6.1 INTRODUCTION
This Chapter focuses on the National Food Emergency Programme one of the programmes that was implemented by the government after 1994. The National Department of Social Development (NDOSD) appointed the Independent Development Trust (IDT) in February 2003 as the Programme Implementing Agency (PIA) for the 2002/2003 National Food Emergency Programme (see Appendix B for Concept Plan Document). Although this programme had no developmental focus but an employment focus in the short-term that was supposed to have a long-term employment benefits. Among other responsibilities, the IDT was tasked with identifying and appointing service providers whose responsibility was to procure, package and deliver food parcels to delivery points located close to beneficiary households. The IDT’s role as the PIA also entails working in consultation with national and provincial DOSDs and partnering with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and businesses to plan and implement the Programme. The programme was completed at the end of September 2003. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed analysis of how the programme was planned, managed and implemented. It also highlights the challenges that were experienced during implementation and the lessons learned. It is hoped that this analysis will help management successfully implement food emergency programmes of this scale in the future.
6.2 THE NATIONAL FOOD EMERGENCY PROGRAMME

The National Food Emergency Programme (NFEP), is a part of the Integrated Food Security and Nutrition Programme. The IFSNP was planned to operationalise the policy thrust enunciated by the Minister of Finance in his mid-term budget review speech to Parliament on 30 October 2002, in which he allocated about R400 million to the Social Cluster to reduce the effects caused by increased food prices, especially to vulnerable groups by providing food relief to the vulnerable families in the short term and in the longer term increase their food production capacities and capabilities. The Strategy has five pillars or programmes, namely:

- Food Production and Trade Programme;
- Community Development Programme;
- Nutrition and Food Safety Programme;
- Safety-nets and Food Emergencies; and
- Information and Communication Management Programme.

The NFEP is a component of the safety-nets and Food Emergencies Programme. In 2002/2003, R230 million of the R400 million allocated to the IFSNP was allocated to the NFEP. It was aimed at limiting the effects of hunger and poverty by distributing food relief as the first form of intervention targeting the destitute, after which the qualifying beneficiaries would receive social grants and/or be assisted through alternative and other viable means of meeting their daily food requirements such as agricultural starter packs and/or linkage to other poverty relief projects in the following model:

- At entry level, the most vulnerable household receives a food parcel for three months. It is also at this stage that the beneficiary is linked to the Social Security System. In the short term, the programme is aimed at reaching 218 000 households.

- For the medium term intervention, it is envisaged that the Department of Agriculture will stimulate production through the provision of production starter packs, targeting to reach at least 200 000
households for a total of R100 million. This stage was supposed to see the linking of the household / beneficiary to a community production centre. This centre was aimed at mobilising the community and scaling up the production and building capacity of participants in preparation for their venturing into individual businesses. It was at this stage that markets, quality control and business/financial management was to be emphasised. Saving schemes and social finance was supposed to be introduced at this stage.

- In the long term, individual entrepreneurs were supposed to be linked to financial institutions like the Land Bank, the Khula Investments, etc and markets will be secured starting with government tenders for schools and hospitals.

The main objectives of the NFEP are:

- To provide direct food aid to vulnerable groups who do not have sufficient food due to insufficient or lack of income;
- To provide agricultural inputs and tools to the vulnerable households in order to produce their own food and improve their means of livelihood;
- To provide support for the implementation of income generating activities; and
- To provide relief and production support to affected SADC neighbouring countries.

The principles adopted for the implementation of the programme included:

- Utilisation of existing structures, processes, procedures and systems to fast track implementation;
- Utilisation of public private partnerships including co-operatives to stretch the interventions in terms of value;
- Active engagement of provinces and local government structures;
• The intervention will be aimed at augmenting the current budgets of the departments of Social Development and other departments that are linked to the scheme;

• Incremental approach in terms of coverage will be employed based on time frames, capacity to deliver and financial resources.

In terms of the NFEP model, the IDT’s involvement was limited to the entry level, that is, delivery of food parcels to beneficiaries for three (3) months. This chapter will therefore focus only on this activity.

6.3 PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT PLAN

6.3.1 Programme scope

In broad terms, the NFEP is a “Food Emergency” programme that was geared to provide interim relief measures to vulnerable groups that do not have access to adequate and nutritious food. This was to be done by providing them with a standard food parcel for three (3) months. The programme was rolled out in all provinces in the country.

6.2.2 Beneficiaries

The specific beneficiaries of the NFEP are vulnerable groups as per Social Development criteria. These are:

• Children and child-headed households;

• Orphaned children;

• People with disabilities;

• Female-headed households;

• HIV/AIDS infected and affected households.
In terms of the Statistics South Africa poverty indicators, which classify households according to average per capita monthly expenditure, there are 2.2 million households or a total of about 14 million people, who spend R600 or less per month on food. This number constitutes about 30% of the South African population. These are the primary household beneficiaries of the programme. They were divided into four bands: Bands A, B, C and D. Table 6.1 below gives a breakdown of households falling under each Band.

Table 6.1: Statistics South Africa: categories of household food per capita monthly expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Band</th>
<th>Spending/month/capita</th>
<th>Number of households</th>
<th>Cumulative number of households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>&lt;R200</td>
<td>166 684</td>
<td>166 684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>R200 to R300</td>
<td>962 625</td>
<td>1 129 309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>R300 to R400</td>
<td>473 784</td>
<td>1 603 093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>R400 to R500</td>
<td>631 947</td>
<td>2 235 040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDT, 2003

The NFEP prioritises Band A beneficiaries.

In addition to the above target groupings, the DSD identified two additional categories of special beneficiaries:

- **People living with HIV/AIDS and TB** – to meet the requirement of food supplement supply to this special grouping, the DSD decided to provide 10 kg of supplementary instant meal per month in addition to the standard food parcel. Provinces are expected, during the actual identification and or verification of Households, to profile these household.

- **People unable to cook their own food** (for example, homeless people and orphans) – to accommodate this special grouping, DSD
decided to allocate funds as grants to identified Drop-in-Centres where these people can go at particular times of the day and get nutritious food.

The task of identifying beneficiaries that meet these criteria was given to the provincial departments of social development.

### 6.4 TARGET AREAS

Statistics South Africa was requested to identify and map out areas throughout the country with a high average number of Band B and A households. These were found to be concentrated in the following affected Provinces:

**Table 6.2: Breakdown of Band A by province according to Statistics South Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of Band A Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>35,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>30,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>28,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>1,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>72,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>167,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: IDT, 2003*

From the above schedule (as per the Statistics South Africa scoping), it is evident that Provinces such as Limpopo and Mpumalanga, Gauteng and the Western Cape have been ‘averaged out’ of Band A. This does not necessarily mean that in these provinces there were no households falling in this band. Furthermore, the scoping by Statistics – South Africa was limited to a broad geographic concentration of poverty. It did not identify the actual household or beneficiaries within those households. It must therefore be understood that the Band A
categorisation was used in conjunction with other targeting methods. Using a combination of these targeting methods, the broad target areas in Table 6.3 were identified in all nine (9) provinces.

Table 6.3: Target areas per province and the estimated number of beneficiary households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Target areas*</th>
<th>Estimated number of households</th>
<th>Revised number of households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>Elandskraal, Nebo, Hlogotlou, Mhala, Calcutta</td>
<td>51 876</td>
<td>50 890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>Zaaiplaas</td>
<td>1 552</td>
<td>12 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>Amalia, Kgomotso, Taung, Atamelang, Bothitho, Ganyesa, Heuningvlei, Madibogo, Morokweng, Tsineng, Dube, Loate, Motswedi</td>
<td>68 693</td>
<td>72 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>Roadside, Rosendal, Verkykerskop, Boithuso, Botshabelo, Heuningspruit</td>
<td>30 333</td>
<td>30 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>4 670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>Beaufort West</td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>Bityi, Elliotdale, Bacela, Bolotwa, Glen Grey, Kei Bridge, Chalumna, Frankfort, Tamara, Zele, Elands Height, Gubengxa</td>
<td>36 513</td>
<td>35 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>Ezibayeni, Mbazwana, Ubumbo, Ceza, Gluckstadt, Mahlabathini, Ngome, Nsuze</td>
<td>30 219</td>
<td>31 770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>225 186</strong></td>
<td><strong>246 330</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source*: IDT, 2003
6.5 FOOD PARCELS

Food parcels are budgeted at approximately R300 each, including VAT, packaging and distribution costs. Each beneficiary household was intended to receive one (1) food parcel per month over a three (3)-month period. Based on the recommendations of the Nutrition Unit of the Department of Health, each food parcel would contain the standard items outlined in Table 6.4:

Table 6.4: Food parcel content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fortified maize meal</td>
<td>12.5 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long grain rice</td>
<td>10 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dried beans</td>
<td>5 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>5 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samp</td>
<td>2.5 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full cream milk powder</td>
<td>1 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soya mince</td>
<td>1 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt (iodised)</td>
<td>1 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soup mix</td>
<td>800 g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peanut butter</td>
<td>810 g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflower oil</td>
<td>2 Litre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea bags</td>
<td>100 g/100 tea bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green bar soap</td>
<td>2 bars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bath soap</td>
<td>4 x 100 g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 L plastic bucket with lid (one delivery only)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDT, 2003
Provinces were allowed to modify the contents of the food parcel based on local food preferences, without reducing the nutritional value and the quality of the food parcel.

6.5.1 Programme timeframes
The NFEP is a three (3)-year programme starting from 2002/2003 to 2004/2005. Due to the fact that the programme was only announced in October 2002, the planning process that had to take place and the pilot phase that was carried out in limited provinces during December 2002, the 2002/2003 phase of the programme started very late. The IDT as an implementing agency was appointed in February 2003. Programme implementation was then scheduled from March 2003 to July 2003.

6.5.2 Programme budget
Funds were allocated to provinces based on the number of households as indicated in Table 6.5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Amount allocated (R million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>64.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>231.6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDT, 2004
Supplementary Food and Drop-in-Centres were to be funded from the savings made from provincial allocations.

6.6 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

The NFEP is set up around the following generic institutional framework.

National Department of Social Development (NDOSD) – has overall financial accountability for the funds to run this programme and to set policy and targets and to monitor performance.

Independent Development Trust (IDT) – was responsible for implementing the programme including contracting with Service Providers, financial management, administration and ensuring the quality of the service.

National Development Agency (NDA) – was responsible for programme facilitation, especially the establishment of local coordinating structures and the identification of the beneficiary households.

National Coordinating Committee (NCC) – comprising an independent committee established by the NDOSD to review and approve operational matters and to refer policy issues to the Deputy Director-General.

Provincial Departments of Social Development (PDOSD) – has overall responsibility and accountability for the programme in the province. Its role is to identify beneficiary households, allocate adequate personnel to manage the programme and monitor performance.

Provincial Coordinating Committee (PCC) – comprising an independent committee established by the PDOSD to review and approve operational matters and to refer policy issues to the HOD.
Local Co-ordinating Committee – comprising an independent committee established by the PDOSD to compile and recommend beneficiary households and monitor and evaluate the effect of the programme on food security.

Service Providers – consisted of firms or other organisations responsible for the supply of food parcels to the households.

Stakeholder Forums – established at both national and provincial level. It is constituted by stakeholders from government, the private sector and civil society. Their role was to give advice on food emergencies and provide policy direction.

6.7 COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT

Overall communication on the programme was managed by the NDOSD through its Communications Unit. A programme communication strategy was drawn up with the following broad objectives:

- Broadly create awareness around the practical food relief measures taken by the government to address an imminent food crisis situation in the country.

- Raise a heightened awareness to ensure appropriate attention to the roll out of the campaign to register more children for social security in order to maximise the benefits that can be accrued from food security at the household level.

- Encourage the production and consumption of nutrient balanced foods to eradicate hunger and malnutrition in accordance with the integrated nutrition programme.

- Mobilise and encourage the private sector and civil society to fight against poverty, hunger, underdevelopment and malnutrition.

- Create and sustain consumer awareness around zero-rated VAT exempted basic foodstuffs in relation to the pricing strategies of the retail sector.
• Clarify and help raise the profile/role of the Food Prices Monitoring Committee (FPMC), and where necessary, provide communication support to the committee.

Ensure a coherent and coordinated communication approach around South Africa’s humanitarian assistance to the SADC region.

The IDT Communications Unit managed communication regarding the specific role IDT is playing in the programme. All communication on operational issues in the programme will be channeled through the Programme Manager.

6.8 QUALITY MANAGEMENT

The IDT, as the PIA, was responsible for managing quality in the programme, especially the quality of food delivered by Service Providers.

6.9 RISK MANAGEMENT

Risk management is a continuous activity that is linked to the various stages of the programme cycle. A comprehensive risk assessment was conducted and a management plan developed and incorporated in the programme management plan. Table 6.6 shows the risk categories which were identified from the beginning.
### Table 6.6: Risk categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk category</th>
<th>Probability (Low, Medium or High)</th>
<th>Impact (1 to 5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Performance of the organisations or structures that form part of the institutional arrangements</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiary identification</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of service providers to deliver</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of food</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interference</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** IDT, 2003

The risk management plan was to develop mechanisms to mitigate these risks.

### 6.10 MONITORING AND REPORTING

A monitoring committee was established as a sub-committee of the National Co-ordinating Unit. It comprised officers responsible for monitoring and evaluation from STATS-SA, NDA, IDT, NDoSD and involved officials from the other social cluster departments. The committee was responsible for the design of a monitoring framework and its implementation in support of the provinces. The Project Co-ordinating Teams were responsible for monitoring the programme and reporting progress, limitations and improvements to both the IDT and the national Department of Social Development. Monitoring occurred primarily in the form of delivery point visits and monthly and quarterly financial and non-financial reports on progress made. The Provinces and the IDT submitted to the DG (DoSD), within 15 days of the end of each quarter, a report detailing:
Services

- Number of beneficiaries reached per month by location (municipality) and composition (gender and age);
- Nature of food relief interventions;
- Implementing agents (whether departmental offices, NGOs, for example) and nature of association;
- Number of beneficiaries that have exited the programme and whether alternative support has been arranged.

Expenditure

- Expenditure on food relief for the month and the composition of expenditure;
- Projections regarding new beneficiaries for the remainder of the financial year and the spending implications of these trends relative to budget allocations;
- The Director General submitted a consolidated quarterly report to the National Treasury, 20 days after the end of each quarter;

Project Coordinating Teams and the IDT were to provide independent national and nine (9) provincial annual evaluation reports.

6.11 BENEFICIARY IDENTIFICATION

The ultimate responsibility for the identification of beneficiaries lies with the Provincial Department of Social Development (PDOSD). This was a critical milestone in the implementation of this NFEP because without beneficiaries, no food parcels can be distributed. Due to the sensitivity and the risk associated with this process, it must be as inclusive as possible and involve all stake holders as represented in the Local Stakeholder Forums. Existing databases developed by provincial departments were also used to identify the most needy beneficiaries.
The IDT received details of identified beneficiary households from the PDOSD in writing for capturing on the database. To facilitate this process, a Beneficiary Profile Form was developed and distributed to PDOSD. The HOD or his/her appointee must approve details of each household before any details are captured on the programme database. Forms that lack some critical information will not be captured on the database.

The identification of target areas within the province as well as the number of affected households in each target area was indicated from the NDOSD with the assistance of Statistics South Africa. This process was questioned in some quarters due to the nature of the data used. However, given the tight timeframes for this phase of the programme, it was advisable for provinces to change these areas drastically. Provinces were not permitted to alter the total number of beneficiary households indicated for that province. Lastly, target areas, and especially distribution points and the number of households, were finalised before the appointment of service providers.

6.12 APPOINTMENT OF SERVICE PROVIDERS

In terms of the NFEP’s roles and responsibilities, the IDT was responsible for appointing Service Providers. However, this was to be done in conjunction with the DOSD. As part of this consultation, provinces were requested to submit organisations that they have worked with before in similar programmes for the consideration of IDT. It must be noted that the IDT was not obliged to use any of these organisations, especially if there were more competent and qualifying organisations identified.

The IDT procurement process was used for the appointment of service providers. Due to tight timeframes, it was decided that they would use a closed tender system to source service providers. The terms of reference (TOR) for the appointment of service providers were developed and forwarded to identify potential service providers.
Service providers that meet the following criteria were preferred:

- Charitable organisations with experience in relief work or poverty alleviation programmes;
- Capacity to procure in bulk, thus offering food parcels at the indicated cost or lower;
- Have infrastructure at the province to package the food parcels, rather than transport from far flung areas;
- Capacity to distribute food parcels to identified areas within a walking distance of the beneficiary households;
- Organisation with the ability to add value to the programme (for example, harness more resources).

The following process was followed in appointing service providers:

- IDT Provincial Offices, together with PDOSD, would identify potential service providers for the province, who sent TOR and then requested to submit their proposals.
- Based on the proposals, service providers would be short listed.
- Interviews and sight inspections would then be arranged where the capacity of service providers is assessed. The panel will be made up of IDT, NPM, IDT Procurement Managers, RPM and PDOSD and NFEP Managers.
- The panel would prepare a report indicating the most suitable service provider/s recommended for appointment; The IDT would then send a letter of appointment to the Service Provider and request that a delivery schedule be developed in consultation with the provincial structures.
- A contract would then be signed with the service provider. The management of the service provider had sole responsibility of the IDT.
6.13 DELIVERY OF FOOD PARCELS

As outlined above, the IDT was responsible for appointing and managing service providers who will procure and deliver food parcels to agreed distribution points. The PDOSD, who identified beneficiaries, was responsible for receiving and distributing the food parcels to these beneficiaries. To meet these requirements, the following process was to be followed:

- IDT, with the service providers, would develop a delivery schedule and share this schedule with the PDOSD and NDA who would communicate it to all stakeholders. IDT would manage the delivery schedule.

- The IDT would print out the food parcels distribution summary sheet for each delivery point, based on the beneficiary profile already captured on the database. The summary sheet is a list of beneficiaries’ names and their Identity numbers with provision to verify the ID and signature/thumb print. This summary sheet will be handed over to the PDOSD Official who is responsible for verification and distribution.

- When the service provider delivers the food parcels, the IDT Official verifies that the correct number and quality of food parcels was delivered and signs the delivery note from the service provider. The IDT Official would then immediately hand the food parcels to the PDOSD Official who would also sign on the delivery note, indicating that he/she is receiving the indicated quantity of food parcels and then distribute them to beneficiaries.

- Beneficiaries would use their identity books to collect their food parcels.

- Payment to the service provider would be based on the invoice and the signed delivery notes.

Any extra food parcels that could not be distributed would be left in the custody of the PDOSD Official.
6.14  MONITORING AND REPORTING

A number of tools were developed to monitor beneficiaries and the delivery of food parcels.

6.14.1 Beneficiary profile form

The purpose of this form was to collect information on the beneficiaries of the NFEP at household level. This form was to be used during the process of identifying beneficiaries. It would provide personal information of beneficiaries as well as the criteria used to select the beneficiary. The data was entered on a database and sorted according to residential area (also referred to as the distribution centre), magisterial district, local municipality, district municipality and province. It would provide baseline information on beneficiaries.

6.14.2 Distribution summary sheet

The purpose of this sheet is two-fold:

- Verification of beneficiary identity numbers to ensure that the food parcels are distributed to the correctly identified beneficiary.
- Record of receipt of the food parcels. Provision was made for the signature/thumbprint of the beneficiary, in addition to the date that the food parcel was received.

The names and identity numbers of the beneficiaries were imported from the household profile form to the summary sheet according to distribution centres. Thus, for each province/district municipality, several summary sheets were generated, depending on the number of distribution centres that were identified. This sheet was used during the food parcel distribution process. The same sheet was used for the distribution of the three food parcels.
6.14.3 Household level form

The purpose of this form was to collect information on the households’ socio-economic status. This information can be used in several ways. For example, it can be used to determine whether the socio-economic criteria for household selection were appropriate for planning at different levels or to contribute to a greater understanding of poverty in the country.

6.15 COMMUNICATION

Communication regarding this programme was led by the DOSD through its Communications Unit. A communication plan has been developed focusing on both internal and external communication. The following channels of communication will generally be used:

**Briefing sessions**

Regular briefing to internal stakeholders would be held including the Cabinet and its Committees, MINMEC, Premiers and Provincial Executives, Mayors and their Councils.

**Provincial launches**

The programme would be launched in all provinces to enhance community participation and mobilisation in the programme.

**Media liaison**

Press conferences and briefings, including radio and TV talk shows, were organised to brief the public about the programme.
Marketing and advertising

The programme was advertised in mainstream and community based media. It was also publicised through posters, leaflets and exhibitions.

Information technology

Websites of various partner organisations were used to inform stakeholders about the programme.

Progress reports

All implementation partners were required to submit weekly, monthly and/or quarterly reports.

6.16 BENEFICIARY IDENTIFICATION AND DATA MANAGEMENT

As indicated herein above, PDOSD were responsible for the identification of beneficiaries in conjunction with various Stakeholder Forums. Details of beneficiaries were recorded on the Beneficiary Profile Forms that were then forwarded to the IDT for capturing on the database. Due to the delay in identifying beneficiaries and therefore capturing, beneficiary profile forms were used for verification during the distribution of food parcels instead of the Distribution Summary Sheet. Data was captured at the IDT Provincial Offices by contracted Data Capturers.

6.17 NATIONAL

The table below shows the number of beneficiaries that were captured per province.
Table 6.7: Number of beneficiaries captured by province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Allocated beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>35 613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>30 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>31 770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>51 876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>12 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>72 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>4 670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>247 929</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDT, 2003

Data capturing has been a tedious and a slow process due to a number of factors, including:

- Delays in beneficiary identification which in turn prolonged the data capturing process;
- Invalid or no identity numbers. This was significant since this was the method used to prevent the duplication of beneficiaries. As a result, these forms could not be captured on the database;
- No indication of the criteria on which the beneficiary was identified or new criteria added;
- Illegible forms; and
- System breakdown.
6.18 PROVINCIAL EXPERIENCES

*Eastern Cape*

There were 35 589 beneficiaries that were captured on the database out of the 35 613 beneficiaries who received food parcels. There were seven (7) temporary staff who were engaged in the capturing beneficiary data. However, capturing could not be finished on time due to the following factors:

- Beneficiary identification was not completed on time;
- Beneficiary forms did not contain all the relevant information;
- Duplication of beneficiary forms

*Free State*

There were five (5) data capturers who were contracted in the Free State to capture beneficiary data and 28 273 beneficiaries out of 30 000 have been captured because beneficiary data forms were submitted late for capturing. There are a number of duplicated beneficiaries that need to be removed from this database. Table 6.8 indicates the number of beneficiaries captured per category in this province.

*Gauteng*

There were 5 322 beneficiaries that were captured in this province compared to the 5 000 beneficiaries who received food parcels. This is one of the provinces where some beneficiaries were removed from the list after the first round of delivery. It was therefore expected that there would be more beneficiaries on the database than the 5 000 allocated even after the data has been cleaned up.

*KwaZulu-Natal*

In KwaZulu-Natal, capturing of beneficiary data was delayed mostly by the late submission of profile forms as well as incomplete information on the forms. Nine
data capturers were contracted until June 2003 to capture data. All the 34 558 beneficiaries have been captured.

**Limpopo**

Limpopo was the first province to capture beneficiary data that was completed by the end of May 2003 as planned. There were five (5) data capturers who were contracted to do the work. There were 56 460 beneficiaries who were captured out of the 51 876 beneficiaries who were allocated to receive food parcels in the province. The additional beneficiaries can be accounted for in three ways:

- Some beneficiaries were replaced in the list after receiving the first payment, resulting in extra beneficiaries being identified.
- More beneficiaries were in fact identified than the number allocated, resulting in extra food parcels being delivered.
- Duplicate capturing.

**Mpumalanga**

This is one of the provinces where the identification of beneficiaries took quite some time because the first identification process was nullified and had to be redone. Three (3) data capturers were contracted for three months to capture beneficiary data. There were 13 676 beneficiaries who were captured on the data base against the 12 000 allocated. The extra beneficiaries are due to duplicate data capturing and beneficiaries that were replaced after the first delivery.

**North West**

This province had the highest number of beneficiaries in the programme. The identification of beneficiaries took a very long time, which delayed data capturing. Five (5) data capturers who were contracted but could not complete capturing the data because the beneficiary profile forms were just trickling into the IDT. Altogether 64 823 beneficiaries were captured.
Northern Cape

To date 4 670 beneficiaries were captured on the data base in this province. Data capturing was delayed because some of the beneficiary profile forms were submitted to IDT for capturing as late as July 2003.

Western Cape

This is one of the provinces where there were many complications in the identification of beneficiaries with the result that it was even difficult to appoint Service Providers to deliver food parcels. 5 000 beneficiaries were captured on the data base and received food parcels.

6.19 SERVICE PROVIDER MANAGEMENT

The IDT was responsible for the appointment of Service Providers in consultation with the Department.

6.19.1 National

Table 6.8 indicates the service providers appointed per province and the value of the contract awarded to them.
Table 6.8: Service providers appointed per province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Service provider/s</th>
<th>Contract amount (R million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>Gift of the Givers Foundation (NPO)</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>Kenworth Spar</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MDC Catering Services</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M Foods Wholesale</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TNT Spar</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suh-Sem Trading</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>KLM Setati Distributors</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>Gift of the Givers Foundation (NPO)</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>Ora Grove Farms cc</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polokwane Distributors cc</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rietgat Cash Stores</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>Impumelelo Distributors</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>Operation Blanket (NPO)</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Siphumelele Enterprises</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northwest Sales</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mmelaga Tswana</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>Just Rite Supermarket</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lesego General Dealer</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vuyani General Dealer</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>Manna Community Food Services</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natware</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H C Supermarket</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Makwa Groot Handelaars</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food world</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boland Meule</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work Report, 2003
6.19.2 Provincial experiences

Eastern Cape

In this Province, only one (1) service provider was appointed to deliver 35 613 food parcels per month. Although delays were experienced from time to time, delivery was generally smooth. While the appointment was approved by the provincial department, concerns were raised later because the service provider was not based in the province. The service provider performed well.

Free State

Four service providers were appointed in this province to deliver 30 000 food parcels per month. The performance of these service providers was excellent and delivery was completed on time.

Gauteng

One Service Provider was contracted to deliver 5 000 food parcels per month. The service provider performed well and delivery was completed on time.

Kwazulu-Natal

The same service provider as in the Eastern Cape was used in this province to deliver 31 770 food parcels per month. Generally, the same issues that occurred in the Eastern Cape, also happened in KwaZulu-Natal. There was however an added problem of more difficult access in this province, where the service provider was complaining about a break down in delivery vehicles.

Limpopo

Three service providers were appointed to deliver 51 876 food parcels per month in this province. The service providers performed very well and this was the first
province to finish delivery. One of the service providers delivered more food parcels than contracted and this matter was resolved after the project was completed.

Mpumalanga

One service provider was appointed in Mpumalanga to deliver 12,000 food parcels per month. Performance was very good and delivery was completed on schedule.

North West

Four service providers were appointed in this province to deliver 72,000 food parcels per month. A number of challenges were experienced during delivery in the North West. These challenges were caused mostly by mixed communication lines between the provincial department, service providers and IDT. For example, bilateral meetings were held without the involvement of IDT. This affected the performance of these service providers, resulting in serious delays in the delivery process.

Northern Cape

In the Northern Cape, it was agreed that the three (3) service providers used during the pilot phase in December 2002 which were later used to deliver the 4,670 food parcels per month. The service providers performed fairly well. However, unlike other provinces, service providers were delivering to the provincial department that in turn delivered food to beneficiaries door to door. Delivery was suspended for about a month after the first round due to fact that food items deviated from the national standard.
Western Cape

The appointment of service providers in this province was complicated by the fact that the province could not indicate the target areas upfront and how many beneficiaries were identified in each area. Service providers were therefore almost appointed on an ad hoc basis. At the end of the project, six (6) service providers were contracted to deliver the total of 11 682 food parcels. It is difficult to indicate how many people benefited because the number of deliveries varied from month to month.

6.19.2.1 DELIVERY OF FOOD PARCELS

6.19.2.2 National

Table 6.9 indicates the number of food parcels delivered per province.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total Expected</th>
<th>1st Delivery</th>
<th>2nd Delivery</th>
<th>3rd Delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>109 539</td>
<td>36 513</td>
<td>36 513</td>
<td>36 513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>90 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>95 310</td>
<td>31 770</td>
<td>31 770</td>
<td>31 770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>155 628</td>
<td>51 876</td>
<td>51 876</td>
<td>52 828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>36 000</td>
<td>12 000</td>
<td>12 000</td>
<td>12 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>216 000</td>
<td>72 000</td>
<td>72 000</td>
<td>72 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>14 010</td>
<td>4 670</td>
<td>4 670</td>
<td>4 670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>5 036</td>
<td>3 916</td>
<td>2 730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>746 487</td>
<td>248 865</td>
<td>247 745</td>
<td>247 511</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDT, 2003

At a national level, delivery proceeded relatively smoothly. However, there were a number of challenges during the process, including the following:
Problems of controlling beneficiaries as more people than identified beneficiaries always came to demand food;

Failure to identify beneficiaries and verify well in advance of delivery added to the crowd control problem and made distribution very difficult;

Demands put by the programme on departmental staff who, in most cases, had to work until late in the night and over weekends distributing food parcels to beneficiaries;

Offloading trucks full of food parcels and, in some cases, reloading some onto “bakkies” [light delivery vans] as well as distributing these food parcels to beneficiaries proved to be a very labour-intensive work. A number of people had to be engaged by service providers. However, some people from the communities also volunteered their services.

The number of delivery points has a huge impact on the delivery cost and the number of personnel required to distribute food. Failure to identify delivery points upfront was always a source of complaint by both service providers and officials.

Inevitably, some beneficiaries do not turn up on the day when food is distributed. It is important that plans are made to store remaining food parcels safely.

6.19.3 Provincial Experiences

Eastern Cape

In the Eastern Cape, delivery started on 27 February 2003 and was completed on 31 July 2003. Delivery was made directly to 46 delivery points in 12 targeted districts. Due to the inaccessibility of some of these delivery points by trucks, bakkies had to be used to deliver food. Some 2 633 “volunteers” were engaged for offloading and distributing food parcels. Volunteers received a stipend of R119 per delivery. Based on these experiences, this province identified the following lessons:
• more time is required for the beneficiary identification and verification process;
• it is critical to verify the authenticity of the beneficiary profile forms to avoid irregularities;
• it is important to combine delivery and distribution as one service;
• the service provider should be locally based to promote local economic spin-offs; and
• there should be a clarification of the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders.

**Free State**

In the Free State, delivery started on 01 April 2003 and completed on 25 June 2003. Its project proved to be one of the smoothest. About 206 people were employed by service providers to offload and distribute food while about 696 people volunteered their services. Lessons learned from this experience include:

• The need for more time for planning;
• The need for proper consultation and communication among role players;
• The need to recognise the work done by volunteers;
• Some people could not benefit from the programme due to lack of identity documents.

**Gauteng**

Delivery here started on 13 March 2003 and was completed by 09 June 2003. Good cooperation between role players contributed to the smooth and on time delivery in this province. Three areas were targeted by the province, namely, Greenfields and Sonwaba at Ekurhuleni and Bekkersdal at Western Area. There
were no figures for people who volunteered their services during the delivery process. During this process the province learnt that:

- poverty is widespread in the province and the 5 000 beneficiaries were just a drop in the ocean; latest statistics should guide future allocation of funds;
- the fast and efficient delivery was attributed to good cooperation between stakeholders, especially the involvement of the MEC office;
- the role of the volunteers was invaluable, but no stipends were paid to them unlike other provinces

**KwaZulu-Natal**

There were four (4) districts that were targeted in KwaZulu-Natal including Ugu, Umzinyathi, Zululand and Umkhanyakude and delivery was made to 69 villages. Delivery started late on 14 May 2003 and completed on 30 August 2003. Delivery was delayed by the identification of beneficiaries and delivery points. Accessibility of communities and distances between villages was a big challenge. Thirty (30) full-time packers were employed by the service provider during delivery, while 690 "volunteers" were used during offloading and the distribution of food. Volunteers received a stipend of R117 per delivery. The province experienced the following challenges during delivery:

- identification of beneficiaries was a big challenge with the result that some beneficiaries had to be removed from the list after the first round of delivery because they were not qualifying;
- political challenges existed throughout the process with the result that this was the only province where the programme was not launched;
- stakeholders were not properly briefed and, therefore, the project was uncoordinated;
**Limpopo**

In Limpopo, delivery started on 07 March 2003 and finished on 29 July 2003. Major delays were caused by the slow identification of beneficiaries, staff shortage and the large numbers of delivery points that were not anticipated. The province targeted Bohlabela, Waterberg, Capricorn, Sekhukhune, Vhembe and Mopani districts delivering to 26 villages. Reports from the field indicated that the distribution became a major social event with even those who were not beneficiaries turning up.

**Mpumalanga**

Delivery in Mpumalanga started on 01 April 2003 and finished on 30 July 2003. The start was delayed in the identification of beneficiaries that had to be redone due to the inclusion of people who did not qualify. Eleven (11) communities were targeted at Ehlanzeni, Gert Nsibande, Sekhukhune, and Nkangala District Municipalities. Volunteers ward councilors and home based care givers were also involved in the identification of beneficiaries and distribution of food. The 12 000 beneficiaries allocated for this province were clearly not enough and could not reach most poverty pockets.

**North West**

In the North West, delivery started on 26 March 2003 and was finished on 08 August 2003. This province had the highest number of beneficiaries, 72 000. This resulted in a number of challenges during the delivery process. About 500 people were employed to offload and distribute food parcels. In addition, a number of volunteers participated in the process. The following are some of the challenges faced by the province during delivery:

- Communication channels between role players were not adhered to. For example, the Provincial Department insisted on communicating directly to service providers without involving the IDT. This was the major cause of delays in the delivery of food;
• Although Councillors played an important role in the identification of beneficiaries, in some areas they insisted that delivery must not take place in their absence. This resulted in delays;

• There was a delay in the identification of beneficiaries, and in some areas people wanted beneficiaries to pay money for registration;

• Reports of food poisoning were received from one area, but this affected one family and could not be linked directly to the food delivered. Despite these challenges, delivery was relatively smooth in this province given the high number of beneficiaries.

**Northern Cape**

The Northern Cape started delivery on 21 March 2003 and finished on 26 August 2003. Delivery was delayed for about one (1) month after the first round because the food items were found to be below national standard. Targeted areas were Kimberley, Campbell and Ritchie. It is worth noting that this province opted for door to door deliveries, rather than a central point where beneficiaries could collect their food. Service providers delivered to the provincial department offices and the department staff delivered to beneficiaries. The practicality of this process of delivery, when dealing with large numbers of beneficiaries, is questionable.

**Western Cape**

The Western Cape deliveries started on 28 February 2003 and finished on 28 August 2003. The delay was caused by slowness in the identification of beneficiaries and availability of staff. Food was delivered to Beaufort West, Laingsburg, Prince Albert, Weltevreden/ Samora, Atlantis and van Rhynsdorp. Eighteen (18) people were engaged by service providers to load and offload food and volunteers also participated in the distribution process. Beneficiary identification was so problematic in this province that it was difficult to procure service providers. At the end of the project, less food parcels were delivered than initially planned.
6.20 PROVISION OF SUPPLEMENTARY FOOD

During the identification of beneficiaries, provinces were required to profile beneficiaries who may have qualified for an additional 10 kg of supplementary food per month. This provision was targeting beneficiaries living with HIV/AIDS and TB patients. These beneficiaries were never identified and therefore supplementary food was not provided.

6.21 DROP-IN-CENTRES

The programme provided funding to Drop-in-Centres. These included organisations that provide food to individuals who are unable to prepare their own food (for example, homeless people, orphans and street children). There were 22 Centres which were provided with a once off funding of R450 000. Of these 15 Drop-in-Centres were funded by the end of September 2003 as listed in Table 6.10.

Drop-in-Centres are paid between the ranges of R270 000 and R180 000. To monitor these Centres more effectively, a number of conditions for funding need to be clarified including the following:

- The type and quality of food to be provided;
- The expected frequency of meals were once a day or twice a day;
- The targeted number of people who are supposed to get meals over the funding period;
- As most of these Centres already exist (most funded by the Department), it needs to be determined as to whether funding is intended for additional beneficiaries or existing ones;
- The conditions to release the next payment.
Table 6.10: List of Drop-in-Centres identified

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Drop-in-Centre</th>
<th>Amount Allocated (Rands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>Children’s Resource Group</td>
<td>450 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>Matwabeng Aids and Social Council for African Development Thousand Aids project</td>
<td>450 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>450 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>Arekopaneng</td>
<td>450 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sithand'iZingane Care Project</td>
<td>450 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>Khanyiselani</td>
<td>450 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St Clements Home</td>
<td>450 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>Masungulo Home-Based Care</td>
<td>450 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingagara Community</td>
<td>450 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mapate HIV/Aids</td>
<td>450 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>450 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>Traditional HIV/Aids</td>
<td>450 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>Emmanuel Congregational Church Women’s Project</td>
<td>450 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luvuyo Drop-In Centre</td>
<td>450 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>Tafelsig United Aids</td>
<td>450 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 750 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDT, 2004

6.22 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

6.22.1 Expenditure

Table 6.11 indicates funds allocated and committed to each province as well as expenditure at the end of the project in September 2003.
Table 6.11: Provincial expenditure as at 30 September 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Funds Committed (Rands)</th>
<th>Expenditure (Rands)</th>
<th>Balance (Rands)</th>
<th>% Spent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>29 358 452</td>
<td>29 358 452</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>24 940 000</td>
<td>24 940 000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>4 358 350</td>
<td>4 358 350</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>25 543 080</td>
<td>25 543 080</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>43 538 462</td>
<td>43 335 436</td>
<td>203 026</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>10 512 000</td>
<td>10 493 777</td>
<td>18 223</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>64 800 000</td>
<td>63 125 988</td>
<td>1 674 012</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>4 203 000</td>
<td>3 429 998</td>
<td>773 002</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>4 500 000</td>
<td>3 392 823</td>
<td>1 107 177</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>9 903 000</td>
<td>531 263</td>
<td>9 371 737</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drop-in-Centres</td>
<td>9 943 656</td>
<td>4 050 000</td>
<td>5 893 656</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>231 600 000</td>
<td>212 559 167</td>
<td>19 040 833</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDT, 2004

Funds committed refer to amounts contracted to Service Providers in provinces plus allocation for the pilot phase in provinces where the delivery was piloted (FS, KZN, NC, WC). The difference between the allocated and committed funds is therefore a result of lower contract amounts per food parcel negotiated with Service Providers against the budgeted amount of R300 per food parcel. These savings were used to fund Drop-in-Centres. The balance is mainly due to funds for pilot phases that have not been transferred to provinces. The national allocation was mainly to cover programme overhead costs. The funds committed under Drop-in-Centres are in fact savings made from provincial allocations. The actual amount committed for the 22 Centres is R9.9 million. Therefore, about
R1.28 million of the programme funds were unallocated by the end of September 2003.

6.23 CHALLENGES

6.23.1 Implementation timeframes

Although the national programme planning process was made as early as June 2002 and funds allocated in October 2002, the programme was only rolled out in March 2003. The IDT, as PIA, was appointed in February 2003 and programme funds were transferred on 31 March 2003. This delay left very little time for the implementation planning process, resulting in increased risks of project failure. The initial activities of appointing Service Providers and identifying beneficiaries proved more time consuming than the time available. For instance, the identification of beneficiaries in some provinces continued until May 2003. Hence, the project went beyond the three months allocated mainly due to limited planning going into the first phase. It is recommended that more time is allowed to plan the implementation of such programmes to achieve the intended development impact.

6.23.2 Beneficiary identification

The PDOSD was responsible for this critical milestone in the programme. For transparency, provinces were required to work with local stakeholders to identify beneficiaries. The NDOSD, together with other role players, provided guidelines for this process. Given the levels of poverty in the country, this was always a difficult task especially with the very broad guidelines provided. As expected, provinces were hard pressed to come up with a final list of beneficiaries. Most provinces ended up with more beneficiaries than the number allocated. Some beneficiaries were removed from the lists after the first round of food parcels were delivered. In many instances, beneficiary information was incomplete making it difficult to verify beneficiaries. One province, the Western Cape, could not identify
the allocated number of beneficiaries. All these challenges have resulted in the very low credibility of the beneficiary database as captured on the system. For these reasons, it is recommended that the existing beneficiary database be verified on the ground before it can be used for future programmes.

6.23.3 Quality of food

During this phase of the programme, the quality of the food items in the parcel was not sufficiently specified, which made it very difficult to manage during the delivery process. This is a very critical issue given the difference in prices between various grades of foodstuffs. More seriously is the ever present risk of food poisoning if poor quality food is delivered to unsuspecting beneficiaries. In future programmes, the quality of food should be specified more tightly.

6.23.4 Appointment of service providers

Service Providers are critical in ensuring timely delivery of food to beneficiaries. It is therefore important to make sure that appointed service providers have the necessary capacity to carry out this responsibility. It is also important that clear lines of communication with service providers are established to avoid confusion as to whom service providers are accountable. In many provinces, the accountability lines were blurred by the requirement that the IDT had to consult the department in the appointment of service providers. This resulted in poor performance by some service providers due to interference by officials outside the contractual arrangements. To manage service providers more effectively, there must be one point of accountability and interference by other role players must be avoided.

6.23.5 Monitoring and reporting

A major challenge to this phase of the programme was the lack of a comprehensive Monitoring and Evaluation system. This responsibility was given to a monitoring sub-committee of the National Coordinating Committee. A
Household Level Form was developed by the sub-committee and it was agreed that the client would allocate sufficient resources to administer the tool and monitor beneficiaries. This did not happen. The obvious challenge is that very crucial information could not be verified especially about demographics, the geography and the future needs of beneficiaries. At the close of the project, we cannot tell for example, the number of beneficiaries that assisted with registration for identity documents with the Department of Home Affairs or linked to grants from the Department of Social Development. These are important developmental outputs of the programme. This limits the success rate because the beneficiary remains largely a statistic and not identifiable. In addition, the data gathered about the beneficiaries is largely for food distribution purposes and its sociological significance has been lost irrecoverably due to the project ending before any monitoring activity taking place. It is strongly recommended that future food emergency programmes should take this matter seriously if they are to achieve their developmental outputs and outcomes.

6.23.6 Participation by other role players

A programme of this scale can only succeed with the contribution by a number of role players. From the beginning, various role players were identified to participate in the programme including other social cluster departments and parastatals. Most of these institutions, like Statistics SA and CSIR, were very keen to participate and contribute to the programme but very little direction was provided by the department to ensure that they were channeled properly. As a result, at the end of the programme, these institutions were not actively involved. The department should ensure that the contribution of various role players in the programme is harnessed and managed tightly for maximum impact.

6.23.7 Stakeholder participation

To ensure transparency in the programme, it was emphasised from the beginning that other stakeholders including NGOs, FBOs, CBOs and organised labour participate meaningfully in the programme. A specific role was identified for these
stakeholders through stakeholder forums, the identification of beneficiaries and monitoring the actual distribution of food. Where these stakeholder forums were established, the programme was implemented relatively smoothly. However, in some provinces these forums were not established. This resulted in some difficulties in rolling out the programme. Generally, very little effort was put to facilitate the involvement of stakeholders, especially in identifying beneficiaries. More effort should be put in mobilising and facilitating the involvement of other stakeholders in future food emergency programmes to ensure transparency and legitimacy.

6.24 LESSONS LEARNED

The following are the lessons learned in relation to the specific responsibilities of the IDT in the NFEP.

6.24.1 Capacity of service providers

Service Providers were critical in this programme since they ensure that food was delivered to beneficiaries. It is therefore important that, before service providers were appointed, an assessment of their capacity to deliver was thoroughly undertaken. This must not be based only on their proposals. Local inspections of facilities such as warehouses and vehicles are imperative. Even when this is done, it is difficult to be completely sure that they will in fact deliver. Experience from the first phase has shown that Service Providers tend to underestimate the amount of work involved in delivering these food parcels. In addition, it seems that there is an optimum amount of food parcels that a Service Provider can deliver efficiently per month. This amount is a balance between efficient delivery and the return that can be realised by the Service Provider. In general, Service Providers who had more than 20 000 food parcels to deliver per month were struggling. On the other hand, those that were delivering less than 5 000 parcels per month were complaining that the amount they were paid per food parcel was too low to make the exercise worth while. It therefore appears that the optimum
The amount of food parcels per service provider per month was between 10 000 and 20 000.

6.24.2 Grade of food items

It is important that the items in the food parcel and the quality of those items are standardised and specified in the tender documents. The difference between different grades of a food item, for example maize meal, can be as much as R10 to R15. This is a significant difference considering that this can amount to R100 000 to R150 000 per month if the service provider is delivering to 10 000 beneficiaries. Proposals from service providers should therefore stipulate the grade of each food item quoted in the price.

6.24.3 Cost of food parcel

The cost of the food parcels varied from R268 to R300 and the average cost was R284 inclusive of Value Added Tax, transportation, for example (IDT, 2003). Due to limited time frames, they were unable to bargain with Service Providers as we could have done, but it is our view that the average should in fact have been lower than this. Depending on the area, the content of the food parcel and the grade of food, the cost should have been anything between R260 in more urban areas and R280/food parcel in rural areas, fixed for 3 to 4 months. Finally, one should be very careful in accepting very low quotations.

6.24.4 Distribution points

This is an important cost driver as it affects transportation. The more distribution points, the higher the cost per food parcel. This is aggravated by the accessibility of these points where the 24 ton trucks normally used for delivery cannot reach some of the areas and smaller bakkies need to be used. To be fair to Service Providers, distribution points must be indicated in the tender documents so that they can factor this cost in their proposals. If this is not done, it may adversely affect delivery efficiency.
6.25 SUMMARY

It is clear from the above analysis that the National Emergency Food Programme was a short-term programme whose developmental impact was also short-term. It is imperative when implementing short-term projects and programmes to link them to other long-term developmental projects and programmes.
7.1 BACKGROUND

Chapter 7 focuses on the Poverty Relief Programme: The Clean and Green Programme. The aim of this programme was to provide short term poverty relief and infrastructure in the poorest geographic areas of the country. It was intended to involve the community in job creation with a special emphasis on women heading households and to seek to make the project sustainable in the long term. The Clean and Green Programme (CAGP) was one such programme that was conceptualised as a poverty alleviation project that would promote the development of waste management systems in poor rural communities. The Poverty Relief Funds were introduced by the National Treasury in 1997/1998 to kick-start employment creation in the country. In 1998/1999 this fund was broadened to include short term poverty alleviation. In the 1999/2000 financial year, the Presidential Job summit resulted in a decision to expand the poverty alleviation mandate to include short term job creation within line departments. Budgetary allocations to line departments were therefore increased to facilitate this aim. The National Department of Public Works was one beneficiary of such poverty alleviation grants to be undertaken over a five year period.

7.2 INTRODUCTION TO THE CLEAN AND GREEN PROGRAMME

The Clean and Green Programme (CAGP) was initiated by a partnership between South African Breweries (SAB), National Department of Public Works (NDPW) and Keep South Africa Beautiful (KSAB) in 1996. When KSAB folded due to
internal problems, SAB and NDPW approached the IDT to take up the
programme’s implementation work. In 1998/1999, the IDT was restructuring and
reorienting itself from a grant making organisation to a development agency with
active participation in programme implementation on a national scale. It therefore
made a bid to implement the CAGP on behalf of the SAB and NDPW partnership.
The IDT was thus brought on board and a novel model of programme
implementation involving a public sector department, a private corporate entity
and a public entity. The model was premised on the assumption that the private
sector company would pass on its corporate management skills to the public
entity and enhance programme implementation.

The programme arrangements stipulated that the NDPW would contribute
resources to cover programme costs with SAB contributing programme
management fees directly to the IDT. The initial contract signed by the IDT and
NDPW was for a three-year period covering the 2001/2002 to 2003/2004 financial
years. The SAB/IDT contract signed in 1999 indicated that SAB would review its
involvement in the programme on a yearly basis. In the first year of the
programme, NDPW contributed R10 million and the SAB contributed R1 million in
management fees. The second year saw NDPW investment grow to R12.6 million
and in 2001/2002 this dropped to R1.5 million.

After the 2001/2002 financial year, the government funding strategy changed
from a national focus to redirecting expenditure to the local tier of government.
Consequently, NDPW was forced to reduce the amount of funding to the CBPWP
as a whole. CAGP got an allocation of R1.5 million and instead of implementing
in seven (7) provinces, the programme was only implemented in two project sites
in the Eastern Cape. SAB felt that the unilateral decision to reduce programme
funding without consultation, and the scale of implementation meant that it could
no longer derive the intended benefit from the programme, and thus expressed
intention to formally terminate the contract.
7.3 METHODOLOGY

The chapter was compiled using a number of different research methodologies. Firstly, project documents were consulted to understand the nature of the partnership and its inception with a view of assessing the partnership’s strengths and weaknesses. Secondly, a review of all available programme reports and financial document were consulted. Project sites were visited to validate the project achievements, and interviews were conducted with a sample of municipal officials to assess the project's gains. This was performed to ascertain the chances of the sustainability of project gains. Lastly, in-depth interviews were held with officials who were active in the implementation of CAGP. These included IDT programme implementation managers (PIMs) and SAB corporate affairs managers for the different provinces where the programme was implemented. NDPW officials were also interviewed.

7.4 PROGRAMME AIMS

As mentioned above the Clean and Green programme was a partnership between the IDT, SAB and National Department of Public Works. The strategic objective of the programme was to attend to the social backlog in service provision for the previously disadvantaged communities while at the same time contributing to job creation. In achieving this objective, the programme was conceptualised to encompass mass job creation for the cleaning of public spaces.

In a bid to ensure sustainable human development, the programme included a strong component of community involvement to facilitate skills development and economic empowerment within the community by utilising small and emerging contractors, and training individual contractors in waste management. The general public was to benefit from the programme through the implementation of full-scale public awareness campaigns intended to increase the level of appreciation for a cleaner and greener environment. The three major activities of the programme were:
To collect refuse from an average of 3,821 targeted households in the identified project areas for a period of 12 months

To plant trees and lawns in public spaces being cleaned by above activity.

To conduct workshops and public participation activities aimed at increasing the level of appreciation for a cleaner and greener environment.

The programme was implemented in seven provinces with a number of project sites chosen in each province. The municipality and local councils at the project sites were involved in the appointment of local small micro and medium enterprise (SMME) refuse collectors and one person contractors (OPC) to carry out refuse collection and disposal.

### 7.5 STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS

IDT’s involvement in the CAGP partnership resulted from the withdrawal of Keep South Africa Beautiful as an implementing agent of the programme. The IDT submitted a proposal to the SAB-NDPW partners and, after extensive reviews and adjustments, was selected as the most appropriate implementing agency. The nature of the partnership relationship was such that it had to be very closely managed because of the discrepancies in financial contributions, and roles and responsibilities of the different partners. These differences were to subsequently lead to significant operational challenges during the life of the project.

From the outset, there was no written contract between SAB and NDPW. It was, however, agreed that the SAB would co-fund the CAGP with NDPW contributing the bulk of the programme resources. SAB agreed to provide R1m per year to cover IDT’s programme implementation cost with NDPW providing R10m for programme related costs. The IDT contracted with both SAB and NDPW separately. The IDT and NDPW contracted by means of their classical programme implementing agent (PIA) agreement as used in the CBPWP without specific reference to the CAGP. It can therefore be assumed that to NDPW,
CAGP was just one of a collection of community based public works programmes. The contract does not make any reference to SAB and as such, it is assumed that at provincial level there was no communication on CAGP specific operational information, or management arrangements to match the increased visibility of SAB personnel.

In terms of the Programme Implementing Agency (PIA) agreement signed between the IDT and NDPW, IDT contracted to undertake the following services:

- Utilise the grant for the implementation of the projects for disadvantaged communities in terms of the CBPWP programme management systems;
- Identify and select projects in terms of the project selection criteria;
- Facilitate implementation of the projects and report to the department when the department require in terms of the CBPWP programme management systems.

Added to this, the IDT contracted with SAB to undertake the following:

- Do all things necessary to implement the CAGP;
- Comply with requirements of SAB as agreed between the IDT and SAB.

SAB undertook to provide at their discretion any assistance as may be requested from time to time for the purposes of implementing the programme and to ensure timely payment of all monies due to the IDT.

It is, however, interesting to emphasise that, as mentioned above, except for verbal agreements, there were no written contracts between the SAB and NDPW. According to the SAB corporate manager, this was because there was never going to be any exchange of monies between the two partners. In its discussions with NDPW, SAB had undertaken to use its regional corporate affairs offices to provide “sweat equity” during programme implementation. SAB’s understanding of “sweat equity” was hands-on involvement in programme activities to ensure
success of the CAGP. The programme was premised on the assumption that SAB involvement would facilitate capacity building through the trickle down of SAB’s corporate value systems and output driven managerial skills. It seems like there was no common understanding of “sweat equity” between the three partners in the programme.

The terms of this partnership and the perceived leeway given to the SAB was later found to pose some challenges when SAB was alleged to be interfering in programme implementation. It must be acknowledged, however, that in some provinces this so-called interference was seen as a positive sign of commitment. One municipal official indicated that public works did not seem as committed to the programme as SAB and lacked visibility. The perceived lack of commitment is thus seen as a result of miscommunication of programme objectives from the strategic to the operational level that translated into misconception of roles and responsibilities. The partnership worked for a period of two years during which SAB contributed R1.09 million to NDPW’s programme costs of R24.1 million.

7.6 OPERATIONAL LEVEL PARTNERSHIPS

CAGP projects were implemented in 25 municipalities in seven (7) provinces. An important aspect of the project selection criteria was the municipalities’ willingness to absorb the project when the funding agencies pulled out in order to ensure sustainability. To facilitate this, IDT entered into bilateral contracts with each implementing municipality to ensure continuity of project gains. The structural arrangements used in CAGP management at project level can be reflected using the structure below. It indicates a situation where IDT was contractually bound to each of the three partners without any legal or contractual obligations between the partners. IDT was the only organisation that had contracts with all the partners at the implementation level. The contract with SAB and NDPW were cascaded down from the national contract, new contracts were signed by the IDT and all municipalities where projects were implemented. The municipalities undertook to provide support to programme implementation and
integrate the cleaning components upon withdrawal of external funding. The projects were also expected to infuse some skills development into the municipalities through a trickle-down effect.

Relationships between the partners were guaranteed through the institutionalisation of the National Management Committee (NMANCO). Provincial DPW structures also had a project coordinating committee (PCC) responsible for managing and coordinating all public works projects at the provincial level. The PCC was responsible for general project oversight which included approving areas for implementation and crises intervention at project level. According to one municipal official, this relationship worked very well and accelerated solutions to operational disputes. He reported that when the programme was first initiated in their municipality, there were clashes between municipal workers and one person contractors. These were resolved through the intervention of the municipal officials and the IDT programme implementation manager (PIM).

The visibility of the different partners and their participation in the programme activities was perceived as an indication of their respective organisations’ commitment to CAGP. NDPW personnel were seen as removed from the projects and regarded as mere funding agents because they were not as visible as SAB personnel on project sites. This is, however, not a true reflection of the value of the programme to the department because the contract between NDPW and IDT did not provide for the on the ground involvement that characterised the SAB contract. It is therefore suggested that in future partnerships the roles, responsibilities and obligation of each partner be fully communicated to the operational personnel to remove perceptions of indifference. It is concluded that, notwithstanding the different operational values, the partners worked together to make a success of the CAGP.
7.7 CHALLENGES TO THE PARTNERSHIP

7.7.1 Challenges to the Partnership at the Strategic Level

The partnership model used in the Clean and Green programme led to very profound implementation challenges. Firstly, the three partners did not seem to have a similar understanding of the developmental orientation of the programme. NDPW approached the programme as an employment creating special public works initiative in a given financial year. The partnership was thus managed in a static way, as merely the conjoining of three agencies rather than a dynamic, living and changing entity that required regular assessment and adjustment of performance targets.

Thus, the pressures of ensuring that there were no expenditure delays on the one hand and the attempts to go beyond the scope of support in provinces and often crossing over into aspects of project management on the part of others, led to the development of awkward institutional and management arrangements. And yet, when viewed externally by provincial politicians, the partnership arrangement was hailed as being precisely the kind of implementation arrangement that the government wishes to see more of. Therefore, while to the parties concerned, the programme presented significant challenges, it did demonstrate the basis on which more creative partnership elements could be introduced to achieve a higher level of delivery.

SAB brought a high level of corporate performance and delivery expectation to the programme, which consistently raised the quality of the project management team’s response to outputs and deadlines. The NDPW maintained its focus on ensuring that the programme remained both politically and administratively relevant within the context of the government’s critical targets. Balancing these different levels of concern is the cornerstone of all public/private partnerships and should inform future arrangements of a similar nature. The IDT, while on the one hand driven by its contractual obligations to the client-based relationship with both SAB and NDPW, was required to respond to its mandate as a public entity, and
bring to bear the defined elements of its role in adding value to the programme, a role which clearly was not effectively synergised with its partners’ expectations.

7.7.2 The challenges to the partnerships at the project level

The following were challenges to the partnerships at the project level:

- Lack of clarity of the roles of the municipality during the phase of IDT implementation of the Clean and Green. The municipalities did not have any clearly delineated roles and responsibilities in project implementation. They were only engaged in signing agreements to continue with the project after the IDT pulled out. It was therefore very difficult for them to learn from the systems and ultimately buy into the programme.

- Inconsistencies within the municipalities due to functional capacities. Most municipalities had limited capacity in terms of contributing to the project. They had undertaken to contribute the following to the project:
  - Supply project managers to work closely with the IDT-PIMs to implement the project;
  - Set up administrative systems for collecting payments from the communities;
  - Make budgetary provisions for the continuity/sustainability of the project;
  - Identify areas where the projects were to be implemented; and,
  - Assist in the identification and accessing of community leaders for establishing community committees.

Most municipalities, however, did not succeed in these undertakings because of capacity constraints, and were therefore in no position to make any significant contribution to the project.
• Lack of prioritisation of waste management services within the municipalities was observed that a number of municipalities did not consider waste management services as a priority delivery area though it was within their competence to do so, and consequently did not fully commit to the project. This was compounded by budgetary constraints and competition between perceived priority areas for municipal budgets.

• The IDT introduced two models of waste management service provision to the municipalities. In the first instance, outsourcing arrangements were used whereby small entrepreneurs were used as part of local economic development. The second model suggested integration of service providers into the municipal structures. Municipalities had difficulties with the outsourcing model and could not raise sufficient funds to absorb the workforce. Therefore, the project gains were lost when external funding ran out.

7.8 PROGRAMME ACHIEVEMENTS

7.8.1 Programme Costs

The programme had a total operational budget of R24.1 million spread over a three year period. It was implemented in 25 project sites in seven (7) provinces. Given that this was a labour-intensive programme, the NDPW’s employment beneficiary targeting strategies were applied. According to these strategies, 30% of the total programme costs were to be spent on labour with the rest going towards contractors and other programme-related costs.

The highest budget allocations were to the Lusikisiki and Butterworth projects in the Eastern Cape with Garankuwa receiving the least funding of R54,500. A total of 656 people were employed using a budgetary allocation of R5,021,727. This meant that on average each project beneficiary received about R7,655 in wages during the life-span of the project. A sum of R7,600,496 was spent on one person contractor and SMMEs leading to a significant cash injection in the project sites.
7.8.2 Programme Outcomes

The programme had a lifespan of 12 months in the selected sites. In total, the programme was implemented in 25 different localities in seven (7) provinces. There was an estimated 126 907 households that benefited from the programme. 656 jobs were created, 25 parks developed, and 20 emerging black contractors employed for refuse collection.

7.8.3 Cleaning up Campaigns

The one-person contractors were supplied with carts to transport waste from the point of source to an appointed SMMEs collection point. The clean-up campaigns were held in 23 project sites in a bid to raise communities’ awareness of environmental issues and increase their appreciation for clean and green living spaces. One-person contractors were appointed to collect, sort and deliver waste to nominated waste collection sites. There was a total of 20 small and medium scale contractors (SMMEs) identified by the beneficiary communities and employed by the relevant local authority. The SMMEs were used to encourage regeneration of local economies as it was assumed that they would spend their earnings within their localities and districts. The SMMEs were also trained in waste sorting, recycling and general management. These skills were meant to ensure sustainability of the project gains after the withdrawal of project funding.

7.8.4 Greening Campaigns

The programme sought to establish green spaces in the form of parks for the beneficiary communities. In some communities, the parks were developed from land that was reclaimed during the cleaning stage while other communities had land allocated by the local municipalities for the establishment of parks.

The programme was implemented in a total of 25 sites in seven (7) provinces. An estimated total of 126 907 households were affected by the cleaning and greening activities of the programme. There are no estimates for the number of
affected households in Leboneng and Mohlakeng due to lack of refuse collection services points. The project employed consultant service providers to develop and landscape the parks and regrettably it was not possible to obtain from the consultants the number of people who were employed on these project sites. No park was developed in Sebokeng because of land shortage. Waste collection services were initiated by the project and, ultimately, the project withdrew out of the local area because of poor support. There were a total of 25 parks developed in 23 communities during the life span of the programme with three (3) parks developed in Lusikisiki. These parks included basic facilities comprising simple playgrounds to more elaborate structures with facilities such as swimming pools. The parks, and all the facilities developed as part of the Clean and Green programme, were handed over to local municipalities for long-term maintenance at project close out.

7.8.5 Environmental Campaigns

Educational campaigns were undertaken by the programme as part of the strategy to introduce the communities to environmental management and the value of a clean and healthy environment. In keeping with the aim of the programme, which was to ensure the greatest degree of inclusiveness and inculcate an appreciation for a clean environment, educational materials were developed and educational campaigns carried out in the communities. Different educational methodologies were used to reach as broad a target audience as possible. The educational methodologies used included:

- Advertising on bill boards;
- Advertising on waste collection drums;
- Distributing educational pamphlets in the communities;
- Community theatre.

In order to reach the largest number of people, all educational material was translated into the languages spoken within the project locality. Additional
educational campaigns in the form of community theatre were implemented in some project sites. The community theatre production used plays written, acted and produced by the beneficiary communities.

In each case, it was important to reflect on community practices while at the same time being sensitive to communal cultural norms and practices. The plays were validated by the IDT for educational content and concurrence with the aims of the programme before production. Community plays were staged in different localities such as community halls, schools and, in some cases, open air theatre in taxi ranks to reach the maximum number of beneficiaries.

To indicate her satisfaction with the project outcomes, at the launch and handover ceremony of the Wallacedene project, the Western Cape MEC for Public Works, Ms Tasmeen Essop, hailed the project as the type of projects she would like to see more of in the Western Cape.

7.9 CAPACITY BUILDING

The programme contributed to building the capacity of the community in order to manage their own environmental affairs in the following broad categories:

Small and Medium Size Enterprises

Small and Medium Size Enterprises were used for the collection and disposal of refuse for the duration of the programme. These contractors used local labour and therefore contributed to local employment and economic activity. The one person contractors were drawn from the community and, through their involvement in the programme, were introduced to concepts of waste sorting, recycling and the general economic potential of waste management.
**Community Theatre**

The use of community members in the production and staging of community theatre was another example of capacity building facilitated by the Clean and Green programme. These communities were taught the intricacies of environmental management before they were selected to write their scripts. The skills acquired during the production of the theatre are transferable skills that will empower the communities to undertake other educational campaigns using the medium of community theatre.

**Beneficiary Selection Criteria**

Beneficiary selection in the Clean and Green programme was standardised in order to avoid deviations and cause conflict in the project areas. The municipality through its community committees was instrumental in identifying potential beneficiaries. The selection was based on the broad criteria used by the NDPW in its community based public works programmes. Priority was given to the following groups of beneficiaries:

- Youth were allocated 15% of the job opportunities created with emphasis of unemployed youth and those in conflict with the law;
- 30% of the labour force had to be unemployed people in general;
- 50% was allocated to women headed households;
- Between 1.5 and 2.0% of jobs were allocated to people with disabilities. The programme aimed to employ people whose disabilities allowed them to do minimal tasks.

SMMEs were selected on the assumption that they owned their own means of transportation and would therefore be able to carry refuse bags to the sorting centres. The OPCs were able bodied people capable of loading refuse bags from the collection sub-zone and loading them off at the sorting centre. In total 657 people benefited from the project as OPCs and 20 were employed as SMMEs to transport collected waste to sorting centres.
**Sustainability**

Sustainability was one of the critical areas where the programme was not very successful. For example, it was unsuccessful in initiating municipal uptake of the developed services. One reason advanced for problems regarding sustainability is that within the partnership structure, no clear exit strategy was in place. The financial years of national and local spheres did not coincide, leaving the IDT with responsibility for Clean and Green in the space between the two (2) financial years. The discrepancies in the budgetary cycles also meant that where municipalities had intended to budget for the project, they were faced with a time gap between the budgeting cycles. This gap led a loss of some of the project gains and subsequent loss of interest by the municipalities.

The programme developed two models for local authorities to absorb the programme activities after the 12-month period of operation ended. In one of these, staff were absorbed and in another, services were outsourced. These appear to be appropriate models where Clean and Green would kick-start activities, help develop local consciousness and payment for the service, and then hand it over to the local authority. Formal agreements were entered into with local councils to adopt either of the models. But because of the non-synchronisation of budgetary cycles, those municipalities who took over the project could only do so for a short period of time.

In some municipalities (such as Thohoyandou) the municipality tried to continue with the project after the official withdrawal of funds. This was however very short lived as the municipality did not have enough funds and environmental cleaning was not considered a priority area by the local councilors. This indicates that regardless of the good reception that CAGP received in the municipality and the visibility of its gains, it was still considered a luxury when compared with services such as water and roads provision. It is important, therefore, that in environmental service provision and the relationship between good quality environmental management systems and infrastructure development, must be emphasised to avoid the recurrence of the types of problems that Clean and Green encountered.
It is concluded that despite the substantial gains made during the lifespan of the programme, it did not fully meet the key test of sustainability in the following ways:

- Firstly, it proved impossible to develop a culture of payment for services. This may have been predicted for a programme with a 12-month lifespan within communities that had a history of non-payment. This was, with hindsight, an ambitious expectation judging by the failure of the Masakhane campaign that was meant to inculcate a culture of payment for services (Thwala, 2001).

- Secondly, the programme did not succeed in introducing a billing system during its life span, thereby creating a vacuum when the project pulled out.

- Thirdly, it did not manage to inculcate a culture of and value for environmental awareness and appropriate waste management within the communities and local municipalities. This was indicated by the municipalities’ reluctance to prioritise and budget for these services.

Human behavioural change is an incremental process. A behaviour change programme and campaign needs a long time frame to develop, implement, assess and adjust. It is desirable to build awareness, observe the resultant behavioural change and, where appropriate, offer support before the new behaviour takes root. It was for this reason that the timeframe for the Clean and Green programme was not enough for the expected behavioural change.

Local government planning is a systematic process that requires support and commitment for the future. The support given to the local government sphere within the auspices of the programme was limited to structural support (providing facilities and hiring one person contractors that did not adequately address issues of future planning. It would therefore be desirable that in future programmes implemented at the local government level, sufficient lead time is invested to support systematic intervention. An equally long period should be allowed prior to exit in order to support sustainable uptake.
It has been reported that communities reverted back to their old ways after the project pulled out. This was even manifest by the municipalities’ unwillingness to budget for waste management services. The issue was, however, not merely one of community dynamics as it was reported that local authorities did not regard waste services as a priority over and above other community expectations.

They were therefore unwilling or uncomfortable with the principles of budgetary deflections towards waste management from other services that were perceived as more deserving. This was despite the fact that according to the programme manager, local authorities welcomed the idea when Clean and Green was first introduced to them. They agreed to fund it at the end of the programme cycle. The IDT provided municipalities with estimated budgets that needed to be set aside for this purpose. Ultimately, the programme was not successfully absorbed by the municipalities. Where attempts were made, this did not last for more than a couple of months.

7.10 LESSONS LEARNT

The Clean and Green programme implementation was faced with a number of partnership challenges. This programme was a new and novel way of doing business in the IDT which included a partnership with a private corporate and a public sector department. The IDT had come in as a programme implementing agent and the partnership seems to have been beset with challenges from the outset. The challenges that befell the programme provide valuable lessons to the IDT as it seeks to engage in partnerships with other organisations.

7.10.1 Programme conceptualisation

Firstly, there were contradictions in the programme’s vision and mission statements which led to a misunderstanding of the programme deliverables. These led to perceptions of unmatched expectations from the partner organisations. Secondly, the programme’s objectives were very broad. This
resulted in poor programme focus at implementation. The agreement between SAB and IDT stated that the programme was set out to:

- “Kick-start” a system and process of refuse collection in identified areas;
- Start a movement of greening residential areas for disadvantaged communities;
- Create a basic infrastructure for waste management;
- Raise awareness through educational programmes and campaigns on environmental management;
- Create opportunities for coordinated efforts by key stakeholders to enhance participation in environmental management.

These objectives were conflicting with the vision and mission that had emphasised environmental greening and employment creation. Different expectations from the partners render the programme very complicated and difficult to assess. It is recommended that when partnerships are initiated, the programme outcomes must be agreed to by all partners, and expressed as simply as possible to avoid misinterpretations. It is further recommended that programme planning and management instruments must be precise in their phrasing and use clear terminology if the programme is to be measured.

### 7.9.3 Proposed Deliverables

The Clean and Green programme manual states that the programme was designed to incorporate standard practice: “Developing a culture of service payment within communities to ensure long-term sustainability of waste management and other municipal services.”

The programme was also set up to inculcate a culture of responsible waste disposal. These were very ambitious given the small programme budget and limited length of implementation. It has also been acknowledged that for
behavioural change to occur there is a need for long term processes of engagement and sustained support. Experience with the longer term, more heavily funded Masakhane programme, has shown that it is very difficult to effect behaviour change in communities Programme plans and claims must not try to appease too many policy needs and priorities as this leads to the development of unrealistic deliverables and a subsequent lack of ability to meet programme obligations.

7.9.4 Programme Sustainability

The programme developed models for the municipal management of environmental cleaning services. There was a contractual agreement between the IDT and the municipalities concerned to continue supporting the Green programme and build local implementation capacity. As this was not successfully implemented, project gains dissipated with the withdrawal of programme funds due to the municipalities’ inability to absorb the programme. It is deduced from this state of affairs that municipalities entered into the contracts without the necessary insight of what it entailed. It is further evident that the IDT did not adequately communicate the requirements and financial obligations of continuing with such a programme to their municipal partners. Consequently, the programme gains were lost and in municipalities where the IDT offered support after the programme, the exercise became too costly to continue.

An important lesson from this is that sustainability plans have to address the realities on the ground as well as the partners’ potential capacity to meet their contractual obligation.

7.10 RECOMMENDATIONS

The Clean and Green programme was conceptualised as a private public partnership to drive programme delivery and facilitate skills enhancement for the three organisations. It has, however, been shown that it was plagued with severe challenges from inception.
The IDT and its partners can draw valuable lessons from these challenges in order to inform its practice as it begins to engage in partnership with other organisations. Some of the most important lessons that came out of this programme are:

- Partnerships should be characterised by a common purpose that is clearly communicated and agreed upon by the partners.

- Each of the partners has to have clearly defined roles and responsibilities within the programme and these have to be clearly communicated to improve accountability partnerships.

- Communication channels between the partners have to be set out and communicated at the outset. The communication strategy should outline the management structure and institutional arrangements and set out mechanisms for resolving problems.

- Attempts should be made very early on in the life of a potential partnership to develop common cultural norms and values to govern the partnerships. This is to avoid the imposition of the dominant partner’s interests onto the other players.
Table 7.1: Budget allocation per project site for financial year 2001/02

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Project area</th>
<th>Planned community labour costs (R)</th>
<th>Planned contractors and other costs (R)</th>
<th>Actual project costs (R)</th>
<th>Labour cost as % of total budget</th>
<th>Total number of people employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eastern Cape</strong></td>
<td>Alice</td>
<td>108 500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>108 500</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mount Frere</td>
<td>96 500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>96 500</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Butterworth</td>
<td>666 000</td>
<td>1 084 000</td>
<td>1 750 000</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lusikisiki</td>
<td>243 200</td>
<td>1 156 800</td>
<td>1 400 000</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Free State</strong></td>
<td>Mangaung</td>
<td>192 800</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>192 800</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thaba Nchu</td>
<td>273 600</td>
<td>506 400</td>
<td>780 000</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gauteng</strong></td>
<td>Ratanda</td>
<td>141 798</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>141 800</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sebokeng</td>
<td>168 300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>168 300</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leboneng</td>
<td>135 000</td>
<td>315 000</td>
<td>450 000</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohlakeng</td>
<td>135 000</td>
<td>315 000</td>
<td>450 000</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KwaZulu-Natal</strong></td>
<td>Inner West</td>
<td>137 600</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>137 600</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pinetown</td>
<td>342 000</td>
<td>448 000</td>
<td>790 000</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mtubatuba</td>
<td>111 550</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>111 550</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Groutville</td>
<td>136 000</td>
<td>364 000</td>
<td>500 000</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>2004 Revenue</td>
<td>2005 Revenue</td>
<td>2006 Revenue</td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>2007 Revenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Limpopo</strong></td>
<td>Nylstroom</td>
<td>91 900</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>91 900</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>650 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vaalwater</td>
<td>203 400</td>
<td>446 600</td>
<td>650 000</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>106 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thohoyandou</td>
<td>106 900</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>106 900</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>790 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malamulele</td>
<td>315 000</td>
<td>475 000</td>
<td>790 000</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>790 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North West</strong></td>
<td>Garankuwa</td>
<td>54 500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54 500</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>116 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moses Kotane</td>
<td>116 900</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>116 900</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>116 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Western Cape</strong></td>
<td>Grabouw</td>
<td>207 500</td>
<td>492 500</td>
<td>700 000</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>117 267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Site View</td>
<td>117 267</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>117 267</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>700 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wallacedene</td>
<td>244 800</td>
<td>455 200</td>
<td>700 000</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>700 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kalkfontein</td>
<td>300 000</td>
<td>700 000</td>
<td>1 000 000</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>1 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gugulethu</td>
<td>185 311</td>
<td>432 393</td>
<td>617 705</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>617 705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 021 727</td>
<td>7 600 496</td>
<td>12 622 222</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDT 2004
Table 7.2: Clean Green project sites for the project duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Project Areas</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Jobs Created</th>
<th>Parks Developed</th>
<th>SMMEs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>Alice**</td>
<td>3 000</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mount Frere**</td>
<td>1 750</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Butterworth</td>
<td>14 697</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lusikisiki</td>
<td>2 367</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>Mangaung**</td>
<td>12 480</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thaba Nchu</td>
<td>6 869</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>Ratanda</td>
<td>6 111</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sebokeng**</td>
<td>10 800</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leboneng*</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohlakeng*</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu Natal</td>
<td>Inner West**</td>
<td>5 890</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pinetown**</td>
<td>5 060</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mtubatuba</td>
<td>3 392</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Groutville**</td>
<td>4 350</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>Nylstroom**</td>
<td>5 500</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vaalwater**</td>
<td>3 750</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thohoyandou**</td>
<td>11 100</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malamulele</td>
<td>6 404</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>Garankuwa**</td>
<td>3 250</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moses Kotane</td>
<td>2 237</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>Grabouw**</td>
<td>4 000</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Site View**</td>
<td>3 000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wallacedene**</td>
<td>7 400</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kalkfontein**</td>
<td>3 500</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gugulethu*</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>126 907</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These project areas only benefited in the development of community parks and did not participate in the cleaning operations.

** These figures are based on estimates supplied by the local councils.

Source: IDT, 2004
Table 7.3: Breakdown of costs invested into CAGP by the partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial year</th>
<th>SAB contribution (R)</th>
<th>NDPW contribution (R)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000/2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/2002</td>
<td>340 000</td>
<td>10 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/2003</td>
<td>750 000</td>
<td>12 600 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/2004</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 550 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total contribution</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 090 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>24 150 000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDT, 2001

7.11.1 Strategic partnerships

The IDT has established good working relationships with the municipalities in the project areas, as well as other government departments and non-governmental organisations involved in the programme. The Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs in KwaZulu-Natal was originally funded by the Flemish government to manage the recycling and gardening components of the programme. These functions were later transferred to the IDT. The department currently provides technical support to the Jozini programme regarding environmental management issues and the up-and-coming agricultural services to be offered in the Jozini Recycling Centre.

7.11.2 Beneficiary testimonies

The programme has achieved very significant impacts on environmental management and awareness-raising within the local municipalities. The job opportunities enabled the beneficiaries to improve the quality of their family lives. When asked to comment about the value of the programme in their lives, the beneficiaries at Jozini mentioned that it had brought about significant changes, including:
• Buying household furniture;
• Paying school fees;
• Meeting the family’s food requirements; and
• Building a house and installing solar energy for heating and lighting;

They also mentioned that engagement in the programme had provided considerable learning in waste management and the economic value of waste. One of the beneficiaries went as far as saying that she had learnt that ‘rubbish is money’ as she could collect cans and sell them to buy basics like bread.

Workers were trained in a range of handcrafting using recycled materials. This included paper-machine, making mats and shopping bags from plastic, and using metal containers to make lampshades. The workers were trained in waste handling techniques, disease transmission through improper waste disposal and handling, and the usefulness of protective clothing when handling waste. Lastly and most importantly, the programme participants regard themselves as ‘authorities’ and ‘community educators’ on waste management and recycling.

In Jozini, the programme has had significant impact on the municipality and community mobilisation within the local authority. The municipal manager indicated that the programme had delivered a badly needed service which the municipality was not in a position to offer. He went on to say that it was life changing in the community because it provided jobs, and extended the provision of waste removal services to areas that did not previously enjoy them, therefore contributing to an aesthetically pleasing environment.

Lastly, he commented that the programme was contributing to community building. It was mentioned that this occurs during the regular interactions of councillors who serve on the programme committee with members of the different tiers and spheres of government engaged in the programme. This view was supported by the councillors when they stated that during the waste management initiated community meetings they discussed other issues of relevance to
community life. The councillors concluded by indicating that there was still scope for further awareness raising on issues of recycling, especially differentiating between recyclable and non-recyclable materials.

7.11.3 Challenges to implementation

In implementing the programme, the IDT has faced challenges with securing construction sites for the recycling facilities. These led to delays in implementation especially after the collection of waste when recycling and composting were planned to commence. These have, however, been resolved with the Department of Environmental Affairs and Agriculture approving the use of their site in Jozini, and a site identified in QwaQwa. The IDT’S role within the programme was expanded to include all responsibilities relating to waste collection, sorting, recycling, composting and selling of recyclable materials midway during programme implementation. This impacted on the programme’s schedule as a study had to be commissioned to investigate the handling of the different waste streams, and inform equipment acquisition. The Jozini project was subjected to significant programme scope creep during implementation. The gardening and poultry production projects were not part of the original programme scope and have therefore contributed to delays in implementation and financial burdens. The IDT has inherited workers from the Department of Environmental Affairs and Agriculture leading to a drain on financial resources. An agricultural expert also had to be brought on board to support the daily management of the agricultural component of the programme.

Further challenges to the programme are around the planned sustainability of the programme gains as both the Jozini and QwaQwa municipalities cannot commit themselves to supporting and maintaining the programme after the withdrawal of the Flemish funding. It is assumed that the success of the agricultural component in the Jozini project will at least guarantee employment for the workers engaged in that part of the programme.
7.11.4 IDT value adding

The IDT’s experience in the Clean and Green Programme provided skills in the implementation and management of waste programmes and this led to a reduction in the programme implementation lag time. The IDT has also been very active in recruiting and managing the contribution of other sector departments such as the Department of Environmental Affairs and Agriculture in KwaZulu-Natal.

7.12 SUMMARY

This Chapter had focused on a partnership programme which involved different stakeholders. On the side of the IDT the programme was successful as all the money was spent. When the programme is evaluated against its objectives which were developmental it was not successful. With an allocation of R24,1 million over three years Clean and Green was a relatively small programme among the NDPW programmes. It was, however, very important as a learning exercise in the management of private public partnerships for service delivery. The programme’s gains outlined above indicate that, notwithstanding its ambitious objectives, the programme managed to provide an example of low cost waste management and environmental greening strategies that can be adopted by municipalities. The programme should also be commended for introducing models of outsourcing environmental management to SMMEs, thus facilitating local economic development.

The labour-intensive design of the Clean and Green campaign has made a significant contribution to the local economies at the project sites through an injection of amounts of R7 000 per employed beneficiary. The development of community parks and green spaces has provided a safe and secure place for children to play. This has resulted in better social interaction among the project communities.
The low sustainability of the programme gains can be attributed to the low budget and short life span. It is important to mention that when similar programmes are conceptualised in the future, more attention should be given to the development of appropriate exit strategies that would allow for project level coaching of beneficiary communities before total pull out. This would facilitate more organised handover and ensure the sustainability of programme gains. In hindsight, given the length and budgetary allocation of the programme, the set objectives were too ambitious. However, it did manage to achieve the following tangible outcomes:

- Short-term job creation;
- Enhanced environmental cleanliness and greening;
- Improved communal facilities; and
- Increased environmental awareness.

It can be concluded that the Clean and Green programme managed to achieve its stated objectives of cleaning and greening the environment using labour intensive methods. It also developed models of community based outsourcing of environmental management that can be adopted and expanded by municipalities in a bid to provide employment and stimulate local economic development.
CHAPTER 8
ZIVUSENI POVERTY RELIEF PROGRAMME

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This Chapter highlights the achievements of the Zivuseni programme since its inception in year 2001/2002. It describes the programme purpose, the beneficiary targeting and recruitment systems, planned programme outputs and social targets, partnership initiation and development for benefits maximisation, and lastly it looks at challenges faced by the IDT in the implementation of the programme (See Appendix B for Programme Design Document).

The Zivuseni programme has been implemented since April 2002. The planning guidelines which form part of the PMS for the programme stated the following in the introduction:

The initial implementation framework and programme design documents were developed with little base information, and were based on assumptions. It is critical that the assumptions are tested against experiences gained through implementation of the programme. The planning guidelines also stated that the purpose of the 're-planning exercise' was to utilise lessons learnt from the implementation of the programme to close gaps and correct planning based on the wrong assumptions. It might be necessary to re-visit and refine the objectives of the programme due to on the ground experience. A key pre-requisite for re-planning is ongoing evaluation of the programme, of which a mid-term evaluation and review is essential.

During the period 2002 to 2005 many difficulties were experienced at the operational level in implementing the programme. The section below outlines the
process and results of the Zivuseni Poverty Relief Programme over the 3 year period. The Zivuseni programme is exemplary of the IDT’s responsiveness to client needs. It is the Gauteng Premier’s flagship programme that was initiated to alleviate poverty and introduce innovative non-welfare based approaches to social service delivery in the Province. It has subsequently served as a model for the planning, implementation and management of workfare based programmes in South Africa. The Zivuseni implementation strategies have been adopted in a modified format for the Asisebenze programme in KwaZulu-Natal, the Saamstaan programme in the Western Cape. On a national level, the Zivuseni principles were used to inform planning for the Expanded Public Works Programme.

8.2 PROGRAMME PURPOSE

In April 2002, the Gauteng Department of Public Transport, Roads and Works initiated a workfare programme managed by the IDT as a programme implementing agency. The programme called Zivuseni was given an initial budgetary allocation of R420 million derived from the provincial MTEF allocations. The strategic purpose of the programme was to contribute towards the upliftment and empowerment of disadvantaged communities in Gauteng, through the implementation of spatially and demographically targeted projects. The programme was specifically intended to contribute to the short term poverty relief and reduction of direct dependence on the state welfare system through the repair of community infrastructure.

8.3 PROGRAMME SCOPE

8.3.1 Programme Objectives

The programme is a workfare programme that will be confined to the province of Gauteng. The programme objectives can be summarised by the following deliverables that have to be generated through the programme:
• The recruitment of beneficiaries from within the target community;
• The provision of technical training to beneficiaries in the selected trade;
• The provision of experiential training and experience to beneficiaries through the upgrading, repair and maintenance of community facilities;
• The provision of life skills training that will allow beneficiaries to utilise the newly acquired skills in income-generating activities;
• The disbursement of a subsistence allowance to beneficiaries during their participation in the programme.

8.4 PLANNED BENEFICIARIES AND BENEFICIARY COMMUNITIES

The programme was designed to provide short term poverty relief and training to at least 70,000 people in different geographic areas of the Gauteng Province within its three (3)-year life span. Specifically, the following demographic targets were set:

• Women: 50%
• Youth: 15 to 20%
• People with disabilities: 1 to 3%.

The geographic targeting was based on identified poverty pockets within the province. The following were identified as areas with the highest poverty rate and were therefore potential beneficiaries of the Zivuseni programme:

• Cosmos City (Diepsloot)
• West Rand (Kagiso)
• Sedibeng (Heidelberg Farms, Sebokeng)
• Johannesburg (Soweto, Orange Farm, Eldorado Park, and parts of Johannesburg West)
- Tshwane Metropolitan area (Soshanguve and Pretoria North)
- Education action zones (Gauteng on-line schools)
- New settlements and legalised informal settlements around the Province.

### 8.5 BUDGET AND CASH-FLOW CYCLES

The following table shows the money budgeted for the project and the cash-flow cycles for the first year. The table further illustrates how the money was spent on different project items.
Table 8.1: Budget for Zivuseni Poverty Alleviation Project Year 1 (2002/2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Budget (R)</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour subsistence allowance (&quot;wage&quot;)</td>
<td>29 040 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small hand tools</td>
<td>3 300 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal protective clothing</td>
<td>3 300 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total labour cost</strong></td>
<td><strong>35 640 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>60.14</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary and general</td>
<td>6 870 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
<td>13 400 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total material cost</strong></td>
<td><strong>20 270 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>34.21</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life skills training course material</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life skills training</td>
<td>3 300 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total training cost</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 350 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.65</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster managers</td>
<td>2 880 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning, facilitation and communication</td>
<td>1 758 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical support team</td>
<td>1 500 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>1 770 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursement</td>
<td>900 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total professional team cost</strong></td>
<td><strong>8 808 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.57</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total contingency cost</strong></td>
<td><strong>2 000 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.85</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>70 068 000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** IDT 2003
8.5.1 Explanatory notes to budget

Total labour cost

The budget for labour was divided into sub-categories which included the following:

- Subsistence allowance;
- Small hand tools allowance; and
- Protective clothing allowance.

The subsistence allowance was based on a payment of R40 per task day for 11,000 beneficiaries who will be employed for a minimum period of three (3) months. The beneficiary participation cycles will run concurrently with a new intake of beneficiaries being recruited every three months. The allowance for tools was based on an allowance of R300 per beneficiary. This allowance caters for small basic tools that were required to execute the work. The actual amount was expected to vary between the different trades. Tools were purchased on a quarterly basis and issued to beneficiaries. It was proposed that the tools be written off against the project and were given to beneficiaries at the end of the three (3) month employment contract. The allowance for personal protective clothing was R300 per beneficiary and was expected to cater for an overall, boots and handling gloves. These were the minimum requirements in terms of the Community Based Public Works Programme. If the budget permitted, T-shirts would also be issued to the beneficiaries in order to provide an identity for the programme.

Material

The material allowance is divided into a category called preliminary and general which caters for the equipment, transport and all requirements to be provided for by the site coordinator. It is based on an allowance of 15% of the material and
labour. The allowance for material is a preliminary estimate that will be revised as the scope of the projects are clarified and quantified.

**Professional team**

The allowance for cluster managers allows for a maximum of six (6) cluster managers to be employed at an all inclusive monthly cost of R40, 000. The allowance for planning, facilitation and communication allows for the contracting of project office staff. Communication marketing expertise and material and community facilitation requirements. Research monitoring and evaluation will cater for the development planning and support services that will be required on the project. The technical support team refers to the need for registered professionals (for example, Quantity Surveyor, engineer) that may be utilised in the implementation of the projects. The disbursement allowance will allow for the project office to be furnished and equipped. Any additional and incidental expenses that may be required will also be catered for from this item.

**Training**

Technical training has been omitted from the budget as it was understood that this would be funded by the Department of Labour. Technical training is estimated at 15 days per individual. Certain trades may have shorter training periods. A provision has been made to adapt existing life skills course material to the programme that will be applied for the programme duration. The delivery of the life-skills training delivery was based on an allowance of R60 per day for five (5) days for each beneficiary.

The following table shows the money budgeted for the project and the cash-flow cycles for the second year.
### Table 8.2: Revised Budget for Zivuseni Poverty Alleviation Project
#### Year 2 (2003/2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Budget (R)</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total labour cost</td>
<td>75 000 000</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total material cost</td>
<td>43 380 000</td>
<td>28.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total training cost</td>
<td>8 479 581</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total professional team cost</td>
<td>18 855 968</td>
<td>12.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total contingency cost</td>
<td>4 281 555</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td><strong>149 997 105</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Gauteng Department of Public Transport, Roads and Works, 2002*

The above budget projected for 2003/2004 was based on the percentages allocated in 2002/2003 and was revised to accommodate the experiences in the first year of operation.

### Table 8.3: Revised Budget for Zivuseni Poverty Alleviation Project
#### Year 3 (2004/2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Revised budget (R)</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total labour cost</td>
<td>100 000 000</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total material cost</td>
<td>57 860 000</td>
<td>28.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total training cost</td>
<td>11 306 108</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total professional team cost</td>
<td>25 141 291</td>
<td>12.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total contingency cost</td>
<td>5 708 740</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td><strong>200 016 140</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Gauteng Department of Public Transport, Roads and Works, 2002*
The 2004/2005 budget was also based on the same proportionate allocation of resources as used in 2003/2004. The subsequent budget was revised in accordance with the MTEF planning cycles.

8.6 STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS

In its operations, the IDT promotes and pursues strategic partnerships to accelerate the speed of programme implementation and increase the chances of sustainability. In Zivuseni, it was imperative to forge strategic partnerships in order to facilitate entry into some crucial markets and secure the types of projects that lend themselves to labour intensive maintenance work. Strategic partnerships were also required to actualise some programme deliverables such as training.

Zivuseni had strategic partnerships with Rand Water and ABI’s Soul Foundation. Rand Water provided technical assistance and expertise during the rehabilitation of wetlands in the Ekurhuleni area. Zivuseni joined forces with ABI and coordinated the continuation of cleaning up campaigns along the Jukskei River in Alexandra.

8.7 PROGRAMME OUTPUTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF SOCIAL TARGETS

The programme has been running for three financial years and Table 8.4 shows the money spent and the number of beneficiary numbers achieved.
Table 8.4: Programme achievements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOME</th>
<th>% of total for first two years</th>
<th>Total (R)</th>
<th>Year 1 01 Apr 2002 to 31 Mar 2003 (R)</th>
<th>Year 2 01 Apr 2003 to 31 Mar 2004 (R)</th>
<th>Year 3* 01 Apr 2004 to 30 Oct 2004 (R)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Government (Budget)</td>
<td></td>
<td>420 000 000</td>
<td>70 000 000</td>
<td>150 000 000</td>
<td>200 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total income (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>420 000 000</td>
<td>70 000 000</td>
<td>150 000 000</td>
<td>200 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPENDITURE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project office</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>3 537 553</td>
<td>898 850</td>
<td>2 638 703</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional fees</td>
<td>15.65</td>
<td>32 563 319</td>
<td>13 854 119</td>
<td>18 709 200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1 508 775</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 508 775</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials</td>
<td>37.47</td>
<td>77 974 299</td>
<td>33 891 655</td>
<td>44 082 644</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>43.93</td>
<td>91 403 950</td>
<td>18 779 593</td>
<td>72 624 357</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1 083 883</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 083 883</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>271 275 399</td>
<td>68 508 100</td>
<td>139 563 679</td>
<td>63 203 620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Expenditure budget (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= [(2)/(1)]x100
## PART B: Social Targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>% Actual</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>% Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of employees</strong></td>
<td>76 601</td>
<td>48 458</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>6 731</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 000</td>
<td>6 731</td>
<td>106%</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>106%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>26 512</td>
<td>106%</td>
<td>40 201</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women</strong></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>17 368</td>
<td>(64.5%)</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth</strong></td>
<td>15 to 20%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>13 345</td>
<td>(50.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disabled</strong></td>
<td>1 to 2%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>2 (0%)</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>2 (0%)</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## PART C: Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Expenditure (a)</th>
<th>Total number of employees (b)</th>
<th>Number of days employed (c)</th>
<th>Cost / job (d) = (a) / (b)</th>
<th>Person days (f) = (b) x (c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R271 275 399</td>
<td>48 460</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>R5 598</td>
<td>10 784 532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R68 508 100</td>
<td>6 731</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>R10 178</td>
<td>1 776 984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R139 563 679</td>
<td>26 512</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>R5 264</td>
<td>6 999 168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R63 203 620</td>
<td>15 215</td>
<td>15 217</td>
<td>R4 153</td>
<td>2 008 380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDT 2004
8.8 CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTATION

8.8.1 Recruitment strategy

The implementation of a workfare programme in an area plagued by high rates of unemployment, high population density in informal settlements, and a mobile community posed its own unique challenges. One of the biggest challenges for Zivuseni was trying to set up a fair and equitable beneficiary recruitment strategy. This was achieved through registration campaigns in targeted communities. Beneficiary call-ups also proved to be problematic as beneficiaries would have relocated, or changed their contact details and therefore failed to turn up for employment.

8.8.2 Geographic targeting

Geographic targeting posed a challenge when communities were requested to submit business plans for renovation and maintenance work in their areas. It became apparent that this system tended to favour more affluent communities that could afford to secure the services of professionals to prepare sound business plans. Subsequently, the strategy was changed to a municipality driven system that did not give unfair advantages to affluent communities.

8.8.3 Training

Training proved to be a highly contentious issue within the programme. Training schedules were difficult to manage and, in some cases, the beneficiaries were only trained after the termination of their services. This was usually necessitated by the requirements of the job and need to get people on site on time. In other cases, the only form of training offered was life skills training that did not satisfy the requirements of the beneficiaries. This kind of training was not well received by all beneficiaries as some felt they could have benefited more from technical
training that would improve their chances of employment after exiting from Zivuseni.

8.8.4 Targeting the disabled

Attaining the disability target proved very difficult within the framework of the Zivuseni programme. This is because the definition of ‘disabled’ used in the programme is the Social Development grant qualification definition, whereas the programme excludes people benefiting from other government schemes. Consequently, the programme has had limited success in recruiting people with conditions severe enough to be classified as a disability while not necessarily qualifying them for social welfare grants.

8.8.5 Beneficiary payment

As part of the life skills training within the Zivuseni programme, beneficiaries were to be introduced to commercial banking and trained in the management of bank accounts. To accomplish this, services of a commercial bank were sought. It, however, soon became obvious that commercial banks did not have the capacity to handle the volumes and frequency of cash payments required by the programme. Additionally, the beneficiaries did not understand the service payment culture of commercial banks and had significant problems with account management. Payments were later processed through the ‘all pay’ cash payment system used by the Department of Social Development for social grants. This was more satisfactory to the beneficiaries even though it eroded the programme funds as the programme had to absorb the service charges. It was also not ideal as it neglected the financial management skills which were part of the lessons gained by using the commercial banking system.

8.9 LESSONS LEARNT

Zivuseni was not conceived as a pilot programme, but was rather a fully fledged poverty alleviation programme. The lessons learnt in the planning and
implementation of the Zivuseni Poverty Relief Programme is very important for the development of future programmes across the country. These lessons can have a significant impact on the deliverables of the programme and their potential to contribute to poverty alleviation. Briefly these lessons are:

8.9.1 Programme design

In designing these types of programmes, there is potential to create a mismatch between the programme goals and types of projects within the programme. Zivuseni’s original goals included providing technical training to beneficiaries. It, however, proved very difficult to provide training and still deliver on the programme outputs on projects of less than six weeks duration. The training component was ultimately down scaled to only include a life skills component, and only offer technical training to a selected cohort.

8.9.2 Community expectations

In programmes of this nature, it is not uncommon for the potential benefits to be exaggerated therefore creating unrealistic expectations among the beneficiary communities. Zivuseni was also seen to have expectations within communities that proved very challenging to meet. Communities were expecting the creation of numerous employment opportunities that would absorb large portions of the unemployed. This was, however, unrealised because of the scope of the projects, and the availability of community assets that could be renovated.

The recruitment strategy utilised was misinterpreted by the communities. This led to unmet expectations. Communities assumed that the primary beneficiaries of job opportunities would be people with direct interest in the renovated assets. For example, there was a perception that schools would be renovated by parents who had children in the schools. When this failed to materialise, a lot of people felt let down and therefore failed to support programme initiatives. It is also important to design the recruitment strategy such that it does not lead to the unnecessary stigmatisation of participants within the programme. These observations highlight
the importance of direct, unambiguous communication with potential beneficiaries during the conceptualisation of workfare programmes. Beneficiaries should also be made to understand that they are engaged on fixed contracts.

8.9.3 Communication and social facilitation

The importance of communication and social facilitation in this programme requires special mention. Social facilitation enables the project managers to handle beneficiary expectations and provides a platform for negotiations around political tensions and operational demands at project sites. Social facilitators also mediate on beneficiary expectations and disputes at site, and counsel beneficiaries around issues of financial management. Lastly, a comprehensive communication strategy provides a channel for creating synergy with other government programmes seeking to achieve related benefits, or targeting similar areas of work.

8.10 SUMMARY

Zivuseni provided an opportunity for the IDT and Gauteng Provincial government to explore ways and means of implementing workfare programmes, and providing vital infrastructure maintenance in a sustainable and cost-effective manner. In conclusion, it must be stated that the Zivuseni programme has thus far achieved its objectives of contributing to short-term poverty alleviation. It has performed beyond expectations in the targeting of women and youth in employment opportunities. It has also increased the confidence of beneficiaries through life skills training. Lastly the fairness of the beneficiary targeting strategy has restored the faith of people in their ability to access government benefits and therefore their potential to get jobs on the open job market. In 2005 Zivuseni Programme closed down and it was to be taken over by the different Municipalities around the country under the newly established Expanded Public Works Programme. The Municipality had no capacity to continue with the programme as it was dumped to them. There was no institutional continuity that
was in place to take over the Zivuseni Programme. This presented a lost opportunity to improve on a programme that was already running.
9.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter 9 focuses on the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme in the Kgalagadi District Municipality. The Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme was launched in 2001 by the President as a strategy to guide national rural development efforts. The strategy aims to address economic growth and development, infrastructure, social and institutional development and the enhancement to delivery capacity. The strategy must benefit the rural poor generally, and particular efforts will be made to target women, youth and the disabled. The Kgalagadi District Municipality is one of the ISRDP nodes and is situated between the North West and Northern Cape provinces, thus making it a cross-boundary municipality administered by the two provinces, in terms of the joint administration model described by the Municipal Structures Act 1998 (Act No. 117 of 1998). The Kgalagadi District Municipality is made out of three local municipalities that is Moshaweng, Ga-Segonyana and Ga-Magara. The ISRDS must address the following issues:

- Economic growth and development
- Infrastructure development
- Social development
- Institutional and delivery capacity enhancement (IDT, 2001).
The apparent affluence in the cities and towns across the country does not show the reality of the situation of the majority of South Africans. South Africa in GDP terms is an affluent country. Its per capita income of about R7 280 places it amongst the upper middle-income countries yet its income disparities are amongst the most extreme in the world. Reducing unemployment and the eradication of poverty are the most crucial problems facing the Kgalagadi District Municipality. Poverty has been defined

“as the inability to attain and maintain a minimal standard of living, measured in terms of basic consumption needs or the income required to satisfy them” (Coetzee et al., 2001).

Poverty is characterised by the inability of individuals, households or communities to command sufficient resources to satisfy a socially acceptable minimum standard of living. This includes the inability to devise appropriate coping or management strategies when there is a crises, either and of an economic dimension or social dimension. Poverty is manifest in many forms but not limited to, food insecurity, unsafe usage of inefficient forms of energy, shanty and informal settlements, family fragmentation, overcrowding and a lack of employment. Poverty can be viewed from many perspectives.

9.2 THE DEVELOPMENTAL MANDATE

The Kgalagadi District Municipality is trying to address the developmental mandate which is reflected in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) through the implementation of the Anchor projects. The RDP primarily reflects a ‘basic needs’ approach to development, but also encompasses aspects of the emancipatory approach (ANC, 1994). The combination of these approaches makes up the political and economic philosophy that underlies the whole RDP. The basic thrust of the RDP is for community-based development, it called for a process that would empower local communities through education, training and ‘the involvement of communities in the process’, of providing sound community assets.
The Bill of Rights in chapter 2 of the Constitution outlines and enshrines the rights that all people in South Africa are entitled to. Moreover, the Bill of Rights obliges the state to “…respect, protect, promote and fulfill …” these rights. In terms of planning and development, it is the rights in sections 24 to 27 that are of most relevance – namely those relating to land, housing, water, environment and social security. All of these rights call for pro-active action on the part of the state to ensure their realisation (South African Government, 1996). Thus for example, in relation to property, the part of the Constitution, which deals with the right to property, section 25 (subsections 4 to 6) obliges the state to take action with regard to the reforming of land relations. Section 26 (which deals with the right to housing) states that the government must take “reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right”. Section 27 relates to rights to health care, food, water and social security, the Constitution obliges the state to take reasonable legislative or other action to achieve the realisation of these (South African Government, 1996). The Bill of Rights thus presents a ‘developmental mandate’ to government, calling for action in the progressive realisation of these rights. The Constitution thus places government at the centre of the post-apartheid development enterprise.

9.3 THE INTEGRATED SUSTAINABLE RURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
The ISRDS was launched in 2001 by the President as the strategy to guide national rural development efforts. The strategy aims at addressing economic growth and development, infrastructure, social and institutional development and the enhancement to delivery capacity.

The cabinet appointed the Independent Development Trust (IDT) to provide programme management support so as to ensure that the goals of the ISRDP and the local Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) are realised; and to support provincial governments in this regard.
9.4 THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT TRUST

The Independent Development Trust is responsible to:

- Prepare the ISRDP design document (PDD);
- Support and assist the municipalities by working closely with the municipalities, with existing centres for nodal planning and implementation, monitoring and management and other stakeholders to prepare, manage and implement the IDPs;
- Ensure that projects and programmes emanating from nodal IDPs are integrated;
- Facilitate institutional and human capacity required by nodes to achieve IDP and ISRDP objectives.

9.5 VISION OF THE ISRDS

The vision of the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy (ISRDS) is to attain

"socially cohesive and stable communities with viable institutions, sustainable economies and universal access to social amenities, able to attract skilled and knowledgeable people, equipped to contribute to their own and the nation's growth and development" (IDT, 2001).

The strategic intent of the ISRDP is to transform rural South Africa into an economically viable and socially stable and harmonious sector that makes a significant contribution to the nation’s Growth Domestic Product (GDP). The strategy will benefit the rural poor generally, and particular efforts will be made to target women, youth and the disabled.
9.6 WHY THE INTEGRATED SUSTAINABLE RURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

The strategy aims to address economic growth and development, infrastructure development, social development and institutional and delivery capacity enhancement. The pillars of the ISRDP are:

- Integration of activities at local level
- Coordination of efforts from all spheres of government and other stakeholders
- Decentralisation to be promoted, thus ensuring that community needs are articulated in a demand-driven manner
- Partnerships formed to complement available resources
- Sustainability will be the driving force for all interventions

9.7 NODAL APPROACH

The thrust of the strategic initiative will be implemented through the concept of nodal development. Two (2) principal structuring mechanisms will be used to drive the initiative:

- Special focus and targeting of funding and resource allocation from the three spheres of government and from strategic partners in response to indicators of poverty and economic opportunity.
- The development of local institutional capacity in these areas based on strengthening local institutions and creating partnerships between local government, public entities, NGOs and the private sector. The capacity in the partnerships should be in a position to plan, prioritise, package and manage the delivery of projects and initiatives in any defined area.
District municipalities, in collaboration with local municipalities within each node, are the primary vehicles for the delivery of the ISRDP at local level. Nodes are expected to achieve two overall objectives:

- Strengthen the capacity of district and local municipalities; and
- Efficient and effective delivery of development projects.

In order to achieve these objectives, municipalities participate in various planning and implementation activities with support from key stakeholders.

### 9.8 DELIVERY FRAMEWORK

The framework for delivery in the nodes should ensure co-ordinated delivery through long range planning that defines key deliverables over the 10-year period, and by setting up institutional arrangements that will manage the implementation process. The institutional arrangements will be supported by stakeholder mobilisation that will ensure that partnerships are developed and bring expertise and resources closer to the nodes. All this will be documented for knowledge management purposes.

Lessons from the implementation process will be used when the implementation is expanded to other nodal points that may be announced at a later stage. The tool to guide the articulated demands from the local municipalities and the supply of resources from the national and provincial government is the Integrated Development Plan (IDP). Therefore, the IDP is the main document for guiding IDT’s support to the nodes and DPLG’s co-ordination of national and provincial government resources to the nodes.
9.9 METHODOLOGY

The aim of the evaluation was to assess the progress that has been made in the implementation of the Anchor Projects in the Kgalagadi District Municipality. The following methodologies have been used in conducting the evaluation:

- Interviewing individuals who are involved in the planning, implementation and the coordination of the anchor projects: The following people were interviewed, Kgalagadi Municipal Manager, Social Facilitator/Head Mayoral Support Services, Project Coordinator Nodal Delivery Team, Project Co-ordinators, Project Managers, Kgalagadi Executive Mayor.

- Conducted detailed evaluation of individual anchor projects: This entailed an in-depth analysis of each Anchor project focusing on the project background, state of the project, challenges, steps taken to address challenges and recommendations.

9.10 OVERVIEW OF THE KGALAGADI DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY

The Kgalagadi District Municipality is made up of three local municipalities, that is, Moshaweng, Ga-Segonyana and Ga-Magara. It is situated between the North West and Northern Cape provinces, thus making it a cross-boundary municipality administered by the two provinces, in terms of the joint administration model described by the Municipal Structures Act 1998 (Act No. 117 of 1998). It also shares its northern border with Botswana. The main towns include the strategically important town of Sishen where iron ore extraction forms a key part of the local economy and Kuruman. Agriculture, mining and residential land uses are dominant in the district, which is characterised by semi-arid and arid landscapes. Furthermore a number of smaller towns are located in the District. The Moshaweng Municipality is completely in the North West and Ga-Segonyana Municipality is predominantly in the North West with certain parts belonging to the Northern Cape. The Ga-Magara Municipality is completely in the Northern Cape. The area is characterised by its vastness and is predominantly rural nature. Its unique attractiveness is associated with the Kalahari bushveld and sandy soils.
9.11 DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

The node consists of a total population of 181 015 persons, made up of 35 446 households with an average family size of 5.1.

Table 9.1: Population by race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>158 311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>10 508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>11 348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>181 015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics South Africa, 2001

9.12 SOCIAL PROFILE

Poverty and deprivation are evident in the majority of places and almost exclusively confined to the non-white population. According to the Statistics South Africa (2001) 68% of the households are without piped water to their dwellings or on site. Fifty-seven percent (57%) are excessively far from the main watercourse. A total of 63% have no access to hygienic sanitation and only 24% have refuse or rubbish removed by local authorities. In terms of accessibility, 79% live far from a post office. With 89% living unacceptably far from a welfare office, 67% of those eligible for welfare are not welfare grant recipients. Seventy-one percent (71%) of households have no access to a telephone. There are great disparities that are evident between races in this node. There is clearly a need that exists for social as well as basic infrastructure.

9.13 ECONOMIC PROFILE

Unemployment in the district is very high. It is estimated that 53% of households
in this node are unemployed and approximately 89% of these have no access to land for agricultural purposes. The average income level ranges from R1 000 to R1 500 per month, while unemployment levels for the economically active are 65 to 70%, indicating a reasonably high level of poverty, almost twice the number of people unemployed nationally. The area was the strongest mining region in the Northern Cape; however, declining mining development trends coupled with the near extinction of asbestos mining in the 1980s has had a strong impact on the socio-economic indicators of the region. In summary there is an overall focus of 49% of all projects being infrastructure type projects, while 44% of the overall projects are social-type projects with economic-type projects constituting only 4% of the overall projects. Both the priorities and the needs identified target basic infrastructure-type projects. The information below from the IDP demonstrates the percentage distribution of projects focused on and in essence the priorities for the district.

- Water 85%
- Sanitation 18%
- Sport and recreation 18%
- Health 8%
- Security 28%.
Table 9.2: Economic and basic infrastructure indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income levels</td>
<td>R12 000 to R18 000 per annum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>50% to 59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Infrastructure</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>Less than 60% have facilities in dwellings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>Between 50% to 60% are not connected to electricity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation</td>
<td>Greater than 75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Greater than 75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Infrastructure</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health Facilities</td>
<td>Between 2501 and 4500 people per facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Health</td>
<td>501 to 1000 persons per facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>301 to 400 learners per school</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics South Africa, 2001

9.14 KGALAGADI DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY NODAL OBJECTIVES

The key nodal challenges for the development of Kgalagadi district have been identified as the following:

- To provide access to health facilities and services in 5 years within 20 km radius
- To improve and upgrade access roads within 5 years
- To provide access to good quality drinking water as per RDP standards
- To reduce the sanitation backlog by 1 000 toilets on site per annum
• To decrease the mortality and infection rates by HIV-related diseases by 20%.

• To decrease the unemployment rate by 10% as well as a 10% rise in the economy within 5 years through Local Economic Development and a decrease by 30% in the unemployment rate through livestock improvement and grazing camps.

• To have 30% increase of tourists to the area.

• To decrease asbestos-related diseases by 40%.

• To provide access to a properly working public telephone connections according to a 2:1 500 people relation.

• To decrease the high crime rate by 10%.

• To provide access to a centre where basic skills development and training are provided within 100 km radius.

• To provide access to good quality pre-primary education within 5 km radius as well as good proper secondary education within 20 km radius.

The following 10 Anchor projects are aimed at addressing the above nodal objectives. Poverty is widespread throughout the district, and is especially problematic in the rural areas, such as Moshaweng Municipality. Given the extreme lack of service provision, economic and educational opportunities, the Kgalagadi was chosen as a presidential poverty node thus the anchor projects were selected based on the local needs of each particular area as identified through the IDPs process. The Municipality has made use of not only the ISRDP document but concentrated the IDP as its main planning tool. Below is the evaluation of the 10 Anchor projects, which were informed by the IDP process.
9.15 SPECIFIC ANCHOR PROJECTS

9.15.1 Integrated Energy Centre

Background

The Integrated Energy Centre is meant to bring alternative energy services closer to the local communities. Initially the Integrated Energy Centre was funded at a tune of R2.5 million by a variety of organizations like TOTAL SA, SASOL, National Development Agency, Paraffin Association of South Africa and Kgalagadi District Municipality. It was identified after a study by the municipality regarding the need and viability of the project. Joseph Lenoke runs the Integrated Energy Centre. This Centre is essentially a filling station, which caters for all the petroleum needs of the area and is owned by the community in a co-operative of 1 650 members from four wards, representing eight (8) villages. The project is also to be used to educate communities about the effective and efficient usage of all kinds of energy. The Centre is now fully functional and able to supply petrol, diesel, paraffin, gas and other lubricants. Other suppliers like ESKOM use the centre to sell electricity coupons.

While the Centre has made significant progress in terms of delivery, there are still matters of concern like the fact that TOTAL are the sole suppliers of petrol and diesel, thus it creates problems for the Centre in terms of efficiency. The problem resulted from the fact that TOTAL provided the fuel pumps to kick start the project. Yet since the station was supported by a variety of partners like SASOL, the station remains unbranded and from a marketing point of view it could also create problems.

State of the project

Figures regarding the profitability of the Centre were not available yet its sustainability as a site of development is undoubted. For instance, it has created 13 permanent jobs, of which four of them are women. And already it has shown
great strength by providing assistance by funding 20 SMME’s to do training in financial management. These were local vendors and tuck shop owners. The Centre is able to run its activities efficiently using a van and a trailer, which was bought via a donation of R200 000 from the National Development Agency. This enables the Centre to do stocking of goods that cannot be supplied by companies like TOTAL such as tuck shop supplies and lubricants especially none branded products. It is envisaged that the co-operative members who contributed in buying of shares in this project could be looking at dividends in the near future. For now though they will have to be content with the fact the Centre has created jobs, ownership lies with the community and it is able to support other extra activities in the community.

Table 9.3: Monthly sales of fuel (in litres)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Petrol (L)</th>
<th>Diesel (L)</th>
<th>Paraffin (L)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>26 694</td>
<td>11 362</td>
<td>Centre: 1 190 Vendors: 412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>25 143</td>
<td>13 137</td>
<td>Centre: 1 257 Vendors: 2 736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>30 501</td>
<td>11 629</td>
<td>Centre: 1 152 Vendors: 1 369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>27 411</td>
<td>18 740</td>
<td>Centre: 1 099 Vendors: 1 644</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work, 2004
Table 9.4: Monthly sales of LP gas by type of unit sold

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>LP Gas Unit</th>
<th>Number of sales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>9 kg: 27</td>
<td>19 kg: 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refill: 25</td>
<td>48 kg: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>9 kg: 39</td>
<td>19 kg: 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refill: 35</td>
<td>48 kg: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>9 kg: 100</td>
<td>19 kg: 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refill: 40</td>
<td>48 kg: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>9 kg: 30</td>
<td>19 kg: 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refill: 37</td>
<td>48 kg: 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work, 2004

Table 9.5: September 2003 diesel order (in litres) for Sedibeng Water

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Quantity (L)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>1 September 2003</td>
<td>2 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 September 2003</td>
<td>2 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 September 2003</td>
<td>2 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 September 2003</td>
<td>2 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 September 2003</td>
<td>2 526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>10 125</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work, 2004
Challenges

According to the Centre manager and the executive mayor, there are still several challenges which the Centre needs to overcome in order to reach full efficiency. For instance, the Centre does not offer unleaded petrol; the lack of telephones impedes the connectivity to speed dialing and petrol cards. The Centre also has to deal with problem of having a single supplier, in this case TOTAL and when deliveries are delayed or shoddy, it is difficult to call on alternatives. The unavailability of unleaded petrol is cause for serious concern as it limits the options of services available to customers especially with a new trend in petrol services requiring all cars to use unleaded products. Business that may have come from the municipality has been stalled due to the lack of unleaded petrol as most of the new vehicles only take unleaded petrol.

In an era where the use of physical cash has greatly diminished and the use of petrol cards has become significant, there is an urgent need to install telephone facilities to enable customers to use cards through gadgets like speed dial. Again the Centre remains unable to exploit advantages of its partnership with the municipality who are in position to provide a large chunk of business but cannot do so if the Centre does not have petrol card facilities. At this point other partners like ESKOM cannot be persuaded to fully utilise the Centre without proper mechanism for accountability.

The Centre manager has also highlighted the limitations of the petrol tank which can only take 23 000 litres, a capacity that can be exhausted in three (3) weeks. Plans are afoot to expand the tanks in order to limit the frequency of refilling. The Integrated Energy Centre as a community project is supposed to benefit a large number of people (1 650); however, this has also created another problem when it comes to the distribution of dividends. Eventually individual benefit is reduced to miniscule. That puts question marks on the commercial value of the project, almost rendering it a subsistence exercise.
**Steps taken to address challenges**

There are several steps which have been taken to improve the services at the Centre like the installation of a satellite dish to facilitate the use of telephones, fax and speed point. There is no target date with regard to these proposed installations. The Centre manager said a computer has been purchased also to facilitate the speed dialing and it could also come in handy in formalizing the accounting process at the Centre. Having identified the lack of unleaded petrol as the biggest handicap of the project, quotations were submitted by the Department of Mineral and Energy to TOTAL for the installation of 9 000 litres of unleaded petrol tank. Unfortunately, the target date was supposed to be 15 October 2003 and as yet it has not been installed. No new date has been set for the installation of the tank. As the Centre has already identified limitations (size) of the leaded tank, TOTAL has not provided a bigger tank despite earlier commitment to do so.

**Recommendations**

- Partners must revisit their agreement with TOTAL. With a sole supplier, it is difficult to consider alternatives even when the service is sloppy. For example, TOTAL has not been able to keep up with dates of expanding the capacity of the petrol tanks.

- Telephone lines must be prioritised as a matter of urgency given that the centre is losing business from the municipality and other corporations who use petrol cards. The Centre must consider incorporating TELKOM as one of their major partners seeing that communication is major problem in this project.

- There must be more vigilance with regard to deadlines and time spell. For example, the installation of the satellite has no set date and TOTAL has not lived up to its promises with regard to the installation of bigger petrol pumps.

- The partners must reconsider the issue of the branding of the Centre because as is, it would be difficult to market services and products of a centre that assumes a status of anonymity at first sight.
9.15.2 Roads, Clinics and Primary Health Care

**Background**

The access roads project will improve access to schools and clinics in the District. It will assist service providers to access these centres with ease. The Clinics and Primary Health Care Project aimed at upgrading and construction of health facilities in the Node, including the building of maternity wards in some of the clinics and community care centres. The project will improve the current status of primary health care services by providing easy access to health facilities for all the communities. The Kgalagadi Anchor Projects are designed in such a way that for every new establishment, be it a clinic, municipality offices or the housing project, access roads form an important part of these new developments. There are 11 access roads that were initially earmarked for construction and most of them tied to the building of new clinics and/or Primary Health Care centres as well.

It could be said that construction process for both the roads and clinics was not an easy process as they were several problems mainly with contractors; however, the overall assessment indicates that the project had some degree of success. For instance, out of the 11 access roads only one site was abandoned due to problems with contractors. A more detailed explanation will be covered in the next section. Newly tarred roads and consequently some new health care facilities are situated in the Moshaweng Municipality, which also includes Mothibistad, an area earmarked for major housing development (1 000 units) by the Anchor Projects. A budget of R35.3 million was set aside for the building of roads and clinics and fortunately there were no financial shortfalls as far as this project is concerned. Funds for construction mainly came from the departments of Public Works and Health (North West). It is worth noting that the Public Works played a crucial role in planning, supervisory and even support construction on sites where contractors had difficulties in meeting delivery schedules.
All these new developments, particularly the roads (11), which are mostly finished, have greatly enhanced and improved accessibility to these areas. The Nodal Integrated approach to construction of facilities has enabled ordinary community folks to get immediate access to electricity, water and primary health care. Employment is another key component to development and it is pleasing to say that construction created 110 jobs, mostly contract workers. Other than conventional employment, small contractors (SMMEs) benefited from the construction projects and the focus was on empowering local people like the WYK Five, a firm which does fencing of built structures.

According to Solly Matoba, the social facilitator and head of mayoral support services, most of the contractors were made of people from outside Kgalagadi and some of those sub-contracts that were given to local SMMEs were left unfinished.

**State of the project**

Most roads and clinics (11) are almost finished or near completion. Some roads, like Laxey and Cassel Roads, were abandoned by contractors due to cash-flow problems. Several of these roads are at the mid-level phase which entails tarring, for an example the D 20 Churchill Road and others await final touches like roads marks and accompanying signs.

With regard to some roads, there are signs of poor workmanship especially with the drainage systems on the sides and that could lead or spark soil erosion in the aftermath of heavy rains. In most of these roads contractors have long left and that may leave the Public Works Department with a sizeable headache to either finish the construction or face the consequent repairs, which may arise out of shoddy work. At the time of evaluation, one clinic also in Churchill Road was near completion. Construction of the 11 clinics began in 2001 on four sites and by 2003 almost all these were built (not necessarily finished) and those that were facing serious difficulties in meeting construction deadline, the Provincial Health Department intervened and started issuing fresh tenders to complete the job.
Challenges

Clearly there were many hurdles with the construction process on both instances, that is, roads and clinics. The most obvious ones were slow progress resulting from cash flow problems on the side of the contractors, sloppy workmanship (for example, lack of proper drainage systems on the side of the roads) and abandonment of sites by contractors. According to Tlhomelang Matlhare, the Project Co-ordinator of the Nodal deliver Team, construction of both roads and clinics were often delayed while contractors were waiting to sort out financial difficulties that were either as a result of poor management or over spending on unforeseen circumstances like the removal of dolomites on sites.

In extreme cases, contractors would eventual abandon sites. Fortunately, the overall impression is that these disruptions did not on the whole alter the eventually outcome of construction. The process of building roads and clinics were derailed and disrupted but ultimately delivered.

Steps taken to address challenges

- The most serious challenge was the abandonment of sites and the Anchor team responded by convening meetings between the contractors and consultants on progress.

- In cases where it became clear that the problems could persist, like when a site was completely abandoned, the Public Works Department would step in to keep project on track.

- It had been highlighted above that in one instance; the Provincial Health Department intervened and started issuing fresh tenders to finish construction of an abandoned clinic.

Recommendations

- To avoid a situation where independent contractors find themselves in serious cash-flow problems, we recommend that as part of the
tendering process companies should provide financial guarantees and make full disclosure of their financial status.

- A closer working relationship between the Public Works Department and contractors is also recommended to the department to gain full insight of contractors' limitations and provide early warning signs of possible problems regarding progress on the sites.

- While awarding contracts, the Nodal Delivery Team is advised to strike the right balance between empowerment and expertise. Not that the two are always diametrical opposed to each other, yet what came out clearly from discussions with the team was that contracts involving locals SMME’s were often bogged down by poor workmanship.

9.15.3 Mothibistad Housing Project

*Background*
The Mothibistad Housing Project is situated at the cross border of Moshaweng and Ga-Segonyana Local Municipalities, very close to a thriving suburb and a semi-rural establishment which is characterised by stick and mud structures. While the initial focus of the project was to address or deal with over-crowding in and around the area, residents from these semi-rural structures could take advantage of the newly constructed roads, water facilities and electrification to upgrade their living standards. Thus a housing project would seem like a natural progression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household status</th>
<th>Number of houses 2001</th>
<th>Number of houses 1996</th>
<th>Difference between 2001 and 1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>29 035</td>
<td>24 550</td>
<td>4 485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>2 761</td>
<td>1 476</td>
<td>1 285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>8 996</td>
<td>8 909</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>-102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Statistics South Africa, 2001
It is envisaged that 1 000 units would be built in the area and four (4) model units are already on site, unfortunately no houses have been built ever since due to a host of problems with this project. A budget of R20.2 million was set aside for the housing project and unlike some others; there is no financial short fall on this project. The majority of funding came from CMIP and DDGLH (North West).

However, progress on this project remains stunted, the main reason being the removal of dolomites on the site. So far developers have found the process daunting at the very least and at worst too expensive. People are getting frustrated by the lack of progress, especially as construction schedules keep shifting forward. Construction was supposed to resume by 21 October 2003 and now it has been moved to February 2004.

The frustration seems to have manifested itself in the vandalism of the model units. Another reason for the smashed windows seems to stem from the poor quality of these proposed houses. In an area where heat is major concern, the size of the proposed houses is alarmingly small and any prospects of extending units for bigger families are almost none existed. Even health experts have cited potential health hazards in areas of sanitation and privacy within these units as individual partitioning will be impossible (division of living room, bedroom and kitchen).

**State of the project**

Construction of houses has stalled completely and probably due to resume in February 2004. No specific date has been set for the completion of the housing project and people in the community are getting weary of waiting for delivery. Prospective bidders were taken for site inspection on the 6 January 2004. The closing date for tender submission for civil work was on the 20 January 2004. The Municipality is currently busy with tender adjudication and a prospective bidder will be announced early February 2004. The closing date for tender submission
for contractors was the 31 January 2004. A successful contractor will be appointed soon and the work will commence before the end of February 2004.

**Challenges**

The main obstacle with the housing project is appointing a contractor who will complete the project in time and at the same time addressing the issue of Black Economic Empowerment. The previous contractor failed dismally to deliver. On the part of the Nodal Delivery Team, it has become imperative now to get the community behind the project once again. It would be disastrous for both the municipality and the Nodal Delivery Team to continue building structures which have been discredited and risk a possible rejection on completion. The Municipality might encounter a problem with the previous contractor in terms of payment.

**Steps taken to address challenges**

- A new civil contractor will be appointed during the course of February 2004. The Municipality must appoint a contractor who will deliver and at the same time addressing the issue of Previously Disadvantaged Individuals (PDI).

**Recommendations**

- Seeing that housing is one of the major worries in most municipalities and no doubt the Mothibistad area would benefit from such a development, it may become necessary for the Nodal Delivery Team to select a focus group to specifically monitor progress and speedily devise solutions instead of relying solely on the developer to finish the job.

- The Provincial Housing Department and Public Works could also be involved to lend muscle in terms of planning and assessments. Again it would be important to guide the developer to adhere to RDP
standards houses despite budgetary constraints that may arise in the process.

- A review of actual structures (houses). As already mentioned these units look too small and the spacing between them limit any possibility of improvements. We would recommend slightly bigger units, bigger windows and a possibility of a small garden on the outside for each unit.

9.15.4 Flagship Poultry and Abattoir Project

**Background**

This is a poverty alleviation project for women. The Flagship Poultry and Abattoir project is being implemented in four areas in the Ga-Segonyane Local Municipality. These areas are namely Maruping, Kortnight, Suurdig and Logobati. The Abattoir is situated in Maruping. The other areas would be for poultry (that is, chicken breeding). A crèche is situated at Logobati for children of the women working in the poultry houses. Two containers were donated by Transnet to be used as a crèche (kindergarten).

One of the developments that arose as a result of the poultry and abattoir project was the construction of roads linking all the projects in Maruping, Kortnight, Ga-Suurding and Logobati. The project was funded by SSACS, Transnet, Kgalagadi District Municipality (KDM) and the Department of Labour. Its total budget is R1.2 million and R1 million was committed to the project. It has a shortfall of R350 000. The Department of Social Services provided training on poultry management and rearing to the 45 women who own the project, while the Department of Agriculture provided technical support.

**State of the project**

The abattoir structure is 97% complete at this stage (January 2004). It needs paving, painting and installation of electricity to be complete. The poultry houses are 98% complete and the equipment has been bought. It is awaiting delivery of
this equipment, which includes drinkers, feeders, thermometer and brooders. The project was initially supposed to be completed by November 2003, and the new target date for the completion of the abattoir and the poultry houses is February 2004. The delay of the project completion was the late delivery of the containers to be used as a crèche and the bridge construction in Maruping, which is now complete. The containers were delivered by Transnet in December 2003. They still have to be roofed and paved so that they could be used as a crèche. However, Transnet has not indicated how soon the paving and roofing will be done.

The project is not yet economically viable. At this stage, it is a social project run by women for subsistence purposes. There were 15 temporary jobs created by the project, which is owned by 45 women.

**Challenges**

- Like the Dipudi project, the major challenge for the flagship poultry and abattoir project is to make the transition from subsistence to commercial farming.
- The paving and roofing of the containers is still a problem that needs to be addressed before the completion of the poultry houses and the abattoir.
- The other challenge for the anchor team is meeting the new target date (that is, end of February 2004) for the completion of the poultry houses and the abattoir.

**Steps taken to address the challenges**

- According to the manager for Kgalagadi Development and Planning, the Municipality has started negotiations with major supermarkets in Kgalagadi District for the provision of markets for the poultry.
- The co-ordinator of the poultry and abattoir project has taken the matter of the crèche up with the Provincial Department of Social Services. The Department is currently involved with negotiations with
Transnet regarding the roofing and paving of the containers to be used as a crèche. However, no positive feedback has been received so far.

**Recommendations**

- The partners must revisit their plans regarding marketing and actual selling of the poultry produce. There is no proper structure on how the poultry project would progress or compete at commercial markets. There is a need to come up with a concrete business and implementation plan on the sustainability of this project.

- It has become clear that the poultry and abattoir project is being derailed by the kindergarten issue, which is an essential part of the project. Instead of engaging the Provincial Department of Social Services, rather the Nodal Delivery Team takes full responsibility to ensure a speedy conclusion of the matter – unfortunately these are the hazards of sponsored programmes.

**9.15.5 Livestock improvement and production**

**Background**

The main objective of this project is to help build capacity amongst small farmers regarding stock management and marketing. The project will also provide infrastructure to growing and value adding sites. According to the Executive Mayor, this is probably the most viable and profitable project. It is funded by the Department of Agriculture (North West), the Premier’s Office and Kgalagadi District Municipality (KDM). The budget of R3,77 million has all been committed to the project. This is one of the projects that have no financial shortfalls.

The Livestock Improvement Project is situated at the Kgnung Village, under the Moshaweng Local Municipality. The villagers involved in the project have responded enthusiastically to the project. These people have, over many years of subsistence farming, acquired the necessary skills to take livestock farming to the commercial level. The KDM buys quality bulls for the villagers to change their cattle breed. This is done to improve the quality of their breed for a better market
value. The breed that they are raising can withstand drought conditions, and therefore suitable to the local climatic conditions. There is no doubt about the sustainability of this project. The market is there and the project is already making money. It is actually the only project that has made significant strides from subsistence to commercial farming. For example since its inception it has been able to generate R198 000.

**State of the project**

The transition from subsistence to commercial farming of cattle is proving to be a success. The 92 women and 21 men who own the project have just (January 2004) purchased a farm near Kuruman through the Elrad Fund (from the Department of Land Affairs). This funding is to help the villagers increase the number of livestock and expand the grazing land for their livestock, so that the project can meet the demands of the market. The market for this project is other local commercial farmers and butchers. The last documented figures (September 2003), indicate that the project beneficiaries received an income of R198 000 from sales last year. The project has created 105 temporary jobs and 15 of those employed are women.

Paddocks (that is, division of grazing land into smaller plots) have been created for rotational grazing and fire belts have been created around the paddocks to protect grazing lands from run away fires. These grazing lands with paddocks are at Kganung, Warder East and West and Phase 2 – all villages in Moshaweng Local Municipality. Grazing camps have also been created at Drieloop and Maketlele Villages in Moshaweng. Boreholes have been drilled at these grazing camps to provide water for livestock. However, these boreholes have not been equipped, due to insufficient funds.

The KDM bought 16 bulls in 2003 for the project. These bulls were given to the project in order to improve the quality of the livestock.
Challenges

- Insufficient funds to equip the boreholes at the grazing camps in Drieloop and Maketlele remain a major challenge to ensuring sufficient grazing land for livestock.

- Run away fires pose a threat to grazing land and livestock. The area is very humid and dry, making it prone to devastating wild fires that can destroy vast areas of grazing land, as well as livestock.

Steps taken to address challenges

- To address the problem of insufficient funds to equip boreholes in grazing areas, the MEC for Finance (North West) has submitted quotations to the Department of Agriculture, with the view of raising funds for the provision of such infrastructure. However, there is no target date set for the boreholes to be equipped with the necessary infrastructure. It is not known how long this process will take.

- To address the threat posed by run away fires on grazing areas, firebelts were created in Kganung, Warder East and West.

Recommendations

- It would be helpful to set targets and deadlines for the boreholes to be equipped with the necessary infrastructure.

9.15.6 Kgalagadi Dipudi Enterprise

Background

The project addresses issues around women empowerment, job creation, and development of rural economy through Local Economic Development (LED), improved goat stock in the area, skills development, and effective and efficient use of natural resources. This is one inspiring project that is tailored to the specific needs and conditions of Kgalagadi District, and the people have responded enthusiastically in support of the project. The climatic conditions of the area are favourable to the farming of goats. Over the years the people have
acquired the necessary skills through subsistence farming, and now through the Department of Agriculture (North West), they are taking goat farming to the commercial level.

The project is spread across the Kgalagadi District. There are 61 goat interest groups (GIG) involved, representing over 20 villages. The project was funded by Eskom, Kgalagadi District Municipality, Department of Agriculture North West and the office of the Premier (North West). The project was budgeted for R1.77 million and there were no shortfalls.

Almost all anchor team members agreed that the Dipudi Enterprise project is the one with a clear sustainability plan in place. For example, the market is secured and so far the enterprise is unable to satisfy the demand. The Dipudi Project created several employment opportunities during the fencing of the grazing areas. Locals were contracted to do the fencing, unfortunately specific figures were not available at the time of the evaluation.

**State of the project**

The transition from subsistence farming to commercial farming is proving to be a lengthy and cumbersome process. For example, transforming the quality of the livestock, through the use of better quality breeding bulls, is not going to be an overnight success. As a result the project has not yet made any money, but its potential is undoubted. The market for the products from this enterprise has been negotiated with Saudi Arabia, India, and KwaZulu-Natal through the help of the National Champion, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka.

**Challenges**

- As already mentioned, there is a huge market yet the goats are too few to satisfy the market. For example, India wants one million goats, yet the project is not in a position to supply that amount. At this stage, it is unable to supply a local market in KwaZulu-Natal.
• Transportation of live goats is problematic. The project does not have transport of its own to deliver live goats to the market.

• The major challenge is to finally make that transition from subsistence to commercial farming (that is, to get the ball rolling).

**Steps taken to address challenges**

• According to the Executive Mayor, plans are in place to link the project nationally in order to fulfil the demand of the market.

• There is no evidence to suggest something concrete is being done to address the challenges like transportation and putting up a proper structure.

**Recommendations**

• It is recommend that the National Champion explores possibilities of linking the Dipudi project with similar project nationally as a matter of priority so that the market is not lost.

• It is recommended that members of the anchor team reconstitute plans for deliverables of this project.

**9.15.7 Moshaweng Municipal Offices**

**Background**

This project is divided into three phases. Phase 1 being the construction of offices to accommodate staff and councillors. Phase 2, being the provision of vendor stalls and paving of the premises and Phase 3, being the setting of spaces for facilities such as pre-school, pay point, post office, clinic and rental spaces for other agencies. The intention of this project is to make all government services easily and readily available to local communities.

The budget for the construction of the offices was R12.5 million. Only R6.09 million of the total budget was committed to the project, thus having a shortfall of R5.91 million. This project is funded by DDLGH, KDM, CMIP, SSACS
The project is situated in the Moshaweng Local Municipality which is one of the three municipalities under the Kgalagadi District. One of the developments that arose as a result of the construction of the offices was the construction of access roads in and around the area and the electrification of the area. The land on which the building is situated was provided by the Traditional Authority, thus indicating a working partnership between the municipality and traditional leaders in the Kgalagadi District.

**State of the project**

The offices are due to be functional by the end of February 2004. All indications are that the deadline will be met. At the time of the evaluation, the contractors had already removed heavy machinery from the site. The few workers that were there were only doing the final touch ups, which included cleaning the yard, putting up the gate and the parking area. While it is pleasing to see that the offices are at a completion stage, it is behind its original schedule. Initially it was suppose to be finished in September 2003. But due to a dispute between the contractors, the project was delayed. The project created 29 temporary jobs and one of the partners in the construction of the offices was from the previously disadvantaged groups – which show an element of empowerment of previously disadvantaged groups.

**Challenges**

- The construction process of the offices highlighted the uneasy partnership between previously disadvantaged groups and already established contractors. For example, there was always bickering between the black partner who owned 49% and his white counter part who owned 51% of the construction company. According to the Executive Mayor, any attempts by the anchor team to resolve differences between the two were seen as political interference.
The construction process was hampered by the possibility of a financial crisis arising from the shortfall of R5.91 million, money which never came through from the initial budget.

**Steps taken to address challenges**

- Since the project is at completion stage, it shows there were few challenges. For example, the dispute between the two (2) construction partners was quickly resolved through the intervention of the anchor team, which put the project back on track.
- With regard to the shortfall, the political and technical forums engaged private companies in the district and outside and also Government Departments to assist with funding.

**Recommendations**

- In future when awarding contracts, firms must show genuine commitment to empowerment. In other words, firms should not only get into partnership to target a specific contract without any serious commitment. It is recommended that companies who are awarded contracts must have a history of empowerment and competency. This requires proper screening mechanisms.
- In future, before starting a project of this magnitude the anchor team must ensure that all the budgeted funds are committed to avoid delays due to shortfalls.
- If there is a construction of any structures within an area, the construction company must show clearer evidence that more local people are employed. In this instance, evidence indicates that the contractor employed people from outside the area.
9.15.8 Kgalagadi Water Project

Background

The supplying and reticulation of water to rural communities in the District is the main focus of this project. The reticulation is according to the Reconstruction and Development Programme standards and the installation of prepaid meters in some villages. Most of the reticulation projects have been completed except those with a financial shortfall. The Water Reticulation Project is ongoing and spread across the entire Kgalagadi Municipality. This project seeks to provide clean and safe water for all residents in the area, and it will also help to upgrade sanitation facilities.

Table 9.7: Water status in Kgalagadi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dwelling</td>
<td>5 823</td>
<td>7 317</td>
<td>-1 494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside yard</td>
<td>5 060</td>
<td>3 222</td>
<td>1 838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community stand</td>
<td>10 263</td>
<td>15 869</td>
<td>-5 606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community stand &gt;200 m from dwelling</td>
<td>12 151</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borehole</td>
<td>3 018</td>
<td>4 326</td>
<td>-1 308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>2 974</td>
<td>-2 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rain tank</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>-719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dam/pool/stagnant water</td>
<td>1 405</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River/stream</td>
<td>1 071</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water vendor</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1 149</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics South Africa, 2001
While the pace of delivery in this project is generally slow, several villages have already been covered despite a host of difficulties encountered in the process. As a predominantly rural area, conditions for conventional water reticulation are not conducive thus making it difficult to use standard water pipes and in most instances boreholes form the basis for reticulation. Unfortunately, the use of boreholes relies on electricity; a process that necessitated the Nodal Delivery Team to seek a partnership with Eskom. At the time of evaluation, the project was encountering several problems regarding both boreholes equipment and electrification.

To compound matters, funding for the Kgalagadi Water Project was suffering due to a shortfall of R40.13 million – money that never came through from the initial budget. Project managers have bemoaned the lack of finances as one of the issues that have accounted for the backlog. However, they have reported that they already engaged the project sponsors (ESKOM, Provincial Department of Water Affairs and Forestry and CMIP) for more commitment.

**State of the project**

At the moment the pace of delivery is very slow although it has been reported that most villages are now able to access clean water. Apart from the problem of inadequate funding, the Water Project also cited difficulties with engaging contractors from previously disadvantaged groups as another handicap to speedy delivery.

Evaluation of the Kagaladi Water Project, like some other programmes in this Node is bit cumbersome as it has no set deadlines or targets except that managers said they would like to cover as many villages as possible. Thus to ascertain the reach, impact and sustainability of the project might be difficult.
**Challenges**

The shortfall is the most obvious and certainly most disruptive matter with the Water Project. For instance, progress could be stalled for several weeks or months while project managers are engaging the Department of Water and Forestry Affairs for more funding. Already time has been lost while waiting for ESKOM to provide electrification for the boreholes and supporting equipment. Both the local municipalities and the Department of Water and Forestry Affairs seem a little detached from the project. Ideally their involvement must go beyond funding to include technical support.

**Steps taken to address challenges**

- According to the Water Project managers, ESKOM has promised to sort out the electrification of boreholes and provide the necessary equipment to get the project back on track.

- Also funding problem should be sorted as the Water project has already approached the Department of Water and Forestry Affairs for extra funds. Unfortunately, they have to wait until the end of the current financial year before any money could be released.

**Recommendations**

- In order to make proper evaluation on whether the Water Project has met its objectives, it would be helpful to set clear targets and deadlines. A blanket approach to water delivery could risk the effectiveness of the project or mask the inherent problems with processes.

- There is a need to put in place a sustainability plan that ensures villagers are able to keep and improve structures beyond the 10 years spell of the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme (ISRDP). Sometimes water delivery structures in rural areas become redundant when villagers are later forced to pay for services.
• It is recommended that full involvement of the Department of Water and Forestry Affairs especially at the implementation stages and that also provide continuous technical support.

9.15.9 Electrification Project

**Background**

The project involves the construction of supply lines and reticulation of electricity to houses. Access to energy will be improved, as well as assist the sustainability of the environment, as it will reduce deforestation and soil erosion caused by cutting of trees by rural communities for firewood. The project is located at the Moshaweng Local Municipality (Ward 9, Bendel and Heuningvlei).

**State of the project**

The electrification of Ward 9 was completed on time. There are more than 23,063 households who use electricity in the node. The total budget for this project is R40.2 million, which has already been spent. All villages in the Node will be electrified by March 2005 as planned. This is one of the success stories in the Node.

**Challenges**

• The major challenge is to electrify all villages in the Node by March 2005 as planned.

• The other challenge would be to ensure sustainability of this project, especially given the high unemployment and poverty rate in the Kgalagadi District.

**Steps taken to address the challenges**

• The electrification of all villages in the Node by March 2005 is an ongoing process and there seem to be no obstacles.
Recommendations

- There is a need to put in place a sustainability plan that ensures payment of the service beyond the ISRDS spell. Sometimes service delivery structures, in rural areas, become redundant when villagers are later on expected to pay for them.

9.15.10 Municipal Support Programme

Background

This project seeks to enhance the capacity of the Municipalities to function effectively. The budget for this programme is R3.8 million and there is no shortfall. The project is funded by DDGLH (NW) and DPLH (NC). Councillors and Municipality staff are beneficiaries of the project.

State of the project

Municipal staff and counsellors have been trained on various issues (for example, computers, legislation) and on other areas of service delivery.

Challenges

- The main challenge is the development of an integrated approach to capacity building among all Municipalities.

Steps taken to address the challenges

- There are discussions taking place between the Northern Cape and North West Province as well as within the Municipalities, with regard to an integrated approach to capacity building.

Recommendations

In order to improve service delivery, there must be a long term plan for capacity building.
Total money committed to the Anchor Projects:

- R208.5 million (budgeted)
- R162.11 million (committed)

Total jobs created by projects: 1 085

9.16 SUMMARY

Eleven Anchor projects were evaluated focusing on the following, aim of the projects, time spell, cost, employment, impact of the project, and project sustainability. The projects aim at providing Kgalagadi District Municipality communities with access to social and economic opportunities as a way to alleviate poverty and unemployment. The projects also address the issues of women empowerment, job creation and development of rural economy. Total money budgeted for the Anchor projects is R208 million and R162 million had been committed. There are 1 085 jobs created by the projects.

The Anchor projects are being implemented by the Kgalagadi District Municipality in order to address the challenges and problems facing the node. Poverty is widespread throughout the KDM and there is lack of service provision, economic and educational opportunities. The anchor projects were selected in order to address the local needs of particular areas as identified through the Integrated Development Plans process. The following are the key problems and challenges mostly facing the anchor projects.

- Some projects were faced with financial shortfalls as some of the money initially budgeted for has not been committed.
- While the importance of empowering previous disadvantaged groups (PDI) is an integral part of the Anchor Projects, it became clear that some local contractors were faced with cash flow problems which negatively impacted on delivery.
• Most of the projects seek to pave a way for development through a combination of social and commercial ventures, yet there seem to be a serious gulf between vision and delivery. For instance, Dipudi Enterprise has the potential and market but the production is too slow and eventually they could lose the market. It is recommended that there must be an ongoing interaction between producers and buyers. For example, the poultry project is at a stage where it could produce yet they are still scouting for the market. Ideally a project like the poultry and abattoir should secure a long term agreement with potential buyers.

• Some of the projects do not have specific deadlines and deliverances. For an example, water and electrification seem to target a broad spectrum of villages and there is nothing that differentiates normal reticulation of electricity by ESKOM. Thus it will be difficult to measure the objectives of the Anchor Projects and beneficiaries of these projects. It is recommended that all projects have clearly defined objectives and measurable objectives.

• In some cases like the Energy Centre which has 1 650 members, the value of dividends is greatly diminished and value could be increased by injecting more money thus increasing capacity of the project. With a bigger financial muscle, they will be able to beat the economies of scale thus increasing the value of the dividends.

• In order to fully empower previously disadvantaged groups, a mentoring scheme through a bigger involvement of all provincial departments is recommended. For instance, it was evident during the construction of roads and clinics that smaller constructors would have benefited through constant monitoring and technical assistance.

• It has become clear that a large chunk of jobs created are temporary. The challenge here is for the Anchor Projects to take it a step further by showing a quantitative transfer of skills to local labourers. It is recommended that it becomes mandatory for contractors to hire locals for all construction work.
• There is no long term sustainability plan that ensures payment of services beyond the ISRDP period, considering the high level of unemployment (67%) and poverty in the node. For example, residents may not be able to pay for water and electricity in the long term. We recommend that the municipality puts the interest of the communities at the core of their development plans.

There is no evidence of maintenance plan in all of the projects. All the good work could be undermined in the long term and thus the author recommends that the Kgalagadi District Municipality make a budgetary provision for maintenance during project planning.
CHAPTER 10
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

10.1 INTRODUCTION

This Chapter draws conclusions on the outcome of the description and assessment of the different large-scale development programmes and provide crucial findings from the study. It then documents lessons learnt and provides recommendations for the planning, organising and implementation of future large-scale development programmes, based on the experiences from the pre-1994 and post-1994 different programmes evaluated in this thesis. In a bid to reduce the development disparity between different parts of the country and reduce unemployment, the Independent Development Trust (IDT) was seen as a vehicle to achieve the above. Consequently, a National Public Works Programme (NPWP) for the provision of infrastructure using labour intensive methods was started on a pilot basis after a series of studies commissioned by the National Economic Forum (NEF). This was under the premise that labour intensive methods could be used, wherever it is technically and economically justifiable, to produce infrastructure assets that are of similar quality to those produced by machines, while at the same time generating employment opportunities.

It has been argued that even industrialised countries have resorted to the use of labour intensive methods during times of recession as a means of generating employment opportunities for the citizens (NEF, April 1994). In the use of labour intensive methods, community involvement is one of the major requirements. In light of the above, the Independent Development Trust (IDT), as a development agency, was supposed to maximise the utilisation of labour in all the projects and
programmes it implements. Furthermore, community involvement in all the projects and programmes was a requirement.

10.2 FINDINGS

Table 10.1: Shortcomings of pre- and post-1994 projects and programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item number</th>
<th>Policy and Implementation Comparisons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>General lack of understanding of labour-intensive construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Projects and programmes still initiated for political gains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>No national institution responsible which will be in charge of labour-intensive construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Inadequate and inappropriate contract documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>No proper technical training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Inadequate planning and lead –in time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Lack of community participation at the planning stage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>No adoption of “programme” approach at project planning and implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Too many ill-defined objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>No difference between short-term relief objectives and long-term developmental objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Lack of internal planning, recording, reporting, monitoring, control and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Inappropriate choice of projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>No link between new projects and already implemented projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No proper planning and budget for maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Lack of project management skills at National, Provincial and Local Government levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Political pressure to spend the money before the end of the financial year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the IDT projects and programmes that have been reviewed in this thesis, it has been identified that the common core of the failure of these projects and programmes has been the underlying political drive governing these projects and programmes. The politicised emphasis on quick, visible results distracted the proper implementation (following principles of project management) and certainly did not allow the proper use of labour-intensive methods. The failure must be seen as a result of putting more emphasis on some aspects of the project/programme at the expense of others. For example, in all the projects and programmes that had been implemented by the IDT, training was neglected and more emphasis placed on spending the project money to meet the set beneficiary target. The development impact of the projects and programmes was ignored.

The major finding is that developmental projects and programmes in South Africa are still initiated and implemented for political gains. Pre-1994 projects and programmes experiences, civil engineering projects have proven not appropriate for the purpose. Labour intensive methods should be removed from politics and be geared towards the creation of meaningful employment opportunities. Not only will those involved benefit during the implementation, but they will be able to utilise skills learned and the experiences gained from the projects meaningfully elsewhere in the future. There is a need to develop national institutions that will be charged with the responsibility of exploring the discipline and developing a framework to guide all initiatives in the field. The umbrella body, from the onset, should be staffed with highly experienced and respectable personnel in the field. Its prime responsibility is to put together a framework for labour intensive projects and design training and related course requirements. Furthermore, the institution
should provide a support system and co-ordinate all labour intensive programmes and projects. Though the suggestion sounds centralised, it is imperative to have a central body that provides the above mentioned services at the national level.

One of the major drawbacks in IDT’s projects and programmes has been the lack of co-ordination of labour intensive projects. Contractors were left with the sole responsibility of incorporating labour as much as they could and training needs were left to them to determine. Moreover, no one monitored such activities. The contractors tended to focus more on the target numbers and finishing the project on time. The lack of expertise in the field within IDT and in the contracting organisations coupled with the absence of necessary support systems at the national level, some contractors ended up using purely capital intensive methods. Even those that did attempt to increase the labour component did so without any direction and knowledge of the tenets of labour intensive construction. As a result, scores of people were seen milling around the construction site without any meaningful contribution. More than 50% of the contractors would hire a lot of people at the beginning of the project and then retrench them as the project progress. Clearly, the above is not what a developmental organisation is all about.

These scenarios led to the misinterpretation of the methodology and resulted in most project managers and development specialists within the IDT losing confidence in labour-intensive methods. A proper and capable institution filled with expert labour intensive and developmental practitioners, together with thorough research into the discipline, is what South Africa needs. The institution, if established, should be charged with the responsibility of advising interested players in labour-intensive technology and all related issues. It should be consulted by parties intending to increase labour in their construction project. Other duties should be to identify, prepare and design appropriate training requirements and formulate training manuals outlining proper procedures and processes to be followed.

The report prepared by the Roads Board (1993:54) underscored the importance of a central institution whose responsibility should be to:
• Plan national programmes and distribute funds to the regions.
• Collect and disseminate information relating to improved labour intensive construction methods.
• Educate engineers, planners, project managers and authorities who are reluctant to seriously attempt to substitute equipment for labour.
• Carry out and co-ordinate research into technological, economical, legal, social, organisational and administrative aspects of labour intensive construction.

For the above mentioned institution to survive and succeed it requires long term backup, both politically and financially from the government, for it to be sustainable and effective in the execution of its tasks. Even though this may sound very costly, the impact will have a widespread and long term positive effect on the poor and marginalised people of South Africa whose majority live in rural areas.

The provision of engineering services to the poor in particular, is often done with the sole purpose of improving living standards and the quality of life. In other words, the provision of services must be development oriented. It has become increasingly apparent that the improvement of the quality of life is not an independent phenomenon existing in a vacuum. It has been gathered in the evaluation of the projects that high standards of living are intertwined with human development. It is only through a thorough understanding of the cultural, socio-political processes of the areas in question, that project managers can be in a position to marry up the delivery of services with community needs and abilities. The standard of living may not only be raised by the provision of high quality and technically sound services, but these should be married to improved local involvement and a better understanding by communities of what these improvements would mean to their daily lives. In other words, the paradigm is that technical expertise should be coupled with human development in the provision of engineering services. This is to be done not only for employment creation
purposes, but also for a clearer understanding of how these assets function and how they can be best looked after.

Hence, it is proposed that a training and awareness drive should be launched prior to the execution of the projects and be tied to the rest of the processes. Training responsibility should not be shifted to the private sector alone and be divorced from the rest of the project proceedings. The training aspects must be monitored by the development agency. These approaches require a well thought out and established institution with management structures that will, in addition to providing a framework, also co-ordinate, monitor and evaluate labour intensive construction processes.

One of the prime tasks of the proposed institution will be to ensure that the objectives put forward in different projects are realistic and achievable. In the review of the programme and projects, it was realised that most of the criticism levelled against these projects has been their ambitious, highly academic and vague objectives. Objectives that were put forward were general. These objectives are difficult to achieve because they were never quantified or contextualised. Neither were they easy to monitor, verify and measure. Some of them were totally unachievable, especially if one considers the scope in terms of the funding allocated and the type of training that was offered. For example, in the Zivuseni Poverty Relief Programme beneficiaries were employed for three months, whereas the Department of Labour requires 66 days for technical training. As a result, more than 95% of the beneficiaries were trained on life skills.

From the projects and programmes documented and reviewed, the Independent Development Trust (IDT) is not a development agency but a government policy implementing agency. The impact of the projects and programmes are short term and the benefits were not seen beyond project completion. Where government fails to spend the money, it is transferred to the IDT in accordance with treasury requirements. The IDT had no control over the types of projects and programmes they implemented as long as the government department requested them to implement the project or programme on their behalf. In order for the IDT to be
developmental in their nature, it must initiate their own project which will have a long-term developmental impact on the community.

The author suggests that the only way to achieve this is through the creation of a solid and dedicated department within the IDT, through the amalgamation of appropriate sections of existing departments of public works, transport, water affairs, research institutions, development agencies manpower and education. This department will drive the development agenda of the government.

10.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

The implementation of the projects and programmes in the future under the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) and other developmental projects and programmes must make sure that projects’ objectives address the following success factors listed below. This will lead to the achievement of a long term impact as these had been identified as the major programme success factors from the thesis’s findings:

- Adopt a ‘programme’ approach project planning and implementation
- Be specific instead of general
- Do not be overly complex
- Be measurable, tangible and verifiable
- Be realistic and attainable
- Be established within resource bounds
- Be consistent with available and anticipated resources
- Be consistent with organisational plan procedures and policies
- The process must be transparent.

To augment the list, project objectives must be:
• Uniformly understood. In other words, project initiators should ensure that there is a common understanding of the objectives by all stakeholders and the route to be followed in achieving these objectives should be clearly comprehended by all.

• Consistent with the organisational capacity to carry out, administer and be in a position to manage the created assets.

• Post-implementation support must be budgeted for during the planning phase.

Community participation

All large-scale programmes evaluated have shown a great deal of the top-down approach. The formulations of some objectives and strategies have not considered the fact that the beneficiaries should influence them for an effective and efficient delivery. As such, the following should be considered:

• Should emphasise both a bottom-up and top-down approach. There must be a balance between the two approaches in order for work to continue;

• Local communities whom the project is being designed for should participate effectively;

• Ownership of the projects should be promoted;

• A labour-Intensive approach should be introduced, promoted and executed by the local communities; and

• There should be a long-term financial commitment on the part of the project funders.

Affordability

• The project should be designed in such a way that local communities can afford to pay for it;

• The project should be designed in such a way that there is a room for upgrading in the future;
- The affordability of the project should also take into account the sustainability of the project;
- The maintenance of the project should also be structured in way that it is affordable; and
- Local material should be utilised as far as possible.

**Training**
- Managerial skills should be provided and local capacity must be developed;
- Entrepreneurial skills should be adequately provided to empower communities in the process of the project;
- Local contractors should be empowered through training;
- Construction skills should be developed among the local community as a form of capacity building;
- Supervision skills should be developed among the local communities to enable the local community to supervise the project after completion;
- The training of women should be given priority in the training programme.

**Reliable institutions**
- Institutions implementing the projects should be assigned clear and specific tasks to achieve;
- The different institutions should collaborate with one another to exchange views and experiences throughout the process;
- The institutions should have the required expertise to implement the project.
Measurement of objectives

- The objectives should be measured in terms of cost, time, quality and performance;
- Objectives should be formulated in terms of the needs of the communities;
- Objectives should be very specific, measurable, realistic and attainable instead of being broad and general.

Therefore, it is of utmost importance to be more realistic in the future, and be in a position to clearly distinguish between what is achievable, how to achieve it and what is not achievable. Employment opportunities envisaged in each project/programme should be identified and quantified to enable the monitoring and evaluation of the success upon completion. There are two types of evaluations that are supposed to be carried out. They are internal and external (independent) evaluation. This aspect is crucial in getting the feedback in order to see if the project/programme has achieved its intended objectives.

The researcher suggests that the only way to achieve this is through the creation of a solid and dedicated department, through the amalgamation of appropriate sections of existing departments of public works, transport, water affairs, research institutions, development agencies, manpower and education that will be based at the IDT. This department will drive the development agenda of the government. This is supported by research that was done as far back as in 1992 by McCutcheon (1992) who advocated in order for large-scale development programme / projects to be successful and meaningful, a long-term political and funding commitment is necessary. He attributed the success of the Kenyan Access Road Programme to the long term commitment and programme approach as opposed to the ad hoc and piece-meal approach that has been adopted in South Africa. The changing socio-political climate in South Africa presupposes a paradigm shift from using the provision of engineering services for politicking, to a thoroughly considered provision with the human development aspect in mind. Thus, it is imperative for professionals in the field to acknowledge this unfolding
scenario and equip themselves fully to be able to respond and deal with the latest dimensions.

The role played by communities at all stages of the project cycle cannot be undermined. The provision of services and project management techniques should be centred on the needs of the receipts of the products and human development will increasingly require thorough attention. It is therefore of outmost importance for the present government to realise, whilst there is still time, the requirements and implications of their campaign clause of “using the expanded public works programme to employ one million unemployed people within five years”. The present government needs to be thoroughly orientated and be made to institutionalise the programme so as not to walk on the same stains left by the previous government. In championing the expanded public works programme / large-scale development programmes the author recommend the following for development of an overall strategy by government:

- Consensus on the conceptual objectives.
- Long-term (>10 years) national perspective.
- Detailed preparatory investigatory and analytical work, leading to
- Small-scale pilot projects combined with embryonic training programmes.
- Expansion into national programmes in which:
  - capacity building: trained people can be produced from the programme;
  - transfer of skills is acquired throughout the project;
  - the local and national institutions can productively absorb the trained personnel.
10.4 PROPOSED PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES IN SOUTH AFRICA

The proposed Programme Management Framework for Development Programmes in South Africa forms part of the author contribution to knowledge of the thesis. The framework had addressed the problems and challenges that had been encountered in the implementation of pre-1994 and post-1994 development programmes in South Africa. The framework had drawn from lessons learnt from other African countries where such programmes had been successful. The aim of the framework is to provide consistent practice and guidance to public sector departments, development agencies and NGOs to assist those involved in the planning and implementation of development projects and programmes. This will enhance successful delivery and sustainable development programme outcomes. The framework is born out of the repeated failures of development projects and programmes that had been experienced in the pre and post 1994 periods. The projects and programmes that had been reviewed showed these short-comings. The development framework is designed to:

- Be simple to understand and to operate;
- Be flexible and adaptable to most development projects and programmes;
- Ensure adequate control and provide an appropriate level of project and programme reporting;
- Provide an appropriate level of consistency of approach across development projects and programmes;
- Acceptability of the framework to all stakeholders with clearly evident benefits;
- Ensure adequate community participation and empowerment throughout the life cycle of the development programme; and
- Adopt a programme developmental approach in the implementation of development projects and programmes in South Africa.
The Development Programme Management Framework is designed to encourage users to plan and implement programmes in a disciplined way so that all the relevant issues are addressed thereby maximising the chances of successful outcomes. The proposed development management framework adopts a life-cycle approach and separates each development project and programme into the following six stages:

- **Stage 1** Identification of need
- **Stage 2** Training and empowerment of stakeholders
- **Stage 3** Alternatives and approval
- **Stage 4** Implementation and monitoring of the programme
- **Stage 5** Evaluation of the development programme and framework
- **Stage 6** Sustainability of the development programme

The importance of thorough planning in the initial stages (Stages 1, 2 and 3) of a development programme cannot be over-emphasised and this can be a time-consuming process. Development programmes will not pass the implementation stage and evaluation stages and the final stage of sustaining the development product if enough thought is not given to the first three stages. The evaluation stage will compare the development outcomes of the programme against its objectives and will also further assess the usefulness of the development management framework itself in order to identify areas for improvement. The last stage is concerned with the sustainability of the development product. In order to realise long-term development outcomes which will impact on the community, a programme sustainability plan must be in place.
10.5 WHEN TO USE THE FRAMEWORK

The Framework is only required to be applied when implementing development programmes which range between two (2) to five (5) years. Single projects must be incorporated with a relevant programme to maximise the benefits. The key to success is adequate planning at all stages of the programme. The planning stage must at least take a minimum of six (6) months. The key factors to be taken into account in planning any development programme are the objectives / scope of the programme, resources, time and the community needs. All four (4) are linked as shown in the following diagram and if one of the parameters is altered, and then either one or all three will have to change. For example, if the scope of the programme is increased, then more time and/or resources will be needed. When the programme is given approval at the end of Stage 3, all of the above four (4) factors should be clearly defined and agreed upon.
Figure 10.1: Programme management framework for a development programme in South Africa
10.6 HOW THE FRAMEWORK IS APPLIED

The Framework identifies a set of checklists for each of the six (6) stages to ensure that all the key issues have been addressed. In planning and running a programme, it is essential that all the issues identified in the checklists are addressed.

10.7 PROGRAMME FRAMEWORK CHECK LIST

The following is a checklist of generic factors to be taken into account at the planning and project implementation.

Stages during the life-cycle of a project including needs analysis, option analysis, implementation, evaluation and monitoring, user satisfaction and the developing of future plans. The checklist is not exhaustive and it may be necessary for the Programme Manager to devise more specific questions in consultation with the independent reviewer. It should also be remembered that different people may well be involved in answering questions at different stages of the project. For example, the project manager may only be involved in answering questions relating to Stages 3 and 4 whilst the project initiator may only be involved in Stages 1 and 2.

10.7.1 Stage 1: Identification of need

- Has the need been researched and justified?
- Is the project consistent with the Development Agency’s strategy?
- Is the project consistent with the unit’s strategy?
- Has the cost/benefit to the Development Agency been identified taking into account any longer-term recurrent costs including staffing, as well as shorter-term capital costs e.g. equipment, office space?
- What is the impact of the investment on the budget?
• Have the major opportunities and risks associated with the project been taken into account?
• Are the appropriate internal resources (including time, personnel and/or skills) available to progress to Stage 2 and subsequent stages of the project?
• Has ‘in-principle’ approval of the project been sought from the appropriate stakeholders?

10.7.2 Stage 2: Training and empowerment of stakeholders

**General**

• Is a general description of the overall project available?
• Have the project’s overall objectives been established?
• Have any overall time constraints/dependencies been identified?
• Have the criteria been defined against which the success of the project can eventually be judged?

**Analysis of options**

For each option (including the ‘do nothing’ option):

• What other departments / units will be involved / affected?

  **What are the implications for them and have they been consulted?**
  **Will this project impact on any other projects?**

**Have you included?**:

• A provisional breakdown of capital costs including office space, equipment and other items?
• The estimated annual revenue costs (staffing and non-staffing) before, during and after implementation of the project?
• Have you sought professional advice on these costs where appropriate?

• Are the resources needed consistent with the proposed scope of the project and the time-scale for its implementation?

• Have the source(s) of funding and, where appropriate, the preferred procurement route been identified?

• Have the significant risks and the method proposed for their management been identified?

10.7.3 Stage 3: Alternatives and approval

• At what level within the institution will approval be sought for the proposal, the budget and the provision of any other supporting resources?

• Has the project manager and the independent reviewer been identified?

• Who will assume responsibility for Stages 4 and 5 of the project?

10.7.4 Stage 4: Implementation and monitoring of the programme

• Does the supporting project team, which will be drawn from those directly responsible for the successful completion of the project; have the necessary experience and skills?

• Do all individuals directly and indirectly associated with the project (including the independent reviewer) clearly understand the objectives of the project and the impact it will have upon them?

• Are their responsibilities clearly defined?

• Has the plan been discussed with the independent reviewer?

• How do you propose to communicate with members of your project team and other stakeholders in the project?

• Does the proposed project management process follow the Development Agency’s Framework?
• Has a detailed project management plan been prepared with SMART (specific, measurable, agreed, realistic and time-limited) targets?

• Are key milestones specified and procedures established for the formal monitoring of the project so that progress and achievement of targets can be measured at appropriate times and corrective action taken at an early stage where necessary?

• Where there are significant time gaps between key milestones, has provision been made for appropriate interim reviews?

• Does the project management plan require that a risk management exercise is undertaken at each key milestone?

10.7.5 Stage 5: Evaluation of the development programme and framework

• How do you propose to evaluate the outputs of the project on immediate completion in relation to the original objectives and success criteria?

• Are further evaluation review(s) planned, for example, at six (6), 12 and 24 months after completion?

• To which body will these project evaluation reviews be submitted?

• What lessons have you learned which could be used to improve the management of similar projects in the future and the Development Agency’s project management framework in general?

• Are there any questions that can usefully be added to the checklist at any of the stages?

• Submit a close-out report.

10.7.6 Stage 6: Sustainability of the development programme

• How will the project be monitored in the longer-term to ensure that end-users are deriving maximum benefit?

• Will there be a successor project and if so, what is the time-scale for its planning/subsequent project management?
• Is there a programme sustainability plan in place?

10.8 WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE PROGRAMME MANAGER?

The Programme Manager will normally be identified and appointed during Stage 1 of the process. The programme manager will be involved from Stage 1 up to Stage 6 and will be responsible for:

• Preparing the detailed programme management plan;
• Preparing a detailed training programme;
• Identifying risks and planning the management and mitigation;
• Ensuring the programme’s overall objectives, targets at various key stages, and individuals’ responsibilities are clearly understood by all concerned;
• Appointing suitable Project Managers to manage different projects within the development programme;
• Monitoring performance against the programme plan;
• Highlighting areas of slippage and identifying and initiating corrective action with a Project Steering Committee at key stages and preparing summary progress reports prior to each meeting;
• Ensuring appropriate communication between the members of the project team and other project stakeholders including the community (end users);
• Ensuring that the programme complies with all organisation procedures and regulations including personnel, financial, legal, empowerment, and preferential procurement.

10.9 WHAT IS THE ROLE OF A PROGRAMME STEERING COMMITTEE?

The role of the Programme Steering Committee is purely advisory, and it plays no direct roles in the operation of the Framework. It must:
• Be directly involved in Stages 1 to 3 in order to influence developmental process;
• Offer guidance on the preparation of the programme management plan;
• Advise the internal sponsor on any subsequent changes to the agreed objectives as may be necessary as the programme proceeds, and how these changes may be accommodated within the programme plan (Stage 3).

10.10 SUMMARY OF THE MAIN RESEARCH FINDINGS

This section will focus on the main conclusion and further contribution to knowledge of the thesis. The main conclusion drawn from the interviews conducted is that government officials have no idea about labour-intensive methods. They only apply it on paper because they are forced to. There is a need to train government officials on the development mandate of the IDT. The different government departments force work on the IDT in order to comply with the financial year requirement to spend all their money. The financial requirements to spend all the money in that financial year has put immense pressure on the different government departments to focus on spending all the money. This has meant that there has been no focus on development.

The most outstanding commonality that one came across in reviewing these projects was that they were the brainchild of forces outside the beneficiary communities. All of them were initiated, designed and implemented by the government agencies and their subsidiaries with the help of appointed external agencies. In most projects, the government wanted to perform a relief venture that would address the discrepancies in disadvantaged areas in terms of both socio-economic and political status. Most of the IDT programmes and projects were intended to have a short life span (for example, two (2) years within which the desired goals of provision of services should be completed). In other words, the projects were once and for all, short-term initiatives both in terms of the financial support and political will by the state, where focus was placed on
resolving the service crisis in disadvantaged black areas on one hand while keeping the unemployed engaged on the other.

From the onset, there was no programme approach in place during the initiation, preparation and planning, and implementation of all these projects’ provision ventures. They were initiated in a vacuum, with no well established national institution with its informed practitioners to oversee and provide a support system that is so crucial to the success of labour-intensive projects. These initiatives were temporary, *ad hoc* and isolated attempts by the state to respond to a national unemployment crisis and underdevelopment in previously disadvantaged areas. Project preparation and planning were decentralised and left at the discretion of the receiver of the funds in each area, which was the IDT.

The main aim of most government departments was to see that the money was spent before the end of that financial year. With the political agendas behind the propositions for the provision of services, it stands to reason that the success of projects would be greatly influenced and determined by this underlying drive.

Therefore, the objectives of employment creation and the stimulation of local economics by virtue of them not being primary, handicapped the realisation of their true potential. Thus, sustainable employment creation may be said to have been a secondary objective. Hence, it did not receive nor enjoy the maximum attention that it required to produce meaningful results. The method was subsequently ill-defined, vague and generalised. From the project cycle premise, these projects displayed an effective lack of project structure, failed to define an appropriate planning process and consisted of poor management and control mechanisms. Due to the short life span of the projects, time was of essence and every stage of the project cycle had to be speeded up. According to the World Bank (1994), time constraints in the application and especially in the market study unequivocally debar an intensive coverage of the crucial issues such as the amendment of important documents; identification of tasks that could be done manually; designing and securing of appropriate tools; meaningful community involvement; the identification of a labour pool and available skills; peculiar needs
of individual communities; the environmental composition and the geological make-up of the areas in question; and availability of appropriate tools for labour intensive construction.

Furthermore, this time impediment had a negative impact on the design stage. The greater use of labour during the implementation was not a design driver. Likewise, due to the inadequate study of areas, community needs and environmental composition were never fed into the designs of these projects. The designs were made in a vacuum from the realities on the ground. Amongst others, the extent to which local resources might have been used were not adequately explored. In addition due to minimal forward planning put into these projects, maintenance of the assets was not built into the projects and budgeted for.

The study found further shortcomings associated with the short term nature of the projects undertaken by the IDT which are:

- It was difficult to carry out the necessary research, development and dissemination of improved construction methods and organisation system for labour intensive construction in a short-term programme;
- Necessary capital expenditure for appropriate equipment cannot be adequately spread over a short term programme;
- There was lack of time and material for proper training, often resulting in low productivity and low quality;
- Skilled supervisors that were identified and partly trained were lost at the end of each short-term programme; and
- There was lack of consistency in the standards of what was being built, which could cause future maintenance problems.

In order for the IDT to be developmental in its project and programme, planning and implementation must be committed to proper labour intensive methodologies and relevant procurement procedures must be adhered to. Even though it has been argued in some quarters that, for example the Zivuseni Poverty Relief
Programme, has reduced unemployment, increased standards of living and transferred skills. At the end of the day, not much improvement has been made in the lives of those who were employed as the employment opportunities were short-lived and no skills were transferred. Employment opportunities created in most of these projects were short-lived. Upon completion of the work, jobs ceased to exist. For individuals who were now used to earning a little income during the execution of projects, termination of these jobs implied frustration and disillusionment. As they were no better than they were before, the earnings they secured during construction were so meagre that they could not be invested for circulation. Their frustration was further exacerbated by the realisation that the skills they have acquired did not carry much weight to ensure absorption in the formal economy or at least to enable them to be self-employed.

Development projects were supposedly initially aimed at empowering the communities. On the contrary, they undermined people’s abilities and, as it might be expected, ultimately had a disempowering effect. Local people were therefore denied the opportunity of being creative and instrumental in the preparation, design, implementation and control of projects. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, for any meaningful employment opportunities to be created, training and transfer of ‘quality’ skills are crucial. Most of these projects failed in their attempts to increase the labour component in construction because they underestimated the importance of proper training. Training was not built into the programme structure and was not properly institutionalised. The major problem was that training was left in the hands of consultants without any proper target and monitoring mechanisms in place.

In other words, the responsibility of designing an appropriate training programme and actual training of the employees was shifted to the private sector. This shifting of responsibility coupled with a lack of a thoroughly structured and uniform manual to guide and direct these private institutions led to training being uncoordinated, incoherent, not properly institutionalised and not responsive to the needs of communities. Skills that were transferred were mainly to train people as
labourers in bricklaying and general engineering work, without any attention given at developing management and leadership qualities amongst local people.

In the Kenyan scenario, McCutcheon (1993:10) attributed the success of the Kenyan Rural Access Road Programme to the training of skilled supervisors who were technically and organisationally competent and thus able to direct and motivate the workers under their control. Proper training is not only imperative during the execution of the project, but is essential for purposes of maintenance and the long life span of constructed assets. One of the major drawbacks that handicapped the realisation of meaningful employment creation through developmental programmes and projects in South Africa has been the absence of an established institution staffed by informed and experienced professional personnel in the field. Labour-intensive construction methodology is a discipline on its own that warrants proper institutionalisation, together with human expertise to provide a framework that will serve as a guide to the programmes and projects. Furthermore, the necessary institutional backup is required to provide professionals interested and serious about labour intensive construction and development of the discipline; identify training need and take into cognisance the skills already existing in the communities and build on them; design material and working manuals to direct training and proper application of the approach; a training centre must be established where training will be undertaken and develop some kind of certification provided; and encourage and be committed to further research and development in the field.

The above point of institutionalising labour-intensive methods of construction is recommended for the simple reason that, in the past, institutions that were involved in initiation and planning of these projects had no knowledge and experience whatsoever on how to conduct labour intensive programmes effectively. There was no national body that was directing or co-ordinating these attempts. Nor was there a department within the IDT where at least those genuinely committed to the concept could refer to and ask for direction. It is not surprising, therefore, when local people do not have any sense of ownership and
appreciation of the created assets and may not even think twice before destroying them, as they are perceived to belong to those who built them. There is, therefore, a lack of ownership of these assets. Where jobs were created there was no ‘real quality’ skills transfer that instilled self confidence in those trained and ensured their participation in economies outside the project. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, people’s self esteem was not raised. Instead locals were left disillusioned, powerless and dependent. Most of them, upon completion of projects, were left where they were before.

The recognition of labour intensive methodologies as a discipline that requires clear objectives, thorough area research and proper planning has not been fully understood. Labour-intensive methods of construction are always misused and not thoroughly investigated, yet they are expected to produce the desired results. Failing this means all sorts of criticism will be levelled against such methods. Labour-intensive projects and programmes are currently focusing on the number of people employed rather than the quality of employment opportunities created.

Well focused and transparent objectives are crucial for successful large-scale developmental programmes and projects. Ambiguous and overloaded objectives underlay most of these projects. They were too generalised, superficial, vague, and unattainable and subsequently subject to individual interpretation. To support this assertion, the author interviewed different participants about the objectives of their projects and each gave a different emphasis. The objectives of employment creation and the triggering of local economies in particular were loosely defined and so was the interpretation. Employment creation objectives were not well defined, lacked precision and were not easily translated into a brief for the professional team and project managers. Hence, it is not surprising when the appropriate procedures and the processes were not uniformly understood and homogeneous. It is important to note that without following a well structured and formalised arrangement such as the project cycle, participants could emphasise different goals without adequate milestones and controls to keep the programme on track.
From the programmes and projects that have been documented and reviewed in the post-1994 period, it became apparent that the concept of developmental programmes and projects has been hijacked and subsequently misused by those who are in control. The employment creation potential of civil engineering service provision was not thoroughly exploited. Likewise, the necessary research was not conducted and proper pre-feasibility studies were not thoroughly covered, if not completely ignored. The crucial role that training plays was neither well designed nor well implemented. For example, in the Zivuseni Poverty Relief Programme, 56 days was found to be too much and training was reduced to five (5) days. The participants were only trained in life skills. In other words, the element of human development was not entrenched into these programmes and projects. Development was perceived as an independent phenomenon divorced from the advancement of humankind. It was important to understand the local environment and people so as to ensure better understanding of what these improved living conditions meant to them and how best can they be looked after.

What is of interest in evaluating the IDT programmes and projects is that they illustrate a common mentality that was followed by the different implementing agency in the pre-1994 period, that of being obsessed with technical excellence. No due regard was given to the developmental impact of projects and programmes on the end-users. It was actually very surprising that even projects and programmes that were executed in the late 1990s and early 2000s still resemble the frame of thought that was followed in the early 1980s projects and programmes. Not much information was accumulated from earlier projects, so as to be filtered to the later ones. The study shows that the IDT, as a developmental agency, never really cared to track past attempts to utilise projects and programmes to create employment opportunities through the use of labour-intensive construction methods and to use them as sources of reference to guide later initiatives.

In light of the changing socio-political picture in South Africa, it is expected that authorities in power now are much more representative, legitimate and
acceptable to most citizens and have their interests at heart. This implies, therefore, that employment creation initiatives would receive the necessary political commitment and the financial backup. It can be concluded from the study that the approach towards a long-term developmental programme will change and that all the necessary tenets to the new paradigm will be adhered to. What is required is for the IDT to change into a developmental agency rather than being an implementing agency. Although past attempts of large-scale developmental programmes and projects in the pre and post-1994 have not been fully explored and exploited in South Africa to achieve the desired results, they have contributed to the understanding of the methodology, and can therefore be regarded as learning curves in the road to perfection. The IDT should acknowledge the mistakes, build on the strengths and strive to develop the approach further.

Knowledge gained which is mostly based on the practical situation, practical examples from experience and research, and the needs and experiences of all relevant stakeholders should be the foundation for acceptable and applicable mechanisms for the planning and implementation of large-scale development programmes and projects for success in South Africa. When large-scale development programmes and projects are well planned and managed during implementation can sparks off further activity. Therefore, the present government must learn from the past lessons from other countries and within the country itself in order to avoid mistakes which have been made in the past.

10.11 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

While this study assessed national programmes with specific focus on the challenges and lessons learnt from the developmental programmes and projects that were implemented before and after 1994 period, however current programmes like the EPWP must be assessed in order to draw lessons for the future. The Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) is a national programme that aims to draw a significant number of the unemployed into productive work. Employment creation and poverty alleviation is one of the
South African government’s major priorities, and the Expanded Public Works Programme is one of the strategies to achieve the government's ambition to significantly reduce unemployment and provide skills for the people of South Africa. In view of the fact that they can offer skills and create more employment than conventional construction methods while producing infrastructure of the specified quality, labour-intensive construction methods should be a technology of choice for programmes relying on funding from government.

This programme involves creating temporary work opportunities for the unemployed, while ensuring that workers gain skills and training on the job, and so increase their capacity to earn income in the future. The programme is one of an array of government’s initiatives to try to bridge the gap between the growing economy and the large numbers of unskilled and unemployed people who have not yet enjoyed the benefits of economic development. Further research must be conducted to evaluate the EPWP at the end of its first five (5) years. The research will inform policy makers and development practitioners on the challenges facing current development initiatives. It is important to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the EPWP as it is the first programme in which the current government has committed billions of Rands on a poverty alleviation programme over a five year period. What will be the lessons over the five year period? A proper documentation and analysis of the EPWP is thus imperative to inform future development programmes and projects.

Furthermore, organisations like the National Development Agency which was founded in 1998, the South African government passed the NDA Act, which stipulates that activities of the NDA are to:

- Grant funds to civil society organisations for the purposes of meeting the developmental needs of the poor communities
- Strengthen the institutional capacity of the civil society organizations for long-term sustainability
• Proactively source funds
• Promote consultation, dialogue and sharing of developmental experiences to debate and influence development policy; and
• Develop strategies to collaborate with local development trust, foundations, government clusters and civil society organizations.

10.12 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, although past attempts of large-scale developmental programmes and projects has not been fully explored and exploited in South Africa to achieve the desired results, they have however, contributed to the understanding of the methodology, and can therefore be regarded as learning curves in the road to perfection. Practitioners should acknowledge the mistakes, build on the strengths and strive to develop a programme approach to project planning and implementation. Therefore, in recognition of the amount of expenditure and human resources that is expected to be injected in the Expanded Public Works Programme in the next coming second five (5)-year period. Recommendations and guidelines for an appropriate public works programme aiming at creating employment opportunities is crucial. Therefore, the present government must learn from the past lessons from other countries and within the country itself in order to avoid mistakes which have been made in the past.

It can be concluded that it is possible to create significant number of jobs in large-scale development programmes without compromising the project budget or quality. This will be possible, provided the programmes are planned; organized and managed in such a way as to create an environment conducive to the implementation of labour-intensive construction methods. In order to facilitate this transition and encourage the use of labour-intensive methods, lessons learnt from previous programmes could be used to forecast challenges in future programmes and assist in finding mitigating measures prior to implementation. This would facilitate successful implementation of projects.
Finally, it is recommended that the above lessons learnt, together with reasons for success/failure from other international and local labour-intensive construction experiences, be referred to for guidance in the implementation of future programmes in order to avoid repetition of the same mistakes.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


International Labour Organisation (ILO), 1979. Introduction to work study, Geneva: ILO.


Langenhoven, H. 1997b. An opportunity to elevate construction policy to its rightful place of importance. The Civil Engineering & Building Contractor, May 1997, Republic of South Africa.


National Public Works Programme Task Team 1994. The National Public Works Programme (NPWP) and the Community-Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP), Pretoria: Department of Public Works.


Works, mimeo, 7 October: 5pp and 5 appendices: A Criteria for Provincial NPWP teams: 2pp; B: Training Programme: 3pp; C: Proposed indicatory framework of allocations to provinces: 5pp; Project Application Form: 4pp; E: Project Submission Form: 4pp.


National Department of Public Works. 1995. Establishing an enabling environment to ensure that the objectives of the RDP and related initiatives by Government are realized in the construction and allied industries. Pretoria: Department of Public Works, mimeo. 31 October.


Sowetan Newspaper, Wednesday March 31 (1999).


Thagesen, B. 1996 Highway and traffic engineering in developing countries. London, UK.


Housing in South Africa. Published in the Proceedings of the 4th Construction Industry Development Board Postgraduate Student Conference Cape Town South Africa 08-10 October 2006.


United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and International Labour Organisation (ILO), 1989. Tenth Joint Meeting for Support to Special Public Works Programmes (SPWP), Turin, Italy, 28 November – 1 December.


APPENDIX A
PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

A.1 PROFESSIONALS
1. Ms Lungile Mabuza Development Specialist – Independent Development Trust
2. Jacob Phaladi Senior Project Manager – Department of Public Works
3. Sibongile Malambe Independent Development Consultant
4. David Daw Project Specialist – North West University
5. Mpendulo Mvubu Senior Quantity Surveyor- Department of Roads and Public Works
6. Musa Mathonsi Senior Quantity Surveyor- Gauteng Regional Public Works Office
7. Harry Quainoo Senior Research Fellow at the Research Centre for Employment Creation and Development- University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
8. Sibusiso Masuku Independent Consultant – Johannesburg
9. Solly Matoba Social Facilitator – Kgalagadi District Municipality

A.2 RESIDENTS
1. Lillian Mkhwanazi: SOWETO Resident
2. Collen Maseko: SOWETO Resident
3. Bhutana Dlamini: SOWETO Resident
4. Thoko Mabunda: SOWETO Resident
5. Make Dladla: SOWETO Resident
6. Martha Mokoena: SOWETO Resident
7. Nokuthula Nkosi: SOWETO Resident
8. Wandile Masuku: SOWETO Resident
9. Sipho Manape: SOWETO Resident
10. Welcome Manase: SOWETO Resident
11. Thalita Thabethe: SOWETO Resident
APPENDIX B
ZIVUSENI POVERTY RELIEF PROGRAMME GAUTENG
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT, ROADS AND WORKS
IDT PROGRAMME DESIGN 2002-2005

B.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

• The Gauteng department of Public Transport, Roads and Works approached the IDT with a request to manage the implementation of the Zivuseni poverty relief programme.

• Thank you for the interest shown in the Zivuseni Poverty Alleviation Programme.

• The Zivuseni Poverty Relief Programme is a programme funded by the Gauteng Provincial Government, which is intended to provide immediate relief to unemployed people in Gauteng. The implementation of the programme is the responsibility of the Gauteng Department of Public Transport, Roads and Works.

• The allocated funds have been earmarked to implement specific projects identified by the following departments:
  • Department of Health
  • Department of Education
  • Department of Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs
  • To date, the number of projects identified by the above-mentioned departments far exceeds the budget allocated.

The objectives of the programme are:
• The renovation of community assets (government infrastructure) in spatially targeted areas through the utilisation of local unemployed women, youth and people with disabilities.

• Provision of short term poverty relief through identified workfare projects to targeted unemployed people.

• Provision of focused life skills and technical training to targeted groups of beneficiaries to improve self-sufficiency.

The demographic targets that the programme aims to achieve are as follows:

• Women (50%)
• Youth (15-20%)
• People with disabilities (1-3%).

The geographic/spatial target areas were determined by the department through an analysis of poverty pockets in the province, and are as follows:

• Cosmo City
• West Rand (Kagiso)
• Sedibeng (Heidelberg, Heidelberg Farms, Sebokeng)
• Johannesburg (Soweto, Orange Farm, Eldorado Park and parts of Johannesburg West)
• Tshwane Metropolitan Area (Soshanguve and Pretoria North)
• Education action zones (Gauteng on-line schools)
• New settlements and legalised informal settlements in the province.
B.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMME

The programme will be implemented over the three year MTEF cycle beginning April 2002. An additional two year period will be considered once funding allocations have been finalised for subsequent years.

B.3 MAIN ACTIVITIES AND DELIVERY OUTPUTS

The main activities and delivery outputs for each project category are outlined below.

B.4 PROJECT CATEGORIES

3.4.1 The renovation and maintenance of community assets, such that there are sufficient projects to allow for short term employment of local unemployed people, for a maximum period of three months per beneficiary. Emphasis will be placed on the identification of projects that utilise local labour; in particular unemployed women, youth and people with disabilities. Projects will consist of government infrastructure that requires renovation and maintenance; no new facilities are to be constructed. Key line function departments; will identify and prioritise project lists with estimated costs. Projects are to be prioritised in a manner that allows for continuous utilisation of teams of beneficiaries for the full period of three months in an area; to reduce the need for travel between the local areas, encourage diversity and depth of experience, and to allow for the delivery targets for each area to be achieved. Cooperation and support from relevant local authorities and communities will be sought with regard to the recruitment of local labour.

Key activities are:

- The identification of projects and the scope of work in each geographic area.

1 These are related to each development objective. It is expected that small projects will emerge within these categories in order to achieve the development objectives.

2 Department of Public Transport, Roads and Works; Department of Health; Department of Education, Department of Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs.
Establishment of project delivery structures for each project’s life-span.

Identification of capacity and resource requirements for each project.

Development of business plans for each project.

Identification of suppliers of materials, and the completion of contracts for supply of materials.

Acquisition and management of inputs for each project.

Utilisation of groups of locally sourced labour for implementation of projects.

Establishment of project delivery structures.

Assessment of range of experience from range of projects.

**Total 3-year budget for this category**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year one</td>
<td>R29.078 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year two</td>
<td>R62.236 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year three</td>
<td>R83. million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4.2 The recruitment of 11 000 beneficiaries for year one, 25 000 for year two, and 34 000 for year three, for workfare projects; and the payment of a daily subsistence wage of R40 to each beneficiary for a maximum period of three months.

Emphasis here is on the recruitment of beneficiaries in terms of strict criteria, and the payment of a subsistence wage of R40 per task day per beneficiary for a maximum period of three months. Beneficiaries should be paid at least every fortnight. Beneficiary participation cycles should run concurrently with a new intake of beneficiaries being recruited every three months. The Department of Labour is a key partner in the recruitment of beneficiaries, with the local authorities playing a crucial role in communicating to prospective beneficiaries.

**Key activities are:**

- Establishment of selection criteria for beneficiaries
- Identification of sites for recruitment
- Implementation of a communications strategy around recruitment
- Recruitment of beneficiaries in terms of selection criteria, demographic and geographic targets.
• Establishment of a financial management system to allow for fortnightly payments of subsistence wages to beneficiaries
• Establishment of a beneficiary management system to track beneficiaries, monitor their activity on the projects and pay them accordingly.
• Establishment of groups of workers per project per quarter from recruitment database.
• Beneficiary management
• Monitoring of recruitment processes, beneficiary performance, outputs and payments.
• Manage beneficiary induction and deployment processes.
• Populate and maintain a register of beneficiaries.

**Total 3 year budget for this category**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year one</td>
<td>R 35,640 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year two</td>
<td>R 75 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year three</td>
<td>R 100 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4.3 Training of all beneficiaries on life skills, and the provision of focused technical training in relation to allocated projects, such that beneficiaries of the programme are enabled to access work opportunities outside the programme. The emphasis is on the provision of focused training to beneficiaries, in order to improve their levels of self sufficiency and reduce their indirect reliance on the system of state grants. Training should consist of the provision of life skills and technical skills in relation to the types of projects beneficiaries are working on. The maximum period for training provision is 20 days per individual (15 days technical training and 5 days life skills training). Certain trades may have shorter training periods. Provision should be made to adapt existing life skills course material to the programme that will be applied for the programme duration, in order to reduce the cost of materials production. The delivery of the life-skills training delivery is based on allowable of R60 per day for each beneficiary. The formation of partnerships which will assist with further development of targeted individuals is crucial, so that diverse skills are developed and groups of emerging
contractors are formed. Relevant tool boxes and protective clothing should also be provided to improve the ability of beneficiaries to source further work. A key partner is the department of Labour, who will fund the technical training with its skills development fund, and maintain a database of unemployed individuals.

**Key activities are:**

- Assessment of training needs of beneficiaries in relation to the projects,
- Assessment of current skills levels of beneficiaries,
- Development of relevant training materials
- Recruitment of trainers
- Provision of relevant training
- Assessment of training provision
- Development of criteria for selection of a group for further training/development.
- Formation of partnerships with other government departments and key stakeholders on the further development of a select group of individuals,
- Maintenance agreements with owners of facilities for future maintenance of facilities with the use of identified local trained labour,
- Identification of suppliers of/alternate projects for protective clothing and toolboxes and the completion of contracts,
- Track beneficiary progress in the programme
- Administer and process beneficiary exit (dismissal, graduation etc) and debriefing from the programme.
- Establish a liaison point with external entities that may be able to employ beneficiaries or contract their services.
Total 3-year budget for this category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year one</td>
<td>R 3.350 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year two</td>
<td>R 8.48 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year three</td>
<td>R 11.306 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B.5 OVERALL PROGRAMME COSTS

The requirements of the programme are that 65% of the funds be directly allocated to labour costs, with the other 35% to be used for materials, training and other programme costs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year One</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year one</td>
<td>R 70 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year two</td>
<td>R 150 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year three</td>
<td>R 200 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B.6 PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND INDICATORS

The implementation of the programme should take into consideration mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the outputs and outcomes of the programme, as well as the performance of the IDT in implementing processes. Below are key indicators for measuring outputs and outcomes of the programme.

3.6.1 Number of individuals recruited and registered through the Department of Labour per quarter.

3.6.2 Number of individuals recruited from each geographic area per annum.

3.6.3 Percentage demographic target group break down per geographic area.

3.6.4 Range of project types generated per area.

3.6.5 Number of participants per project type.

3.6.6 Range of functional, in-situ training undertaken.

3.6.7 Total amount of allowances disbursed per geographic area per quarter.

3.6.8 Entry level skills of participants.

3.6.9 Range of skills acquired during the programme.

3.6.10 Entrance survival mechanisms (how do they access food, shelter etc)

3.6.11 Income sources of family members

3.6.12 Employment history of participants

3.6.13 Number of emerging contractors identified
3.6.14 Number of new contracts sourced for trained beneficiaries.
3.6.15 Percentage of beneficiaries that were youth
3.6.16 Percentage of beneficiaries that were women
3.6.17 Percentage of beneficiaries that were people with disabilities
3.6.18 Status of labour market vis-à-vis range of skills provided.

B.7 EXPECTED OUTPUTS
3.7.1 Beneficiaries trained on relevant skills in the targeted areas.
3.7.2 A group of emerging contractors from trained beneficiaries.
3.7.3 Renewed community assets.
3.7.4 Disbursed poverty relief funds predominantly in the form of subsistence wages.
3.7.5 Training programmes for functional and life skills
3.7.6 Relevant protective clothing and toolboxes provided to beneficiaries.
3.7.7 Partnership agreements with key stakeholders.
3.7.8 Documented lessons learnt

B.8 EXPECTED IMPACTS/OUTCOMES
3.8.1 The ability of targeted unemployed people to source employment opportunities is improved.
3.8.2 The reliance on current safety nets is reduced.

4 Mechanisms for disbursing funds
## 5 Mechanisms for monitoring expenditure and project implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reports prepared by</th>
<th>Target audience for reports</th>
<th>Frequency of reports</th>
<th>Main elements of report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDT</td>
<td>Provincial Department of Public Transport, Roads and Works</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
<td>Progress on programme and expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provincial Department of Public Transport, Roads and Works</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>Progress on programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project managers internal to the IDT</td>
<td>IDT team leader</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>Progress on projects and expenditure against project business plans. Key issues and risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community project managers/bodies/cluster managers</td>
<td>IDT project manager</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>Progress on projects and expenditure against project business plans. Key issues and risks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6 FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

6.1 Total MTEF allocation (R million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002/03</th>
<th>2003/04</th>
<th>2004/05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R 70 million</td>
<td>R 150 million</td>
<td>R 200 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2 Analysis of 2002/03 projected expenditure (R million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001/02</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total allocated</td>
<td>Expenditure Quarter 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 70 million</td>
<td>R20 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3 Expenditure by objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>2002/03</th>
<th>2003/04</th>
<th>2004/05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R million</td>
<td>Proposed Breakdown (1)</td>
<td>Proposed Breakdown (2)</td>
<td>Proposed Breakdown (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1 R 174,314 m</td>
<td>R 29,078 m</td>
<td>R 62,236 m</td>
<td>R 83 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2 R 210,640 m</td>
<td>R 35,640 m</td>
<td>R 75 m</td>
<td>R 100 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.3 R 23,136 m</td>
<td>R 3,350 m</td>
<td>R 8,48 m</td>
<td>R 11,306 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3 Expenditure by item

6.3.1 Year 1 (2002/2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour Subsistence allowance</td>
<td>29,040,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Hand Tools</td>
<td>3,300,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Protective Clothing</td>
<td>3,300,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Labour Cost</strong></td>
<td>35,640,000.00</td>
<td>60.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary and General</td>
<td>6,870,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
<td>13,400,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Material Total</strong></td>
<td>20,270,000.00</td>
<td>34.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Skills Training Course</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
<td>50,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life skills Training</td>
<td>3,300,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>3,350,000.00</td>
<td>5.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster Managers</td>
<td>2,880,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning, Facilitation and Communication</td>
<td>1,758,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Support Team</td>
<td>1,500,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research monitoring and Evaluation</td>
<td>1,770,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursement</td>
<td>900,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Professional Team</strong></td>
<td>8,808,000.00</td>
<td>12.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td>2,000,000.00</td>
<td>2.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>70,068,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6.3.2 Year 2 (2003/2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Labour Cost</td>
<td>75,000,000.00</td>
<td>63.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Total</td>
<td>43,380,000.00</td>
<td>36.64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Total劳 Cost</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>8,479,581.51</td>
<td>5.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Team</td>
<td>18,855,968.49</td>
<td>12.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td>4,281,555.06</td>
<td>2.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>149,997,105.05</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Year 3 (2004/2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Labour Cost</td>
<td>100,000,000.00</td>
<td>63.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Total</td>
<td>57,860,000.00</td>
<td>36.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>11,306,108.67</td>
<td>5.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Team</td>
<td>25,141,291.32</td>
<td>12.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td>5,708,740.08</td>
<td>2.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>200,016,140.07</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Additional funding

- IDT to utilise its overhead budget for internal staff.
- Department of Labour skills development fund to finance the technical training of beneficiaries. This budget caters for life skills training.

### Projected delivery rates

The delivery schedule is based on the targeting formula contained in the concept business plan. The formula has been determined through the population size and poverty index of each municipality in Gauteng.
### Year One:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>1st Quarter Number of individuals</th>
<th>2nd Quarter Number of individuals</th>
<th>3rd Quarter Number of individuals</th>
<th>4th Quarter Number of individuals</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>3 828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekurhuleni</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>2 660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwane</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>2 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedibeng</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>1 176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Rand</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metsweding</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2 750</td>
<td>2 750</td>
<td>2 750</td>
<td>2 750</td>
<td>11 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Year Two:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>1st Quarter Number of individuals</th>
<th>2nd Quarter Number of individuals</th>
<th>3rd Quarter Number of individuals</th>
<th>4th Quarter Number of individuals</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>2 175</td>
<td>2 175</td>
<td>2 175</td>
<td>2 175</td>
<td>8 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekurhuleni</td>
<td>1 513</td>
<td>1 513</td>
<td>1 513</td>
<td>1 513</td>
<td>6 052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwane</td>
<td>1 200</td>
<td>1 200</td>
<td>1 200</td>
<td>1 200</td>
<td>4 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedibeng</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>2 676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Rand</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>2 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metsweding</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6 250</td>
<td>6 250</td>
<td>6 250</td>
<td>6 250</td>
<td>25 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Year Three:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>1st Quarter Number of individuals</th>
<th>2nd Quarter Number of individuals</th>
<th>3rd Quarter Number of individuals</th>
<th>4th Quarter Number of individuals</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>2 958</td>
<td>2 958</td>
<td>2 958</td>
<td>2 958</td>
<td>11 832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekurhuleni</td>
<td>2 057</td>
<td>2 057</td>
<td>2 057</td>
<td>2 057</td>
<td>8 228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwane</td>
<td>1 632</td>
<td>1 632</td>
<td>1 632</td>
<td>1 632</td>
<td>6 528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedibeng</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>3 640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Rand</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>2 892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metsweding</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8 500</td>
<td>8 500</td>
<td>8 500</td>
<td>8 500</td>
<td>34 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>